ISSN 2378-556X [print]
ISSN 2378-5578 [online]
www.dcthink.org
www.dcthink.us
English Language Teaching
Volume 2, Issue 2, 2015, pp. 13-24
DOI: 10.18319/j.elt.45
A Cognitive Linguistics Approach to Metonymy in Discourse
DONG Tao[a],*
INTRODUCTION
[a]
Instructor. Department of Foreign Languages, University of Jinan,
Jinan, China. Bachelor, research direction is Cognitive Linguistics.
*Corresponding author.
Metonymy has been studied for centuries. In the time
of Aristotle, metonymy is regarded as a subcategory
of metaphor (Panther & Radden, 1999, p. 1). In the
Renaissance period, metonymy is viewed as a trope
apart from metaphor and irony (Al-Sharafi, 2004, p. 37).
In other words, metonymy is thought of as a figure of
speech. In addition, metonymy is discussed in the field of
pragmatics, in which metonymy is regarded as violating
the Cooperative Principle. In general, the above studies
on metonymy are confined to the field of rhetoric.
With the development of cognitive science, linguists
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987, 1989; Gibbs,
1994, 1999; Langacker, 1993; Panther, 1998, 1999,
2003) have begun to make the study of metonymy
from a cognitive linguistics perspective. Metonymy is
considered to exist not only in poetry, but also in ordinary
conversation. In addition, metonymy is part of the way of
thinking, is grounded in experience, is subject to general
and systematic principles and structures our thoughts
and actions. That is to say, metonymy is regarded as a
conceptual phenomenon from a cognitive linguistics
perspective.
Within the field of cognitive linguistics, metonymy
is thought of as an important way in which polysemy
is generated (Bartsch, 2002; Taylor, 2001). However,
there are few linguists who have studied metonymy in
discourse. In other words, linguists have seldom studied
how metonymy constructs coherent discourse and the
pragmatic functions of metonymy.
Generally, this article aims to study metonymy in
discourse in the framework of seven components of
discourse proposed by Beaugrande and Dressler (1981).
The seven components of discourse are cohesion,
coherence, informatively, intentionality, acceptability,
intertextuality, and situationality. Specifically, this thesis
deals respectively with cohesion, coherence, informatively,
intentionality, and acceptability in metonymic discourse.
Supported by Humanities and Social Science Youth Foundation of
Ministry of Education of China, “A Contrastive Study of Multimodal
Metaphor in English and Chinese News Discourse” (14YJC740103).
Received 14 December 2014; accepted 12 February 2015
Published online March 31 2015
Abstract
This article is carried out on the basis of the cognitive
linguistics view of metonymy and the seven components
of discourse. In detail, this article deals respectively with
the cohesion, coherence, informatively, intentionality and
acceptability in metonymic discourse. This article also
explores the influence of intertextuality and situationality
on metonymic discourse during discussing the above five
components. Through discussions, some conclusions are
drawn. First, metonymy can make discourse coherent.
Furthermore, different types of metonymy, mainly the
referential metonymy and the speech act metonymy, make
different degrees of coherence. Secondly, metonymy is
informative in discourse. Thus the hearer has to make
the effort to understanding the discourse involved.
Thirdly, metonymy usually achieves certain intentions in
discourse, such as economy, humor, politeness and irony.
Finally, metonymy is acceptable in discourse in that the
hearer has the ability to interpret metonymy.
Key words: Metonymy; Cognitive linguistics;
Discourse; Contiguity; Salience
Dong, T. (2015). A Cognitive Linguistics Approach to Metonymy in
Discourse. English Language Teaching, 2 (2), 13-24. Available from:
http://www.elt-journal.dcthink.org/index.php/elt-journal/article/view/45
DOI: http://dx.dot.org/10.18319/j.elt.45
13
Copyright © Developing Country Think Tank Institute
A Cognitive Linguistics Approach to Metonymy in
Discourse
In addition, this thesis also explores the influence of
intertextuality and situationality on metonymic discourse
during discussing the other five components.
They agree on Lakoff ’s view of metonymy in that
metonymy is part of the way of thinking, is grounded
in experience, is subject to general and systematic
principles and structures our thoughts and actions
(Radden & Kovecses 1999, p. 18). Besides, Radden
and Kovecses make the contribution to the theory of
metonymy. Radden and Kovecses (1999, p. 21) argue
that metonymic processes are not restricted to reference,
they occur at the purely conceptual level (categorization,
linguistic reasoning), at different levels of language (lexis,
morphology, syntax, discourse), in different linguistic
functions (reference, predication, speech acts), and
as a linkage interrelating different ontological realms
(concepts, forms, and things/events). In addition, Radden
and Kovecses (1999, p. 19) hold that metonymy operates
within an idealized cognitive model (ICM).
1.1.2 The Cognitive Bases of Metonymy
1.1.2.1 Contiguity
Contiguity is interpreted as conceptual contiguity
or cognitive contiguity from a cognitive linguistics
perspective. Ungerer and Schmid (2001, p. 115) define
contiguity as the relation of nearness or neighborhood
between what is denoted by the literal meaning of a
word and its figurative counterpart. Thus, contiguity
occurs at conceptual level. The cognitive contiguity
has a close relationship with conceptual distance.
conceptual contiguity is defined as a relation of nearness
or neighborhood. That is to say, contiguity expresses the
degree of how much it is related between two entities in
the same ICM, or between an ICM as a whole and one of
its entities. Conceptual contiguity is also called conceptual
distance (Dirven, 2002, p. 92). For example:
(1) The crown has not withheld its assent to a bill since
1707.
In this example, the crown stands for the monarch
institution. In this metonymy, one conceptual entity of
ROYAL REGALIA ICM, which consists of the crown,
the scepter, the robe, etc, is selected to refer to the whole
monarch institution. The contiguous relation between one
part of the regalia (symbols for royalty), the crown, as an
entity, and the institution, as an ICM, is shown as follows:
1. THE BACKGROUND OF THE
PRESENT STUDY
1.1 The Study of Metonymy From a Cognitive
Linguistics
1.1.1 Defining Metonymy
Metonymy as a conceptual phenomenon first caught the
attention of cognitive linguists with the publication of
Metaphors We Live by (1980). Metonymy, in the cognitive
linguistics view, is pervasive in our everyday life, not only
in language but also in thoughts and actions. For example,
if you ask me to show you a picture of my son and I show
you a picture of his face, you will be satisfied. You will
consider yourself to have seen a picture of my son (Lakoff
& Johnson, 1980, p. 37). In this example, the noun face
is used as a metonymy, standing for a certain person. In
contrast with the rhetorical view, metonymy has primarily
a referential function in the cognitive linguistics view.
That is to say, it allows us to use one entity to stand for
another (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 36). Lakoff and
Johnson’s exploration is an initial step towards the nature
of metonymy.
Lakoff (1987) develops the conceptual theory of
metonymy in Women, Fire and Dangerous Things.
Metonymy is regarded as one of the basic characteristics
of cognition (Lakoff, 1987, p. 77). Lakoff explains
metonymy in the notion of metonymic model, which is
defined as an idealized cognitive model (ICM) containing
stands-for relation (Lakoff, 1987, p. 78). Furthermore,
Lakoff (1987, p. 84) puts forward the characteristics of a
metonymic model as follows:
There is a “target” concept A to be understood for
some purpose in some context.
There is a conceptual structure containing both A and
another concept B.
B is either part of A or closely associated with it in
that conceptual structure. Typically, a choice of B will
uniquely determine A, within that conceptual structure.
Compared to A, B is either easier to understand, easier
to remember, easier to recognize, or more immediately
useful for the given purpose in the given context.
A metonymic model is a model of how A and B are
related in a conceptual structure; the relationship is
specified by a function from B to A.
In a metonymic model, metonymy is regarded as a
stands-for relation. The vehicle and the target have a
functional relationship. The vehicle is easier to remember,
easier to recognize. Besides, metonymy is operated in the
same conceptual structure.
Radden and Kovecses (1999) go on exploring the
nature of metonymy in Towards a Theory of Metonymy.
Copyright © Developing Country Think Tank Institute
the institution
prerogatives
executive
regalia
crown
scepter
robe
Figure 1
Contiguous Relations Between the Monarch Institution
and the Crown
14
DONG Tao (2015).
English Language Teaching, 2 (2), 13-24
metonymy or the context-independent metonymy. In
this type of metonymy, on the one hand, the contiguity
between the target and the vehicle involved is permanent.
On the other hand, the vehicle is salient without the help
of context. For example:
(3) We saw some familiar faces in a pub.
In this example, the noun, faces, is a metonymy,
standing for people. The appearance of faces perceptually
reminds the reader of people, its referent.
The other is the novel metonymy or the contextdependent referential metonymy. In this type of
metonymy, on the one hand, the contiguity between the
target and the vehicle is contemporary. On the other hand,
the vehicle does not turn to be salient unless with the help
of context of situation. Consider (4).
(4) The Times has not arrived at the press conference
yet.
The Times, which is a metonymy, refers to a certain
reporter who works for the Times paper. In this example,
the recognition of The Times as a certain reporter is
invoked by the context of situation. If this metonymy is
uttered in a press conference, The Times, which is thought
of as a less salient entity, will turn to be salient. Besides,
the contiguous relationship is established contemporarily
between the Times and its referent, a certain reporter. If
the context of situation is changed, the entity, the Times,
will not be salient. Then the contiguous relationship
between the Times and its referent will collapse.
1.1.3.2 The Predicational Metonymy
In the predicational metonymy, a potential event like the
ability, possibility, permission, obligation to undertake an
action is metonymically linked to its actual occurrence
(Panther & Thornburg, 2003, p. 4). For example:
(5) a. She was able to finish her dissertation.
b. She finished her dissertation.
(5a) expresses the subject’s ability to finish the
dissertation. Thus (26a) is a metonymy, referring to (5b),
the actual occurrence of finishing the dissertation. In
addition, (26a) acts as the vehicle and (5b) acts as the
target.
This thesis does not focus on the predicational
metonymy. So there is no detailed explanation on this
kind of metonymy.
1.1.3.3 The Speech Act Metonymy
Metonymy has also non-referential usages. There are two
conditions under which metonymy are non-referential.
One of them is the speech act metonymy. The speech act
metonymy is different from the referential metonymy in
that the speech act metonymy is related to the speech act
theory.
The speech act theory basically holds that language is
not always used to inform or to describe things but often
used to do things (Levinson, 2001, p. 228). The speech
act metonymy mainly concerns indirect speech act. Searle
defines an indirect speech act as a speech act which is
performed by means of another speech act (Panther &
In this figure, there are conceptual distances between
the institution and its entities: the prerogatives, the
executive, and the regalia. There are also conceptual
distances between regalia and its entities: the crown,
the scepter, and the robe. In other words, there is the
contiguity between the institution and its entities. There is
also the contiguity between regalia and its entities.
1.1.2.2 Salience
Salience is another factor which influences the choice
of the conceptual entity, the vehicle, because contiguity
relations only hold for salient members of an ICM (Peter,
1999, p. 150).
Salience is defined as the ease with which a linguistic
item is perceived. Originally, the first one who makes
researches on cognitive salience is Langacker (1993), who
points out that other things being equal, various principles
of relative salience generally hold: human > non-human;
whole > part; concrete > abstract; visible > non-visible;
etc (Langacker, 1993, p. 30). On the basis of Langacker’s
study, Radden and Kovecses (1999, pp. 45-50) propose
detailed cognitive principles, which contribute to the
selection of the vehicle. The principles consist of three
parts: human experience, perceptual selectivity, and
cultural preferences. The detailed descriptions of the
principles are shown as follows:
Human experience: (I) HUMAN OVER NONHUMAN; (II) SUBJECTIVE OVER OBJECTIVE; (III)
CONCRETE OVER ABSTRACT; (IV) INTERACTION
OVER NON-INTERACTION; (V) FUNCTIONAL
OVER NON-FUNCTIONAL.
Perceptual selectivity: (I) IMMEDIATE OVER
NON-IMMEDIATE; (I) OCCURRENT OVER NONO C C U R R E N T; ( I I I ) M O R E O V E R L E S S ; ( I V )
DOMINANT OVER LESS DOMINANT; (V) GOOD
GESTALT OVER GESTALT; (VI) BOUNDED OVER
UNBOUNDED; (VII) SPECIFIC OVER GENERIC.
Cultural preference: (I) STEREOTYPICAL OVER
NON-STEREOTYPICAL; (II) IDEAL OVER NONIDEAL; (III) TYPICAL OVER NON-TYPICAL; (IV)
CENTRAL OVER PERIPHERAL; (V) INITIAL OR
FINAL OVER MIDDLE; (VI) BASIC OVER NONBASIC; (VII) IMPORTANT OVER LESS IMPORTANT;
(VIII) COMMON OVER LESS COMMON; (IX) RARE
OVER LESS RARE.
1.1.3 The Classification of Metonymy
1.1.3.1 The Referential Metonymy
Metonymy has a referential function. That is to say, it
allows to use one entity to stand for another. Consider (2).
(2) a. I have got a new set of wheels.
b. Mrs. Grundy frowns on blue jeans.
In (2a), wheels, which is a metonymy, refers to
cars, motorcycles, etc. In (2b), blue jeans, which is a
metonymy, stands for people who wear blue jeans.
The referential metonymy is usually classified into
two types. One is called the conventional referential
15
Copyright © Developing Country Think Tank Institute
A Cognitive Linguistics Approach to Metonymy in
Discourse
Thornburg, 1997, p. 206). According to this definition,
an indirect speech act involves the performance of two
illocutionary acts: the secondary illocutionary act relies
on the literal force of the utterance whereas the primary
illocutionary speech act corresponds to its intended force.
In the cognitive linguistics view, the speech act metonymy
occurs between two illocutionary acts, between which
one of the illocutionary acts functions as the metonymic
vehicle and the other illocutionary act functions as the
metonymic target (Panther & Thornburg, 1999, p. 335). In
other words, the speech act metonymy can be regarded as
a cognitive process, in which one illocutionary act maps
on the whole ICM or the other illocutionary act in the
same ICM. Consider (6).
(6) A: What did you do when facing the robbers?
B: I hold a kitchen knife in my hand.
In this conversation, speaker A asks speaker B what he
does when he encounters a robber. speaker B replies that
he hit the robber with a kitchen knife by uttering I hold a
kitchen knife in my hand. The utterance I hold a kitchen
knife in my hand is a speech act metonymy, in which the
metonymic vehicle is that I hold a kitchen knife in my
hand, and the metonymic target is the whole action of
hitting the robber by taking a kitchen knife.
As mentioned above, the speech act metonymy is
related to the speech act theory. Thornburg and Panther
(1997, p. 20) argue that speech acts are actions. So the
speech act metonymy is related to actions. Thornburg
and Panther (1997, p. 207) propose an action scenario as
follows:
The Action Scenario
(I) The BEFORE: preconditions which enable a
physical action, legitimize a social action or motivate an
action.
(II) The CORE and its RESULT: properties which
define the action as such and the immediate outcome of a
successful performance of the action.
(III) The AFTER: intended or unintended consequences
of the action which are not its immediate results.
A
D
In the action scenario, there are such four stages as
the BEFORE stage, the CORE stage, the RESULT stage,
and the AFTER stage. First, a component that states the
conditions that must be fulfilled before the action proper
can take place. This component is called the BEFORE
stage. Second, there is a CORE stage that describes the
essential features of the action itself, and the immediate
RESULT stage that obtains whether the action is
felicitously performed. Finally, there is an AFTER stage,
which describes the intended consequences of the action
(Panther & Thornburg, 1998, pp. 758-759). From the
action scenario, it can be drawn that every stage of the
whole action can stand for the whole action. That is to
say, the BEFORE stage can stand for the whole action, the
CORE stage can stand for the whole action, the RESULT
stage can stand for the whole action, and the AFTER stage
can stand for the whole action. For example:
(7) Did you open the window?
a. I am coming to the window.
b. Yes, I opened the window.
c. The window is open.
d. Fresh air flows into the room.
In (7), a, b, c and d are four answers to the question
whether you open the window. And the four answers are
all regarded as the speech act metonymies because these
four answers describe the different stages of the action
of window opening. (7a) is the BEFORE stage of the
whole action, expressing that the speaker is on the way to
open the window. (7b) is the CORE stage. (7c) describes
the result of the whole action, expressing the state of the
window. And (7d) is the AFTER stage, describing the
consequences of the action.
1.2 Seven Components of Discourse
Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) propose seven standards
of discourse. They are cohesion, coherence, informatively,
intentionality, acceptability, intertextuality and
situationality. The seven components of discourse can be
regarded as a communicative occurrence and constructed
as a model of discourse as follows:
A
D
intertextuality
D
D
cohesion
R
E
intentionality
S
E
coherence
E
S
S
situationality
E
R
Figure 2
The Model of Discourse as a Communicative Occurrence
Copyright © Developing Country Think Tank Institute
acceptability
informativity
S
R
16
E
DONG Tao (2015).
English Language Teaching, 2 (2), 13-24
the following text. The referential function of metonymy
meets Halliday’s classification of reference. Metonymy
can be taken as an anaphoric reference in discourse.
Consider (10).
(10) A: Can I borrow the Shakespeare?
B: Yeah, it is over there on the table.
In speaker A’s question, the Shakespeare, which is a
metonymy, refers to the work written by Shakespeare, the
great author. In speaker B’s answer, the pronoun it refers
back to the Shakespeare. More accurately, the pronoun it
refers indirectly to the work written by Shakespeare.
Besides anaphoric reference, metonymy also functions
as a cataphoric reference in discourse. Consider this
Chinese example,
(11) [Pointing to the person who is playing the violin]
A: Do you know him?
B: The first violin?
In this example, the first violin is a metonymy,
referring to the person who is playing the violin. In this
conversation, the pronoun him refers forwards to the first
violin.
In addition, the identity of exphoric reference can refer
to context of situation. For example:
(12) The cooking contest was over. Mary won the first
prize, although Jane was very tasty as well.
In this example, the noun Jane, which is a metonymy,
refers to the dish cooked by a person whose name is Jane.
The noun Jane can be identified as the dish cooked by
Jane with the help of the context of situation in which
Jane attended the cooking contest.
Whether the referential metonymy performs either an
exophoric function, an anaphoric function, or a cataphoric
function in discourse, the recognition of metonymy
involves a cognitive process. In (10), the Shakespeare as
a whole ICM maps on the work by Shakespeare. In (11),
the first violin maps on the person who plays it as a whole
ICM. And in (12), Jane as the whole ICM maps on the
dish cooked by Jane.
2.1.1.2 The Referential Metonymy and the Cohesive
Force
In order to explore the role of the referential metonymy in
building a coherent discourse, the notion of the cohesive
force should be introduced. The cohesive force has a close
relationship with the notion of tie, which is defined as one
occurrence of a pair of cohesively related items (Halliday,
2001, p. 3). For example:
(13) John could not decide whether to buy the bust of
Shakespeare or the bust of Goethe. In the end, he bought
the Shakespeare.
In this example, the bust of Shakespeare and the
Shakespeare form a cohesive tie because the Shakespeare
refers to the bust of Shakespeare.
The cohesive force in discourse is different in degree.
That is to say, the cohesive force may be great or not in
discourse. For example:
This model shows the communicative process, in
which an addresser conveys information to an addresee
successfully. In this model, an addresser and an addressee
lie on the two opposite poles. Intentionality is situated
on the left and acceptability on the right. In this model,
informatively acts as a bridge between intentionality and
cohesion and coherence. On the one hand, informatively
is reflected in intentionality. On the other hand,
informatively is shown with cohesion and coherence. The
whole communicative process is affected by two factors,
which are intertextuality and situationality.
2 . T H E S T U D Y O F M E TO N Y M Y I N
DISCOURSE
2.1 Cohesion in Metonymic Discourse
2.1.1 Cohesion in the Discourse Containing the
Referential Metonymy
2.1.1.1 The Referential Metonymy and Cohesion
Halliday (2001, p. 5) argues that the potential for
cohesion lies in the systematic resources of reference,
ellipsis and so on that are built into the language itself.
The actualization of cohesion in any instance depends
not merely on the selection of some option from within
these restrictions, but also on the presence of some other
element which resolves the presupposition that is set up.
Consider (8).
(8) Wash and core six cooking apples. Put them into a
fireproof dish.
In this example, the cohesion lies in the relation that is
set up between the noun phrase six cooking apples and the
pronoun them because the pronoun them refers back to the
noun phrase six cooking apples.
Metonymy performs a referential function in discourse
so that it can make discourse cohesive. For example:
(9) We have found some bodies for your team. They
are all 22 years old.
In this example, the noun bodies is metonymy,
standing for people. In addition, the pronoun they refers
back to the noun bodies. Thus the pronoun they actually
makes an indirect reference to people. The cohesion of
(9) is situated in the referential relation that is established
between the noun bodies and the pronoun they. In contrast
with (8), (9) is special in that the pronoun they refers to
people instead of the noun bodies. So the pronoun they
connects people not directly, but indirectly. That is to say,
the metonymy, bodies, performs an indirect referential
function in discourse.
Halliday (2001, p. 33) classifies reference into two
types: exophora and endophora. Endophora is further
subclassified into anaphora and cataphora. The identity of
exophoric reference depends on context of situation. The
identity of anaphoric reference depends on the preceding
text. And the identity of cataphoric reference depends on
17
Copyright © Developing Country Think Tank Institute
A Cognitive Linguistics Approach to Metonymy in
Discourse
(14) a. I saw a head. Suddenly he disappeared.
b. I saw a stranger. Suddenly he disappeared.
These sentences in (14) both express that the subject
meets a person who suddenly disappears. The noun head
in (14a) is a metonymy, referring to a certain person.
However, the cohesive forces in the two sentences
are different. In (14a), the noun phrase a head and the
pronoun he form a cohesive tie because he refers back
to a head. In (14b), the noun a stranger and the pronoun
he constitute a cohesive tie because he refers back to
a stranger. Perceptually the cohesive force of (34a) is
less great than that of (14b) in that he in (14a) makes
an indirect reference to a head, while he in (14b) refers
directly to a stranger.
2.1.1.3 The Referential Metonymy and Coherence
Halliday (2001, p. 1) holds that the distinction between
a text and a collection of unrelated sentences is a matter
of degree. That is to say, coherence is a semantic notion
of degree. Furthermore, the coherence in the discourse
containing the referential metonymy is also a semantic
notion of degree.
The referential metonymy is classified into two types:
the context-independent referential metonymy and the
context-dependent referential metonymy. These two types
of metonymy both make the contribution to the coherence
in discourse.
On the one hand, the discourse containing the contextindependent metonymy can make discourse coherent.
(15) I saw some new faces. They probably are
newcomers.
In this example, the noun faces is a metonymy,
standing for people. In addition, the pronoun they refers
back to the metonymy faces. In other words, the pronoun
they makes an indirect reference to people. The pronoun
they and the metonymy faces form a cohesive tie which
leads to the coherence in this discourse.
On the other hand, the discourse containing the
context-dependent metonymy can make discourse
coherent, too. For example:
(16) ① We thought we were onto a steam iron
yesterday, but we were too late. Steam irons never have
any trouble finding roommates. ② She could pick her own
pad and not even have to share a bathroom. ③ Stereos are
a dime a dozen. ④ Everyone’s got their own systems. ⑤
We’ve just had a streak of bad luck. ⑥ First, our Mr coffee
flunked out of school and went back home. ⑦ When we
replaced her, our electric typewriter got married and split.
⑧ And we got stuck with a girl who said she was getting
a leather coat, but she just said that to get the room. (Gibbs,
1999, p. 70)
In this example, such noun phrases as a steam iron,
Mr Coffee, and our electric typewriter are metonymies,
referring respectively to the person who owns a steam
iron, the person who likes to drink coffee, and the person
who owns an electric typewriter. Among these three
Copyright © Developing Country Think Tank Institute
metonymies, the metonymy a steam iron in sentence ①
and the pronoun she in sentence ② form a cohesive tie.
The metonymy Mr Coffee in sentence ⑥ and the pronoun
her in sentence ⑦ constitute a cohesive tie. The two
cohesive ties contribute to the coherence in this discourse.
The coherence of these two discourses is different in
degree although these two types of metonymy both make
the two discourses coherent. The discourse containing the
context-independent metonymy is usually more coherent
than the discourse containing the context-dependent
metonymy. That is to say, (15) is perceptually more
coherent than (16).
The cohesive force is different in degree. The degrees
of the coherence in discourse depend on whether the
cohesive force between the two cohesive items is great or
not. The cohesive force involving the context-independent
referential metonymy is usually greater than the cohesive
force involving the context-dependent metonymy. That is
to say, the cohesive tie in (15) is greater than that in (16).
Thus (15) is more coherent than (16).
The reason why there are different cohesive forces is
that there is different contiguity between the two cohesive
items. Contiguity is the notion of degree which is caused
by different conceptual distance between two entities.
Panther and Thornburg (2003, p. 6) argue that the link
between a metonymic source and its target may vary in
strength. The strength of a metonymic link depends on
how conceptually close the source and the target are to
each other. The strength of a metonymic link refers to
the contiguous relation between two entities. In other
words, contiguity makes different cohesive forces. Take
(15) and (16) for example. The cohesive tie in (15) is
greater than that in (16). The reason is that the conceptual
distance between the two cohesive items in (15) is less
great than that in (16). In (15), the metonymy faces has a
closer semantic distance from its referent, a certain person
because the entity face is a part of people conceptually.
In (16), such metonymies as a steam iron, Mr Coffee
are semantically far from their referents because such
entities as a steam iron and coffee have no direct semantic
relations to people.
Context can improve the salience of the less salient
entity because only salient entity is qualified to be the
vehicle. In other words, context can help the target and the
vehicle establish contiguous relation. However, context
cannot shorten the conceptual distance. Take (16) for
example. With the help of the context of situation, the less
salient entities like a steam iron, coffee, electric typewriter
turn to be salient. As a result, the contiguous relations
between a steam iron, Mr. Coffee, and their referents
are set up. However, the context cannot shorten the
conceptual distance between the less salient entities and
their referents. Thus, the conceptual distances between a
steam iron, Mr Coffee and their referents are not changed.
Thus (15) is more coherent than (16).
18
DONG Tao (2015).
English Language Teaching, 2 (2), 13-24
more likely even a relatively peripheral component can
stand metonymically for the scenario.
On the one hand, Hypothesis 1 indicates that the CORE
stage makes the greatest contribution to the coherence in
discourse. The BEOFRE stage, the RESULT stage, and
the AFTER stage, which have been discussed in section
3.5.3, make less contribution to the coherence in discourse
because they are far from the CORE stage. Panther and
Thornburg (1998, p. 759) suggest that the RESULT stage
is the closest to the CORE stage, and the BEFORE stage
and the AFTER stage have equal conceptual distance from
the CORE stage. Thus in (18), the conversation with B2
is more coherent than the conversations with B1, B3, and
B4 respectively. In addition, the conversation with B3 is
also more coherent than the conversations with B1 and B4
respectively.
On the other hand, hypothesis 2 indicates that context
of situation influences the coherence in discourse. That is
to say, such the peripheral stages as the BEFORE stage,
the RESULT stage and the AFTER stage are usually not
permitted to appear in discourse unless with the help of
context of situation. For example:
(19) Pan Yueting:…(suddenly) Bai Lu, it is cold in the
room, you are likely to get cold, so I close the window for
you.
Chen Bailu: (stubbenly) no, I will not! I will not!
Pan Yueting: ok. It’s ok not to close the window. I have
no idea about you. I didn’t even care about my natural
daughter.
Chen Bailu: (Turning back) it’s not unusual. If I were
your natural daughter, would you care about me like this?
Pan Yueting: good. (begging) please close the window,
I am going to get cold. (sneezing) look, I have got cold.
Chen Bailu: (suddenly going back from the window)
why didn’t you tell me earlier?
Pan Yueting: (satisfactorily) then you may close the
window.
Chen Bailu: (shaking the head) no, no, I take more
clothes for you.
The two speakers talk about window closing. Thus, the
context of situation is window closing. This conversation
is full of the speech act metonymies, which are situated in
the same ICM. Among these speech act metonymies, it is
cold in the room, you are likely to get cold, please close
the window, I have got cold, you may close the window
and I take more clothes for you are in the WINDOW
CLOSING ICM, in which please close the window and
you may close the window lie in the CORE stage. it is
cold in the room, you are likely to get cold, I have got
cold and I take more clothes for you lie in the AFTER
stage. As mentioned earlier, the CORE stage makes
more contribution to the coherence in conversation than
the AFTER stage makes. Besides, the BEFORE stage,
the RESULT stage and the AFTER stage do usually
not appear in discourse without the help of the context
of situation. In this conversation, because the speakers
2.2 Coherence in the Discourse Containing the
Speech Act Metonymy
2.2.1 Coherence and the Speech Act Metonymy
The speech act metonymy involves two illocutionary acts,
of which one is regarded as the vehicle, and the other
is viewed as the target. The speech act metonymy is a
cognitive process in which one illocutionary act maps on
the other one in the same ICM or the whole ICM.
The speech act metonymy makes the contribution to
the coherence in discourse. For example:
(17) A: Did you open the window?
B: The window is open. (Panther & Thornburg, 1999,
p. 338)
Speaker A asks whether speaker B opened the window.
Speaker B implies that he has opened the window by
uttering the window is open. As discussed in 3.5.3, there are
such stages as the BEFORE stage, the CORE stage, the
RESULT stage, and the AFTER stage in an action ICM.
In (17), the RESULT stage maps on the whole action of
window opening in the WINDOW OPENING ICM. Thus,
this conversation becomes coherent.
2.2.2 The Degrees of Coherence and the Speech Act
Metonymy
Coherence is a semantic notion of degree. The coherence
in the discourse containing the speech act metonymy is
not an exception. That is to say, the discourse containing
the speech act metonymy can be more (or less) coherent.
Consider (28) as repeated.
(18) A: Did you open the window?
B1: I am coming.
B2: Yes, I opened the window.
B3: The window is open.
B4: Fresh air flows into the room.
B1, B2, B3, and B4 may be the answers to speaker
A’s question whether speaker B opened the window. And
they are the speech act metonymies, standing for the
action of window opening. Among the four answers, B2
makes more contribution to the coherence in discourse
than B1, B3 and B4 respectively do. In other words, the
conversation with B2 is perceptually more coherent than
the conversations with B1, B3, and B4.
Panther and Thornburg (1998, pp. 761-768) propose
two hypotheses to explain the metonymically standingfor strength of the parts in an action scenario. Their
hypotheses go as follows:
Hypothesis 1:
The more distant a speech act scenario component
is from the CORE, the weaker is its ability to evoke
the scenario metonymically. In other words, the more
conceptually removed a component is from the core,
the less likely that component will be in a stand-for
(metonymic) relation to the scenario as a whole.
Hypothesis 2:
The more components of a scenario present in a
discourse, the easier it is to identify the scenario and the
19
Copyright © Developing Country Think Tank Institute
A Cognitive Linguistics Approach to Metonymy in
Discourse
communication. The speaker uses the Shakespeare instead
of one particular work of his in that the hearer does not
want detailed information about the book which the
speaker has been reading.
Ruiz (2003, p. 131) argues that the referential
metonymy is often used either when the speaker cannot
clearly describe the referent which he wants the hearer
to identify or when, even though he can, he finds it
more economical—and still equally effective from the
communicative standpoint—not to describe it fully. This
kind of metonymy usually occurs in the part-for-whole
metonymy or the whole-for-part metonymy. On the one
hand, the part-for-whole metonymy refers to metonymy
in which the vehicle is a part of an ICM, which acts as the
target. Consider (23).
(23) a. Where is the brain now that we need him?
b. We need a couple of strong bodies for our team.
c. As a result of putting some legs in our team, we
could win the game.
These sentences in (23) include the part-for-whole
metonymies, in which brain, bodies, and legs all stand
for various people. Furthermore, this kind of metonymy
carries more information besides their literal meaning.
That is to say, in order to get the expected communicative
intentions, the speaker respectively highlights entities
that they need in PERSON ICM. In (23a), the speaker
highlights a person’s intelligence. In (23b), the speaker
focuses on a person’s physical strength. In (23c), the
speaker indicates that he needs some athletes for the
game. Thus, the part-for-whole metonymy carries extra
information in discourse. In other words, the speaker
achieves the intention of economy by the use of the partfor-whole metonymy.
On the other hand, the whole-for-part metonymy refers
to metonymy in which the target is one part of an ICM,
which acts as the vehicle. This kind of metonymy hides
specific information. Consider (24).
(24) a. The Times hasn’t arrived at the Press
Conference yet.
b. IBM should get together to discuss common
problems.
c. The Chicago Bulls won their fifth championship.
These sentences in (24) include the whole-for-part
metonymies, in which the Times refers to a certain reporter
who works for The Times; IBM stands for the leaders
who govern the company; the Chicago Bulls means the
basketball players who work for the team, Chicago Bull.
These metonymies achieve the intention of economy in
discourse because they can express the accurate meaning.
In (24a), the Times is used metonymically because the
speaker does probably not know the reporter’s name or the
speaker expects to focus on the journal that the reporter
represents rather than a specific reporter. In (24b), the
speaker emphasizes the authority of the leaders because
only the leaders have the right to make a decision. In (24c),
the speaker indicates that the fifth champion is won with
talk about window closing, the less salient entities like
it is cold in the room, you are likely to get cold, I have
got cold, and I take more clothes for you come into the
conversation. Furthermore, they make the contribution to
the coherence in this conversation.
2.3 Informatively in Metonymic Discourse
The notion of informatively expresses the extent to which
a presentation is new or unexpected.
The function of metonymy does not stop at the level
of referentiality alone. Rather, it extends to the level
of cognitive informatively (Al-Sharafi, 2004, p. 54).
Metonymic discourse is informative. For example:
(20) We need some good heads.
In this example, the metonymy heads stands for people.
Further, the use of heads is informative in that the subject
needs intelligent people not just any ordinary people.
An unusual cohesive device promotes informatively
of discourse and increases difficulty in understanding
discourse. Metonymy in discourse is regarded as an
unusual cohesive device because it performs an indirect
referential function. Contrast between (21a) and (21b),
(21) a. A: Where is the work written by Shakespeare?
B: It is over there.
b. A: Where is the Shakespeare?
B: It is over there.
Between the two conversations, (21a) is less
informative than (21b) in that in (21a), the pronoun
it refers directly to the work written by the author,
Shakespeare. In (21b), the pronoun it refers indirectly
back to the Shakespeare and the Shakespeare stands
for the work written by that author, Shakespeare. As a
result, the use of the Shakespeare increases difficulty
in understanding this discourse. Thus, (21b) is more
informative than (21a).
2.4 Intentionality in Metonymic Discourse
2.4.1 Economy
Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 36) argue that metonymy
has primarily a referential function. It is the referential
usage by means of which metonymy achieves the
intention of economy in discourse. For example:
(22) I have been reading the Shakespeare.
In this example, the metonymy the Shakespeare stands
for his work. Understanding the metonymic usage of the
Shakespeare has to refer to the notion of salience. The
speaker highlights one conceptual entity, Shakespeare, in
SHAKESPEARE ICM. As a result, the Shakespeare maps
on the great author himself as a whole ICM.
Al-Sharafi (2004, p. 55) argues that the use of the
term Shakespeare to refer to his work is not a result of
a random or purely innocent choice, but of a purposeful
choice to signify that the whole oeuvre of this author,
his comedies, his tragedies and his sonnets and so on,
are in my mind even though I am reading only one
particular work. The intention of economy is the needs of
Copyright © Developing Country Think Tank Institute
20
DONG Tao (2015).
English Language Teaching, 2 (2), 13-24
functions, sex and so on. Thus, he usually expresses his
idea by euphemism. Euphemism is defined as the use of a
word which is thought to be less offensive or unpleasant
than another word (Richards et al., 2000, p. 163). For
example, people usually use to pass away instead of to
die. That is to say, in order to achieve the communicative
intention of politeness, people usually use the euphemistic
expression. Metonymy is regarded as one of the ways
in which euphemism is generated. The reason is that
metonymy can produce strong or weak implicature. In this
way, such stages as the BEFORE stage, the CORE stage,
the RESULT stage, and the AFTER stage may be regarded
as strong or weak implicature. More exactly, the CORE
stage is usually regarded as strong implicature, while the
other stages, including the BEFORE stage, the RESULT
stage, and the AFTER stage, are often thought of as weak
implicatures. Radden and Kovecses (1999, p. 53) argue
that the euphemistic expression usually focuses on the
BEFORE stage and the AFTER stage of the whole action.
For example:
(26) a. They go to the bathroom.
b. They go to wash their hands.
The two examples in (26) both mean that the subject
urinates. The speaker respectively highlights the BEFORE
stage and the AFTER stage to stand for the whole action
of urinating. Thus, weak implicatures arise and politeness
is achieved. By means of the metonymic shift, the speaker
not only expresses the accurate meaning, but also achieves
their communicative intention—politeness.
The reason why only those stages except the CORE
stage are qualified to meet the intention of politeness is
that the link between a vehicle and its target may vary
in strength. The strength of a metonymic link depends
on how conceptually close it is between the vehicle and
the target. The BEFORE stage and the AFTER stage
are regarded as the peripheral stages, while the CORE
stage is not. Such stages as the BEFORE stage and the
AFTER stage are more distant from the whole ICM than
the CORE stage is. Thus the strength of a metonymic
link leads to the avoidance of the CORE stage rather than
the BEFORE stage and the AFTER stage. As a result,
the speaker achieves the communicative intention—
politeness.
2.4.4 Irony
Metonymy may show the speaker’s attitude in discourse.
This section mainly discusses one of the speaker’s
attitudes—irony. Kihara (2005, p. 513) defines irony as
an expression of meaning, often, humorous or sarcastic,
by the use of language of a different or opposite tendency.
Papafragou (1996, p. 187) argues that irony has to (a)
remain implicit, and (b) communicate an attitude of
dissociation from the interpretive material. Metonymy
meets both of the conditions. On the one hand, the
referent that a metonymic expression refers to may remain
implicit. On the other hand, the vehicle can be dissociated
every player’s effort rather than a specific player’ effort.
Through the whole-for-part metonymy, the speaker not
only expresses the meaning accurately, but also achieves
the intention of economy.
2.4.2 Humor
Metonymy also achieves humorous effects in discourse.
Humor results from a crucial interaction between new and
old information. In other words, humor is the result of
interaction between the new information and the context of
situation which old information establishes. For example:
(25) A student writes K Y on the wall of the dorm,
referring to Kiss Ying because he is in love with a girl
named Ying. One day, a teacher finds the sign on the wall
when he checks around the dorm. The teacher blames this
student for his disorderly drawing and questiones him
what the sign means. In order to avoid the embarrassment,
the smart student replies: “the sign is used to encourage
myself to work harder because it stands for Kao Yan,
a Chinese character, meaning attending the graduate
entrance examination.”
In this example, on the one hand, Kiss Ying, which the
sign K Y refers to, establishes a context of situation. On
the other hand, the metonymic reinterpretation of K Y sets
up new information. The interaction between Kiss Ying
and Kao Yan causes the humorous effect.
The metonymic interpretation of the sign K Y
performs a crucial function in achieving humor. The
dissociation between the vehicle and the target leads to
humor. Dissociation can be viewed as contiguity. Thus,
dissociation can be thought of as the conceptual distance
between two conceptual entities. Thus, the conceptual
distance between the vehicle and the target should be kept
great enough in order to achieve humor. Take (25) for
example. Kiss Ying and Kao Yan are usually not connected
semantically. That is to say, there is a great conceptual
distance between Kiss Ying and Kao Yan. However, the
student highlights Kao Yan in that he needs the other
interpretation of K Y which is advantageous to him. In
other words, the context confines Kiss Ying and Kao
Yan to the same ICM. Thus, Kao Yan maps on Kiss Ying
in K Y ICM. Because there is a semantic sharp contrast
between Kao Yan and Kiss Ying, humor arises.
The context of situation is another important factor
in humor arising. More exactly, metonymy that causes
humor is usually the context-dependent metonymy. In (25),
it is Kao Yan, the context-dependent metonymy, that leads
to humor. The reason is that only the context-dependent
metonymy can keep conceptual distance great enough
from its counterpart.
In conclusion, the humorous effect of metonymy is
mainly caused by the conceptual distance between two
conceptual entities involved and context of situation.
2.4.3 Politeness
In communication, the speaker usually avoids direct
mention of matters pertaining to parts of body, bodily
21
Copyright © Developing Country Think Tank Institute
A Cognitive Linguistics Approach to Metonymy in
Discourse
from the target. That is to say, there should be enough
conceptual distance between the vehicle and the target.
Consider (27).
(27) A: Is Mary married?
B: Yes. She married the money.
In this conversation, the money is a metonymy,
standing for Mary’s husband. The irony lies in the
metonymic usage of the noun phrase the money, by which
speaker B sarcastically criticizes that the goal of Mary’s
marriage is to live with money rather than the person
who owns money. There are two reasons why the money
is an ironic usage. On the one hand, the referent, Mary’s
husband, which the money refers to, remains implicit. On
the other hand, the money is conceptually dissociated from
its referent.
The money remains implicit. Originally, money
has no semantic relation to Mary’s husband. In this
conversation, speaker B highlights the entity, money
in MARY’S HUSBAND ICM in order to achieve the
intention of irony. That is to say, speaker B uses a less
salient entity to refer to Mary’s husband. In addition, the
money is dissociated from the referent, Mary’s husband.
As mentioned above, there is no direct semantic relation
between money and Mary’s husband. That is to say, there
is enough conceptual distance between money and Mary’s
husband. Thus, Mary’s husband is not only implicit but
also dissociated from money in MARY’S HUSBAND’S
ICM.
In conclusion, the implicit reference of the money plus
the dissociation of the money from its referent leads to the
ironic effect.
the whole ICM. The typical example comes from Lakoff
(1987, p. 89) who proves the existence of metonymic
reasoning with the example of DC-10. After publicizing
DC-10 crash in Chicago, people refuse to take DC-10.
Instead they choose to take other types of planes despite
the fact that they have worse records than DC-10s. In
this case, people use the salient example of the DC-10
that crashes to stand metonymically for the entire ICM
for the safety records of DC-10. Evidence, which occurs
in discourse, proves people’s metonymic reasoning, too.
Consider (28).
(28) A: How did you get to the airport?
B: I waved down a taxi. (Gibbs, 1999, p. 66)
In this conversation, speaker B expresses the idea that
he arrives at the airport by mentioning the BEFORE stage
of the whole action, which includes hailing a taxi, having
it stop and pick him up, and then having it take him to the
airport.
The ability to interpret metonymy is governed by
cognitive principles. There are two cognitive bases of
metonymy: contiguity and salience. Here the two bases of
metonymy are thought of as the cognitive principles. That
is to say, the ability to interpret metonymy is governed by
contiguity and salience.
To summarize, it is with the ability to interpret
metonymy that the hearer understands metonymic
discourse. Furthermore, the ability to interpret metonymy
is governed by the cognitive principles: contiguity and
salience.
2.5 Acceptability in Metonymic Discourse
acceptability is described as some use or relevance
that the text has for the receiver. Thus, acceptability is
regarded as the notion of whether the listener understands
the discourse involved.
Metonymic discourse can usually be understood
automatically. The reason is that people have the ability
to interpret metonymy. Gibbs (1994, p. 358) argues that
the listener is able to understand conventional and novel
metonymic expressions precisely because the inferences
needed to interpret such language are a common mental
operation in our everyday conceptual system. The mental
operation is defined as our conceptual ability to use one
well-understood aspect of some domain to stand for the
domain as a whole, or to use the mention of a whole
domain to refer to one salient subpart (Gibbs, 1994, p.
358). Thus, the ability to interpret metonymy is defined
as the mental capacity to map one conceptual entity on
the other conceptual entity which stands in contiguous
relationship in the same ICM or the whole ICM.
Cognitive psychological evidence supports the
existence of people’s conceptual ability to interpret
metonymic expressions in which a salient entity of an
ICM can stand for the other entity in the same ICM or
From the cognitive linguistics perspective, metonymy is
defined as a cognitive process in which one conceptual
entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another
conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized
cognitive model (ICM). Metonymy depends on two
cognitive factors: contiguity and salience. In addition,
metonymy falls into three kinds: the referential
metonymy, the predicational metonymy, and the speech
act metonymy.
This article has dealt respectively with cohesion,
coherence, informatively, intentionality, acceptability
in metonymic discourse from a cognitive linguistics
perspective. This thesis has also explored the influence of
intertextuality and situationality on metonymic discourse
during discussing the above five components. Through
discussion, some conclusions are drawn. First, metonymy
can make contribution to a coherent discourse. However,
different kinds of metonymy (the referential metonymy
and the speech act metonymy) have different degrees of
coherence. In general, the context-independent metonymy
makes more contribution to the coherence in discourse
than the context-dependent metonymy does. Furthermore,
the conceptual distance between two conceptual entities
determines the coherence in metonymic discourse.
Copyright © Developing Country Think Tank Institute
CONCLUSION
22
DONG Tao (2015).
English Language Teaching, 2 (2), 13-24
Generally speaking, the shorter the conceptual distance
between two conceptual entities, the more coherent a
metonymic discourse becomes. Secondly, the use of
metonymy is not at random, but purposeful in discourse.
Thus metonymic discourse is informative. Thirdly, the
intentions that the speaker uses metonymy for are usually
economy, politeness, humor, and irony. The conceptual
distance between two conceptual entities decides whether
the communicative effects are achieved. In general, the
longer the conceptual distance between the two conceptual
entities is, the more perceptual the intentions are. Finally,
this thesis has analyzed the reason why the listener
can understand metonymic discourse automatically.
The reason is that people have the ability to interpret
metonymy. In addition, during discussing the other five
components, this thesis has explored how intertextuality
and situationality influence the understanding of
metonymic discourse.
Gibbs, R. W. (1999). Speaking and thinking with metonymy.
In K. -U. Panther & G. Radden (Eds.), Metonymy
in language and thought (pp. 61-76). Amsterdam &
Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Halliday, M. A. K., & Hasan, R. (2001). Cohesion in
English. Beijing, China: Foreign Language Teaching
and Research Press.
Kihara, Y. (2005). The mental space structure of verbal
irony. Cognitive Linguistics, 3, 513-530.
Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fire, and dangerous things:
what categories reveal about the mind. Chicago &
London: The University of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by.
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, G., & Turner, M. (1989). More than cool reason:
A field guide to poetic metaphor. Chicago & London:
The University of Chicago Press.
Langacker, R. W. (1987). Foundations of cognitive
grammar, vol. i, theoretical prerequisites. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press.
Langacker, R. W. (1993). Reference-point construction.
Cognitive Linguistics, 4, 1-38.
Markert, K., & Hahn, U. (2002). Understanding metonymies
in discourse. Artificial Intelligence, 135, 145-198.
Panther, K. -U., & Radden, G. (1999). Introduction.
In K. -U. Panther & G. Radden (Eds.), Metonymy
in language and thought (pp. 1-14). Amsterdam &
Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Panther, K. -U., & Thornburg, L. (1998). A cognitive
approach to inferencing in conversation. Journal of
Pragmatics, 30, 755-769.
Panther, K. -U., & Thornburg, L. (1999). The potentiality
for actuality metonymy in English and Hungarian.
In K. -U. Panther & G. Radden (Eds.), Metonymy in
language and thought (pp. 333-357). Amsterdam &
Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Panther, K. -U., & Thornburg, L. (2003). Introduction: On
the nature of conceptual metonymy. In K. -U. Panther
& L. Thornburg (Eds.), Metonymy and pragmatic
inferencing (pp. 1-20). Amsterdam & Philadelphia:
John Benjamins.
Papafragou, A. (1996). On metonymy. Lingua, 99, 169-195.
Peter, K. (1999). Frame and contiguity: On the cognitive
bases of metonymy and certain types of word
formation. In K. -U. Panther & G. Radden (Eds.),
metonymy in language and thought (pp. 139-167).
Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Radden, G., & Kovecses, Z. (1999). Towards a theory of
metonymy. In K. -U. Panther & G. Radden (Eds.),
metonymy in language and thought (pp. 17-59).
Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Richards, J. C. et al. (2000). Longman dictionary of
language teaching & applied linguistics. Beijing,
China: Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press.
REFERENCES
Al-Sharafi, A. G. M. (2004). Textual metonymy: A semiotic
approach. Hampshire & New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Barcelona, A. (2002). Clarifying and applying the notions of
metaphor and metonymy within cognitive linguistics: An
update. In R. Dirven & R. Porings (Eds.), Metaphor and
metonymy in comparison and contrast (pp. 207-277). Berlin
& New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Barcelona, A. (2003). On the plausibility of claiming a
metonymic motivation for conceptual metaphor. In A.
Barcelona (Ed.), Metaphor and metonymy at the crossroads
(pp. 31-58). Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Bartsch, R. (2002). Generating polysemy: Metaphor and
metonymy. In R. Dirven & R. Porings (Eds.), Metaphor and
metonymy in comparison and contrast (pp. 49-74). Berlin &
New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Beaugrande, R. D., & Dressler, W. (1981). Introduction to
textlinguistics. London & New York: Longman.
Croft, W. (2002). The role of domains in the interpretation of
metaphors and metonymies. In R. Dirven & R. Porings
(Eds.), Metaphor and metonymy in comparison and contrast
(pp. 161-205). Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Dirven, R. (2002). Metonymy and metaphor: Different mental
strategies of conceptualization. In R. Dirven & R. Porings
(Eds.), Metaphor and metonymy in comparison and contrast
(pp. 75-111). Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Feyaerts, K. (2003). Refining the inheritance hypothesis:
Interaction between metaphoric and metonymic
hierarchies. In A. Barcelona (Ed.), Metaphor and
metonymy at the crossroads (pp. 59-78). Berlin & New
York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Gibbs, R. W. (1994). The poetics of mind: Figurative thought,
language, and understanding. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
23
Copyright © Developing Country Think Tank Institute
A Cognitive Linguistics Approach to Metonymy in
Discourse
Ruiz de Mendoza, F., & Hernandez, P. (2003). Cognitive
operations and pragmatic implication. In K. -U.
Panther & L. Thornburg (Eds.), Metonymy and
pragmatic inferencing (pp. 23-49). Amsterdam &
Philadelphia: John Benjamins .
Ruiz, F. (2003). The role of mappings and domains in
understanding metonymy. In A. Barcelona (Ed.),
Metaphor and metonymy at the crossroads (pp. 109132). Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Seto, K. -I. (1999). Distinguishing metonymy from
synecdoche. In K. -U. Panther & G. Radden (Eds.),
Metonymy in language and thought (pp. 91-120).
Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Copyright © Developing Country Think Tank Institute
Taylor, J. R. (2001). Linguistic categorization: Prototypes
in linguistic theory. Beijing, China: Foreign Language
Teaching and Research Press.
Thornburg, L., & Panther, K. -U. (1997). Speech act
metonymies. In W. -A. Liebert & L. Waugh (Eds.),
Discourse and perspective in cognitive linguistics
(pp. 205-219). Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John
Benjamins.
Ungerer, F., & Schmid, H. J. (2001). An introduction
to cognitive linguistics. Beijing, China: Foreign
Language Teaching and Research Press.
24