TheJoanShorenstein
BaroneCenter
PRESS. POLITICS
. PUBLIC POLICY .
HarvardUniversity
JohnF.KennedySchoolofGovernment
INrnooucrroN
I met Alexander Merkushev at a Moscow
dinner party hosted by Ann Blackman of Time
and Michael Putzel of the AssociatedPressin
October, 1989. At the time, Merkushev was
Editor of the English languageserviceof Tass,
the official Soviet news agency. He spoke with
fluency and a quiet self-confidencebut without
the bravadoof other young Soviet journalists,
many of whom, in their sudden embraceof
glasnost,went from one extreme to the other,
discardingtheir recent allegianceto the socialist
system and espousinga stylish denunciation of
everything from Stalinism to a planned economy
with an enthusiasm they mistook for wisdom.
Over caviar and vodka, late into the night, we
discussedthe wonder of Gorbachevand
perestroikaand the problems of moving a stagnant society into the uncharted vibrancy of the
1990s. The practice of journalism, naturally,
occupied alarge part of our discussion. Questions arose;many of them were left unanswered.
Has fear vanished from the newsroom? How far
could journalists go in criticizing the Soviet
system? Gorbachev?Communism? The Party?
Lenin? "Freedomof the Press?"-did Soviet
iournalists even begin to understandthe concept?
At one point, I askedMerkushev: "Let us say
that when you get to your desk tomorrow
morning, you find a messagefrom your boss.
'Comrade,'it says,'from now on, you forget
about glasnostand return to the old way of doing
business. Whatever the Party says,you do.'
Would you, Sasha?" Merkushev is prematurely
balding, and when he's pondering a question, the
creaselines run unevenly from his foreheadto
his scalp. "Yes," he responded,"I think I'd do
what the Party said." He then went on to
explain his responsibilities to family and friends,
father and mother. The honesty and directness
of his response,uncharacteristically soberfor a
young reporter, especiallyin the still heady days
of glasnost,impressedme, and when I returned
to Cambridge and thought about the next group
of Fellows at the ShorensteinBaroneCenter, the
name of Merkushev poppedinto my mind. A
letter of invitation was soon in the mail, and his
acceptancefollowed in quick order.
Merkushev spent the fall semesterof the '90'91 academic year at the Center, enriching our
lives immeasurably with his warmth, charm and
seriousness,especiallyin all of our discussions
about freedom of the press. His paper speaksfor
itself. It deservesa wide readership,not because
Merkushev is one of Russia'stop journalists, the
big name whose views command attention, but
rather becausehe representsa new generationof
Soviet journalist who is beginning to grapple
with such conceptsas truth, responsibility,
candor, courage/all within the broaderframework of a society struggling to move from
dictatorship to democracy. It is an incredibly
difficult journey-one that may never be finished, despiteheroic efforts by thousands,even
millions, of Merkushevs.
As we sat down for our farewell lunch, I
recalledthe question I had posedto Sashain
Moscow. Would his answer be the same?
Would he still bow before the Party? Sasha's
eyescrinkled in a way reminiscent of a character
out of Chekhov, ateat, a certain sadness,lurking
behind the smile. "No," he said,"if my boss
askedme to return to the old days,I wouldn't. I
couldn't. Too much has happened." He paused.
"You see,I now know what freedom is." Before
Sashareturned to Moscow, he told me that he
and his friends were going to try to set up a free
and independentnews agency. "You know, like
the AP." I wished him well.
Marvin Kalb
Edward R. Murrow Professor
Director, foan ShorensteinBarone
Center on the Press,
Politics and Public Policy
Harvard Universitv
THE RUSSIANAND SOVIETPRESS:
A LONG JOURNEYFROMSUPPRESSION
TO
FREEDOMVIA SUPPRESSION
AND GLASNOST
"Frcedom
of the press must be combined with
representation
of the country, and if therc is
free
no rcprcsentation of public opinion, but is only
govetnment, then I cannot imagine freedom of
the press."
A.S. Suvorin, member of His Majesty's
Special Conference for Drawing Up
New PressRegulations, 1905
As fate would have it, the Russianshad to
make their way towards democratic liberties and
pressfreedom twice: first within the framework
of czarist Russia and then repeating the entire
path within the Communist structure of the
Soviet Union. In both cases,their travail produced but partial success:basically a compromise between what the authorities were willing
to allow and what the subjectswere demanding
to obtain.
Attempts launched by pro-democracyforces
to accedeto freedoms,culminating in the
February 1917 "bourgeois democratic" revolution, resulted in the weakening of the Russian empire that had been historically held
together by the strong hand of its rulers and led
to the paralysisof power in the absenceof
democratic traditions of government. The
Bolsheviks who took advantageof the situation
and seizedpower in November I9I7 proclaimed
basic liberties only to replacethem later with
tough controls in all spheres-political, economic, and intellectual. The democratic changes
initiated by the Soviet leadershipin the mid1980s did lead to a greaterfreedom of expression
and the acceptanceof basic human rights, but they
also unleashedlong-suppressednationalist,
centrifugal forces that are now threatening to
break up the "Soviet empire," tempting the
authorities to apply force to preservethe country's
unity and their own existence.
The printed word has always had a special
appealfor the Russians:writers and poets have
enjoyedan esteem that was envied by rulers and
heroesalike. Anything that appearedin print
was consideredtruth, and the powers that be,
aware of this idiosyncrasyof their subjects,
sought to control the pressand literature in order
to control the populace.They succeededin doing
this only partially as there have always been
intrepid men of letters who defied pressuresfrom
above and planted seedsof doubt in the minds of
admirers through their novels, poems/ or newspaper articles. Very often, they did that at the
expenseof their own freedom and even lives.
The press,as well as other institutions both in
pre-revolutionary Russia and in the Soviet
Union, always reflected the tug-of-war between
authorities unwilling to yield powers and a
public wanting to have as much freedom as they
could possibly handle.
The pfinted word has always
had a special appeal for the
Russrans: wtiters and poets have
enioyed an esteem that was
envied by rulers and herces alike.
The Beginnings of the Pressand the Origins of
Censorship
The history of the pressin Russiais full of
examplesof high-level interferencein its work,
attempts to suppressinformation or present it in
a way favorablefor the rulers. The following
brief journey through time will also illustrate the
strugglefor a free pressin both imperial and
Soviet Russia.
Under Czar Alexei, 1629-1676.extracts from
foreign paperswere carried by severalmanuscript periodicalsto keep the authorities informed about international developments.The
information was uniformly outdated and inaccurate, causing the Muscovite state embarrassment
more than once for addressingletters to headsof
state who had died, and more generally for
demonstrating great ignorancein then-current
political metters. Neverthelessthe information
in these courants was consideredto be of state
importance and was kept from the public eye. t
The first Russiannewspaperfor the general
public was born out of an tkaz, or a decree,
issuedby Peter I on December 16, 17O2.Peter,
who reigned from 1689 to 1725, was aware of the
highly restricted circulation of information on
late developmentsand was quite concerned
about the status of education in Russia.His idea
was to launch a periodical that would provide
the peoplewith information about important
events of the day. Appearing with unheard-of
Alexander Merkushev 1
dispatch, the first issue of the new periodical,
Vedomosti, came forth on fanuary 2, 1703.
Much of the Vedomosti's information came
from German newspapers,particularly the
Hambuger Relation Courier and Nordischer
Mercurius.2 As a rule, these paperswere received within three weeks after publication and
were examined either by Peter himself or by the
secretaryof his cabinet, Makarov. Whatever
seemedinteresting was quickly translated into
Russian and sent to the typesetters.The general
weaknessof political and intellectual interests in
society then and the greatly restricted ideological
outlook of the paper-the glorification of the
Northern War and the Czar's armies being the
principal theme-restrained its growth and had
an adverseeffect on its influence. Thus it was
that not social need but the ukazes of the czar
kept the paper alive while it servedmuch the
same function as had the l Tth century manuscript courants,which were circulated among
the Russianrulers' immediate coterie.
The establishment of private publications in
the 1750swas a significant event in the history
of Russianperiodicals,for until then all periodicals had been governmental organs.3
Catherine II initiated an upsurgeof publishing
activity by starting her own periodical and then
allowing other private citizens to do the same.
But the reign of Catherine 11762-1796l'marked
not only the emergenceof private publishing,
but also the beginnings of censorshipin Russia,
the empressherself being the prime censor.She
had before her the nearly 4O0-year-longexample
of western state controls over private presses
plus Russia'slong-establishedpaternalism
towards the printed word.
Europeanmonarchs and jurists had, in controlling the printed word, provided useful concepts:
seditious libel, prior censorship,licensing-all of
which Catherine and her successorsdefined and
applied as they saw fit. Only later did these
administrative measuresbegin to give way. 4
In 1804,Alexander I introduced a liberal
statute on censorship.But when revolutionaries
tried to overthrow his brother who succeeded
him to the throne in 1825 (the Decembrist
revolt|, the new czar, Nicholas I, introduced a far
more stringent code.The French traveler, the
Marquis de Custine, caught the spirit of the
times when he wrote of Russia in 1839:
"IJp to now, I believed that man could no
more do without truth for the spirit than air and
sun for the body; my journey to Russia disabuses
me. Here to lie is to protect the social order; to
speakthe truth is to destroy the state." 5
The year 1865 marked a watershedin government-pressrelations becauseit createdentirely
"press"
new conditions for publishing. The word
ceasedto mean an enterprisedominated by the
government wherein every word was assumedto
have official approval;and becausethe courts
beganto spell out in more detail the new relationship, writers, editors, publishers, and lawyers
were able to improve even more rapidly the
position of the pressin Russian society in the
secondhalf of the 19th century."
Kobeko Commission: Freedom of the Press
Proclaimed in Russia
Bowing to revolutionary agitation and general
discontent of the population, the czarist government establishedin l9O4 a commission to write
"His
a new presslaw. Known formally as
Majesty's SpecialConferencefor Drawing Up
New PressRegulations," the group was more
popularly referredto as the "Kobeko Commission" due to the fact that its chairman was D.F.
Kobeko.
Bowing to rcvolutionary
agitation and general discontent
of the population, the czafist
government establishedin 1904
a commissron to write a new
press law.
The debateon the pressalso sparkedoff
discussionsabout the country/s political system
in general.A.S. Suvorin, a member of the Kobeko
Commission, summed these up by declaring that
"freedom of the pressmust be combined with
free representationof the country/ and if there is
no representationof public opinion, but is only
government, then I cannot imagine freedom of
the press."7
Prince V.P. Meshchersky was afraid of the
bacchanaliathat would undoubtedly occur were
a free system to be introduced, and those who
"rogues"
would suffer from it would not be the
"respectable
organsof the press." 8
but the
ObservedPrince Meshchersky: "The interests
of the pressare dear to me, and therefore I f.eara
reaction: I fear that two or three mad-caps,
having entered into the pressthanks to the free
system/ will put in dangerthe further existence
of that freedom which we are giving to the press
2 The Russianand Soviet Prcss:A Long lourney from Supptessionto Frcedom via Suppressionand Glasnost
by the universal abrogation of the preliminary
censorship.Panic in society will result and then,
as often happensin Russia,a reversalin government and some kind of restrictive supplement to
the law, the dimensions of which may do damageto that which is most important-freedom of
the press."
In emancipating the pressin 1905-1906by
subordinating it solely to the authority of the
courts and abolishing prior censorship,Russia
granted "freedom of the press" as generally
understoodin the l9th century in Europe.But
that did not stop newspapersfrom being seized
or editors from being harassed.
The Bolshevik, the Decree on the Press,and the
Reintro duction of Censorship
Two days after seizing power on November 7,
L917, the new Bolshevik government in Russia
adopteda decreeon the press,banning-temporarily or permanently-press bodies that called
for open resistanceor disobedienceto the new
authodties or incited strife by distorting facts or
calling for actions punishable by law. The
interpretation of the decreewas rather broad,
leading to the closure of virtually all papersin
opposition to the Bolsheviks.
No censorshipin the strict sensewas introduced,however. Many professionalrevolutionaries with the vast experienceof work under
restrictive rule abhorredthe very idea of "red
censorship."The decreemade it clear that "as
soon as the new government is firmly established, all administrative controls of the press
will be abolished;full freedom will be granted to
the presswithin the framework of its responsibility before the courts, in accordancewith the
broadestand most progressivelaw."
But it took more than 70 years to draft and
adopt a new presslaw, while the idea of prior
censorshipwas quickly embracedby the emerging Soviet bureaucracy.
In May 1919,the pressdepartment of the
Moscow City Council obliged all periodicalsin
the capital to request permission from it before
sendingarticles into print. The Council of
People'sCommissars rescindedthe city's decision only to introduce pre-publication censorship
nationwide two years later, on December 12,
1921.On fune 6, 1922 the Russiangovernment
approvedregulations on establishingthe Main
Department for the Affairs of Literature and
Publishing, which came to be known by its
Russian-languageacronym Glavlit. The name
stuck even though the censorshipapparatuslater
changed its name to the Main Board for the
Protection of Military and State Secretsin the
Press.Censorshipis an issue that arousesemotions: its practice producesan almost instinctive
opposition. For this reason/those who use it
often call it something else, as did the imperial
officials who changedthe name of their censoring agencyto "Chief Administration for Press
AJfairs"in 1865.e
Initially, Glavlit was in chargeof permitting
the establishment of pressbodies and publishing
houses,compiling lists of bannedbooks and
censoringmanuscripts beforepublication. The
chief emphasiswas on non-divulgenceof "military secrets,"later changedto "information not
subject to being made public," and "anti-Soviet
agitation," which came to include "works embracing hostile ideology on issuesof public life,
religion, economy/ ethnic relations, art, etc."
Censorship covered pr actically
all printed materials, the
only exception being seuet
government and party
coftespondence,
accounting records and
handwritten newspaperc
posted on walls.
Soon Glavlit gainedthe right to play a part in
the appointment of chief editors and changesin
editorial boardsof newspapersand magazines.In
the early 1930sit was assignedto decideby itself
what information should be consideredclassified. Censorshipcoveredpractically all printed
materials, the only exception being secret
government and party correspondence/accounting recordsand handwritten newspapersposted
on walls.
The situation remained unchangeduntil the
late 1980s.
The Censorship Debate in the Late 7980s
All of the discourseabout the pressthat
started in the mid-1980s and continued until the
adoption of the new presslaw on lune 12, 1990
did not involve issuesof censorship,since the
very existenceof censorshipwas a secret.During
one of the debateson the press,a high-ranking
Glavlit official even told journalists not to
mention the word "censorship" in their account
Alexander Merkushev 3
of the meeting since "readerscould think that
we have censorship." r0This was very typical of
life in the USSR:not mentioning things that are
not nice and making believe they do not exist.
Characteristically, drug addiction was one of
such taboo subjects.The problem did not exist in
the Soviet vocabulary and the police did not have
specialunits to fight drug related crimes: you
cannot fight something that doesnot exist. The
scopeof the problem describedin the pressin
the late 1980shorrified the public and forced the
Interior Ministry, which is in chargeof police
operations/to set up a special department to
fight drug trafficking.
As democratic processeswere unfolding
in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s,the press
took its future into its own hands.Hundreds of
samizdat newspapersand magazineshit improvised sidewalk newsstands,their political
affiliations ranging from "left of the left-wing" to
ultra-right, from Marxist to monarchist. The
spreadof new technology, including desk-top
publishing and photocopy machines, and the
weakening of central controls in virtually all
areasof public life dramatically changedthe
pressscene.Television increasedthe shareof
live programs;journalists at establishedgovernment news organtzations felt the need to express
themselvesmore freely in the freer atmosphere
that was reigning in the country. Under these
conditions, the existenceof prior censorshipwas
becoming increasingly irrelevant, although
highly placed censorsthemselvesstrongly
disagreed.Glavlit chairman V.A. Boldyrev argued
that "Preliminary control is more effective and
less 'painful' in what concernsthe protection of
state secretsin the press." ll
The Utilitarian Approach after Glasnost
In one of his first public speechesas General
Secretaryof the Soviet Communist party in
1985,Mikhail Gorbachevemployed the term
glasnost,broadly interpreted as openness,candor
or publicity, stating that "the more informed
people are, the more consciously they will act,
the more actively they will support the party, its
plans, and its fundamental goals."
For Gorbachev,glasnostwas a tool to help
streamline the political system, reorganizethe
economy/ and fight such negative phenomenaas
widespreadcorruption, inefficient management/
and overall inertia of the populace.
As ProfessorTimothy Colton of Toronto
University wrote/ "Gorbachev's emphasiswas
less on the right to know than on the utility of
an informed citizenry to the regime." 12
This utilitarian approach,a fluctuating policy
adopted(or abandoned|in the interests of the
state, differs from the concept of the right to
know as a fundamental, inviolable principle.
Becauseof this, no one-either in the Soviet
Union or abroad-initially believed that glasnost
and greaterfreedom were ends in themselves.
Gorbachevappearedsimply to be using liberalization to inspire workers and intellectuals to
fight against the party and state bureaucratswho
opposedhis reforms. 13
Someoutside observersgreetedthe Gorbachev
innovations with the hope that the Soviet Union
would allow a greatermeasureof freedom, including less restricted emigration and more
attention to human rights. But most dismissed
them as wishful thinking. ProfessorHermann
Frederick Eilts of Boston University wrote in a
book publishedas recently as 1989,that "Glasnost
and perestroika representat best a processthat
will take yearsto show any meaningful Gestalt,
although obstaclesand slowdowns will be
manifest....Generallyspeaking the Sovietsystem
is not one of abrupt shifts in course/but rather one
of imperceptible dialectical fusion. This often
makes substantive changeapparentonly long after
a comer has beentumed."ra
"The major objective of glasnost is to win
sympathy and support, both inside and outside the
Soviet Union, for the country's new economic
policy," observedLadislav Bittman, Director of the
Disinformation Documentation Center and
Associate Professorof Iournalism at Boston
University.ts
According to an opinion poll conducted among
joumalists and party functionaries in chargeof
mass media bodies in Central Russiaby the
Moscow Higher Party School in 1988,glasnosthad
a long way to go before becoming a norrn of life.
Forty-two percent of respondentsunderstood
glasnostas the right of all citizens to know about
everything that takes place in the country, and 34
percent viewed it as the legally endorsedsystem of
free information. The opinion as to when this
would happenwas fivided more or less equally
among those who thought that this processwould
be completed by 1995,by the end of the century,
and even between the years 2025 or 2050. All three
groups linked the evolution of glasnostwith a
favorableintemational situation and the further
unfolding of overall democratic processesin Soviet
society.
The corner seemedto be very f.ar away.
4 The Russianand Soviet Press:A Long lourney from Suppressionto Freedom via Suppressionand Glasnost
The Press Initiative in Stretching the Limits of
Glasnost
It was the pressitself that was to crossthe t's
and dot the i's in its crusadefor greaterfreedom,
often acting against stereotypessupportedby its
own representatives.Epitomizing and upholding
these traditional views, Valentin Zorin, a senior
Soviet political commentator, said in a television
discussionabout glasnostthat "Self-criticism is
used by enemy propagandato causeharm to our
country, for open slanderagainst socialism."
But the majority of iournalists were only too
eagerto respondto Gorbachev'scalls for greater
candor in reporting shortcomings and exposing
corrupt officials. Stories were run in newspapers
and magazines,depicting "servants of the
people" living in luxury, while "the masters of
the land" were eking out a miserable existence,
slaving on cotton plantations and in coal pits.
...themaiofity of iournahsts
were only too eagerto rcspondto
Gorbachev'scalls for greater
candorin reportingshortcomings
and exposrngcoruuptofficials.
The Soviet pressstarted carrying health, economic, and other vital statistics, marking a shift
of policy away from the concealment of figures
showing Soviet performancelaggingbehind
other countries. The infant mortality rate/ long a
taboo subject not only for the pressbut also for
physicians themselves,was revealedfor the first
time. This disclosure,as well as the publication
of the previously classifiedinformation about
life expectancyof Soviet citizens, sent shock
waves throughout the nation. The presscompared the indicators to those of other countries
to find out that the Soviet Union was at the
bottom of the list, somewherebetween Honduras and Barbados.The work of the Health Ministry has ever since been under close scrutiny of
the public and the press.
True, the "glasnost" processwas not welcomed by entrenchedbureaucratsand even
many members of the generalpublic. The former
fearedlosing their own positions and privileges,
the latter fearedhearing so much "bad news"
after years of the comforting and dosedflow of
mostly "good news." Had it not beenfor the
terrible national tragedy,which was the
Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in April
1985,the oppositionto glasnoston the part of
government and party bureaucrats would have
probably forced the pressto adopt a "more
responsibleattitude'/ and "spare the feelings of
the people."
Coverage of the Chernobyl Accident as a
Breakthroush for Soviet fournalism
By the time of the Chernobyl accident,the
presswas ready to cover it as fully as possible.
The initial delay in the publication of vital
information about the disasterwas largely due to
the unwillingness of government agenciesand
officials in nuclear-relatedfields to provide
information and their attempts to belittle the
magnitude of the nuclear accident and cover up
their own incompetence.
The explosion at Unit 4 of the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant occurredin the early hours
of April 26, 1986.This was Saturdayand many
officials as well as journalists were away from
their desksfor the weekend. |ournalists at TASS
learnedthat something was wrong from Reuters
and AP stories reporting increasedlevels of
radiation in Scandinavia.Messageswere immediately sent to Kiev, the city closest to
Chernobyl with a TASS bureau, to determine
whether a Soviet nuclear facility had anything to
do with the reported rise in radioactivity in
Scandinavia.Moscow-basedjournalists tried to
get in touch with specialistsor officials in the
Soviet capital. Those who might have known
something were unavailable,others said they did
not know anything. The first dispatchesfrom
TASS correspondentsin the Ukraine confirmed
the accident but failed to give any information as
to its magnitude-Ukrainian officials were just
as reticent. The TASS World News Service
moved a one-paragraphstory Monday night-it
took all of Monday to have it authorized at the
highest level of government. That was followed
by a chronicle of nuclear power plant accidents
over the past severalyears,including the one at
Three Mile Island in the United States,to
emphasizethe "normality" of the situation. For
severaldays the pressmanagedto print only one
brief communiqud per day, all provided by TASS
and authorized at the highest level.
But the circumstancessurrounding the accident, and the interest, fear and rumors it provoked, causedother media outlets/ including
television, to attempt to cover it from their own
perspective.TV coveragewas especiallyrevealing since it provided the visual image of nononsensemen wearing white gowns and gas
masks, and the sight of the still smoldering
Alexander Merkushev 5
reactor,even though the commentators'words
were more comforting than realistic.
With time, more emphasiswas placed on the
incompetenceof plant managersand designers,
and on attempts by local and later central health
officials to cover up the consequencesof the
accident.The Chernobyl accident and the press
coverageof clean-up operationsalerted public
opinion in the country to the dangersof nuclear
power. Peoplearound operating power plants and
areaswhere their construction was planned
started forming independentenvironmentalist
groups.As joumalists engagedin true investigative reporting and uncoveredfacts relating to
other incidents involving nuclear facilities, even
military ones, the environmentalist movement
grew so strong that the government had to close
a number of nuclear power plants, and to abandon the construction of many nuclear facilities.
Recently it announcedthe termination of the
production of military-grade plutonium. In the
latter case,international as well as domestic
factorswere at work.
TV coverugewas especially
rcvealing since it provided the
visual image of no-nonsensemen
weafing white gowns and 1as
masks,and the sight of the still
smoldering reacto4 even though
the commentators' wotds were
more comforting than rcalistic.
Public pressure/brought about by extensive
pressreports and the growing public awareness
of the dangersof nuclear testing, compelled the
Soviet DefenseMinistry to consider closing its
biggestnuclear test site in Semipalatinsk,
Kazakhstan.And the popularly electedparliament in that Central Asian republic recently
banned nuclear tests on its territory altogether,
causing the military establishment to move
testing to the Arctic island of Novaya Zemlya.
The underground nuclear test in Novaya Zemlya
on October 24, 1990generatedimmense controversy around the issue of nuclear testing and
sparkedprotests by inhabitants in Northern
Russia.
Chernobyl presenteda real challengeto
journalists in that it required personalcourage
not iust to visit contaminated regions,but also
to wdte about shortcomings,many of which
were direct products of the country's social and
economic system.
After Chemobyl, no natural or man-made
calamity seemedtoo scary.The pressbecame
filled with accounts of air crashesand train
wrecks, hijack attempts and street violence. This
behavior of the pressdispleasedmany a Sovict
"under
citizen who often complained that
Brezhncv,we did not have so many accidents."
Many linked the country's predicamenteconomic and ethnic-to the operation of the
press,accusingit not only of being unpatriotic
and exaggeratingproblems but also of stirring up
trouble and leading the Soviet Union to disaster.
Thus twisting the correlation between causeand
effect, Ycgor Ligachev,a retired Politburo member, obscrvedin an interview with U.S. Naws
and Wctrld Report, "One reasonfor the current
gloom in the country is that from morning till
night, ncgative things from the past are being
dumped on the people.Our cultural figures
lately havc published more things that aren't
true, that are anti-Soviet, than our enemies in
the West managedto do in 7Oyears." t6
Gorbachev's Broadening of the Notion of
Glasnost to Embrace Frcedom of Speech,and
the Reaction of the Censors
The year 1988,dubbedthe "Year of Glasnost,"
saw the keenestdebateon the role of the press
and the emergenceof the first draft law on the
media, preparedvery much in the old fashion by
party and government officials with an aim to
restrict the freedom of expressionand regulate
down to the minutest detail the operation of all
mass media bodies.The draft was severely
criticized in the pressand at public rallies and
quietly passedaway.
As practice changedthe content of glasnost
and stretched its limits, Gorbachevwent on
record to give a new definition of his brainchild.
In an interview with Newsweek and the Wash'
ington Post in May 1988,he said:
"Glasnost and freedom of speech are,of
course/intenelatedbut not identical notions...
Freedomof speechis an indispensablecondition
of glasnost,but glasnostis a broaderterm. We
understandit not only as the right of each
citizen openly to expresshis opinion on all social
and political issues,but also as the commitment
of the ruling party and all bodies of government
and managementto observethe principle of
opennessin decision making, be responsiblefor
their actions, react by deedsto criticism, and
take into account the advice and recommenda-
6 The Russianand SovietPress:A Long lowney ftom Suppressionto Freedom via Suppressionand Glasnost
tions offeredby work collectives, public organizations, and individual citizens. In glasnost,as
we understandit, the emphasisis on the creation
of conditions enabling citizens to take a real part
in discussingall affairs of the country and in
elaboratingand adopting decisions that affect the
interests of society, and to exercisecontrol over
the fulfillment of thesedecisions." I'
By that time this was the most revolutionary
definition of glasnostby the Soviet leader.
Paradoxically,the interview itself stirred a lot of
controversy about the degreeof freedom of
speechand the pressallowed in the Soviet Union
at that time. Indeed,the text of the NewsweekWashington Post interview, the questions as
well as the answers,was altered at the party
Central Committee before its publication in the
USSR,ostensiblyto "shorten" it. The deletion of
the name of Gorbachev'sreputed archrival of
that time, Yegor Ligachev,from the Soviet
version of a Newsweek-WashingtonPost question about the splits in the leadershipwas the
most revealing instance of selective editing of
the interview.
Anything that might have embarrassed
Gorbachevbefore his Soviet audiencewas left on
the cutting-room floor, including the referenceto
Gorbachev'spersonaltelephone call to dissident
academicianAndrei Sakharov,asking him "to
return to his patriotic work" and effectively
ending his internal exile in Gorky.
Incidentally, the above definition of glasnost
failed to appearin full in the Newsweek issue.
Nor was it the only instance when the Soviet
leader'swords were censoredin his own country.
At one point in an improvised street discussion with citizens during a trip to a provincial
town, he called on the press"to play the part of
the opposition for lack of other political parties
in the USSR." This remark, shown live on
television, was subsequentlydeletedfrom all
otherwise full television accounts of his statements and never appearedin print.
A Leningtad College Teacher Threatens
Glasnost
The year 1988 marked the watershedbetween
the glasnostthat was allowed, encouragedor
tolerated by authorities and the glasnostthat no
longer neededany assistancefrom "above" to
exist and developon its own. In fact, that year
nearly saw the end of glasnost,and had it not
been for reform-minded politicians like
Alexander Yakovlev, then a Politburo member,
or mavbe even Gorbachevhimself, the Soviet
presswould not enfoy the freedom it finally
acquiredin I990.
On March 13, 1988,one day before Gorbachev
was to leave on a trip to Yugoslavia,the influential newspaperSovetskaya Rossiyapublished a
letter to the editor from Leningrad chemistry
lecturer Nina Andreyeva which becameknown
as the "manifesto of conservativeforces." The
article attacked glasnostand came out in support
of Stalin'srepressivepoliciesbecausethey
advancedthe causeof socialism. Written from
the Stalinistperspectiveand combining Russian
nationalism and Marxism, the letter advocated
viewing eventsin their "class" context.
The year 1988marked the
waterched between the glasnost
that was allowed, encouragedor
tolerated by authofities and the
glasnostthat no longer needed any
"
assistancefrom above" to exist
and develop on its own.
Many Soviet citizens and especiallyiournalists who had been used to signalsof this kind
showing them how to "behave properly" viewed
Andreyeva'sletter as an end of both glasnostand
perestroika.It was clear that the publication of
the letter had receivedstrong support from the
party leadership.In addition, acting on "recommendations" from the party Central Committee,
TASS circulated the text of the article to provincial newspapersfor reprint, an action that later
incurred on its journalists the wrath of many of
their more liberal colleagues.
Glasnost and perestroikahung in the balance
for three weeks tntll Pravda published an
editorial excoriating conservativesfor engineering the letter's publication and warning that the
"revolutionary principles of perestroika" would
carry on. The Pravda editorial was reportedly
written by Alexander Yakovlev, a man often
describedas Gorbachev'salter ego and a driving
force behind perestroika.
The fact that a single article could paralyze
political discoursein the country for so long
illustrates how thin the layer of reform was and
how little would have been neededto turn the
country back to the days before Gorbachev.It also
shows that without assistancefrom above,the
presswas not yet able to overcome the decadeslong habit of doing whatever it was told. True, the
Alexander Merkushev 7
editors of many provincial newspapersrefusedto
reprint Andreyeva's letter, many at the expenseof
their own careers.But those were isolated instances,the exceptions confirming the ruIe.
The fact that a single article
could p arulyze political
discourse.. . illustr ates how thin
the layer of reform was and how
little would have been needed to
turn the country back to the days
before Gorbachev.
The incident was extensively investigated
later on, during the period when the pressfelt
free to examine and analyze its own shortcomings as well as failings of the system. The article
turned out to be a genuine letter by the obscure
college lecturer turned politician. Contrary to
widely held views that "Nina Andreyeva" stood
for a high-ranking party official, probably
Ligachevhimself leven Pravda used quotation
marks around the words "letter to the editor"),
Andreyeva was a real person who wrote the
article all by herself and submitted its shorter
versions to severalcentral newspapers,including
Pravda, for possiblepublication. The chief editor
of Sovietskaya Rossiya,himself a devout conservative, apparently liked the idea and sent the
abridgedversion for approval to the No. 2 man in
the Politburo and chief of the party's ideological
work. Ligachev reportedly read the article and
found it quite suitable for publication in the
paper/an organ of the party Central Committee.
He was later quoted as saying that the short
version of Andreyeva'sarticle was not critical of
Gorbachev'spolicies of perestroika and glasnost
and that he did not mean to organizeresistance
to reform in the Soviet Union. Whether these
reports are true or not/ we will soon learn from
Ligachev'sown memoirs that he has gone to
write in his hometown in Siberiaupon retirement from the party Politburo in 1990.
Behavingin a way characteristic of relations
within the party hierarchy, Pravda, the main
organ of the Central Committee, castigated
SovetskayaRossiya for its lack of "responsibility
for articles and publications." While not rejecting debates,discussions,and polemics altogether, the Pravda editorial pointed out, "We
need disputes that help to advanceperestroika
and lead to the consolidation of forces,to cohe-
sion aroundperestroika,and not to disunity. Wt'
will firmly and steadily follow the revolutionarr
principles of perestroika:more glasnost,more
democracy,more socialism." 18
The anti-Andreyeva editorial encouragedth,
pressto write with even greaterboldnessan,.l
marked the acme of Pravda'srole as the flag'i:
of the Sovietpress.Never againwould Pr,ir,1,
pagesbe used as a vehicle for revolutionary,
innovative ideas.On the contrary, despite
changcsin the management,Pravda'sediton,,
policy has begunto becomeincreasinglycttn.
vative and anti-reformist.The year 1988also .
the beginningof the declineof the Communist
party as well as its principal publication as first
demandswere voiced to removethe constitutional article enshriningthe party's "leading
role" in society.
Yet the party had to make one more important step in 1988,a step that indisputablyled to
a greaterfreedom o{ the pressand one more step
towardsits own undoing.
The National Party Conference as a Boost to
Glasnost
Thc All-Union party conference,basicallya
curtailedversionof a congtesswhich is the Soviet
Communist party's supremegovemingbody, held
on |une 28-fuly 1, 1988,adopteda resolution
reaffirming that glanost "is an indispensable
condition for the expressionof the democratic
essenceof the socialistsystem,its orientation
towards man, and the involvement o{ individuals
in all a{fairsof societyand the state..." re
The archives belonging to
v afious govetnment deqartments
or otganizations,such as the KGB
or the Communist party, temain
off-limits, however.
The resolution on glasnostwas ambiguous in
many respects.It called for the use of glasnostas
a tool "to consolidateall social forces around
ideasand principles of perestroika" and serve
"the interests of the socialist plurality of views."
But it also stressedthe "need to remove uniustified restrictions on the use of statistical data
about the socio-economicand political development of society,on the ecologicalsituation,...
ensureaccessibility of all library funds and adopt
laws on the use of archive materials." 20
8 The Russianand Soviet Prcss:A Long lourney from Suppressionto Freedom via Suppressionand Glasnost
The latter provision led to the exposureof
many past and presentpractices,from Stalinist
repressionsto abusesof psychiatry to previously
unreported accidentsin military and spacefields.
State,or national, archives were openedto the
public. The archives belonging to various government departments or otganizations, such as the
KGB or the Communist party, remain off-limits,
however. The explanation is the absenceof a law
on archives,yet to be adoptedby parliament.
The true reason,however, is the fear on the part
of these agenciesthat materials to be found by
researcherswill lead to fresh exposuresof their
practices in the distant and not so distant past.
Public opinion polls.. .showed
that 90 percentof the Soviet
population rcgarded changesin
the work of the pressand televisron as the sole positive result of
Gorb achev'sp erestroika policies.
The presswas beginning to influence public
opinion and even the country's politics to a
degreenever experiencedbefore.By providing
the full picture of Stalinist repressions,for
instance, the pressmade the generalpublic and
emerging politicians explore the underlying
causesof the country's grim history. As a result,
Lenin's practices came under close scrutiny, and
so did the very ideas of socialism preachedby
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.Works by
leading non-Communist philosopherswere
published for the first time, and the public not
only discoveredthe existenceof ideas different
from those that reigned in the country for more
than seventy years/but also started forming
groups or movements that subscribedto those
ideas,marking a changein the political situation
and preparingground for the emergenceof
opposition political parties. Reflecting this
changeof public mood, the USSR'snew supreme
legislative body, the Congressof People'sDeputies, elected in 1989,finally deleted the constitutional article about the Communist party's
"leading role" in society, effectively proclaiming
a multi-party system.
Another subject that had been extensively
debatedin the presswas the introduction of
executive presidencyto replace,actually, the
rule of the party and its Politburo. When public
pressuregrew to a point when the party had to
say something, Gorbachevtook the floor in
parliament to flatly reject the proposal,dismissing the very idea of presidencyas "alien" to our
country. A few months later, however/ the
parliament overwhelmingly voted in favor of
changing the political system and elected
Gorbachevas the USSR'sfirst president.
Struggle for Circulation and Bureaucratic
Control of Subscriptions to Popular Periodicals
As articles in newspapersand magazines
inflamed passionsacrossthe political spectrum,
and the pressbeganto play an increasingly
important role in the daily lives of the country's
citizens, the bureaucracysharply reducedavailable subscription quotas/ particularly for proreform periodicals.This was at a time when
lines to buy newspapersand magazines,unlike
lines near department or food stores,were the
only encouragingsign of the emergenceof a
more informed and politically active citizenry
and subscriptionsto "reform" publications
increaseddramatically, while the circulation of
conservativejournals laggedbehind. With the
first free elections one year from then, and
political rallies still largely suppressedby the
authorities/ the presswas the only legitimate
vehicle for the expressionof various views on
the country's past, present,and future. Emotions
erupted in major cities and protests were voiced
in the pressand television against the drive to
"conserve paper," as bureaucratsexplained
their
action which reformers correctly interpreted as
an effort to resffict democratization. Finally the
authorities had to rescind the order-another
victory for public opinion and the emerging free
press.
The Pressand Public Opinion
Public opinion polls conducted in February
1989 showed that 90 percent of the Soviet
population regardedchangesin the work of the
pressand television as the sole positive result of
Gorbachev'sperestroikapolicies. By summer,
the indicator droppedsomewhat due to widespreaddispleasurewith the tendentious coverage
of ethnic conflicts, miners' strikes, and activities
of new public organizationsand movements/ as
well as with the superficial criticism of Stalin
and events in Soviet history. 2r
Facedwith growing problems in the sphereof
ethnic relations and economics,the powers that
be sought to curb the flow of information available to the generalpublic. The governmentAlexander Merkushev 9
controlled presswas orderedto carry only
government-approvedTASS accounts of ethnic
or labor conflicts. All these "dispatches" were
actually written by high-ranking officials at the
party Central Committee headquartersin
Moscow and Gorbachevhimself was said to
proofreadthem-very much like czar Peter who
personally edited the Vedomosa more than 200
years ago.That situation did not last long,
however. Newspapersrevolted, and, first, the
youth daily l(oms omolskaya Pravda, and then
other periodicals,begancarrying accounts
written by their own correspondentson the spot.
As a result, many newspaperspublished more
information about actual developmentsin
Azerbaiian and Armenia, the scene of fierce
ethnic clashes,or in Siberia,which witnessed
the emergenceand consolidation of an independent workers'movement, than TASS.The
government news agencywas losing credibility,
the morale of its journalists was low. Confronting the new challenge,TASS had to adjust to the
changedconditions by sending its own correspondentsto all "trouble spots" and providing
more detailed and objective information about
developments.Sourcesbecamemore diverse,
too. TASS correspondentsbeganto interview not
only Interior Ministry officials, but also representativesof local nationalist groups.This
practice gradually spreadto other spheresand it
becamenot uncommon for leadersof informal or
non-Communist groups to expresstheir views
through TASS wire.
Despite this new level of glasnostand boldnessin the press,the readershipwas more
radical and critical than newspapersand especially television, accordingto an opinion survey
conducted early in 1990.22Television was
subjectedto particularly strong pressurefrom the
goyernment which recognizedthe special importance of the visual image and the nationwide
reach provided by television.
The Pressand Economic Pressure in the Late
7980s
Newsprint, long since regardedas the "bread
of culture" was, and is, in short supply. The
distribution of paper reflected the domination of
the departmental and party bureaucracywho
continued to hold the monopoly on information
and the printed word. Forty-nine percent of paper
produced in the country was used to print sociopolitical and socio-economicjournals, the
overwhelming majority of which were propagandamaterials piled up unsold in their hun-
dredsat all newsstands
from Kalrnrnrr.rJ:r: r!r.
westernpart of the country to ViaJrr rr.i r "
east.Out of 8,811newspapers
rctth rtu .r..-'
circulation of.230 million and I ,619 ::r.:* , '
(221million copies)that were put or.rr::-.SovietUnion in 1989,lessthan two hun.:'
were not official publications of party org.::
tions-from the Central Committee to a tirparty committee. 23
...motercadercare now
atuacted to youth publications
reflecting the entfue spectrum of
new sentimentsand mass"thin"
circulation, and to
m agazineswith non-ideological
content-pfiv ate lif e, f amily,
health, gardening.
In 1975,the country's best printing plants
were handedover to the party. The rest, utilizing
outdatcdequipmentand classifiedas lossmaking, remain a heavy burden on taxpayers.2a
Despite all financial support, the party publications beganto lose circulation as soon as the
obligatory subscription for managersand party
members was lifted. The number of.Pravda subscribers,for instance, droppedby 36.4 percent by
lanuary 1st, 1990 comparedto the 1987 figure,
and is rapidly declining. The situation becameso
serious that Pravda employees,in a bid to save
their paper from total collapse,demandedin
October 1990 the resignation of their chief editor
Ivan Frolov, an unprecedentedevent in the party
press.Other party periodicalsalso suffereddrops
in circulation, ranging from 20 to 50 percent.
Many ideologically loadedpublications had to
close down or changetheir style.2s
On the other hand, pro-reform periodicals
gainedhuge readerships.The Soviet and world
record is held by the weekly Argumenty i Fakty,
basically an information bulletin, which managedto increaseits circulation in three years
from 1.5 million to 33.4 million copies,a vivid
indication of the hunger for information in
Soviet society and an indictment of the entire
system of the pressand television in the Soviet
Union that failed to provide peoplewith basic
facts. A number of "thick" literary journals
(Novy Mir, Druzhba Narodov, Znamya and some
others) and Ogonyok andMoscow News increased
their circulation by 3 to l0 times. The same is
10 The Russian and Soviet Press:A Long lowney ftom Suppressionto Freedom via Suppressionand Glasnost
true with regardto Baltic journals and independent periodicals.
In addition to these, more readersare now
attracted to youth publications reflecting the
entire spectrum of new sentiments and masscirculation, and to "thin" magazineswith nonideological content-private life, family, health,
gardening.
After a drop in popularity due to their "success"
in fighting the West'shumanitarian thought,
philosophy, and culture, academicjournals
specializingin humanities have gradually begun
to depart from scholasticsand popularize the
cultural heritage of Russiaand other countries of
the late l9th-early 20th centuries,winning welldeservedrespectof the readingpublic.
Republican periodicals,especiallythose
published in the tonguesof the indigenous
population, have dramatically increasedtheir
circulation. Many (in the Transcaucasusand the
Baltic region)beganto serveas legitimate vehicles for the expressionof nationalist sentiments and play an immense role in politics,
specifically in the campaignsfor independence
from the Soviet Union, reflecting and promoting
separatisttendenciesamong their populations.
The 1990Law on the Mass Media
The year 1990saw the completion of the
struggle-or should it better be describedas a
truce?-between authorities and pro-reform
forces.It must be statedthat all successive
constitutions adoptedin the Soviet Union since
the days of the Bolshevik revolution proclaimed
freedom of speechand all other basic human
rights. None, however, provided legal guarantees
for the exerciseof these rights, leaving the press
and the generalpublic largely unprotected
against and vulnerable to arbitrarinesson the
part of government and party bureaucrats.
As a matter of fact, the pressin the Soviet
Union has always been free in the senseLenin
meant when he said that any journalist has the
right to write whatever he thinks appropriate,
even if that would be contrary to party line. But
then the p^rtyt too, he remarked, has the right to
take away his party card. And taking aw^y a
journalist's party card even ten years ago would
effectively put an end to his or her career.As the
favorite joke of those times had it, "Any editor
may publish whatever he likes. But only once in
a lifetime..."
The Soviet parliament adopteda draft law
elaboratedby independent-mindedjournalists as
the basisfor work on a presslaw in 1988.
Mikhail Fedotov,one of the authors of the draft,
in a seminar held in April 1990at the fournalism
Department of the Moscow Higher Party School,
describeddifficulties that accompaniedthis
work at parliamentary committees and commissions. All typists assignedto do technical work
were drawn from the party Central Committee
pool. Whenever a redrawn draft was handed to
them for retyping, they would add some nuances
that were not immediately apparentbut changed
significantly the content of the would-be bill. In
addition, the composition of the working Broup,
including experts and parliamentarians, was
constantly changedon the initiative of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Everything was being
done to make the work of whom Fedotov described as "politically literate" typists easier.
Despite all the odds and to a large extent due
to pressurefrom journalists themselves,one
hundred of whom had been elected to the
country's supremelegislative body, the law was
completed and finally approvedby parliament,
and it came into force on August I,I99O.
Article I of the new law, officially known as the
Law on the Pressand Other Mass Information
Media, proclaims that "The pressand other mass
information media ^re free." It also officially does
away with censorship,stating that "Censorship of
massinformation is not permitted.//
...thisis the first law in the
country that enumerates things
that are not allowed...
In contrast with the First Amendment environment in the United States,but very much in line
with the laws on the pressexisting in most
Europeancountries and consistent with documents such as the EuropeanConvention on
Human Rights, the Soviet presslaw enumerates
restrictions on the operation of the law: "It is not
permitted to use mass information media for
divulging state or other secretsspecifically protected by Law, call for the forcible overthrow or
changeof the existing state and social system/
propagate(ideasof) war, violence, and brutality,
racral,ethnic, or religious exclusivenessor intolerance,disseminatepomography, (and)in order
to carry out other deedspunishable by law."
It is not permitted, and is punishable by Law,
to use mass information media for invasion of
private life of citizens and encroachmenton
their honor and dignity.
Alexander Merkushev 77
The above is definitely a compromise between
radicals and conservativesin parliament as well
as a tribute to the tradition of the USSR'slegal
system. What is noteworthy, howevet, is that
this is the first law in the country that enumerates things that are not allowed, rather than
things that are allowed, marking a transition to
"Whatever is not bannedby law is
the principle
allowed."
The law allows all organizations, parties,
groups,and individual citizens agedabove 18 to
establish mass media, and bans monopolization
of any medium (press,radio, or television).
For the first time in Soviet lawmaking, the
parliament adopteda law that rests on the
principle of registration, rather than permission-a precedentyet to be emulated by other
laws of the land. Many radical publishers and
editors, however, are opposedto the idea of
registration. Some,Iike SergeiGrigoryants, have
declaredthey will refuse to register their publications with the authorities as required by the law.
Characterizing the new presslaw, American
journalist Nicholas Daniloff observed,"The
Sovietpressof the 1990swill not have an easy
time, nor have Soviet hardliners given up trying
to control the media. The battle goeson.
"Yet during the struggle fought between
conservativeand liberal factions of Soviet
society, more than 600 independentnewspapers/
journals, and newsletters have made their
26
appearancein the Soviet lJnion."
Reflecting and repeatingthe fears that characterized the atmospherearound the pressdebate
in pre-revolutionary Russia,many a Soviet
parliamentarian would declarethat, given the
right to institute pressbodies,private individuals
in the country would fall prey to and become
fronts for profit-seeking cooperators(private
"underground millionaires, " and
entrepreneurs),
even foreign intelligence agencieskeen on
/'...groupcapital will
destroying the Soviet state.
be behind the individual seekingto institute a
pressbody, and this personwill actually represent an organization,recognizedor non-recognized, formal or informal, legal or illegal. The
personalizedright will become a mere camouflage or cover for the right of the otganization,"
Pravda wrote in 1990.
"One should not disregardthe fact that the
personalizedright will inevitably lead to disorder, chaos,and the unpredictability of the
situation in a spherethat demandsthat all
personsinvolved in it should possessa senseof
zz
lofty social responsibility."
Many parliamentariansand members of the
generalpublic feareda backlashirom :ht i ":::ment and party apparatuswhich strli r*:c..:- "
substantial power and were capableo: -;.-:. an all-out attack aimed to crush the emc:i.:' free press,repeatingthe fearsvoiced at thc : .
of the century during the work of the Kobci
Commission.
Conclusion
Can there really be a backlash of any kind?
Can the situation be reversed?Is it possiblethat
the presswould be willing to restrict its newly
found freedom?
Be{oretrying to find answersto these questions, it is necessaryto look back at the situation
in the country at a time when Mikhail
"period of
Gorbachevcame to power.The
stagnation,"as Leonid Brezhnev'srule was called
and the brief tenures of Yuri Andropov and
Konstantin Chernenko that followed were
characterizednot only by the slow pace of
economic development,but also-which is even
more important-by the overall apathy of the
population. It was obvious that the country had
no future among industrialized nations in the
technological and information ageunless structural changeswere made in the economic and
political systemsand correspondingincentives
were createdfor productive work. Perestroika,
which means "restructuring" in Russian,was
precisely such an attempt to propel the Soviet
Union into the modern age.And the pressrightfully-was assignedan important role to
play.
In a mere five years,the Soviet presshas
"the gold assetof the party"
turned from being
as defined by Brezhnevinto an independentbody
of decision-making,
watching over the processes
government,and democratization.It has become
in fact the largestoppositionforce in the politrcal arenaof the SovietUnion tn the late 1980s
and early 1990sthat is yet to seethe emergence
of organizedpolitical panies able to compete for
power. No government or prestdentralorder or
parliamentary decision passesunnottced by the
press.Vying for readershipand commerctal
success,which is synonymous with survtval tn
the new economic conditions, newspap€rs,radro,
and television can no longer afford hssding the
calls for "caution" from the Communist party or
the central authorities.
Although launched from above,glasnostwas
necessitatedby both domestic and international
factors. It was not a whim of only one political
leader,nor can it be done away with by a presi-
and Glasnost
12 TheRussjcn and Soviet Press:A Longlourney from Suppressionto Freedom via Supptession
dential decreeor parliamentary decision. A free
presshas become a part of political processes
taking place in the country. And these processes
have changedthe situation in the country with
all constituent republics firmly set on the course
towards sovereigntyor independence.What is
even more important is people living in all
republics of the Soviet Union have changed.
They have become more active politically; they
know that their opinion matters, that they can
make the difference.
..,they will never again
become docile vehicles for
official ideas.
Any crackdown by the central authorities may
alter the content of some central publications.
But even they will never again become docile
vehicles for official ideas.Nor can the government becomenearly as repressiveor authoritarian as it was fifty, twenty, or even ten years ago.
In addition, any action by the central government will have little or no effect on the opera-
tion of the pressin constituent republics. True,
individual republics may restrict their local press
bodiesby creating difficulties with newsprint,
imposing high taxes on media-relatedbusinesses,
or harassingjournalists, covertly or overtly. In
the emerging market economics,new businesses
will surely try to influence the pressby granting
or denying it advertising rights, bribing individual journalists, or just buying up papersand
televisionstations...
Isn't that a familiar picture?
The Soviet republics are entering the community of nations not only adding their own problems
but also partaking of the problems that exist in
countries with free pressand democratic govemment traditions that are centuries old. The battle
for democracyand democratic institutions will
continue forever, and it is precisely becauseof this
battle that democracyremains alive.
Addressingthe United StatesCongressin
1990, Czechoslovakia'splaywright-prbsident
Vaclav Havel observed,"As long as people are
people,democracyin the full senseof the word
will always be no more than an ideal. One may
approachit as one would a horizon in ways that
may be better or worse, but it can never be fullv
attained."
Alexander Merkushev 13
Endnotes
1. Richard Bennet Bayley,fueedom andRegulation
D octoral
in " i"i t i o" Perio dical Pr ess, 1905 19 14'
p' 2'
Illinois'
Urbana,
itt"tit, University of Illinois,
of
2 . I b i d . ,P . 3 .
3. Ibid.,P.8.
Censor'
4. Charles A' Ruud, Fighting Wotds: Imperial
p'
8'
L804-7906'
Prcss,
Russian
shipand the
Realities'
14. Gorbachev's Glasnost:Challenges and
University
Boston
Bittman,
Edited by Ladislav
Sesquicentennial,1989,P. 4'
15. Ibid., P. 105.
22' l99O'
16. U.S. Newsand World Report, October
17. Izvestia,MaY 23, 1988'
18. Pravda,APril 5, 1988'
tercente5. Nicholas Daniloff, Addressmarking the
Domestick'
and
Foreign
Occuuences
r"ty of Publick
25'
tut"rr""fr.tr"rts' first newspaper/Boston,September
1990.
19. Materialy XIX Vsesoyuznoikonferentsii
Kommunisticheskoi partii SovetskogoSoyuza'
Moscow,Politizdat,1988,P' 140'
6. Charles A. Ruud, oP. cit , P' 5'
20. Ibid., P. 143.
p' lO6
7. Richard Bennet Bayley,op' cit''
21. OgonYok.APril, 1990'
8 . I b i d . ,P . 1 0 5 .
22. tbid.
9. CharlesA. Ruud, oP' cit', P' 4'
23.Argumentv i Fakty,May l2-18, 1990'
lO. MoscowNews, October 23, 1988'
1990'
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14 TheRussian and soviet