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1-1-2014
One-State/Two-Votes: Do Supermajority Senate
Voting Rules Violate the Article V Guaranty of
Equal State Suffrage?
Burt Neuborne
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Recommended Citation
Neuborne, Burt, "One-State/Two-Votes: Do Supermajority Senate Voting Rules Violate the Article V Guaranty of Equal State
Suffrage?" (2014). New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers. Paper 450.
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/450
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Pleaseciteto10STANFORDJ.C.R.&C.L.____
OneͲState/TwoͲVotes:
DoSupermajoritySenateVotingRulesViolate
theArticleVGuarantyofEqualStateSuffrage?
BurtNeuborne
Introduction
SenateRuleXXII,ascurrentlyadministered,imposesadefactosupermajorityvoting
ruleontheSenate,requiringsixtyvotestoenactlegislation,ortoprovideconstitutionaladvice
andconsenttoaPresidentialnomination.1Tobesure,finalSenatevotesonbillsand
nominationsareformallygovernedbymajorityrule,2butinordertobeeligibleforafinalvote,
VisitingProfessorofLaw,StanfordLawSchool(Winter;Spring2013);InezMilhollandProfessorofCivilLiberties,
NewYorkUniversitySchoolofLaw.MythankstotheBoardofEditorsoftheStanfordJournalofCivilRightsand
CivilLibertiesforaskingmetosubmitthisessay.Mythanks,aswell,toSenatorsJeffBingaman(D.N.Mex.)(1992Ͳ
2012)andRussFeingold(D.Wis.)(1998Ͳ2010).WesharedthegoodfortunetobevisitorsatStanfordLawSchool
during2013.SenatorsBingamanandFeingoldeachprovidedmewithinvaluableinsightintothedayͲtoͲday
workingsoftheSenate.Theideaforthisessayemergedfromastudentforumonthefilibusterthatthethreeofus
hostedinMay,2013,undertheauspicesoftheStanfordLawSchoolProgramonLawandPolicy.Themistakesin
thepieceare,alas,minealone.
1
SenateRuleXXIIprovides:
Notwithstanding...anyotherruleoftheSenate,atanytimeamotion
[is]signedbysixteenSenators,tobringtoaclosethedebateuponany
measure...pendingbeforetheSenate...thePresidingOfficer...shall
atoncestatethemotiontotheSenate,andonehouraftertheSenate
meetsonthefollowingcalendardaybutone,heshalllaythemotion
beforetheSenateanddirectthattheclerkcalltheroll,anduponthe
ascertainmentthataquorum[offiftyͲoneSenators]ispresent,the
PresidingOfficershall,withoutdebate,submittotheSenatebyayeaͲ
andͲnayvotethequestion:“IsitthesenseoftheSenatethatthedebate
shallbebroughttoaclose?”Andifthatquestionshallbedecidedinthe
affirmativebythreeͲfifthsoftheSenatorsdulychosenandsworn—
exceptonameasureormotiontoamendtheSenaterules,inwhichcase
thenecessaryaffirmativevoteshallbetwoͲthirdsoftheSenators
presentandvoting—thensaidmeasure,motion,orothermatter
pendingbeforetheSenate...shallbetheunfinishedbusinesstothe
exclusionofallotherbusinessuntildisposedof.RulesoftheSenateXXII,
availableat:http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXXII.
2
ArticleI,Section5oftheConstitutiondefinesaquorumoftheHouseandSenateasamajorityofmembers,
currently218intheHouseandfiftyͲoneintheSenate.Onceaquorumispresent,noruleoftheSenatemandates
majorityvoting.RulesoftheSenate.Thepracticeofmajorityruleispremisedontheconsensusunderstanding
that,onceaquorumexists,amajorityofthequorummayact.SeeU.S.v.Ballin,144U.S.1,5(1892)(upholdingthe
constitutionalityofaHouserulesettingquorumatasimplemajorityoftheentireHouse,andallowingamajority
ofthequorumtoenactlegislation)(theoldruledidnotcountHousemembersforquorumpurposesifthey
declinedtovoteon a bill). Federal law makes six justices a quorum of the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2013).
Thus,underthecurrentrules,legislationmaybeenactedbyasfewas110Housemembers(approximatelytwentyͲ
1
Pleaseciteto10STANFORDJ.C.R.&C.L.____
virtuallyeveryproposednomineeorbillmustclearadefactosixtyͲvotethreshold.Overthe
years,thesupermajoritythreshold,calledafilibuster,hasevolvedfromtherelativelyrare
“speaking”filibuster,whereaSenator,orarelayofSenators,hijackstheSenatefloortoblocka
vote,tothemodern“virtual”filibuster,whereasingleSenatorcanplayatbeingavirtualpirate,
refusingtoyieldavirtualfloorwithouttheinconvenienceofactuallydoingorsayinganything.3
Notsurprisingly,themodernvirtualfilibusterhasmorphedintoadefactosupermajorityrule
forthetransactionofalmostallSenatebusiness.4Icallittheziplessfilibuster.5
Thebasiccomponentsoftheziplessfilibusteremergedinthe1970sastheresultoftwo
wellͲintentionedeffortsatreform.TheoriginalSenatecloturerulegoverningtheoldspeaking
filibuster,datingfrom1917,permittedaSenatortodelayavoteonanissuebycontinuingto
debateitunlesstwoͲthirdsoftheSenatorspresentandvotingoptedforcloture.6PreͲ1970
Senatecalendarpractice,moreover,forbadeconsiderationofotherbusinessuntilthespeaking
filibusterwasresolvedonewayoranother.7Undertheoldrules,therefore,afilibustering
Senatorwasactuallyobligedtospeakforanextendedperiodoftime,supportersofafilibuster
hadtomaintainasubstantialphysicalpresenceonthefloortoassuresufficientvotes(oneͲthird
ofSenatorspresentandvoting)tosustainthefilibusteragainstasurprisecloturemotion,and
theentireSenatewastiedupinknotsuntilthefilibusterwasendedorthebillwithdrawn.In
theearly1970s,SenateMajorityLeaderMikeMansfield,seekingtopreventfilibustering
fivepercentofthebody),andstatutesstruckdownasunconstitutionalbyasfewasfourJustices(fortyͲfour
percentofthebody).
3
Foranexcellentdescriptionofthehistoryofthefilibuster,seeCatherineFisk&ErwinChemerinsky,The
Filibuster,49STAN.L.REV.181,187Ͳ209(1997).RecentscholarshipintheareaowesmuchtotheirpathͲbreaking
work.Theterm“filibuster”isderivedfromDutchandSpanishslangdenotingapirateorfreebooterwhohijacksa
shiporothercargo.Id.at192.Inthebeginning,thetermwasusedintheUnitedStatesasaderogatorylabelfor
nineteenthcenturySouthernadventurersseekingtooverthrowforeigngovernments–CubaandNicaragua,in
particular–tocreateadditionalspaceforslaveholding.Id.Intime,itbecameassociatedgenerallywith
swashbucklingadventurism.Id.MR.SMITHGOESTOWASHINGTON(ColumbiaPictures1939)depictsaspeaking
filibuster,withasingleheroicSenatorrefusingtoyieldthefloorinanefforttodefendthecommongoodagainst
specialinterests.Speakingfilibustersderailedalmosteveryefforttoenactcivilrightslegislationfrom1877Ͳ1964,
Fisk&Chemerinsky,supraat198Ͳ200,includingthe“forcebill”of1891andtheantiͲlynchinglawof1922,Id.at
187n.25;preventedthearmingofmerchantshipsin1917inresponsetoGermansubmarineattacks,Id.at196;
preventedratificationoftheTreatyofVersaillesin1919,Id.at187n.25,blockingAmericanentry intointhe
LeagueofNations;andblockedAmericanmembershipintheWorldCourtin1926Id.
4
Iamnotthefirsttonotetheevolutionofthefilibusterintoitscurrentform.SeeFisk&Chemerinsky,supranote
3,at200Ͳ09(describingtheemergenceofthe“stealth”filibuster).
5
Forthederivationof“zipless,”seeERICAJONG,FEAROFFLYING(1973).
6
ThemovetoatwoͲtrackcalendarisdescribedinSARAHA.BINDER&STEVENS.SMITH,POLITICSORPRINCIPLE?
FILIBUSTERINGINTHEUNITEDSTATESSENATE7(1996).
7
WALTERJ.OLESZEK,CONGRESSIONALPROCEDURESANDTHEPOLICYPROCESS212(7thed.2007).
2
Pleaseciteto10STANFORDJ.C.R.&C.L.____
SenatorsfromholdingtheSenatehostage,initiatedatwoͲtrackSenatecalendar.8Under
Mansfield’stwoͲtracksystem,filibusterswouldbecarriedonduringspecificpartsoftheday,
withtheremainderreservedforregularsenatebusiness,carriedoutonaseparatecalendar.9
WhileMansfield’stwoͲtrackcalendarreformsucceededinavoidinggeneralparalysisofthe
Senate,italsomadeitunnecessaryforafilibusteringspeakerorgroupofspeakerstoholdthe
Senatefloorformorethanashortperiodoftimeeachmorningbeforeitwastimetomoveon
totheothercalendartrack.Moreover,underatwoͲtrackcalendar,launchingafilibusterno
longerhadinstitutionalconsequences.AsfarasotherSenatebusinessisconcerned,filibusters
becamecostless.10
Then,in1975,reformers,ledbySenatorWalterMondale,soughttolowerthecloture
thresholdfromtwoͲthirdstothreeͲfifths,buttheoldguardpickedtheirpockets.11Supporters
ofthefilibusteragreedtothethreeͲfifthsnumber,butextractedasaquidproquothatthe
cloturenumberbethreefifthsofallSenators–orafixedsixtyvotes.12Ittookthereformersa
whiletorealizethatunderthenew“reformed”rule,itwasnolongernecessaryforanyoneto
supportafilibusteronthefloor.Sincethenewcloturethresholdwasanabsolutesixtyvotes,
supportersofafilibustercouldstayhomeinbedandnotworryaboutmarshalingonethirdof
theSenators“presentandvoting”todefeatacloturemotion.13Notonlythat,reformersagreed
tothecontinuationoftheentrenchinglanguageinRuleXXIIrequiringatwoͲthirdsvoteofthe
SenatorspresentandvotingtoaltertheabsolutesixtyͲvoterequirement.14Itwasamassacreof
theinnocents.1516
8
SARAHA.BINDER&STEVENS.SMITH,POLITICSORPRINCIPLE?FILIBUSTERINGINTHEUNITEDSTATESSENATE7(1996);WALTERJ.
OLESZEK,CONGRESSIONALPROCEDURESANDTHEPOLICYPROCESS212(4thed.1997).
9
OLESZEK,supranote7,at212.
10
TheunforeseenconsequencesofthetwoͲtrackcalendarontheeasewithwhichafilibustermaybemounted
havebeenwidelynoted.SeeFisk&Chemerinsky,supranote3at201;JoshChafetz,TheUnconstitutionalityofthe
Filibuster,43Conn.L.Rev.1003,1010(2011).
11
Thestoryofthe1975amendmentstoRuleXXIIissetforthinGREGORYKROGER,FILIBUSTERING:APOLITICALHISTORYOF
OBSTRUCTIONINTHEHOUSEANDSENATE176Ͳ79(2010).SeealsoExaminingtheFilibuster:TheFilibusterTodayandIts
Consequences:HearingBeforetheS.Comm.onRulesandAdmin.,111thCong.145Ͳ48(2010)(statementofHon.
WalterF.Mondale).
12
EmmetJ.Bondurant,TheSenateFilibuster:ThePoliticsofObstruction,48HARV..J,ONLEGIS.467,476(2011).
13
Fisk&Chemerinsky,supranote3,at203.(“presentandvoting”addedbymeforclarification).
14
Bondurant,supranote12,at476.
15
TelescopinghistoricalmaterialcollectedinKroger,supranote7,carefullydescribedinFisk&Chemerinsky,supra
note3,at185Ͳ209,andsummarizedinEmmetJ.Bondurant,supranote12,at470Ͳ76(2011),thechronologyof
cloture“reform”runsfromtheSenate’sabolitionin1806,atthesuggestionofVicePresidentAaronBurr,ofthe
motiontocallthequestionbymajorityvote,leavingnowaytocutoffSenatedebatethroughouttheNineteenth
century;totheadoptionoftheoriginalversionofRuleXXIIin1917permittingclotureona2/3voteofthe
Senatorspresentandvoting;toa1949amendmentextendingcloturetoproceduralissues,butatthecostof
raisingtheneeded2/3votetotheentireSenate;toa1959amendmentmovingthe2/3rulebacktoSenators
3
Pleaseciteto10STANFORDJ.C.R.&C.L.____
ThemodernziplessfilibusterwasfinallyperfectedbytheinformalpracticeofSenate
“holds,”oftencarriedoutinsecret,allowingasingleSenatortofreezeanissuemerelyby
threateningtomountafilibusteroverit.17Nowitisn’tevennecessaryforafilibusteringSenator
totakethefloorforafewmomentseachmorning.AlltheSenatorhastodoisthreatentodoit.
So,wehavemovedfromaspeakingfilibusterwiththreeselfͲlimitingtransactioncosts:(1)
significantphysicalcommitmentbyboththefilibusteringspeakerandasmanyasthirtyͲtwo
supporters;(2)publicdisclosurebyforcingafilibustertooccurintheglareofSenatedebate;
and(3)institutionalparalysisduringthependencyofafilibuster,toaziplessfilibusterwithno
transactioncostsfortheparticipatingSenatorsortheSenateitself.Tothenation’sloss,we
havelearnedthatwhenyouremovetheselfͲlimitingtransactioncostsfromthespeaking
filibuster,ittransformstheSenateintoasuperͲmajoritarianbody.Afirststepinlooseningthe
currentfilibusterͲdrivenstrangleholdontheSenatewouldbetorestorethetransactioncosts
associatedwithafilibuster.Abolish“holds.”ScrapthetwoͲtrackcalendar.Restoretheold
“presentandvoting”criteriaforcloturevotes.MovingbacktoasingleͲtrackcalendarand
endingtheinterrorempowerof“holds”couldbecarriedoutunilaterallybythecurrentSenate
MajorityLeader,HarryReidorthroughapointoforderraisedbyacourageousSenator
challengingthechair’srulingthat:(1)RuleXXIIcanbeinvokedwithouttakingandholdingthe
floor;and(2)theSenatemaymoveontoothermatterswhileafilibusterisinprogress.Under
thestandardrulesoftheSenate,rejectionofsuchapointoforderbythechairwouldbe
immediatelyappealabletothebodywithoutdebate,andwouldbegovernedbyafiftyͲoneͲ
votemajority.18Changingbacktoa“presentandvoting”calculationforcloturevoteswould
requireaformalamendmenttoRuleXXII,requiringthesamefiftyͲonevotesif,asIbelieve,the
1959entrenchingprovisionisunconstitutional.19
presentandvoting,butatthecostofanentrenchingprovisionrequiringa2/3presentandvotingsupermajorityto
changetheSenatevotingrules;toa1975amendmentloweringthecloturevoteto3/5,butatthecostofgoing
backto3/5oftheentireSenate,andleavingtheentrenchinglanguageuntouched.Withreformslikethose,you
don’tneedaproblem.WehaveneverfoundawaybacktothepreͲ1806practicechronicledinThomasJefferson’s
VicePresidentialnotebookswherethemajoritywasempoweredtocutoffdebatebycallingthequestion.Early
SenatepracticeisdescribedinBondurant,supranote12,at470Ͳ73.
16
Thepejorativecharacterizationoftheresultasa“massacreoftheinnocents”ismyown.
17
Thepracticeofusing“holds”totriggerafilibusterisdescribedinFisk&Chemerinsky,supranote3,at203Ͳ05.
18
LloydCutler,inhiscapacityasWhiteHouseCounsel,laidouttheblueprintforthepointoforderchallengetothe
filibuster.LloydCutler,TheWaytoKillSenateRuleXXII,WASH.POST,April19,1993atA23.SeealsoMartinB.Gold
&DimpleGupta,TheConstitutionalOptiontoChangeSenateRulesandProcedures:AMajoritarianMeansto
OvercometheFilibuster,28HARV.J.L.&PUB.POL’Y205,252Ͳ60(2004)(describingthe1975ruleschange).Forabrief
descriptionoftheuseofthetechniquein1975,seeFisk&Chemerinsky,supranote3,at212Ͳ13.
19
SincetheexistingtextofRuleXXIIcontainsanentrenchingprovisionrequiringatwoͲthirdsvotetoamend
Senaterules,Senatorsseekingtoamendtherulebyasimplemajoritywouldhavetoarguethattheentrenching
provisionisunconstitutional.Fisk&Chemerinsky,supranote3,arguethattheentrenchinglanguageis
unconstitutionalat245Ͳ52.TheconstitutionalityofentrenchingprovisionsisdefendedinEricA.Posner&Adrian
Vermeule,LegislativeEntrenchment:AReappraisal,111YALEL.J.1665(2002)(supportingtheconstitutionalityof
theruleXXIIentrenchingamendment),andinJohnO.McGinnis&MichaelRappaport,SymmetricEntrenchment:A
4
Pleaseciteto10STANFORDJ.C.R.&C.L.____
Why,youmayask,shouldfiftyͲoneSenatorsbucktheleadershipandbegintheprocess
ofreinstatingtheoldspeakingfilibuster?ThemostobviousresponseisthatrevertingtopreͲ
1970spracticewouldendtheziplessfilibusterandrestorethethreeselfͲlimitingprincipal
transactioncostsassociatedwiththespeakingfilibuster:(1)thephysicaltollonthefilibustering
Senatorsandtheirsupporters;(2)thepublicnatureofthespectacle;and(3)thederailingofthe
entireinstitution.WhilethespeakingfilibusterwascapableofbringingtheSenatetoahaltona
numberofoccasions,20thetransactioncostsplacedaselfͲlimitinglidontheprocess.When
thoseselfͲlimitingtransactioncostswereremovedinthe1970s,itwasjustamatteroftime
untiltheziplessvirtualfilibusterevolvedintoastandardsupermajorityvotingrulewith
disastrouseffectsontheSenate’sabilitytotransactbusiness.21
ThesecondreasonisthatageneralsupermajorityvotingruleintheSenateis
unconstitutional,notonlybecauseitviolatesanimplicitmajorityrulerequirementlurkingin
theConstitution’stext,butbecauseitviolatestheSeventeenthAmendment’srequirementthat
“eachSenatorshallhaveonevote”22anddepriveseachstateof“equalsuffrageintheSenate”
inviolationoftheEntrenchmentClauseofArticleVoftheConstitution.23
IftheSenatorswon’tacttorescuetheSenatefromitscurrentpartisanstalemate,who
will?Usually,werelyonacourttorescueusfromunconstitutionalfolly.Itasksalot,though,to
expectajudgetoovercomeArticleIIIstandingproblems,aswellasthepoliticalquestion
doctrine,andinvalidateaninternalSenateruleintheteethoftheauthorizationtoeachhouse
inArticleI,Section5to“determinetherulesofitsproceedings.”24WhileIbelievethatArticleIII
judgeshaveboththepoweranddutytodisallowanunconstitutionalsupermajorityvotingrule
intheSenate,Ihavenoillusionsthattheywillusethatpowerinthecurrentjudicialclimate.If,
ontheotherhand,aconscientiousSenator(yes,Virginia,thereareconscientiousSenators)
believesthatthefilibusterrule,ascurrentlyadministered,hasmorphedintoan
unconstitutionalsupermajorityvotingrule,thatSenatorisdutyͲboundtosupportanddefend
theConstitutionbyraisingandsupportingapointoforderchallengingthecurrentzipless
filibusterasunconstitutional.25
ConstitutionalandNormativeTheory,89VA.L.REV.385(2003)(supportinganarrowerclassofentrenchment
provisions).Theconstitutionalityoftheentrenchingprovisionisdiscussedinfraat18Ͳ20.
20
Seesupranote3.
21
ThedramaticrecentincreaseintheuseofthefilibusterischronicledinBondurant,supranote12,at477Ͳ79.
22
U.S.CONST.amend.XVII(“eachSenatorshallhaveonevote”).SeeMichaelJ.Teter,EqualityAmongEquals:Isthe
SenateClotureRuleUnconstitutional?,94MARQ.L.REV.547(2010).
23
U.S.CONST.art.V(“nostate,withoutitsconsent,shallbedeprivedofitsequalsuffrageintheSenate”).The
constitutionalissueisdiscussedinfraat8Ͳ15.
24
U.S.CONST.art.I,§5.TheproceduralhurdlestoArticleIIIreviewofthefilibusterarediscussedinfraat15Ͳ18.
25
SenatorstakeanoathprescribedbyArticleVI“tosupportthisConstitution.”U.S.CONST.art.VI.SeeCityof
Boernev.Flores,521U.S.507,535(1997)(“Congress...hasnotjusttherightbutthedutytomakeitsown
5
Pleaseciteto10STANFORDJ.C.R.&C.L.____
I.
TheZiplessFilibusterisUnconstitutional
A.
TheConnecticutCompromise:
“EqualSuffrageintheSenate”
SeventhgradecivicsteachesusthattheConstitutionwasmadepossiblebyRoger
Sherman’sConnecticutCompromise,providingforaHouseofRepresentativesapportionedby
populationandaSenateinwhicheachstatehasequalrepresentationregardlessof
population.26TheSenateis,therefore,intentionallymalapportioned,andgettingworse.Under
theConnecticutCompromise,California,withthirtyͲsevenmillionresidents,isentitledtothe
samerepresentationintheSenateasWyoming,with563,626hardysouls.27Underthe“oneͲ
person,oneͲvote”lensusedbytheSupremeCourtsinceBakerv.Carr28totestfor
unconstitutionalapportionments,aWyomingresident’sSenatevoteisseventyͲtwotimesas
powerfulastheSenatevotecastbyaCalifornian.29UndertheConnecticutCompromise,fiftyͲ
oneSenators,representingtwentyͲsixstateswithlessthantwentypercentofthenation’s
informedjudgmentonthemeaningandforceoftheConstitution.”);1ANNALSOFCONG.500(1789)(JosephGales
ed.,1834)(statementofRep.Madison)(“[I]tisincontrovertiblyofasmuchimportancetothisbranchofthe
[g]overnmentastoanyother,thatthe[C]onstitutionshouldbepreservedentire.Itisourduty....”).
26
ForastandardnarrativeoftheConnecticutCompromise,seeRICHARDBEEMAN,PLAINHONESTMEN:THEMAKINGOF
THEAMERICANCONSTITUTION200Ͳ25(2009).ThebackgroundoftheConnecticutCompromiseanditsrelationshipto
thefilibusterisdiscussedinTeter,supranote22,at555Ͳ62,574Ͳ76.
27
Allpopulationreferencesinthisessayaredrawnfromthe2010Census,availableonlineat
https://www.census.gov/2010census.
28
369U.S.186(1962).
29
Cf.Baker,369U.S.at207Ͳ08(predicatingstandingontherelativedifferencesinvotingpowerofcitizensin
malapportioneddistricts).TheprecisemathematicaltestfortheoneͲperson,oneͲvoteruleemergedinJustice
Douglas’opinionfortheCourtinGrayv.Sanders,372U.S.368,371,379Ͳ80(1963),comparingtherelative
mathematicalweightofvotesinmalapportioneddistricts.InWesberryv.Sanders,JusticeBlack,writingforthe
Court,restedtheoneͲperson,oneͲvoteprinciple,asappliedtoCongress,ontherequirementinArticleI,Section2
thatRepresentativesbechosen“bythePeopleoftheseveralStates.”376U.S.1,7Ͳ8(1964)(quotingU.S.CONST.
art.I,§2).CitingGray,JusticeBlacknotedthatmalapportionedCongressionaldistrictsgivedifferentrelative
mathematicalweightstothevotesofcitizensresidingindifferentdistricts.Id.Thefullexpositionofthe
mathematicaltestoccurredinChiefJusticeWarren’sopinionfortheCourtinReynoldsv.Sims,377U.S.533,561Ͳ
64,568(1964)(demonstratingtherelativemathematicaldiminutionofvalueofmalapportionedvotesby
comparingtheproͲratavalueofeachvote).ApplyingtheCourt’sformulatothepresentͲdaySenate:InCalifornia,
eachvoterhasaoneͲinͲthirtyͲsevenͲmillionsayintheoutcome.InWyoming,eachvoterhasaoneͲinͲ564,000say.
Thus,accordingtoBakerv.Carranditsprogeny,aSenatevoteinWyomingis66timesmorepowerfulthana
Californiavote.
6
Pleaseciteto10STANFORDJ.C.R.&C.L.____
population,canexercisemajoritycontroloftheSenate.30Theemergenceinrecentyearsofthe
ziplessfilibusterallocatesevenmoredisproportionatepoliticalpowertoSenatorsrepresenting
sparselypopulatedstates.WhentheSenateoperatesunderastandardvotingruleenabling
fortyͲoneSenators,representingtwentyͲonestateswithaboutelevenpercentofthenation’s
population,toblocklegislationoranominationfavoredbyfiftyͲnineSenatorsrepresenting
thirtystateswitheightyͲninepercentofthepopulation,31itbecomesimpossibletodescribethe
resultingprocessasremotelydemocratic.
That’spreciselywhathappenedwhenfortyͲsixsenatorsoutvotedfiftyͲfourtoblockthe
requirementofbackgroundchecksforprospectivegunpurchasers.32Assumingfor
comparison’ssakethateachsenatorrepresentshalfherstate’spopulation,thefortyͲsix
senatorsvotingagainstcloturerepresentedonly37.5%ofAmericans.33Thisminoritywasable
toblockavotedespitepollsindicatingthatthelegislationwassupportedbyalmostninety
percentofthenation’spopulation.34Themalapportionmentwouldhavebeenevenworse,but
twoSenatorsfromTexas,withtwentyͲfivemillionresidents,andonefromFlorida,with
eighteenmillionresidents,opposedcloture.IfthethreelargeͲstateSenatorshadvotedfor
cloture,thevotewouldstillhavefailedfortyͲthreetofiftyͲseven.
There’snotmuchthatcanbedoneaboutthebasicfactofamalapportionedSenate.
ArticleI,Section3,whichprovidesthat“theSenateoftheUnitedStatesshallbecomposedof
twoSenatorsfromeachState...andeachSenatorshallhaveonevote,”35wasdesignedto
codifyRogerSherman’sConnecticutCompromise,whichgavethelargestatesaHouseof
Representativesapportionedbypopulation,andthesmallerstatesaSenatewhereeachstate,
regardlessofpopulation,wouldexercise“equalsuffrage.”TheEntrenchmentClauseofArticleV
purportstolocktheConnecticutCompromiseintoplaceforeverbyforbiddingany
30
The2010decennialcensusdescribedsuprainnote27reportsanationalpopulationofapproximately310
million.ThetwentyͲsixleastͲpopulousstatesinreverseorderofpopulationcontainabouteighteenpercentofthe
nation’spopulation.
31
Seesupranote19.ThetwentyͲoneleastͲpopulousstatesinthe2010Censuscontainaboutelevenpercentofthe
nation’spopulation.
32
ThevotingbreakdownonthebackgroundcheckcloturemotionissummarizedatU.S.SenateRollCallVotes
113thCongress,1stSession:VoteSummaryontheAmendment(ManchinAmdt.No.715),U.S.SENATELEGISLATION&
RECORDS(lastvisitedNov.5,2013),
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=113&session=1&vote=0009
7.32ThefinalreportedSenatevoteoncloturewasfortyͲsixtofiftyͲfour,butMajorityLeaderHarryReidshiftedhis
voteatthelastminutetoenablehimtocallthematterupagaininthefutureunderrulesofparliamentary
procedure.So,theactualvotewasfortyͲfivetofiftyͲfive.
33
Ihaveused2010Censusfiguresasdescribedsuprainnote19.
34
SeePoll:AmericansOverwhelminglyApproveofBackgroundChecksforGunPurchases,CNNPOLITICS(lastvisited
Nov.5,2013),www.cnn.com/Politics/pollingcenter/polls/2451.
35
U.S.CONST.art.I§3.
7
Pleaseciteto10STANFORDJ.C.R.&C.L.____
constitutionalamendmentthatwoulddepriveastatewithoutitsconsentof“itsequalsuffrage
intheSenate.”36
AtthePhiladelphiaConvention,theConnecticutCompromisepotwassweetenedfor
Virginia,alargeslavestate,andtheotherSouthernslavestatesbythefirstsentenceofArticle
1,Section2,Paragraph3(the“threeͲfifthscompromise”),countingeachslaveasthreeͲfifthsof
apersonforHouseapportionmentpurposes,therebyguaranteeingthattheslavestateswould
exercise:(1)artificiallybloatedvotingpowerinthesupposedlyproperlyͲapportionedHouse;(2)
disproportionatepoliticalpowerinthemalapportionedSenate;and(3)enhancedpowerinthe
ElectoralCollege.It’snocoincidencethatfourofourfirstfivePresidentswereVirginians,37and
thatslaveryresisteddemocraticreform.
TheConnecticutCompromisethatgaveusabadlymalapportionedSenateand
enhancedslaveͲstaterepresentationintheHouseandtheElectoralCollegewasadoptedin
1787bythevotesofonlyfivestates(Connecticut,NorthCarolina,Maryland,NewJersey,and
Delaware)withaboutthirtyͲonepercentofthenation’s1790population.38Fourstates
(Virginia,Pennsylvania,SouthCarolinaandGeorgia)representingfortyͲonepercentofthe
nation’spopulationin1790voted“no.”Massachusettsabstained.NewYorkwasunabletovote
atallbecausetwoofitsthreedelegateshadalreadywalkedoutinprotestoverthegrantof
powerstothenationalgovernment,leavingAlexanderHamiltonwithoutpowertocastavote
onewayortheother.39Notsurprisingly,NewYorktookitonthepoliticalchin.Asalargestate
withveryfewslaves,itwasharmedbyboththemalapportionedSenateandthethreeͲfifths
compromise.It’snosurprisethatJamesMadisoninFederalistNo.62calledtheSenatea
36
U.S.CONST.art.V.FrustrationoverthemalapportionednatureoftheSenateoccasionallyboilsoverintoadebate
overwhethertheConstitutioncouldbeamended,despiteArticleV,tomaketheSenatemoredemocratic.See
AkhilReedAmar,TheConsentoftheGoverned:ConstitutionalAmendmentOutsideArticleV,94COLUM.L.REV.457
(1994);DougLinder,WhatintheConstitutionCannotBeAmended?,23ARIZ.L.REV.717(1981).
37
WithouttheadditionalSouthernelectorscreatedbythethreeͲfifthscompromise,JohnAdamswouldhave
defeatedThomasJeffersonintheelectionof1800.Forthe1800ElectoralCollegebreakdown,seeTallyofElectoral
Votesforthe1800Election,NATIONALARCHIVES(lastvisitedNov.5,2013),
www.archives.gov/legislative/features/1800Ͳelection/1800Ͳelection.html.
38
Forthe1790censusfigures,seeCensusofPopulationandHousing,UNITEDSTATESCENSUSBUREAU,
www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html(follow“CensusofPopulationandHousing,1790”hyperlink;then,
under“ReturnofthewholenumberofpersonswithintheseveraldistrictsoftheUnitedStates,”follow“Full
Document”hyperlink).FollowingtheprecedentoftheArticlesofConfederation,thePhiladelphiaConvention
ballotedstateͲbyͲstate,witheachstatevotinginaccordancewiththewishesofamajorityofitsdelegates.A
simplemajorityofthestatesvotingwassufficienttoadoptaprovision.Thestoryoftheconvention’sballotingand
deliberationsistoldinEdwardJ.Larsen&MichaelP.Winship,THECONSTITUTIONALCONVENTION:ANARRATIVEHISTORY
FROMTHENOTESOFJAMESMADISON91(2005).
39
TwoofNewYork’sthreedelegatestothePhiladelphiaConvention,JohnLansingandRobertYates,walkedout
afteraboutsixweeksinordertoorganizetheantiͲFederalistoppositioninNewYork.AlexanderHamilton,the
thirddelegate,remained,butcouldnotvote.SeeTheFoundingFathers:NewYork,NATIONALARCHIVES,
www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_founding_fathers_new_york.html(lastvisitedNov.5,2013).
8
Pleaseciteto10STANFORDJ.C.R.&C.L.____
necessarycompromisewithprinciple,andwarnedthenationnottoseekanytheoretical
justificationforit.40Whateveritsunsavorydemocraticprovenance,however,itisimpossibleto
articulateaplausibleconstitutionalobjectiontotheSenate’smalapportionednature.Giventhe
EntrenchmentClauseofArticleV,youcan’tevenarguethatthepassageoftheFourteenth
Amendment’sguaranteeofequalprotectionofthelawssomehowamendedorerodedArticle
1,Section3onalastͲinͲtimebasis.Inanyevent,theSeventeenthAmendment,providingfor
directelectionofSenatorsin1913,reͲenactedtheoperativelanguageofArticle1,Section3,
awardingeachstatetwoSenators,eachofwhomhasonevote.Thus,amalapportionedSenate
basedonequalsuffrageforeachstate,favoringruralAmericaanddisfavoringcities,isan
enduringconstitutionalfactoflife.Thankyou,Roger.41
B.
TheZiplessFilibusterErodes“EqualSuffrageintheSenate”
TheconstitutionalityofthesixtyͲvoteziplessfilibusterisanothermatter.Lackingexplicit
constitutionalauthorization,theziplessfilibuster’sconstitutionalityhasbeenthesubjectofa
gooddealofscholarlycomment,42andthetargetofseveralunsuccessfulcourtchallenges.43
40
THEFEDERALISTNO.62(JamesMadison)atIII.
41
RogerSherman,whobrokeredtheConnecticutCompromisein1787,alsopersuadedareluctantHouseof
Representativesin1789tooverruleJamesMadisonandlistourrightsinasingledocumentcalledtheBillofRights.
Shermanistheonlyfoundertohavesignedallfourofourfoundationaldocuments:theContinentalAssociation
(1774),theDeclarationofIndependence(1776),theArticlesofConfederation(1781),andtheU.S.Constitution
(1787).Whilehewasatit,ShermanservedonallthreedraftingcommitteesfortheBillofRights:theCommitteeof
Eleven,thethreeͲpersonCommitteeonStyle,andtheHouseͲSenateConferenceCommittee.NotevenMadison
servedonallthree.HeskippedtheCommitteeonStyle.OncetheConstitutionwasratified,Shermanservedinthe
HouseandthenintheSenate.Hediedin1793,whileamemberoftheSenate.Inallthoseyears,apartfromhis
insistenceonunitingourrightsinasingledocument,RogerShermandoesnotappeartohavehadasingleuseful
idea.SeeMARKDAVIDHALL,ROGERSHERMANANDTHECREATIONOFTHEAMERICANREPUBLIC(2013).
42
Amongthesubstantialnumberofexcellentarticlesdebatingtheconstitutionalityofthefilibuster,Ifoundthe
followingparticularlyinformative:MichaelJ.Gerhardt,TheConstitutionalityoftheFilibuster,21CONST.COMMENT
445(2004)(supportingtheconstitutionalityofthefilibusterandtheentrenchingamendment);JohnO.McGinnis&
MichaelRappaport,TheConstitutionalityofLegislativeSupermajorityRequirements:ADefense,105YALEL.J.483
(1995)(supportingtheconstitutionalityofsupermajorityrequirements;Fisk&Chemerinsky,supranote3
(supportingtheconstitutionalityofthefilibuster,butopposingtheconstitutionalityoftheentrenching
amendment);Bondurant,supranote8(opposingtheconstitutionalityofthefilibusterandtheentrenching
amendment);Teter,supranote14(opposingtheconstitutionalityofboththefilibusterandtheentrenchingrule);
Chafetz,supranote6(opposingtheconstitutionalityofthefilibuster,butacknowledginglackofArticleIIIpowerto
invalidateit);Posner&Vermeule,LegislativeEntrenchment,supranote11(supportingtheconstitutionalityofthe
entrenchingamendment);McGinnis&Rappaport,SymmetricEntrenchment,supranote11(opposing
constitutionalityoftheentrenchingprovision);JohnC.Roberts&ErwinChemerinsky,EntrenchmentofOrdinary
Legislation:AReplytoProfessorsPosnerandVermeule,91CALIF.L.REV.1773(2003)(opposingconstitutionalityof
theentrenchingprovision);AaronͲAndrewP.Bruhl,Buryingthe“ContinuingBody”TheoryoftheSenate,95IOWAL.
REV.1401(2010)(FindingthecaseforentrenchmentunderminedbystrongargumentsthattheSenateisnota
continuingbody).SeealsoRICHARDS.BETH&VALERIEHEITSHUSEN,Cong.ResearchServ.,RL30360,FILIBUSTERSAND
9
Pleaseciteto10STANFORDJ.C.R.&C.L.____
Few,ifany,scholarschallengetheconstitutionalityoftheold,relativelyrare,“speaking
filibuster,”whereaSenatorcontinuestodebateabillforaslongasheorshewishes,subject
onlytoasuperͲmajoritycloturevote.Rather,scholarlyattentionhasfocusedonthecurrent
ziplessversionthatsubjectsallSenatebusiness,includingconfirmationvotes,toadefacto
supermajorityvotingrule.Academicdefendersofthefilibuster’sconstitutionalitypointtothe
explicitgrantofpowertotheSenateandHouseinArticleI,Section5toadopttheirownrules
ofprocedure;tothefilibuster’sformalstatusasaproceduraldebaterule,notasubstantive
votingregulation;andtotheabsenceofanyexplicitconstitutionalprovisionrequiringthe
Senate(ortheHouse)toactbymajorityvoteinordinarymatters.Defendersargue,aswell,that
thelonghistoricprovenanceofafilibusterruleintheSenatearguesagainsteffortstodisplace
itasunconstitutional.Finally,defendersmarshaltheusualarrayofprocessͲbasedobjectionsto
anyjudicialchallengetoacongressionalruleorpractice,rangingfromstandingtopolitical
question.44Reportedjudicialchallengestothefilibusterhavefounderedontheseprocedural
grounds.45
Academicchallengerstothefilibuster’sconstitutionalityarguepersuasivelythateven
SenaterulesadoptedpursuanttoArticleI,Section5mustcomplywiththerestofthe
Constitution.46Thus,aSenatevotingruledecliningtocountthevotesofwhiteSenatorswould
clearlyviolatetheFifthAmendment,andwouldbejudiciallyreviewable.47Somechallengers
arguethatasupermajorityvotingruleviolatesanimpliedconstitutionaldutytousemajority
votingrulesinboththeHouseandSenate,derivedasanegativepregnantfromthesix
occasionsonwhichtheFoundersdeemeditappropriatetoprovideexplicitlyinthebodyofthe
Constitutionforsupermajorityaction.48Opponentsofthefilibusteralsoquestionthehistorical
provenanceofthemodernziplessfilibuster,notingthatuntil1806,theSenateappearstohave
CLOTUREINTHESENATE(2013);andJAYR.SHAMPANSKY,CONG.RESEARCHSERV.,RL32102,CONSTITUTIONALITYOFASENATE
FILIBUSTEROFAJUDICIALNOMINATION(2004).
43
Pagev.Dole,No.94Ͳ5292,1996WL310132(D.C.Cir,May13,1996)(percuriam)(vacatingasmootthedistrict
court’sdismissalofachallengetoRuleXXII);Pagev.Shelby,995F.Supp.23(D.D.C.1998);CommonCausev.
Biden,909F.Supp.2d9(D.D.C.2012).
44
ArgumentssupportingtheconstitutionalityofthefilibusterarewellsummarizedinGerhardt,supranote32,at
450Ͳ55.
45
SeeDole,Shelby,andCommonCause,supranote43.
46
SeeUnitedStatesv.Smith,286U.S.6(1932)(construingSenaterules,whichprovidedfor
reconsiderationofanadviceandconsentvotewithintwoExecutivesessions,topermitappointmentby
Presidentonthedayofthefirstvote);Ballin,144U.S.1(upholdingtheconstitutionalityofaHouse
quorumrule).
47
SeeFisk&Chemerinsky,supranote3,at230.
48
Bondurant,supranote12,atpt.III,§E;Chafetz,supranote10,at1014Ͳ15.
10
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maintainedamajorityruleforendingdebate.49Opponentsstress,moreover,thattheoldͲ
fashionedspeakingfilibusterhasbeentransformedintoamoderndefactovotingrulethat
vestsaminorityoftheSenaterepresentingasmallminorityofthepopulationwithvetopower
overthecontinuedexistenceoftheArticleIIIjudiciaryandtheArticleIExecutivebranch.50
Finally,severalacademicschallengetheconstitutionalityoftheentrenchmentlanguageofRule
XXIIrequiringatwoͲthirdsvoteofSenatorspresentandvotingtoamendthefilibusterrule,
whileconcedingtheconstitutionalityofthefilibusteritself.51
1. ImpliedMajoritarianism
ApartfromcallingattentiontoMadison’sobservationinFederalistNo.62thatthe
Senatewouldordinarilyoperatebymajorityvote,52Ihavelittleornothingtoaddtothemerits
oftheexistingdebateovertheexistenceofaconstitutionallyimpliedmajorityͲvotingrule.As
othershavenoted,theimpliedmajorityruleargumentsuffersfrombothprocessͲbasedand
substantiveweaknesses.Foronething,itmaywellbenonͲjusticiable.Ifanimpliedmajority
votingruleexistsintheConstitution,whowouldhavestandingtoenforceit?InRainesv.Bird,53
theCourtrejectedaconstitutionalchallengetothePresidentiallineͲitemveto,holdingthat
individuallegislatorslackedstandingtoassertanallegedinstitutionalrightbelongingtothe
HouseofRepresentativesitself.WhileitisunclearwhetheramajorityͲvotingruleis
institutionalorpersonalinnature,Icanimagineareluctantjudgerulingthatindividual
Senatorslackstandingtochallengetheimpositionofsupermajorityvotingrules.Moreover,
evenifstandingtoassertanimpliedmajorityruleexists,judges,respectfulofthepolitical
questiondoctrine,maybereluctanttorelyonsuchathinconstitutionalreedtooverridethe
formalcharacterizationofthefilibusterasadebate,notavotingrule,andtointerferewiththe
internalworkingsoftheSenate.That’sjustwhathappenedtothemostrecentjudicial
challengetothefilibuster.54
49
Fisk&Chemerinsky,supranote3,at188;Teter,supranote22,at564Ͳ66.
50
AsofJuly1,2013,theziplessfilibusterhasleft10%ofArticleIIIjudgeshipsvacant,oneͲthirdofwhicharein
judicialdistrictslabeledbytheAdministrativeOfficeoftheUnitedStatesCourtsas“judicialemergencies.”See
LaurelBellows,JudicialemergenciesworsenaspartisanshipstallsnominationsintheSenate,President’sMessage,
ABAJOURNAL.COM(July1,2013,4:40AM),www.aba.com/magazine/articles/judicial_emergencies_worsen;Seealso
ChiefJusticeJohnRoberts,2010YearͲEndReportontheFederalJudiciary,THIRDBRANCHNEWS,Jan.2010.Similarly,
theziplessfilibusterlefttheNationalLaborRelationsBoardwithoutaquorumandvirtuallyunabletofunctionfor
threeyears.SeeNoelCanningv.NLRB,705F.3d490(D.C.Cir.2013)(discussingtheconstitutionalvalidityofrecess
appointmentsdesignedtoassurequorumofNationalLaborRelationsBoard),cert.granted,561U.S.___(2013).
51
Bruhl,supranote42;Roberts&Chemerinsky,supranote42(opposingconstitutionalityofentrenching
provision).
52
THEFEDERALISTNO.62(JamesMadison)atIII.
53
521U.S.at811(holdingthatindividuallegislatorslackstandingtochallengeconstitutionalityoflineitemveto)
54
CommonCausev.Biden,909F.Supp.2d9(D.D.C.Dec.21,2012),appealdocketed,No.12Ͳ5412(D.C.Cir.).
11
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Thesecondweaknessissubstantive.It’snotcleartomethatthemereexistenceofsix
settingswheretheoriginalConstitutioncallsexplicitlyforsupermajoritiesgeneratesanegative
pregnantrequiringtheuseofmajorityruleeverywhereelse.Itisatleastplausibletoarguethat
iftheFoundersusedsupermajoritiessixtimes,usmortalscanlearnfromtheirexampleanduse
supermajoritiesinotherveryimportantsettingsaswell.55Acceptanceoftheexistenceofa
generalimpliedmajorityrulerequirementintheConstitutionwould,moreover,callall
supermajorityrulesintoquestion.ButGordonv.Lance56teachesthataproperlyapportioned
legislativebodymaytieitshandsinparticularsettingsbyenactingsupermajorityrequirements,
aslongasthesupermajorityruleisnotplacedbeyondreasonabledemocraticreconsideration
byafuturemajority.57So,whateveritspoliticalattraction,Ifearthattheimpliedmajorityrule
argumentprovestoolittle,andwouldbeimpossibletoenforcejudicially.
2. EqualSuffrage
Morerecently,MichaelTeterhasarguedthatasixtyͲvotesupermajorityruleviolates
thetextualrequirementinArticleI,section3,clause1,andtheSeventeenthAmendmentthat
“eachSenatorshallhaveonevote.”58The“OneSenator,onevote”languagehad—andhas—
twoobviouspurposes.First,itwasdesignedtoalterthepracticeundertheArticlesof
ConfederationandthePhiladelphiaConventionofconductingvotingstateͲbyͲstate,witha
majorityofastate’sdelegationdeterminingastate’ssinglevote.59OncetheFoundersdecided
toscrapstateͲbyͲstatevotingintheSenate,andtohavemorethanasingleSenatorfromeach
state,theprospectofdeadlockbetweentwoSenatorsfromthesamestatecreatedariskthat
certainstateswouldbeunabletovoteatall.Intheend,theFoundersmovedfromstateͲbyͲ
55
Gerhardt,supranote42,at455Ͳ56.
56
403U.S.1(1971)(upholdingconstitutionalityofstateconstitutionalandlegislativesupermajorityrequirement
of60%toenactnewtaxesandincurbonddebt).
57
Newtonv.Commissioners,100U.S.548,559(1879)(insistinguponpowerofsubsequentlegislaturetoalteror
modifyactsofpastlegislatures);Stonev.Mississippi,101U.S.814,818(1880)(“nolegislaturecancurtailthe
powerofitssuccessorstomakesuchlawsastheymaydeemproper...inmattersofpolice.”).SeeOhioLifeIns.&
TrustCo.v.Debolt,57U.S.416,431(1853)(forbiddingentrenchmentwherebylegislatures“disarmtheirsucessors
ofanyofthepowersorrightsofsovereigntyconfidedbythepeopletothelegislativebody.”);seealsoLetterfrom
LegalFacultytoMembersoftheSenate(Dec.12,2012),availableat
www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/Scholars_Re_Constitutional_Authority_121212.pdf
(same).ComparePosner&Vermeule,supranote19,at1695(supportingconstitutionalityofentrenching
amendmentinRuleXXII);andMcGinnis&Rappaport,supranote19(supportinganarrowclassofentrenching
provisions),withRoberts&Chemerinsky,supranote42(opposingconstitutionalityofentrenchingprovision),and
Bruhl,supranote42(same).
58
IfoundProfessorTeter’sarticleparticularlyhelpful,andsomewhatdiscouragingbecauseIthoughtIhadcome
upwithanoriginalidea.TherequirementintheSeventeenthAmendmentthat“eachSenatorshallhaveonevote”
echoestheidenticallanguageinart.I,§3,cl.1establishingtheSenate.SeeTeter,supranote42.
59
SeeBeeman,supranote26,at199;Teter,supranote22,at569Ͳ571.
12
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stateballotingtoindividualSenatorialvoting,withtwoSenatorsperstate,eachofwhomwas
entitledtocastonevote.60
IbelievethatthesecondpurposewastopreservetheintegrityoftheConnecticut
Compromise.GiventhevolatilepoliticalclimateoftheearlyRepublic,itwasnotbeyond
imaginationtothinkthatmenlikeJamesMadison,whotellsuscandidlyinFederalist#62that
heconsidersthemalapportionedSenatetobeasurrenderofprinciple,wouldattainamajority
intheSenate,andadoptaweightedvotingsystemtocorrecttheSenate’sdemocraticfaults.61
Weightedvotingallowstheindividualmembersofamalapportionedlegislaturetocastvotes
weightedtoreflectthenumberofpersonsthelegislatoractuallyrepresents.62Undera
potentialSenatorialweightedvotingsystem,eachstatewouldcontinuetobeentitledtotwo
Senators,eachofwhomwouldcastoneformalvoteconsistentwiththeliteraltextofArticleI,§
3cl.1,andtheSeventeenthAmendment,butthemathematicalweightofeachvotewouldvary
withthepopulationofthestaterepresentedbytheSenator.Thetextualrequirementthat
“eachSenatorshallhaveonevote”63wasaimedatpreventingweightedvotingbyassuringthat
themathematicalvalueofeachSenatorialvotewouldremainequal.Anydoubtaboutthe
meaningofthe“OneSenator,onevote”languageissweptawaybytheequalstatesuffrage
languageofArticleVdesignedtoentrenchthemathematicallyequalvotingpowerofeachstate
forever.64
Ifthepurposeofthe“OneSenator,onevote”languageintheSeventeenth
Amendment,coupledwiththeEntrenchmentClauseofArticleV,istoreinforcetheguarantee
ofmathematicallyequalstatesuffrage,theequalsuffrageprinciplemustruninbothdirections.
NotonlydoesitforbidaSenateruleimposingaweightedvotingsystemthatleavesCalifornia
andWyomingwithequalformal—butunequalmathematical—votingpower;itmustalso
precludealreadyoverrepresentedsmallͲstateSenatorsfromusingtheirmalapportionedpower
toadoptsupermajorityvotingrulesthatfurtherreducetherelativevotingpowerofSenators
60
TheFounder’sdecisiontoretainstateͲbyͲstatevotingintheHouseofRepresentativesinconnectionwith
presidentialelectionswheretheElectoralCollegefailstoreachamajority,coupledwiththeinitialfailureto
distinguishbetweenballotsforPresidentandVicePresident,almostsankthenewRepublic.Intheelectionof
1800,theHousetook36ballotstobreakthetiebetweenThomasJeffersonandAaronBurr.SeeBurtNeuborne,
ServingtheSyllogismMachine,44TEXASTECHL.REV1,5Ͳ10(2011)(SymposiumIssue).TheTwelfthAmendmentwas
designedtofixtheproblem.
61
Madison,supranote52,atIII.
62
See Larry Bowen, Weighted Voting Systems, INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY MATHEMATICS (Jan. 1, 2001),
www.ctl.ua.edu/math103 /POWER/wtvoting.htm, for a mathematical explanation of weighted voting. The
Founder’s generation was remarkably sophisticated about voting schemes. See EDWARD ELGAR, CONDORCET:
FOUNDATIONSOFSOCIALCHOICEANDPOLITICALTHEORY(IanMcLean&FionaHewitt,eds.&trans.1994).
63
U.S.CONST.art.1,§3,cl.1;U.S.CONST.amend.XVII.
64
TheEntrenchmentClauseofArticleVprovidesthat“noState,withoutitsConsent,shallbedeprivedofitsequal
SuffrageintheSenate.”U.S.CONST.art.5.
13
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fromotherstates.Onceagain,ifwegobacktothevolatilepoliticalclimateoftheFounding,it
wasnotinconceivablethataSenatemadeupofamajorityofHighFederalists,likethefolks
whobroughtustheHartfordConvention,65wouldadoptsupermajoritySenatevotingrules
allowingasmallnumberofSenatorsfrompopulousfreestatestoblocklegislationsupportedby
anoverͲrepresentedslaveͲstatemajority.Ifthetextualrequirementthat“eachSenatorshall
haveone[equal]vote,”andeachstateshallhave“equalsuffrageintheSenate”isaimedat
assuringthemathematicalequalityofstates’suffrage,amoment’sreflectionrevealsthe
mathematicalimpactofa60Ͳvotesupermajorityruleonaconstitutionalmandatethateach
stateshallenjoyequalsuffrageintheSenate.When,asundertheziplessfilibuster,thevotesof
41Senatorsdefeatthevotesof59SenatorsonvirtuallyallissuesbeforetheSenate,each
Senatorformallycasts“onevote”onanissue,but,asinaweightedvotingscheme,theformal
votesarenotmathematicallyequal.ApplyingthemathematicalformulausedbytheSupreme
CourtinBakerv.Carranditsprogeny66totestwhetherthe“oneperson,onevote”principle
hasbeenviolatedinapportioninglegislativepower,theindividualvotesofeachofthe41
victoriousSenatorsexercisesa1/41influenceontheoutcome,whileeachofthedefeated59
Senatorscastsavotevaluedat1/59,renderingthevoteofthe41victoriousSenators
approximately1.5timesmorepowerfulthantheindividualvotesofthe59defeatedSenators.67
Suchasubstantialdeviationfrommathematicallyequalvoting,whereeachSenatorhasan
equal1/50say,denieseachstateequalsuffrage,andeachSenatoranequalvoteonthe
particularissuebeforetheSenateinflatviolationofArticleV,andtheoneͲSenatoroneͲvote
principleoftheSeventeenthAmendment.
Itisnoanswertoarguethat,unlikeaweightedvotingsystemwheretheinequalityis
stateͲspecificandpermanent,themathematicaldeviationcausedbyasupermajorityruleis
episodicandrandom,allowingthesameSenators,representingthesamestates,tocastboth
enhancedanddebasedvotesovertime,dependingontheirrespectivepositionsonthemerits.
TheconstitutionalmandateofequalstatesuffrageintheSenatecannotbesatisfiedby
aggregatingthesumofanumberofmathematicallyunequalretailvotesonvaryingissuesin
thehopeofreachinganaveragethatsatisfieswholesaleequality.Intestingforunconstitutional
votedebasement,itistheparticularvotethatcounts,notanaggregateaverageofmanyvotes
overtime.Itwould,forexample,beimpossibletodefendavotingsystemthatgavetwovotes
toleftͲhandedSenatorsinevenyears,andtwovotestorightͲhandedSenatorsinoddyears.
Whilesuchaplanmightachievewholesaleequalityovertime,itguaranteesthateveryelection
65
NewEnglandHighFederalistsmetin1814Ͳ15inTheHartfordConventiontodiscussconcernsovertheallocation
ofpowerintheConstitution.SeeWilliamEdwardBuckley,TheHartfordConventioninC73CONNECTICUT
TERCENTENARYCOMMISSION:PAMPHLETSERIES(1934).Amongtheconcernswastheeffectofthe3/5compromisein
overͲrepresentingtheslavestates.Id.
66
SeeBaker,369U.S.at208foradescriptionoftheoneͲpersonͲonevotetestformathematicalequalityimposed
byBakeranditsprogeny.
67
Ibecamealawyerbecausetheypromisedmetherewouldbenomath.Ihave,however,checkedthecalculation
withcolleagueswhoclaimtobeabletocount,andtheyconfirmitsaccuracy.59/44=1.34.
14
Pleaseciteto10STANFORDJ.C.R.&C.L.____
isunequal.That’sexactlywhathappensintheSenateunderthesupermajorityvotingrule
imposedbytheziplessfilibuster.
Norcanonearguethata“oneSenator,onemathematicallyequalvote”ruleimposedby
ArticleVandtheSeventeenthAmendmentcastsdoubtonallsupermajorityrulesinthefaceof
Gordonv.Lance.68Theconstitutionalargumentforstrictmathematicalequalityinvotingis
confinedtotheSenate,justastheheightenedoneͲpersonͲoneͲvoterequirementimposedby
ArticleI,§2isconfinedtotheHouseofRepresentatives.69Thus,unlikeordinarysettings,the
sixtyͲvotesupermajorityruleintheSenatefliesinthefaceoftextualprovisionsinthe
SeventeenthAmendmentandArticleVrequiringeachSenatortohaveonemathematically
equalvote.
Moreover,whileGordonv.Lanceteachesthatafairlyapportionedbodymaytieits
handsinparticularsettingsbyimposingsupermajorityrulesonitself(aslongasthesuperͲ
majorityruleisnotplacedbeyondreasonabledemocraticreconsideration),70theUnitedStates
Senateisnotafairlyapportionedbody.The66Ͳ1ratiointherelativevalueofthevotesof
SenatorsfromWyomingandCaliforniamockstheideaofequalapportionment.Insucha
radicallymalapportionedsetting,thealreadyfavoredminorityshouldnotbepermittedto
exploititsadvantagetoleverageitselfintoevengreaterpowerbyimposingandembedding
additionalsupermajorityrules.AstheSupremeCourtnotedinthecontextofseparationof
powers,placingtwolayersbetweenanadministrativeofficialandthePresidentsodilutesthe
principleofpresidentialcontrolastorenderitmeaningless.71Similarly,thepresenceoftwo
cumulativelayersofmalapportionmentsoerodestheprincipleofdemocraticrepresentationas
torenderitmeaningless.
TheprincipalweaknessintheSeventeenthAmendment/ArticleV“oneSenator,one
vote”argumentflowsfromacombinationofhistoryandseparationofpowers.Ifsupermajority
SenatevotingrequirementsaresoflatlyviolativeofArticleI,§3,cl1,theSeventeenth
Amendment,andArticleV,howcomenoSenatorhaschallengeditsconstitutionality?Maybe
it’sbecausewhiletheunequalvotingpowermayburdenoneormoreofthemwhentheyarein
68
403U.S.1(1971)(upholdingWestVirginiastateconstitutionalandstatutory60%supermajorityrulefortax
increasesandincurringbondindebtedness).
69
AsimilaranalysisderivestheextremelystrictoneͲpersononeͲvoterulesgoverningCongressional
apportionmentsfromtheunyieldinglanguageofArticleI,§2.SeeWesberryv.Sanders,376U.S.1(1964);
Kirkpatrickv.Preisler,394U.S.526(1969)(invalidatingplanwithrelativelyminorpopulationdeviations);Karcher
v.Daggett,462U.S.725(1983)(invalidatingplanwithdeviationssmallerthanthemarginoferrorforcountingthe
population).
70
Gordon,403U.S.1(1971).
71
SeeFreeEnter.Fundv.PublicCo.OversightBd.,130S.Ct.3138(2010)(holdingthatmakingBoardmembers
removableonlybySECcommissionersandonlyonrigorousgoodcausestandardviolatedseparationofpowersby
improperlylimitingthePresident’scontroloverexecutiveofficers).
15
Pleaseciteto10STANFORDJ.C.R.&C.L.____
themajority,itmaybenefitthemifandwhentheyfallintotheminority?IfSenatorsare
politicallycomfortablewithariskͲaversesupermajorityvotingrulethatpromisesequalbenefits
andburdensovertime,whyshouldajudgeinterfereonthebasisofaformaloneͲSenatorͲoneͲ
voterequirementintheSeventeenthAmendment?ThebestresponseistoattackaSenator’s
powertogetcomfortablewithaziplesssupermajorityvotingsystemthatappearstoviolatethe
ConnecticutCompromise.Thebestwaytodothatwouldbetostresstheroleofthe
EntrenchmentClauseofArticleVinlockingmathematicallyequalvotingproceduresintoplace
regardlessofthewishesofSenatorswhofeelmorecomfortablewithariskͲaverse
supermajoritysafetynet.
ArticleVidentifiesthreeunamendableprovisionsoftheConstitution—abanon
interferingwiththeAtlanticslavetradeuntil1808;protectionagainstpercapitataxation;anda
guarantythat“nostate,withoutitsconsent,shallbedeprivedofitsequalsuffrageinthe
Senate.”Thefirsttwounamendableprovisionsweredesignedtoprotectslaveownersfrom
interdictionofsupply,andfromdirectpropertytaxesbasedonslaveholdings.Theyworked.
Slaveownerswereabletobuildupasufficientstockofhumanchattelsby1808tomake
AmericanslaveryselfͲsustaininguntiltheCivilWar,andnoeffortwasevermadebyCongressto
taxslaveryoutofexistence.Thepurposeofthe“equalstatesuffrage”clauseofArticleVwas,
asJudgeBybeehasnoted,totieUlyssestothemastbypreventingfuturegenerationsfrom
tinkeringwiththeprincipleofequalstatesuffrageintheSenateattheheartoftheConnecticut
Compromise.72Substantively,the“eachSenatorshallhaveonevote”languageofthefirst
clauseofthesecondsectionofArticleOne73andtheSeventeenthAmendment74operatesin
perfecttandemwiththe“equalsuffrageintheSenate”languageofArticleV75tolock
mathematicallyequalvotingrulesintotheSenate’sDNA.TheEntrenchmentClauseofArticleV
isexplicitlyintendedtopreventpoliticiansfromtradingawaytheConnecticutCompromisefor
amessofpottageintheformofriskͲaversesupermajorityvotingrules.Inshort,theArticleV
equalsuffragelanguageismadeofnonͲwaiveableiron.Ifitcannotbeamendedawaybythe
people,surelyitmustbeimpervioustoaSenator’swillingnesstoadoptriskͲaverse
mathematicallyunequalvotingrulesthatscratchmybacktodayandyourstomorrow.
III.
IstheConstitutionalRequirementof
MathematicallyEqualVotingintheSenateEnforceable?
Aswe’veseen,fourargumentshavebeenmadeagainstthemathematicallyunequal
Senatevotingrulegeneratedbytheziplessfilibuster.First,theemergenceofageneral
supermajorityvotingrulepreventstheSenatefromcarryingoutitsresponsibilitiesunderthe
72
JayBybee,UlyssesattheMast:Democracy,FederalismandtheSiren’sSongoftheSeventeenthAmendment,91
NW.U.L.REV.500(1997).
73
U.S.CONST.art.I,§2,cl1
74
U.S.CONST.amend.XVII
75
U.S.CONST.art.V
16
Pleaseciteto10STANFORDJ.C.R.&C.L.____
Constitutionandshouldbechangedasamatterofpolicy.Second,theziplessfilibusterviolates
animpliedrequirementofmajorityrulelatentintheconstitutionaltext.Third,itviolatesthe
requirementintheSeventeenthAmendmentthateachSenatorshallcastone,presumably
equal,vote.Fourth,itviolatestheunamendablerequirementinArticleVthateachstatemust
enjoyequalsuffrageintheSenate.
A.
JudicialRemedies
TheavailabilityofajudicialremedyturnsonwhichofthefourargumentsanArticleIII
judgeisaskedtoenforce.Obviously,thepolicyͲbasedargumentisnotjudiciallyenforceable—
althoughthedegreetowhichanArticleIIIjudgebelievesthattheziplessfilibusterisa
legislativedisasterwillcolorthejudge’sresponsetoanylegalargument.
Theimpliedmajorityruleargumentisthemostdifficulttoenforcejudicially.76
Uncertaintyoverwhethertherighttoamajorityvoteisaninstitutionalprerogativeofthe
SenateorapersonalrightofaSenatorcreatesaseriousstandingproblem.If,asinRainesv.
Byrd,77therightisdeemedinstitutional,it’shardtoseewhohasstandingtoenforceit,other
thantheSenateitself.Ifchallengerstotheziplessfilibusterhaveenoughvotestoprecipitate
theSenateintocourt,theycanfixitthemselvesbyinternalSenatevotes.Iftheylackthevotes
toforcetheSenatetoassertitsrights,it’shardtoseeunderRainesv.Byrdwhyanindividual
SenatorhasanArticleIIIinteresttoenforceanallegedinstitutionalrightthattheSenateis
decliningtoenforceonitsown.Norwouldindividualcitizenshavestanding,since,asin
Hollingsworthv.Perry,78theywouldbeunabletoarticulateaninjuryͲinͲfactnotsharedequally
withallothercitizens.Evenifstandingexists,moreover,Isuspectthatmanyconscientious
districtjudgeswouldbeloathetointerferewiththeinternalworkingsoftheSenateonthe
basisofanimpliedconstitutionalnormlackingexplicittextualsupport.WhileIfindthenegative
pregnantargumentinfavorofmajoritarianismappealingonpolicygrounds,Imustadmitthatit
isathinjustificationforextremelyaggressivejudicialbehavior.
ShiftingtotextualargumentsundertheSeventeenthAmendmentandthe
EntrenchmentClauseofArticleVimprovestheargumentforjusticiability.The“oneSenator,
onevote”languageoftheSeventeenthAmendmentandtheequalstatesuffragelanguageof
76
ThecaseagainstjudicialenforceabilityoftheimpliedmajorityruleargumentissummarizedinGerhardt,supra
note42,at449n.8.
77
521U.S.811(1997).RaineswasachallengetotheexerciseofalineͲitemveto.Thechallengersarguedthat
Congresshadtheexclusivepowertodefineabillforvetopurposes.Id.TheCourtdismissedthechallengeon
standinggrounds.Id.
78
133S.Ct.2652(2013).TheHollingsworthCourtrejectedcitizenͲstandingtodefendaninitiativebanningsameͲ
sexmarriageinCalifornia,eventhoughtheCaliforniaSupremeCourthadheldthatcitizensactiveintheinitiative
processhadstandingunderCalifornialawtodefendtheinitiative’sconstitutionalityagainstjudicialchallenge.Id.
17
Pleaseciteto10STANFORDJ.C.R.&C.L.____
ArticleVbothappeartovestapersonalrightineachSenatortocastamathematicallyequal
vote.UsingBakerv.Carrasatemplate,aSenatordeprivedoftherighttocastamathematically
equalvotewouldhavestandingtoenforceapersonalrightunderRaines.Moreover,theexplicit
textualnatureoftheargumentshouldassuagethepoliticalquestionandbalanceofpower
concernsthatprovedfataltotheclaiminBallinv.Smith.Indeed,thetextualhookwouldbe
strongerthanthesemanticmorassinNoelCanning.79Defendersoftheziplessfilibusterwillbe
driventoextremeformalisminattemptingtodistinguishthesixtyͲvotefilibusterrulefroma
generalvotingruleonthemerits.Thefilibusterrule,theywillbeforcedtoargue,ismerelya
proceduralefforttoregulatedebatefallingwithintheArticleI,§5rulemakingpowerofthe
Senate,asopposedtotheimpositionofasupermajorityruleonthemerits.Perhapsinyears
pastwhenthespeakingfilibustermerelypreventedtheterminationofongoingdebateina
relativelysmallnumberofsettings,aplausibleargumentexistedthatitwasmerelyprocedural,
notsubstantive.Butinitscurrentziplessmode,wherethevirtualfilibusterfunctionsasa
routineroadblocktovotingonthemeritsofeveryissuewithnolinktopreservingactual
debate,noplausibledistinctionexistsbetweenitsproceduralandsubstantiveimpact.Atthat
point,IbelievethatajudgeshouldrecognizeanArticleIIIdutysoundinginMarburyv.Madison
toreachthemerits.80
Deepdown,though,I’mdoubtfulthatamajorityofthecurrentcropofArticleIIIjudges
hasitinthemtoenforcetheConstitutionagainstthestrongaswellastheweak.Thecurrent
SupremeCourtmajorityisgreatatprotectingtheconstitutionalrightsofthepolitically
powerful,whetherit’sacorporaterighttospendunlimitedfundstoinfluencetheoutcomeof
elections,81orastate’srighttobetreatedequallyinthecontextofCongressionalrules
designedtoprotectthevotingrightsofminorities,82orthewhitemajority’srighttooppose
affirmativeaction,83orthebusinesscommunity’srighttofreefrompeskyaggregatelitigation
challengingitsunlawfulconduct.84Whentherightsoftheweakareatstake,though,the
79
SeeNoelCanning,705F.3d.490(D.C.Cir.2013).
80
5U.S137(1803).
81
CitizensUnitedv.FEC,130S.Ct.876(2010)(upholdingcorporaterighttospendunlimitedsumstoinfluence
elections).
82
ShelbyCountyv.Holder,133S.Ct.2612(2013)(invalidating§5oftheVotingRightsActaimedatpreventing
racialdiscriminationinaccesstotheballotbecausetreatsstatesunequally).
83
Fisherv.UniversityofTexas,132S.Ct.1536(2013)(reversingFifthCircuitdecisionupholdingaffirmativeaction
programforUniversityofTexas).
84
See,E.g.,WalͲMartStoresv.Dukes,131S.Ct.2541(2011)(decliningtocertifyclassofwomenworkersallegedly
harmedbygrantofexcessivediscretiontolocalmanagers);Comcastv.Berhnhard,133S.Ct.1476(2013)(declining
tocertifyclassbasedondifficultyofcalculatingindividualdamages);AT&TMobilityLLCv.Concepcion,131S.Ct.
1740(2011)(enforcingarbitrationagreementforbiddingaggregatearbitrationproceedingsdespitestatefindingof
unconscionability);Am.ExpressCo.v.ItalianColorsRest.,133S.Ct.2304(2013)(findingarbitrationclausewaiving
aggregatearbitrationenforceabledespiteshowingthatcostofindividualizedarbitrationexceedssumatissuein
18
Pleaseciteto10STANFORDJ.C.R.&C.L.____
currentArticleIIIjudiciarytoooftentakesawalk.ForalltheSupremeCourt’srhetoricabout
Guantanamo,85nothingpracticalhasbeendonejudiciallytodealwithanappallingbreakdown
intheruleoflawthatwillbeviewedinyearstocomeasasecondKorematsu.And,forallthe
Court’slibertarianrhetoricaboutprotectingsuspecteddrunkdriversagainstforcedpolice
bloodtesting,86orpreventingthepolicefromputtingGPSdevicesonasuspect’scar,87the
CourthasstoodbyastheFourthAmendmentcollapsesunderafloodofunlawfulgovernment
surveillanceandKafkaesquesecretnationalsecuritycourts.88Mypredictionisthatthecurrent
SupremeCourtmajoritywon’tdoanybetterinenforcingtheequalsuffrageaspectsofthe
ConnecticutCompromiseagainstSenateleadersbentonerodingitforreciprocalbipartisan
politicaladvantage.
B.
InternalSenateRemedies
ThatleavestheSenatorsthemselves.IthasbeenarguedthatthatthecurrentsixtyͲvote
rulecannotbechangedbyanythingshortofatwoͲthirdsvoteofSenatorspresentandvotingin
accordancewithanentrenchingprovisioninRuleXXII.89Theargumentclaimsthatunlikethe
HouseofRepresentatives,whichrenewsitselfcompletelyeverytwoyearsandmustreͲenact
newrulesbienniallyatthebeginningofeachnewincarnationoftheHouse,theSenateviews
itselfunderSenateRuleVasacontinuingbodywithonlyoneͲthirdofitsmemberssubjectto
reͲelectioneverytwoyears.Asacontinuingbody,theargumentgoes,allexistingSenaterules
remainineffect,includingtheziplessfilibuster,unlessalteredbyatwoͲthirdsvoteofSenators
presentandvotinginaccordancewiththeentrenchingprovisionofRuleXXII.Theironyofusing
individualizedcase).ForanoverviewoftheunrelentinglyproͲbusinessapproachoftheSupremeCourtmajority,
seeErwinChemerinsky,OpEd.,N.Y.TIMES,July2,2013.
85
Boumedienev.Bush,553U.S.723(2008)(assertinghabeascorpusjurisdictionoverprisonersconfinedat
militaryprisonatGuantanamoBay).
86
Missouriv.McNeely,133S.Ct.1552(2013)(invalidatingwarrantlesstakingofbloodsamplesfordrunkdriving
test).
87
UnitedStatesv.Jones,132S.Ct.945(2012)(invalidatingplacingofGPSoncarwithoutwarrant).
88
Clapperv.AmnestyInt’l,133S.Ct.1138(2013)(denyingstandingtochallengemassiveNSAsurveillance).
89
Posner&Vermeule,supranote19(supportingconstitutionalityofentrenchingamendmentinRuleXXII).The
operativelanguageoftheentrenchingprovisioninSenateRuleXXIIis:
IfthequestionisdecidedintheaffirmativebythreeͲfifthsoftheSenatorsduly
chosenandswornͲexceptonameasureormotiontoamendtheSenaterules,in
which case the necessary affirmative vote shall be twoͲthirds of the Senators
presentandvoting–thatsaidmeasure,motion,orothermatterpendingbefore
the Senate…shall be the unfinished business to the exclusion of all other
business until disposed of. Rules of the Senate XXII, available at:
http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXXII.
19
Pleaseciteto10STANFORDJ.C.R.&C.L.____
anentrenchingruletoerodetheEntrenchmentClauseofArticleVseemslostonSenatorsand
academicsbentonpreservingthestatusquo.
Ibelievethattheentrenchmentargumentisaredherring.90WhiletheFoundersmay
havehadthepowertoentrenchcertainaspectsoftheConstitutionagainstfuture
constitutionalamendmentunderArticleV(itselfadoubtfulproposition),91ordinarydemocratic
institutions,especiallyoneasmalapportionedastheSenate,lackthepowertoentrenchtheir
transitorydemocraticjudgmentsagainstreconsiderationbyfuturedemocraticmajoritiesby
imposingsupermajorityrulesforrepealoramendment.92WhiletheSenatemaywellbea
continuingbodyforsomepurposes,itwould,inmyopinion,beflatlyunconstitutionaltopermit
anearlierSenatetodictatetoanewlyͲconstitutedSenatehowthecurrentbodyshouldconduct
itsbusiness.FourVicePresidentshaveruledfromthechairin1957(Nixon),1959(Nixon),1967
(Humphrey)and1975(Rockefeller),andonehasruledlessformally2005(Cheney),that,
despitetheentrenchinglanguageofRuleXXII,amajorityoftheSenateremainsfreetoalteror
modifyitsrules.93
Totheextent,moreover,thattheSenatorswouldbeactingtorepealoralteran
unconstitutionalvotingrule,Ibelievethattherecanbenodoubtoftheright–indeedtheduty
–oftheSenatetoactimmediatelybymajorityvotetoredressaviolationoftheConstitution.94
Whateverpowertheentrenchingargumentmayhaveinordinarysettings,itcannotinsulate
unconstitutionalgovernmentconductfromremedialaction.
Amoredifficultquestionexistsconcerningthepowerofthemajoritytochangethe
Senate’srulesinmidͲsession.Whileanemergingconsensusofscholarsrecognizespoweratthe
openingofeachnewlyͲelectedSenatetoaltertheSenate’srulesbymajorityvote,95oncethat
90
Forarecentrefutationoftheentrenchmentthesis,seeBruhl,supranote42.
91
SeeAmar,supranote36;SeeLinder,supranote36.
92
TheCourtdidnotenteramajorityopinioninDebolt.57U.S..SixJusticessupportedthepowerofasubsequent
legislaturetotaxacorporation.Id.ThreeJusticesdissented,reasoningthattheoriginalcorporatecharter
constitutedacontractwithinthemeaningoftheContractsClause.Id.at341(Ohiolegislaturemaynotbindfuture
legislaturestorefrainfromtaxingcorporateentity).Newtonv.Commissioners,100U.S.548,559(1879)(insisting
uponpowerofsubsequentlegislaturetoalterofmodifyactsofpastlegislatures);Stonev.Mississippi,101U.S.
814,818(1880)(“nolegislaturecancurtailthepowerofitssuccessorstomakesuchlawsastheymaydeemproper
inmattersofpolice.”).
93
ThefiveVicePresidentialrulingsarediscussedinthesoͲcalledBrennanCenterlettersignedonDecember12,
2012byanumberofliberalandconservativeacademicsarguingthattheSenatemayalteritsrulesbymajority
voteduringtheorganizationalphaseofeachnewCongress.LetterfromLegalFacultytoMembersoftheSenate,
supranote57.Intheinterestoffulldisclosure,IsignedtheBrennanCenterletter.
94
TheconstitutionalargumentagainsttheentrenchingprovisionissetoutinfullinFisk&Chereminsky,supranote
42,at245Ͳ54.
95
SeeBruhl,supranote42;LetterfromLegalFaculty,supranote57;Fisk&Chemerinsky,supranote42at245Ͳ54,.
20
Pleaseciteto10STANFORDJ.C.R.&C.L.____
windowofopportunitypasses,IbelievethattheordinaryrulesoftheSenate(includingthe
entrenchingprovision)maynotbechangeduntilthenextwindowofopportunityafterthenext
Senateelections.Otherwise,rulesdesignedtoprotectaSenateminoritybecomemeaningless,
sincetheycanbesetasidebyfiftyͲoneSenatorsatanytime.Tomyknowledge,however,
discussionoftheSenate’spowertoalterthefilibusterruleinmidͲsessionhasnotattemptedto
distinguishbetweenapolicyͲdrivenchangeofanordinaryrule,andachangedrivenby
constitutionalconsiderations.MyviewisthatpolicyͲdrivenchangescanonlyoccurduringthe
organizationalphaseofeachnewlyͲelectedSenate,butthatconstitutionallyͲmandatedchanges
may—indeed,must—bepermittedtotakeplaceatanytime.ConstitutionallyͲvalidrulesthat
provideprotectiontotheminority,liketheoldspeakingfilibusterrule,won’tmeanmuchifthe
majoritymaysuspendthematwill.Butwhereanexistingruleisunconstitutional,Senatorsare
dutyboundundertheiroathsofofficetoputanendtoitasquicklyaspossible,regardlessof
whentheissuearises.Thus,IbelievethatasoͲcalledconstitutional“nuclearoption”exists,
grantingpowertotheSenatemajoritytochangeorwaivethefilibusterruleasunconstitutional
atanytimebyapointoforderreinforcedbyamajorityvote.96
Asapracticalmatter,ofcourse,anyattempttoaltertheziplessfilibusterbymajority
voteintheSenatemustcontendwiththreepracticalimpediments:(1)thedifficultyof
assemblingfiftyͲonevotesforchange;(2)thealmostobsessiveunwillingnessofmanySenators
toconsiderchanginganythingtodowiththesoͲcalledtraditionsoftheSenate;and(3)ariskͲ
averseviewbythoseinthemajoritythattheymayneedthefilibusterrulesomedaytoprotect
themwhentheyareintheminority.That’swhereanappealtoaSenator’ssworndutyto
upholdanddefendtheConstitutionhasrealbite.AsSenatorFeingoldhasnoted,adisturbing
tendencyexistsatthelegislativeleveltooutsourcequestionsofconstitutionallawtothe
judiciary.97Afterall,ArticleIIIjudgestellusadnauseumthatitistheirduty—andpower—to
saywhatthelawis,evenwhenthepoliticalbranchesdisagree.Acceptingthatjudgeshavethe
finalwordonconstitutionalityshouldnot,however,excuseaconscientiouslegislatorfroman
independentdutytoconsidertheconstitutionalityofhisorheractions,especiallywhenArticle
IIIconsiderationsmayinhibit—evenblock—judicialreview.98AsSenatorFeingoldarguesso
96
SeeCutler,supranote18;Gold&Gupta,supranote18.AthreatbyMajorityLeaderReidtoinvokethe“nuclear
option”toabolishthefilibusterinconnectionwiththeSenate’sconsiderationofPresidentialExecutive
appointmentsinducedtheRepublicanminoritytoagreetoavoteonsevenpendingExecutiveappointments,
includingtwonewnomineestotheNationalLaborRelationsBoardtoreplacememberssittingbycontestedrecess
appointments.SeeBurgessEverett,Senatedealavertsnuclearoption,POLITICO.COM(July17,2013,6:47AM),
www.politico.com/story/2013/07/senateͲnuclearͲoptionͲ94259.html.
97
RussFeingold,TheObligationofMembersofCongresstoConsiderConstitutionalityWhileDeliberatingand
Voting:TheDeficienciesofHouseRuleXIIandaProposedRulefortheUnitedStatesSenate(Nov21,2013)
(unpublishedmanuscript)(onfilewiththeStanfordJournalofCivilRightsandCivilLiberties).
98
SeeCityofBoernev.Flores,521U.S.507,535(1997)(“…Congress...hasnotjusttherightbutthedutytomake
itsowninformedjudgmentaboutthemeaningandforceoftheConstitution”);1ANNALSOFCONG.500(1789)
(JosephGalesed.1834),StatementofRep.JamesMadison(“[I]itisincontrovertiblyofasmuchimportancetothis
branchofgovernmentastoanyother,thatthisConstitutionshallbepreservedentire.Itisourduty....”).
21
Pleaseciteto10STANFORDJ.C.R.&C.L.____
persuasively,it’slongpasttimetoaskeachSenatortoconfronthisorherconscience,andto
considerwhetherthemathematicallyunequalvotingpowerthatinevitablyaccompaniesa
supermajorityvotingrulecanbesquaredwiththeonlyremainingunamendabledutyunderthe
Constitution—protectionofequalstatesuffrageinthemalapportionedSenate.Surely,
worryingabouttheconstitutionalequalityrightsofstatescannotbeconfinedtoanequalright
tousecynicaltrickstodisenfranchiseblackvoters.99
99
ShelbyCounty,133S.Ct.2612.
22