Genocide, Civilization and Modernity
Author(s): Michael Freeman
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Jun., 1995), pp. 207-223
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Michael Freeman
Genocide,civilizationand modernity
ABSTRACT
The intention of this paper is to vindicate the historical sociology of
genocide. This project demonstrates important continuities as well
as discontinuities in the history of genocide. These findings call into
question the thesis of Zygmunt Bauman that the modernity of the
Holocaust challenges orthodox approaches to the sociology of
morality and politics. While the Holocaust undoubtedly manifested
distinctive features of modern society, it also reproduced ancient
motivational and structural sources of genocide. What follows from
this analysis is not, as Bauman argues, a radical critique of modern
civilization, but a clearer view of the interrelations between the
constructive and destructive features of all civilizations. If modernity produced the Holocaust, it also produced the sociological and
moral critique of genocide.
Today, more than at any other time, the Holocaust is not a private
property (if it ever was one); not of its perpetrators, to be punished
for; not of its direct victims, to ask for special sympathy, favours or
indulgence on account of past sufferings; and not of its witnesses, to
signifiseek redemption or certificates of innocence. Thepresent-day
for thewholeof humanity.
canceof theHolocaustis thelessonit contains
(Bauman 1989: 206)l
1. MODERNITYAND GENOCIDE
Sociological analysis of the Holocaust, Zygmunt Bauman has argued,
calls into question central beliefs of the sociology of morality and of
politics. Orthodox sociology, he holds, proposes that social institutions
produce and maintain moral behaviour. On this view, society is a
humanizing and moralizing device, and, if immoral behaviour is other
than marginal ('deviant'), this is to be explained as an effect of the
BJS Volumeno.46 Issueno.2
Junel995
ISSN0007-1315
)LondonSchoolofEconomicsl995
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Freeman
Michael
208
contrast, Bauman
of normal social processes. In
malfunctioning
moral drives
generate
that human relationsspontaneously
suggests
weakens their constraining
that modern societal organization conduct more, ratherthan
and
Societytherefore makesimmoral
power.
the myth that a world without
likely.Modernculturepromotes
less,
be a Hobbesianwarof all
knowledgeand institutionswould
modern
ideologyof the
all,but thismythis partof the self-legitimating
against
ideology conceives of and
bureaucraticstate. What this
modern
is a moraldrivethat
as savageryto be tamedand suppressed
presents
neutralizeand to replacewith the
civilizingprocesshas set out to structures of domination and
the
processes of the new
controlling
(Bauman1989: 198-9).
a
oppression
moralityand modern societyis
Atthe heart of this error about Sociologistshave thought of the
analysisof 'civilization'.
mistaken
firstly,the supprocess as having two main components:
civilizing
and,secondly,the gradual
of irrationaland anti-socialdrives,
pression
from social life, or, more
relentless elimination of violenceunder the controlof the state,
but
the concentrationof violence of the nationalcommunity
precisely,
it is used to guard the perimeters
where
These two components form a
the conditions of social order. society as a moral force; as a
and
of the modern, civilized
conception
orderwhichsafeguards
of institutionsthatimposea normative
system
were poorly defended in
peace and individualsecurity that
social
he suggests,is not false,but it is
conception,
This
settings.
pre-civilized
the persistenceof the
for it diverts our attention from
one-sided,
process (Bauman
destructivepotential of the civilizing
alternative,
28).
1989:
Holocaust,Baumanargues,is that
The mostimportantlessonof the
educated
They were not insane, but well
werecivilized.
it is
perpetrators
its
Rather,
understand.
difficultto
is
that
Holocaust
the
not
is
It
to
men.
the Holocaust makes it difficult
which
civilization
western
bear
our
of modern state bureaucracieshave
understand.When the leaders
from socialconstraints,we
granddesigns and are emancipated legitimatesgenocide. The state
therecipe for genocide. The design
of societyencouragesit.
is its instrument.The paralysis of genocide are thus
bureaucracy
perpetration
Theconditionspropitiousto theare neitherimmanentin nor aliento
They
special,yet not exceptional. modernitygenocide is neither abnormodernsociety.In relationto demonstrateswhatthe rationalizing,
malnor a caseof malfunction.It
is capableof if not checkedand
engineeringtendencyof modernity
powers.The modernideal of the
mitigatedby the pluralismof social
and conflict-freesociety is
purposefullydesigned, fully controlled
(Bauman1989:83A, 114).
thereforepotentiallygenocidal
modernitybased upon a powerful
This is a forceful critique of however, misleadingin three ways
is,
analysisof the Holocaust. Itupon
the case of the Holocaust.Firstly,
based
preciselybecauseit is
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andmodernity
civilization
Genocide,
althoughBaumanis correctto associategenocidewith the processof
civilization,he is incorrect to equate civilizationwith modernity.
Secondly, although he is correct to associate genocide with the
bureaucraticstate and the incapacityof civil societyto constrainthe
state, he overlooks the associationbetween genocide and warfare.
Thirdly, although he drawscorrectand importantlessons from the
Holocaustabout the dangersinherentin modern society,in concentratinghis attentionon a single,albeitexceptionallyimportantcaseof
genocide,and by associatingit withproblemsof modernity,he misses
other importantlessons of the Holocaust.These lessons are to be
learnedfrom whatwasnot modernin thatgenocide.They requireus
to do what Bauman does not: to locate the Holocaustin the more
generaltheoreticalconsiderationof genocide.
2. THE SOCIOLOGYOF GENOCIDE
'Genocide'has become a common term of contemporarypolitical
discourse.It was coined in 1944 by RaphaelLemkin,a Polishjurist.
Contraryto a widely-heldbelief, Lemkindid not develop the concept
in orderto comprehendthe eventwe nowknowas 'theHolocaust'.His
purpose was to documentGermanwar crimes. He came to the view
thatthesecrimeswereso barbarousthattheywentbeyondthe actsthat
had been rendered criminalby the framers of the relevant internationallaw. This body of law assumedthat warwas fought between
states. However, the German state, under the influence of Nazi
ideology, was wagingwar againstnations. It was for this projectthat
Lemkin coined the term 'genocide'. The original conception of
'genocide',therefore,wasthatof the wagingof warby a statein order
to destroynations(Lemkin1944).
In proposingthisnewconcept,Lemkinmadeexplicittwoimportant
assumptions.The first was that, although the Nazi genocidal programmewasunprecedentedin the wayit appliedmoderntechnology
and forms of organizationto the goal of nation-murder,'genocide'
was a generic concept: there had been many genocides throughout
history.Lemkin'sprimaryconcern was with the internationallaw of
warand the underlyingmoralprinciplesof just-wartheory.Genocide
was the extreme form of unjust war, the war of national extermination.He held 'genocide'to be a genericconceptbecausehe believed
thatwarsof nationalexterminationhad occurredthroughouthistory.
Lemkin'ssecondassumptionaboutgenocidewasthatthe Nazi case
constituteda reversionto barbarism.This assumptionpresupposeda
particularconceptionof history.Accordingto Lemkin,once therewas
barbarism,consistingof tribalwarsof extermination.Then there was
gradualprogresstowardscivilization,manifestedparticularlyin the
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209
Freeman
Michael
210
unnecesslawof war.The regulationof warto prevent
international
populations,wasa
sufferingand, in particular,to protectcivilian
ary
specificsense that
achievementof civilizedstates.It wasin this (indeedin part
special
wasa reversionto barbarism,notwithstanding
Nazism
meansoflits use of modernmethods. challenged.For him, the
by
It is this viewof historythat Baumanhas
but the
was not a reversionfrom civilizationto barbarism,
Holocaust
and
Bauman
of certainpropertiesof civilizationitself.
manifestation
carry
to
agree that the Holocaustused modernorganization
Lemkin
as an expression
genocide.Bauman,however,sees the Holocaust
out
modern'engineering'projectof socialcontrol,
the characteristically
of
form of tribal
Lemkinsaw it as a reversionto an unregulated
while
is one of level
The differencebetweenBaumanand Lemkin
warfare.
typeof
certain
a
of
analysis.Baumaninterpretsmodernityin terms
of
by
unregulated
is
but
relationin whichthe stateregulates
state-society
the
of
regulation
the
Lemkinviewed modernityin terms of
society.
peace and the
among states with the aim of maintaining
relations
as not false
view
this
of civilianpopulations.Baumanregardssidesto modernitysecurity
two
one-sided.Baumanand Lemkinbothsee Baumanconsidersthe
but
while
theregulatoryand the destructive- but,
and modernity,Lemkin
civilization
of
feature
a
to be equally
latter
shallsee thatBauman
We
it as a reversionto ancientbarbarism.
treats
is right about the
Lemkin
isright about the civilizationthesis and what Bauman correctly
reversionthesis. Lemkin could not seeBauman underemphasizes
emphasizes:the modernity of Nazism.
the humanizing
whatfor Lemkin was of the first importance:
as interinstitutions
modern
aspirationsof such characteristically
nationallaw.
Holocaustin the context
WhileBaumanlocatesthe problemof the placed the concept of
Lemkin
ofcivilizationand the modern state,
militaryrelationsand the
genocidein the frameworkof inter-state restraintsof international
rebellionof the Nazisagainstthe civilizing
has, however, been
law.The problem of 'genocide' for sociologyIn 1948 the United
confusedby the later career of the concept.
and therebydissociated
Nationsadoptedits Conventionon Genocide According to the UN
context.
genocide from its original military harmfulacts 'committedwith
definitiongenocide consistsof various a national,ethnical,racialor
intent to destroy,in whole or in part, 210). Althoughthe term had
religiousgroup, as such'(Kuper 1981: of the UN Convention by
been used even before the adoption describe and condemn the
nationalistsfrom the Baltic states to
it did not enter popular
annexationof their homelandsby the USSR,
the 1960sby criticsof the
politicaldiscourseuntil it wasemployedinfollowed Lemkin'soriginal
US interventionin Vietnam.These uses
actsof wardirectedat
conceptionin that they referredto destructive the fault lay not only
civilianpopulations.If they seemed hyperbolic,
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andmodernity
civilization
Genocide,
211
in the commoninclinationof politicalactiviststo exaggeratebut in the
imprecisionof the definitionsproposedboth by Lemkinand the UN.
For, although Lemkinhad equated genocide with wars of extermination, he treated as genocide any systematicpolicy designed to
undermine the way of life of a people. And the UN, by defining
genocideas harmfulactionintendedto destroya group 'in part',also
licensedits use for projectsthatfell wellshortof extermination.Once
launched,the conceptwas impossibleto regulate.All sortsof actions
thatwere eitherveryharmful,or targettedagainstdistinctgroups,or
both, might be called 'genocide'. The term quite lost its original
relativespecificityas the warof nationalextermination.It came to be
appliedto a widerangeof socialproblems,includingAIDS,drugsand
free-marketeconomics.2
As the concept of 'genocide'was tossed around in the rough and
tumble of political polemics, it began to attract the attention of
sociologists.3Unfortunately,they have not solved but have rather
aggravatedthe problemsof definition and conceptualization.They
have produced diversedefinitions,typologiesand even some prototheories, but little consensuson what genocide is, which events are
cases of genocide, nor how such cases should be studied. In this
confusedsituation,thereis a casefor going backto basics.Lemkinwas
a lawyer,not a sociologist.Neverthelessit washe who introducedthe
term into politico-legaldiscourseand he did so with a relativelyclear
purpose: to name and to conceptualizea politico-militarypractice,
whichhad not only madea shockingappearancein the modernworld
but which had also numerous historicalantecedents.The merit of
Lemkin'sapproachwas its relativelywell worked-outconceptualizationof genocideas a warof nationalextermination.Its limitationwas
its lack of a sociologicalframeworkfor understandinggenocides,
modern and ancient. Bauman, as we have seen, has proposed a
powerful theoreticalapproachfor understandingthe modernityof
the Holocaust,but its meritsare balancedby its inappropriatenessfor
understandingthe historyof genocide.
approachto genocide has
Preciselysuch an historical-sociological
been proposed by Frank Chalk and KurtJonassohn. They suggest
that we can organize our understandingof the diverse genocidal
events of historyby a typology based on the perpetrators'motives.
They identify four types of genocide: 1) to eliminate threats;2) to
spread terroramong enemies; 3) to acquirewealth;4) to implement
an ideology(ChalkandJonassohn1990:29).
This typologyrecallsHobbes'sclassicaccountof the causesof war.
Accordingto Hobbesthree principalcausesof conflictarosefrom the
nature of man: competition,diffidence, and glory (Hobbes 1909:
chapter 13). Competition,Hobbessaid, makesmen invade for gain.
They use violenceto appropriateother men'spersons,wives,children
and cattle.To thislistwe shouldadd invasionfor gain of land,and the
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212
MichaelFreeman
raw materials it contains, for this has been of great importance
historically.Land and materialsmay be desired for consumption
and/orfor the more effectiveconductof war.Diffidencemakesmen
invadefor safety,to defend whatthey have.Warand genocidemaybe
justified and/or motivatedby a real or pretended fear of a real or
illusorythreat. 'Preventivewar'is a concept used by war-makersto
justify their going to war and sometimesby external observersto
explain it. Geo-politicalvulnerabilityis a potent cause of war. The
desire for glory makes men fight for prestige:for themselves,their
families, friends or nations. This conception of'glory' suggests a
fourth cause of violence: revenge. Revenge may be motivatedby
glory, but it is not reducibleto it. One may seek revenge to protect
one's reputation,but revenge may be sweet itself. We can revise the
Hobbesianaccount,therefore,by suggestingfour causesof war and
genocide:desirefor gain,pre-emptivestrikein fearof beingattacked,
desirefor prestige,and desirefor revenge.
We can comparethis classificationwith the typologyof Chalkand
Jonassohn. I shall re-arrange the latter to make the comparison
clearer. The four motives for genocide, according to Chalk and
Jonassohn,are: 1) to acquirewealth;2) to eliminatea threat; 3) to
implementan ideology;4) to spreadterror.The firsttwo are clearly
quite Hobbesian: gain and diffidence. By the third Chalk and
Jonassohnrefer to utopianideologiessuch as Nazismand Communism. This adds a fifth motive to the neo-Hobbesianlist. Richard
Gabrielhasarguedthat,whereasnon-humananimalsfightfor limited
and specificobjects- females,food and territory- only humansfight
for such 'mindstuffbas good, evil, God andjustice (Gabriel1990: 12).
Chalk and Jonassohn acknowledgethat the desire to implement a
politicalideologymaybe mixedwithothermotives,butonce againit is
not reducibleto the others.Their formulationis, however,not wholly
satisfactory.Genocidefor gain, to eliminatea threat,for prestigeor
revenge may all be attemptsto implementan ideology.Even in very
earlysettledsocietieslandand religionwereintimatelyinterrelated,so
thatwarfor territorywasa holy cause. Ideologicaland other motives
are therefore not simply empiricallymixed but conceptually interrelated.Whatis conceptuallyand empiricallydistinctis the desire to
organize society upon new principles.The violence of the Terror
duringthe FrenchRevolution,for example,is to be explainedin part
by 'ideology'in this sense, even though it may have been motivated
alsoby the desireto eliminatethreats,spreadterroretc.4
Is the desire to spread terror a distinct motive for genocide? Is
terror an end in itself or a means to gain power over others?Is the
desirefor powera distinctmotivefor warand genocide?(Onecannot,
of course, exercise power over those one has exterminated,but one
can exterminate some to exercise power over others.) Hobbes
consideredpower to be a meansto gain, glory and/or freedom from
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Genocide,
civilization
andmodernity
213
fear (Hobbes 1909: chapters 1W11). But it may be an end in itself.
Terror,too, canbe both a meansand an end, as ChalkandJonassohn
imply. If this is so, we have identified seven motives for war and
genocide: 1) gain;2) glory;3) fear;4) revenge;5) ideology;6) power;
7) terror.These maybe mixedand some maybe meansto others.But
none is whollyreducibleto any other. This list should have explanatoryvalueeven if it is not exhaustive.
Michael Mann has challenged the value of motivationalexplanations in political sociology. He assumes that human beings are
purposive and rational,seeking to increase their enjoymentof the
good things of life, and capable of choosing and pursuing the
appropriate means for doing so. These characteristics,he says,
providethe dynamismof humanlife and give it a history.They arethe
original source of power. Consequently,social theorists have been
tempted to proceed further with a motivationalmodel of human
society.However,Mannargues,the pursuitof goals involveshuman
beings in external relations with nature and other human beings.
Thus, the characteristicsof nature and of social relations become
relevant to, and may indeed structure motivations. They have
emergent properties of their own. We can take for granted the
motivationaldriveof humansto increasetheirmeansof subsistence:it
is a constant. It cannot, therefore, explain social variability.What
explains the origin of 'civilization',for example, is the opportunity
presented to a few human groups by flooding, which provided
ready-fertilizedalluvial soil. Constant motivationaldrives received
greaterenvironmentalhelp from rivervalleys,whichled to particular
socialresponses.Mannconcludesthathumanmotivationis irrelevant,
except that it providedthe 'forwarddrive'of sociallife. Motivationis
therefore 'original'but is not possessed of'ultimate primacy'.It
provides the primarydrive for social change, even though specific
changesare to be explainedby motives-in-context.
As there are many human goals, there are many forms of social
relations.Sociologicaltheory, accordingto Mann,'heroicallysimplifies'by selectingrelationsthat are more powerfulthan others in that
they influence the nature of other relations.This is not becausethe
needs they satisfyare motivationallymore powerfulthan others but
becausethey are more effectiveas means to achievegoals. 'Not ends
but meansgive us our pointof entryinto the questionof primacy'.
Thus we leavethe areaof goalsand needs altogether.For a form of
power may not be an originalhuman goal at all. If it is a powerful
means
to othergoals,it willbe soughtfor itself.It is an emergent
need.
It emerges in the course of need satisfaction(Mann 1986: F6 emphasisMann's).
Mann accords sociologicalprimacy to power relations, which are
means to goals. His claim that we thus leave the area of goals is,
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Freeman
Michael
only in
on his account,is intelligible
He
power,
power.
for
incorrect,
however,
original source of
the
priare
which
of'ultimate
to goals,
relation
methodologicalprinciplein termsof power
unhelpful
the
introduces
is
betweenexplanations
andposesa falsechoicein terms of motives. Neither alone
macy'
constant.
as
and explanations
treat motives
relations
Chalk and
his account, can we
on
Nor,
motives are mixed.
adequate.
when
in
priorities
do
a significant role
vary, as
play
Motives
that
he rightly
identify four motives
Jonassohn
weakenthisclaim,although
to
nothing
says
Mann
genocide.
of powerrelations. of genocide. Power is a
the
on
insists importance
at the core
relationsare obviously
Power
of genocide.The perpetrators
condition
sufficient
a
not
for genocide. No
but
specifically
necessary
motivated
such a relativelyrare
be motivated and
must
explain
could
was
constant motivation
not sufficient: Hitlerto do
putative
but
necessary
the power
Motives too are
event.
long beforehe had
To
theJews
exterminate
reconstructed.
to
motivated
hermeneutically
be
call
we
to
what
also have
so.Motives
perpetrators committed
were doing
historical
they
why
understand to understandwhatthey thought are, however,
we have
'genocide'
wasjustified.Suchconceptions
why they thoughtit situations. As we shall see, the structured
and
among
in structured
ecologiesand those
formed
their
and
groups
interpreof their
betweensocial
relations
as well as consequences
causes
are
groups
social
has been
of the world.
tations
that the study of genocide
suggest
contemof
Chalkand Jonassohnrecentlyhas it shockedthe values Lemkin
with
becauseonly
They agree
neglected
produced
Jonassohn 1990: 5-8).
and
(Chalk
that modernityhas
poraries
proposing
moral
in
differ from Baumanus both to make the appropriate The
and
analysisof genocide.
values that enable
the
construct a scientific
to
both a preconand
judgments
humanitarianismis
an
to
brutality
from
of analysisand also in
object
value-change
an
as
for constructinggenocide
of genocidesperpetrated
dition
Explanations
in its explanation. they are considerednaturalor morally
element
in
contexts in which of genocidesoccurringin contextshis
historical
to locate
will differ from those
is therefore correct
justified
Bauman
but, in
society
shocking.5
whichthey are Holocaustin the contextof modern
of analysis.
of the
explanation
employmodernforms
course,
of
massacresand
must,
many
record
doingso, he
societies
of
ancient
of
The survivingtexts There are, however, two main problems
apparentgenocides.
for the
exaggerationsor liesmay have
nterpretlngtnese reports.
often
were
they
The first is that propaganda.The makersof the texts terrify
purposesof officialtheir rulers,impresstheir peoples and/or
1989:
1990: 59-60; Hobbs
intended to flatter
Jonassohn
if we
and
even
that,
is
problem
their enemies (Chalk
second
The
179).
192-3; Liverani1990:
214
.
.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
andmodernity
civilization
Genocide,
have no reason to doubt the veracityof the report, we still have to
grasp its meaning. thalk and Jonassohn note that the fate of the
victimsis often unclear.When the record tells us that a people was
destroyed, we cannot be certain whether we should understandit
literallyor whetherwe should interpret'people'to mean 'significant
people',such as leadersand fighters(ChalkandJonassohn 1990: 58,
61). In other words, we may not be able to distinguish, from the
recordsof antiquity,brutalwarsfrom genocides.None the less, Chalk
and Jonassohn believe that genocide was a common event in the
ancientworldfor four reasons:1)manypeopleshavedisappeared;2)
reportsof exterminationare common;3) ancientreligionscommonly
commandedtheir adherentsto exterminatenon-believersand enemies; 4) modernarchaeologyhasrevealedmanydestroyedcities(Chalk
andJonassohn1990:64).
Lemkin,in constructingthe concept'genocide',interpretedNazism
as the reversion by a modern state to primitive barbarism.The
modern form of genocide was perpetratedby the bureaucraticstate,
as Bauman also holds. But for Lemkinthe most primitiveform of
genocide was the tribal war of extermination.This conception is
'primitive'in both the analyticaland the historicalsenses.Analytically,
genocideis the attemptby one 'tribe'to exterminateanother,whether
the perpetratortribebe statelessor organizedby moderncentralized
power. Lemkin'shistoricalthesis is, however,misleading.In certain
importantrespectsgenocideis not barbarous,i.e. uncivilizedwarfare.
Genocideis a distinctivelycivilizedactivity.In this Baumanis correct.
Baumanis incorrect,however,in believingthat civilizedgenocide is
distinctivelymodern.To see this, it is necessaryto recoverthe origins
of genocide.
3. TRIBAL WARS, NATION-STATES AND IMPERIALISM
The archaeologicalrecordis usuallyread as tellingus that for mostof
human historyhumanslived with little fightingand no warfare.In a
world of small nomadicfamiliesand clans both the motivesand the
means for warfarewere slight. Perhapsone of the earliestcauses of
warwasa processof over-population,wherebya group exhaustedor
outgrewthe resourcesof its ecologicalniche, migratedand cameinto
conflictwith anothergroup whichcontrolledthe resourcesit needed
(Mann 1986:46). However,in a spaciousworld there waslittle cause
for protractedconflict between rival groups over scarce resources.
When'primitive'tribalwarfareoccurred,it wasgenerallylimitedand
mainlyritualistic.The inventionof settled agricultureincreasedthe
size of humangroupsand providedmotivesfor war,such as raiding,
territorialdefence and the captureof slaves.The identificationof a
humangroup witha settledterritoryacquireda religioussignificance.
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215
Freeman
Michael
216
made possible various
production of an agriculturalsurplus aristocrats,priests and
The
classes:rulers, land-owning
non-productive
or some
Rulers might be gods or priests or warriors,The gods
warriors.
of these. The proto-nation-statewasforming.
combination
the destructionof
commandthe defenceof the nation-stateand
might
(Gabriel1990:21-6,30-7).
enemies
its
trade, which, as it
Settlementand division of labour generated
out that,
became vulnerableto banditry. Mann points
developed,
it
(merchants),
trademightbe pioneeredby non-stateagents so that its
although
an important interest of their home societies,
became
state,
became a state concern. The early militaristic
protection
As
routes.
trade
had as one of its goalsthe protectionof its the need and
therefore,
both
expanded imperialistically,they developed (Mann 1986: 131,
states
trade
of
protection
resourcesfor the military
the
only the case that trade
132,148). According to Mann, it is not but also that imperial
militaristic,imperialisticactivity,
generated
the further developcould generate the stableconditionsfor imperialismcould
order
of economicproductionand exchange.Thus 153, 154, 23X5).
ment
1986:
beproductiveas well as destructive(Mann
might include geno(which
war
by
constructed
empireswere
Stable
order, which could
of
cide),but they could also establishdomains (Mann1986:91,201).
some normativeregulationof warfare
impose
no meansthe only motive
The protectionof tradewas,however,by at leastpartiallyindepenforimperialism.Powerand glorywereends
of the militaristic
dentof economic gain to which the development
to nation-state
lead
might
statemight be the means. Tribal warfare
and
neighbours
its
buildingas one tribe successfullydominated
similarly
lead
might
warfare
expandedits dominion,and nation-state
are incompatible
imperialism
of
goals
Many
toempire-construction.
but others are
exploitation),
withgenocide (most notably,economic threats or of obstaclesto
not (for example, removal of perceived
peoples may be a
territorialexpansion)and genocide of particular
project,whateverthe
'rational'(goal-serving)part of an imperialist
is necessarilysubjugatory
motivesof the latter.Imperialismtherefore93, 10s1; Gabriel1990:
57,
26,
andmay be genocidal(Mann 1986:
26-7,69-70; Liverani1990: 129).
stronglysuggest,thereThe historicaland anthropologicalrecords
destructivenessof warfare
fore, that the frequency organizationandsettlementand with civilizincreasedsubstantiallywith permanent have engaged in highly
ation. All civilizationsof recorded history48). Civilization(division
organizedand bloodywarfare(Mann1986:
development, literacy etc.)
of labour, urbanization,technological
of genocide with
generates power. Thus Lemkin's identification
if nomadictribes
Even
'primitive'tribalwarfaremay be misleading.
other tribes,
against
have been motivated to perpetrate genocide
considerable
require
Mannsuggeststhat warsof conquestgenerally
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Genocide,
civilization
anzl
modernity
217
social organizationby both conquerorsand conquered.Thus social
stratificationand the statemaybe preconditionsof highlydestructive
warsand genocides.
Mann's argument about the relation between war-makingand
state-formationis, however,not entirelyconsistent.He suggeststhat
kingsoriginatedas warleaders(Mann1986:99,131). He alsosuggests
that, when barbariansattackedcivilized societies, stateless military
organizationsmightengage in conquestand 'sucha militaryorganizationoften led to the firstemergenceof a stateamongthe barbarians'.
Yet he also argues that the initialemergence of the state preceded
conquest warfare (Mann 1986: 55-7). Nevertheless, his principal
argumentis that the need for more effective means of defence and
attack encouraged state-formationand that the drive to greater
militaryefficiencycontributedto the transformationfrom feudalism
to the centralizedstate (Mann1986: 18, 58). Mannallows,therefore,
both that states make wars and that wars carried out by stateless
groups lead to state-formation.The Old Testament tells a story of
genocidalwarcarriedout by statelesstribeswho came to form a state
as their power and that of their enemies grew, and, although the
historicaltruth of this storyis uncertain,it suggeststhe possibilityof
genocidalwarby statelesstribes.
States therefore usually, stateless tribes sometimes are the perpetratorsof genocide.Who are the victims?By definition,the victims
are 'peoples'. But what is a 'people'? Not all human groups are
peoples. Nor are peoples 'natural'(spontaneouslyformed). Peoples
are ideologicallyconstructed. Genocide is likely to result from a
doubleconstructionof 'peoples':a perpetrator-peoplecommitsgenocide against a victim-people.Mann points out that ideologies of
nationhoodare sourcesof power.Nationsare not necessarilymilitaristic nor armiesnecessarilynationalistic,but there is an affinitybetween
the solidarityof nationhoodand the solidarityof warfare(Mann1986:
24,43,54,90,166,235,236).
Ideology also shapes warfarein the form of religion. In ancient
societiesthe ideologicalformationsof gods, rulers,statesand peoples
are not easilydistinguishable.The tribalor nationalgods, the stateand
its ruler,and the people often formeda relativelycohesiveideological
construct:gods were warriors,gods orderedwars,gods intervenedin
wars, gods were rulers and protectors,rulers were gods, nation or
empire and its gods were identified with each other. Gods were
invoked as justificationfor (indeed as commanding)warfare,which
mightbe imperialisticand moreor lessgenocidal(Mann1986:47,88;
Chalkand Jonassohn 1990: 64; Olmstead1923: 26-7, 66-7, 103-4;
Liverani1979:301,31>1; Saggs 1965: 104,110,11X7,181).
Machiavellisuggested that violent destructionis often a means to
politicalconstruction.As rulersseek to establish,restore,maintainor
increase the power of their politicalcommunities,they encounter
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Freeman
Michael
218
of suchresistanceis often
fromothers.Ruthlesselimination constructionprojects
resistance
prudentpolicy.The two mainpolitical
most
the
the empire,and the enemies
havebeen the nation-stateandmay
history
of
be external or internal.
stand in the way of such projects
who
as genocide have been
of the events that have been identified
Many
Khan),or national(asin the campaignsof Genghis regime)or both(as
imperial-external
Rouge
(asin Cambodiaduringthe Khmerdistinctionsare open to
internal
these
the Nazi case). However, both
in
are not alwaysdistinguishempires
and
in thatnation-states
question,
the Baltic republics)and
to
(e.g., the relation of the USSR the combatantsdispute the
able
wars may be fought because
genocidal
USA and native
border (e.g., the warsbetweenthe
internal-external
of genocide in the
tribes). Yet locating the explanation
American
helps us to understandits
of politicalconstructionnot onlybut also shows how various
context
and its justifying ideologies subjugation, deportation,
motivation
of domination - extermination, and how each may have a
forms
may serve a similarpurpose
assimilationfrom the others. Total
quality even though it differs
'genocidal'
meansto the ends
are rare,butmassacresarecommon is often a very
exterminations
and assimilation
ofsubjugationand deportation, 127-9, 13840, 1434). Extermiprocess(Liverani1990:
destructive
end of politicalconstruction.
is therefore one means to the of interestbetweenpeoples,
nation
projectsmay involvereal conflictsor conflictsthat are ideologiSuch
land,
forexamplecompetingclaimstowhen the perpetratorsof genocide
callyconstructed,for example participatein the new order.
deemtheirvictimsto be unfitto
4.ANCIENT GENOCIDE
an
associatedwithcivilizationmaybe in
Thepropositionthatgenocideis
'civilization'
define
if we
artificialconstructof our methodology
for the originof genocide.
records
written
to
termsof literacyand look
wars of extermination,the
We know very little about unrecorded
being very recalcitrantto interpreunwrittenarchaeologicalrecordassociatesgenocide with barbarism,
tation. Yet the Lemkin thesis
withthe ruleof law.There is
the
barbarismwithtribalwar,andcivilization
thatwe find casesof genocidein
no viciouscircularityin showing
politics,
by literacy,city-state
earliestrecordedsocietiescharacterized
organization. If we
political
and
and complex social, economic 'barbarism'
in terms
to 'civilization'
interpretthe transformationfrom complexity and power, then the
of increasingcultural and social was associatedwiththe humanizhypothesisthat this transformation
ationof warfareis false.
Near East. Prior to the third
the
The story begins in the ancient
was relatively peaceful. From
millenium B.C. Mesopotamia
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andmodernity
Genocide,
civilization
beginningof the third milleniumwarsbecamemore common (Kang
1989: 11-3). Sargonof AkkadconqueredSumer around 2310 B.C.
and ruled it until his death around 2273 B.C. In Sumer his violence
was selective and limited by tradition,destroyingcity walls but not
cities. He left some Sumerianrulers in their places. In Syriahe was
more ruthless and boasted of the destruction he wrought. Mann
identifieshis motivesas economic(acquisitionof naturaland human,
i.e. slaveresourcesand protectionof trade)and political(destruction
of rival states and terrorizationof enemies). If opponents resisted,
they might be killedor enslaved.If they surrendered,they might be
pillaged and their walls destroyed. Defeated enemies were often
converted into allies. The difficult logisticsof ancient warfaremotivatedattackersto finish confrontationswith their enemies quickly,
by incentives,coercionor destruction.The threator perpetrationof
genocide, in the form of the destruction of cities, constituted an
economyof violence,not in the sense of minimizingviolence,but in
that of maximizingthe efficiencyof conquest(Mann 1986: 133, 135,
141, 151, 232, 234). At the end of the third milleniumthe political
power of Sumer was overthrownwhen the Third Dynasty of Ur
succumbed to Amorite invaders and the Elamites from southern
Persiasackedthe capitaland slaughteredits inhabitants(Saggs 1965:
37).
H. W. F. Saggshas suggestedthatthe violenceof the mostnotorious
of the earlyempires,thatof Assyria,wasexaggeratedby the Assyrians
themselves in order to terrorize their enemies and facilitatetheir
conquests,andthatthisexaggerationhasbeen reproducedby modern
scholars(Saggs 1965: 122-3). Mann believes that the Assyriansdid
indeed conquerby terroristicthreatsand occasionalruthlessmilitarism (Mann1986:234). Gabrielconcurs.
The Assyrianempire was no easy empire to govern. In an age of
primitivecommunicationsit was widely scattered and, in some
places,wasgeographicallyisolatedby mountainrangesand deserts.
It was, moreover, comprised of conquered peoples with strong
nationalistfeelings often tied to local religious, tribal,and blood
loyalties.The Assyriansmasteredthe administrationof this state
through the use of a modern bureaucracy,the establishmentof a
systemof provinces,the use of auxiliaryarmies,deportation,and
the ruthlessuse of police and militaryterrorbackedby an efficient
intelligencesystem.(Gabriel1990:5940)
Saggsalso explainsAssyrianmilitarismby the geo-politicalpressures
to whichit wassubjected.
Situatedin northernMesopotamiaon the open plainsimmediately
south of the great mountain ranges of Armenia, the people of
Assyriahad borne the brunt of the pressure generated by IndoEuropeanpeopleson the movein the steppesof Russia.... Assyria
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219
Freeman
Michael
220
and in the following
wasfor a time actuallya vassalof Mitanni,
subjectto constant
be
to
was
it
centuries,up to about 1000 B.C.,
region to the west. The
pressurefrom Aramaeanpeoples in the wasthe developmentof
humanresponseto thiscontinualpressure ruthlessly for their
a sturdy warlike people prepared to fight
existence.(Saggs1965:42,120)
and destructive,but
Assyrianwarfarewasprobablyextremelycruel after his defeat of
it was genocidal is uncertain. Sargon, rest of the people,
whether
and Zikirtu,is reportedto have said: 'the
Urartu
glorify the victoryof
had fled to save their lives, I let go free to official narrativesof
who
my lord' (Saggs 1963: 148-50). The but recordthe king
Assur,
describeferociousdevastation,
Ashur-nasir-apal
I have appointed
declaringthat'in the landswhichI have subdued
as
upon them'
service, labour, and serfdom I inflicted Romans in
governors,
the
(Olmstead1923: 97). The Assyrians anticipated
as auxiliary
and
labourers
slave
as
peoples
conquered
employing
same time
the
at
be
(Gabriel1990: 60). Imperialismcannot be destructiveand
troops
and exploitative.It can, however,
exterminatory
massThe Assyriansmay have perpetratedsubjugatory
exploitative.
The
common.
was
but not extermination.Destructionof cities
acres
by
accompanied
was
this
recordsare not always clear whether form of culturalgenocide
genocide.It does appear to have been a
1923:2954).
(Olmstead
Assyrians committed
It is therefore not certain whether the (i.e. extermination of
genocidein the stricter Lemkinian sense
genocidalin the looser
peoples)but they did commitacts that were of alienwaysof life),
sensethatLemkinalsoemployed(i.e.destruction
1990).The Assyrians
andthese they recordedandjustified(Liverani
of economic and
pursuit
made imperialisticwar in the rational endorsed by a god of
politicalgain, but their endeavours were
interestswere fused in the
slaughter.Rational,nationaland religious 1986: 157, 236). Mario
causeof conquest and destruction (Mannideology was a necessary
Liveranihas suggested that imperialistic andeconomicgain.This
supplementto the practicalmotivesof power
centre,whichwasknown,
ideologywasbasedon the oppositionof the
periphery, which was
the
and
normal, orderly and reassuring,
The peripheryexisted in
unknown,abnormal,chaotic and hostile.
this subordination,
naturalsubordinationto the centre. To confirm
the periphconquering
of
task
heroic
the centre must undertakethe
the
therefore
was
ery, the projectof the 'difficultpath'.Imperialism
ideology,
to Assyrian
triumph of order over chaos. According against barbarism,a
civilization
by
out
carried
imperialistwar was
The Assyrianswere for
theme that prefigured later imperialisms.
human,whereasforeigners
themselvesnormal,comprehensibleand
enemies. Assyrians
were strange,incomprehensibleand sub-human
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anxlmodernity
civilization
Genocide,
221
constituteda sacredcommunity;outside this communitywas unholy
disorder. Liveraniinterpretsthis ideology as genocidal. The interactionof the sacredand the Othermustlead to the eliminationof the
latter, either by physicaldestructionor by forcible culturalassimilation. Submissionpermittedthe incorporationof the alien into the
sacredcommunity,albeitin a subordinateposition.Rebellion,on the
other hand,wassinful,mad,unnatural.Thus the submissivemightbe
sparedwhile the rebelliousmustbe destroyed.Imperialconquestwas
a reconstruction:alien people and peripheral lands were reconstructedto become integratedinto the sacredorder (Liverani1979:
299,301,302,30S12; 1990:PartTwo).
Assyriafinallyfell to the Medes and the Babyloniansbetween614
and 608 B.C. Its citieswere destroyedin whatappearsto have been a
genocidal rebellion. Assyriadisappearedfrom history in what may
havebeen a caseof 'genocidefrom below'(Mann1986:237).
5. CONCLUSIONS
Bauman has emphasized the modernity of genocide. Lemkin saw
Nazismas a reversionto ancientbarbarism.Whatdoes our knowledge
of ancientwarfaretell us aboutcivilization,genocideand modernity?
A. T. Olmsteadbelievedthat'the Assyrianswere no worsethanother
imperialistsand differed from them only in being more honest'
(Olmstead1923: viii). He also held that war transcendedthe savaget
civilized distinction because all war was savage (Olmstead 1923:
64S9). I have proposed that war transcends the savagetcivilized
distinction in a different sense: there is savage war and there is
civilizedwar,but civilizedwarmaybe more destructive.
Stuart Hampshire has suggested, in a sympatheticdiscussionof
Machiavelli,that civilizationhas spread through the most brutal
violenceand thatit is naiveto associate,as Lemkindid, civilizationand
humanitarianism(Hampshire 1989). This neo-Machiavellianview
findsfavouramong some Assyriologists.In Olmstead'sjudgment, for
example, the Assyrianswere not so much wolvesof war but, like the
Romans,shepherd-dogsof civilization(Olmstead1923:654).
What are the implicationsof these views for Bauman'sargument
that Nazismwas an expressionof modern civilizationand Lemkin's
propositionthatit wasa reversionto barbarism?Naziimperialismwas
the carrierof a culturewhichBaumanshowswas more modernthan
we have recognizedand yet which,in the wordsof the UN Universal
Declarationof Human Rights,'outragedthe conscienceof mankind'.
The studyof ancientwarfareand genocideshows,however,thatboth
Baumanand Lemkinare partlymistaken:Baumanin insistingupon
the modernityof genocideand Lemkinin insistingupon dissociating
it fromcivilization.There are strikingsimilaritiesbetweenthe ancient
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222
MichaelFreeman
and modern practice of warfare, notwithstandingthe enormous
technologicaladvancesof modern times. It is constitutiveof civilizationthatpoliticallife has its sourcein urbancentres.Whetherwarbe
fought for gain, diffidence,gloryor some other motive,the disabling
of enemy cities is a strategicimperative.From almost the earliest
recordedtimes to the siege of Sarajevoin the post-Yugoslavwar the
destruction of cities has been a primary object of warfare. The
bombingof Dresden, Hiroshimaand Nagasakiin the Second World
Warseemsto havebeen motivatedbygoalssimilarto thoseof the great
urbanslaughtersof history:to destroy,to kill,to terrorizein order to
conquerthe moreefficiently.Lemkinidentifiedgenocidewithancient
tribalwarfare.Fiftyyearslatera genocidalwarhas been takingplace
in Europe. Bauman is certainlycorrect to tell us that civilization,
modernityand genocidearecompossible.Lemkinremindsus thatthe
modern is not in all respects radically novel. Genocidal social
engineeringhas a long history.
However, one important difference between Assyria and the
former Yugoslaviashould be noted. The Assyrianscelebratedtheir
killings.Modernculture,in the face of genocide,is weak,vacillating,
collaborationist,shocked,guiltyand ineffectuallyhumanitarian.The
historical-sociological
studyof genocide revealsimportantstructural
and motivationalsimilaritiesthroughoutmilleniaof socialchange. If
Liverani'sanalysisof imperialistideology is correct,there are even
important structural similaritiesbetween the Assyrian and Nazi
genocidaldiscourses,notwithstandingthe uniquenessand historical
specificityof the latter. The sociology of genocide tells a story of
continuityamid difference. One importantchange, however,is the
way we tell the story and our reasons for telling it. There was no
sociologyof genocidein Assyria.This factcan be explainedsociologically. The values of our society require that we develop such a
sociology.Bauman'sargumentis therefore partlyself-refuting.His
sociologyof the Holocaustis a distinctivelymodernculturalresponse
to a practicethat,as the UN declaredin the preambleto its Genocide
Convention,has inflictedgreat losses on humanityat all periods of
history.
(Dateaccepted:April1994)
MichaelFreeman
Departmentof Government
EssexUniversity
NOTES
1. The emphasis is Bauman's.
2. US protesters against the failure of
their government adequately to address
the AIDS problem have referred to the
AIDS 'genocide'. For the alleged US 'drug
genocide', see Simon Tisdall, 'The Dream
that Turned Sour', The Guardian, 25
Januaryl990.Thefree-marketpoliciesof
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anxlmodernity
civilization
Genocide,
223
History and Sociology of Genocide, New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Gabnel, R. A. 1990 The Cultureof War:
Invention and Early Development, New
York: Greenwood Press.
Hampshire, S. 1989 Innocenceand Experience,London: Allen Lane.
Hobbes, T. 1909 Leviathan, Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Hobbs, T. R.1989 A TimeforWar:A Study
of Warfare in the Old Testament,Wilmington, Delaware: Glazier.
Kang, S-M. 1989 Divine War in the Old
Testamentand in the Ancient Near East,
Berlin: de Gruyter.
Kuper, L. 1981 Genocide, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Lemkin, R. 1944 Axis Rule in Occupied
Europe,Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Liverani, M. 1979 'The Ideology of the
Assyrian Empire' in M. T. Larsen (ed.)
Power and Propaganda:A Symposiumon
Ancient Empires, Copenhagen: Copenhagen Studies in Assyriology, vol. 7,
Akademisk Forlag.
Liverani, M. 1990 Power and Interest:
InternationalRelationsin the Near East ca.
1600-I 100 B.C., Padua: Sargon.
Mann, M.1986 TheSourcesof SocialPower,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Olmstead, A. T. 1923 Historyof Assyria,
New York: Charles Scribner'sSons.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Saggs, H. W. F. 1963 'Assyrian Warfare
Bauman, Z. 1989 Modernityand the Holo- in the Sargonic Period', Iraq25: 145-54.
Saggs, H. W. F. 1965 EverydayLife in
caust,Cambridge: Polity Press.
Chalk, F. and Jonassohn, K. 1990 The Babyloniaand Assyria,London: Batsford.
President Boris Yeltsin of Russia were
described as 'economic genocide' by
Alexander Rutskoi when he was VicePresident.
3. The pioneering work was Irving
Louis Horowitz, Genocide:StatePowerand
Mass Murder, New Brunswick, Transaction Books, 1976. Also very influential
was Leo Kuper, Genocide, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981. For a useful
survey, see Helen Fein, Genocide: A
Sociologzcal Perspective, London, Sage,
1993.
4. For an argument linking the Terror
of the French Revolution with genocide,
see Reynald Secher, Le GenocideFrancoFrancais:La Vendee-Venge,Paris, Presses
Universitaires de France, 1989. For a
critique of this thesis, see Charles Tilly,
'State and Counterrevolution in France',
in Ferenc Feher (ed.) The FrenchRevolution and theBirth of Modernity,Berkeley,
University of California Press, 1990:
5843.
5. For a discussion of this value
change, see John Mueller, 'Changing
Attitudes Towards War: The Impact of
the First World War', BritishJournal of
PoliticalScience21, 1991: 1-28.
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