TAKING
CHARGE:
Disaster Fallout Reinforces RIM’s Importance
Hurricane Katrina revealed weaknesses in records management procedures.
The lessons learned can lead RIM professionals to an expanded role in disaster planning.
Bruce W. Dearstyne, Ph.D.
R
ecords and information management
(RIM) professionals administer programs to protect vital information in
time of disaster and to ensure that the
right information gets to the people who
need it in a timely fashion for critical decision making. As described in the article “Dealing with
Disaster” on page 28, Hurricane Katrina damaged
and destroyed records and information systems on a
large scale and revealed major problems with the
way records and information are managed. The
House of Representatives’ report on the hurricane, A
Failure of Initiative, concluded:
“Many of the
problems we have
At the Core
identified can be
This article
as
categorized
‘information gaps’
Summarizes the records man– or at least probagement issues spotlighted by
lems with inforHurricane Katrina
mation- related
Pinpoints areas where RIM
implications, or
professionals can aid their
failures to act
companies in preparing for
decisively because
disaster
information was
Provides resources for further
sketchy at best.
information on disaster planBetter informaning/recovery
tion would have
been an optimal
weapon against Katrina. Information [should have
been] sent to the right people at the right place at the
right time. Information [should have] moved within
agencies, across departments, and between jurisdic-
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A Shock to the Legal System
T
he storm destroyed courthouses, ruined records,
and disrupted judicial proceedings. The New York
Times reported on September 9 (“Storm Leaves
Legal System a Shambles”) that more than a third of
Louisiana attorneys had lost their offices and most paper
files, though most computer files survived. Some arrest
and prison files were lost; the status of people accused
and convicted of crimes was uncertain. Court proceedings,
including divorces, corporate litigation, and murder, had to
be postponed or moved.
The judicial system slowly recovered. Evidential records
were located and dried out, or in some cases, other evidence was used in place of records that were lost. State
bar associations in Louisiana and Mississippi and other
groups provided advice and training for lawyers in how to
reestablish their practices and deal with lost or damaged
records. After some extended deadlines, the courts began
opening for business, sometimes in temporary locations.
Local court officials showed initiative and dedication.
The Hancock County (Mississippi) Chancery Court reported to the state’s ad hoc Hurricane Katrina Judicial
Assessment Committee in September that many records
survived, but many of them had serious water damage.
“Large numbers of ledger books turned on end are clustered in a central hallway to dry.” Older records were
stored in the county jail, which flooded. Some land records
had been copied onto microfiche or imaged, but at first it
was unclear whether the duplicates survived.
Later, the chancery court reported in a state bar association survey that it had moved into a Quonset hut, then
into trailers. Staff continued drying records, and the county hired a document preservation company to scan all its
surviving records for electronic retrieval in the future.
Once scanned, the hard-copy records were moved to a
refrigerated truck. Land records were needed for title
searches and other purposes by people who lost their
homes.“Our county can’t rebuild without having access to
the land records,” a deputy clerk noted.“That was our first
priority.”
tions of government as well….The federal government is the
largest purchaser of information technology in the world, by
far. One would think we could share information by now. But
Katrina again proved we cannot.”
The following insights and lessons learned from the crisis
will help clarify and strengthen the role of RIM professionals.
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1. Vital records are essential to document identity
and rights.
“Many victims found it difficult to reconstruct their shattered
lives” and claim rights and benefits because they did not have such
basic documents as insurance information, birth certificates, and
marriage licenses, according to a White House report, The Federal
Response to Hurricane Katrina. The Louisiana State Bar
Association advised attorneys on how to help victims replace or
find substitutes for four types of lost essential, or vital, documents:
1) bank and investment accounts; 2) birth, death, marriage, and
divorce records; 3) legal documents such as deeds; and 4) miscellaneous documents, including drivers’ licenses, passports, food
stamp cards, insurance documents, and credit cards.
Several compromises were developed. The Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals offered “birth cards” (small
versions of birth certificates) to evacuees and their children at no
cost. The state temporarily waived the requirement for parents to
present their children’s immunization records to enroll them in
schools; the Department of Health and Hospitals used its computer system to track immunization records and share them with
education officials. The Federal Department of Health and
Human Services in September permitted states to enroll evacuees
for Medicaid and other programs without requiring documents
such as tax returns or proof of residency.
2. Disaster preparedness must take into account
potential worst cases.
Often people had taken reasonable precautions that turned
out to be inadequate. Legal and court records were especially critical; many were lost. (See Sidebar “A Shock to the Legal System.”)
A team of archivists visiting the Mississippi Gulf Coast in midSeptember noted in their Report of Hurricane Katrina Damage
Assessment that many organizations had used Hurricane Camille
(1969) as their benchmark. One repository assumed a worst-case
scenario of three feet of water in their facility; in fact, a 30-foot
storm surge swept the entire building away.
Having a disaster plan helped, but using “improvised actions
as conditions permit” and a contract with a document restoration
company – including quick preparation for freeze-drying records
– made a real difference. Other exacerbating conditions – high
humidity and mold damage after the flood, lack of electricity,
structurally damaged buildings, and the displacement of records
custodians whose homes were destroyed – added to the problems.
The evidence seems to confirm that only “duplication and dispersal” – storing a reliable copy (paper or electronic) well offsite –
will ensure survival of important information essential to recovery
and that moving from paper to secure electronic systems can be an
effective preservation strategy.
3. Crises may require rapid creation of new, flexible,
inclusive information forums.
Part of the challenge posed by the hurricane and its aftermath
was simply keeping track of people displaced by the flood,
responding organizations, supplies and materials, and sources of
aid. RIM professionals played major roles in creating new information centralization forums, particularly in assessing audiences, organizing information, designing for ease of use,
and helping ensure that records management principles were
incorporated.
The federal government’s portal, FirstGov.gov, established
links to federal programs providing hurricane relief to help
coordinate efforts and aid people seeking services.
More than 50 uncoordinated websites sprang up to help
identify victims and reunite families. Microsoft, Yahoo, Google,
IBM, and the Red Cross worked together to develop a system to
crawl the web to search these sites and create a central repository, “Katrina Safe” (www.KatrinaSafe.org). The “Hurricane
Katrina Information” website (http://hurricanekatrinainforma-
evacuees. The Federal Department of Health and Human
Services negotiated agreements with Louisiana and the
Southern Governors’ Association in November to encourage
medical facilities to develop electronic rather than paper medical records systems in their rebuilding efforts. This helps
advance the Bush administration’s goal of having electronic
medical records for all Americans by 2010. Electronic medical
records pose many challenges and opportunities for RIM professionals: Who will control the information? How will privacy
be assured? What about long-term preservation? How will
records management and retention/disposition issues be handled? Katrina added to the momentum and, therefore, the need
to address these information policy and records management
issues becomes even more prevalent.
Katrina added to the momentum and, therefore, the
need to address these information policy and records
management issues becomes even more prevalent.
tion.com) is a source of information on services, employment,
and people seeking family members. It also has space for people to post their recollections and so constitutes something of
an oral history record. “Louisiana Rebuilds” (www.louisianarebuilds.info), a state-of-the-art portal, is “the first step on the
way home” for displaced people, with information on jobs,
housing, reviving a business, social services, and other topics.
4. Katrina boosted interest in electronic health
records.
Katrina tested the capacity of healthcare information systems in hospitals, nursing homes, and other facilities. The hurricane destroyed many people’s medical records; other people
were evacuated from medical facilities or fled without medical
records. Lack of information significantly complicated the
challenges of taking care of evacuees.
“A lot of people walk in and say ‘I take a little blue pill’
without any idea what it was,” complained a doctor treating
evacuees in Baton Rouge according to Lauren Neergaard in an
Associated Press dispatch on September 12. On the other hand,
Joseph Conn, writing in Modern Healthcare, noted that patients
from hospitals with computerized records, including Veterans’
Administration facilities, fared better because medical professionals could access their electronic records wherever they
went.
By October, the Louisiana Department of Health and
Hospitals, working with the American Medical Association, the
National Community Pharmacists’ Association, and others,
established a secure online service, www.KatrinaHealth.org, for
pharmacies to post prescription drug histories of evacuees and
authorized medical professionals to access them when treating
5. Blogs constitute a new kind of record.
As the hurricane tore its way across the Gulf Coast, some of
the most dramatic, first-hand accounts and photos were provided by bloggers, including residents, weather experts, and
media commentators. A search engine, Bloggers Blog, provides
links to many of them (www.bloggersblog.com/hurricanekatrina).
The Times-Picayune of New Orleans, forced out of its offices by
the rising water and publishing online, operated a blog that ran
contributions from its own reporters and some “citizen journalists.” NBC newsman Brian Williams blogged from New
Orleans.
After the storm, bloggers turned their focus to such topics as
recovery efforts, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), and the future of New Orleans. One, www.Hurricanekatrina.org, welcomes comments from people who lived
through the storm or have opinions about the government’s
response and related issues, and it also includes links to other
blogs and other information on the hurricane. Blogs get the
word out fast and can be linked to other blogs, providing the
semblance of an information network.
Their value as records, however, is uneven. A check in
March 2006 of the Katrina blogs ranked most important by the
search engine Technorati (www.technorati.com) found many
blogs featuring uninformative personal musings but also some
blogs with useful information about post-Katrina crime, the
rate of rejections for federal hurricane recovery loans, and the
probability of major coastal storms in 2006.
Blogs pose several challenges for records managers: their
accuracy and completeness cannot be confirmed, they may start
up and stop without notice, and there is currently no good way
to organize or preserve them. Developing strategies for dealing
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Disaster Planning Principles
ustralia’s DIRKS methodology offers eight steps
that help organizations implement the following
principles. For more information about the
methodology, visit www.naa.gov.au/recordkeeping/dirks/dirksman/dirks.html.
A
• Do a needs assessment and develop a disaster prevention/preparedness/response.
• Include provisions for crisis/situation management.
• Make sure employees know what they need to do in
case of a disaster.
• Test the plan before an actual emergency occurs.
• Reduce risks where possible.
• Establish or strengthen a sound, comprehensive records
management program, including records retention/disposition schedules, which are implemented and followed on a regular basis.
• Do not store records in basements, attics, or other risky
locations.
• Store inactive records and duplicates (paper or electronic) of the most important records in a secure, offsite
location – sufficiently remote so that it will not be
affected by a disaster that might strike a primary site.
• Heavy reliance on paper documents, particularly singlecopy documents stored in one location, poses a significant threat. This is an incentive for shifting from paperbased records to electronic systems and ensuring that
electronic records are duplicated or backed up in an
offsite/dispersed location.
• Consider use of decentralized computing to prevent
loss of data in a central location. Back up computer files
offsite in a secure location.
• Factor in the prospect of offices being damaged and
electrical and telecommunications systems and networks being out of commission.
with blogs-as-records will be a significant challenge for the RIM
community.
6. Lack of information leads to limited “situational
awareness.”
The hurricane overwhelmed communications systems
which, in turn, stifled information flow and left even very capable
military units information-deprived. The Louisiana National
Guard’s After Action Review noted communications breakdowns
and “lack of doctrinally correct reports, graphics, and communications procedures [that] caused duplication of effort, confusion,
and multiple requests for clarification of information,” all of
which led to serious command-and-control difficulties. The
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Louisiana National Guard recognized a need to improve “protocols associated with sharing essential information” to improve
future operational effectiveness. Other military, police, and rescue
organizations reached similar conclusions. RIM professionals can
draw on this – and other examples of information needs – in
developing robust information systems and planning for disasters.
7. Command and control require fresh, reliable
information.
The House report noted that command-and-control was
impaired at all levels, delaying critical action. Agencies in all three
levels of government were overwhelmed. Local governments were
often paralyzed by the destruction of their emergency management infrastructure. The federal government struggled to coordinate work across agencies and with state and local officials. Lack of
coordination led to delays and duplication of efforts to carry out
evacuations from the Louisiana Superdome; uncertainty about
hospital evacuations, uncoordinated search and rescue efforts, and
confusion over delivery of relief supplies were common. At the
heart of these problems was a lack of fresh, reliable, actionable
information about the extent of the damage, growing needs, and
the status of rescue initiatives.
8. Leaders have to decide during a crisis even when
information is sketchy.
The crisis showed that leaders make decisions, even when the
information is incomplete, confusing, or inconsistent. The House
report pointed out that:“Leadership requires decisions to be made
even when based on flawed and incomplete information. Too
often during the immediate response to Katrina, sparse or conflicting information was used as an excuse for inaction rather than
an imperative to step in and fill an obvious vacuum. Information
passed through a maze of departmental operations centers and
ironically named “coordinating” committees, losing timeliness
and relevance as it was massaged and interpreted for internal
audiences.”
9. Records clarify responsibility and accountability.
Who was responsible for the slow response to Katrina?
Congressional investigations and media studies, some based on
records, did not reach definite conclusions.
Louisiana officials blamed the federal government and
released e-mails and other documents to prove they asked for
help. The then-FEMA director, Michael Brown, forced out for
his ineffectiveness, criticized Louisiana and produced documentation that he had warned his boss, Secretary of Homeland
Security Michael Chertoff, as well as the White House. Chertoff
accepted some of the blame.
President Bush seemed unaware of the tragedy until too
late, but a FEMA video surfaced in the media showed him being
briefed about the prospect of the breech of levies and saying the
federal government was fully prepared to respond.
One particularly revealing document, an onsite report from
FEMA Public Affairs Officer Marty Bahamonte on August 29,
which was reproduced in the House report, stated the extent of
the city flooding and “a quarter mile breech in the levee.” Why
wasn’t the information in this and other reports used? The
House report referred to “the fog of war” to describe the general sense of confusion, inability to process information, and the
lack of effective decision-making from the White House on
down.
For the future, studies of Katrina-related records problems
can help clarify responsibility and lead to better use of records
systems.
Bruce W. Dearstyne, Ph.D., has more than 30 years of experience
as a practitioner, consultant, and professor in records, archives, and
related information work. He is the author of many articles and several books, including Managing Government Records and
Information, published by ARMA International. He may be
reached at [email protected].
Disaster Recovery Journal. www.drj.com (accessed 5 June 2006)
Jones, Virginia A. and Kris E. Keys. Emergency Management for
Records and Information Programs. Lenexa, KS: ARMA
International, 2001.
Kahn, Miriam. Disaster Response and Planning for Libraries.
Chicago: American Library Association, 1998.
Stephens, David O. “Protecting Records in the Face of Chaos,
Calamity, and Cataclysm.” The Information Management
Journal, January/February 2003.
Wellheiser, Johanna and Jude Scott. An Ounce of Prevention:
Integrated Disaster Planning for Archives, Libraries, and Records
Centers. Lanham, MD; Scarecrow Press, 2002.
References
Conn, Joseph. “IT Systems Survive Katrina.” Modern
Healthcare 35 (Sept. 12, 2005).
For More Information
ARMA International. Vital Records: Identifying, Managing,
and Recovering Business-Critical Records. ANSI/ARMA 5-2003.
Lenexa, KS: ARMA International, 2003.
“The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned.”
Report to the President, February 23, 2006. www.whitehouse.gov/
reports/katrina-lessons-learned (accessed 5 June 2006).
Disaster Puts Focus on IT, Electronic Information Systems
T
he hurricane provided many insights about the
potential strengths and weaknesses of IT and
electronic information systems. Some examples:
Preparedness makes all the difference. The likelihood of staying in business was significantly
enhanced by having a plan, being prepared, and making provision for business recovery and continuity of
services in other locations. (“IT Takes Stock in Katrina’s
Wake,”Infoworld, 9/12/05)
Disaster preparedness is more than planning.
Katrina showed the need for: analyzing and reducing
risks; identifying critical business functions; analyzing
backup needs; cultivating relationships with services
vendors and suppliers of computer equipment whom
they might need to call on in emergencies; considering having duplicate e-mail and emergency systems;
establishing off-premises websites; and testing their
recovery plans. (“Ready for the Next Katrina?”
Chronicle of Higher Education, 10/14/05)
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Natural disasters wreck infrastructures as well as
information systems. New Orleans Chief Information
Officer Greg Meffert reported that most of the city’s
data survived in offsite locations but “anything
plugged in was washed away in the flood.” There was
no question of repairing the old system. “That
system’s gone,”he said. He had to rebuild his operations center and services, improvising as he went.
A Wi-Fi network installed to support public safety
surveillance cameras was converted for police use.
A new Wi-Fi system was developed to permit inspection of houses. (“After the Storm,”Public CIO, 2/06)
Communications can be a major issue. Both land
and cell communications services were taken out of
service. Just getting in touch with employees was a
major challenge.Tom Oreck, chief executive officer of
Oreck Corporation, recalled transferring the company’s data offsite, per their disaster plan. But “communication was a major issue.That was a complete surprise….we came up with solutions to prevent com-
Hurricane Katrina Information, http://hurricanekatrinainformation.com (accessed 5 June 2006).
KatrinaHealth.org, www.katrinahealth.org (accessed 5 June 2006).
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals. “Hurricane
Katrina # 23 – Birth Cards Available at No Cost to Evacuees.”
News Release, September 3, 2005.
Louisiana Development Authority. “Louisiana Rebuilds.”
www.louisianarebuilds.info (accessed 5 June 2006).
Louisiana National Guard. “After Action Review: Hurricane
Response,” September 2005. In Eric Lipton, “A Closer Look at
Some of the Documents.” New York Times, February 10, 2006.
Louisiana State Bar Association. Emergency/Disaster Training
Manual for Volunteer Lawyers Following Hurricane Katrina,
September 29, 2005. www.lsba.org/home1/trainingmanual.asp
(accessed 5 June 2006).
Mississippi State Bar Association. “Hurricane Katrina Disaster
Relief.” www.msbar.org/hurricane-katrina-disaster-relief.php
(accessed 5 June 2006).
Mississippi State Supreme Court. “Hurricane Katrina Judicial
munications issues in the future.” (“Cleaning Up
After Katrina,” CIO, 3/15/06)
Backup files need to be located far away from
the originating site. For instance, Tulane
University had a backup system, but their tapes
were stored in a New Orleans facility, which also
flooded. (“Users Start to Weigh Long-Term IT
Issues,” Computerworld, 9/12/05)
Dispersed data centers and duplicate electronic
files permit working offsite. Many schools,
businesses, and other organizations operated from
temporary emergency locations outside New
Orleans after the flood. SCP Pool Corp., a large pool
supplies wholesaler, had contracted with a Dallas
vendor for a hot site to host its mission-critical
applications and moved its call center, support
operations, and other services there. (“Katrina: The
Ultimate Testing Ground for Disaster Recovery,”
CIOInsight, 9/20/05)
Assessment Committee Preliminary Report,” September 15, 2005.
www.mssc.state.ms.us/news/Katrina%20Report%20with%20
Orders.pdf (accessed 5 June 2006).
Neergaard, Lauren. “Katrina Shows Need to Computerize
Records.” AP Online, September 12, 2005.
“Report of Hurricane Katrina Damage Assessment,” September
21, 2005. Society of American Archivists, www.archivists.org/news/
katrina_DamageReport.pdf (accessed 5 June 2006).
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services. “HHS Enters Into
Agreements to Support Digital Health Recovery for the Gulf
Coast.” News Release, November 17, 2005. www.hhs.gov/news/
press/2005pres/20051117.html (accessed 5 June 2006).
_____. “Secretary Leavitt Tours Gulf Region; Announces
Streamlined Access to Benefits for Hurricane Katrina Victims.”
Press Release, September 13, 2005. www.hhs.gov/news/press/
2005pres/20050913a.html (accessed 5 June 2006).
U.S. House of Representatives. “A Failure of Initiative: Final
Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,” February
15, 2006. www.katrina.house.gov (accessed 5 June 2006).
Planning needs to address issues of supply chain
and logistics management. Some firms continued
their business from other locations because they had
automated their supply chain and logistics management work and could coordinate it from other locations.Chiquita Brands, for example, quickly moved its
warehousing and other operations from Gulfport,
Mississippi, to locations in Texas and Florida.(“Hurricane
Katrina: Lessons Learned,”CIOInsight, 9/13/05)
Mobile technologies and WiFi provide versatility in
disasters. The American Red Cross used wireless
laptops and WiFi at the Houston Astrodome to gather
information on people in an effort to provide assistance services.The secure system captured and
uploaded information and also produced a debit card
so families could get relief faster. (“American Red
Cross Making Client Service Faster, More Efficient,”
Press Release, 9/7/05, www.redcross.org;“IT to the
Rescue,”CIOInsight, 11/05)
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