Associations, Civic Norms, and Democracy: Revisiting the Italian Case
Author(s): Hyeong-Ki Kwon
Source: Theory and Society, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Apr., 2004), pp. 135-166
Published by: Springer
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Associations, civic norms, and democracy:
Revisiting the Italian case
HYEONG-KI KWON
Seoul National University
Abstract. By exploring associational life in early modern Italy, which the arguments of
neo-Tocquevillians such as Robert Putnam explore, this article critically reconsiders the
effects of associations upon democracy. By revealing how rich associational life resulted
in the establishment of Fascism, I argue that associations do not necessarily contribute
to the stabilization of democracy. In order to account better for meanings of associations, I emphasize transformation of identities of associations in a political and
ideological context.
In recent democratic theories, the Tocquevillian view that the viability
of democracy depends on associational life has assumed the status of
conventional wisdom.' Few scholarly books in the past decade have
generated as much debate and empirical investigation as Robert
Putnam's Making Democracy Work, which re-energized arguments
about the conception of civil society. Robert Putnam, working from
empirical research in Italy, has focused on associational life in civil
society, arguing that "democratic government is strengthened, not
weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society." In addition, Francis
Fukuyama and Benjamin Barber hold that the cooperative spirit
generated in civil society is a key factor for political democracy and
economic prosperity. A school of "associative democrats" - for example, Paul Hirst, Joshua Cohen, and Joel Rogers - maintains that
associations unburden the state and revitalize democratic decisionmaking. Many eminent scholars, including Putnam and Robert Bellah,
lament the decline of associations in the United States.2
The arguments of Tocqueville and the neo-Tocquevillians are concerned about the context of tendencies of modern democracy to lead
to excessive individualism, which may in turn lead to dangerous trends
of mass politics (i.e., mob rule and majority tyranny). As a way to
counter that trend of atomistic individualism and mass politics, neoTheory and Society 33: 135-166, 2004.
? 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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136
Tocquevillians emphasize a sense of social solidarity nurtured by
associations and social networks. In particular,"market"and "hierarchy"were discreditedbecause of the market'sfailure regardingthe
free-riderproblem and hierarchy'sinefficiency.Voluntarycooperative
spirit and trust in civil society encouraged by associational life are
sufficientto attractattentionas an alternativeto marketand hierarchy
in solving collectiveactions.
Nevertheless,a vigorous associational life does not always contribute
to consolidation of democraticorder and institutionalperformance.3
Contrary to the expectation of neo-Tocquevillians,civic associations
can generatesevere conflicts in civil society and endangerdemocracy.
For example, hate groups in civil society may deter open deliberation
throughtheir segregatedracism and parochialism;Timothy McVeigh
and other co-conspiratorsin the Oklahoma City bombing weremembers of a bowling league.4 Contraryto the Tocquevillians'theory of
"mass society" in the 1950s and 1960s, the establishmentof Fascism
and Nazism was not producedby the collapse of intermediateassociations and parasiticindividualsbut by associations themselves.5Fascism in Italyoccurrednot in the so-called"uncivic"southernprovinces
but in "civic"northern and central Italy based on voluntaryassociational life. As I demonstrate,civic associations in Italy from 1860 to
1920, which the neo-TocquevillianRobert Putnam correlateswith a
higherperformanceof democracy,contributedto the establishmentof
non-democraticFascism. Contraryto Putnam's claims, associations
do not alwayscontributeto the developmentof democracy.
By investigatingassociationallife in early modern Italy,a pursuitthat
providedneo-Tocquevillianssuch as Robert Putnamwith revitalizing
power in the last decade, I warn against over optimistic belief in
associations and their effectson democraticperformance.I arguethat
active associations in civil society do not necessarilyimprovedemocracy.Although vigorous associational life might encouragea sense of
social solidarity,civic virtuessuch as trustwithinan associationdo not
easily spread beyond its boundaries, contrary to the expectation of
neo-TocquevillianPutnam. Furthermore, solidarity under different
identities can generate severe conflicts among associations, causing
disastrous consequences in a society. By examining how flourishing
associations in earlymodern Italy contributedto the rise of Fascism,I
show that local or civic associations cannot produce specific political
outcomes, and that their effects on democracydepend upon interactions with the larger political and ideological context.6 Before inves-
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137
tigating why the golden age of associations in early modern Italy
resulted in the establishment of Fascism there, I will first critically
review Robert Putnam's neo-Tocquevillian argument about "civicness"
and expose the correlation between associational life and Fascism.
The neo-Tocquevillian interpretation of Italian civicness
Based on empirical research about the connection between democratic
performance and civic engagement, Robert Putnam argues that associations in civil society are pivotal conditions for democratic performance and economic prosperity. But the golden age of associations in
Italy that Putnam correlates with democracy also presaged the establishment of Fascism. The relationship between Putnam's civicness and
the rise of the Fascist movement must be addressed before one can
investigate in depth the process of how flourishing associations in civil
society resulted in Fascism.
Based on empirical research about institutional performance in Italy's
twenty regions, Putnam theorizes that differences in institutional
performance in contemporary Italy are strongly correlated to a pattern
of civic engagement. Map 1, "Civic Community," and Map 2, "Institu-
MostCivic
Average
Least Civic
Source:Putnam:MakingDemocracyWork,97
Malp1. The Civic Community in the Italian Regions.
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138
Highest Performance
Average Performance
Performance
bLowest
a
Source:Putnam,MakingDemocracyWork,84
Map 2. Institutional Performance in the Italian Regions, 1978-1985.
tional Performance in the Italian Regions, 1978-1985," illustrate this
correlation.
Central and northern Italy recorded high levels of governmental
performance and equally high levels of civic community, whereas
southern Italy had lower levels. Putnam traces contemporary democratic performance back to associational life in Italy between 1860 and
1920. The index of civicness from 1860 to 1920 closely correlates with
the contemporary civicness (r = .93) and with the institutional performance of the regional government (r = .86). Civic traditions of the
period between 1860 and 1920 extend even further back to the Middle
Ages. The high civicness of northern and central Italy originates from
the medieval city-state tradition, while the relative lack of civicness of
southern Italy stems from the autocratic Norman regime in place
there.
To the question of why associational life contributes to democratic
performance, Putnam claims that active involvement in secondary
associations generates social capital, norms of reciprocity, and generalized trust; the '"softsolution" of social capital generated in associational life is superior to the Hobbesian solution (a third-party enforce-
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139
ISpring
initial
Stage
1921The
expansion
S
IAr
:"
I Stage 2 Until July 1922
Stage 3 AuCust-October1922. After the
AC
*
Afailtire
general
of thelegalitarian
41922-4.
Stae
After
the
March
Rome.
on
strike
All otherprorincesexcept Ctuneo
and Palermo. hliesewere taken
over only in 1925-6
iTUSCNY
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si
"
SSARDINIhA
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-4 7k
SICILY
S ,Source:
Lyttelton.TheSeizureof Power.444-445
Map3. The FascistTakeoverof Local Power
ment) to the dilemmas of collective action such as the free-rider,
becausethe formerfacilitatesspontaneouscooperation.7Putnamalso
argues that civic norms generatedwithin an association easily spread
beyond its boundaries and thus contribute to democracy at a wider
polity level. Putnamsays:
Civil associationscontributeto the effectivenessand stabilityof democratic
government..., both because of their "internal"effectson individualmembers and because of their "external"effects on the wider polity. Internally,
associations instill in their membershabits of cooperation,solidarity,and
public-spiritedness.5
Putnam's argumentis that the democraticperformanceof northern
and central Italy today depends on the civic norms of "habits of
cooperation"that citizens learned from associational life and applied
to the widerpolity.
However,if we look at the corruption-fedeconomics of Italy during
the 1980s, it is hard to believe in the effectivenessof civic norms.
Corruption scandals that have shaken Italy since 1990 have occurred
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140
Table1. RegionalDistributionof FascistMembership,March1921and May 1922
March1921Membership
May 1922 Membership
No.
No.
%
%
Piedmont
Lombardy
Liguria
Veneto
2,411
13,968
2,749
23,549
3.0
17.4
3.4
29.3
14,526
79,329
8,841
46,978
4.5
24.5
2.7
14.3
NorthernItaly
42,677
53.1
148.774
46.0
Emilia
Tuscany
Umbria
Marches
Latium
Abruzzi
17,652
2,600
485
814
1,488
1,626
21.9
3.3
0.6
1.0
1.8
2.0
51,637
51,372
5,410
2,311
9,747
4,763
16.0
15.9
1.8
0.8
3.0
1.5
CentralItaly
24,657
30.6
125,240
39.0
3,550
4,211
712
3,569
1,100
4.4
5.2
0.9
4.4
1.4
13,944
20,683
2,066
9,546
2,057
4.4
6.4
0.6
3.0
0.6
SouthernItaly
13,142
16.3
48,296
15.0
Totals
80,476
Campania
Apulia& Lucania
Calabria
Sicily
Sardinia
100
322,310
100
Source:De Felice,Mussoliniilfascista, vol. 1, pp. 8-11; Revelli,"Italy,"p. 14.
mainly in so-called "civic" regions.9 In addition, the immediately
apparenteffects of the civicness of central and northernItaly between
1860and 1920on liberaldemocracyin the early 1920scontraststarkly
with the civic climate of the 1980s, negating the claim that "civic
associations contributeto the effectivenessand stabilityof democratic
government."10 In fact, Fascists seized power based on their movement in central and northern Italy. As illustrated by Map 3, "The
Fascist Takeoverof Local Power,"and Maps 1 and 2, Fascist regions
correspondalmost exactly with Putnam's"civic"regionsof centraland
northernItaly.Table1,"RegionalDistributionof Fascist Membership"
shows the regional distributionof the Fascist movement in the early
1920sin more detail. Fascism rose rapidlyin Putnam'scivic regionsof
central and northernItaly,ratherthan in the uncivic regions of southern Italy. The civicness of central and northern Italy, such as Lombardy,Veneto, Emilia and Tuscany,were fertile soil for the Fascist
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141
movement rather than democratic stability. Putnam evaluates the
civicness of 1860-1920 Italy by the strength of mass-based parties in
1919-1920, the incidence of cooperatives in 1889-1915, membership in
mutual help societies in 1873-1904, electoral turnout in 1919-1920, and
the longevity of local associations. But the indicators of civicness that
Putnam detects during this period were actually indicators of violence
and bitter conflicts.
Contrary to the optimistic neo-Tocquevillian explanation, social capital fostered by associational life did not extend to the wider polity. The
massive electoral turnout, combined with bitter conflicts not only at
mass parties but also among associations inspired by Radicalism,
destabilized the liberal regime, resulting in the establishment of Fascism. Cooperatives and mutual help societies in 1860-1920 Italy should
be understood by their identities in the political and ideological context.
The voluntary associations in early modern Italy emerged, pursuing
mutual aids, but later transformed into proponents of radical Republicanism and Socialism. The sense of social solidarity nurtured by associational life was utilized in an idea of radical nationalism and Socialism,
finally transforming into Fascism in the turbulent political context.
Fascism grew rapidly in the short period from September 1920 (the
"Occupation of the Factories" under the leadership of Socialism) to
October 1922 (the "March on Rome" by Fascists), by taking advantage
not only of organizational skills learned from associational life, but
also of the political vacuum created by bitter conflicts among associations. Why and how did flourishing associations between 1860 and
1920 contribute to the establishment of Fascism? To answer this
question, I examine first how the associations destabilized the liberal
regime; then, I explore what roles associations in civil society played in
competition for power as an alternative to liberal democracy.
Liberals and associational life
The growth of associational life endangered, rather than contributed
to, the establishment of cooperative and democratic society in Italy in
the early modern era, although Putnam rightly characterizes the late
nineteenth century in Italy as "the golden age of mutual help societies."1" This section investigates in detail how these associations
destabilized liberal regimes, and how the liberal regime failed to
capitalize on the sense of social solidarity fostered by the associations.
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142
At the end of the pre-modernera, especially when the feudal estate
systemwas abolishedin the early nineteenthcentury,therewas considerablegrowth in the numberof voluntaryassociations such as reading
rooms, scientificassociations,associationsfor the improvementof arts
and industry,aristocraticclubhouses,and recreationclubs.12 Redefining the social geography and reconstructingthe spaces of elite life,
these associations contributedto the prevalenceof liberalismin Italy.
Adrian Lyttelton rightly describes the growth of associations and
liberalism:
The expansionof liberalismin Italy in the decade beforethe revolutionsof
1848coincidedwith a "maniafor associations."The "spiritof association,"in
fact, can be consideredas "a metaphorfor liberalism,"defined as the selforganizationof a carefullydelimitedcivil society.13
Voluntaryassociations in early modern Italy not only raised future
liberal politiciansbut also diffusedliberaland national fervor.Nevertheless, the characteristicsof these associationsare not as simpleas socalled "devicesfor the developmentof social capital."It is noteworthy
that the membersof these associations were not ordinarypeople, but
the rich, prestigious upper classes comprised of aristocrats, landowners, professionals,officials, and rich merchants.For example, the
AgrarianSocieties that formedthe core groupof Risorgimentoliberalism were constituted mainly of commercializedlandlords clamoring
for free trade (e.g., Camillo Cavourin Piedoment,Bettino Ricasoli in
Tuscany,and Minghettiin Bologna).14
One must note the limitations of the early liberal associations. The
liberalclubs and associations failed to co-opt the spiritof associations
from ordinarypeople after the unificationof Italy.Liberalassociations
remained localistic, and based on personal relationships;thus, they
failed to integrate the nationalistic fervor of the majority of the
populace, losing the initiativesto radicalRepublicans.'5Becausecitybased notables in northern Italy had little contact with countryside
folk, it was difficultfor elite clubs and associationsto reachout to nonelite people in ruralareas.After unification,popular(mass-based)associations flourished, inspired by patriotic Republicanismand Socialism.16 In the 1870s,mutual help societies and Republicanfraternities
spreadwidely in ruralareas. For example, the Artisan Brotherhoods,
inspired by Mazzini, broadly diffused popular Republicanism in
northern and central Italy. In the 1880s, the middle- and workingclasses began to form their own associations. About one hundred
workers' associations emerged in Milan by 1881.The most popular form
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143
of association was mutual help societies. At the turn of the century,
936,000 members were registered in mutual help societies, whereas
cooperatives maintained 500,000 members and Socialist-inspired
trade unions about 250,000.17
Liberals failed to integrate the spirit of associations in ordinary people
within national democratic institutions. Under the stresses of the task
of national unification and the difficulty in controlling the church,
Risorgimento Liberals changed their "society-centered" model to a
"state-centered" model. Many Liberals, struggling with the project of
national unification, began to regard associations based on local elites
and the primacy of communal loyalties as an obstacle to the establishment of a nation-state. On the other hand, due to the papacy's denial
of the new nation-state, liberal elites were not comfortable with the
spontaneous forces of civil society. Despite their adherence to the statecentered model, Liberals failed to dissolve popular associations or
prohibit meetings legally. In the first several years after unification,
moderate Liberals tried to promote and control mass-based associations, but they ultimately failed to win over popular associations,
losing them in competition with the Catholic Church. In order to
control the Church's influence, Liberals relied on statist bureaucratic
devices. Another method used to check the spirit of associations in
ordinary people was to close off the access of popular associations to
the public realm, but this tactic was challenged by the Republicans.
Through this process, Liberals lost their mass-based associations and
failed to develop a popular associative base. 18
Because of the Liberals' shallow mass base, the liberal regime was
propped up by two main poles. The first was a restricted franchise; in
1870, about two percent of the total population had the right to vote on
account of the restriction of male franchise and property qualification.
Although there had been several electoral reforms, the franchise
remained restricted.19 It is not surprising, then, that the adoption of
proportional representation and the extension of franchise in 1919
brought the Liberals a great defeat. Another pole supporting the
liberal state was the system of clientele-patronage networks. Before
the emergence of the Socialist party, no nation-wide mass party system
existed. Liberals existed in a "tendency" in which many groups combined or dissolved according to their local or group interests.20 Voters
in small towns, especially in the south, were easily manipulated by
local magnates. The local magnates acted as "grand electors" within
patronage networks. In this political structure, the prime minister
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144
createda majorityin parliamentand ruled Italy,"by patronageand by
ceaseless negotiation with the leaders of the fluctuating regional or
personal groupingsof deputies."21Although the liberal regimein the
Giolittian era (1900-14) was relativelystable because of its alliances
with Catholics, which were a counterweightto Socialists, these new
allianceswere fragile.
To understandthe collapse of the liberalregimeand the establishment
of Fascism, one must note the political and ideological context
generated in the First World War. Italy's disappointment with the
outcome of the war caused the growth of interventionistnationalism,
contrastedwith Russia, and the enormityof non-compensatedItalian
sacrifice caused the repudiationof establishedItalian politicians(i.e.,
anti-liberalism),comparedunfavorablyto France and Britain.In this
political and ideological context of anti-liberalismand interventionist
nationalism, the upsurge of popular participation and the Catholic
non-expedit became critical to the liberal regime. Italy's military
intervention in 1914 was actually the Liberals'desperate measureto
maintain power, hoping that military intervention would generate
popular support for liberal leadership of the country.22The result,
however,was exactly the opposite of what the Liberalshad hoped for.
The Italian people disassociated themselveseven more severelyfrom
the Liberalsnot only because the Liberalsbroketheir own promiseon
political economic reforms, but also because war produced severe
conflictswithin liberalfactions, especiallyamong pacifists,democratic
interventionists,and revolutionaryinterventionists.Liberals on the
right wing (Salandrra,Sonnino, Orlando)and the moderateleft (Nitti)
refusedto supportthe neutralistsunderthe leadershipof Giolitti.This
conflict within the liberal state produced the "ministerialcrisis" in
which no liberal factions could constitute stable government just
before Mussolini'sMarchon Rome in 1922.23
Although the liberal regime fell into crisis in postwar Italy, this
collapse did not lead automaticallyto the Fascist revolution;instead,
Socialists gained mass support in the mood of anti-liberalismand
discinnovismoimmediately after the First World War.24 The next
section will examine this and other alternativesto liberalism,leading
to possibleideologicalsolutions for "awakening"and "less submissive"
Italians.
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145
Alternativesto liberalism
In postwar Italy, there were two large mass parties (Catholic and
Socialist) that could provide an alternative interpretative framework
to the Italian people, particularly in regards to mass movement based
on popular associations. Political options as alternatives to the liberal
regime must be examined before we begin to explore why the political
currents failed or succeeded in competition for popular support from
voluntary associations.
The first feasible option to the liberal regime was Catholic democracy.
Considering that Liberals in France and Britain could stabilize liberal
democracies by the Center-Right coalitions, a collaboration between
the Catholics and the Liberals might have stabilized early postwar
Italy. But the Catholic Popular Party (Partito popolare) vetoed the
formation of a national government, a decisive point in the collapse of
the liberal regime. The basic reason why the popolari did not collaborate with the Liberals was because of conflicts between the Italian state
and the Vatican. The conflict came from ideological symbols (the
Liberals' anti-clericalism and the Vatican's non-expedit), rather than
the "uncivic" character of Catholicism.
Catholics' non-expedit (the abstention of Catholics from public life in
Italy) and Liberals' anti-clericalism arose from the bitter conflict
centered on the "Roman Question" in Italian unification. The unification of the Italian state required the inclusion of Rome as its own
territory because of Rome's unique symbolic significance and the
persistent memories of the Roman empire. For the Vatican, the Roman
Question depended on the Pope's temporal power and spiritual authority. The papacy could not permit itself to be subjected to the jurisdiction of any state, and could not be merely Italian while remaining
universally Catholic. The papacy considered temporal sovereignty in
Rome essential to its spiritual performance.25 As a result, Catholics
were forced to withdraw from participation in elections.
However, Catholics were free to organize ordinary people in local
politics through charity and mutual help societies. In addition, with
the rise of Radicalism, Catholic associations formed "clerico-moderate" alliances with conservative Liberals, which were countered by
democratic blocs composed of Radicals, Republicans, and Socialists.
As the franchise increased while Liberals failed to co-opt a popular
associative base, Liberals needed sufficient votes to defeat Socialists.
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146
On the side of the Church,the Vaticanalso revisedits oppositionto the
liberal state in the face of the menace of radicalism. The Vatican
thoughtthat it was betterto spreadspiritualauthoritythroughschools,
hospitals, and charitabletrusts under a compromise with the liberal
state.26 Thus, in the Giolittianera, the Catholiclay associations,which
Putnam describesas "uncivic"because of their hierarchicalstructure,
fosteredstabilityin the liberal regime.The effects of Catholic associations on democracy were determined not by associational internal
character,but by the relationshipbetween the Vaticanand the liberal
state.
By the end of Leo XIII's pontificate, the non-expeditbecame little
more than symbolic, and was canceled formally.However,the symbol
remainedideologicallypowerfulenough to deter the Catholic Popular
Party from participatingin national government.Furthermore,anticlericalismwas still a powerfulforce among Liberals.On January22,
1922, when Benedict XV died, the Ministerof Justice paid an official
condolence call at the Vatican, shocking almost all Liberals.Shortly
thereafter, on February 1, 1922, the eve of parliament's assembly,
the newly formed Democratic Group called on its friends inside the
cabinetto withdraw,an act inspiredby the Liberals'anti-clericalism.27
These events led to a revival of the non-expeditsymbol. In contrast
with France, the conflict between anti-clericalismand the Church's
non-expedit was decisive in the breakdown of the liberal state in
postwar Italy. In France, anti-clericalismwas also revived with the
Dreyfus Affair as in Italy, but the Poincare governmentin 1912was
able to reorganizea "concentration"majoritythroughthe relaxationof
anti-clericalism.28
An alliance between Catholics or Liberalsand Socialists was another
option for stabilizinga democraticregime.In the postwarera, reformists led by Turatifocusedon constitutionalreform,leading Giolitti and
the Liberalsto think that a nationalgovernmentshouldincludeSocialist-reformists.Catholics also tried to collaboratewith Socialists. But
such attempts at creating alliances between moderate Socialists, Liberals, and Catholics failed mainly because Socialists became more
radicalafter the war.29 The growingmilitancyof the masses, workers'
factoryoccupation,and the RussianRevolutionin the postwarcontext
furthercontributednot only to the radicalizationof Socialism,but also
to splits of the Socialist movement. But the "inclusive" factory occupation in 1920, a peak of Socialist movement, sharpened ideological
conflicts among reformists, maximalists, and communists without
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147
moderating the party's parliamentary intransigence. On account of the
party's parliamentary intransigence and radical situation, even reformists were careful in forming alliances with Liberals.30 Although radical
Socialists took initiative in postwar mass movement, they did not
succeed in their revolution.
It was the Fascists who succeeded in giving the Italian people an
appealing and effective alternative to liberalism. Before 1920, however,
Fascism was just "a movement of elite adventurers or intellectuals." 31
Fascism grew into a mass movement rapidly, filling the political and
ideological vacuum that neither Socialists nor popolari could fill. In
October 1919, when the first Fascist Congress was held in Florence,
Fascist groups claimed 40,385 members. But by the middle of 1920, the
Fascist movement quickly became a mass movement in the wake of the
crisis of the parliamentary system and the catastrophic failure of the
"Occupation of the Factories" by workers, jumping from 88 fasci and
80,476 members in December 1920 to 471fasci and 98,399 members in
April 1921, 1,318 fasci and 217,256 members in November 1921, and
2,124fasci and 322,310 members in May 1922.32
A main component of the Fascist movement was radical nationalism,
influenced by war intervention and its aftermath. Although there was a
broad spectrum of middle-class associations, such as voluntary professional associations and cultural and patriotic groups, they suffered
from various cleavages of interests. The only unifying force among the
middle-class associations was patriotism. During the war, many interventionist groups, such as the Comitato di Resitenza Interna (Committee of Internal Resistance) and the Fascio Rivoluzionario Interventisa
(Fascist Revolutionary Interventionists), were formed. At the end of
the war, this Committee of Internal Resistance was transformed into
the Progressive Association, which tried to perpetuate the interventionist alliance and the unity of "moderates" (anti-clerical middleclass shopkeepers and employees) and "democrats" (the landowners
and professionals).33 In addition, the Progressive Association connected with the National Association of War Veterans (Associazione
Nazionale di Smobilitate). It was this kind of combination of various
popular associations that formed the Fascist mass movement.
The formation of Fascist organizations came from two main directions, local as well as national. Local Fascism appeared in spontaneous
popular associations called fasci and led by ras; national Fascism
existed inside parliament, led by Mussolini. The spontaneously formed
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148
local Fascist organizationsdid not have hierarchicalconnectionswith
the Fascist Party (PNF). Local leaders, or ras, "were less ready to
accept without question instructions from a newspaper editor in
distant Milan."34This meant that the Fascist mass movementwas not
establishedwith a hierarchicalstructureor a consistent program.This
spontaneous movement contained contradictoryand conflicting elements such as anti- and pro-parliamentarism,anti-clericalismand
Mussolini's pro-clericalism, and workerism and pro-employerism.
These conflicts within the Fascist movement were resolved through
the mediation of radical nationalism. Mussolini needed organized
forces of local fasci, while local fasci needed a national symbol like
Mussolini.Throughthis pragmaticcompromise,the spontaneousFascist movement developed rapidly,competing with the Catholics and
Socialistsfor the supportof popularassociations.
Competingfor membersof associative groups:A regional
examination
Social capital fostered by mutual help societies in early modern Italy
did not necessarilycontributeto the establishmentof cooperativeand
well-performingdemocraticsociety.Social capitaland social solidarity
nurturedby associational life were utilized by identities and ideas of
associations. Associations in early modern Italy changedtheir identities from mutual aid to radical nationalismor Socialism, and later to
Fascism.Without an understandingof the constitution and transformation of identities,it is hard to identifythe effectsof associationson
democracy.This section investigatesin detail why associations transformed their identity and political faith, leading to the support of
Fascism.
Even as a "late-comer"to the political scene, Italian Fascism seized
powerby gaining the supporterswho had formerlyidentifiedas Socialists and Catholics. For example, according to E. SpencerWellhofer's
(2003) recentempiricalstudy of 1919and 1921regionalelectionsbased
on the data of 54 electoraldistricts and the 6,110local municipalities,
Fascism's electoral success in May 1921, which aided its march to
power even though the election did not mean a wholesale conversion
process, was mainly explained by 1919-1921voter transitions rather
than property holding arrangements and violence. Based on the 1919
and 1921 election data that Wellhofer discovered recently in his field
research, he argues that "the municipalities more likely to vote Fascist
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149
were those located in districts where the 1919 Center-Left and Socialist
vote was higher and where the Socialist rural organizational membership density was higher."35 In the 1919 election, approximately 64% of
contract laborers and 61% of day laborers supported the Socialists. But
in the 1921 election, approximately 70% of contract laborers and 56%
of day laborers supported the Fascists; consequently, support for the
Left dramatically declined to 44.9% in contract laborers and 21.5% in
day laborers. Sharecroppers, who supported the Center-Left in 1919 by
34%, shifted to the Fascists in 1921 by 31%, dropping their support to
the Center-Left by only 8.6%. It is noteworthy that the same organizations of popular associations shifted their identities. For example, in
the 1919 election, approximately 63% of Socialist rural organization
members, 60% of Socialist rural trade union members, and 76% of the
unaffiliated trade union members voted for the Socialists. In the 1921
election, however, approximately 51% of Socialist rural organizational
members, 56% of Socialist trade union members, and 34% of unaffiliated trade union members voted for the Fascists. Why did the Italian
people change their identity and political faith? How did Fascism win
over the associative people in early modern Italy?
Violence of the Fascist squads does not explain the whole story of
Fascist success.36 For example, Fascist achievements in Bologna,
where violence reached the highest levels, were considerably more
modest than those of Ferrara. In addition, recent statistical studies
reveal that violence was not the decisive factor, although important,
and that there is no significant correlation between violence and the
Fascist vote in 1921.37 Based on extensive study of Ferrara, Paul
Corner argues that too much attention to violence misses something
important. Corner rightly points out that "Some people were beaten
into submission, certainly, but many came to Fascism spontaneously
and for varying reasons."38 This article emphasizes the transformation
of identities in a political and ideological context that interactions
among associations continuously constituted in the wake of Italy's
disappointment with the outcome of the war and the upsurge of
popular participation in postwar Italy. First, I focus on regional differences in the ways in which Italian Fascism made inroads into Socialist
and Catholic associative groups; then I explore in detail the means of
competing for popular support of associative groups.
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Problems of southernItaly
As Map 3 "The Fascist Takeover of Local Power" and the table
detailing "RegionalDistribution of Fascist Movement"show, Fascists
did not appeal to ordinarypeople in the so-called "uncivic"areas of
southern Italy, whereas they made rapid inroads in the civic areas of
central and northernItaly.This section exploreswhy Fascists, as well
as Socialists,were weak in southernItaly.
In the early twentieth century, Italy was an unevenly industrialized
country.While central and northern Italy modernizedrapidlyduring
the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, southern Italy
lagged behind. Most modern industrialenterpriseswere densely concentrated in the Milan-Genoa-TurinTriangle.Commercializedfarming was centered in the fertile valley of the Po River. Although less
developed than northern Italy, central Italy moved away from the
feudal system, and mezzadria(small peasant leaseholding and small
peasant proprietorship)prevailed.By contrast, most regions of southern Italy retaineda feudalsystem, latifundium.In social and economic
terms, southern Italy was the least developed region of the country.
The reasonthe appealof Socialistsand evenpopolari(politicallyactive
Catholics) was weak was not simply because of the area'sunderdevelopment; it also hinged on the status of associational life in southern
Italy. Associational life can be a strong resourcefor mass movement,
althoughit cannot determinethe directionof mass movement.
In southernItaly,with the exceptionof Apulia, Fascismand Socialism
were hard to find. As in other regions of Italy,discontentafterWorld
WarI createda new atmosphereof militancyin southernItaly.Without
pre-existing organizational bases, however, peasant revolts in the
postwar era were the expression of this atmosphere, following the
traditional style of sporadic peasantjacqueries. Gramsci writes that
"the South can be described as an area of extreme social disintegration, [t]he peasants [...] have no cohesion among themselves."39
Among peasants, there existed only weak solidarity.The social conditions of southernItaly made peasant rebellionendemic,but peasant
rebellions had no coherentlong-term goals because of the absence of
organizationto articulatepeople'sdiscontents.
The first reason for weak solidarity among southern peasants can be
found in the social conditions of southern Italy that affected people's
life-style. In southern Italy, the semi-feudal latifundium was hardly
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151
touched. Peasants lived in scattered strips of tenure land. The land
under this semi-feudal tenure system was divided into tiny plots
cultivatedby a single, isolated family.This traditionalsystem militated
against any broad cooperation among peasants. In addition, emigration was a major "safety valve," draining off the discontented.40
Becausemost emigrantswere young men between20 and 40 years old,
southern people lost their potential organizationalleaders. Furthermore, the southern pattern of strong clientele relationships deterred
peasantsfrom creatingtheir own organizedmovements.In centraland
northern Italy, city-based notables had little personal contact with
countrysidepeople and did not control voluntary associations in the
countryside. By contrast, in southern Italy, both landowners and
peasants settled in the same area. Based on the direct contact and
strongclientelisticbondage, southernnotableswere able to exercisean
inclusive and effective hegemony.Thus, Republicans, Socialists, and
evenpopolarihad difficultyin penetratingthe clientele-patronagenetwork in southernItaly.41
Finally, ideological effects of the Catholic non-expeditalso prevented
southernItaliansfrom developinga secularassociational and political
movement. For example, voters' abstention due to the Vatican'snonexpedithighlightedthe distributionand strengthof clericalism. Even
when conflict between the Vatican and Liberals was tapering, the
percentage of voters' abstention remained high.42 One exception in
southern Italy was Apulia, where the Socialist movement was strong
becauseclericalismwas weak.43In Apulia, landlessworkersdeveloped
local and provincial associations and, through these associations,
cooperatedfor economic benefits. By 1911,these associations created
a strong labor movement.44The situation in Apulia confirms that
clericalism,specificallythe non-expedit,was one of the main reasons
for the weak status of Socialists,Fascists,and evenpopolari.
The case of southern Italy shows that development of democratic
society requires associational life and sense of social solidarity,
although the associational life still leaves much room for various
consequences.In the absence of solidarityamong associative people,
or in the condition of socially disintegratedindividuals,authoritarian
order like feudalisticnobles' rule can easily prevail, as southern Italy
showed,and whichTocquevilliansworriedabout. In southernItaly,the
clerical non-expedit and the tradition of strong clientele networks
deterred any political movement of democratic reform and national
integration from taking root among ordinary people.
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Competitionin central and northernItaly
The main area of competitionfor Fascists,Socialists,andpopolariwas
centraland northernItaly,wherevoluntaryassociationsflourished;for
example, about 94 percent of a national total of 443 mutual help
societies in 1862were located in centraland northernItaly.45 It was in
these so-called "civic"regions that Fascists establishedtheir first and
strongest footholds. Initially, popular associations in postwar Italy
contributed to the growth of Socialism. But people in the civic
associations changed their identity and political faith, reflectingtheir
own practices in a turbulent political context. In this environment,
Fascism grew rapidly,competing mainly with Socialism, by focusing
on differentgroupsof the population.
In the summerand fall of 1920,when the Socialist movementwas at its
height, peasant and labor struggles directly raised the question of
power and placed the prerogativesof property in jeopardy.In cities
such as Milan, Turin, and Genoa, workers occupied factories and
managed production for themselves. In the countryside, peasants
occupied lands.46In addition, on a political level, the Socialist party
won national and provincialelections in the fall of 1920.47The victory
of the Socialist party in local and provincial elections effected the
passing of local power from the hands of the traditionalrulingclasses
to Socialists.
The victory of the Socialist movement in 1920 meant not just victory
over the Liberalsbut also victory over the popolari;on local levels, it
was a victory over the clerical-liberalalliance. Before the war, there
were two main local currents among popular associations: Socialist
and Catholic associations.These were based on mutual help societies,
cooperatives, and recreational associations. These popular associations conflicted mainly on the issue of town governance,formingtwo
main coalitions of anti-clericalleftists and clerical-Liberals.The anticlericalleft consisted mainly of the workingclass and so-called "Democrats" (local anti-clericalmiddle-class shopkeepersand employees).
The clerical-liberalcoalition comprised by Catholics and so-called
"Moderates"(landownersand professionals).The latter clero-moderate connubio was a local variant of the national liberal-Catholic
alliance against the Socialist movement in the Giolittian era, during
which the Moderates dominated the local affairs on the basis of the
clero-moderatealliance.48 But this situationchangedin 1919and 1920,
when the Socialist movement reached its climax. Socialists made in-
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roads into the Catholic associative base as peasants and unskilled
laborersfrom ruralbackgroundstransformedtheir political faith from
Catholicismto Socialism.49
However,Socialists failed to accomplish their own revolution even at
this climax, paradoxicallylosing their own associativebase to Fascists.
Why did this happen? The failure cannot be blamed entirely on
internecinesplits among Socialists. It was also the result of people in
the Socialist movementfacing unexpectedconsequences of their own
practices,such as disappointmentin utopianism, fear of an uncertain
future,and new conflicts.
In order to understand the reasons for the failure of the Socialist
movement, we must first recognize changes in existing coalitions of
popular associations as unskilled workers appeared in the political
arena. In the Giolittian era, mechanizationproducedenormous numbers of unskilledworkers.But at that time, the unskilledwere not an
influentialfactor in the political arena.BeforeWorldWarI, workersat
the local level expressedtheirdemandsmainly throughthe anti-clerical
left, the so-called "Popular Coalition" against the clero-moderate
alliance.The PopularCoalitionwas mainly made up of skilled workers
and lower-middle-classgroups.50However,the tremendousparticipation of "awakened"unskilled workers in the political arena after the
war caused changes in both the anti-clericalPopularCoalition and in
the clero-moderate alliance. A postwar influx of radical unskilled
workers challenged the leadership of moderates and democrats in
each alliance, causing internal conflicts within each movement, of
which the Fascists took advantage.51 Although "awakened"unskilled
workersgave the initial revolutionaryimpetus to the Socialist movement - membershipin the Socialist tradeunion increasedenormously
in a very short time on account of the recruitmentof unskilledworkers,
from 249,039in 1918,to 1,150,062in 1919,and to 2,200,100 in 192052the massive recruitmentof radical unskilled workers promoted conflicts among workers,for example, between contract laborers and day
laborers,as shall be examined later in detail. One of the reasons for
these conflicts was the under-representationof the unskilled. For
example,in the Socialist party'selectorallist of the Sesto area in 1920,
seven of the nine candidateswere either artisans or skilled workers.53
Dissatisfactionof newlyrecruitedworkerscaused them to defect to the
Fascists. A Socialist press in April 1921 confessed this defection, saying
that "the present defections are the work of those who came last to the
proletarian organization because they are unhappy with the regime of
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social and working-class justice brought about through the labor
exchanges."54 Additionally, skilled workers could not control the
enthusiasmof the new recruits,who werefilled with radicalvision and
discianovismo.Skilled workers and existing Socialists were swamped
by the new recruits'radicalspontaneity.55
The divisionamong workersfurtheredexistingconflictsin theirSocialist party.It is hardto deny that the failureof the Socialistmovementat
its climax was precipitatedby its internecine schisms.56 The deeprooted schism between maximalists and minimalists in the Socialist
movementled first to the formal split between Socialistsand Communists in January1921.Then, in October 1922,the reformistfaction led
by FillipoTuratiwas expelledby the maximalistsof the Socialistparty.
Maximalistsand Communistcurrentsrootedin the Chamberof Labor
argued for immediate sovietization, while minimalists rooted in the
Category Federationsinsisted on democraticreform.The disunityof
the Socialist movement appearedto be crucial in terms of the organizational efficiency of a united movement. But a more important
considerationis that conflicts among Socialistsleft not only suspicion
and hostility among partyactivists but also a sense of demoralization
and discouragementamong ordinaryworkers.II Domani, the maximalist-orientedSocialist paper, pointed out the profound sense of discouragementthat had overtakenordinaryworkers:
Deprivedof a goal [.. .] theirloss of faith is thereforemorejustified.How can
we hope for their loyalty and discipline when their leaders destroy [the
movement]in the name of purity?57
Another importantfactor in the failureof the Socialistmovementwas
this disillusionmentand discouragementamong workers.Associative
people under Socialist leadership took from their experiences of
"Occupationof Factories"a great disappointmentthat led to a change
in their ideological identities.During their factory occupations,workers acknowledgedthat "thedifficultyof replenishingrawmaterialsand
obtaining money for wages brought some sense of reality into Utopia."58 Laborersfelt neither technologicallynor morally equippedto
manage factories. Angelo Tasca writes of this discouragementamong
workers:
The occupation of the factories denoted the decline of the working-class
movement.... The former"victors"weredemoralized;they had attempteda
superhumaneffort,and had drunkat the intoxicatingspringsof freeproduction only to find themselvesat the end in an atmosphereof a wake - and
more seriously,withoutprospectfor the future.59
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The "Occupationof Factories"showed workers the harsh reality of
their utopianvision, ratherthan the illusion of a Socialist victory.The
Socialist idea of workers'autonomous management or sovietization
surrenderedto an emerging "bourgeois"ideology of "scientificmanagement" by their own practices.60 For example, when Giovanni
Agnelli, president of Fiat, formally proposed handing over the management of the enterpriseto the labor organizations,laborersrefused
it.61
As disillusionmentreplacedthe enthusiasmand militancy that rapidly
emerged among the rank-and-file,particularlynewly recruitedworkers, Fascist practicalprogramsbecame attractiveto workers.Fascism
filled the void at this critical point, becoming a mass movement. As
Wellhoferrightly points outs, "adaptingto local conditions, the Fascists settled strikes on more favorableterms than the Socialists or the
Catholics proposed."62In April 1921,the Fascist "economicunions"
were founded, and they became full-fledgedin February1922. Fascist
propaganda of "scientificmanagement"appealed to many workers,
especiallythose disappointedand "tired"afterfactoryoccupation.63The
Fascists also co-opted many unemployedworkersbecause the Fascists
could providejobs by means of their connectionswith capitalists.
In addition, the Fascists tried to promote and appeal to cultural
associationssuch as concert and drama-readinggroups.64 The Fascists
also proposed "leisure-timeactivity" in inter-class rather than classbound terms. For example, the Fascists founded sports associations
such as soccer and billiardsleagues.Evenwhen riots and revolutionary
talk swept Italy, workers, middle-class citizens, and war veterans
played soccer together.The Fascists also organized billiards tournaments to raise funds for a monument for the war dead. Throughthese
cultural activities, the Fascists instilled a sense of national duty and
provided moral uplift. These Fascist cultural activities erased class
conflictsand steeredworkersawayfrom class-orientedSocialist movements. Solidarity and generalized consensus raised through associational activities were mobilized for the purpose of the Fascist movement, instead of contributingto stabilizingdemocracy.
Competitionfor ex-combatants
Winning the support of ex-combatants was very important to the
Fascists. Most young Italian men, especially peasants, were mobilized
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duringWorldWar I, and their ideological impact on postwar society
when they returned to their old positions in the community was
considerable.As illustratedby the peasant revolt in the Roman campagna,65 ex-combatants were at the forefront of mass movements
because the war had changedthe mentalityof peasantsoldiers,making
them sensitiveto their rights and apt to organize.Earlyin the postwar
era, Socialist unions (CGL) and Catholic unions (CIL) increasedtheir
membershipenormouslyby recruitingthese ex-combatants.66
However,neitherthe Socialists nor the popolarisucceededin fully coopting ex-combatantsbecause they did not understandtheir complex
psyches.When the ex-combatantsreturnedto civil life, most of them
retained a hatred of war, but they were also angry at statementsthat
"thewar had been in vain."The Socialists and thepopolaridid not take
the hurt nationalismand heroismamong ex-combatantsinto account.
In particular,the Socialists criticized not only war leaders but also
humble combatants.Ordinaryex-combatantswere "despisedfor their
The Socialists'
gullibilityand often barredfrom party membership."67
action
alienated
thousands
of
Socialists"
doctrinaire
(ex"embryo
combatants)from their movement.
By contrast, Fascists succeeded in appealingto ex-combatants.First,
Mussolini changed the title of II Popolo d'Italia from "The Socialist
Daily" to "TheCombatantsand Producers."Mussolinitried to keep in
touch with many of the ex-combatantclubs and societies, where he
tried to extend war-tensionand comradeshipby employing symbols
such as the steel helmet, dagger, and military banners.The Fascists'
nationalismappealedto the ex-combatants,addressingthe ideological
needs of injurednationalism and anti-clericalism,which neither the
Socialists nor the popolaricovered.
Competingfor peasants
It was not until Fascism took root among peasantsthat it swelledinto
a mass movement.Consideringthat peasantsconstitutedthe majority
of the ItalianpopulationafterWorldWarI, the co-optation of associative peasants was crucial. Although Socialists and Catholics first
organized peasant movement successfully after the war, the Fascists
quickly made inroads into the associative bases in rural areas. For
example, as stated above, sharecropperswho supported the CenterLeft in 1919by 34% defected to Fascism (31%for Fascists; 8.6%for
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Center-Left in 1921). Although contract laborers and day laborers
supported Socialists in 1919 by 64% and 61% respectively, they supported Fascists in 1921 by 70% and 56% respectively. In the 1921
election, 51% of Socialist rural organizational members and 56.4% of
Socialist rural trade union members supported Fascists, while 63% and
60% of the organizational members respectively supported Socialists
in 1919.68 Fascism accomplished this success by taking advantage of
fragmentation among peasants.
The radicalization of the Socialist movement sharpened tensions within the Socialist agrarian trade unions. In central and northern Italy,
particularly in the Po Valley, most peasants were divided into two
categories as agriculture became commercialized: middle peasants
such as mezzadro (sharecroppers), affittuari (leaseholders), and small
proprietors on one side; contract laborers and day laborers on the
other. Initially these two categories of peasants were united against
landlords under Socialist leadership. However, as the war and the
Russian Revolution inflamed the radical enthusiasm of those who
argued for the "proletarianization" of all workers, the collectivization
of land, and the immediate revolution, the radical changes of Socialist
movement sharpened the internal tensions within the Socialist agrarian unions. First, Mezzadri who hired laborers were victims as well as
beneficiaries of the movement against landlords. The complex feeling
from the mezzadri's dual position was bitter when they were forced to
abandon their traditional practice of mutual help among themselves
and were compelled by the Socialist leagues (leghe) to turn to the labor
market. Mezzadri feared that further development of the movement
might result in their eviction as tenants and ultimately lead to collectivization of the land.69 Furthermore, mezzadri and other middle
peasants disliked the arbitrary power of the leagues. As Socialists
gained power in rural areas, leagues dictated details such as the
minimum number of men and women to be employed on each crop.
The leagues' power was abused by the braccianti (wage laborers). For
example, "refractory proprietors" were punished, non-union members
were blacklisted and refractory members were fined, pilloried, or
ostracized.
In addition, the proletarianization of all workers, abolishing the
distinctions between contract laborers and day laborers, was another
source for the tensions within the Socialist agrarian unions. The
proletarianization caused dissatisfaction among contract laborers
who maintained a high influence in the agrarian unions far exceeding
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158
their numbersin the workforce- e.g., contractlaborersmade up 14%
of the Socialist trade union members although they constituted only
about 2% of the cultivators,while day laborersconstituted30%of all
cultivatorsand 19%of them were unionizedwith 12%in the Socialist
unions.70 The proletarianizationsignaledto the contractlaborersthat
they would lose their right of first-hireand fall into the same precarious status as day laborers. Contraryto Putnam'sneo-Tocquevillian
explanation, this dissention shows that associational life did not
necessarily develop solidarity even among members of an association.71
The fears of land collectivizationand the discontentwith proletarianization and the leagues' arbitrarypower were resources for Fascist
movement. Fascists appealed to people by pragmatic programs
adaptedto regionaland class differences.For example,in some places
likeTuscany,wheresharecropperswereprevalent,the Fascistsappealed
to sharecropperswith land redistribution,while in others, Fascists
sided with day laborersby shoring up tenant rights and demanding
land reforms.In responseto fear of land collectivism,in the May 1921
election, Fascists offered"To Every Peasant His Land!"72 In several
regions like Brescia, Ferrara and Tuscany,actual redistributionof
lands occurred. The Fascists also offered profit sharing, opposing
collective ownershipof the land favoredby the Catholic ruralunions.
This programappealedto contractlaborersbecauseit gave them more
secure access to land.73In the regions like the Po Valley,where day
laborerswere prevalent,the Fascists built hiring halls and syndicates,
providinglegal services and offeringmore favorablewage agreements
than the Socialists. Fascists also offered protection against fines imposed by the Socialistunions.74Fascistunions poached socialist workers in increasingnumbers.During 1921,the membershipof the Socialist National Federation of Land Workersdropped from 890,000 to
294,000.75 Agrarian laborers who thought Socialism unfeasibleafter
the 1920s climax of the Socialist movement, began to be attractedto
Fascist practicalprogramsduringa period of high unemployment.
The appeal of Fascist propagandafor peasants does not indicatethat
there was no Fascist violence in this competition with Socialists. In
southern Italy's Apulia and central Italy's Tuscany,Fascist violence
was severe. It is noteworthy that the areas of severe violence were
tended to have homogeneous peasant populations. In Apulia, for
example, class divisions were clearly drawn between great estates and
laborers; there were few middle-class peasants.76 By contrast, in many
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159
regions of central Italy, middle-class peasants prevailed and there were
few braccianti. In these homogeneous areas, the Fascist movement rose
slowly and painfully. These exceptions show that the Fascist movement
grew rapidly by filling the political and ideological vacuum among
associative people that existing political ideologies could not.
Conclusion
This article proposes some theoretical implications about the effects of
civic associations on democracy. In view of the example of southern
Italy, we see that associations are a necessary condition to counter
atomistic individualism and mass politics. In the absence of associative
people's solidarity, or on the condition of disintegrated individuals, as
Tocquevillians argue, authoritarian rule can easily prevail. Nevertheless relative credit gained by criticism of excessive individualism and
mass politics does not automatically confirm the optimistic view of
associational life. As I have demonstrated here, vigorous associational
life in early modern Italy, which Putnam detected as civicness, did not
confirm the optimistic view that "Democratic government is strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society."77 As the
collapse of the liberal regime in postwar Italy shows, vigorous associations in postwar Italy caused severe conflicts rather than harmonious
cooperation and ultimately facilitated the Fascists' seizure of power.
The fact that the Fascist movement thrived among the "civic" associations in northern and central Italy rather than in the "uncivic" regions
of southern Italy reveals that civic associations also can be fertile soil
for totalitarian movement. This also is confirmed by the case of
Nazism, in which vigorous growth of voluntary associations in interwar Germany undermined the Weimar Republic and facilitated the
rise of Nazism.78 Voluntary associations may be at least one necessary
condition for mass movement. But associations themselves cannot
produce a certain political outcome. The reason for uncertainty in the
impact of associations on democracy is that social norms, such as
reciprocity in a community, are not an agent but a kind of material
resource that can be used by agents to further their purpose and vision.
Social capital fostered by associational life does not always contribute
to democracy. Strong solidarity under the identity of radicalism can
cause disabling of democratic order.
Contrary to Putnam's explanation, social capital and norms fostered
in an association do not easily spread, transforming intra-norms of
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reciprocityto the wider community.First, associational life does not
necessarily generate civic norms. As the case of the Socialist movement in postwar Italy shows, vigorous associations can themselves
contain internal conflicts rather than harmonious cooperation. Jane
Mansbridge'sobservationof a New England town meeting also confirms that face-to-face associational life, which neo-Tocquevillians
believe are so important to nurturecivic norms, does not automatically generate solidarity and democratic representation.She clearly
shows the problemsof face-to-face associationallife:
In this town meeting, as in many face-to-face democracies,the fears of
making a fool of oneself, of losing control, of criticism, and of making
enemiesall contributeto the tensionthat arises in the settlementof disputes.
The informalarrangementsfor the suppressionof conflictthat resulttyrannize as well as protect.... Participationin face-to-face democraciesis not
automaticallytherapeutic:it can make participantsfeel humiliated,frightened, and even more powerlessthan before.79
Although"civicnorms"such as trustare nurturedby associationallife,
the norms may not work in a wider community.Cooperativenorms
and solidarity developed by associational life can endanger a stable
democracy.For example,althoughpeasantsin postwarItalydeveloped
a strong solidarity in organizing their associations, their solidarity
was not conducive to the development of democracy because their
"hurtnationalism"that supported solidaritywas co-opted by Fascist
ideology.
In order to understandthe effects of associations on democracy,it is
more importantto see the identitiesof associations,and their ongoing
interactionsin a political and ideological context, than to focus solely
on the social capital of civic associations or the attributesof organizational structure(horizontalor hierarchical).Although Putnamargues
that the hierarchicalstructure of Catholic associations in Italy prevents them from working for democracy,it was Catholic lay associations that contributedstabilityto the liberalregime in Giolittian Italy
throughclero-moderatealliances.The reason for the negativeimpact
of the popolarion the crisis of the liberalregimeafter the WorldWarI
was not the Catholic hierarchicalstructurebut the rejuvenationof the
Church'snon-expeditand the Liberals'anti-clericalism.Illiya Harik's
observationof Lebanesedemocratizationis insightfulon this point:
The main reason why Lebanon'snon-Westernsystem of democracyworks
is the pluralism of competing actors. Competition checks authoritarian
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161
tendencies. When five or more hierarchically organized and led associations
compete in one area, they check one another just as much as when five
democratically run and led agencies do.
As Lebanese democracy suggests, even hierarchically organized associations, "uncivic" organizations in Putnam's terms, can foster stable
democracy insofar as they interact within sound democratic rules of
deliberation. The fact that social corporatism in Sweden and Germany,
hierarchically organized, contributed to the establishment of welfare
democracy after World War II is another example to counter Putnam's
emphasis on associational structure. In order to understand the effects
of associations on democratic order, associations' identities and their
methods of interaction are more important than their property and
characteristics.
Through their identities and interpretive framework, associations use
their own resources, such as solidarity, in a political and ideological
context. An association's identity is not fixed but is subject to ongoing
changes. Voluntary associations in early modern Italy emerged in pursuit of the goal of mutual aid, but later transformed into proponents of
Republicanism for constitutional reform and, even later, into champions
of Socialist class movement. The radical class movement generated
bitterness among association members, e.g., mezzadri (sharecroppers),
and braccianti (agrarian laborers), helping the rise of the Fascist
movement. Whether or not, and how, associations in civil society
contribute to democratic development are determined by how they
interact and change their own interpretive framework in the ongoing
political and ideological terrain, rather than by the character of a
specific organization. Social capital fostered by civic associations can
endanger democracy when civic norms of associations are not founded
on sound faith in democratic rule and fail to govern interactions and
conflicts among associations through peaceful processes.
Notes
1. Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); idem, Bowling Alone: The Collapse
and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000); idem,
"The Prosperous Community," American Prospect 13 (Spring 1993); John Keane,
"Despotism and Democracy: The Origins of Development of the Distinction
between Civil Society and the State," in John Keane, editor, Civil Society and the
State: New European Perspectives (London: Verso, 1988). For critical review of the
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162
Tocquevillianview, see Bob Edwards,MichaelW. Foley,and Mario Diani, editors,
Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative
Perspective(Hanover:UniversityPressof New England,2001).
2. Francis Fukuyama, Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York:
Free Press, 1995); Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How the Planet Is Both
Falling Apart and Coming Together - and What This Means for Democracy (New
York: NY Time Books, 1995); Paul Hirst, Associative Democracy: New Forms of
Economic and Social Governance (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press,
1994);JoshuaCohen and Joel Rogers,"SecondaryAssociations and Democratic
Governance,"in ErikOlinWright,editor,Associationsand Democracy(NewYork:
Verso, 1992); Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and
Commitmentin AmericanLife (Berkeley,Universityof CaliforniaPress);Putnam,
BowlingAlone. On the other hand, among policy-makers,voluntaryassociations
are also emphasizedas a solution for deepeningdemocracyand economicprosperity. Both Neo-conservativesand Progressivesin the U.S. Congressagreethat civil
society should be revitalized in order to improve democracy and economics,
althoughthey disagreeabout how such a revivalshouldbe accomplished.See Dan
Coats et al., "Can CongressRevive Civil Society?"Policy Review:The Journalof
American Citizenship, no. 75 (Jan 1996).
3. Democracyin this articleis definedin a broadsense.The democraticgovernmentis
constitutedby free electionundercompetition,and includesaccountabilityfor the
people'sdemands.
4. FareedZakaria,"BiggerThan the Family,SmallerThan the State:Are Voluntary
GroupsWhat Make CountriesWork?"New YorkTimes,Book Review (13 August
1995),1, 25.
5. For the "masssociety"theoryof Tocquevilliansin the 1950sand 1960s,seeWilliam
Kornhauser,ThePoliticsof Mass Society(Glencoe, Ill.: FreePress,1959);Hannah
Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1973); Edward Shils, "The Theory of Mass Society," in Philip Olson, editor,
Americaas a Mass Society (New York: Free Press, 1963);Bernt Hagtvet,"The
Theoryof Mass Societyand the Collapseof theWeimarRepublic:A Re-Examination,"in Stein Larsen,BerntHagtvet,and JanPetterMyklebust,editors,WhoWere
the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen, Norway: Universitetsfor-
laget, 1980).
6. Recentlytherehave been many excellentcritiquesof the neo-Tocquevillians'
arguments.In particular,John Ehrenberg'sCivilSociety not only providesan excellent
study of "historyof conception of civil society"but also sharp criticismagainst
neo-Tocquevillians'
arguments.Scott McLeanet al., editors,Social Capitalis also a
noteworthybook in criticism against Robert Putnam.This article shares many
views with Ehrenberg'scriticism on neo-Tocquevillians,in particular,that local
associations do not necessarilyproduce democracy.But this article differsfrom
Ehrenberg'sbook in the sense that like many other scholars such as Amy Fried,
David Schultz,and YvetteAlex-Assensohin Social Capital,Ehrenbergfocuseson
the effectsof economic interests,conflictsand inequality,while this articleemphasizes transformationof associationalidentitiesthroughtheir ongoing interactions
in political and ideological contexts. See John Ehrenberg, Civil Society: The
CriticalHistoryof an Idea (New York:New YorkUniversityPress, 1999);Scott L.
McLean,David A. Schultz,and ManfredB. Steger,editors,Social Capital.:Critical
Perspectives on Community and "BowlingAlone" (New York: New York University
Press,2002).
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163
7. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 165-173.
8. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 89-90.
9. Sidney Tarrow, "Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical
Reflection on Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work," American Political
Science Review 90/2 (June 1996): 393.
10. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 89.
11. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 138.
12. For the associational life in early modern Italy, see Alberto Mario Banti, "Public
Opinion and Associations in Nineteenth-Century Italy," and Adrian Lyttelton,
"Liberalism and Civil Society in Italy: From Hegemony to Mediation," in Nancy
Bermeo and Philip Nord, editors, Civil Society Before Democracy: Lessons from
Nineteenth-Century Europe (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
2000). For the associational life in premodern Italy, see Gene Brucker, "Civic
Traditions in Premodern Italy," Edward Muir, "The Sources of Civil Society in
Italy," and Raymond Grew, "Finding Social Capital: The French Revolution in
Italy," in Robert I. Rotberg, editor, Patterns of Social Capital: Stability and Change
in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
13. Lyttelton, "Liberalism and Civil Society in Italy: From Hegemoney to Mediation,"
62.
14. Lyttelton, "Liberalism and Civil Society," 63-64; Banti, "Public Opinion and
Associations in Nineteenth-Century Italy," 45.
15. The fact that social capital nurtured by associations is limited by class boundary
confirms Ehrenberg's criticism against neo-Tocquevillians that they do not understand the effects of economic structure on associational life. See Ehrenberg, Civil
Society, 144, 164, 236, 246.
16. Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism: 1870-1925 (London:
Methuen & Co., 1967), 4-15; Frank M. Snowden, "The Social Origins of Agrarian
Fascism in Italy,"Archieves Europeenes de Sociolgie 113/2 (1972): 269.
17. Lyttelton, "Liberalism and Civil Society in Italy," 69-71; Banti, "Public Opinion
and Associations in Nineteenth-Century Italy," 50-53.
18. Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism: 1870-1925, 1-14; Henry Spencer,
Government and Politics of Italy (Yonkers-on-Hudson, N.Y.: World book company,
1932), 140-220.
19. By electoral reforms, in 1882, 7% of the total population had the right to vote. In
1894, a suffrage rate of 9.4% was reduced to 6.7% again by the Liberals' repression
of the labor movement. In 1912, 23.2%. See Andrew McLaren Carstairs, A Short
History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1980), 149-158.
20. Maurice F. Neufeld, Italy: School for Awakening Countries: The Italian Labour
Movement in Its Political, Social and Economic Setting from 1800 to 1960 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1961), 201-203, 228, 232-249.
21. Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, 16-17.
22. Giovanna Procacci, "Italy: From Interventionism to Fascism, 1917-1919," Journal
of Contemporary History 3/4 (1968): 154; see also Charles S. Maier, Recasting
Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Grmany and Italy in the Decade After
World WarI (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 27.
23. Marco Revelli, "Italy," in Detlet Mfihlberger editor, The Social Basis of European
Fascist Movements (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 8-10; Seton-Watson, Italy from
Liberalism to Fascism, 607-609; Procacci, "Italy: From Interventionism to Fascism," 154-155.
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164
24. Discinnovismoliterallymeans nineteenth-century-ism.
Originally,it referredto the
whole mood of revolutionaryRepublicanismduring Italian unification in the
nineteencentury.The disciannovismomeant people's initiative(Mazzini'sRepublicanism),ratherthan politicians'diplomacy(Cavourianliberalism).After World
WarI, discinnovismorefersto anti-liberalismandpeople'svoluntarism.
25. D. A. Binchy, Church and State in Fascist Italy (London: Oxford University Press,
1941), 60-61; Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, 55-59.
26. In additionto the menace of Socialism,therewere other reasonsfor theVatican's
reconciliationwith Liberals.The first was the influenceof "patrioticCatholics."
Many patriotic laity wanted a compromisebetween state and Church.Pius X
himself was known as "a staunch patriot as well as an extreme conservative."
Second, average peasants were little interestedin the "restorationof the Papal
government." See Binchy, Church and State in Fascist Italy, 47-54.
27. Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, 561, 599-600.
28. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe, 30-31.
29. Radical currentsamong Socialists dominatedtheir party afterWorldWarI. This
bifurcatingtendencyin the ItalianSocialistmovementhad a deep-rootedtradition.
From the beginning of the labor movement, two extreme tendencies became
apparent:a radical tendencybased on the "Chamberof Labor"and a reformist
tendencybased on the "CategoryFederations."Neufeld, Italy:Schoolfor Awakening Countries, 321-329; Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, 575-576.
30. In March 1920, reformistleader, ClaudioTreves,describeda delicatesituationof
1920 to the Nitti government,saying that "This is the crux of the presenttragic
situation:you can no longer maintainyourexistingsocial orderand we are not yet
strongenough to impose the one we want."Anthony L. Cardoza,AgrarianElites
and ItalianFascism(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress,1982),292.
31. Adrian Lyttelton, The Seizure of Poewr: Fascism in Italy 1919-1921 (Princeton:
PrincetonUniversityPress,1987),370.
32. Revelli,"Italy,"11-13.
33. The Committeeof InternalResistance playeda role in supportingthe war effort
and reportingbehaviorsof local Socialistsand other supportersof neutralism.See
Lawrence Squeri, "Politics in Parma, 1900-1925:The Rise of Fascism,"Ph.D
dissertation, Universityof Pennsylvania,(1976), 88, 113 fnl; Donald H. Bell,
"Working-ClassCulture and Fascism in an Italian IndustrialTown, 1918-22,"
Social History 9/1 (1984): 4, 8-9.
34. Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, 573.
35. E. SpencerWhellhofer,"Democracyand Fascism:Class, Civil Society,andRational Choice in Italy,"American Political Science Review 97/1 (Feb. 2003): 95.
36. Whetherviolence is a decisive factor for the Fascist victory is still controversial.
Gentile and Smitheach arguefor violence,while Cornerand Lytteltoneach argue
that too much attentionto the Fascist violence misses somethingimportant.See
Emilio Gentile, Storia del PNF, 1919-1922 (Bari: Laterza, 1989); Denis Mack
Smith,Italy: A ModernHistory(Ann Arbor:Universityof MichiganPress,1959);
Lyttelton, The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 1919-1929; Paul Corner, Fascism
in Ferrara,1918-1925(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1975).
37. Dahlia S. Elazar,"Class, State, and Counter-Revolution:
The Fascist Seizureof
Powerin Italy, 1919-1922,"EuropeanSociologicalReview16(Sept.2000): 301-321;
Whellhofer,"Democracyand Fascism."
38. Corner, Fascism in Ferrara, 146.
39. Antonio Gramsci, The Modern Prince and Other Writings(London: Cape, 1957),42.
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165
40. Snowden, "The Social Origins of Agrarian Fascism in Italy," 289.
41. Banti, "Public Opinion and Associations in Nineteenth-Century Italy," 52-54.
42. The abstention rate fluctuated, mainly influenced by conflicts between the church
and the Italian liberal state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Nevertheless, until 1909, the highest percentage of voter abstention was always
found in the mainland south of Italy, where it rose steadily from 54% in 1870 to
72% in 1882, while that of northern Italy declined. Frank M. Snowden, Violence
and Great Estates in the South of Italy: Apulia, 1900-1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), 80; Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, 226.
43. In addition to the effect of modernization, the reason clericalism was weak in
Apulia was because of the weakness of the parish network. It was similar to the Po
Valley of northern Italy in the sense that they were both frontier regions. In
addition, the low quality of the Apulian clergy also weakened clericalism. For
clergy, this remote and malarial region was undesirable. A series of scandals
involving parishes provoked popular outrage. Finally, peasants had antagonism
against clericalism because the Church itself was a farm employer. See Snowden,
Violence and Great Estates in the South of Italy, 81-84.
44. Filippo Sabetti, "Path Dependency and Civic Culture: Some Lessons from Italy
about Interpreting Social Experiments," Politics and Society 24/1 (March 1996): 33.
45. Lyttelton, "Liberalism and Civil Society in Italy," 71.
46. Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, 565; Neufeld, Italy: School for
Awakening Countries, 375-380.
47. In the November 1920 national election, the Socialist party tripled its 1913
representation, capturing 156 seats and becoming a majority party, while liberal
currents too got 200 seats. In local and provincial elections, the Socialist party
controlled 2,162 of the Italy's 8059 communes, compared with 300 in 1914. In
provincial elections, it won 25 of 69 provinces.
48. Donald H. Bell, "Worker Culture and Worker Politics: The Experience of an Italian
Town, 1880-1915," Social History 3/1 (1978); idem, "Working-Class Culture and
Fascism in an Italian Industrial Town, 1918-1922," Social History 9/1 (1984).
49. Bell, "Working-Class Culture and Fascism in an Italian Industrial Town," 5.
50. Giovanna Procacci, "Italy: From Interventionism to Fascism, 1917-1919,"Journal
of Contemporary History 3/4 (1979): 4; Bell, "Worker Culture and Worker Politics,"
18.
51. Bell, "Working-Class Culture and Fascism in an Italian Industrial Town," 4.
52. Neufeld, Italy: School for Awakening Countries, 368-9; Seton-Watson, Italy from
Liberalism to Fascism, 519-520.
53. Bell, "Working-Class Culture and Fascism in an Italian Industrial Town," 21.
54. Corner, Fascism in Ferrara, 159.
55. Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, 511, 520.
56. Neufeld, Italy: School for Awakening Countries, 379-80; Bell, "Working-class
Culture and Fascism in an Italian Industrial Town," 21-23.
57. October 7, 1922. Quoted in Bell, "Working-Class Culture and Fascism in an Italian
Industrial Town," 22.
58. Neufeld, Italy: Schoolfor Awakening Countries, 380.
59. It is re-quoted in Bell, "Working-Class Culture and Fascism in an Italian Industrial
Town," 7.
60. According to Charles Maier, Taylorism ("Scientific management" ideology) in the
first postwar period helped relegitimate capitalist hierarchies and technical organization.
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166
61. Neufeld, Italy: Schoolfor Awakening Countries, 380; Cardoza, Agrarian Elites and
Italian Fascism, 293.
62. Whellhofer,"Democracyand Fascism,"103.
63. Squeri,"Politicsin Parma,"126-127.
64. LainChambersand LidiaCurti,"AVolatileAlliance:Culture,PopularCultureand
the Italian Left," in idem, editors, Formations of Nation and People (London:
Routledge, 1984), 102; Bell, "Working-ClassCulture and Fascism in an Italian
IndustrialTown,"14.
65. In 1919,returnedex-combatantsoccupied land in Roman Campagnaspontaneously.
66. Membershipin CGL leaped withina short time: from 249,039in 1918to 1,150,062
in 1919,and to 2,200,100at its climax in 1920.CIL membershipwas 162,000at the
end of the war but leaped to 1,500,000 in 1921. See Neufeld, Italy: Schoolfor
Awakening Countries, 368-369; Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism and Fascism,
519-521.
67. Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, 512.
68.
69.
70.
71.
Wellhofer,"Democracyand Fascism."
Snowden,"TheSocial Originsof AgrarianFascismin Italy."
Wellhofer,"Democracyand Fascism,"102.
In criticizingneo-Tocquevillianargumentsfor theirrelianceon face-to-faceassociations, Jane Mansbridgealso argues,based on her observationof New England
town meetings,that face-to-face meetingscan cause tensions and suppressionof
free deliberation.See Jane Mansbridge,BeyondAdversaryDemocracy(Chicago:
Universityof ChicagoPress,1983).
72. Snowden, Violence and Great Estates in the South of Italy, 180; Seton-Watson, Italy
from Liberalism to Fascism, 523, 574; Cardoza, Agrarian Elites and Italian Fascism,
326-327.
73. Frank M. Snowden, The Fascist Revolution in Tuscany (Cambridge: Cambridge
UniversityPress,1989),97ff.
74. Cardoza, Agrarian Elites and Italian Fascism, 337-338.
75. Membershipin Catholic agriculturalunions fell less sharply, from 945,000 to
749,000. Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, 574.
76. Snowden, Violence and Great Estates in the South of Italy, 180.
77. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 182.
78. See SheriBerman,"CivilSocietyand The Collapseof theWeimarRepublic,"World
Politics49 (April 1997):401-429.
79. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy, 70-71.
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