Sociology of Religion 2014, 75:2 234-259
doi:10.1093/socrel/srt057
Advance Access Publication 6 January 2014
Popular Buddhists: The Relationship between
Popular Religious Involvement and Buddhist
Identity in Contemporary China
Reid J. Leamaster*
Purdue University
Anning Hu
Fudan University
Drawing on previous literature and theoretical considerations, the authors identify six key independent
variables related to popular religious belief and practice in mainland China: institutional religious
affiliation, level of education, income, perspectives on inequality as a social problem, assessment of
overall health, and rural residency. Using the 2007 Spiritual Life Study of Chinese Residents, the
authors find that Buddhist identity is positively associated with popular religious involvement across
measures of popular religious belief and practice. Identifying as a formally committed Buddhist consistently displays the strongest positive relationship with popular religious involvement. The level of education does not reveal a consistent negative association with popular religious adherence, contrary to
predictions of classical secularization theory. One measure of existential security theory, feeling
inequality is a serious social problem, shows a strong positive relationship with popular religious belief,
but not popular religious practices. Finally, despite research highlighting the functional importance of
popular religion in rural areas, rural residency is not consistently a significant predictor of popular religious adherence. The implications of these findings are discussed.
Key words: China; popular religion; modernization; secularization; Buddhism.
Since the advent of economic and social reform starting in 1978, scholars
of Chinese religion have described a resurgence of religious vitality of all major
religious traditions in mainland China (e.g., Overmyer 2003; Yang 2012)—
including a resurgence of popular religion (Chau 2006; Dean 1993, 1997, 1998,
2003, 2009; Fan 2003; Feuchtwang and Wang 1991; Harrell and Perry 1982;
Jordan 1994; Jordan and Overmyer 1986; Katz 2003; Lagerwey 1987; Overmyer
*Direct correspondence to Reid J. Leamaster, Sociology Department, Purdue University, 700 W. State
St, West Lafayette, IN 47907, USA. E-mail: [email protected].
# The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Association
for the Sociology of Religion. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail:
[email protected].
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BUDDHIST IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
235
2001, 2003, 2009; Teiser 1999; Weller 1994, 1999). The purpose of this paper is
to add to the understanding of the resurgence of popular religion in mainland
China by examining factors related to popular religious1 involvement based on
the analysis of recently available survey data. In particular, this paper asks (1)
what is the relationship between popular religion and other religious traditions,
especially Buddhism, in mainland China? (2) What are the social characteristics
that predict popular religious adherence?
This analysis makes an important contribution to the sociological understanding of religion in China for at least two reasons. First, previous research—
both historical works and contemporary ethnographies—has shown that popular
religion is intrinsically linked to other religious traditions in China, especially
Buddhism (Lin Benxuan 2008; Lin Meirong 2008; Overmyer 1976). By investigating the extent to which different religions intersect with popular religion, this
study provides an opportunity to better understand the link between other religious traditions and popular religion in China (see Fan 2003; Madsen et al. 2001;
Overmyer 1972, 1982). Second, many sociological and anthropological theories
and research, such as classical secularization theory, existential security theory,
theories about the differences between institutional and loosely organized religions, and studies highlighting the functional roles of popular religion, have
highlighted several potential key factors predicting involvement in popular religious activities. Taking advantage of a recent nationwide survey, this research is
the first quantitative study to empirically examine whether these factors are
related to popular religious activity in mainland China.
We first review literature highlighting the relationship between popular religion and other religious traditions in China. Next, we draw on classical secularization theory and existential security theory that call attention to education and
measures of existential security as key variables predicting popular religious
adherence. Third, we cite anthropological studies that highlight the role of
popular religion in rural China prompting us to include rural residency as an
explanatory variable. Next, we describe the methods and findings from statistical
models predicting popular religious belief and practice in mainland China.
Finally, the implications of the findings are discussed.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POPULAR RELIGION AND OTHER
RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS IN CHINA
The Relationship between Popular Religion and Buddhism
Many researchers have noted the eclectic nature of religion in China. For
instance, as early as the 1600s, Western Sinologists have pointed out the
1
For this research, we take popular religion to mean practices such as ancestor worship,
rituals for asking favors, belief in local deities or folk gods, and beliefs in souls, spirits, and the
active role of gods in personal affairs (see Teiser 1995; Yang and Hu 2012).
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syncretistic nature of Chinese religion and defined Chinese religion as a complex
combination of Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, and popular religious traditions (Clart 2007; Soothill 1913). In contemporary China, Buddhism has been
found to overlap with popular religious beliefs and practices. Kurtz, for example,
describes Buddhism’s place in China’s diverse religious landscape in this way:
It (Buddhism) became intertwined with indigenous religions of China and elsewhere, especially
with Confucianism and Taoism, where the three traditions mingle with other local indigenous
ritual practices to create a rich tapestry of spiritual beliefs, practices, and institutions that have
evolved. (Kurtz 2007:71)
Daniel Overmyer has traced the historical origins of the relationship between
Buddhism and popular religion (Jordan and Overmyer 1986; Overmyer 1972,
1976, 1981, 1982, 1990). Buddhism was a lay movement that started in medieval
China; during this time, lay Buddhists adopted many popular religious practices.
One reason for this mixing of Buddhism and popular religion was that Chinese
popular religion is usually not institutional in form and many popular practices
and beliefs are necessarily diffused within institutional religious organizations
(Yang 1961). The syncretic mixing of Buddhism and popular religion can also be
attributed to the fact that lay Buddhist sects did not compete with popular religion, but treated popular religion as a supplement to Buddhist practice and even
adopted popular religious gods and practices into Buddhism (Overmyer 1990).
The result of lay Buddhists assimilating popular religious beliefs and practices was
the formation of “Folk Buddhism” (Lin Meirong 2008; Overmyer 1976).
There is evidence that Folk Buddhism is alive and well in China today. For
instance, in Fan’s (2003) case study of popular religion in a village in Hebei
Province, she finds that popular religion and Buddhism were mixed to such an
extent that the villagers thought that a popular sectarian scripture passage was
Buddhist in origin. In fact, she states that Buddhism and popular religion were
sometimes indistinguishable to local villagers. To what extent is this type of religious borrowing and intermixing prevalent in contemporary China on a large
scale? Are Buddhists also active in popular religious activities? In this paper, we
explore these questions and expect to find that self-identifying with Buddhism is positively associated with involvement in popular religion.
One important caveat is in order here. Although previous research has
described a close relationship between Buddhism and popular religion, such a
relationship may vary depending on a Buddhist’s link to the institutional
Sangha.2 Informed by theories concerning loosely organized and well-organized
religions, Buddhists who have closer ties to the institutional Sangha and have
formally committed to Buddhism, may be less likely to mix Buddhism and
2
What we mean here by institutional Sangha is the institutional organization of
Buddhism, which is usually connected to a Buddhist temple and the community of monks
and nuns associated with the temple.
BUDDHIST IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
237
popular religion (Hu and Leamaster 2013; Iannaccone 1995; Lu et al. 2008;
Stark 2006a, 2006b). In particular, Stark and his colleagues define loosely organized religions as having no ties to a formal organization and not requiring exclusivist membership. Conversely, institutional religion often requires exclusive
membership, which is established through ritual. According to Iannaccone
(1995), these rituals raise the extent of religious exclusiveness, which allows a
religious tradition to prevent members from participating in other religions’
activities. It is important to point out that the theoretical ideas of institutional
religion and formal conversion were formulated in the Western context. Clear
religious boundaries and formal conversion are more akin to Western religions,
especially Christianity, whereas Chinese religion is more eclectic and boundaries
are fluid—as we note above. Thus, we are not arguing that institutional Buddhism
is identical to Western Christianity; however, given previous theorizing on differences between institutional and loosely organized religions, we predict that those
Buddhists who have undergone a formal commitment ceremony will be less likely
to have involvement in popular religion—although we fully expect to find that formally committed Buddhists also participate in popular religion.
Previous empirical work on Buddhists in China seems to substantiate the
conceptual differences between loosely organized and institutional religion.
Holmes Welch describes casual Buddhist practitioners (hereafter casual
Buddhists or self-identified Buddhists) in pre-Cultural Revolution China as
being unorganized and mostly not belonging to formal Buddhist groups while
engaging in individualistic practices (Welch 1972:298). Welch contrasts these
Buddhists with the institutional Sangha. It seems likely that this type of
Buddhist is more apt to mix popular religion with Buddhism.3 Therefore, we
predict that Buddhists who have undergone commitment rituals, specifically
those who have formally taken the three refuges, should be more committed to
and have closer ties to institutional Buddhism. Hence, we expect these Buddhists
are less likely to mix Buddhism with popular religion.
There are also historical and political reasons to expect that formally committed Buddhists are less likely to engage in an eclectic mix of Buddhist and popular
religious practice. Before the advent of Chinese Communist Party (CCP hereafter)
rule, Buddhist monks—most notably Taixu—were seeking to modernize Buddhism.
Taixu and his fellow reformers felt that Buddhism could be purged of its
“superstitious” and “backwards” elements to become viable in a modernized China
(Pittman 2001). After the CCP came to power, it was clear that some of the
3
It is likely that Welch’s description of the Buddhist laity still applies today, as most selfidentified Buddhists have not formally converted. The Spiritual Life Survey of Chinese
Residents shows that while 18 percent of the population identifies as Buddhist, around 2
percent of the population reports having formally converted to Buddhism. Less is known
about the Buddhist laity in China because most studies focus on temple building and the institutional Sangha. However, a recent special issue of Social Compass focuses mostly on the laity
(for an overview on the revival of Buddhist temple building, see Fisher 2008; for studies that
consider lay involvement, see Fisher 2011; Jones 2011; Sun 2011; Yang 2005).
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reforms were of particular use to communist leaders and their goals in terms of religion, such as: a move toward a Buddhism that was more pragmatic and scientific,
reforming Buddhism to be more utopian (but still realistic), and the abolition of
superstitious practices (i.e., the eclectic mixing with popular religion). After his
death in 1950, Taixu’s supporters—realizing the potential of reformed, modernized
Buddhism to subsist under communist rule—continued the political project of “modernizing” Buddhism. It appears as if Buddhist leaders were at least partially successful
at helping Buddhism gain legitimacy under CCP rule (Laliberté 2011; Pittman
2001; Welch 1972). To sum up, given the efforts of institutional Buddhism to distance itself from popular religion and the theorized boundary differences between
institutional and popular religion, we expect to find that Buddhists who have undergone
formal commitment ceremonies will be less likely to mix Buddhism and popular religion.
The Relationship between Popular Religion and Other Institutional Religions
While there is a larger literature depicting the affinity between Buddhism
and popular religion, the Chinese religious landscape is an amalgamation of
popular religion at the local level with Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism
(Kurtz 2007; Soothill 1913). Hence, other religious traditions in China may also
be related to popular religious belief and practice.
Some scholars have argued that there is a strong link between Daoism and
popular religion (Feuchtwang 2001; Yang 2005). This assertion is based on the
idea that many popular religious beliefs and practices stem from Daoist textual
and oral traditions. We include Daoist identity in our models and test the extent
to which Daoist identity is linked to popular religion based on the variables in
our analysis.
Catholicism—among lay Catholics—has also been linked to popular religion. According to Madsen et al. (2001).
The focus on orthodoxy, whether Catholic or Confucian, leads to a neglect of the heterodox, or
“superstitious” magic and myth that—to the consternation of Chinese Church and government
leaders down to the present day—are intertwined with precepts from the catechism in the living
culture of many Chinese Catholics, especially in rural communities. . . . Catholicism in China,
especially in the rural areas where the vast majority of Chinese Catholics live, is as much folk religion as world religion” (2001:234).
This phenomenon has been termed “Folk Catholicism,” coined in much the
same manner as the term Folk Buddhism. The extent to which identifying as
Catholic and popular religion are intermixed will also be examined in the analysis.
Neither Protestant Christianity nor Islam has been linked to popular or folk
religion in the way that Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism, and Catholicism
have. Given the exclusivist theology of each of these religions,4 we expect that
4
It is worth mentioning that the religious boundary of Islam from other religions can also
overlap with the ethnical boundary between Hui and the other ethnicities in China.
BUDDHIST IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
239
self-identified Protestant Christians and Muslims will be less likely to participate in
popular religion or hold popular religious beliefs.
PREDICTING POPULAR RELIGIOUS ADHERENCE
Modernizing Ideologies
Classical theories of secularization contend that “modernization leads to less
religious commitment because of the growth of education, science, and a technological worldview” (Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009:866). The modern, scientific
worldview propagates through macro level changes such as an increase in higher
education, which affects individual-level religiosity as people abandon religious
explanations of phenomena in favor of rational and scientific explanations. In
China, secularization is not only thought to be a natural product of modernization, but is also a deliberate social engineering project headed by the CCP who promotes Leninism-Marxism atheistic ideologies and suppresses religion—popular
religion in particular is suppressed because of its “backwards “and “superstitious”
nature (Feuchtwang 1989; Feuchtwang and Wang 1991; Goossaert and Palmer
2011; Nedostup 2010; Overmyer 2001). Many sociologists of religion feel that
classical secularization theory is outdated, and others argue that the CCP softened its view on religion beginning in the 1990s (Potter 2003). Nevertheless,
the idea that a modernizing worldview decreases religiosity is still influential in
research and deserves serious attention in the context of China. Because level of
education has been used to proximately measure the extent of modernity (see
Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009), we include education level as an independent variable predicting popular religious adherence and expect to find a negative relationship.
Existential Security
Norris and Inglehart’s (2011, first edition 2005) more recent theory of existential security sheds light on the role security may play on religiosity. Norris and
Inglehart theorize that societies and individuals with more existential security—
in other words, less need to worry about the basic essentials of life—tend to have
lower levels of religious adherence on average, controlling for other factors. The
reasoning behind this relationship is that once people have their basic needs
met, there is less of a need to rely on the supernatural (see Olson 2011).
Consequently, Norris and Inglehart propose that in welfare states, there is less
religiosity because of social welfare nets such as the redistribution of income, and
access to good, affordable healthcare. They provide substantial evidence to back
up their theoretical claims. Since that time, the findings of several studies appear
to support Norris and Inglehart’s initial findings. Most of these studies are also
cross-national comparisons and find negative relationships between macro measures of existential security and rates of religious attendance and belief (see Aarts
et al. 2010; Crockett and Voas 2006; Ecklund et al. 2008; Ruiter and van
Tubergen 2009; Tubergen 2006). The dataset used in this study provides three
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variables that can act as measures of existential security on the individual level—
a measure of the individual’s perceived health, a measure of the respondent’s feelings on social inequality, and household income. Based on the rationale of existential security theory, we expect a positive relationship between having poor health
and popular religions adherence, as those with poor health will have more existential need. We also expect to find a positive relationship between feeling that inequality is
a problem and popular religious adherence, feeling that inequality is a serious
problem likely leads to existential insecurity. Because family income should
improve existential security for individuals, we expect family income to have a negative relationship with popular religious adherence.
A caveat is necessary. Many previous studies on Chinese popular religion do
not investigate the attractiveness of popular religion among people with poor
health or economic status from the perspective of existential security. The same
is true of research on mental and physical health and religiosity in the United
States (Hackney and Sanders 2003; Levin and Markides 1986; Son and
Wilson 2011). However, it does not mean that the existential security theory
is independent or even conflicts with the generic psychological dynamics on
the individual level highlighted in these studies. On the contrary, they can mutually supplement each other. Thus, even though we consider the subjective
measure of health from the perspective of existential security, it also has implications for the relationship between social and psychological dynamics and
religiosity.
Specifically, popular religion in many Eastern societies has always been
attractive to those with poor health status. One reason is that popular religion
practices promise immediate rewards (Stark et al. 2005; Weller 1994), so that followers, especially those with poor health, turn to popular religion for healing.
Actually, many people in China worship folk religion deities out of pro-health
intents, as shown in many existing field studies (e.g., Chau 2006; Fan 2003).
Besides the immediate rewards, another reason for the propensity of those with
poor health to endorse popular religion is that popular religion, as part of traditional Chinese culture, provides a unique discourse to define and cure disease,
such as mental illness (Lai and Surood 2009; Lam et al. 2010). In China, “people
believe that many illnesses are supernatural in origin” (Lam et al. 2010:36).
Therefore, it is not uncommon that those who are sick in traditional China
are prone to turn to specific folk religion practices. One example in this light is
the practice of calling soul ( jiao hun), which is used to call back someone’s lost
soul (Cohen 1990; Harrell 1979) and generally believed to be associated with
spiritual healing (Harrell 1991). As for the popular religion among lower class
individuals, one readily noticeable reason might be the potential monetary
rewards (e.g., winning a lottery) anticipated by popular religion followers.
This can be consolidated by the widespread worshipping of the god of wealth
(caishen) in contemporary China (Ma 2011; Yang and Hu 2012). Additionally,
relative to the high literacy requirement of other religions in China, popular
religion has a lower threshold. Therefore, as put by Jordan and Overmyer in
BUDDHIST IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
241
their studies of Taiwan folk religion groups pailuan (1986:279 –80) “The appeal
of pailuan in particular, logically, should be to those individuals who both have
need of feeling meritorious and are cut off from performance of activities which
are culturally defined as merit-producing or as characteristic of meritorious
people, and which pailuan imitates.” In summary, previous historical and field
research points out the psychological, cultural, and economic reasons for the
attractiveness of popular religion to individuals of poor health and lower class.
These explanations do not conflict with the hypotheses drawn based on the existential security theory. What the existential security theory emphasizes is that in
a society where meeting basic needs is more in question (such as traditional agricultural China), people may have a strong reliance on religious or even magical
endeavors. However, in the process of moving toward a welfare society, such reliance may be weakened.5 For instance, people may become less likely to turn to
spiritual healing through popular religion when universal health insurance is
available. In this light, existential security theory is consistent with previous
studies in that feeling of low existential security implies stronger psychological,
cultural, and economic dynamics motivating people to practice popular religion,
and vice versa. Also, seen from this perspective, the growth of existential security
is related but not equivalent to the modernization process, especially in light of
the fact that modernization in China is part of a cultural and political project
driven by the state.
Urban versus Rural Residency
Anthropologists have highlighted the functional roles of popular religion in
China’s rural areas, leading the authors to include rural residency as an independent variable predicting popular religious participation. We expect to find this
association because many scholars understand the resurgence of popular religion
in rural areas in the context of its communal and cultural functions, while
popular religion is not thought to serve these functions in urban areas (Ahern
2008; Dean 1995, 2003; Eng and Lin 2002; Feuchtwang 1996, 2001; Tsai 2007;
Weller 1987). The resurgence of popular religion in China is part of the conscious restoration of cultural tradition in China’s rural areas.
In addition to its cultural importance in rural areas, on the communal level,
popular religion functions as a source of social interaction and group ritual in
rural China. Popular religion is an important part of everyday life in rural
China’s communities. In fact, the most important places in rural areas before the
communist government came to power were local temples and ancestral halls,
and popular religion was deeply connected to communal social life and solidarity
(Dean 1995). The resurgence of popular religion in China is seen as a restoration
of this role.
5
The social development, however, cannot eliminate people’s involvement into popular
religion (Hu and Leamaster 2013).
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SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
Another reason to expect those in rural areas of China to be more involved
in popular religion is provided by research on the communal functions of popular
religious rites as a way to provide a supplementary universe to that of the ruling
orthodoxy (Feuchtwang 2001). Rural residents in China are far removed from
the politics and the power structure of the nation and have little opportunity to
participate in the political process. Popular religion is seen as a way for people in
rural areas to symbolically participate in elite roles.
Moreover, research on popular religion in northern rural China finds that
monastic Buddhism is less important in these areas; thus, it may be true that the
lack of institutional Buddhism in rural areas leads casual Buddhists to participate
more in popular religion (DuBois 2005).6 Perhaps most importantly, rural – urban
comparative studies also highlight the higher level of engagement in popular religion among rural residents (e.g., Liu 2003). In short, previous work indicates that
popular religion does not play as important of a cultural and communal role in
urban areas.
Given empirical research and theorizing that highlights the important role
popular religion plays in rural areas compared to urban areas, we recognize rural
residency as an independent variable and expect it to be positively related to popular religious involvement.
In summary, previous research and theoretical considerations prompt us to
include religious identity, level of education, measures of existential security, and
rural residency as important independent variables associated with popular religious adherence. In the following analysis, we investigate the predictive power of
these variables on popular religious adherence using representative, nationwide
survey data.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
Attempts have been made to conduct large-scale surveys of religion in mainland China, but the reliability of these surveys has been called into question and
the data collected in these surveys have not produced much scholarly work. This
paper uses data from the 2007 Spiritual Life Study of Chinese Residents7
(SLSCR), which is designed to address the lack of reliable survey data on religion
in mainland China. The SLSCR is the most comprehensive and recent survey of
religion in China available. The questionnaire was designed by researchers at
Baylor University and Purdue University, administered by Horizon Information
and Consulting Company Limited, and included 88 questions concerning
6
This study also provides evidence that casual Buddhists may be more likely to participate in popular religion.
7
For more information on data collection procedures and access to the SLSCR data file,
visit http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/SPRTCHNA.asp.
BUDDHIST IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
243
religious beliefs and practices as well as other social and political opinions and
attitudes. A multistage probability sampling method was employed to select the
cities and towns in the survey. Households were randomly selected within neighborhoods and a KISH grid procedure was used to randomly select respondents
from each household. In total, 7,021 respondents 16 years of age and older completed the face-to-face interview. The response rate is rather low at 28 percent;
thus, the data set is weighted to reflect population parameters using the 2006
Census of China.
Methods and Measures
We use binary logistic regression to explore the relationship between the key
independent variables and popular religion in China. For the dependent variables, we select practices and beliefs that are widely accepted to constitute popular
religion in China. Over the past 20– 30 years, there has been a scholarly debate
over the use of the term popular religion and its meanings (see Bell 1989; Teiser
1995). Some scholars claim that popular religion is the religion of the folk class,
an antithesis of elite religion (Feuchtwang 1974; Harrell 1974, 1979; Jordan
1972). Other scholars contend that popular religion in China refers to the religious or spiritual beliefs and practices that are commonly held by the Chinese,
thus the term “popular” religion (e.g., Fan 2003; Freedman 1974). Furthermore,
as China modernized under CCP rule, popular religion came to be defined as
feudal superstition by intellectuals and the state (for a review, see Goossaert and
Palmer 2011; Nedostup 2010; Overmyer 2001). Due to the conceptual complexity and comprehensiveness of “popular religion,” there is still no consensus on
the substantial definition(s) of popular religion. In this light, we do not engage
this debate in the current research. Instead, we examine popular religion by
focusing on its representative beliefs and practices because—despite the debate
over defining popular religion—there seems to be some consensus as to what
practices and beliefs should be called popular religion. Popular religion usually
entails practices like ancestor worship or rituals for asking favors, worship of local
deities, and beliefs in local deities, souls, spirits, and the active role of gods in
personal affairs (Teiser 1995). Thus, some of the variables in the SLSCR do
portray what is considered to be popular religious belief and practice. We include
only variables that measure beliefs and practices found in Teiser’s (1995) article
on defining popular religion in China, which includes things like ancestor
worship, belief in and praying to folk Gods, and participation in rites and rituals.
These measures are also employed in a recent descriptive study on Chinese folk
religion (Yang and Hu 2012). We incorporate these variables into binary logistic
regression models as dependent variables.
The dependent variables measuring popular religious practice and belief in
the models are (all coded as 1¼presence of attribute, 0¼no presence of attribute): participated in ancestor veneration in the past year, having an ancestral
tablet in respondent’s home, making and fulfilling a vow in the past year, participated in fortune telling including palm reading/face reading in the past year,
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burned incense in the past year, prayed to the God of Wealth, the God of Earth,
the God of Stove, etc., or ancestral spirits, belief in spirits, belief in ghosts, belief
in sages, belief in the God of Wealth, belief in ancestral spirits, belief in destiny,
believe God/gods is/are involved in personal affairs. We recognize that there
may be some debate over labeling some of these variables as popular religious
adherence—especially making and fulfilling a vow, which is also found in institutional religions. However, we believe that it is more appropriate in an empirical
study to apply broad measures of popular religion rather than focusing on definitional theoretical debates (as mentioned above). Besides, the aspects of Chinese
popular religion shown by our measures have been addressed in previous research,
e.g., the seminal article by Teiser (1995) and the recent empirical study by Yang
and Hu (2012).
To measure religious affiliation, respondents were first asked, “Do you have
any religious belief?” Respondents who answered in the affirmative were then
asked, “regardless of whether you have been to churches or temples, do you
believe in any of the following?” Available options were Buddhism, Daoism,
Confucianism, Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, Chairman Mao, and “I do not
believe in anything.” Survey questions that measure religious identity or affiliation are inherently imperfect because of the symbolic significance of claiming a
religious identity and what this means to different individuals. Thus, the
meaning of being Buddhist or Daoist is not clear. This is especially true in China
where religious identity does not necessarily denote exclusive or strong commitment. Something unique to the SLSCR is that respondents could select more
than one religion in answer to the question. Because China’s religious landscape
is a rich tapestry of interrelated religious traditions and practices, this type of
survey question is appropriate. Analysis in this study includes respondents who
selected the above options in any of the iterations. For example, a respondent is
considered a Daoist if he or she selected only Daoism in response to the above
question or if he or she selected Daoism and something else. Most respondents
only selected one religious affiliation. Respondents who identified as Buddhist
were asked, “Did you have a formal conversion ceremony.” Because taking the
refuges is not the same as Christian baptism, we refer to Buddhists who have participated in this ritual as committed rather than converted. Those Buddhists who
had ritually committed to Buddhism were coded as “formal Buddhists,” those
who had not formally committed but self-identified with Buddhism were coded
as “casual Buddhists.” These categories are mutually exclusive.
Education is measured using the question “which of the following best
describes your highest level of education” (1, less than elementary; 2, elementary;
3, junior high, high school, or technical college; 4, college; 5, bachelor’s degree;
and 6, master’s degree and above). We measure existential security with three
variables. Questions on personal and household income resulted in large
amounts of nonrandom missing data (over 50 percent missing). Hence, we
choose to use an alternative measure of income based on interviewer’s assessments of the economic status of the interviewees’ family (lower, average,
BUDDHIST IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
245
middle – high, high). Another variable used to measure existential security asks
respondents, “There are many social problems in our society today. Do you think
the social inequality is a serious problem where you live?” The respondents
can then choose from the options: 1—not serious at all, 2—not very serious,
3—somewhat serious, 4—very serious. Measures of inequality are often used in
macro level tests of existential security theory (e.g., Norris and Inglehart 2011).
We also use a measure of perceived overall health with the question, “how is your
overall health these days?” With the responses ranging from 1, very good, to 5,
not good. While we use individual-level data, the same logic applies to macro
level tests of existential security—those who feel that inequality is a serious
problem or who have a low assessment of their overall health should have higher
levels of existential need and be more likely to participate in religion. Families
with higher economic standing should have less existential need and be less
inclined to participate in popular religion. Rural residency is measured with a
binary yes/no variable (1, rural; 0, urban).
Additional control variables are also included. These are gender (1, male; 0,
female), Chinese Communist Party membership (1, yes; 0, no), ethnicity
(1, Han; 0, others), marital status (1, married, 0, not married), and age of the
respondent.
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in
the models. Table 2 shows the dependent variables measuring popular religious
belief and practice by self-identified or casual Buddhists (respondents who
identified as Buddhist but have not formally committed), formal Buddhists
(respondents who have ritually committed to Buddhism), and the rest of the
non-Buddhist population. The clear descriptive pattern here is that selfidentified Buddhists participate in and believe popular religion at higher rates
than the rest of the population and—contrary to expectation—formal Buddhists
believe and participate at higher rates than self-identified Buddhists. Table 2 also
shows that veneration of ancestral spirits is a widespread practice in China, but
other popular religious practices are not as widespread. Belief in ancestral spirits
and belief in destiny are also fairly common and popular religious beliefs are generally more widespread than popular religious practice.
The most telling trend across tables 3 and 4—showing results of the binary
logistic regression models—is that being a Buddhist, whether self-identified or
formally committed, significantly increases the odds of holding popular religious
beliefs (all six measures) and participating in popular religious practices
(all seven measures). This is strong evidence for the conflation of popular religion and Buddhism in contemporary China on a large scale. In many cases, identifying as a formally converted Buddhist is the strongest predictor of popular
religious belief and practice: belief in spirits and gods [(odds ratio [OR] 10.612)],
246
SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics Independent Variables
Variable
Proportion or mean
Family income
Low income
Medium income
High-medium income
High income
Percent male
Rural resident
CCP member
Age
Level of education
Less than elementary
Elementary
Junior high
High school/technical HS
College
Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree above
Han ethnicity
Married
Buddhist
Formal Buddhist
Daoista
Protestanta
Catholica
Muslima
Confuciana
Health good or very good
Inequality problem
Very serious
Somewhat serious
Not very serious
Not at all serious
2.12
14.3
61.5
22.2
2.1
47.6
63.1
5.6
40.8
3.2
6.5
17.9
37.4
27.5
7.0
3.6
0.2
97.4
82
16.4
1.7
1.2
2.9
0.3
0.3
0.4
63
a
32
39
25
5
N
1003
4317
1556
145
3344
4429
390
457
1252
2621
1925
491
250
15
6638
5722
1151
117
87
206
24
22
30
5875
2170
2710
1703
316
Combined through multiple iterations.
belief in ghosts (OR 14.550), belief in ancestral spirits (OR 6.991), believing in
the God of Wealth (OR 11.693), belief in destiny (6.276), believing gods are
involved in personal affairs (OR 26.399) having an ancestral tablet in the home
(OR 3.612), participating in fortune telling (OR 3.759), and burning incense
(OR 66.278). Identifying as a Buddhist who has not ritually committed is often
the second strongest predictor of both popular religious belief and practice. In
short, analysis shows that there is a strong relationship between identifying as a
BUDDHIST IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
247
TABLE 2 Popular Religious Practice and Belief by Buddhist Identity
and Non-Buddhists (Percent)
Variable
Self-Identified
Buddhist
Belief in spirits and gods
24
Belief in ghosts
15
Belief in sages
16
Belief in ancestral spirits
47
Belief in destiny
43
Belief in God of wealth
35
Believe gods spirits involved in personal
16
affairs
Venerated ancestral spirits by their graves
79
in the past year
Do you have ancestral tablets in your home? 14
Made and kept a vow in the past year
6
16
Participated in fortune telling including
palm reading, and face reading in the past
year
Burned incense in last year
1
Prayed to folk god or ancestors in past year
7
N
1,151
Formal
Buddhist
Rest of
Population
44
33
17
53
65
56
31
7
3
6
14
21
9
3
80
72
14
3
21
6
1
6
7
15
117
2
5,753
formally committed Buddhist and popular religion. Additionally, the odds of
popular religious involvement are higher for formally committed Buddhists than
for casual Buddhists. This is contrary to what we expected based on theorized differences between institutional and loosely organized religion as well as attempts
to modernize institutional Buddhism. We reflect on these surprising findings in
the Discussion section.
Table 3 provides evidence of a positive relationship between Daoism and
popular religious belief. Identifying as a Daoist was a significant, positive predictor of holding six of the seven popular religious beliefs included in the models
shown in table 3. Table 4 reveals that identifying as Daoist is the strongest predictor of praying to folk gods or ancestors (OR 23.157) but is not a significant predictor of the other popular religious practices in the models. In short, while the
models in tables 3 and 4 provide evidence of a relationship between Daoism and
popular religious belief, the relationship does not seem to hold up when considering popular religious practice. Also, Daoist identity does not predict popular religious belief and practice to the same extent as Buddhist identity.
The Protestant and Muslim variables provide interesting and seemingly
counterintuitive results. Identifying as Protestant is a significant predictor of
believing in spirits and gods, believing in ghosts, and belief in destiny. This
Gender
CCP member
Age
Han ethnicity
Married
Rural resident
Family income
Highest education
Overall health
Inequality problem
Buddhist
Formal Buddhist
Daoist
Protestant
Catholic
Muslim
Confucian
Log likelihood
Nagelkerke R 2
df
Belief in spirits
and gods
Belief in
Ghosts
Belief in
Sages
Belief in Ancestral Belief in the God of Belief in
Spirits
Wealth
Destiny
Believe Gods
Involved
0.626***
0.510*
NS
NS
0.766*
NS
0.826**
NS
NS
1.132*
4.310***
10.612***
1.866*
5.465***
NS
NS
NS
4,084.865
0.152
17
0.753*
NS
1.010*
NS
NS
0.702**
0.829*
NS
NS
1.489***
5.443***
14.550***
2.831**
2.277**
NS
NS
NS
2,474.677
0.165
17
0.677***
NS
NS
NS
0.744*
NS
NS
1.309***
NS
1.167**
2.527***
2.837***
2.973***
NS
NS
NS
5.300***
3,587.304
0.079
17
0.784**
NS
NS
NS
0.805*
1.336**
NS
0.907**
1.103**
1.105*
5.182***
6.991***
NS
NS
2.950*
.077*
NS
6,196.801
0.158
17
0.709**
NS
1.018***
NS
1.457*
0.620**
NS
NS
NS
NS
10.222***
26.399***
2.220*
22.244***
NS
6.767*
0.001**
2,139.695
0.268
17
Source: Spiritual Life Survey of Chinese Residents 2007.
N ¼ 7,021 weighted data.
*p , .05, **p , .01, ***p , .001.
0.682***
NS
0.993*
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
1.155**
5.194***
11.693***
1.863*
NS
3.222*
NS
0.085*
4,909.078
0.155
17
0.825**
0.708*
0.990**
NS
NS
NS
NS
1.097**
1.119**
1.234***
2.703***
6.276***
4.978***
1.379*
5.264***
NS
0.112**
7,298.612
0.097
17
SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
Social Factors Influencing Popular Religious Beliefs (Adjusted ORs for Various Popular Religious Beliefs by Predictor Variables)
248
TABLE 3
TABLE 4 Social Factors Influencing Popular Religious Practice (Adjusted ORs for Various Popular Religious Beliefs by Predictor
Variables)
Ancestral tablet in
home
Making/keep
vow
Fortune
telling
Burning
incense
Praying to folk god
or ancestors
1.311***
NS
1.008**
0.635*
NS
2.127***
0.873**
NS
1.526***
NS
0.987**
0.379***
NS
2.589***
0.794**
NS
NS
0.073*
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
1.530**
0.636***
NS
0.983***
0.406***
NS
NS
1.193*
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
0.105**
NS
NS
0.640**
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
1.122**
1.121**
1.274***
NS
NS
NS
NS
1.210**
NS
NS
0.712***
1.282**
1.507**
1.766*
NS
0.239***
NS
0.248**
NS
7,474.408
0.080
17
2.595***
3.612***
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
3,374.088
0.081
17
7.386***
3.364*
0.067*
2.549*
NS
NS
11.239***
1,040.258
0.155
17
2.954***
3.759***
NS
0.441*
NS
NS
NS
3,478.936
0.079
17
6.814**
66.278***
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
180.465
0.299
17
2.549***
6.541***
21.862***
NS
NS
NS
NS
1,799.664
0.118
17
249
Source: Spiritual Life Survey of Chinese Residents 2007.
N ¼ 7,021 weighted data.
*p , .05, **p , .01, ***p , .001.
BUDDHIST IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
Gender
CCP member
Age
Han ethnicity
Married
Rural resident
Family income
Highest
education
Overall health
Inequality
problem
Buddhist
Formal Buddhist
Daoist
Protestant
Catholic
Muslim
Confucian
Log-likelihood
Nagelkerke R 2
df
Venerate ancestral
spirits
250
SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
finding is most likely due to “spirits,” “ghosts,” and “destiny” having separate
Christian and popular religious meanings and this diversity of interpretations not
being accounted for in the survey questions. Identifying as Muslim or Protestant
also significantly predicted believing that God or gods were involved in respondent’s everyday affairs. Again, our interpretation of this finding is that the survey
question is not designed to differentiate between the monotheistic Christian and
Muslim understanding of “God” and folk “gods” resulting in a positive, significant
relationship for adherents to several of the institutional religions included in the
model (the Chinese word shen
is used in the survey). For all other variables,
self-identifying as Muslim or Protestant is either not statistically significant or
renders one less likely to participate in popular religion or have popular religious
beliefs. The expected relationship between Catholicism and popular religious
belief and practice appeared for two variables: belief in ancestral spirits and belief
in the god of wealth. However, no consistent relationship between Catholic
identity and popular religious activity was found in the analysis.
Rural residency is a significant predictor of venerating ancestors, having an
ancestral tablet in the home, and believing in ancestral spirits, but is not a significant predictor on the other dependent variables or had a significant, negative
relationship. This is surprising considering the substantial literature that highlights the functional role of popular religion for rural communities in China and
is discussed further below.
Results pertaining to the education variable provide very little support for
classical secularization predictions of who participates in popular religion.
Education has a significant negative effect for only one variable: belief in ancestral spirits. However, the education variable also demonstrates a significant positive effect on belief in destiny and making and keeping a vow. Moving one
category up on the education variable significantly predicted belief in sages,
which makes logical sense, given that those with more education are likely more
cognizant of the works and history of traditional Chinese sages. The assumed
effects of education on religiosity and popular religious adherence specifically are
not supported by our findings.
Among the popular religious beliefs included in our analysis, six of the seven
revealed a positive relationship with respondents feeling that the gap between
rich and poor is a serious social problem. In other words, those who view inequality as a serious problem had increased odds of holding popular religious beliefs.
This pattern holds true for three measures of popular religious practice, venerating ancestral spirits, fortune telling, and praying to folk gods or ancestors. Family
income shows the expected negative relationship on four of the dependent variables: belief in spirits and gods, belief in ghosts, venerating ancestral spirits, and
having an ancestral tablet in the home. Family income also had a significant positive effect on participation in fortune telling. In Yang and Hu’s descriptive
research on the relationship between household economic status and the odds of
participation into folk religion (2012), they found that people at the two ends of
the spectrum of household income are more likely to get involved in popular
BUDDHIST IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
251
religion, a pattern called “the poor want their fortune told while the rich like to
burn incense” (qiong suanming fu shaoxiang)” (517). By detailing different practices and beliefs of popular religion, this study extends Yang and Hu’s finding and
clarifies the complex relationship between household income and popular religion. Having a poor assessment of overall health had the expected positive relationship in four of the models. In sum, the findings reveal more support for
existential security theories than classical secularization theories, but the findings
are not consistent across popular religious practices.
Another finding of interest is the consistent pattern of women being more
likely to believe and practice popular religion. All seven models predicting
popular religious beliefs reveal that, controlling for other factors, women tend to
be more involved in popular religion than men. The models also predict that
women are significantly more likely to participate in fortune telling and praying
to folk gods or ancestors. These findings are consistent with other research that
shows women are more likely to be religious than men across many cultures—
although the finding is not universal (e.g., Sullins 2006; Yang and Hu 2012). It is
also interesting to point out that the gap between women and men in popular
religious belief is more pronounced than for popular religious practice. This is
consistent with findings in the United States, which show that while women are
more religious in general, the gap is greater for affective rather than active religiosity (e.g., Sullins 2006). The models also show that men are more likely to
venerate ancestral spirits and have an ancestral tablet in the home, although
they are not more likely to believe in ancestral spirits. This may be explained by
the patriarchal structure of Chinese family relations where within a marriage, it
is the male’s responsibility to venerate ancestors and a female may not have the
opportunity to venerate her ancestors after marriage.
DISCUSSION
This study marks the first attempt to explore two aspects of popular religion
in mainland China using nationwide survey data: (1) the eclectic mixing of
popular religion and other religious traditions; and (2) the social factors predicting popular religious belief and practice. The central finding from this research is
that there is a clear relationship between identifying as a Buddhist and participating in popular religion in contemporary China. Moreover, this relationship is
constant across various measures of popular religion and the relationship is
always positive. While this finding may not be surprising to some, the overwhelming strength of this relationship and the very strong link between formally
committed Buddhists and participating in popular religion provides interesting
new insight into this relationship.
Based on conceptualizations of the differences between institutional
and loosely organized religion as well as efforts to differentiate institutional
Buddhism from “superstitious” practices, we expected that Buddhists who had
252
SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
not formally committed would be more likely to mix Buddhism and popular religion. Given the results of the analysis, it seems plausible that formally committed Buddhists are more religious in general than self-identified Buddhists and
this translates into higher rates of participation and belief in popular religion.
The implications of this finding for our expectations are two-fold: first, the
divide between loosely organized and institutional religion in China is not pronounced. This further implies that participating in formal Buddhist conversion
rituals is not seen as exclusive and is not associated with clear religious boundaries as is often the case in the Western context. Another possibility is that
Buddhism and popular religion have been mixed to the extent that many
popular religious beliefs and practices are taken to be Buddhist. This supports
the commonly accepted idea that there is not a clear delineation between
loosely organized and institutional religion in the Chinese context—at least as
it pertains to institutional Buddhism and loosely organized popular religion.
Second, this finding implies that the efforts of Buddhist leaders and the state to
distance institutional Buddhism from popular religion have not been successful.
Buddhism and popular religion are still conflated to a great extent, though there
is no way to know longitudinally if the degree of eclecticism has decreased from
the data used in this study.
It is important to point out that the causal direction of the relationship
between Buddhism and popular religion cannot be confirmed with our statistical
analysis of a cross-sectional data. Consequently, it is impossible to know if
Buddhist identity leads people to participate in popular religion, or, conversely,
if people who tend to be religious in a “traditional Chinese” sense tend to identify as Buddhist. Therefore, the documented relationship between Buddhism and
popular religion may be also attributed to the fact that many Chinese who are
participating in popular religion claim a Buddhist identity because of the legitimacy it affords as one of the officially accepted institutional religions in China
that has been favored by the CCP (Laliberté 2011). In this context, many selfidentified Buddhists who have little knowledge of Buddhist philosophy and
practice may use a Buddhist identity as a way to label their traditional Chinese
religious practices and beliefs. The legitimacy of Buddhist identity may also
explain why the link between Buddhist identity and popular religious activity
was stronger than that between Daoist identity and popular religious activity. In
other words, this finding may not imply that Buddhism has a stronger historical
link to popular religion than Daoism; rather, it may be depicting respondents’
claiming a Buddhist identity to gain legitimacy.
Another important consideration is the lack of predictive power for the rural
residency variable. While a strong relationship exists between ancestor veneration and rural residency, rural residency is not significantly correlated with other
dependent variables in the models. A significant and important literature stresses
the functional roles popular religion plays in the day-to-day life of rural China. It
may be that the insignificance of the rural residency variable can be attributed to
a lack of variables measuring beliefs and practices specific to certain villages and
BUDDHIST IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
253
regions in China8 (for example, no variables measuring belief in or worshiping of
Mazu which is prominent in southern coastal regions). Respondents may also
have interpreted the questions about popular religion based on their individuallevel functions, such as performing rituals for personal favors, rather than communal level functions, such as group rituals that provide social interaction in the
community. This may explain why living in a rural area is a significant predictor
only for variables related to ancestor worship (see Weller and Rubinstien 1999).
Also, it is possible that this relationship exists at other levels of analysis, such as
province, city, village, etc. Future research employing multilevel analysis may be
able to shed light on the impact of nested levels of data on popular religious
belief and practice.
On the other hand, there might be spatial difference in the effects of the key
predictors used in this study. Accordingly, we conducted another preliminary
analysis. We ran the same models but filtered out rural and urban residents in separate analyses. For many of the dependent variables in our study, the rural and
urban analyses had different significant independent variables. One key finding
in this regard is that the secularization and existential need variables were significant predictors in many of the rural resident models, but were never predictors in
the urban resident models.9 This leads us to believe that the secularization and
existential need measures may be interacting with the rural residency variable. In
other words, the existential need variables matter more in rural areas. One
explanation for this finding might be the fact that the educational level as well as
the extent of existential security among rural residents is on average much lower
than that of urban residents. In this case, the effect of improvement in education
and existential security are more likely to have a pronounced effect. Future
research should further explore this finding. It is also worth noting that Buddhist
identity was the most consistent predictor of popular religious belief and practice
for both the rural resident and urban resident models. The lack of predictive
power for the rural residency variable may also be related to another spatial difference in religious life in China. During the reform period, rural areas have
experienced weaker political control and because of this exhibit faster rates of
religious revival. One effect of greater political control in urban areas is a shortage of religious sites. The exception to this pattern is Buddhist temples, which
are being built or revived in urban areas for various reasons including increased
tourism (Fisher 2011). Thus, rural/urban differences in religious life may be less
pronounced for Buddhists, which likely explains why Buddhism is a strong
8
It is also possible that popular religious beliefs and practices are reviving in urban areas
as well as rural areas. For example, Yang (2005) in an ethnographic study of Christian converts dispels the myth that Christianity is weak in urban areas. Ethnographic studies of
popular religion in urban settings may find that it is reviving in urban areas also.
9
Tests of collinearity such as VIF and eigenvalues revealed no multicollinearity between
rural residency and the secularization and existential need variables.
254
SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
predictor of popular religious belief and practice in both rural and urban areas.
The implications discussed here are speculative and require further exploration.
This study finds little support for the classical secularization theory prediction concerning the impact of education on popular religious adherence. This
finding makes sense in light of the fact that popular religious practice in China is
increasing despite the fact that Chinese society is modernizing through comprehensive economic reforms. Perhaps, as Weller (2004) suggests, there is no inherent tension between modernization and popular religion because of popular
religion’s adaptability. This finding also echoes Hu and Leamaster’s study (2013),
which finds that as Taiwanese society modernized, popular religious involvement
also increased. Additionally, the insignificant association between educational
attainment and the propensity of involvement in popular religion suggests that
the state’s modernization efforts, such as raising the educational level of Chinese
citizens, will not dampen once-labeled superstitious activities.
Our study does find support in favor of existential security theory, particularly
in regard to feeling that inequality is a serious social problem. In more than half
of our models, this variable was a significant predictor of popular religious adherence. In light of the increasingly exacerbated social inequality in Chinese
society, it may be reasonable to expect increases in popular religious involvement.
However, it should be noted that more research on the effects of existential need
on religious practice in China is needed. Longitudinal data and measures of
overall economic development and inequality at the macro level are needed for a
more robust test of the affects existential need has on popular religious belief and
practice. Furthermore, the effects of subjective measures of health and popular
religious involvement should also be considered further, especially with the
recent availability of reliable survey data.
The findings from this study also highlight important considerations for
future research on religion in China—whether qualitative or quantitative. For
researchers embarking on quantitative studies of religion in China, it is important to be cognizant of the strong relationship between Buddhist identity and
popular religion in China and account for the possible intermixing of the two in
statistical models. The problematic issue of religious identity in survey research is
exacerbated in the Chinese context and requires careful attention. For researchers embarking on qualitative studies of religion in China, case studies of Buddhist
sites and case studies of popular religion in rural communities should consider
the intersection between Buddhism and popular religion. In addition, researchers
should strive to make distinctions between self-identified Buddhists who have
not ritually committed and Buddhists who have when considering the relationship between Buddhism and popular religion. Additionally, future research
should look for empirical evidence of the relationship between Buddhist identity
and popular religion in Taiwan, where, similar to mainland China, popular religion is mixed with Buddhism and Daoism. Buddhism in Taiwan has also undergone reforms with the goal of becoming more modern and pragmatic, as
evidenced by the growth of Buddhist organizations in the 1990s (Madsen 2007).
BUDDHIST IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
255
However, it is unclear whether these efforts have effectively reduced the amount
of mixing of popular religion and Buddhism in Taiwan.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank Daniel V. A. Olson and Fenggang Yang for
their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this manuscript.
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