Volume 1 Number 1
Spring 2009
Program on Conflict
Management and Negotiation
Intercivilizational Conflict: Can It Be Moderated?
Special Issue Editor: Ben Mollov
This issue is published in cooperation with the
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Israel Office
Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
Published by
The Interdisciplinary Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation
As an interdisciplinary journal analyzing micro and macro level conflict
from the perspective of the social sciences, humanities and law, we
welcome contributions for consideration of publication that relate to the
development, resolution or management of conflict, primarily in Israel but
also around the world. The journal will appear three times a year as an ejournal, with occasional book-form publishing. All manuscripts will
undergo academic review. Manuscripts may be submitted in either Hebrew
or English. Further details appear on our website.
Editor: Ephraim Tabory
Guest Editor: Ben Mollov
Book Review Editor: Amira Schiff
Editorial Assistants: Shlomit Stern (Hazan), Michal Roness
English Language Editor: Shirley Zauer
Cover Graphic Designer: Hagit Weinberg
Editorial Advisory Board
Michal Alberstein, Israel
Daniel Bar-Tal
Rachel Ben-Ari, Israel
Robert Bush, USA
Roy Eidelson, USA
Tamar Hermann, Israel
Hanan Mandel, Israel
Ifat Maoz, Israel
Ben Mollov, Israel
Theodore Sasson, USA
Amira Schiff, Israel
Gerald Steinberg, Israel
Hana Zagefka, UK
This issue of the Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution is published in cooperation with the
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Israel office. We acknowledge the contribution of the Project
for the Study of Religion, Culture and Peace in the preparation of this special issue.
Executive Office:
Program on Conflict Management and
‫התכנית ללימודי ניהול ויישוב סכסוכים‬
Negotiation
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan 52900
52900 ‫ רמת גן‬,‫אילן‬-‫אוניברסיטת בר‬
Tel: 972-3-5318043 Fax: 972-3-7384047
[email protected]; www.barilan-conflict.com
THE ISRAEL JOURNAL OF
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009
Intercivilizational Conflict: Can It Be Moderated?
Special Issue Editor: Ben Mollov
Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
2
Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009
Intercivilizational Conflict: Can it Be Moderated?
Special Issue Editor: Ben Mollov, Project for Religion, Culture
and Peace
TABLE OF CONTENTS
From the Editor
Ephraim Tabory
5
Foreword
Lars Hänsel
7
From the Guest Editor
Ben Mollov
9
Intercivilizational Conflict:
Some Guidelines and Some Fault Lines
Fania Oz-Salzberger
13
The Political and Social Context of Intercivilizational Conflict
and the Possibilities of Peace Building
Jeffrey Haynes
29
The Logic of Clash of Civilizations in Global Context with
Special Reference to Turkish Politics
Ali Yaşar Saribay
49
Virtual Meetings in the Middle East:
Implementing the Contact Hypothesis on the Internet
Katelyn Y. A. McKenna, Tal Samuel-Azran and
Natalie Sutton-Balaban
63
Conflict and Compromise in Inter-Religious Issues in Malaysia
Johan Saravanamuttu
87
Federalism, Multiculturalism and Intercultural Dialogue for
Conflict Management in Israeli Society
Ben Mollov
103
Inter-Religious Dialogue: Lessons from a Practitioner’s
Perspective
Daniel Rossing
123
3
Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
Symposium: What Can Scholars of Conflict Situations, Conflict
Management and Policy Makers Learn from Each Other?
Ephraim Tabory, Jonathan Fox, Israela Silberman, Moty Cristal,
Hillel Wahrman
133
List of Contributors
155
Hebrew Abstracts
159
Conflict Management and Negotiation Interdisciplinary Graduate Program
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel 52900
Tel +972 3 5318043; fax +972 3 7384047
Email: [email protected] Web site: http://www.barilan-conflict.com
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
6 Lloyd George St., Jerusalem, Israel 91083
Tel. +972 2 5671830; fax +972 2 5671831
Email: [email protected] Web site: http://www.kas.de/israel
4
Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009
From the Editor
Israeli society at times appears to be locked into conflict that affects
numerous sectors on a variety of levels. Interpersonal conflict leads to
hostility, animosity, and seemingly escalating levels of aggression.
Intergroup conflict is based on various traits, including ethnicity and
religious identity that are at times perceived by protagonists to be primordial.
Organized and wildcat strikes appear to be a necessary condition for the
resolution of labor disputes.
On a national level, Israel is embroiled in an ongoing conflict with its
neighbor states, as well as those further removed. This conflict also has
internal implications that further complicate the relations between its own
Arab and non-Arab citizens, in addition to having global repercussions. The
complex factors involved in these conflicts render their resolution difficult
and challenging. Issues of identity, values and materialistic interests lead to
steadfast positions and intractable conflict. Research indicates that being
embroiled in an external armed conflict has implications for the level of
conflict within a country, as states at war tend to be characterized by
intensified internal aggression. Coming full circle, then, Israel’s external
conflicts on a macro level impact on and exacerbate the micro level of
conflict.
Research on the development and resolution of such conflicts is a
fundamental requisite of the academy. The variety of factors that impact on
conflict and the numerous ways in which conflict is channeled has led BarIlan University to develop an innovative, multidisciplinary approach for its
study.
We, in the Interdisciplinary Graduate Program on Conflict Management
and Negotiation, have established this academic journal as our contribution
to furthering the goals of the university and the program. We intend this
journal to serve as a forum for the highest level of academic work as it
focuses on all levels of conflict, primarily in Israel and in Jewish society,
but also around the world. We believe that the exchange of knowledge in
this field will serve academic goals, while contributing to world peace and
understanding.
This inaugural issue of the journal is based on a conference on
intercivilizational conflict held in 2007. This conference was held in
cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, the Program on Conflict
Management and the Dr Josef Burg Chair in Education for Human Values,
Tolerance and Peace. Dr. Ben Mollov, who was later appointed Academic
Organizer of the Project for the Study of Religion, Culture and Peace (under
the auspices of the Department of Political Science of Bar-Ilan University),
organized the conference, and serves as the guest editor of this issue. The
publication of this issue was made possible by the Konrad-Adenauer5
Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
Stiftung—a friend and supporter of the Conflict Resolution Program since
the founding of the program. It is with great pleasure that I acknowledge the
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and its cooperation and support.
In closing, the entire staff of the Conflict Resolution Program and the
journal gratefully acknowledges the support of the Hans Bachrach family,
whose initial contribution and continuing support have made our activities
within the university a viable enterprise.
In an era of global economic crisis, we are always fearful that conflict
management will be considered an expendable area rather than a field
worthy of expansion to deal with issues that are compounded by economic
turmoil. We look forward to the day when programs such as ours are no
longer necessary and when the words of the prophet Micah (4:3) will be
fulfilled:
‫וכתתו חרבתיהם לאתים וחניתתיהם למזמרות לא ישאו גוי אל גוי חרב ולא ילמדון עוד‬
.‫מלחמה‬, “They will beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into
pruning hooks. Nation will not take up sword against nation, nor will they
train for war anymore.”
Dr. Ephraim Tabory
Spring 2009 ‫אביב תשס"ט‬
6
Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009
Foreword
In June 2007, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) in Jerusalem organized
with the Program on Conflict Management at Bar-Ilan University and the
Burg Chair for Peace Education at Bar-Ilan University an international
conference, “Intercivilizational Conflict: Can it be Moderated?” devoted to
exploring ways of defusing intercivilizational conflict.
We regarded this innovative effort as very much an expression of the
KAS’s core mission in expanding on its basic foundations of work in Israel
and connecting it to efforts in other parts of the world.
Indeed, more than 40 years ago, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Prime
Minister David Ben-Gurion laid the foundation for reconciliation between
Germany and Israel and a future partnership for the two nations. Carrying
on the legacy of the late chancellor, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung has been
active in Israel for almost 30 years.
Together with local partner organizations, we strive not only to deepen
the understanding between Israel and Germany as well as Europe, but also
to encourage harmonious coexistence between different sectors of Israeli
society as an immigrant society, bridging ethnic and religious differences
and strengthening Israel’s democracy as the only democratic country in the
region.
All KAS projects are guided by our belief in the benefits of democracy,
freedom, market economy and peaceful coexistence. We aim at making a
lasting and sustainable contribution to Israel’s thriving in peace and
prosperity.
KAS involvement over the years with Bar-Ilan University has developed
in innovative and important directions. Emphasizing the intercultural
dimension, KAS has been actively assisting in a special graduate course
under the auspices of the Program on Conflict Management offering a new
approach to conflict management in Israeli society. In addition, several
international conferences have been held together, along with the
publication of books of proceedings.
We are pleased to support the appearance of this first and special issue of
the Israel Journal of Conflict Management, which was initiated by Dr
Ephraim Tabory and is based on the proceedings of the conference and is
being guest edited by Dr. Ben Mollov, who was also the conference’s
academic organizer.
7
Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
Indeed, as an outgrowth of the conference the Project for the Study of
Religion, Culture and Peace headed by Dr. Ben Mollov was established at
Bar-Ilan University. We believe that this special publication will add to the
impact of the conference and the international understanding that it sought
to advance. We would like to thank all those who labored for the conference.
Dr. Lars Hänsel
Director, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Israel
8
Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009
From the Guest Editor
Current international challenges relate fundamentally to deep concerns
relating to the rise and escalation of “intercivilizational conflict.” This idea
of a “clash of civilizations” was formulated by Samuel P. Huntington and
has generated much discussion and controversy.
Reaction to his thesis has ranged from criticism and even rejection of this
notion, and on the other side of the debate there has been strong embrace of
his framework with the conclusion that civilizations must be prepared to
struggle and even prevail over one another. This first issue, as a special
issue of the Israel Journal of Conflict Management, is based on an
international conference held at Bar-Ilan University on June 12, 2007 on the
theme of “Intercivilizational Conflict: Can it be Moderated?” The
conference, held in cooperation between the Program on Conflict
Management at Bar-Ilan University and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, was
devoted to exploring the notion of intercivilizational conflict further, and
proposing theoretical and practical means of moderating it in a variety of
contexts.
The operating assumption of the organizers and participants associated
with the conference, upon which this publication is based is that
international polarization founded on the increasingly prominent element of
culture is not inevitable. However, better approaches to understanding the
dynamics of this type of conflict, which was not anticipated decades ago
when the U.S.-Soviet conflict was the prime characteristic of the
international system, are called for. Furthermore, a vital challenge is for the
development of strategies that can promote moderation and commonalities
among cultures and civilizations.
This issue contains a number of illuminating articles that explore the
dynamics of intercivilizational conflict and the means of moderating them,
along with practical approaches to moderating such conflicts that can occur
within specific nation states. Indeed, the contributors to this volume
represent a variety of disciplinary approaches and geo-political contexts. As
such the participants at the conference, and we hope, the readers of this
publication, will find much relevance in the richness of these different
perspectives.
As part of an overview, Dr. Fania Oz-Salzberger of the University of
Haifa and Monash University offered a historic comparison of different
periods in which civilizations appeared to be in conflict, and in fact reflected
upon the significance of the very term “civilization.” Prof. Jeff Haynes of
London Metropolitan University presented a more nuanced appraisal of
Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis and offered an agenda for
moderating these tensions with particular attention to inter-religious
dynamics. Prof. Ali Yaşar Saribay of Uldag University in Turkey presented
a sociological analysis of inter-religious conflict, which is closely related to
9
Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
intercivilizational conflict in the context of modernity, and offered some
references to the situation in Turkey.
The conference and this issue also sought to highlight practical, in
addition to theoretical, perspectives for moderating intercivilizational
conflict. Given the great importance of the media in helping to formulate
perceptions that can serve either to moderate or escalate tensions, Dr.
Katelyn Y. A. McKenna (Yael Kaynan) of The Interdisciplinary Center,
Herzliya offered an analysis of some media trends particularly relating to
conflict and conflict management efforts in the Middle East, and the
potential efficacy, based on field work, of Internet blogs, which can function
across borders even during periods of acute tensions.
We are privileged to include a paper from Dr. Johan Saravanamuttu of
the University of Singapore, who presented an analysis of inter-religious
conflict in Malaysia and some approaches that have been undertaken to
moderate them. Little is known about Malaysia in Israel and therefore
insights concerning this society, which is both Muslim and multicultural, are
very useful for helping to formulate larger conclusions concerning means of
understanding and moderating intercivilizational conflict.
The conference, of course, also related to Israeli society as it was relevant
to the larger theme. Dr. Ben Mollov of Bar-Ilan University presented the
basis of an integrated model for moderating intercivilizational tensions
occurring between groups within one state––i.e., Jews and Arabs, and
among Jewish groups. This was informed by both federalist thought and
research on inter-religious dialogue, based on fieldwork undertaken at BarIlan University and elsewhere. Finally, from a practitioner’s perspective Dr.
Daniel Rossing, director of the Center for Jewish-Christian Relations
presented a very useful analysis of which approaches can be useful and
which are less so in Israel for conducting inter-religious dialogue, which is
so relevant for the moderation of intercivilizational tensions.
The conference concluded with an innovative round table discussion
devoted to the theme of “What Can Scholars of Conflict, Conflict
Management and Policy Makers Teach One Another?” Chaired by Dr.
Ephraim Tabory, director of the Program on Conflict Management, the
exchanges between scholars of Political Science, Peace Education and a
combination of scholar practitioner offered an opportunity for an exchange
of interdisciplinary perspective that is rarely heard. We are proud to present
the remarks of Dr. Jonathan Fox of Bar-Ilan University, Dr. Israela
Silberman of Columbia University, Dr. Hillel Wahrman of Bar-Ilan
University and Mr. Moty Cristal, who directs the Israel Palestinian
Negotiating Partners network.
As academic organizer of the conference and guest editor of this special
issue of the Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution, I would like to thank the
staff of the Program on Conflict Management, who were most dedicated to
making the conference the success it was, and Dr. Ephraim Tabory, director
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Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009
of the Program on Conflict Management, who is the founder of this new
journal. I would also like to thank the Burg/UNESCO Chair of Bar-Ilan
University and its director, Prof. Yaacov Iram, who was an enthusiastic
partner in this conference. Mrs. Shirley Zauer deserves special thanks for
her dedicated professional efforts in carrying out the technical editing and
publication coordination for this special issue.
Most of all we would like to express our appreciation to the Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung in Jerusalem, and its director, Dr. Lars Hänsel, for its
generous support and co-sponsorship, which made both the conference and
this publication possible on the foundation of so many of their vital earlier
partnerships. I would also like to thank Mrs. Palina Kedem of the KonradAdenauer-Stiftung whose day-to-day contacts and involvement were
essential in making this endeavor a success. We are immensely proud of and
grateful for the partnership with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung for
endeavors such as these and look forward to continued and increased
partnership in the future.
Finally, against the background of this important international conference
the Project for the Study of Religion, Culture and Peace under the auspices
of the Department of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University was
established to reflect the commitment of Bar-Ilan University to advancing
specific strategies to help moderate conflict from the point of view of
religion and culture, for which this conference was intended. We hope this
publication will add in some meaningful way to that quest.
Dr. Ben Mollov
Academic Organizer and Guest Editor
Research Fellow, Project for the Study of Religion, Culture and Peace
Bar-Ilan University
11
Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
12
Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009
Intercivilizational Conflict:
Some Guidelines and Some Fault Lines
FANIA OZ-SALZBERGER
Intercivilizational conflict has prospered in public and academic discourse
since Samuel P. Huntington’s 1993 essay, “The Clash of Civilizations?”
which gave new currency to a far older theme. It spread independent wings
as fundamentalist Islam, and the fear thereof, peaked on and after September
11, 2001. This article offers several points of order. It examines the historical
semantics of both “culture” and “civilization,” tracing the conceptual
tension between them in the history of European thought. Along the way, it
dwells on philosophers, social theorists and novelists from the 18th century
to the present. It then proposes a reconsideration of the early 19th-century
distinction between culture and civilization, associating the merits and
tensions of distinctiveness with the former and allotting universal values to
the latter. Finally, it considers contemporary problems weighing on the
useful distinction between––and desirable cohabitation of––cultural
pluralism and civil universalism.
It is 1873. The place: a village in the heart of a forest, somewhere in the
Indian subcontinent. The participants: an English gentleman, Mr. Phileas
Fogg; his French valet, Monsieur Passepartout; the European-bred, young
and beautiful Parsi widow of the old Rajah of Bundelkund The extras: a
crowd of traditional Indian villagers. The event: the dramatic rescue of the
young widow from the suttee pyre, where she is about to be burned alive
together with her husband’s corpse. The result: the Asian beauty will marry
her English rescuer, and they will live happily ever after, in London. The
book, of course, is Jules Verne’s Around the World in Eighty Days.
Here is the key sentence: “‘Oh, the scoundrels!’ cried Passepartout, who
could not repress his indignation. While Phileas Fogg, his voice betraying
not the least emotion, asked: ‘Is it possible that these barbarous customs still
exist in India, and that the English have been unable to put a stop to them?’”
(Verne 1873/1995: 60–61). But wait. Here is a different way to begin: “O,
Europe corrupted with vice and misguidance and drawn far from the
religion of Jesus!… You have bestowed this hell-like state on the human
spirit with your blind genius… The only remedy you have found for this
disease are the fantasies of entertainment and amusement and anodyne
diversions which serve to temporarily numb the senses… You hold a
diseased and misguided philosophy in your right hand and a harmful and
corrupt civilization in your left, and claim, ‘Mankind's happiness is with
these two!’ May your two hands be broken and may these two filthy
presents of yours be the death of you!… And so they shall be!” (Nursi 1996,
17th Flash, 5th Note).
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
The quotation, from Risale-i Nur, a 6,000-page commentary on the holy
Quran, was written during the second quarter of the 20th century by the
Turkish-born Islamic preacher (of Kurdish descent), Bediuzzaman Said
Nursi, born in 1873, three years after Jules Verne sent his triumphalist pair
of European voyagers, armed with their “diseased and misguided
philosophy” of rationalism and secularism, to circumnavigate the world in
80 days. Bediuzzaman, who died in 1960, had a complex attitude towards
Europe and certainly not all his disciples adopted his sharp condemnation of
European civilization. At the same time, his writings marked the future
battleground: 41 years after his death, Osama Bin Laden sent his 19 Islamic
fighters, armed with the Quran and with modern anti-Western thought, to
blow up the Twin Towers in New York and the White House and the
Pentagon in Washington within the course of one half hour. That, in a
nutshell, is the subject of our discussion.
Intercivilizational conflict has prospered in public and academic
discourse since Samuel P. Huntington’s essay, “The Clash of Civilizations?”
in Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, and Huntington’s The Clash of
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996). Initially launched as
polemics against Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man
(1992), Huntington’s thesis, as it came to be known, spread independent
wings as the rise of fundamentalist Islam peaked on September 11, 2001 and
proceeded with a stream of violent attacks and challenges to freedom of
speech in Europe and beyond.
This article does not offer yet another discussion of Huntington’s thesis.
Instead, it makes several suggestions toward tidying up what has become a
messy, quasi-academic, Internet-bloated, politically impassioned (and
impatient) field of discourse and debate.
Beginning with some historical semantics, it is not superfluous to note
that civilization and culture are not the same things, even though they are
frequently employed as synonyms (see, for example, Dixon 1928:3; Shaw
1932; Williams 1958:16). Both concepts have countless definitions. Let us
take a classical one offered by the historian of ideas, Will Durant, as our
reference point: “Civilization is social order promoting cultural creation.
Four elements constitute it: economic provision, political organization,
moral traditions and the pursuit of knowledge and the arts” (Durant 1935).
This definition suits our purposes, because it presents “culture” as an
element, or fruit, of “civilization,” so that different cultures may be present
within the sphere of one civilization. Although this taxonomy, like all other
taxonomies, does not dovetail with each and every historical experience, it
nevertheless reflects a good deal of theoretical scholarship, and it is handy
for some of the considerations that will follow.
Only at the beginning of the 19th century did European scholars begin
using the word “culture” in its modern context, and employing the word
“civilization” as a new derivative of an ancient root. Though both derive
14
Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009
from Latin, they were shaped in the linguistic sphere of modern English,
French and German. The concept “civilization” developed out of “civil
society,” its main meaning being the antithesis of savageness and barbarism.
More widely, civilization was perceived as a complex and advanced human
society, with a sophisticated political structure.
The Scottish Enlightenment thinker Adam Ferguson may have been the
first modern writer, or at least the first widely read theorist, to use the term
“civilization” in its modern sense. In his successful book, An Essay on the
History of Civil Society (1767) Ferguson coined what his readers must have
appreciated as a shiny new idiom. “Not only the individual advances from
infancy to manhood, but the species itself from rudeness to civilization”
(Ferguson 1767/1995:1). “In the progress of civilization,” he wrote, “new
distempers break forth, and new remedies are applied” (p. 230). And again:
“[L]uxury[…] is sometimes employed to signify a manner of life which we
think necessary to civilization, and even to happiness” (p. 231). The
meaning of this new exciting word was further clarified by Ferguson’s
pointed contrast of the “extremes of civilization and rudeness” (p. 236), and
linked to the growth of commerce (p. 256) and politeness (p. 75, 193). Most
strikingly, Ferguson had a clear notion of civilization as a process that might
happen to any people in the world. The Greeks and Romans enjoyed it in the
past (p. 89), the Europeans do at the present time; yet who knows what the
future holds?
The Romans might have found an image of their own ancestors, in the
representations they have given of ours: and if ever an Arab clan shall
become a civilized nation, or any American tribe escape the poison which is
administered by our traders of Europe, it may be from the relations of the
present times, and the descriptions which are now given by travellers, that
such a people, in after ages, may best collect the accounts of their origin (p.
80).
Culture was a different neologism. In the 18th century, its usage often
displayed a metaphorical adaptation of the agricultural sense of the original
Latin cultura. “The mind that lies fallow but a single day,” Joseph Addison
wrote, “sprouts up in follies that are only to be killed by a constant and
assiduous culture” (Addison 1711). By the early 19th century, Addison’s
metaphor sprouted into an independent idiom of the human sciences. It was
used by numerous authors in so many contexts, that, as Raymond Geuss
pointed out: “The attempt to say anything both general and useful about the
concept of “culture” might seem doomed from the very start” (Geuss
1995:151). Yet, as Geuss himself acknowledged, 19th-century German
thinkers applied the new term Kultur in several distinguishable ways. The
most significant, for our purpose, was in the context of analyzing the
disparate manners and mores of the world’s diverse ethnic groups (Geuss
ibid.).
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
Significantly, culture was mostly perceived as social order predating
civilization, having a narrower ethno-geographical applicability.
Anthropology, which came into being alongside the new prominence of the
concept of “culture,” placed an emphasis on lifestyle, arts and crafts, and
concrete methods of expression and creation. Its pioneer, Sir Edward
Burnett Tylor, published his two-volume opus Primitive Culture in 1871.
He could not possibly have replaced “culture” with “civilization” in this title,
as is obvious from his use of “civilization” in the name of an earlier book,
Researches into the Early History of Mankind and the Development of
Civilization (1865). Culture was thus ancient as well as modern, and allotted
to numerous ethnic groups; civilization was a broad forward flow. Culture
was, civilization progressed. In a comparable way, many 19th-century
historians believed that Rome imposed civilization, which comprised many
cultures, on the ancient world (For a more complex discussion of “culture”
than the present context allows, see Williams 1983:87–93).
Let us return to Phileas Fogg. This Englishman is a figment of the
imagination of the French writer, Jules Verne, a loyal progeny of French
culture and European civilization, as it perceived itself at the peak of its
self-assurance at the end of the 19th century. If we want to understand how
intercultural fields of tension differ from intercivilizational conflict, it
suffices to take a look at Fogg and his valet, Passepartout. Throughout all of
Verne’s novel, Around the World in Eighty Days, a farcical field of tension
is drawn between the fastidious, upright British gentleman and the resilient,
sharp-tongued French valet. But, as members of one civilization, both
remain steadfast when faced with the widow-burning Hindis. There, in the
Indian subcontinent’s rainforests, the cultural difference between the
European with the top hat and the one with the beret is of no significance.
Both tour the globe in colonial pith helmets. Both are faithful
representatives of Western European civilization. Both are refined and
polite, in particular to beautiful aristocratic women. Both are very severe
and full of contempt, in particular towards “barbarians” and “savages,”
which often appear to be everyone but the beautiful, aristocratic women.
So, it was the 19th century that established the modern paradigm of
conflict between civilizations. But, does not the modern-day war between
civilizations have ancient parallels, such as the Persian Wars between
Greece and Persia in the fifth century BCE? Or such as the ancient
Israelites’ fight against the Philistines, a conflict repeatedly kindled by
differences of faith and culture?
The distinction between “I” and “you,” or between “us” and “them,” is
probably as old as human consciousness. In postmodern language, “us” is
opposed to “the Other.” Nineteenth century philosophy––that of
Schopenhauer, Hegel and Nietzsche––sharpened the conception of the
individual as being in opposition to the subject outside himself: not-I is my
enemy; the grammatic first person and second person are, philosophically, a
16
Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009
dichotomy. In a known sense, it is a dichotomy as old as Cain and Abel. The
intercivilizational confrontational discourse of our times adopts this
distinction as its own. In his book, The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order, Huntington sympathetically presents the
following quotation from a novel by Michael Dibdin: “There can be no true
friends without true enemies. Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot
love what we are” (Huntington 1996: Ch. 1). This assertion, as Huntington
acknowledges, is timeless.
War, too, is a fixed element in the history of mankind. In one of his
poems, Israeli poet Yehuda Amichai wrote of “War, the insatiable”
(“Sabbath Night Song,” Amichai 1977), while British philosopher Bertrand
Russell noted that children are beaten at school by the older pupils and beat
the younger ones, and that, in fact, is a summary of human history (Russell
1932).
Our topic, however, is not conflict, struggle, or war as a perennial human
attribute. It is, rather, contemporary perceptions of conflict among
civilizations as a symptom of the modern era.
As a modern idea, the war of civilizations is an invention of the 18th
century; it runs like a leitmotif through the thinking of the German and
Scottish Enlightenment philosophers. It was reworked and greatly enhanced
by post-Enlightenment historians and thinkers such as Johann Gottfried von
Herder, Georg Friedrich Hegel and Arnold Toynbee, and in the 20th century
it was immortalized in fiction, notably in George Orwell’s 1984 and John
Ronald Reuel Tolkien’s great fantasy on clashing civilizations, the Lord of
the Rings trilogy. Huntington did not invent anything new: he just inserted
modern actors into a 300-year-old model.
Christoph Meiners, a professor at the University of Göttingen, is today
considered the father of the modern theories of race. His innovative book,
Outline of the History of Humanity, was published in the heydey of the
German Enlightenment (Meiners 1785). As Meiners viewed it, the human
species is divided into two essential branches, the Caucasian and the
Mongolian, that do not share a common ancestor. These branches are
divided into races. Meiners was among the first, and possibly the very first,
to coin the concept “race” (rasse) in its modern sense. And, so he wrote,
some of these races are inherently superior and others inferior: the
Caucasians are at the top of the scale, the Mongolians at the bottom. He
even dubbed the Mongolian races “sub-races” (Unterassen). Physical traits
alone do not differentiate between the superior and inferior races––they are
also distinguished by cultural and spiritual capacities.
From Meiners’ book, which apparently was the first link in a long chain
of modern theories of race, the distance is short to the assumption that
confrontation among the races is inevitable, and that its results will be
dictated by the location of the races on the scale of innate traits. By the way,
Meiners’ colleagues and disciples, such as the anthropologist Johann
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Friedrich Blumenbach, also from Göttingen, lost no time in adapting their
master’s theory to the Jewish race (whose inferiority Meiners noted only
briefly), describing its physiological characteristics and attributing spiritual
baseness to it (Zantop 1997:66-80).
According to the German thinker Johann Gottfried von Herder, in whose
path Hegel, Marx, Toynbee and others in the 19th century followed, human
history is a ceaseless dynamics of the rise and fall of empires, nations,
cultures and civilizations. The rise of one is regularly accompanied by the
noise of the other’s collapse. Hegel, in particular, attributed a conflictual,
violent character to these civilizational vicissitudes. During the last 150
years, this paradigm was so strong in Western tradition that it was adopted
by both Right and Left. Marx adapted it to the history of the war of the
classes, while the European nationalists adapted it to the history of national
communities (Talmon 1952; Avineri 1961; Mazlish 1966). Yet Hegel and
Marx were primarily interested in historical processes as reflecting human
reason and culminating in universal freedom. A rather less philosophical
generation, including Oswald Spengler (1918/1922) and Arnold Toynbee
(1934), focused on intercivilizational conflict as the central theme of world
history.
Which elements in these theories are essentially modern? How do they
differ from ancient conceptions on the superiority and inferiority of peoples,
as in the Greek and Roman feelings of superiority to the “barbarians”? How
do they differ from the older cyclical and linear models of the history of the
nations, such as Aristotle’s cycles of regime types and the Christian concept
of the millennium?
A marked modern element is the biological conception of civilization. A
nation, or a cluster of nations, is seen as a quasi-human organism, which has
a moment of birth, a childhood and youth, maturity, decline and death. This
organism’s age of maturity and ripeness is the age of civilization. A great
number of 18th- and 19th-century thinkers utilized this model, which often
grew from a metaphor into a full-fledged historical-ontological belief.
Herder, for example, attributed to each “national group” its own physiology.
A hundred years later, this concept was already a cliché. Many Internet sites
attribute to the bitingly witty Oscar Wilde the assertion that “America is the
only country that went from barbarism to decadence without civilization in
between.”
What is more, there is a notably modern element in the idea––much in
the spirit of Charles Darwin, though preoccupation with it predated him by
several decades––that different civilizations engage in wars of survival
among themselves. This conception indeed predated the decidedly
Darwinian principle of the “survival of the fittest,” and may even have
influenced Darwin himself. It is an 18th-century idea, which thinkers such
as Herder, and later Hegel and Marx, mobilized to explain the fall of ancient
civilizations such as Egypt, Greece and, in particular, Rome.
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Modern Americans, conscious of being members of a young nation and
deeply familiar with Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment historical
theories, often made use of this model of thought. “A nation or civilization
that continues to produce soft-minded men purchases its own spiritual death
on an installment plan.” The person who said this was none other than civil
rights leader Martin Luther King (King 1963).
Modern philosophy and historiography thus added two quasi-scientific
elements to the ancient conception of “insatiable war.” First, the entity at
war is not a mere human group, tribe, or people. Rather, it is a
“civilization,” that is, a nation or nations in full blossom. Though the
organic metaphor is taken from the science of biology, it contains an
atavistic element carved by German Romanticism: the organism is
“authentic,” “healthy,” “pure,” close to the source of life and to the
fountainhead of collective human energy. Secondly, civilizational warring is
a “scientifically” diagnosable fight for survival. It is, in some ways, similar
to the ancient theological fight of the children of light against the children of
darkness. But the modern theme involves either the war of the advanced
peoples against the primitives or, in several versions, of the war of the
healthy and mature against the declining and the decadent. The best of the
human species, having reached full blossom, fights those who represent its
earlier, barbaric stages, or its later, decadent ones.
*
Note the two separate versions of the motive of the civilizational struggle
for survival. According to the first version, the world has two, or three, or
perhaps even seven, civilizations, which are, actually or potentially, at war
with one another. That is George Orwell’s version, in his book, 1984
(Orwell 1949). And that, in somewhat inferior English and without the
novelist’s flair, is Huntington’s version in The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order.
According to the second version, the world has only “one civilization,”
and the barbarians are preparing to attack it. The South African writer J.M.
Coetzee wrote about the state of mind underlying this concept, examining
the still-victorious race’s unhappy, sick, besieged conception of superiority
in his novel, Waiting for the Barbarians (Coetzee 1980). In it, the
inhabitants of a tiny frontier garrison town, at the edge of “civilization,”
wait in terror, hidden behind their walls, for the inevitable attack by the
savages on the outside. Even if the tale takes place in the distant past or in a
supra-historic sphere, its topical context did not go unnoticed by Coetzee’s
readers, especially by his fellow countrymen.
Several decades earlier, Winston Churchill openly expressed what
Coetzee implicitly challenged. “Civilisation will not last,” he said in a
speech in 1938, “freedom will not survive, peace will not be kept, unless a
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very large majority of mankind unite together to defend them … [from]
barbaric and atavistic forces” (Churchill 1941:46).
In a vein similar to Churchill’s, again in somewhat flatter English, United
States President George W. Bush, addressed a joint session of Congress
following September 11, 2001. It was, Bush said, a matter of “the fight of
civilization,” which every nation is called on to join, including “our many
Muslim friends” and “our many Arab friends” (Bush 2001). In other words,
there is only one civilization. Its enemies, Bush continued, were “a
collection of loosely affiliated terror organizations” (ibid.). However, a few
days earlier, Bush had made a serious slip of the tongue, defining the
American fight against world terrorism as a “crusade,” an expression which,
later on, he also associated with the war in Afghanistan.
It is of interest to follow Bush’s involuntary semantic wanderings, which
cross the problematic line between the two versions referred to above:
civilization versus civilization (the crusade), and civilization as universal,
peerless, facing the barbarians (and hence the place where all thinking
people belong, without distinction of religion). It is precisely the American
president’s wavering that exposes the duality implicit in more sophisticated
texts.
*
So, which paradigm is the conclusive one––that of Orwell-Huntington, or
that of Churchill, pondered by Coetzee and shakily embraced by Bush?
Before we attempt to reply, let us consider a third aspect of the modernity
of the struggle of civilizations: the concept of “values”––in the sense of a
clear ethical code––as the key to cultural superiority. This ethical claim
works far beyond the simple “I versus Other,” “Us and Enemy” dichotomies
we have mentioned above. It underlies the enormous moral energy, the
indefatigable sense of justice of the historical and fictitious heroes referred
to at the beginning of this article––both Phileas Fogg and his creator, Jules
Verne, and Bediuzzaman Said Nursi and his disciples.
According to the value key, “we” are “pure,” while “they” are “corrupt.”
“We” are right and “they” are wrong. “We” are “worshippers of the
Creator,” while “they” are “slaves of Satan.” We soar high; they lick the
dust. Our soul is true and houses our vitality; their body is unclean and they
live in clay houses. And so on and so forth.
This resounding equation of the grammatic first-person-plural with the
ethical Right was lampooned, as early as 1867, by Henrik Ibsen in his play
Peer Gynt (Ibsen 1867). The Troll king forces Peer, who is after his
daughter and crown, to accept and even like the abonimable Troll cuisine
and dress, all in the name of national pride and the inherent superiority of
the local: “The cow gives cakes and the bullock mead; ask not if its taste be
sour or sweet; the main matter is, and you mustn’t forget it, it’s all of it
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home-brewed” (Act 2, Scene 6). And home-brewed, by definition, is good.
“We” must be “right.” But Ibsen’s Peer Gynt, the ultimate individualist,
cannot become part of any “we.” He flees the Troll’s kingdom and his
native Norway, to wander alone, mocking civilization, in the increasingly
nationalist and colonialist world of Phileas Fogg.
The Enlightenment analyzed, explained and celebrated the universality of
human values. Voltaire, Rousseau, Hume, Kant, and others in different
though interconnected ways, viewed the human species as a moral and
rational totality. Once the prejudices and historical wrongs, the
misunderstandings and the arbitrary actions are removed, universal
rationality, non-discriminating technological progress and general justice
can prevail in the world. Voltaire’s “we” are, potentially, “all human
beings,” while his “they” are corrupt priests, modern tyrants and
worshippers of the past, who reject progress and humanity.
However, there is a second Western conception that, indeed, also
originated in the Enlightenment: it received its final form in later ideologies,
and gives absolute priority to specifically Western values. Nineteenthcentury and later Western thinkers frequently abandoned the hope for, and
pretension to, universality. Unlike Voltaire and Kant, they no longer tried to
persuade the entire human species of the justice and rationality of basic
human values.
This anti-Universalist current, in several different ways, localized
Enlightenment values, assigning them to bourgeois, or liberal, Europe, and
to its English-speaking offspring. It rejected the hope of these values ever
belonging to all human beings. It also denied the need and necessity of their
belonging to all human beings. Should, and could, all human beings, in all
societies, share such values as democracy, equality, the rule of law, human
solidarity and communal responsibility with Western cultures? Those who
gave a negative answer, either for positive or for normative reasons, were
left to answer a new set of questions: did a society with different values
belong to a foreign civilization? Or, could it be that it was not a civilization
at all but, rather, barbarism? Or, could it be that the West was the aggressor
and the atavist, because it refused to acknowledge the existence of foreign
value systems?
Current views are scattered on a broad spectrum. There are moderate
combinations, trying to apply a small number of universal values to a world
of disparate cultures and mores. Global community is increasingly presented
as a beneficent roof over diverse cultures, but controversy is rife over the
sinister outcome of economic globalization and the merits and demerits of
the metaphorical flattening of the Earth.
One extreme progeny of the liberal tradition that turned individualistic
and shifted into libertarianism is of special interest for me, because it
brought up the specter of single actors manipulating societies and playing
out against the masses in the name of a higher civilizational creed. Thus
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wrote Ayn Rand, the American novelist and philosopher, who advocated
extreme individualism: “Civilization is the progress toward a society of
privacy. The savage’s whole existence is public, ruled by the laws of his
tribe. Civilization is the process of setting man free from men,” according to
the hero of her book, The Fountainhead (Rand 1943:715). It is no surprise
that the war of civilizations, Rand-style, is led by individuals imbued with a
sense of greatness and utter disregard for the wretched masses. One may
suspect that a comparable sentiment is reflected in anti-Western creeds
today, not based upon libertarian philosophy but upon the perennial belief
that certain individuals––mentors and actors––are far wiser than the rest.
I am no authority on Muslim conceptions that may parallel these Western
ideas. It would not surprise me to find that current Islamic debates on
civilizational questions reflect some of the tensions discussed here. There
may even be individuals, Rand-style, seeking to impose their own unique
superiority on a worthless global mass. After all, human dreams of grandeur
have been known to cross civilizations before.
In Western theory and literature since the 18th century, polish, finesse
and manners were venerated as the basic traits of civilized man. Even
unkind deeds were done in a refined, civil manner. “We veneer civilization
by doing unkind things in a kind way,” George Bernard Shaw is quoted as
having said. As long as finesse was a criterion for civility, sensitive
Westerners harbored respect––mingled with some degree of ignorance and
worship of the exotic––for certain distant cultures. Thus, in the era of
Enlightenment, the French enthused about Chinese culture, while
Montesquieu, in his great book, Persian Letters (1721) examined and
criticized France through fictitious Persian eyes. The German Romantic
thinkers discovered and worshipped India. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
tried to combine and celebrate the best in Asian and European cultures in his
cycle of poems, West-Eastern Divan (1814–1819)
The 20th-century retreat from the romantic worship of foreign
civilizations was partially prompted by intellectuals such as Edward Saïd,
whose reproach against Western “Orientalism” was grounded in his
biography and based on his study of 19th-century European literature. But
decades before Saïd and post-colonialist critique, the center of gravity had
moved from aesthetics to ethics, from artistic enchantment to moral critique,
especially pertaining to political and legal culture. This reflects, on the one
hand, an acknowledgment of the fact that some basic Western values must
be universal and, on the other, disappointment at the rejection of those
principles by large expanses of humankind: the Muslim world still refuses to
acknowledge that women are equal to men, while China has not yet adopted
democracy and freedom of speech. The criterion of finesse today seems
outdated and ridiculous. Civil values overshadow it, leading to a conflictual
field that Montesquieu and Goethe neither foresaw nor imagined.
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Some thinkers argue that the course of this collision of values is
inevitable. “Asian societies and Muslim societies are increasingly resentful
of our efforts [“our”––that is, the West, F. O-S] to induce them to adopt our
values” (Gergen/Huntington 1997). According to this approach, September
11, 2001 marked a fundamental transition from the 19th to the 21st century–
–the leap from a “war of civilizations” as a cultural metaphor, or as the
subject for historic meta-theories, to an actual field of battle.
But were the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center a result
of a “war of civilizations,” as Huntington and his followers would have
diagnosed it, or a provocation intended to serve as a pretext for a war of
civilizations, as, for example, David Remnick wrote in The New Yorker
several weeks after the assaults (Remnick 2001)? Are we in the midst of
such a war, or do we have to be on our guard not to lapse into one?
Many of those shrinking from the Huntingtonian conception of the war of
civilizations retort that civilizations are not monolithic. On the contrary, the
Muslim world, for example, is diversified and multifaceted, as Western
Muslim intellectuals such as Edward Saïd and Fouad Ajami have repeatedly
emphasized. The problem here is that even a multifaceted civilization is
liable to collide with another multifaceted civilization, as long as the core
values of each––those core values on the strength of which we are capable
of relating to them as “civilizations”––are on a collision course. Thus, the
question is not whether the Muslim world is plural, but rather whether it is
pluralistic. The question is not whether it includes diversified human and
social positions––which of course it does––but rather whether it, as a whole
and in general, adopts or rejects values such as freedom of expression, free
universal suffrage and equality before the law. Or does it, as a whole and in
general, practice values contrary to these?
According to the distinction I suggested above, freedom of expression
and free universal suffrage, as well as equality before the law, may seem to
us to be universal values fit and appropriate for everyone belonging to
“Civilization” in its exclusive signification. If so, societies exempting
themselves from these rules are not part of Civilization. Rather, they are
barbarous entities in the Churchillian sense. Alternatively, if there is more
than one civilization in the world, then the West, and those who share its
core values, will have to recognize the fact that we are talking here of a deep,
intercivilizational collision of values.
Present-day debates may thus benefit from a reconsideration of the early
19th-century distinction between culture and civilization. The global
community is increasingly asserting the universal validity of core political
and civil values, encompassing the rule of order and the fight against
corruption. They may be seen as the backbone of Civilization, the sole and
global civilization, outside of which only barbarians roam, namely
individuals and non-government organizations and, in extreme cases, rogue
states, all of which reject the core values of a universal political culture.
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And yet people everywhere are increasingly inspired by cultural plurality
in matters relating to creativity and art, taste and expression. The dire,
purse-lipped aspects of political correctness are hardly necessary to promote
a genuinely multicultural and inter-cultural world. And while diverse
cultures peacefully pursue their mutual inspiration and fermentation, an
emerging global civilizational code will prohibit violence and denial of civil
freedoms, not even in the name of cultural diversity. Civilization will not
undermine cultures, but its basic civil rights (freedom, equality and the rule
of law) will not be subjected to “cultural rights” opposing them.
Three trends complicate this necessary distinction between civil
universalism and enriching, creative cultural pluralism.
The first is religious fundamentalism in its numerous versions.
Fundamentalism raises, first and foremost, the problem of authority.
Universal civil principles will not survive in a world that is tossed among
competing interpretations of three or four sacred books.
Second, economic globalization and the opposition against it: socialists
and anarchists view globalization as a victory of corrupt capitalism. Much
of their criticism is an expression of deep concern for social justice and a
genuine desire for solidarity with the weak, as well as for supervision and
inspection of the strong players in the global market. However, in its
extreme form, this trend also targets values considered by many to be
universal, such as the rule of law and the fight against corruption, which are
attacked as the hidden, hypocritical servants of the rule of capital. Just as
Marxism mocked the separation of powers as a bourgeois invention, so do
its modern-day successors attack the values of democracy, liberalism and
legalism, viewing them as a cynical structure serving the interests of
corporate control.
Third is extreme Islam, in the East and West, which draws from both
fundamentalism and anti-globalization. Those in the East, who are opposed
to economic globalization, including many (though by no means all)
Muslims, identify it with Western culture as a whole: materialistic, corrupt,
adulterous, shallow. As long as the Satanic image of Western society is not
disposed of, through honest dialogue and assertive purging of extremism,
we will not be rid of the evil specter of an actual or potential war of
civilization(s).
*
In 1949, Jorge Luis Borges published a short story titled, “La Busca de
Averroës” (The Search of Averroës) (Borges 1949). At the height of the
Muslim golden age in Spain, the great philosoher sits in his beautiful home
and, while his female slaves work and quarrel in the kitchen, he wrestles
with two concepts from Aristotle’s Poetics: Tragedy and Comedy. The
brilliant Arab Aristotelian can neither comprehend these words, nor
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translate them into Arabic. Or, as Borges insinuates, it is precisely because
there are no Arab words for these terms, that Averroes cannot grasp them.
Borges did not intend to insult Averroës or his culture. “I felt that the
work mocked me, foiled me, thwarted me,” he wrote in an afterword to the
story. “I felt that Averroës, trying to imagine what a play is without ever
having suspected what a theater is, was no more absurd than I, trying to
imagine Averroës […]” (Borges 1949).
Borges’ short story is a brilliant etude on the intranslatability of ideas
between languages and across civilizations. The author, too, seems to draw
a clear parallel between the conceptual wall separating Aristotle from
Averroës, and the wall separating Averroës from Borges. And yet––could
Borges be drawing the parallel tongue in cheek? He and his protagonist did
not live in similar times, under comparable conditions. In the story it seems
that shadows are gathering around the great philosopher; can the great
Islamic civilization of Spain be doomed, already in its 12th-century prime,
because it cannot fathom the meaning of theater, drama, tragedy, comedy?
Or perhaps, dare I suggest, it is doomed because of those female slaves, who
are just a brief (but sly) aside in Borges’ story? As we know, they were
never freed, never emancipated, never allowed to read philosophy. Not to
this day.
*
I tried to propose that we refrain from generalizations but also from
sanctimoniousness. Today, confrontation between civilizations––or, if you
prefer, between Civilization and those outside of it––may well be growing
deeper, and may well be based on conflicting values. At our best, we will
pursue this confrontation peacefully but assertively, through targeted
support and open dialogue. These may not suffice, but they must be tried,
and tried hard: it is no longer a matter of saving the widow from the pyre,
but of obtaining formal education for her and her daughters and introducing
them to civil rights, primarily their own, and to the global economy, in
which they should take part.
War may, indeed, remain insatiable for a long time to come. But at our
best, we will also learn to acknowledge which pretexts for war are in no way
whatsoever connected to a “war of civilizations”––the ancient pretexts,
territory and resources, power and hate––and we will not cover them up
with sweet talk about conflicting values and cultural gaps.
However, in the end, we will also have to approach the philosophical and
ethical differences. Primary among them are the relationships between men
and women in different cultures. This must not be ignored. This cannot be
flaunted in multicultural rhetoric. Phileas Fogg may have been an
unpleasant, arrogant colonialist, but the challenge that Verne bequeathed us
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is firm and valid today, too. Relativism ends here: a culture that humiliates
women lies outside the boundaries of civilization.
Futuristic movies present us with a famous cliché: should the villains, the
scoundrels, the crazy professors, or the green creatures from Mars manage
to carry out their evil schemes, it would be “the end of civilization as we
know it.” Today, some people think we are approaching the fulfillment of
that prophecy taken from second-rate Hollywood scripts. Personally, I
prefer another version, that of the late American humorist, Erma Bombeck:
“When humor goes, there goes civilization.”
It is, therefore, appropriate to conclude by wishing latter-day Phileas
Foggs, the knights of civilization, the defenders of the walls and those
“waiting for the barbarians,” and, in particular, all the Armageddon theorists,
that they keep their sense of humor afloat. After all, what Nursi dubbed
“[Europe’s] fantasies of entertainment and amusement” has been a hallmark
of civility and of freedom ever since Greeks, Hebrews and Romans started
laughing at themselves in public. For comedy, even more than tragedy, may
have been the secret crucial ingredient of this lineage of political culture.
And it may yet prove to be stronger than it looks to its humorless foes.
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Borges, Jorge Luis. 1949. The Aleph and other stories. Spanish: El Aleph.
Bush, George. W. 2001. Address to a joint session of Congress and the American people,
September 20. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html
Churchill, Winston. S. 1941. Civilization. In Blood, sweat, and tears. New York: G.P.
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http://www.pbs.org/newshour/gergen/january97/order_1-10.html
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Ibsen, Henrik. 1867. Peer Gynt.
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New York and London: Harper & Row.
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de Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat. 1721. Lettres Persanes.
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Nursi, Bediuzzaman Said. Risale-i Nur: http://www.risale-i-nur.org/
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The Political and Social Context of Intercivilizational
Conflict and the Possibilities of Peace Building
JEFFREY HAYNES
Religion has made a notable return to political prominence in recent years, both
domestically and in international relations. It is now clear that religion has a
durable and perhaps growing significance as a strong source of identity for
millions of people around the world. Both religious individuals and faith-based
organizations are notable as purveyors of ideas, which can encourage either
conflict or conflict resolution and peace building. In particular, scholars have
noted increased religious involvement in so-called “intercivilizational” conflicts,
in relation to protests and increased tension between the Muslim world and the
West following the events of September 11, 2001 and publication of the
“Muhammad cartoons” in September 2005 in Denmark. This paper argues that
despite the potential for religious differences to lead to or exacerbate conflicts,
religion can also be an important potential bridge in helping to resolve them. In
addition, the paper examines the role of religion in intercivilizational conflict in
relation to 9/11 and its aftermath.
Each of us has the right to take pride in our particular faith or heritage. But
the notion that what is ours is necessarily in conflict with what is theirs is
both false and dangerous. It has resulted in endless enmity and conflict
leading men to commit the greatest of crimes in the name of a higher power.
It need not be so. People of different religions and cultures live side by
side in almost every part of the world, and most of us have overlapping
identities which unite us with very different groups. We can love what we
are, without hating what––and who––we are not. We can thrive in our own
tradition, even as we learn from others, and come to respect their teachings
(Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary General, Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance
Speech, 2001).
The United Nations (U.N.) proclaimed the years 2001–2010 as the
“International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the
Children of the World.” A “culture of peace” is defined by the U.N. as “a
set of values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life that reject
violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve
problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups and
nations.”1 Such concerns are central to nearly all religions and, as a result, it
might be expected that religion would be a very useful tool in helping to
address conflicts and to help their resolution.
This is especially the case when it is noted that religion has made a
notable return to political prominence in recent years, both domestically and
in international relations. Confounding the expectations of both secularists
1
U.N. Resolutions A/RES/52/13 1998: Culture of Peace and A/RES/53/243, 1999:
Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace.
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
and proponents of secularization theories, religion has a durable and perhaps
growing significance as a strong source of identity for millions of people
around the world. Both religious individuals and faith-based organizations
are noted as purveyors of ideas, which can broadly encourage either conflict
or conflict resolution and peace building.
Religious entities––both individuals and organizations––can play
constructive roles in helping to resolve conflicts, as well as to facilitate
peace building in various ways, including early warnings of conflict, good
offices once conflict has erupted and advocacy, mediation and
reconciliation.
On the other hand, scholars have also noted involvement of religion in
so-called “intercivilizational” conflicts, for example in relation to September
11, 2001 (9/11) and the protests and increased tension between the Muslim
world and the West following the publication in Denmark of the
“Muhammad cartoons” in September 2005.
In addition, religion is also noted as a contributory factor in contending
group claims over territory, including in the Middle East. This is because
religion ultimately defines identity among Jews and Muslims in the region;
it is a basic element not only upon which Jewish attachment to the territory
of Israel is based but also which provides a key source of regional Islamists’
political involvement. That is, like religious Jews, Islamists also draw on
religious sources to underline their emphatic attachment to the same land. In
sum, religion is involved in a variety of issues in many contexts centering
on conflict and cooperation issues.
This paper (1) argues that, despite the potential for religious differences
to lead to or exacerbate conflicts, religion can also be an important potential
bridge in helping to resolve them, and (2) examines the role of religion in
intercivilizational conflict in relation to 9/11 and its aftermath. The overall
aim is to examine whether religion can be a potential bridge in relation to
some conflicts, including that between “Islam” and “the West.” In other
words, does resolution of conflicts become easier or harder with interreligious dialogue? For example, Mollov (2006) contends that quantitative
empirical survey data (which he gathered among Israelis and Palestinians at
a dialogue held in Khan Yunis in Gaza in 1999) “provides evidence that
perceptions among those who are most religious and initially negative in
attitude could improve as a result of inter-religious dialogue.”
Since 1999, however, three significant events have occurred, which
collectively may make attempts at inter-religious dialogue more problematic:
the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon; the U.S./UK-led
invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from late 2001, and the unfinished
U.S./UK-led assault on Iraq from March 2003 and subsequent unsuccessful
attempts to rebuild the failed state and build democracy.
Although these issues are not directly religious, they do have the capacity
to be interpreted in relation to conflicts where religion plays a prominent
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Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009
role, whether between Christian and Muslims, Jews and Muslims, or
between different sects of Islam.
RELIGION AS A POTENTIAL BRIDGE IN CONFLICTS
Inter-group conflicts are often––perhaps, increasingly––framed in
religious terms and this often appears to be encouraged by processes of
globalization (Haynes 2007a, 2007b). This is because increased interaction
between people and communities leads to encounters between different
religious traditions which are not always harmonious; a situation that can
lead to what Kurtz has labelled “culture wars” (Kurtz 1995:168). The reason,
Kurtz contends, is that religious worldviews can encourage different
allegiances and standards in relation to various fundamental areas, including
the state, land and politics, as noted above in relation to the
Israel/Palestinians issue. Such conflicts can “take on ‘larger-than-life’
proportions as the struggle of good against evil” (Kurtz 1995:170).
According to the eminent Roman Catholic theologian, Hans Kung:
…the most fanatical, the cruelest political struggles are those that have been
colored, inspired, and legitimized by religion. To say this is not to reduce all
political conflicts to religious ones, but to take seriously the fact that religions
share in the responsibility for bringing peace to our torn and warring world (Kung,
quoted in Smock 2004).
On the other hand, religions and faith communities can also be effective
as “angels of peace.” This duality is what Appleby (2000) calls the
“ambivalence of the sacred,” referring to the fact that, ultimately, the
relationship of the world religions to violence is unclear. This is because
they all evolve from traditions that in certain circumstances, legitimize force,
may claim victims in the battle for their own beliefs and may demonize
believers in other religions. Yet, simultaneously, they are all sources
proclaiming incompatibility of violence with religious tenets, expecting
sacrifices for peace and respect for people of other religions.
If we are to assume that, for the foreseeable future, the religions of the world will
continue to be a factor in political conflicts, then it is high time that we
strengthened the “civilising” side of the sacred and made it more difficult for it
cynically to be taken over by political interests. What is said here about the
relationship of world religions to violence can be considered generally valid for
religions overall (Holenstein 2005:10).
Ambivalence is especially notable when focusing upon religious
involvement in many recent and current conflicts. For example, much
contemporary political violence in Africa, Asia and other parts of the
developing world is associated with religious tensions, competition and/or
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
conflict (Haynes 2007a, 2007b). However, as Barringer (2006:2) notes,
religious tensions are very often themselves linked to other, non-religious,
issues, including: “ethnicity, culture, class, power and wealth, played out
both within” countries, for example, Nigeria, Fiji, Cyprus, Sri Lanka, and
between them, for example, India and Pakistan or Israel/“Palestine.”
Turning to the Middle East, stability and prosperity are key regional goals,
central to achievement of peace and the elimination of poverty. However,
the region is also often characterized for its continuing religious and cultural
tensions and conflicts between, Israel and, inter alia, the (mostly Sunni
Muslim) Palestinians and Lebanon’s mainly Shi’a Hizbullah guerrillas. In
addition, there are continuing conflicts within Iraq between Shi’a and Sunni
Muslims and internationally between Shi’a Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia
(which is also played out in Iraq; Haynes 2008).
The nature of these conflicts draws our attention to the fact that the
Middle East is the emblematic birthplace of the three monotheistic world
religions (Islam, Judaism and Christianity). The unfortunate result is a
legacy not only of shared religious wisdom but also of many inter- and
intra-societal conflicts, providing a complex environment affecting not only
all regional countries but also some far away from the region. These include
the Philippines, which has seen growing numbers of Islamic extremist
groups in recent years, apparently inspired by al-Qa’ida, as well as various
Western countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom and
Spain, all of which experienced Islamist bombing outrages between 2001
and 2005.
A key to eventual peace in the Middle East region may well be
achievement of significant collaborative efforts among different religious
leaders and organizations, accompanied by renewed efforts from secular
regional actors, plus external efforts from, inter alia, Europe and the United
States; collectively, they could introduce, develop and embed new models
of peace and co-operation. The aim, of course, should be to facilitate the
region’s escape from an apparently endless cycle of religion- and culturebased conflict. This serves to emphasize that in the Middle East religion is
intimately connected both to promulgation and prolongation of conflicts as
well as attempts at their reconciliation: it can play a significant, even a
fundamental, role contributing to conflicts in various ways, including how
they are intensified, channelled or reconciled. On the other hand, it can play
an important role in seeking to resolve conflicts and build peace. The
ambivalence of the sacred is not of course limited to the Middle East, as it is
also present in conflicts in Asia (notably the internecine struggle between
Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, and India/Pakistan), Africa (for example,
Sudan, Nigeria and Algeria) and Europe (the Balkans).
In sum, while most religious believers would regard their chosen
religious expressions as normally both benevolent and inspiring, religious
faiths are sometimes linked to violence and conflict both between and
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within religious groups (or at least entities with a religious veneer).
In recent years a massive literature has appeared on religious
contributions to conflict, violence, conflict resolution and peace building
(for a major bibliography, see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
2004). We can also note that various armed groups claim religious support
for their activities in sundry parts of the world. Yet it is not that surprising
that religion is often implicated in both domestic and international conflicts,
because religious conviction contains within it various sources of related
danger:
•
•
•
•
Religion is focused on the absolute and unconditional, and as a
result can adopt totalitarian characteristics. The Abrahamic,
monotheistic religions––Christianity, Islam and Judaism––may
have particular difficulty trying to distinguish between, on the
one hand, claims of the absolutely divine and, on the other, the
traditions and history of human existence.
When claiming both absolute and exclusive validity, religious
conviction can lead to intolerance, over-zealous proselytization
and religious fragmentation. Religious exclusiveness is also
typically hostile to both pluralism and liberal democracy.
Religion can increase aggressiveness and the willingness to use
violence. Added symbolic value can be an aspect of religious
conviction, deriving from profane motivation and aims that
become “holy” objectives.
Leaders within faith-based organizations may seek to legitimize
abuses of power and violation of human rights in the name of
religious zeal. Because such leaders are nearly always men, there
can also in addition be specific gender issues and women’s
human rights concerns. In addition, religious power interests
may try to make use of the following susceptibilities:
* Domination strategies of identity politics may seek to harness
real or perceived “ethnic-cultural” and “cultural-religious”
differences.
* Misused religious motivation informs some recent and current
terrorist activities.
* Leaders of religious fundamentalist movements “lay claim to a
single and absolutist religious interpretation at the cost of all
others, and they link their interpretation to political power
objectives” (Holenstein 2005:11).
The last point relates to what Kurtz calls “exclusive accounts of the
nature of reality,” that is, followers only accept religious beliefs that they
regard as true beliefs (Kurtz 1995:238). Examples include the “religions of
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
the book”––Judaism, Christianity and Islam––because each faith claims
authority that emanates principally from sacred texts, actually, similar texts.
Such exclusivist truth claims can be a serious challenge to religious
toleration and diversity, essential to our co-existence in a globalized world,
and make conflict more likely. On the other hand, many religious traditions
have within them beliefs that can help develop a peaceful, multicultural
world. For example, from within Christianity comes the idea of nonviolence, a key attribute of Jesus, the religion’s founder, who insisted that
all people are children of God, and that the test of one’s relationship with
God is whether one loves one’s enemies and brings good news to the poor.
As St. Paul said, “There is no Jew or Greek, servant or free, male or female:
because you are all one in Jesus Christ” (Galatians 3:28).
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE BUILDING
Religion is by no means invariably associated with conflict, as it can
also play a significant role in attempts to resolve inter- and intra-group
clashes and help build peace. Bartoli (2005:5–6) notes that, “all religious
traditions contain references in the form of didactical stories, teaching or
even direct recommendation as to how the faithful should act in order to
achieve harmony and peace within him/herself in the first place.” Appleby
(2006) points out that more than a decade after the publication of a seminal
text on this topic, Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson’s Religion, the
Missing Dimension of Statecraft (1994), numerous relevant books and
journal articles have recently appeared, collectively focusing on how
religious actors can play a role in ending conflicts and building peace.
Summarizing an initial set of findings regarding religious peace building
and faith-based diplomacy, Appleby notes that:
•
•
•
Religious leaders are uniquely positioned to foster nonviolent conflict transformation through the building of
constructive, collaborative relationships within and across
ethnic and religious groups for the common good of the
entire population of a country or region.
In many conflict settings around the world, the social
location and cultural power of religious leaders make them
potentially critical players in any effort to build a
sustainable peace.
The multigenerational local or regional communities they
oversee are repositories of local knowledge and wisdom,
custodians of culture, and privileged sites of moral,
psychological and spiritual formation.
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•
Symbolically charged sources of personal as well as
collective identity, these communities typically establish
and maintain essential educational and welfare institutions,
some of which serve people who are not members of the
religious community (Appleby 2006:1).
Religious individuals and faith-based organizations from a variety of
religious traditions are currently actively involved in various attempts to end
conflicts and to foster post-conflict reconciliation between warring parties in
the developing world (Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana and Abu-Nimer 2005).
This is not an entirely new phenomenon as religious individuals and/or
representatives of various faith-based organizations have for decades carried
out such mediations, albeit with varied records of success. Examples include:
mediation undertaken by the Quakers and financed by the Ford Foundation
in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–70; the work of the World Council of
Churches and the All Africa Conference of Churches in mediating a
cessation to the Sudan conflict in 1972; efforts made by John Paul Lederach
(professor of International Peace-building at the University of Notre Dame)
in Nicaragua in the 1980s; and the recent work of the Imam of Timbuktu in
mediating various West African conflicts (Conflict and Resolution Forum
2001).
Thus, to focus exclusively and single-mindedly on conflicts within and
between religions not only oversimplifies causal interconnections between
religion and the absence of peace––in particular by disregarding important
alternate variables––but also leads to a potential underestimation of attempts
emerging from various religious traditions to help resolve conflicts and
build peace. When successful, religion’s role in helping resolve conflicts
and build peace is a crucial component in helping achieve both peace and
human development.
“Religious peacemakers” are religious individuals or representatives of
faith-based organizations that attempt to help resolve inter-group conflicts
and build peace (Appleby, 2000, 2006; Gopin 2000, 2005; ter Haar and
Busutill 2005). It appears that religious peacemakers are most likely to be
successful when they: (1) have an international or transnational reach; (2)
consistently emphasize peace and avoidance of the use of force in resolving
conflict; (3) have good relations between different religions in a conflict
situation, as this will be the key to a positive input from them (Appleby
2006:1–2).
It is often noted that the three “religions of the book” share a broadly
similar set of theological and spiritual values and views and that this can
potentially underpin their ability to provide positive contributions to both
conflict resolution and peace building. Practical effects in this regard have
increased in recent years, with growing numbers and types of religious
peacemakers working to try to build peaceful coexistence in multi-faith
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
societies, while advocating reconciliation and fairness in a world that often
seems characterized by social and political strife and economic disparity
(Bartoli 2005). These observations encourage the following summary points
in relation to religious individuals and faith-based organizations and their
contributions to conflict resolution and peace building:
•
•
•
•
•
Faith-based organizations are increasingly active and
increasingly effective in attempts at peace building.
Faith-based organizations have a special role to play in zones of
religious conflict, but their peace-building programs do not need
to be confined to addressing religious conflict only.
Although in some cases peace-building projects of faith-based
organizations resemble very closely peace building by secular
nongovernmental organizations, the various religious
orientations of these faith-based organizations typically shape the
peace building they undertake.
These organizations’ peace-building agendas are diverse, ranging
from high-level mediation to training and peace buildingthrough-development at the grassroots.
Peace can be often promoted most efficiently by introducing
peace-building components into more traditional relief and
development activities.
Faith-based efforts contribute positively to peace building in four main
ways. They can: (1) offer “emotional and spiritual support to war-affected
communities”; (2) provide effective mobilization for “their communities
and others for peace”; (3) supply mediation “between conflicting parties”;
(4) serve as a conduit in pursuit of “reconciliation, dialogue, and
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration” (Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana
and Abu-Nimer 2005:ix). On the other hand, ambivalence also surfaces in
two main ways: (1) some religious leaders fail to “understand and/or enact
their potential peace-building roles within the local community,” and/or (2)
lack the ability to “exploit their strategic capacity as transnational actors”
(Appleby 2006:2).
Overall, it is clear that in various parts of the world faith-based actors
from various religious traditions are engaged in peacemaking activities in
relation to specific contexts and conflicts. In some cases, however, their full
potential may not be realized because of problems relating to geographical
focus of their attentions, as well as an occasional reluctance to be involved
in a peacemaking role (Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana and Abu-Nimer 2005;
Appleby 2006; Smock 2001, 2004, 2006; Haynes 2007b).
Finally, there is the question of how to prevent conflicts developing in
the first place. While there are some organizations involved in conflict
prevention, there is generally insufficient attention paid to this crucial
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factor. There is a relatively ineffective United Nations’ early warning and
prevention program on existence. Overall, faith-based organizations have
not yet been that successful in conflict prevention. More effort needs to be
made in studying ways to improve attempts to defuse conflict before it
breaks out.
THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN INTERCIVILIZATIONAL CONFLICT
IN RELATION TO 9/11 AND ITS AFTERMATH
There is also another significant problem to examine: inter-religious
dialogue can be made extremely difficult––although not necessarily
impossible––in the context of sudden, unexpected and unplanned
developments. I want to illustrate this contention in the next section, in
relation to the 9/11 attacks and subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and
Iraq, which, I contend, have in some contexts made inter-religious dialogue
more problematic.
The fact that both 9/11 and many subsequent terrorist outrages were
perpetrated by Muslims against various Western targets leads us to the issue
of what Huntington (1993, 1996) referred to as “intercivilizational” conflicts.
In a nutshell, do they provide clear evidence to underpin his influential
arguments about “intercivilizational” conflict, especially between “Islam”
and the “West”? Certainly, some commentators have averred that both the
9/11 attacks and subsequent U.S. responses––especially in relation to the
“war on terror”––have served to make his predictions on the sources,
context and ramifications of “clashing civilizations” appear far less abstract
and far more plausible than when first aired 15 years ago.
Huntington first presented his “clash of civilizations” thesis in an article
published in 1993, followed by a book in 1996. Following the end of the
four decades-long conflict between liberal democracy/capitalism and
communism, Huntington’s main argument was that a new, global clash was
now upon us––a fight between the (Christian) “West” and the (Muslim)
“East.” Christianity is said by Huntington to be conducive to the spread of
liberal democracy. In evidence, he noted the collapse of dictatorships in
overwhelmingly Christian countries in southern Europe and Latin America
in the 1970s and 1980s––they were mainly Roman Catholic but Orthodox
Christianity was also represented, notably in Greece––followed by
subsequent development of a full range of liberal democratic political norms
(including the rule of law, free elections, and multiple political rights and
civil liberties).
For Huntington, these events were proof of a demonstrable synergy
between Christianity and liberal democracy, key foundations of a
normatively desirable global order built on individualistic, liberal values.
Huntington contrasted this situation with that found, he alleged, in Islam. As
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
a result, the West now found itself in conflict with radical Islam, a key
threat to international stability. Radical Islam (covering related terms, such
as: “Islamism,” “Islamist extremism,” and “Islamic fundamentalism”) was a
political movement concerned with fundamental changes in the
international order, with its various elements not only united by antipathy to
the West but also inspired by anti-democratic religious and cultural dogma,
Huntington claimed.
Huntington was not a lone voice; others also alleged that Islam was
inherently undemocratic or even anti-democratic. For example, another
venerated U.S. university professor, Francis Fukuyama (1992:236),
suggested that “Islamic fundamentalism” had a “more than superficial
resemblance to European fascism.”
There were, however, many critics of Huntington. Many noted that it was
one thing to argue that various brands of political Islam had qualitatively
different perspectives on liberal democracy compared to many forms of
Christianity, but quite another to claim that Muslims en masse were poised
to enter into a period of conflict with the West. Critics also pointed out that
there were actually many “Islams” and only the malevolent or misinformed
would associate the terrorist attacks with an apparently representative
quality of a single––necessarily, extremist––idea of Islam. Second, the 9/11
atrocities––as well as subsequent bomb outrages in London, Madrid and
elsewhere––were not carried out by a state or group of states or at their
behest, but by al-Qa’ida, an international terrorist organization, as vilified
by Muslim governments, including those of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and
Libya––as it is by Western states.
Third, the idea of intercivilizational conflict is also implausible for
another reason: it is very difficult or impossible to clearly delineate
territorial boundaries between “civilizations,” and even trickier to perceive
them as acting as coherent units. This underlines that, problematically,
Huntington’s scenario of “clashing civilizations” focused attention on a onedimensional, undifferentiated category––“civilization”––and as a result
placed insufficient emphasis on various trends, conflicts and disagreements
occurring within all cultural traditions, whether, for example, Islam,
Christianity, or Judaism. The wider point is that cultures are not usefully
seen as closed systems of essentialist values, while it is not useful to try to
understand the world as comprising a strictly limited, discrete number of
civilizations or cultures, each with its own unique core sets of beliefs. We
can note in passing the continuing influence of globalization in this regard:
it results in more and expanding channels, pressures and agents via which
ideas diffuse and interact.
Finally, the image of “clashing civilizations” ignored the very important
sense in which radical Islamist revolt generally and al-Qa’ida terrorism in
particular is primarily aimed at governments within the Islamic world,
especially those consistently accused of both corruption and “un-Islamic”
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practices. Yet the rise of Islamist groups across a swathe of Arab countries
and elsewhere in the Muslim world is not only consequential to failings of
individual regimes––it is also the result of the failure of modernization
promises to deliver generally beneficial outcomes. That is, the contemporary
Islamist resurgence––of which al-Qa’ida is an aspect but not of course the
whole story––carries within it popular disillusionment at developmental and
societal failures, as well as widespread disgust at the specter of corrupt and
unrepresentative governments which, to add insult to injury, consistently
refuse meaningfully to democratize political systems. As a result,
confronted by state power that seeks to destroy or control communitarian
structures and replace them with an idea of a national citizenry based on the
link between state and individual, Islamist groups are to many Muslims
important vehicles of popular political aspirations.
Political Islam can be both “extremist” and “mainstream.” On the one
hand, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran, Afghanistan’s now resurgent Taliban, and
Bin Laden’s al-Qa’ida––as well as Islamist terrorists from Morocco to
Indonesia––have one thing in common: they all adhere to conceptions of
what might generically be called “revolutionary Islam.” This almost always
involves political violence and, in some cases, terror. On the other hand, we
must acknowledge that many Islamist social and political movements across
the Muslim world work within existing political systems and are usefully
described as “moderate.”
Over the last two decades Islamically oriented candidates and political
parties in Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan,
Kuwait, Bahrain, Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia have all sought to utilize
pluralistic pathways to electoral success. They have contested and won seats
at both local and national levels, been invited to serve in cabinets and, in
some cases, achieved top office, for example, prime minister in Turkey and
Iraq and president in Indonesia.
Overall, during the last five or six years, elections in, inter alia, Bahrain,
Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Morocco, Palestine, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and
Turkey, have served to highlight the political salience of “Islam” in
numerous countries. Some such groups, it should be noted, are highly
controversial, espousing militancy, which has not necessarily endeared them
to democrats everywhere; examples include Hizbullah in Lebanon and
Hamas in Palestine. In both cases, however, the organizations combine the
attributes of successful guerrilla groups with those of viable, grassrootsorientated political parties, which have achieved massive electoral
successes.
Seeking to respond to both mainstream and extremist political Islam,
Western foreign policymakers must learn to acquire better understandings of
how global Muslim majorities see the world, including the West.
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
A 2005 Gallup World Poll sought to answer the following questions:
•
•
•
How many Muslims hold extremist views?
What are their priorities?
What do they admire and what do they resent about the United
States and the West?
According to the 2005 Gallup Poll, seven percent think the 9/11 attacks
were “completely” justified and are very critical of the United States.
Among those who believe that 9/11 was not justified, let us call them
“Muslim moderates,” 40% perceive the United States favorably while 60%
do not. However, it is important to look more closely at the “anti-U.S.
extremists” (that is, the 7% noted above). This is not because all or even
most would be prepared to commit acts of violence, but because such people
are likely to be potential recruits or at least actively support Islamist terrorist
groups. Such people (unsurprisingly) are also more likely to view civilian
attacks in general as justifiable, as compared to the “moderates.” Nineteen
out of 20 “moderates” believe that, “Other attacks in which civilians are the
target” are “mostly” or “completely” unjustified, while only 70% of actual
or potential extremists concurred with this statement.
(http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/popup_photo.html?articleID=1453&photo=4)
Already anachronistic with respect to thermonuclear war, the 9/11 attacks
emphasized that geographical space is no longer an insuperable barrier to
external attack on a state from a terrorist group inspired by religious idea(l)s
such as al-Qa’ida. The state’s “hard shell” was now irreversibly crushed and,
as a result, there was a pressing new challenge: to understand the
relationship of international relations to domestic politics. In particular,
according to Smith (2002:177), 9/11 had major ramifications for chances of
world order, as it demonstrated that states were no longer the only important
actors in major international arenas. Keohane (2002:30) contends that the
“effective wielding of large-scale violence by non-state actors reflects new
patterns of asymmetrical interdependence and calls into question some of
our assumptions about geographical space as a barrier.”
This points to the fact that the kind of international terrorism exemplified
by the cross-border activities of al-Qa’ida––whether perceived as a top
down terrorist network with bin Laden at the apex as CEO, or as a more
nebulous terrorist ideal, galvanizing followers through a shared ideological
worldview––does not map onto state structures, but works in the spaces
between them. That is, the raison d’être of international terrorist groups such
as al-Qa’ida is not defined by territory but by commitments and beliefs. This
implies that al-Qa’ida is a very different type of organization compared to
the state, both in terms of identity and structure. Its structure is the reverse
of the modern state characterized by a hierarchy of power and authority,
while its identity is equally nebulous.
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In terms of intercivilizational conflict, what was the impact of 9/11 both
on the USA specifically and on international relations more generally?
First, while political violence and terrorism issues were already important
areas of concern prior to 9/11, they provided a newly noted and distinctive
emphasis on international terrorism and its networks, of which al-Qa’ida is
the most significant, but not the sole, example (Gunaratna 2004). Second,
the 9/11 attacks were a profound challenge both to the U.S. government and
to political analysts, who had hitherto shared an apparently unshakeable
belief in fundamental foreign policy assumptions. Third, there was a
profound impact on Americans’ sense of security: 9/11 shattered it. As
Huntington notes, the last time the continental United States suffered
anything at all comparable to the 9/11 attacks was nearly 200 years earlier,
in 1814. Then, the British burned down the White House. Since then,
Americans had lived in an atmosphere of invulnerability from foreign attack.
After 9/11 that disappeared (Center Conversations 2002).
From this we can surmise that 9/11 was calculated not simply to wreak
terrible destruction but also to create a global media spectacle. For some
among the mass of “downtrodden ordinary Muslims,” bin Laden was
already a hero prior to 9/11. This constituency was an important target
audience for the highly visual spectacle of the destruction of the Twin
Towers and the attack on the Pentagon. Thus, for al-Qa’ida, a key goal of
9/11 was to grab the attention of ordinary (Sunni) Muslims, and to
encourage them to make connections between the attacks and the multiple
resentments felt against the U.S. in many parts of the Islamic world.
Manifestations of such resentments include support for unrepresentative
rulers in the Arab world, the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and
(Iraq) 2003, as well as Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, which many
Muslims believe is neither just nor fair.
One result of multiple resentments among Muslims is hatred for the U.S.
and the West more generally, a sentiment, which Esposito (2007) notes is
not restricted to the relatively small numbers of Muslim religious and
political radicals. More generally, it is exacerbated––among “moderates”
and “radicals” alike––by years of U.S. refusal to censure what are widely
regarded as unacceptable Israeli actions in relation to the Palestinians.
But that is not all. Muslim resentment is also a result of failure to deal
with the privations and humiliations inflicted on Iraq following the downfall
of Saddam Hussein in March 2003 and his subsequent arrest and execution,
as well as the continuing failed state that is Afghanistan. Finally, it is also
plausible to suggest that Muslim resentment goes wider than such specific
issues, important though they are. The ramification is that even if solutions
for the Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel/Palestinian issues were to be found
speedily, this might not be enough to undercut the potential for terrorism to
burgeon and terrorist attacks to be carried out against the U.S., Israel and the
West more generally.
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Hurrell (2002:197) suggested that Muslim “resentment has to do with the
far-reaching and corrosive encroachments of modernization, Westernization
and globalization.” And this is the fourth impact of 9/11: it highlighted the
unequal global distribution of power, a state of affairs that globalization is
said to worsen. This is because, as Hurrell (2002:189) explained,
globalization creates “many kinds of negative externalities, including the
reaction of many marginalized groups, the creation of new channels for
protest, and, in particular, the facilitation of new patterns of terrorist and
other kinds” of political violence. In short, the unequal global distribution of
power is believed to encourage international terrorism, represented by but
not restricted to al-Qa’ida. This is not to suggest that there this is something
inherent in Islam and its belief systems that encourages political violence,
but it is to note that there are extremist and violent elements among some of
the radical Islamist groups, demonstrated not only by 9/11 but also by
subsequent bomb outrages in, inter alia, Bali, Casablanca, Istanbul, Nairobi,
Madrid and London.
Societies around the world responded to 9/11 in broadly cultural terms.
Most Western governments, including those of Britain, Italy, Japan, and
Spain, strongly supported the American people and their government, both
in relation to 9/11 and (at least initially) subsequent wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Many ordinary Muslims, on the other hand, saw 9/11 quite differently:
it represented an attempt by “Islam” to “fight back” against the U.S. (in
particular) and the West (in general) (Hammond 2003: 3).
Turning back to the specific problems of the Middle East and associated
chances of inter- and intra-religious peace and cooperation, it is necessary to
underline again the impact of U.S. foreign policy on the region and the ways
that it makes resolution of many deep-seated conflicts less rather than more
likely. While optimism engendered by emphasizing shared principles and
beliefs is not misplaced or futile, it is also important to see that U.S. foreign
policy and the development of political Islam––including radical and
extremist versions, encapsulated here as “jihadism”––are today deeply
intertwined. It is important to recall that every U.S. president since Jimmy
Carter in the mid-1970s––his focus was revolutionary Iran following the
Islamic Revolution of 1978–79––has had to “deal with” regional
manifestations of radical/extremist Islam. Yet none perhaps has been as
challenged as George W. Bush in 2008. During the same 30-year time
period, U.S. policymakers have consistently demonstrated inability and/or
unwillingness to distinguish between radical/extremist and moderate
Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar
to the way that Communism was perceived during the Cold War. However,
even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved
from an ill-informed, broad-brush and paranoid approach personified by
Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic and
reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in
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the 1970s, even as tensions remained high between the United States and the
Soviet Union. So far, however, this has not clearly occurred in relation to
Islamists in the Middle East.
For U.S. policymakers to learn to make distinctions and adopt more
differentiated and informed approaches, they would have to develop better
understanding of what motivates and informs Islamic political action of all
kinds, including jihadism. In particular, they will need to take on board that
Islamist entities and the support they receive is affected by Western––
especially, American––policies that serve to encourage radical/extreme
Islamist movements, while in some cases weakening moderate
organizations’ appeal. And this also implies more effort to gather the
necessary political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue in
order, when necessary, to encourage non-moderates to come to the
negotiating table. We need to bear in mind, moreover, that roots of political
Islam everywhere go deeper than simple anti-Americanism, while in most
cases––save for jihadism––political Islam can, and frequently does,
manifest itself in various non-violent and democratic ways, commensurate
with pluralistic politics.
Note, however, that, especially since 9/11, the so-called “war on terror”
has become an egregious excuse for non-democratic rulers in many Muslim
countries to deny in stronger terms than before the salience of democracy
for their polities. Promotion of democracy, they claim, will only serve to
encourage the Islamists, which, in turn, will serve to bring on a more
virulent anti-Westernism and in turn increased instability.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I sought to raise and discuss some basic issues about the
role of religious actors in helping ameliorate conflicts, encourage conflict
resolution and build peace. Regarding conflict, we saw that inter-religion
tensions and competition are often implicated in the “politics of identity.”
We also noted the role of religious individuals and faith-based organizations
in conflict resolution and peace building, with various outcomes. While the
contexts, issues and religious faiths and actors differs from country to
country, the common factor in each case is that while religious causes of
conflict receive much public attention, religious peacemakers’ efforts in
conflict resolution and peace building tends to get much less attention and
publicity (Smock 2004; Appleby 2006). Research indicates, and this paper
would underline, that religious faith could encourage believers to work
toward resolving conflicts and develop peace (Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana
and Abu-Nimer 2005). This is reflected in the fact that growing numbers of
religious organizations seem to be looking for opportunities to promote
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peace, including in circumstances where religion itself is seen to contribute
to conflict (United States Institute for Peace 2003).
Overall, the hope is that, as a result of increased public recognition and
support and development of more effective peacemaking strategies, conflict
resolution and peacemaking skills of faith-based organizations and religious
individuals will develop further in order to achieve their undoubted
potential. Peacemaking ability is likely to develop in this way when, acting
under the auspices of a religious group, individuals and groups are seen as
reflective of a high moral standing, credibility, and stature, to the extent that
they can be regarded by all interested parties as neutral in conflict situations.
However, peacemaking should not only be about short-term building of
peace, but should, in addition, aim to develop restorative justice and/or the
establishment of what are considered “right relationships” between formerly
conflicting groups through acknowledgement of each other’s position and
accountability of those acting on behalf of religious communities. In some
cases, however, religious individuals and faith-based organizations may
enter a conflict situation and focus primarily on trying to resolve its
immediate manifestations, while not looking as closely at the structural
problems that underlie the conflict and trying to work toward addressing
important background issues that make conflict more likely.
Regarding relations between the West and the Muslim world, we noted
and discussed two common claims: (1) there is a developing “clash of
civilizations,” and (2) Islam is generically incompatible with democracy––
because it is an “extremist” religion built on quite different norms and
values compared to the individualistically oriented “Christian” West.
However, is the real issue the alleged incompatibility of two sets of
religion and culture, or is it more to do with international politics?
Contemporary jihadism is clearly stimulated to a considerable degree by
generic anti-Westernism, especially pronounced anti-Americanism, given
further impetus by the U.S. and other Western governments’ support of
egregiously undemocratic governments in the Middle East and the Muslim
world more generally.
Finally, what is the potential of inter-religious dialogue to reduce
tensions in the Middle East? If there is realistically potential to identify
common ground and manage subsequently to develop dialogue based on
areas of commonality, then it may be possible to foresee possible––and of
course meaningful––negotiations between the government of Israel and the
Palestinians’ leaders. In this context, inter-religious dialogue might turn out
to be a significant factor in helping achieve progress toward a lasting peace.
On the other hand, it would be utopian to claim that injecting inter-religious
dialogue into the situation would on its own lead to remarkable peace
breakthroughs.
This observation is informed by the fact that the most recent escalation of
tensions in the Middle East has occurred despite the widespread agreement
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that increased inter-religious dialogue will improve chances of success in
resolution of deep-seated conflicts; yet it is also clear that the role of U.S.
foreign policy has generally served to aggravate pre-existing inter- and
intra-religious tensions, making the finding of common ground––an
essential first step––more, not less, problematic.
REFERENCES
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reconciliation. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
––––. 2006. Building sustainable peace: The roles of local and transnational religious
actors. Conference paper prepared for the Conference on New Religious Pluralism in World
Politics. Georgetown University, March 17.
Barringer, T. 2006. Taking faith seriously in international relations and development
studies. Paper presented at the conference, Governance in the Commonwealth: Civic
Engagement and Democratic Accountability. The Institute of Commonwealth Studies,
London, March 11–13.
Available at: http://commonwealth.sas.ac.uk/events/csc_march11/barringer.pdf
Accessed August 3, 2006.
Bartoli, Andrea. 2005. Conflict prevention: The role of religion is the role of its actors. New
Routes, 10(3):3–7.
Bouta, Tsjeard, S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana and Mohammed Abu-Nimer. 2005. Faithbased peace-building: Mapping and analysis of Christian, Muslim and multi-faith actors.
The Hague, Netherlands: Institute of International Relations.
Center Conversations. 2002. Religion, culture, and international conflict. After September
11. A conversation with Samuel P. Huntington, No. 14, June. Ethics and Public Policy
Center, 1015 Fifteenth Street. NW, #900, Washington, DC 20005, USA.
Available at: http://www.eppc.org/publications/pubID.1537/pub_detail.asp
Conflict and Resolution Forum. 2001. Faith-based peacemaking: The role of religious
actors in preventing and resolving conflict worldwide, April 10, Washington, DC.
Esposito, John L. 2007. It’s the policy, stupid. Political Islam and US foreign policy.
Harvard International Review, May 2.
Available at: http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1453/
Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The end of history and the last man. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Gopin, Marc. 2000. Between Eden and Armageddon: The future of world religions,
violence and peacemaking. New York and London: Oxford University Press.
––––. 2005. World religions, violence, and myths of peace in international relations. In
Bridge or barrier. Religion, violence and visions for peace. Edited by Gerrie ter Haar and
James J. Busutill. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers: 35–56.
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Gunaratna, Rohan. 2004. Defeating al-Qaida – The pioneering vanguard of the Islamic
movements. In Defeating terrorism. Shaping the new security environment, edited by
Russell Howard and Reid L. Sawyer. Guilford, Connecticut: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin: 1–8.
Hammond, P. 2003. Review article: Making war and peace. Contemporary Politics 9,
March 1: 83–90.
Haynes, Jeffrey. 2007a. An introduction to religion and international relations. Harlow:
Pearson Education.
––––. 2007b. Religion and development: Conflict or cooperation? Basingstoke and New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
––––. 2008. Religion and foreign policy making in the USA, India and Iran: Towards a
research agenda. Third World Quarterly 29(1), February: 143–165.
Holenstein, Anne-Marie. 2005. Role and significance of religion and spirituality in
development co-operation. A reflection and working paper. Translated from German by
Wendy Tyndale Bern: Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation, March.
Huntington, Samuel. 1993. The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs 72(3):22–49.
––––. 1996. The clash of civilizations. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Hurrell, Andrew. 2002. There are no rules George W. Bush: International order after
September 11. International Relations 16(2):185–204.
Johnston, Douglas and Cynthia Sampson. 1994. Religion, the missing dimension of
statecraft. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Keohane, Robert O. 2002. The globalization of informal violence, theories of world politics,
and the ‘liberalism of fear.’ Dialog-IO, Spring: 29–43.
Kurtz, Lester R. 1995. Gods in the global village. Pine Forge: Sage.
Mollov, Ben. 2006. Managing conflict: Can religion succeed where politics has failed? An
Israeli addresses a global peace forum in Malaysia. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs,
November 1. Available at:
http://jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&TMID=111&LNGID=1&FID=3
75&PID=0&IID=1423 Accessed December 5, 2007.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks. 2004. The 9/11Commission Report. Washington,
DC.
Smith, Steve. 2002. The end of the unipolar moment? September 11 and the future of world
order. International Relations 16(2):171–183.
Smock, David R. 2001. Faith-based NGOs and international peace building. Special report
no. 76, United States Institute of Peace, October.
Available at: http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr76.html Accessed February 4,
2006.
––––. 2004. Divine intervention: Regional reconciliation through faith. Religion 25(4).
Available at: http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1190/3/ Accessed September 1, 2005.
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––––. ed. 2006. Religious contributions to peacemaking. When religion brings peace, not
war. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
ter Haar, Gerrie and James J. Busuttil, eds. 2005. Bridge or barrier: Religion, violence and
visions for peace. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers.
United States Institute for Peace 2003. Special report: Can faith-based NGOs advance
interfaith reconciliation? The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Available at: http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr103.pdf
Accessed February 1, 2006.
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The Logic of Clash of Civilizations in a Global Context
with Special Reference to Turkish Politics
ALI YAŞAR SARIBAY
In this paper, I analyze Turkish politics from the wider perspective of the
Global Society concept. What I would like theoretically to accomplish in my
paper is to examine the dynamics of the globalization process in connection
to a nation-state such as Turkey, and to reveal Turkey’s socio-political
status in global politics in terms of the role of political Islam. If we were to
reach a conclusion from the case of Turkey, we may state the following: a
democracy-friendly Islam could minimize the negative impact of
globalization within a peaceful framework. Along these lines, the argument
of this article is that as the process of globalization advances, to the extent
that a need to adapt to this process arises, religious values will become
flexible and their nature will change to support democracy. In this sense, it
can save globalization from becoming the context for the hard clash of
civilizations that Samuel Huntington predicted. It can contribute to the
solidification of a structure, such as global society, that is the work of all
civilizations. In the case of Turkey, such a role for Islam is possible by
adjusting to and respecting secular values. This paper also analyzes Islam’s
role in Turkey in the process of globalization and the propelling force they
pose as both sources of identity and the formulation of a rival alternative
stance.
Modern society is a global society: we are living in a society where the
network of communication and information has spread over the whole globe.
“World Society” is a concept that the late German sociologist Niklas
Luhmann (1995:430) introduced as a theoretical tool of analysis. According
to Luhmann, societies that depend on differing characterizations (national,
local, developed, underdeveloped, etc.) do not exist. There is only one
society, and that is World Society. World Society, as is mentioned below,
unites the horizons of all societies in a communications system.
The conceptualization in this paper follows Luhmann’s approach closely,
but does not ignore that of Wallerstein and integrates it with Manuel
Castells’ analyses. Following Luhmann, this paper essentially uses the
concept of Global Society, in the sense of “World Society,” to characterize
the current era we live in.
What we mean by Global Society is, first, that the horizons of societies
are integrated as a communications system. The major factors that play a
role in this integration are micro-electronic-based information and
communication technologies. In today’s world, people form their values,
opinions, beliefs, and regulate their behaviors with the help of these factors,
most importantly TV and Internet. We are now members of a Global
Society where news, information, values, convictions and even power have
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become flowing and everything has changed to the extent that everything
can suddenly be turned upside down.
As Manuel Castells (2004:695) defines it, Global Society is essentially a
network society where human relations are intricately tied to each other on
the basis of communication, with the thick knots of information and
communication technologies. This is a society in which flexible financial
markets, processes and organizations that are subject to adaptive capacity
and programmed structures, as well as cultural activities at the global/local
level, are carried out via electronic communication; we are made aware of
institutional decisions and societal movements via the Internet and have the
chance to get back in touch with these in the same manner.
The heart of such a society is capitalist economy. As Castells mentions
(2003:10–11), what differentiates the network society’s “new economy”
from the old is that it is global, informational and network-based. Castells
(2003:17–19) argues that with the help of these features, the whole planet
has become capitalist for the first time in history, with a few exceptions
(China, North Korea, Cuba). All the knotting points of the capitalist network
society, from production to consumption, culture to power are hugely
different from what used to be. For instance, a network effect that has
changed the nature of the relationship between capital and labor relations
has also transformed the nature of relations of production. Both capital and
labor have been freed from their previous spatial constraints, and have
changed to a new form by acquiring flow and individuality within global
networks. Capital, which has taken the form of human-made automation of
the network society, is also imposing this structural feature on production
relations. This, in turn, has blurred the relationship between social classes,
even though it does not exclude the phenomenon of exploitation.
In the area of consumption, the conspicuous value of products has gained
a determining role as compared to their exchange value. The major factor
that leads people to consume in the new capitalist economy is cultural, not
economic. In other words, human behavior will be determined more by
cultural (non-materialist, belief-based) values than by economic (materialist)
values. What is valuable is determined culturally, not economically
(Baudrillard 1981:ch. 1).
On the other hand, power relations are no longer hierarchical but
decentralized and organization-less. Even the nation-state, as a structuration
of sovereignty that hierarchical and organized relations have brought to life,
is being bypassed.
We can argue the following to give a more detailed definition of Global
Society: it is a society that is brought to life by worldwide information and
communication technologies; is built upon informational, global and
network-based principles of a capitalist nature; possesses product relations
that are organized around a capital-labor axis that is individualized and
automated; is where economic values that are the outcome of these relations
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are transformed into a conspicuous consumption; is exposed to a nonhierarchical, centerless, and unorganized exertion of power; is flexible,
flowing, has high adaptive capacity, autopoietic, and in this way feeds upon
differentiation, not integrity.
It is crucial to touch upon two issues to solidify the above definition.
First is that, from a historical perspective, Global Society is not a
consequence but a cause of globalization. For instance, in the past, a kind of
network formation could be seen both within and between the world’s
societies, even though it was of a different nature. We have witnessed the
historical transformation of labor and capital multiple times already.
Consumption has emerged in connection with culture in various ways.
Information, despite being passed on with tools of varying nature with
differing effects, did exist as an important factor within and among all
societies.
Yet, as Castells mentions, none of these was global, informational and
network-based to a sufficient degree. The second issue is the need to view
globalization not as societal change itself but as only one aspect of it. To
think of societal change as globalization is to think of it as a process without
a subject. Yet, the phenomenon we call globalization is, viewed from any
angle, the globalization of capitalism. In this sense, globalization is a
process whose subject is capitalism and it is the dynamic jump and spread of
capitalist modernity in virtually every area and in society made possible by
the emergence of global society.
GLOBALIZATION AS A NETWORK SYSTEM
BETWEEN REAL AND VIRTUAL
The prerequisite for talking about Global Society is to accept that society
is a social system. By “social system,” we mean a self-referential formation
on the basis of meaningful communication in the way conceptualized by
Luhmann (1990). In Luhmann’s conceptualization, social system consists of
events and is reconstructed by those events. What brings about events and
links them in turn is meaningful communication (Luhmann 1990:176). As a
social system, society communicates with other systems and in this way it
locates primarily in an environment formed by itself. It should be noted that
social system, in Luhmann’s sense, is not in touch with a given environment;
it forms its own environment by internal differentiation and the division of
labor among the subsystems that this differentiation causes. In this sense,
social system is autopoietic, making and remaking itself. Therefore, in the
Luhmannian framework, society is an entity in which the differentiation of,
for instance, the political subsystem and its surrounding emerges thanks to
communication.
According to Luhmann, society as defined above, is a new kind of
system that possesses functional differentiation and is historically much
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more complex than all societies that precede it. It is not possible for such a
social system to be integrated with a territorial boundary, for that
encompasses all its sub-systems. The political sub-system is an exception
because it is divided into “states” and the state continues to exist and fulfill
the functions of the political system in the best possible way. Hence, we
cannot define society as an entity with territorial boundaries, even though
this is only valid for the state.
For this reason, we cannot talk about “modern societies” in the plural
sense because today the most meaningful boundary is that determined by
communicational behavior (Luhmann 1990:178). All communicative
behavior in turn belongs to a societal system as an inevitable consequence
of functional differentiation and for this reason, today’s society is global in
nature.
We turn to Manuel Castells, another sociologist, who solidifies the
insides of global society which we defined relying on Luhmann. Castells
views modern society, which Luhmann defines as a social system, as a
social structuration consisting of informational networks that are based on
an interrelated, but centerless, set of knots (Castells 2004). These
informational networks bring globalization, and thus global society, to life.
Two important issues emerge here: first, the “network” that is the axis of
the social structuration which Castells defines as “network society” is born
out of the re-structured capitalism programs which he calls “information
capitalism.” The second issue is that “network” is not the same thing as
information capitalism. In this sense, the emergence of network society as a
social structure that emerges around extant forms of sovereignty possesses a
logic that goes beyond those forms. Since globalization is determined by
governments, corporations and various other institutions, the information
that international relations depends upon also takes place within a unidirectional context. Consequently, globalization functions via an
instrumental information.
Capitalism, as the subject of globalization, takes on a virtual quality at
every point that is determined by the network in the form of informational
capitalism. On the other hand, this virtuality cannot be perceived as a
representation of a fantasy world that is disconnected from reality. We draw
on Castell’s concept of “real virtuality” (2004:403–404) to state this more
clearly.
“Real virtuality,” in essence, signifies those situations in which “reality”
and “symbolic representation” are not distinguished. In all societies the
human condition both gains meaning within a symbolic environment and
emerges by way of symbols. This has become much more obvious because
of electronic communication tools. Hence, in today’s world, reality has
become virtual as experiential existence because it is only possible for
reality to come about with the help of meanings framed by symbols. In other
words, what we experience in real life is put into visual form and becomes
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virtual; but, at the same time, we experience the concrete events that are
shown to us––the things that become virtual––in real life; we transform
virtual into real.
In this state of affairs globalization takes place in the form of both real
and virtual informational capitalism within a space of flows. According to
Castells, information technology has wiped out the distinction between time
and space. Interactions among societies, in almost all domains, takes place
within the boundaries of a space of flows, not within a space originated
from a historical ground. In a way this means that forms of interaction
between concrete singularities (individuals, societies, nations, etc.) are
replaced by superordinate collective abstract processes. On the other hand,
these collective abstract processes emerge as pieces of the material
organization of time-dependent social practices. For instance, information
capitalism (the realization of the workings of capitalism through Internetbased functions in virtual environments) has rendered capital and labor
flowing by individualizing them. However, this does not mean that certain
capital and labor are completely independent from a certain place. In
Castells’ analyses, space of flows is dependent on a “timeless time.” In
network society, the dominant form of social time is timeless time (Castells
2004:465).
At this point, we can gain a better understanding of the fact that Global
Society encapsulates almost all societies on the axis of “timeless time” only
if we consider it in conjunction with the phenomenon of real virtuality.
Otherwise, it can be difficult to know how our daily life experiences
“become old” in the face of “new” forms that we see (that are shown to us)
and thus what it is that makes us live constantly in a sense of “present.”
Certainly, this does not mean the ignorance of the role of space within the
process of flows.
In this context a weakness that can emerge in the organization, flexibility
and informatic-technological force of network society––or a decrease in
“global concentration” in Castells’ words––can cause a reverse process of
localization to occur. To ignore this possibility is only possible if one views
modernity––the heart of globalization––as a linear phenomenon.
Yet, it has become obvious in many spheres that modernity, in the global
moment, includes processes that are contrary to its own nature. We can give
the example, in the context of fundamentalist movements, of the
replacement of secularization of religion with religionalization of the secular;
and the replacement of nationalization of ethnicity with ethnicization of
national as a result of micro nationalisms.
Certainly, these phenomena as the reverse of the logic of modernity, are
not simply a “regression” but paradoxically, simultaneous opposites of the
global moment of modernity. “Space of flows” has not only functioned to
affirm the constitutive logic of modernity, but has also created the
opportunity for an opposite logic to revitalize. Informational capitalism has
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allowed the traditional social forms that it has undermined to spread by
flowing as an oppositional cultural code with the help of network webbing.
RELIGION AS A SOURCE OF SOME FUNCTIONS
IN GLOBAL SOCIETY
Religion is one of the major determinants of this process because it is the
most powerful source of social identity among the heterogeneities that
emerged. As Castells (1997:12-27) also argues, when the place of religion is
considered together with the structural trends of the network society, the
following three functional roles emerge: first, religion has a softening
impact on information capitalism. Second, he argues that religion is both the
carrier of globalization and also an obstacle to it; the borderless universal
aspects of scriptural religions especially fulfill the transmission function due
to the opportunities for spreading. Religion is an obstacle for globalization
because it is the defender of local cultural values due to its nature. Finally,
he argues that network society is paternalistic, and that paternalism is a core
element of religion, and is pushing religion into a conflictual role in the face
of many cultural transformations that globalization causes.
All of these, first and foremost, afford religion an important
functionality in the conflicts that take place within the nation-state: religion
is exposed to globalization along with its demand to be the founding
element of the nation-state, especially in non-Western societies. Religion as
an important source of social identity has approached globalization through
its own values and perceptions. Accordingly, religion also attempts to shape
the content of globalization.
Along with this, to the extent that it is appended to the network society,
religion loses its “divine impact” and runs the risk of turning into a
legitimization tool for globalization. Fundamental religious movements
must be understood in this framework. These movements do not simply
emerge as just movements against global capitalist invasion. Besides that,
and primarily, they emerge as movements against religious stances and
interpretations that exhibit a tendency to append to globalization. The real
propelling force for these movements is found in the presence of Islam.
The general conclusion we draw from the Islam-globalization interaction
is that Islamic movements, including the fundamentalist types, are going
after a project we might call “Islamization of globalization” in all
geographic areas in which they are at work (for a more general framework
with regard to the Islam-globalization interaction, see Mohammadi 2002).
This is a project whose only consequence has been the verification of
Castells’ observation, mentioned above: Islam’s being appended to the
global network society, losing its divine impact, not being able to meet the
expectations that are rooted in feelings of alienation and powerlessness, and
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its growing negative legitimization of globalization. The most obvious
appearance of this is in an attitude conceptualized by historian Arif Dirlik
(1997): “self-orientalization.”
Self-orientalization is legitimizing one’s attitude in the face of what one
is opposed to, by referring to the lexicon (ideological, political, cultural, etc.)
of that opposite phenomenon. We have observed this typical attitude in most
Islamic movements at various time periods. For instance, when socialism
emerged as a rising value in the West, it was claimed that Islam included
socialism. The same attitude has been shown with regards to democracy,
capitalism, liberalism, postmodernism, and so on.
ISLAM’S SPECIFIC FUNCTION IN GLOBAL SOCIETY
Today, in a wide spectrum formed by Muslim societies, Islam is a
phenomenon that is not only exposed to globalization but also accompanies
it. This situation causes Islam to function, in its own geographical area,
within the borders defined as non-Western societies, as a cultural identity
source that prevents isolation from globalization. At the same time, it causes
Islam, in Western societies and especially in the guise of “Euro-Islam” in
Western Europe, to be transformed into a global phenomenon (Alsayyad
and Castells 2002).
In this case, global network society has brought to life a line of cultural
tension between the “globalization of Islam” and “Islamization of
globalization.” However, this stress line is constructed on the basis of
Islam’s failure to meet expectations that are rooted in feelings of alienation
and powerlessness due to losing its divine impact. As a consequence, the
globalization of Islam becomes primary, and globalization processes are
legitimized by non-Western societies using Islam. No matter what, we see in
the picture that emerges that generally religion has an important social value
in a global society as well.
Considering Christianity and Judaism in addition to Islam (see Castells
2000c:21-27), it can be claimed that religion is vitalized as an important
source that provides the meanings it cannot extract from global society (both
in reconstructing society in the face of the given situation and in
constructing a true societal identity), in the context of heterogeneities
provoked by global society. In this sense, religion “…survives as a
functional subsystem of a functionally differentiated society. It has gained
recognized autonomy at the cost of recognizing the autonomy of the other
subsystem, i.e., secularization. It represents the world within the world and
society within society,” as Luhmann states (Luhmann 1990:155). In other
words, it shows a structural nature that is both admissive to the external
transformation process that it is exposed to and is excluded from that
process.
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It functions as a legitimization-reinforcer when it gains an admissive
nature, and a delegitimizer when it is exposed to an external status. Yet, in
any case, religion, as a source of meaningful communication, preserves its
power to shape situations it faces.
TENSION AMONG ISLAM, NATION-STATE AND
GLOBALIZATION: THE TURKISH CASE
The political effects of globalization are generally considered with
respect to the argument that the nation-state, as a historical category, has
completed its life. Almost all political analyses of globalization proceed by
discussing this argument. Attempts to reveal the political effects of
globalization must take as a starting point the contemporary political
position of the nation-state. This is also the starting point in this paper. I
begin by providing a picture of the current state of Turkish political life
within a framework determined by a macro-level conceptual analysis, such
as the nation-state. I proceed by attempting to cast light on specific political
changes and formations, and finally, I make some predictions.
One of the most important results of the French Revolution is the nationstate as the objectified version of sovereignty. In 18th-century France, due
to revolutionary politics, sovereignty centered in the state, which
represented the collection of citizens, and states demanded a loyalty beyond
all loyalties from their citizens for the sake of their sovereignties. Although
this is the political background of the nation-state, capitalist world economy
is the factor causing its spread, as sociologist Giddens stated. According to
Giddens, the fact that all capitalist states, without exception, are in the form
of nation-state shows that the connection between capitalism and nationstate is not due to chance (Giddens 1981:182).
When capitalism, which started showing its effects in the 16th century,
proceeded toward institutionalization in the 18th century, it made the
nation––the socio-political phenomenon of the same century––the
foundation of the legitimacy of state power, thus causing the “invention” of
the nation-state form. In this way, the nation-state became a dominant
institution, which possessed the monopoly of government within defined
borders and directly controlled internal and external tools of physical force
by decorating this government with law (Giddens 1981:190). Globalization
is forcing its way as a phenomenon that is making it necessary for this
structure of the nation-state––that is, its institutional domination––to change.
Globalization, in the sense of the solid structuring of the world as a whole,
is emerging as essentially a meta-national oppression process that aims to
homogenize and to change leading societies’ cultural codes into goals to be
achieved.
This process implies a consequence that Max Weber drew attention to
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long ago: if the nation symbolizes the cultural world and the state
symbolizes the political world, then globalization has the possibility of
emerging in the following two ways, both of which destroy and make
impossible the bond between these two worlds: (1) Since the constructive
principle of the nation is to stabilize cultural and social
differences/heterogeneity that have always existed within itself,
globalization can make this extremely difficult. Heterogeneities within the
nation itself, such as race, ethnicity, sub-culture, etc., can find the
opportunity to gain in importance. However, in the second place, each of
these can proceed toward becoming the major element defining nationality.
(2) The state can be perceived as an institution to be minimized and
deregulated. In response to this, in parallel to the need to politically
legitimize global and social heterogeneities, the state can begin to search for
a new community that can legitimize itself or provide grounds for its
existence.
These two points indicate tension between the nation-state and
globalization, which is hard to resolve. I argue that this tension determines
the macro effects that globalization has on the nation state. In fact, this
tension is pictured clearly in Michael Hardt and Antony Negri’s Empire
(2000). According to Hardt and Negri, the nation is not just a cultural
formation, a sense of belongingness and a common heritage, but is also,
perhaps primarily, a legal-economic structure. This fact is causing the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to
downplay the role of the nation-state as a sole political actor. However,
Hardt and Negri present this retrogression as not exactly a tension between
the nation-state and globalization, but as the impossibility of an analysis
based on the nation-state. I think it would be appropriate to say that these
two things are different.
I will not discuss the issue that the nation-state is still the leading political
actor. What is of true interest is, to state again, the tension between the
nation-state and the impact of this tension on the nation-state.
I will limit and consider the tension between the nation-state and
globalization in the context of Turkey at these two levels: (1) macro-level
effects; and (2) the effects on political identity.
Macro-Level Effects
The bundle of effects that Turkey as a nation-state has observed is
included in the 800-page historical-political document called National
Program (2001). The first volume is exclusively about macro-level political
effects. More specifically, the subjects enlisted under the title “Political
Criteria” in this volume, are solid clues to the analyses that were presented
in this article under the title of “The Nature of Modern Society: Some
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
Issues.” All “accommodations” demand from “Freedom of Thought and
Expression,” to “Abolishing Death Penalty,” to “Cultural Life and
Individual Freedoms,” to “National Security Council” share the property of
adopting the leading states’ cultural codes as the ultimate goals to be
reached. As mentioned before, this is a challenge to the process of
globalization in the sense of the solid structuring of the world as a whole.
What is important here is: whereas it is being demanded that
homogenization at the global level be recognized as a “value,” Turkey is
exposed to arrangements/procedures that are based on heterogeneity.
What I argue is not that homogeneity possesses a sociological superiority,
but that there is an inconsistency embodied by degrading homogeneity at the
nation-state level and simultaneously imposing it as a value at the global
level. The socio-political legitimacy of heterogeneity can serve as a crank in
a society’s adaptation to democratic values. However, using this crank to
reinforce homogeneity will give rise to a condition in that society that I cited
from Weber: destruction of the bond between culture (nation) and the
political (state)––ultimately, the becoming plastic of sovereignty.
What I mean by “the becoming plastic of sovereignty” is the movement
of sovereignty toward every kind of legitimacy as grounds for a response to
globalization, which sociologist Ulrich Beck (2000) defined as a process
that possesses the logic of “both this and that” and consequently as a process
where “anything goes.”
Sovereignty’s becoming plastic shows the property of making legitimacy
the primary aim for the state in non-Western societies. Consequently, every
form of heterogeneity that is seen as defining the nation can be taken as
functional and be used by the state for the purpose of legitimizing itself. For
this, even though its desire is so, the power and the state become unable to
reproduce the society; each of the heterogeneities of the society aims at reproducing the power and the state, either by itself or together with other
heterogeneities.
The essence of the tension between the nation-state and globalization is
found just at this point. The nation-state is no longer on stable ground where
it can be sovereign in the Hobbesian sense. To re-construct just such a
ground, a) the nation-state will either recreate the bond between culture and
the political by way of homogenization, but then run counter to the
impositions of globalization (national heterogeneity required for global
homogeneity); b) or by taking heterogeneity as given, it will accept to
legitimize itself (conjecturally) via one or several of them; then, it will
accept to exert sovereignty in the way, level and area that is imposed by
global homogeneity. In other words, it will become plastic and therefore not
be completely sovereign.
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The Effects on Political Identity
We cannot think of the effects of globalization on political identity
independent of macro-level effects described so far. In trying to understand
these effects, we must always take into account the tension between
globalization and the nation-state. When viewed from the perspective of
implications of this tension, it can be observed that the political identity––
whose elements are relatively salient––that Turkey has acquired as a part of
its Westernization process (I call this political identity “Western Turk”) is
subject to dissolution and takes a heterogeneous form.
It is worth mentioning that Turkey has presented itself and received
acceptance with the political identities of “Western Muslim” in the Gulf
War, “Turk-Muslim” in the Azerbaijan-Armenia issue, “Muslim” in the
Bosnia-Herzegovina issue, and most recently “Western-Muslim-Turk” in
the Iraqi war. The reason for this is that the plastic sovereignty phenomenon
also shows itself in the political identity issue; consequently, the role played
by the destruction of the bond between culture and politics (via
globalization) acquires a determining status.
This destruction of the bond is salient in the fact that Turkish nationalism,
as a political identity, considers its citizens as equals without regard to their
ethnic backgrounds, whereas it views Turkishness as a single ethnic whole
(Cizre-Sakallioglu 1996:6). Thus, the political identity that is to be defined
for Turkish society is forced in advance to take shape according to
conjuncturally changing features of heterogeneities that have occurred due
to the effects of globalization; in other words to take a malleable and not a
stable stance.
Because the part of globalization that is oriented toward homogeneity
allows diversified identities to express themselves, the nation-state’s
political identities, which it defines on the basis of their own heterogeneities,
are bound to be limited and transient.
What is stable and permanent is only the political identity that the
cultural codes of globalization impose. A typical example of this is the
conditions that have arisen due to the war in Afghanistan after the terrorist
attacks of September 11. Internally, our political identity is “Turkish”:
secularism has limited the Muslim Brotherhood to a belief sphere and has
excluded it from being an element of political identity. However, the “global
war,” from the perspective of its aims, is intending to include Turkey in the
war as a “Muslim” country and, therefore, to designate “Muslim
Brotherhood” as a descriptive function for its political identity. Interestingly,
the conflicts in the last decade of Turkish political life center around
whether such a function can be attributed to “Muslim Brotherhood.”
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FUTURE WITHOUT ANY GUARANTEE
In line with what has been discussed so far, one pole of the dilemma in
which the possibility of non-Western societies’ getting stuck in the loserswinners dialectic exists, representing the matter called by Arif Dirlik as selforientalization (Dirlik 1997:115). This symbolization tells us that global
culture codes essentially exist in our own “true” and “native” resources; thus,
it recreates/reproduces them and provides a legitimate basis for their
acceptance. Being in the position of winner and the hopes that emerge about
the permanence of this position and/or the promises given make possible
this symbolization. In this way, the society directed toward perceiving itself
as a part of the dominant cultural world experiences the pleasantness of
being together, and in some situations, even that of ruling, and shows an
acceptance of all the demands of the global.
The other pole of the dilemma is represented by what Ulrich Beck (2000)
calls “globalism,” the domination of the world market economy without
alternative. Some claim that this domination is a new form of nationalism,
which will ultimately construct a world state.
This imposes itself as a factor that leads to the political provocation of
non-Western societies; because if globalism, as a new form of nationalism,
proceeds toward this imposition by bringing together “Western” culture
codes under a broad umbrella (i.e., by turning globalism into a “pan”
nationalism), then this will lead to both the provocation of other
nationalisms, and thus, to the formation of an alternative “pan” nationalism,
and also the broadening of the area of political conflicts.
Not only conflicts between different worlds, but also conflicts within
those worlds will come to be on agenda. Indeed, this is what is happening in
the world currently. It is a victory for globalization that humanity seems to
have internalized this situation because under the guidance of the “both this
and that” logic, everything is considered to be valid. This is true for both
winners and losers. Therefore, just as Turkey’s position in relation to
globalization is not unique, so is her fate uncertain: in Stuart Hall’s words,
globalization is ultimately a phenomenon that is related to history without
any guarantee (cited by Dirlik 2000:50).
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REFERENCES
AlSayyad, Nezar and Manuel Castells, eds. 2002. Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics,
culture, and citizenship in the age of globalization. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books.
Baudrillard, Jean. 1981. For a critique of the political economy of the sign. St. Louis, Telos
Press Publishing.
Beck, Ulrich. 2000. What is globalization? Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Castells, Manuel. 1997. The power of identity. Oxford and Malden, Mass.: Blackwell
Publishers.
––––. 2000. The rise of the network society. Second Edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
––––. 2004. End of millenium, Second Edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Cizre-Sakallioglu, Umit. 1996. Historicizing the present and problematising the future of
the Kurdish question in Turkey, New Perspectives on Turkey, 14.
Dirlik, Arif. 1997. The postcolonial aura: Third world criticism in the age of global
capitalism, Boulder: Westview Press.
––––. 2000. Globalization as the end and the beginning of history: The contradictory
implications of a new paradigm. Working paper series. Institute on Globalization and the
Human Condition: McMaster University.
Giddens, Anthony. 1981. A contemporary critique of historical materialism. London:
Macmillan.
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. 2000. Empire. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press.
Luhmann, Niklas. 1990. Essays on self-reference. New York: Columbia University Press.
––––. 1995. Social systems. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Mohammadi, Ali. 2002. Islam encountering globalization. London: Routledge Curzon.
National Program. 2001. http://www.abgs.gov.tr
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Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009
Virtual Meetings in the Middle East:
Implementing the Contact Hypothesis on the Internet1
KATELYN Y. A. MCKENNA
TAL SAMUEL-AZRAN
NATALIE SUTTON-BALABAN
Despite the fact that the contact hypothesis has been described as one of the
most successful ideas in the history of social psychology (Brown 2000), there
have been few tests to determine whether this hypothesis can be borne out,
and to what extent, within the sphere of everyday life. Amichai-Hamburger
and McKenna (2006) have argued that the Internet may be the best tool
developed thus far for effectively putting the contact hypothesis into practice.
The Good Neighbors website was designed to test the efficacy of implementing
the contact hypothesis online within the conflict-ridden setting of the Middle
East. This article discusses the practical problems and promise of bringing
about a successful contact situation online and examines relevant highlights
from a larger virtual ethnography conducted over the first 18 months the
website was in operation. The ethnographic study focused on several
“flashpoint event ––that is, events occurring in the region that tend to shake
up the status quo by serving to heighten an individual’s sense of national
identity, increase the use of stereotyping, or to serve as a catalyst for critical
examination of one’s own culture, one’s nation’s actions or that of a
neighboring country––as examination points for attitude shifts within the
framework of the contact hypothesis.
True acquaintance lessens prejudice. That assumption, at least, is the basis
of the contact hypothesis (Allport 1954) and, if so, has important
implications for the resolution of conflict, the reduction of stereotyping and
the furtherance of equality and egalitarian practices. According to the theory,
knowledge alone will not cause people to negate their prejudices and
stereotypes about others. Research has long shown that individuals filter and
sift through new information to accept only those pieces that readily fit into
their preconceived schema of the world. Encouragingly, however, the
contact hypothesis suggests that, through getting to know the “other,”
individuals may be able to not only break down their stereotypes of him or
her, but to also reduce their stereotyping of the entire group to which the
individual belongs.
Yet, despite the fact that the contact hypothesis has been described as one
of the most successful ideas in the history of social psychology (Brown
2000), there have been few tests to determine whether this hypothesis can be
borne out, and to what extent, within the sphere of everyday life.
The Good Neighbors Web project (http://gnblog.com) was thus launched
to do just that. The project brings together participants from the Middle East,
1
This research was supported by a grant from the Burda Center for Innovative Technology.
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a region particularly fraught with conflict and segmentation. The initial
phase of the project consists of a group weblog in which invited authors,
representative of significant segments of their countrymen, write articles
dealing with a wide range of issues from the cultural to the political to the
intensely personal. A comment section also exists for each of the blog
entries. Here, participants discuss the blog entry and express their own
opinions on the issue at hand, engaging in a vibrant give-and-take
discussion with one another. Participation in the comments sections is open
to anyone who chooses to participate and thus includes not only the invited
authors but also visitors to the site from around the world. In the third year
of the project, additional communications features will be sequentially
added and examined in line with the suggestions of Hamburger and
McKenna (2006).
The contact hypothesis posits that if individuals interact under conditions
where there is equal status within the situation, if the participants share
common goals, and if intergroup cooperation can be successfully fostered,
then the tensions existing between them and the stereotypes they have of
one another and of the larger group will be significantly reduced. As will be
discussed in greater detail, there are significant barriers to achieving these
requirements when participants are brought together for face-to-face
meetings and, in the case of the Middle East, significant barriers to bringing
together participants at all. Indeed, the Middle East presents a far more
complex “nut to crack” than when attempting to reduce stereotyping and to
build bridges between two groups, such as between blacks and whites,
French-speaking versus English-speaking Canadians, or Catholics and
Protestants in Ireland.
COMPLEX REGIONAL CONFLICTS
While the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the most prominent of the
tensions in the Middle East and receives the most media and international
attention, less visible but no less influential are the numerous other tensions
between countries, and between groups within the various countries, in the
region. None of these tensions, prejudices and conflicts exists in a vacuum
but, rather, each is intimately tied to, influences and affects the other
ongoing conflicts and tensions in the entire region.
In Lebanon, for instance, the tensions between the three primary religious
sects (Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Shi’ite Muslim) that brought about a
nearly 20-year long civil war in the 1980s still simmer just below boiling
point. The country is further split in its support for the pro-Syrian bloc,
which wants Lebanon to be under Syrian control and is exemplified by the
(primarily Shi’ite) militant group Hizbullah, and those who support the
“March 14th Alliance,” named after the date on which a chain of mass
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demonstrations began in 2005 in protest against the assassination of
Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri (February 14, 2005) and calling for
the Syrian occupation and political control of Lebanon to end. These
demonstrations became known as the “Cedar Revolution” and, in the
elections two months later, the “March 14ers” became the dominant group
in the Lebanese parliament, although recent assassinations have reduced
their number to a bare majority.
Tensions remain high between Lebanon and Israel, particularly following
the Hizbullah-initiated Second Lebanon War between the two in the
summer of 2006. Lebanese take a strong pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli
stance when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and yet, within their
own country, Palestinians are generally despised and discriminated against
both on a legal and practical level. For instance, legislation bars Palestinians
from owning property in Lebanon and they are prohibited from working in
72 professions in the country. In 2007, tensions flared into armed conflict
between militants within one of the Palestinian refugee camps and the
Lebanese Army, leaving nearly 500 civilians, militants and soldiers dead.
Beneath all of these conflicts and factions lie the ever-shifting clan
allegiances and rivalries.
THE INTERNET
While Lebanon is a very complex country with its (often overlapping)
layers of tensions and conflicts, it is by no means unique in the region. The
conflicts and tensions that plague the Middle East are intimately related.
Many of the stereotypes of particular groups are shared across borders and
many of the conflicts occurring within one country can be found in other
countries as well (e.g., conflicts between secularists and fundamentalists).
Given the tensions and, in some cases, the legal barriers (both Lebanon and
Syria, for instance, have laws prohibiting contact between their citizens and
Israeli citizens) as well as a lack of “neutral ground” within the Middle East
and the cost of travel, arranging for a physical meeting between participants
from the region is exceedingly difficult. The Internet may thus be the best
opportunity to bring together participants from the Middle East in an effort
to promote dialog and interaction that may reduce the stereotypes and
conflicts that plague the region.
Indeed, a great deal of cross-country interaction has been taking place
between individuals within the Middle East via the Internet over the past
five years. Increasingly, average citizens residing in “enemy” countries are
talking across borders through connections made via Facebook, personal
blogs, group peace blogs, forums, and even in the “talk-back” sections of
newspapers. Maintaining, reading and interacting through blogs are
activities that are becoming increasingly popular in the Middle East, with
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the number of bloggers expanding exponentially. According to The
Washington Institute (Exum, February 27, 2007), the number of Middle
Eastern bloggers has been increasing by 50 percent every six months. But
what, if any, is the impact of such cross-border dialogue and connections?
This chapter begins with a discussion of the main means through which
most inhabitants of the Middle East learn about one another––television and
print media––and the effectiveness of these mediums for reducing
stereotypes and increasing understanding. We then turn to the potential of
the Internet for implementing the contact hypothesis, followed by reporting
the results of an ethnographic study conducted on the Good Neighbors Blog,
as it tests the viability of the Internet as a venue to not only bring disparate
groups together but to achieve the aims of the contact hypothesis.
MASS MEDIA, CROSS-CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING
AND STEREOTYPING
Currently, the two main forms in which people from the region learn
about the “other” are through the global and regional mass media networks
(e.g., Al-Jazeera, CNN) and via the Internet. As we will now show, while
the latter option (online interactions) provides a prime opportunity to
increase understanding by bringing together participants from across the
Middle East, the former (learning of the neighboring cultures from the mass
media) has not fulfilled its promise. Indeed, the disappointment resulting
from the mass media representations––which often serve to heighten
stereotyping, tensions and misunderstanding rather than reducing them––is
one of the reasons behind the Good Neighbors initiative.
The advent of transnational news networks, and most notably CNN’s
cross-border broadcasting of the 1991 Gulf War to a “global audience,” has
facilitated a debate regarding the influence of transnational connectivity on
the potential to reduce cross-cultural stereotypes. The hyperglobalist
paradigm sees that international Western news networks such as CNN, BBC
World Service, Euronews, Star News and Sky news, are extending the
bounds of the nation-state and bringing about the emergence of a
transnational, if not a “global public sphere.” The argument goes that these
international networks influence the political communications of nations
worldwide, thus shrinking the national “public sphere” in favor of a global
one (e.g., Volkmer 1999).
The hyperglobalist view builds from the work of Robertson (1992) and
Featherstone (1990). Robertson argues that under globalization, the world
becomes a single place that serves as a frame of reference to everyone. He
posits that globalization is a reflexive process where participants must
monitor the impact of changes on their lives and must identify their own
positions in relation to the larger process. In other words, no one can feel
comfortably “at home” anymore. Robertson views globalization as creating
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a new “global consciousness,” where cultures become “relativized” to each
other (Robertson 1992:183), thus creating something like a “global culture.”
This, he argues, expands the national public sphere to create “intersocietal
and intercivilizational encounters,” and consequently, a “long term process
of cultural syncretization” (Robertson 1992:141).
Building on the work of Robertson, Volkmer (1999) suggests that
satellite news networks are part of this syncretization process (together with
non-government-organizations, henceforth NGOs, such as World Watch and
Greenpeace). To illustrate this argument, consider the various events that
international media brought to the “global consciousness,” and that arguably
would not have created the same resonance without global media
technologies (such as satellite television and the Web): such events range
from political-environmental matters such as Shell’s plan to dump the Brent
Spar oil platform in the North Sea, the French nuclear testing in the Pacific
ocean, and the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in China (examples
taken from Hjarvard 2001:18).
While in some cases, such as the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square,
the global broadcasting of the events and the emergent “global
consciousness” was not enough to stop the atrocities from happening, in
other cases the global broadcast of the gory images of atrocities actually
contributed to reverse what the so-called “international community” saw as
misdeeds. Serra’s (1999) study on the influence of international pressure to
halt the murders of Brazilian street children is a case in point. In this case, it
has been argued that the Brazilian press reproduced social prejudices against
the street children, despite the fact that the number of murders of these
children escalated in the mid-1980s. Serra (1999) argued that it was the
widespread international media coverage that encouraged an international
outcry over the killings. According to Serra’s empirical study, the
international pressure instigated debates on the matter in foreign parliaments,
human rights groups (which pressured their own governments to act on the
killings), and even a threat of economic sanctions on the Brazilian
government from influential intergovernmental bodies such as the European
Parliament.
In another important empirical work, Volkmer (1999) found that CNN
World Report is used in crisis regions (e.g., Cyprus) not only as a global
newscast, but also as a communication platform to communicate bilaterally
with the opposing party (such as with Antenna TV Greece and TRT Turkey).
News shows such as CNN’s World Report are taking a “more overt kind of
socially responsible commercialism” by “using a more inclusive and cooperative approach to getting out the news,” where “the number of [global]
players and the number of perspectives is greatly enhanced” (Fluorney
1992:21).
In light of this policy, Fluorney posits that, “if Ted Turner has his way,
international conflict will be less and international understanding will be
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greater.” In accordance, Volkmer (1999) optimistically argued that the
global news environment rapidly transforms political communication within
nations, creates a global rather than a local public, and bypasses the
traditional “gatekeeping” hierarchies. This, Volkmer suggests, fosters
cooperation and affiliation on an international level and, through the placing
of news events in this multinational context, stereotypes will be avoided.
Similarly, Hannerz (1996:62) coined the term “creative confrontation” to
portray the desired reality of cross-cultural heterogeneity in the media
globalization age, defining it as a merging of separate streams of meaning
that creates a “generative cultural process” (Hannerz:62).
Perhaps surprisingly, the media coverage of the horrific events of
September 11, 2001 in the U.S. is seen to support the hyperglobalist theory.
In the context of the “global news order” in the wake of 9/11, Volkmer
(2002) applied the advent of Al-Jazeera to the concept of “micro-frames,”
arguing that the global spread of Al-Jazeera’s news reports had the potential
to transform traditional political communication within countries.
Nevertheless, the optimistic notion of a new global news order suffers
from wide criticism and seems anachronistic in the post-September 11 (socalled) “Global War on Terror.” There are two strong lines of criticism
regarding the hyperglobalist perspective. The first comes from various
political economist traditions and argues that what is taking place is not the
emergence of a “global civil society” but rather a continuing domination of
the “local public sphere” by several Western transnational corporations.
These corporations are motivated by economic interests rather than by
providing a public service, thus creating something that has been widely
described as Western “media imperialism” (see Boyd-Barrett 1977, 1998).
In light of the global dominance of Western news networks such as CNN,
BBC World, Sky News, Schiller (1993:47) argues that Western corporate
media is silencing public debate in developing countries, which results in an
increased commodification of both culture and public in these countries:
I do not believe that globalization of the media industries sector has resulted
in the formation of an international civil society as such. Rather, this process
has resulted in an international order organized by transnational economic
interests that are largely unaccountable to the nation-states in which they
operate.
The second line of criticism emphasizes the continuing importance of the
national in the mediation and domestication of foreign media. Scholars
argue that news from transnational networks is being “glocalized” (see
Robertson 1992) in different countries in accordance with the local agenda.
Sparks (1998) argues that the local has shaped the content of transnational
networks, which had to cater and “glocalize” its content, as in the case of
MTV Asia and the export of British Broadcasting Corporation (henceforth
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BBC) World program, which are “localized” in local languages and rebroadcast by local agents. Sparks (1998) mentions that many transnational
networks (e.g. Sky News) were forced to localize their content, clearly
contradicting the idea of a “global public sphere.” Similarly, Schlesinger
(1999) brings the example of the Independent Television Network
(henceforth ITN), which, due to audience demand, had to “localize” its
content through collaboration with local content-providers. To these caveats
we can add Rupert Murdoch’s Star TV in India, which was also forced to
refine its programming in accordance with local taste (see Thussu 2000:186).
The argument regarding the domestication of international news is
supported by Clausen’s (2004) comparative study of news production in
Denmark and Japan. The study, which was based on interviews with 40
media experts and news producers from two of Japan’s most prominent
(public and private) channels, found that the stations had “domesticated” the
content of international news. For example, when examining the framing of
a U.N. conference on female equality (that took place in China), Clausen
found that, due to national agenda, the Danish television anchors criticized
the Chinese organizers for operating “in direct contrast to the conference
themes,” but that the Japanese media did not offer criticism on the Chinese
organizers. He concluded that the efforts to put the news events in a context
that local audiences would readily understand, coupled with the varying
contextual differences, among not only the distinct nations but also among
the various news organizations within those nations, leads news content to
differ.
Clausen’s argument is also supported by evidence from empirical studies
of news exchange mechanisms. In their comprehensive empirical content
analysis study (of 2,569 news stories) of patterns of story usage of the
national services of news stories from the Eurovision News Exchange
channel, Gurevitz and his colleagues argued that the networks were
“domesticating” the “foreign” news, and concluded that “the globalization
of television news has not diminished the uniquely national character of
news program on different countries” (Gurevitz et al. 1991:206; Cohen et al.
1996). Rather, they assert, “the Global Newsroom is still confronted by a
Tower of Babel” (Gurevitz et al. 1991:214–5).
Finally, audience reception studies show that the “national” plays a
central role in the understanding and interpretation of international news.
Jensen’s (1998) study of the reception of international news by audiences in
seven countries found that interpretation of foreign news is influenced by
how they view the position of their own nation in the world. Similarly,
Martin-Barbero has argued that people filter and organize information to fit
within the framework of their own culture and their own culturally
generated understanding of the world (Martin-Barbero 1993).
What all this means is that despite the optimistic notion that media
globalization would be able to promote cross-cultural understanding and a
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genuine avoidance of stereotypes, what actually happens is that audiences
and local networks are “reading” international text in a local context.
Furthermore, while scholars argued that Al-Jazeera would contribute to
promote the Arab perspective to Middle-Eastern countries including Israel,
the Al-Jazeera broadcasting in Israel mostly creates outrage and claims of
bias. In March 2008, Israel decided to impose an official embargo on the
Arabic Al Jazeera satellite TV network due to the Foreign Ministry’s
assessment that the station functioned as a propaganda arm in the Arab war
against the Jewish state.
Even with the best of intentions and even were the various media to
provide wholly unbiased, objective and balanced coverage of events, people
and cultures of the various countries of the Middle East, the media would
likely have little effect in countering culturally imbedded stereotypes and
long-held prejudices. While knowledge may be power, research has long
shown that knowledge alone does not significantly reduce stereotypes or
deeply held prejudice. As Pate (1981) noted, “knowledge alone will not
reduce prejudice; knowledge is something of a prerequisite of prejudice
reduction, not the sole means” (Pate:288). Nor is contact alone with
members of an out-group enough to bring about such a reduction and,
indeed, can actually lead to an increase in tension (e.g., Connolly 1995).
We turn now to the conditions under which a combination of knowledge
and contact may prove to be effective, the ways in which these conditions
can be met within the online environment and, specifically, how they were
implemented in the Good Neighbors project.
THE KEYS TO THE CONTACT
Amichai-Hamburger and McKenna (2006) have argued that the Internet
may be the best tool developed thus far for effectively putting the contact
hypothesis into practice, as the Internet may also offer solutions to many of
the problems that occur in attempting to meet many of the conditions
necessary for a successful contact in the face-to-face world. They outline the
ways in which the Internet appears to be uniquely suited to the
implementation of the various requirements of the contact hypothesis that
have, through previous research, been found necessary to consistently
produce successful outcomes. Particularly important to successfully
fulfilling the goals of the contact hypothesis are unique aspects of online
communication that can overcome some of the barriers to this fulfillment in
face-to-face situations. Specifically, the ability for individuals to take part
anonymously, the lack of physical cues within a text-based environment to
prevent the automatic activation of stereotyping sparked by visibly available
features (e.g., skin color, attractiveness), the greater tendency to engage in
self-disclosure within online venues as compared to face-to-face, and the
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ability to manipulate the salience of individual versus group-level
perception and identification, may prove crucial to the process.
KEY CONDITIONS OF THE CONTACT HYPOTHESIS
Under ideal circumstances, when a member of a majority group meets
with a minority group member and the experience is a positive one, an
attitude change on two levels will result (Allport 1954). An attitude change
that is target-specific will occur first, that is, initial assumptions about the
other that arise from the (negative) stereotypes associated with his or her
group will be replaced by more positive perceptions of the individual. These
new positive associations with the individual will then become extended to
that individual’s group as a whole. This second step should thus reduce
negative attitudes toward the minority group.
Allport (1954) delineated three key conditions that must be met for such
a meeting to prove successful: equal-group status within the situation,
common goals and intergroup cooperation. A fourth condition outlined by
Allport, institutional support, is necessary should the meeting take place
among members of corporations, government ministries and so forth.
Several other conditions were later added, the most important of these being
voluntary participation and intimate contact (Amir 1969, 1976) that have
been shown to increase, but not be crucial to, the chance of a successful
contact.
Previous research provides strong empirical support for the assertion that,
when effectively implemented, Allport’s three conditions described above
do, indeed, lead to a positive attitude change that is target-specific (e.g.,
Brown and Wade 1987; Hewstone and Brown 1986; Riordan and Ruggiero
1980); that is, such facilitated contact between individuals from disparate
groups leads to more positive feelings toward, and perceptions of, the
individuals with whom they come into contact.
The evidence is more contradictory regarding a global attitude change
toward the group, however. A majority of studies do not find that the newly
formed positive attitude toward the individual translates into a more positive
attitude toward the group or into more positive behavior toward other
individual group members (see Hewstone and Brown, 1986 for a review). In
other words, the individual in question will be viewed positively, but he or
she will be seen as an exception to the norm and the stereotypes held toward
the group as a whole will remain undiminished.
A minority of studies (e.g., Scarberry, Ratcliff, Lord, Lanicek and
Desforges 1997) demonstrate that a global attitude change can be
consistently achieved, but only under carefully controlled conditions.
Pettigrew and Tropp (2000), in their meta-analysis of contact studies, have
found that it is not necessary for all of Allport’s (1954) conditions to be
present simultaneously for bias to be reduced. Indeed, mere contact can be a
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sufficient condition for bias reduction that is lasting and generalizes beyond
the individuals to their larger group. Importantly, however, each of Allport’s
conditions further enhances the bias-reducing effects of mere contact and,
thus, the more conditions that are co-present, the more likely a successful
and lasting outcome will be achieved.
There are significant barriers to meeting many of the conditions and,
indeed, even to arranging for “mere contact” to take place in the face-to-face
world. This, in turn, limits the number of contacts that actually take place.
The Internet provides wider opportunities for contacts to take place and
greater ease of creating the necessary conditions under which such contacts
should, optimally, take place. Below we discuss these conditions in greater
detail and their implementation on the Good Neighbors Blog in specific.
As noted above, organizers often face significant difficulties in arranging
a meeting among individuals and groups when it comes to recruiting
individuals to participate, finding a suitable meeting place, transporting the
participants involved, and compensating participants for lost time due to
travel incurred. This is particularly the case when the various members to be
involved live at some distance from one another, or all live some distance
from the nearest “neutral ground” on which a meeting could take place.
Participation may thus be limited to those members of the groups or
countries who have the financial resources and job flexibility to enable their
attendance, or those who live in close proximity to the meeting site, rather
than to all members who have the inclination (but not the resources) to
attend. Further, face-to-face meetings are not possible for participants for
whom legal restrictions and repercussions prohibit their attendance. Thus
the number of participants, number of contacts and, in some cases,
representation of all groups possible are severely curtailed when such
meetings are face-to-face affairs.
The advent of computer-mediated interaction has opened the doors to
connection possibilities that were previously not feasible. Time differences
and physical distance are no longer obstacles to bringing people “together,”
at least in the developed countries of the world. Electronic meetings are
neither costly to set up nor are they time-consuming for the participants. All
that is required is for the participants to log onto the Internet and into the
virtual meeting space from a computer in their home, school, place of work
or public Internet cafe.
In fact, there are distinct advantages to participants engaging in the
contact from the privacy of their respective homes (Hamburger and
McKenna 2006). Participants are likely to feel more comfortable and at ease
in their familiar surroundings. Further, research has shown that public, as
opposed to private, settings can exacerbate the activation and use of
stereotypes, especially when it comes to those tied to racial prejudice (e.g.,
Lambert, Payne, et al. 2003). As Zajonc (1965) has shown, an individual’s
habitual or dominant response is more likely to emerge in public settings,
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whereas the individual is likely to be more open and receptive to altering the
habitual response when in a private sphere. Even when participants interact
in quite “public” electronic venues but do so from the privacy of their
homes, they tend to feel that it is a private affair (e.g., McKenna and Bargh
2000; McKenna 2007). Thus, interacting electronically from home should
serve to inhibit the activation of stereotypes as compared to a more public
and face-to-face setting in a new environment.
The Good Neighbors website was designed to ensure that participants
from across the Middle East would be able to access the site. The location of
the server was an important consideration in establishing the site. For
instance, Syria and the United Arab Emirates block all websites originating
within Israel, where the Good Neighbors project originated, and thus
participation would be barred to individuals from these countries were the
site to be hosted on an Israeli server. Further, participants from countries
such as Lebanon, which prohibits contact with Israelis, and even from
countries with which Israel has peace treaties, such as Egypt and Jordan,
may have feared visiting and participating in a site located within Israel.
Locating the site within Jordan was initially considered, but the server
owners who were contacted there declined to host an “Israeli” site once they
realized that their payments would be issued from a bank within Israel. Thus,
the server for the site itself is located outside of the Middle East, on “neutral
ground” in Canada, enabling access to participants across the Middle East.
Of course, there are still limitations on potential participation within an
online framework. Those who may be interested in participating must have
access to a computer and the Internet and, in the case of Good Neighbors,
have a command of at least rudimentary English in order to take part.
Nonetheless, the number of potential participants is exponentially higher
than is the case when face-to-face contact situations are arranged. Face-toface contacts, for instance, generally involve only a very small number of
participants at any given meeting. The Good Neighbors blog, in addition to
the invited authors, has more than 100 regular commenters and a daily
average readership of 2,000, with visitors coming from an average of 87
different countries.
ACHIEVING STATUS EQUALITY
Creating the perception of equal status among all participating members
is an important component of the Contact Hypothesis. According to
McClendon (1974), equal status increases the likelihood for perceived
similarities among the individuals and groups and so enhances the
likelihood for improvement in their relationships and in the reduction of
stereotypes (Pettigrew 1971). In a best-case scenario, there should be both
external equal status (in real life) and internal equal status (within the
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contact) among the people taking part in the encounter. In face-to-face
encounters, even very subtle differences in manner of dress, body language,
use of personal space and the seating positions taken in the room can
suggest real (or perceived) status differences. As Hogg (1993) has shown,
within group interactions people tend to be highly sensitive in discerning
subtle cues that may be indicative of status. Online interactions have the
advantage here because many, although not all, of the cues individuals
typically rely on to gauge the internal and external status of others are not
typically in evidence (see Hamburger and McKenna 2006, McKenna 2008).
One aspect of electronic communications that has long been decried (e.g.,
Sproull and Kiesler 1991) is the tendency, within organizational settings, for
there to be a reduction in the usual inhibitions that typically operate when
interacting with one’s superiors. In other words, existing internal status does
not carry as much weight and does not affect the behavior of the group
members to such an extent. Underlings are more likely to speak up, to speak
“out of turn,” and to speak their mind. Thus electronic interaction makes
power less of an issue during discussion which leads group members,
regardless of status, to contribute more to the discussion (Spears, Postmes,
Lea and Wolbert 2002). While this can prove to be problematic within a
corporate setting, it is advantageous in the present context, as the medium
serves to reduce the constraining effects of status both within and among the
groups. In other words, participants feel freer to speak their minds and to
deviate from the many “party lines” espoused by politicians and other group
“representatives” when covered in the media.
GENERALIZING BEYOND THE INDIVIDUAL
The largest hurdle to facilitating a successful contact is the tendency for
the various members of the contact situation to come to feel quite close to
one another and yet to view their new comrades from the out-group as
exceptions to their group rather than as normative representatives. Unless
the members of the out-group are perceived as representative members, the
contact will have failed, for no changes in the perceived stereotype of the
group as a whole will have taken place.
One of the advantages of online communication is that one can quite
easily manipulate the degree of individual versus group saliency in a given
contact situation in order to achieve a desired outcome. Indeed, there are
actually two group identifications involved. The first is, of course, the group
of origin––the group the individual is representing within the contact
situation. The second is the new group that forms that is composed of those
taking part in the contact situation. A delicate balance must be maintained
for the degree of saliency for each of these identification dimensions.
Importantly, in an online environment, one can hit three birds with one
stone: one can moderate the sense of individuality and heighten the
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perception of the individual members as representative of their disparate
groups while simultaneously fostering feelings of kinship and attachment to
the “new group” composed of all members taking part in the exercise
(McKenna 2008).
Spears et al. (2002) have argued that anonymous communication within
groups leads to a sense of depersonalization by the group members. That is,
members feel an absence of personal accountability and personal identity
and thus the group-level identity becomes more important. When the grouplevel identity is thus heightened, Spears et al. (2002) have shown that group
norms can have an even stronger effect than what occurs in face-to-face
interactions. Further, heightened group identity is associated with greater
liking for the fellow group members, greater respect for their opinions, and
so forth. The degree to which the group identity is salient, however, plays an
important role in determining what the effects of anonymity will be on the
development of group norms. Thus, participants on the Good Neighbors
blog choose a nickname (e.g., Blacksmith Jade) or use only a first name
(e.g., Yaeli) in order to heighten the sense of group-level identity specific to
the Good Neighbors community (the GN-identity). Further heightening the
sense of a common GN-Identity are the informational pages, the stated goals
of the website, rules for participation, and so forth, which are expressed in
terms of “we,” “us” and “our.” This appears to be effective in heightening
the sense of GN-Identity not only for the authors but also for those who take
part through commenting, as there are frequent references to “all of us” and
“we here at GN…”
In order to heighten the sense that the individual “GN” members are also
representatives of their respective wider regional groups, the flag of each
member’s country (or region, in the case of the Palestinian participants)
appears beside each author’s name. Thus, there is a visual tie and reminder
linking the individual to his or her nationality. This appears to be an
effective means of heightening the sense that these individuals are, indeed,
representative of their larger nation-groups as commenters on the blog
frequently make such references as, “the Lebanese posters seem to feel…”
or “It is good to hear the Lebanese viewpoint” in response to a contribution
by an individual from Lebanon.
Mutual self-disclosure is a critical component for the formation of close
interpersonal bonds, the establishment of a sense of belonging and
acceptance, and trust are all requirements for the amelioration of stereotypes
and an increase in understanding. Thus, problematically, interactions
between in-group and out-group members are usually conducted on a casual
and superficial level. One of the major advantages of Internet interactions
over face-to-face interactions is the general tendency for individuals to
engage in greater self-disclosure and more intimate exchanges there.
Interactions online tend to become “more than skin deep” and to do so quite
quickly (e.g., McKenna et al. 2002; McKenna 2007; Walther 1996).
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Research on e-gotiations has also found that initially sharing some
personal information in the form of a “getting to know each other” exchange
prior to engaging in negotiations significantly increases the chance that the
participants will reach a mutually beneficial agreement rather than
negotiations ending in an impasse (see Thompson and Nadler 2002). Thus,
at the start of the Good Neighbors project, all of the authors taking part at
the time were encouraged to introduce themselves and to share information
about themselves and their perspectives. This was done in several ways. In
the week before the website went “live,” a round-robin email went out to the
“foundational 7” authors in which they were encouraged to get to know one
another via this group email exchange. Each author then contributed an
“introduction” post on the website. A number of the early postings that
followed by the various individual authors spontaneously focused on nonpolitically oriented topics or on topics only peripherally related to the
political and social tensions. For instance, an Israeli author contributed a
post titled “something personal” about a trip to Ein Gedi and her love of the
outdoors and a Palestinian author suggested “Let’s use modern art” as a way
to forge cross-cultural connections. Additional authors were recruited and
brought in slowly, with a period of approximately two months spaced
between each new “recruitment round,” in order to allow time for group
norms and unity to be developed and a sense of trust and camaraderie to be
established before the group grew larger, and to ensure that the new authors
became well integrated within the group. Each new author also provided an
“introduction” post.
So, how effective have these efforts proved and does the Internet indeed
have the potential to create effective contact situations? We turn now to the
results of an ethnographic study of the Good Neighbors website and discuss
the limitations that have been encountered and some preliminary indicators
of some success.
RESULTS OF A VIRTUAL ETHNOGRAPHY
A virtual ethnography is simply an ethnography that treats cyberspace as
the ethnographic reality. In accordance with the special characteristics of the
Internet, Hine (2000) maintains that the research technique of virtual
ethnography should perceive Internet users as a specialized audience that
not only consumes but also “culturally produces” content. The main
advantage of this research method is that compared to surveys, experiments,
focus groups and personal interviews, virtual ethnography is a far less
obtrusive method.
Nevertheless, this does not come without problems, as the method’s
major weakness is that it is often difficult to verify the authenticity of
respondents online. Fortunately, in the case of the Good Neighbors project,
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the longitudinal nature of the study and the limited number of participating
authors allowed a relatively in-depth familiarity of the researchers with the
bloggers participating in the study. Further, as a result of the relationships
established through the group, a number of the participants from various
regions have managed to get together in person (post-ethnography),
including the Israeli participants meeting with their Palestinian “good
neighbors” and one of the Lebanese contributors with dual-nationality
visiting Israel. Several of the Lebanese authors have also subsequently met
with the Egyptian contributors.
The ethnography was conducted over the first 18 months the website was
in operation. We chose to focus on several “flashpoints”––that is, events
occurring in the region that tend to shake up the status quo by serving to
heighten an individual’s sense of national identity, increase the use of
stereotyping, or to serve as a catalyst for critical examination of one’s own
culture, one’s nation’s actions or that of a neighboring country––as
examination points for attitude shifts.
Specifically, we examined the flashpoint events of the Hamas coup in
Gaza, the execution of Saddam Hussein, the suicide bombings on June 13,
2007 in Beirut, Lebanon and that on February 4, 2008 in Dimona, Israel, the
assassination of Pierre Gemayel and the Fateh Al-Islam uprising in Lebanon.
The reactions of authors and primary commenters on these events were then
examined in light of their previous activities and opinions expressed on the
site and their subsequent contributions were then also particularly examined.
Below we discuss what can be thought of as “the good, the bad and the
ugly” of the promise of the Internet to be an effective tool for facilitating
and implementing the contact hypothesis successfully. We first discuss the
logistical difficulties in implementing the contact hypothesis that were
encountered and then turn to the results of the ethnography.
LIMITATIONS TO THE PROMISE
The project originally envisioned including author participants
representing all of the major regions (countries) and all of the major
“factions” within the Middle East and within the specific regions. Thus, in
the case of Lebanon for instance, we hoped to include Christians, Druze,
Sunnis and Shi’ites, March 14th supporters and supporters of Hizbullah;
Among the Palestinian authors we hoped to number Christians and Muslims,
Fatah supporters and Hamas supporters, and Palestinians in the West Bank
and in the Gaza Strip; Among the Israeli authors we hoped to recruit Jewish
Israelis and Arab Israelis, religious and secular, those in the center of the
country and “settlers,” liberals and conservatives, and so forth. The
assumption was that the anonymity guaranteed to participants would
encourage and enable participation and interaction that otherwise would not
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occur. In this effort, the Good Neighbors project has had only limited
success, however, and for three primary reasons: fear, insecurity about
communicating in English (the only common language to all participants)
and unwillingness to “interact with the enemy.”
The fear factor has resulted in there being a lack of a single
representative from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and only a
limited number of participants from Egypt, Iran, Syria and Jordan.
Originally four representatives from Saudi Arabia, each of whom
maintained an English-language blog, were recruited who were willing to
take part in the project. Several weeks before the website was launched,
however, there was a state crackdown on bloggers and our four Saudi
authors withdrew from the project and closed their personal blogs. Similarly,
in the wake of arrests of bloggers in Egypt, many of the bloggers we
approached there indicated that participation was a risk they did not want to
take. After we recruited a Jordanian blogger and he simply placed a link to
the Good Neighbors site on his own blog, he received death threats through
email because the site included Israeli participants. He quickly, but with
regret, removed the link and withdrew from the project. Thus, clearly, the
promise of anonymity and the location of the server in a neutral
environment are not enough to allay either the fears or the potential risks
associated with taking part in a dialog that is not embraced by one’s wider
society.
Willingness to participate in a contact situation, or lack thereof, is
another difficulty that the Internet does not automatically overcome. The
precepts of the contact hypothesis require that all members willingly engage
in the contact of their own accord and that they be motivated to at least
interact in the contact situation with members of the “out-group.”
Unfortunately, as the adage goes, “You can lead a horse to water, but you
can’t make him drink,” and thus our efforts to recruit Shi’ites from Lebanon
failed either because they refused to interact with fellow countrymen whom
they consider traitors by supporting the Cedar Revolution or because they
refused to interact with their enemies, the Israelis. Similarly, we were
successful in recruiting several Christian Palestinians from the West Bank
(both of whom support Fatah), but were unable to convince any of the West
Bank or Gaza Muslims whom we (and the Palestinian authors) approached,
regardless of their support for Fatah or Hamas. Our Palestinian authors do
differ in that one is in favor of a two-state solution, while the other argues
for a single bi-national state composed of Israelis and Palestinians.
The broadest spectrum of participants comes from Israel with both
settlers and centrists, religious and secular, and liberal and conservative
authors being represented––although some of the authors fulfil more than
one role, by, for instance being both religious and a settler, or liberal and
living in the center of the country, and so forth. Indeed, we were forced to
limit the number of Israeli authors, choosing carefully from among those
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who volunteered to participate, in order to avoid an over-representation of
the Israeli contingent. Nonetheless, we did not succeed in recruiting several
desired “sector” representatives such as Israelis of Ethiopian descent, Druze
or Arab-Israelis. While several Arab-Israelis occasionally interact in the
comments sections, neither they nor those we approached in the above other
categories, felt comfortable enough to contribute to the group as authors
writing in English.
POSITIVE TRENDS
Several successful examples of the contact hypothesis can be observed
on the Good Neighbors website. The connections forged between the
Lebanese and Israeli authors and commenters appear to be particularly
strong and the greatest shifts in attitudes––especially toward perceived
commonly held values, goals, and worldviews––and in closeness seem to
have occurred among these participants. This is particularly surprising given
that the website had originally been slated to open just days into the Second
Lebanon War and opened in fact only several months following its
conclusion.
Below we take several examples of observed attitude change over time to
highlight the breaking down of the in-group versus out-group paradigm of
perception.
The first example focuses on one of the Lebanese authors. This author
never displayed a sense of animosity toward Israel or its citizens; however,
his posts were often quite critical of Israeli policy and government decisions.
Today, approximately 18 months later, this author displays a heightened
sense of identification with Israel. Indeed, his current posts and positions on
the blog resemble those of the Israeli bloggers. Had the information about
the author’s nationality not been known on the site, one could easily mistake
him for an Israeli participant. The change in attitude that occurred in the
period between November 2006 and March 2008 supports the theories
outlined in the contact hypothesis. Below we provide examples and trace the
transformatory process in viewpoint that this blogger underwent.
In January 2007, news reports indicated that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert supported a decision to relocate a separation barrier near the Israeli
town of Modi’in llit. If implemented, this decision would have resulted in a
great hardship for 17,000 Palestinians and would have drawn harsh criticism
throughout the world. The Lebanese author’s response was not sympathetic
toward Israel’s decision to rearrange barriers and emulate those of the
Armistice lines in 1949. Specifically, on January 31, 2007, the author made
the following comments: “I don’t care anymore what happened 4,000 years
ago. Nor do I care what happened in 1948. Nor do I care what happened in
1967… the people who are alive and on the ground TODAY are entitled to
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a life of dignity, and free of violence.” The author chose to take a rather
neutral stance toward Israelis and Palestinians.
However, immediately after the Lebanese army engaged in a battle
against militants in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr El Bared in June
2007 there was a notable shift in the author’s outlook. On June 28, 2007. the
author posted a survey that demonstrated the decrease in approval ratings
toward the United States on a global scale. Middle Eastern countries, whose
population was in the majority Muslim, with the exception of Lebanon, had
a negative view of the United States. The survey’s findings were that 47%
of the Lebanese population had a positive view of the United States. This
post is an attempt by the author to distinguish Lebanon from other Muslim
countries that, unlike Israel, are not noted supporters of the U.S. In the
weeks following the events at Nahr El Bared, the author demonstrated
markedly greater sympathy in his comments for issues that many Israeli
authors were facing, particularly those regarding the dilemma of appropriate
responses to terrorist attacks and the rocket attacks on Israel’s southern
border with Gaza.
More recently, one can observe the author posting comments praising the
foundations of the Israeli state. On March 4, 2008, he commented that
Israel’s founding fathers made a wise decision to maintain a secular state:
“From day 1, solid state institutions were put in place. Things like civic
duties, respect for the law, the state and its institutions, etc. were pounded
into people’s heads from day 1.” As a result of specific events and dialogue
with the other blog members, one can observe a change in the author’s
attitude over time. The author is not alone in displaying such a change in
attitude and greater understanding for “the other”––other authors have
experienced similar changes.
Consider, for instance, one of the Palestinian authors who, from the
beginning of his participation in the website, was critical of anyone who
thought violence was an acceptable way to solve conflicts under any
conditions. He experienced a noted attitude change in late May 2007 when
Hamas and Fatah engaged in what some considered a civil war. Violence
inflicted by Hamas, and other fundamentalist Islamic groups, is something
Israelis have experienced for many years and many of the Israeli
participants on the website had long argued that a violent response in return
was the only mechanism to stop these fundamentalists. After the occurrence
of the civil war, the author began identifying more with the Israeli bloggers.
Though the author still believes that the best approach to solving conflicts is
a peaceful one, there was a marked shift in his logic, as can be seen from his
reactions to events outlined below.
Pierre Gemayel was a member of parliament involved in the anti-Syrian
coalition in Lebanon, who was assassinated on November 21, 2006. Upon
his assassination, this Palestinian author expressed his sympathy to the
Lebanese people and responded to a Lebanese blogger that, “By keeping the
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hope to live in peace, we will eventually live in peace one day!” This author
was saddened by Gemayel’s death, and his comments indicated that he truly
did not believe that killing another human can ever be justified. Even when
Saddam Hussein was killed, the author stood strongly against it. He
commented, “Not that I liked Saddam, NOT AT ALL ACTUALLY! But I
can’t understand that some people consider that they are allowed to take
away a life in the name of ‘justice.’”
As time passed, and the events discussed on the blog had a more personal
effect on the author, he began reflecting many of the opinions shared by a
majority of the Israeli and Lebanese contributors’ vis-à-vis appropriate
reactions to militant attacks, namely, attack in return and with enough force
to quell the militant force. In a May 2007 post regarding the Fatah- Hamas
clashes in Gaza, the author demonstrated a surprising attitude shift and
noted that violence would be the only way to end this civil war. His post
read as follows: “The sooner it will explode, the better for everyone! Even
though the outcome is surely going to be violent and dramatic, I prefer a
violent outcome now than a full scale world war.”
The uprising of Fateh al Islam in Lebanon also brought out a significant
attitude change among the Palestinian authors and commenters, in general,
toward Israel as they contrasted their treatment by Israel to that of
Palestinians living in Lebanon. One of the Palestinian authors contributed a
post decrying the treatment of Palestinians in Lebanon over the past 60
years and noted that he was “glad I live in the West Bank.” In the comments
on his post and on other posts regarding the uprising, Palestinian
commenters who had consistently described living under Israeli occupation
in terms such as being subjected to “the greatest crime in history,” were now
making statements such as “the Palestinians living in Lebanon have no civil
rights (unlike those living in Egypt, Jordan, and under the Israelis…)” and,
“A lot of things that Israel does to us are nothing compared to what Lebanon,
the Host, does to its so called ‘Guests!’”
Meanwhile, the Lebanese were finding greater understanding with the
Israelis after one of the Lebanese authors wrote a post titled
“Disproportionate Lebanese response?! Are you serious?!” regarding the
response of the international media and community to the Lebanese Army
response against the militants. The Israeli commenters and authors were
quick to point out that such a reaction to Israeli military responses to attacks
against Israeli civilians coming from Gaza were the order of the day, with
one Israeli commenter summing it up: “What can I say… welcome to a
small taste of our world, bro.” Literally all of the Lebanese commenters and
authors noted that, where they had previously felt outrage when Israeli
military responses against militants in Gaza resulted in civilian casualties
and thus condemned Israel, they now understood the need for such military
responses despite the loss of civilian life. In an interesting exchange
between Lebanese and Palestinian participants, one Lebanese author noted:
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
As to why the Lebanese Army is bombarding the camp…Well… How do
you expect the army to root out the terrorists? I mean, we all know it sucks to
be an innocent civilian caught in the crossfire, or even worse, used as a human
shield (reports are now coming out to that effect, see my other post). But you
have to blame the terrorists here, not the LAF.
A Palestinian responded, “When Israel does this to us, we say that it’s
terrorism, when we do it to each other, it’s collateral damage… and we
blame the terrorists. Why these double standards?” and the Lebanese
answered, “No, it is not a double standard (at least not for me), because last
summer, as much as I lamented the human losses, I completely understood
Israel’s right to defend itself from Hizbullah’s rockets and soldier
kidnappings. I didn’t agree with the IAF hitting civilian infrastructure like
bridges and stuff, but I totally agreed with their justification of hitting back
at Hizbullah.”
CONCLUSIONS
The above examples are certainly not stand-alone instances that indicate
that, over time and with greater knowledge and intimacy on a personal level
(rather than simply knowledge about the other), the contact hypothesis can
be successfully employed over the Internet. Attitude change on a large (and,
perhaps, extreme) scale can and does occur, such as was the case with one
of the frequent Israeli commenters on the blog who, after many months of
conversation and joining the Israeli authors in meeting with the Palestinian
authors, came to the conclusion that these Palestinian authors were
representative of not only the average Palestinian but also of Arabs
throughout the Middle East, regardless of political leanings. In discussion
on a separate blog, this commenter noted that, after getting to know
Palestinians through the Good Neighbors site, she no longer considered
Hizbullah and Hamas to be true enemies and believed that given the chance
they would be as warm, reasonable and friendly to Israelis as the
Palestinians she had come to know and, further, did not believe they mean
any harm to Israelis.
In other cases, observed shifts in attitude were much more subtle, such as
the secular but right-wing Israeli commenter who frequently engaged in
forceful arguments with one of the Palestinian authors in particular. Over
time he began softening his criticisms by adding in “achi” or “habibi” (the
Hebrew and Arabic terms for “my brother” and “my friend,” respectively)
when responding, in order to take some of the sting from his words. Clearly,
however, for this commenter on the blog the Palestinian authors are
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exceptions rather than the rule to Palestinians in general. Thus far, at least,
his interactions with these authors have not led him to generalize any of the
positive qualities and peaceful traits he recognizes that they share beyond
these individuals to Palestinians in general.
In the interactions between the Lebanese participants and the sole
participant from Syria, several of the Lebanese have noted the liking they
feel for the Syrian author and have expressed sympathy and empathy for the
Syrian people––they certainly do not extend such feelings toward the Syrian
leadership, about whom they remain strongly critical. In general, indeed, the
majority of the shifts that have occurred in attitude have been tempered by
the realities of the situations in which the participants are living. Thus, while
many of the Israeli authors and commenters agree that the Palestinian
authors are not exceptions but, rather, representative of a significant
segment of the Palestinian population, the successful and attempted terror
attacks and daily rocket attacks from Gaza highlight for them that at least as
significant a segment of the population does not share these peaceful
characteristics.
Just as clearly, from the many comments made by authors and
commenters from across the Middle East, the participants feel they have a
much better idea of what their neighbors are like as people and as nations
than they had before joining the group. There have been a number of
conversations on the blog about local media and international media with
participants comparing the framing of situations and attitudes held by “the
other” by the media and the deeper understanding of the situations and
attitudes they’ve gained from talking with “the others” (e.g., members of
that group on the blog).
Whether the apparent changes in attitudes are robust and enduring
remains to be seen. Just as events, coupled with the interactions on the blog,
have served as a catalyst for attitude change, it is also reasonable to assume
that were another event such as the Second Lebanon War (2006) to occur,
the warm relations, increased tolerance and respect that have evolved may
well be altered and, perhaps, negated. If nothing else, the project has shown,
in the words of one of the Palestinian authors that, “As for the discussions, I
believe that we proved on Gnblog that we were able to discuss everything
without having to kill each other…”
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Dahlgren and Colin Sparks. London: Routledge.
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Hewstone, Miles and Rupert J. Brown. 1986. Contact is not enough: An intergroup
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Pettigrew, Thomas F. and Linda R. Tropp. 2000. Does intergroup contact reduce prejudice?
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Robertson, Roland. 1992. Globalization: Social theory and global culture. London: Sage.
Scarberry, Nikki C., Christopher D. Ratcliff, Charles G. Lord, Daniel L. Lanicek and
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of Allport’s contact hypothesis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23(12):1291–
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Zajonc, Robert B. 1965. Social facilitation. Science 149:269–274.
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Conflict and Compromise in Inter-Religious Issues
in Malaysia
JOHAN SARAVANAMUTTU
This essay provides a brief history of Malaysia in terms of the contours of
ethnic relations, which it argues has entered a new phase in terms of the
consociational pact struck among the three major ethnic groups of Malays,
Chinese and Indians. It touches on major events of ethnic conflict and strife in
the context of Malaysian multiculturalism, which can be seen as a form of
socio-political practice that has provided the modus vivendi for inter-ethnic
and inter-religious accommodation for some 50 years of the nation-state’s
existence. However, over the years numerous ethnic altercations and conflicts
over cultural rights have peppered the political terrain of Malaysia. In
particular, this essay examines the aborted attempt to form an Inter-Faith
Commission in 2005 and explores its social and political ramifications. It
shows that a conflict avoidance strategy in the political class which, while
successfully suppressing everyday ethno-religious conflict, does have grave
implications for Malaysian multiculturalism and democratic practice in
general.
Malaya was a collection of states of former British colonies and
protectorates, which achieved its independence from the British on August
31, 1957 without a bloody anti-colonial struggle. Sabah (or British North
Borneo), Sarawak and Singapore joined to form “Malaysia” on August 16,
1963. However, owing to acrimonious developments between Malayan and
Singaporean leaders and political parties, Singapore was forced to leave the
Federation on August 9, 1965. Today, peninsular Malaysia comprises 13
states, nine having sultans or rajas, one chosen every five years as the
constitutional monarch (Yang Di Pertuan Agong). Peninsular Malaysia is
comprised mainly of Malays (50 percent) Chinese (24%) Indians (7%),
while other communities, such as Eurasians, form the rest of the population.
Sabah and Sarawak have large numbers of indigenous (Bumiputera)
communities such as Iban, Kadazan, Melanau and Orang Ulu, besides
Malays and Chinese. Malays are invariably Muslims (indeed, the
constitution defines them as such), and the Chinese and Indians are mostly
Buddhists and Hindus respectively. There are also large communities of
Christians in Sabah and Sarawak. The ethnic and religious distribution of
the Malaysian population of about 27 million is given in Table 1.
After a period of self-government, the British finally granted
independence to Malaya in 1957. The Alliance Party, which comprised
three major ethnic political parties––the United Malays National
Organization (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the
Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), which formed the government after the
1955 general election–agreed to the terms of the 1957 Constitution, which
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was to be the basis for the newly independent country. This was dubbed the
“social contract” among the major ethnic communities. The major features
of the consociational pact1 of Malaysia, found in the 1957 Constitution,
were: citizen’s rights will be granted to all on the principle of jus soli by
virtue of birthright, not blood-right; that the special position of the Malays
[or later in 1963, Bumiputeras (sons of soil)] be guaranteed by Article 153
and Article 69; that Malay (Bahasa Malaysia) be the National Language
(Article 152); and that religious freedom be guaranteed (Article 11), with
Islam as the “religion of the federation” (Article 3).
Table 1: Ethnic and Religious Distribution of Malaysian Population
(2006 Estimates, U.S. State Department)
Malays
50.2 %
Muslim
60.4%
Chinese
24.5%
Buddhist
19.2%
Indigenous
11.0%
Christian
9.1%
Indian
7.2%
Hindu
6.3%
Other
7.1%
Confucian, Taoist
2.6%
Total
100%
Other
1.4%
Total
100%
It should be mentioned that the massive influx of Chinese and also
Indians in the British period created a rather interesting ethnic demographic
development wherein by the 1930s, in Peninsular Malaysia, the Malays and
Chinese constituted the largest plurality, but combined with the Indians, the
Malays became a numerical minority. This “ethnic arithmetic” was a major
factor behind the inclusion of Sarawak and Sabah into the new Malaysian
federation in 1963. With Singapore joining Malaya in 1963, the Chinese
would have formed a majority and then prime minister Tunku Abdul
Rahman assumed that the Sarawak and Sabah indigenous groups, seen as
Bumiputera, would be for all intents and purposes on the side of the Malays.
History was perhaps to prove the Tunku somewhat naïve, but when
Singapore left the Federation in 1965, Malay demographic dominance was
ensured.
At the point of independence in 1957, a multicultural pact, often referred
to as the “social contract” by political players, was hammered out among the
parties of the ruling Alliance coalition, the UMNO, the MCA and the MIC.
1
“Consociationalism,” a concept derived from Dutch political scientist Arend Lipjhart
(1977), is the term used for a political system of ethnically based political elites,
representing their respective communities and cooperating at the political level to maintain
social peace through ethnic bargaining.
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The Malayan (later Malaysian) Constitution guaranteed citizenship rights
for the non-Malays, but embedded the “Special Position” of the Malays in
entitlement to educational and administrative positions, and land known as
“Malay Reservations.” Islam was also to be the religion of the federation
and Malaya was to be a constitutional monarchy, retaining the symbolic
Malay Sultanate at the federal and state levels.2 In religious matters, Shari’a
(Islamic law) continued to be enforced for Muslims in limited areas
particularly in inheritance and family law. These inter-ethnic and multiethnic constitutional provisions provided the basis for fairly harmonious
consociational politics up until the end of the 1960s.
MAJOR EVENTS OF ETHNIC STRIFE
The rendering of Malaysian history would not be complete without
touching on major events in which Malaysia’s ethnic communities were
engaged in violent conflict despite the consociational pact referred to above.
The list of events below will provide a quick appreciation of the prevalence
of ethnically driven political altercations that sometimes erupted––although
not always––into riots in Malaysian society:
The 1957 Chingay Riot in Penang
The 1964 racial riots in Singapore
The Hartal riots of Penang in 1967
The May 13 1969 riots of Kuala Lumpur
The Operasi Lalang event of 1987
The Kampong Rawa Incident of 1998
The Kampong Medan incident of 2001
A quick rendering of the facts will provide the requisite context and
necessary comprehension of the deeply rooted ethnically polarized character
of Malaysian society and politics. The accounts of these events are often
obscured, but can be found in various studies of contemporary Malaysian
politics.3
The 1957 Chingay (street parade) Riot may be said to be a kind of
modern-day Malaysian communal riot that one has come to expect in this
pluralistic society. On January 2, 1957, a clash between Malays and Chinese
occurred in George Town during a Chinese chingay procession held to
celebrate Penang’s centenary. Trouble began when 10 or 15 Malays were
2
The exceptions were the two former straits settlements of Penang and Malacca, which had
governors instead of sultans. Only sultans are eligible to be the constitutional monarch or
Yang Di Pertuan Agong, who is rotated every five years.
3
I have drawn particularly on Cheah (2006), Lau (1998) and my own research over the
years. See also Crouch (1996) and Milne and Mauzy (1999).
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
understood to have tried to stop one chingay section. The chingay is a
Chinese cultural event, in which the procession carries a large number of
banners in Chinese, and acrobatic groups twirl the banners, accompanied by
loud drumming. Apparently a Chinese lion troupe turned on the Malays
after one of the group’s boys was injured. Further outbreaks occurred later
forcing the authorities to close schools and to impose curfews in various
parts of George Town. The conflict, which lasted 10 days, abated after Chief
Minister Dato Wong Pow Nee and multi-ethnic goodwill committees
appealed for calm and distributed relief to the families of victims. Five
people died in the clashes (Cheah 2006).
The 1964 racial riots in Singapore also began during a procession on the
occasion of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad on July 21, and at the
peak of acrimonious politicking between Malayan and Singaporean
politicians. An estimated 20,000 Malays and Muslims from some 73
organizations had assembled for the traditional parade in the heart of the
city. Inflammatory speeches by leaders of the Singapore UMNO preceded
the riots. The situation got out of hand as the procession wound through the
city and groups of Malays broke ranks and clashed with riot policemen, and
were subsequently seen to attack Chinese civilians. This sparked Chinese
retaliatory attacks on Malays. By midnight 220 incidents had been reported,
four had been killed and 178 persons had been wounded, 32 of whom were
admitted to hospital. Some houses were also razed (Lau 1998:169). A
second riot broke out on September 2 of the same year, leaving 13 dead and
106 wounded after 11 days. Some 1,439 arrests were made by the police
(Lau 1998:197).
Another incident of great significance was the Penang “hartal” (strike
action) riots. On November 24, 1967 riots broke out in George Town
following a boycott of retailers and a general strike against the Malaysian
government’s devaluation of the Malayan dollar. Five people were reported
killed and 92 wounded, 32 seriously. Cases of arson were reported in both
towns and rural areas. The situation was serious enough for a 24-hour
curfew to be imposed. The conflicts involving Chinese and Malays spread
to three other states, Perak, Kedah and Perlis, where curfews were also
imposed in specific areas. Ethnic tensions lasted a month and the final death
toll reached 27 with more than 200 wounded. Schools were closed in
Penang for a week, banks shut down their services and some 1,600 people
were arrested, mostly curfew-breakers and those whom the police described
as hooligans and gangsters. The government also detained several leaders
and members of political parties, which included those from the opposition
parties, the Labour Party and the Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), and also
from the UMNO, a member of the ruling coalition.
Next came the May 13, 1969 tragedy, undoubtedly the most traumatic
event of Malaysia’s political history to date. These riots began after a
“victory” parade in the capital city, Kuala Lumpur, on the part of opposition
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political parties on May 12 after a general election, which saw the Alliance
Party lose its two-thirds majority in parliament. The non-Malays, who came
out in droves, allegedly hurled insults and taunts at Malays during the
victory celebrations. On May 13, the Malay party, UMNO, organized a
similar parade, which turned into a racial riot. On May 14, a state of national
emergency was declared throughout the country, and on May 16 the
National Operations Council (NOC) was established and parliament was
suspended for the next 18 months. According to the official report of the
NOC, 196 people died (25 Malays, 143 Chinese, 13 Indians and 15 others),
hundreds more were wounded and some 5,561 arrests were made. There
were 753 cases of arson and 211 vehicles were destroyed or damaged. An
estimated 6,000 Kuala Lumpur residents––90% of them Chinese––were
made homeless. In the aftermath of the May 13 incident, various
amendments to the Constitution were made which I have termed “the new
multicultural pact” (Saravanamuttu 2004), as discussed below.
The 1987 Operasi Lalang––or “weeding” operation––was a series of
mass arrests carried out because Malay-Chinese ethnic tensions had reached
another breaking point in a situation almost mimicking May 13, 1969. The
event was sparked by Chinese unhappiness over the appointment of nonMandarin-speaking senior assistants to Chinese vernacular schools. Some
106 prominent politicians and social activists were detained on October 27
under the repugnant Internal Security Act (ISA), although one Chinese
minister was able to flee to Australia. However, the action did douse a series
of highly incendiary incidents which may have caused a riot had the
escalation of ethnic tensions continued. At the height of the episode, a
massive gathering of about 10,000 Malays congregated at the TPCA
stadium, with UMNO speakers condemning the Chinese educationists and
Chinese politicians.
The next two events had different complexions in terms of ethnic
relations. The 1998 Kampong Rawa incident in Penang turned out to be
more of a conflict between mostly “Indian” Muslims and Hindus from an
adjoining mosque and a temple in a semi-urban locale, which saw the
desecration or destruction of some Hindu shrines in Penang. While
reportedly some 5,000 people came from outside Penang to support their
Muslim brethren, the incident was defused by the mediation of then deputy
prime minister Anwar Ibrahim. As for the March 2001 Kampong Medan
story, still shrouded in a veil of secrecy despite an investigation by the
government, we can safely surmise it was a conflict that involved Indians
and Malays. The episode, confined largely to an urban slum of Indian and
Malay residents, was sparked by a misperceived altercation between the two
sets of dwellers; six Indians were killed and many more wounded, and
hundreds were detained.
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POST-1969 MULTICULTURAL ARRANGEMENT
After the May 13, 1969 riots, there emerged what one could call a new
consociational arrangement, paradoxically re-emphasizing Malay or
Bumiputera rights, or some would say, Malay supremacy, under the Tun
Abdul Razak government. This took the form of the New Economic Policy
(NEP), buttressed by various legislations. Tun Razak and his advisers
virtually revamped the formula of Malaysian multicultural politics, with the
accent now on Bumiputera rights, one which has remained fairly intact until
today, with perhaps one further development after Razak––Islamization.
Under Razak, the following features of a new multicultural politics were
cultivated and embedded:
Bumiputera or Malay supremacy––ketuanan Melayu.
Authoritarianism or a “guided democracy”
Consociationalism in educational/cultural policies based on a
national ideology––Rukunegara4
A new multiparty coalition––Barisan Nasional
Malaysia’s policy of Bumiputera rights may be considered the obverse
of the contemporary multicultural discourse and practices which put the
accent on minority rights. Here it would seem that the accent is on the
majority community or communities that have become socially constructed
as Bumiputera. Unlike the usual minority rights issues, political rights or
political discrimination is not the issue here. Instead, rather uniquely, the
argument is that the economic backwardness of the Bumiputera confers a
privilege to receive affirmative action in various areas ranging from holding
administrative posts and scholarships to emplacement in educational
institutions. The argument perhaps is much like the feminist standpoint that
women, because of societal and “structural” factors of discrimination,
should be accorded special treatment or positive discrimination in job
emplacements. However, the one major difference in the analogy would be
that the Bumiputera case also comes with the de facto political hegemony of
Malays via UMNO in the political process.
The Razak team also put into practice a more authoritarian political
framework that delimited ethnic mobilization and politics, which remains in
place today. From the perspective of multiculturalism it was clearly a step
backwards as various contentious issues were deemed “sensitive” and
proscribed from political debate. Through the Constitutional (Amendment)
Act of 1970 and the Sedition Act of 1971, the following matters were sealed
from public debate:
4
The five “motherhood” tenets of the Rukunegara are belief in God, loyalty to king and
country, upholding the constitution, rule of law and good behavior and morality.
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Provisions of citizenship
National language
Special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of
other communities5
Sovereignty of the rulers
To allow the government to act firmly on these matters, Article 10 of the
constitution guaranteeing basic freedoms of the individual was emended to
give parliament the power to pass laws prohibiting discussion of all the
above matters.
ISLAMIZATION
Since the 1980s, a further political development, Islamization, may be
said to have occurred under the Mahathir Mohamad tenure. Islam is
arguably the most contentious issue of multicultural politics in Malaysia
today. The politicization of Islam may be said to have traversed the
following phases:
1. Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s
2. Islamization policies of the government from the 1980s
3. Conflict over Islamization discourse from the 1990s
Martinez (2001) made the observation that the government’s Islamization
program continued in varying degrees throughout the Mahathir
administration in response to the forces of political Islam. She avers:
“However, over the last years from the period beginning September 1998,
Islam is also the recourse and metaphor for Malay anger. This anger is
largely over the dismissal of what many perceive as the persecution of
former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim” (Martinez 2001:218). Anwar
was brought into UMNO by Mahathir in 1981 to check the rising
prominence of the Islamic Party, PAS.6 Although known to be a critic of
government policies, Anwar’s credentials as the then leader of the Islamic
Youth Movement, ABIM, meant he could mobilize the younger,
professional Muslims to the side of the government. His sacking had little to
do with Mahathir’s attitude toward Islam, which was largely modernist and
“liberal.” The setting up of the moderate-modernist Institute of Islamic
Understanding under Mahathir’s watch is indicative of this attitude, as was
his many pronouncements against the excesses of PAS. However, because
5
Article 153 was emended to make the provision applicable to the indigenes of Sarawak
and Sabah (Milne and Mauzy, 1978: 98).
6
PAS stands for “Parti Islam SeMalaysia” or Islamic Party of Malaysia.
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
Anwar represented the Islamic faction within UMNO, his removal clearly
emasculated UMNO and allowed PAS to perform with great success in the
1999 election.
Conflict over Islamization reached a peak in the aftermath of the 1999
general election, when PAS captured the state of Terengganu, while
retaining control of Kelantan. Both state governments have passed
legislation to introduce––Kelantan since 1992––Hudud and Qisas (criminal)
enactments under Shari’a, which is currently largely confined to family law
and inheritance.7 The Kelantan and Terengganu state enactments have been
thwarted by a constitutional impasse in that the federal government will not
endorse such legislation. However, on a lesser scale, this has not prevented
either state from introducing various Islamic practices such as compulsory
veiling for Muslim women and the prohibition on the sale of alcohol in
some outlets, including hotels. In late 2001, after 9/11, the Islamic state
issue captured center stage in political debates in Malaysia. Mahathir joined
the fray when he suggested that Malaysia was already a practicing Islamic
State (Negara Islam), and governmental ideologue and then law minister
Rais Yatim also echoed this. PAS has called for the matter to be openly
debated, as had the Democratic Action Party (DAP) for diametrically
opposite reasons. DAP left the Alternative Front of opposition forces in
August 2001 because of disagreement with PAS over the Islamic state issue.
Meanwhile, a spokesperson of PAS and former chief justice Salleh Abas
argued that Malaysia would not be an Islamic state until it introduced
comprehensive Shari’a for all Muslims in the country.
Conflicts were not only confined to the usual UMNO-PAS-DAP
fisticuffs; they also spilled over into the domain of civil society. In the early
part of 2002, the Persatuan Ulama Malaysia (PUM) or Muslim Scholars
Association of Malaysia accused several writers and social activists of
disparaging Islam. The statements and allegations of the PUM were
endorsed by seven other Muslim organizations. A police report was lodged
against one writer and this was followed by a request to the Conference of
Rulers to indict the individuals for an offence punishable by imprisonment
or fine. In the event, no action was taken by the police or the rulers, but the
episode demonstrates the explosive nature of conflicts and disagreements
over religion in a pluralistic society such as Malaysia.
7
Hudud and Qisas laws deal with mandatory punishment derived from the Quran and
Sunnah (of the prophet). Under Hudud, theft, robbery, illicit sex, alcohol consumption and
apostasy are considered offenses. Punishment for these is corporal in nature, involving
whipping, stoning to death and amputation of the limbs. Qisas law refers to offenses that
involve bodily injury or loss of life. The punishment is death or imprisonment but
compensation in the form of money or property is acceptable if the guardian of the victim
forgives the offender. (“Q and A on the Hudud and Qisas Enactment,” Aliran Monthly,
22(6):25-29).
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Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009
It is important to also appreciate Islamization as a response to the rising
religiosity of Malaysian Muslim society, illustrated by a survey of Muslims
in four regions/states of Malaysia carried out in the latter part of 2004.8 The
survey was a purposive, non-random survey of 800 Muslim adults in the
states of Penang, Kelantan, Terengannu and the federal territory of Kuala
Lumpur.
When Muslim respondents were asked how important it was to be a
“strict Muslim,” some 89% thought it was important, with about 35% saying
it was “essential.” Attitudes toward Shari’a, such as on apostasy, saw a high
degree of convergence toward strong affirmation for the contours of an
“Islamic” state. For example, on the question of whether Muslim society
should be governed by Quran and Shari’a, an overwhelming 95% agreed or
strongly agreed that this should be so. Oddly enough, there were no
significant differences of opinion across states. Indeed, the figure for
“strongly agree” (64.8%) was highest in Penang, arguably one of the most
multicultural regions in the whole of Malaysia.
Table 2: Strict Enforcement of Islamic Punishment
Place o f
Interview
s trongly
dis agree
Rura l
Urban
Total
dis agree
not s ure
s trongly
agree
agree
no ans wer
Total
5
2
21
89
128
13
258
1.9%
.8%
8.1%
34.5%
49.6%
5.0%
100.0%
12
11
38
162
275
32
530
2.3%
2.1%
7.2%
30.6%
51.9%
6.0%
100.0%
17
13
59
251
403
45
788
2.2%
1.6%
7.5%
31.9%
51.1%
5.7%
100.0%
8 The survey was conducted together with Dr. Riaz Hassan of Flinders University,
Australia, in October–November 2004 and I acknowledge the use some of its findings here.
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
Table 3: Muslim Society Must Be Based on the Quran and Shari’a
Islamic injunctions and practices
Place o f
Interview
s trongly disagree
Rural
Urban
Total
disagree
not s ure
agree
s trongly agree
Total
3
3
8
107
133
254
1.2%
1.2%
3.1%
42.1%
52.4%
100.0%
11
10
14
192
294
521
2.1%
1.9%
2.7%
36.9%
56.4%
100.0%
14
13
22
299
427
775
1.8%
1.7%
2.8%
38.6%
55.1%
100.0%
Somewhat disturbing is the finding (not shown here) that fully 32% of
the respondents do not agree that freedom of speech is important and some
26% are unable to convey an opinion on the subject.
THE ABORTED INTER-FAITH COMMISSION OF 2005
We now turn to the conflict that developed over the proposed
establishment of an inter-faith commission, proposed by various groups in
civil society. The conflict over the setting up of the Inter-Faith Commission
of Malaysia (IFC) in February of 2005 provides an interesting case study of
Muslims and their everyday politics. It should be stated at the outset that the
very idea of discussing the establishment of an inter-faith commission was
itself rather remarkable, but the proposal soon became controversial. The
problem hinged around the issue of Islam as the official state religion, as
some would have it, or more correctly, the religion of the federation. In any
case, there was little doubt that it is the recognized primus inter pares of
faiths in Malaysia. This said, the Malaysian Constitution, under Article 11,
guarantees freedom of worship also for all other faiths.
Members of the human rights subcommittee of the Bar Council mooted
the IFC idea some years ago. Some advocates of the idea, which included
prominent Muslims––in particular Malik Imtiaz Sarwar 9 ––felt that the
existing inter-faith dialogue mechanism, the Malaysian Consultative
9
Malik Imtiaz Sarwar, a prominent human rights advocate and lawyer, was chairman of the
Steering Committee of the IFC initiative.
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Council for Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism (MCCBCHS),
was inadequate to deal with thorny inter-faith matters, not least of all
because Muslims were not members of the MCCBCHS. Indeed, Muslim
groups did not participate in any formal inter-faith mechanisms. Hence the
idea of the commission came about. All religious groups, and especially
Muslim groups, were invited to participate in this initiative of the Bar
Council. The Bar Council, incidentally, was at this time led by a Muslim
lawyer, Khutubul Zaman Bukhari. Eventually, after many meetings, a broad
consensus was arrived at to hold a national conference to discuss the setting
up of the IFC. The main objective was to iron out differences and reassure
doubters about the bona fide intentions and the value of having such a
commission. Right from the outset some Muslim groups were not overly
enthusiastic about the idea, but no strong objections were registered. Groups
such as ABIM participated in the early decision-making, but later chose to
stay out. Another group that did not participate was the Movement for a Just
World, led by Muslim intellectual Chandra Muzaffar. In contrast, the
Sisters-in-Islam, a liberal-minded Muslim women’s group, supported the
idea and participated actively in the conference.
The holding of the conference, involving some 200 multi-faith
participants representing various faiths, was itself an achievement. It was
also interesting that a minister, Rais Yatim, a lawyer by profession,
officiated at the event. But the inevitable happened. A coalition of 13
Muslim groups calling itself the Allied Coordinating Committee of Islamic
NGOs (ACCIN), demanded that the government scuttle the idea of the IFC.
A spokesperson of ACCIN, Mustapha Ma, made statements to the effect
that there was deep hatred against Islam among some of the proponents of
the IFC idea. As quoted by the website www.malaysiakini.com, March 1,
2005, he also allegedly remarked:
It was said that Malaysia would have achieved Islamic state status if not for
the interference of the colonial masters and the arrival of non-Muslims. Are
we now witnessing the regression of our country into a secular state with
Islam as a mere ornament?
It became a supreme irony that the very idea of an inter-faith commission
proposed by civil society forces turned out to be an issue requiring the
eventual intervention of politicians and the prime minister himself no less.
Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi stepped in at the height of the controversy
to pronounce that the IFC idea should be shelved and that the government
was only prepared to consider it at a later time. The boldness and inaccuracy
of the ACCIN spokesperson’s remark may be attributed to the fact that the
previous prime minister had proclaimed Malaysia to be already an Islamic
state, although in actual fact the Malaysian constitution only states that
Islam is the religion of the federation. Many constitutional experts have
argued that this meant that the Malaysian state remains one not based on any
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
particular religion but one that guarantees freedoms of all faiths as stipulated
in Article 11 of the Constitution. However, in 1988 when the Amendment
121 (1A) was passed, the Shari’a courts were seemingly given absolute
discretion over matters of Islam. This introduced, yet another, perhaps
unintended, consequence on matters pertaining to religious freedom.
FAITH AND BODY POLITICS: MOORTHY AND LINA JOY
Two controversial legal cases no doubt had a bearing on the aborted IFC.
These cases are among a slew of controversies swirling around the issue of
whether Shari’a courts have primacy over the civil courts in matters
pertaining to Muslims, and even non-Muslims who are related to Muslims.
In December 2005, a major religious controversy engulfed Muslims and
non-Muslims, in particular, Hindus, sparked by the Kuala Lumpur religious
authority, JAWI,10 laying claim to the dead body of one Moorthy Maniam
(aka Mohammad Abdullah)11 on the grounds that he had earlier converted to
Islam. JAWI approached the KL Shari’a Court on December 22 and
received the ruling that Moorthy’s conversion to Islam was valid. This was,
however, disputed by his wife, S. Kaliammal, who took the matter to the
High Court, which heard the case on December 28. The three-panel court of
appeal ruled that there was no “relief” for Kaliammal on the grounds that
Article 121 (1A) of the Malaysian Constitution proscribed a civil court from
ruling on matters of Islam. The 1988 Constitutional Amendment Bill of
1988, which allowed for the insertion of Article 121 (1A), states that civil
courts despite being federal courts shall have no jurisdiction with respect to
any matter within the jurisdiction of Shari’a courts, which are state-level
religious courts.12
A sequence of events followed which is typical of Malaysian
consociational politics. Some 35 Hindu organizations, led by the Malaysian
Hindu Sangam, protested JAWI’s action and called for an amendment to
Article 121 (1A) of the constitution. A similar stand was then taken by the
inter-faith MCCBHCS which called on the government to “urgently cure the
grave defect in our legal system by making the necessary amendments to the
Federal Constitution and all other legislation so that jurisdiction to
determine the validity of conversions into and out of Islam are vested in the
10
Jabatan Agama Wilayah Persekutuan (Federal Territory Religious Department)
Corporal Moorthy, who died at the age of 36 of serious head injuries, was one of the 10
individuals in the Malaysian team, two of whom reached the peak of Mount Everest on
May 23, 1997, the first Malaysians to achieve the feat. Moorthy was posthumously
promoted to the rank of sergeant in the midst of the controversy.
12
See Aliran Monthly 25(11/12), 2005, for a discussion of this. The inserted section 1A of
Article 121 simply reads, “The courts referred to in Clause (1) [High Courts] shall have no
jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Shari’a courts.”
11
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High Court where all Malaysians can be parties and have equal rights as
witnesses.”
At the peak of the controversy, nine non-Muslim ministers in the cabinet
submitted a memorandum to the prime minister for the matter to be brought
up for discussion in the cabinet. It was clear from this request that the nonMuslims were greatly perturbed by the Moorthy decision and wanted the
prime minister to take a stand more sympathetic to them. However, the
prime minister did the opposite and prevailed on the ministers to withdraw
their request after privately discussing the issue with five of the ministers
(Utusan Malaysia, January 22, 2005).
For the non-Muslim ministers this move effectively meant that they had
failed to successfully represent the interests of their constituents.
After Moorthy, a case that made international headlines was that of Lina
Joy, a 43-year-old Muslim woman, who embraced Christianity in 1988. She
applied to the National Registration Department for a change of name and
religious status in 1997. In 1998, the NRD allowed the name change but not
the change of religion. Lina Joy appealed this decision in the High Court in
2001. The High Court ruled against the change of religion stating that the
jurisdiction in conversion matters lay solely in the hands of the Shari’a
Court. In 2004, Lina Joy’s case to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on the
grounds that neither the Shari’a Court nor any other Islamic authority had
confirmed her renunciation of Islam. In her appeal, Lina Joy’s application to
have her conversion to Christianity validated was struck off by the highest
court of the land, the Federal Court, on May 30, 2007, ending a 10-year
legal battle. The court ruled in a 2-1 split decision that the National
Registration Department (NRD) was correct to ask Lina Joy to seek a
declaration from the Shari’a Court to confirm her conversion. The chief
justice, who sat on the three-man bench, argued that Muslims could not
change their religion at their own whim or fancy. The dissenting judge, a
Christian, argued that the NRD’s demand of Lina Joy was unreasonable,
discriminatory and unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
It could well be said that Malaysia reached a new, dangerous threshold of
ethnic relations by 2007 because of the issues and conflicts discussed above.
The core of this new context of ethnic relations was an inter-ethnic, as well
as an intra-Muslim, conflict, debate and discourse over Islam and religious
rights. One side thought that Islam was becoming too embedded and was
impinging negatively on the lives and rights of ordinary Malaysians and that
Malaysians should look to the constitution for guarantees of civil liberties
and freedom of religion. The other side argued that while Islam was
constitutionally embedded, there had been an erosion of its status and,
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
furthermore, that all questions of religious rights and freedoms must be cast
in terms of the dominant status of Islam as the official religion of the state.
The second group often turned to the amendment to Article 121 (1A),
which gave Shari’a courts full jurisdiction over questions of Islam. An
impasse remained, nonetheless, as such matters are still referred to the civil
courts and non-Muslims do not have legal standing in Shari’a courts.
However, the Federal Court had ruled in the Lina Joy case confirming the
primacy of Shari’a courts in matters pertaining to Islam.
Inevitably, the implications of such a complex problem and its resolution
or lack of resolution would impact on Muslim-non-Muslim (in the old mold,
Malay-non-Malay) relations. Undeniably, Muslim-non-Muslim relations at
the formal level had greatly strained the government’s consociational model.
Evidently, such cases as Moorthy and Lina Joy had pushed the non-Malay
cabinet ministers to hand over a memorandum on inter-faith issues to the
prime minister. However, Prime Minister Badawi Abdullah’s failure to deal
sympathetically with the problem undermined the legitimacy of his nonMuslim political partners in the ruling coalition.
At the civil society level, the Malaysian Consultative Council for
Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism was greatly exercised over
such inter-faith controversies and supported the formation of the IFC, which,
unfortunately was shelved by the government for reasons that remain
unclear.
If Malaysian society were indeed at a new threshold of a changed context
of ethnic relations, what then would have been plausible directions for a
new political understanding among the political class and within civil
society? The political leadership seemingly has no appetite or gumption to
tackle the problem. Instead, Abdullah took umbrage over his non-Malay
ministers’ mild protest and handled it in an authoritarian manner by
basically silencing their dissent. By putting the lid on the IFC, the
government seems to have given the pro-Shari’a Muslims reason to believe
they have succeeded in winning an important round of the inter-religious
debate.
This changed context of ethnic relations indicated to the broad public that
there was now a new conservative political ideology of the ruling coalition
in conflict management and that conflict avoidance may have become
embedded in the approach of the UMNO-led government. This was further
enforced by the fact that civil society remained largely fragmented along
ethnic lines and politically divided despite the presence of a strong section
of progressive Muslims, who continued to rely on democratic procedures
rather than violence to resolve outstanding issues.
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POSTSCRIPT
The bulk of this article was written well before the March 8 General
Election of 2008, which has been termed a “political tsunami” by many
commentators. The Barisan Nasional (BN), led by Abdullah Badawi, lost its
two-thirds majority in parliament and lost four state governments to the
opposition parties, while the Islamic Party retained the state of Kelantan. It
is clear that inter-faith fractures such as those discussed above greatly
impacted on the showing of the BN government, which suffered the worst
defeat in its history. One of the factors that created such a result was the
massive swing of Indian voters to the opposition parties, a factor related to
the event organized by the Hindu Rights Action Front (HINDRAF) on
November 25, 2007. HINDRAF, which was formed after the Moorthy
decision, fought for the religious rights and the betterment of the Indian
community.
The Abdullah government again took umbrage when thousands of
Indians took to the streets in November 25 to demonstrate, among other
things, against the wanton demolition of Hindu temples and the alleged
economic marginalization of Indians. Abdullah used the draconian Internal
Security Act to detain five HINDRAF leaders. In the general election, only
three Indian parliamentarians of the BN were returned and the leader of the
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), Samy Vellu lost his seat. Religious
issues, such as the Lina Joy case, also greatly influenced Malaysian
Christians to vote against the BN candidates.
There is arguably a silver lining for inter-faith developments as a
consequence of the 2008 election. The opposition coalition of parties, led by
the Parti Keadilan Rakyat (National Justice Party), with its partners the
Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the Islamic Party (PAS), has now
muted the call for an Islamic state and inter-faith matters are being
prioritized for more sustained resolution. The BN government, for its part,
may be forced now to address inter-faith issues in a more consistent and
compassionate manner.
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REFERENCES
Boon Kheng, Cheah. 2006. Ethnic conflicts in Georgetown, Penang Island, 1857–1969.
Unpublished paper.
Crouch, Harold. 1996. Government and society in Malaysia. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press.
Lipjhart, Arend. 1977. Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration. New
Haven, London: Yale University Press.
Lau, Albert. 1998. A moment of anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and the politics of
disengagement. Singapore: Times Academic Press.
Milne, Robert S. and Diane K. Mauzy. 1978. Politics and government in Malaysia.
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
––––. 1999. Malaysian politics under Mahathir. London and New York: Routledge.
Saravanamuttu, Johan. 2005. Malaysian multicultural policy and practices: Between
communalism and consociationalism. In The challenge of ethnicity: Building a nation in
Malaysia, edited by Cheah Boon Kheng, pp. 89–114. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish.
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Federalism, Multiculturalism and Intercultural Dialogue for
Conflict Management in Israeli Society
BEN MOLLOV
While cultural and even intercivilizational conflict is often considered to
overlap among states or groupings of states, such conflicts can also occur
within states. This paper will consider some expressions of cultural conflict
within Israel, both within its Jewish sector and between its Jewish and Arab
sectors, and focus on an experimental culturally oriented program taking
place at Bar-Ilan University aimed at providing tools for reducing inter-group
tensions within Israel. The course is anchored in a federalist approach as
articulated by political scientist Daniel J. Elazar that is amalgamated with
multicultural theory and intercultural competency. Furthermore, approaches
to dealing with the Arab-Jewish schism from an intercultural approach, which
takes into account regional dynamics, are addressed. Based on six years of
experience, it suggests that federalism, which is rooted in the Jewish idea of
“brit”––covenant in Hebrew––designed to advance “diversity within unity,”
can be a promising means to maintain Israeli social cohesion while not
requiring that Israel renounce its core Jewish-Zionist narrative.
While the homogeneous nation-state has been the dominant paradigm of the
international system over the past approximately two centuries, this model is
increasingly not the norm as the majority of nation-states are no longer
homogeneous in character. Thus intercivilizational conflicts can arise within
states. New strategies are called for to advance and maintain inter-group
cohesion while allowing for greater sub-group expression.
This article considers the case of Israel and offers the “federalist”
strategy rooted in Daniel Elazar’s thought as a promising means of
maintaining “diversity within unity” based on the experience of a six-yearold experimental graduate course being held at Bar-Ilan University on the
theme of new approaches to conflict management in Israeli society.
Furthermore, it also incorporates inter-religious and intercultural approaches
to addressing the Arab-Jewish schism in Israel with reference to larger
regional dynamics.
The State of Israel as a nation-state was conceived primarily to secure the
interests and aspirations of the Jewish people. It is a prime example of a
nation state founded on an assumption of a homogeneous model of state and
society. As an expression of this philosophy, the Jewish-Zionist ethos of
state and society building, particularly in the State of Israel’s formative
years, sought the integration of diverse Jewish communities along a
“melting pot” model. This was meant to advance the vision of the creation
of a “new” Jewish citizen who would exemplify the ideal of a new and
proud Jew––the antithesis of the Jewish experience of victimization in the
2,000-year-old exile––and serve as the model for emulation as the country
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
dealt with the challenges of mass immigration and integration following its
independence in 1948.
However, by the 1980s researchers (e.g., Lissak and Horowitz 1989)
began to note the appearance of intergroup tensions in Israel connected to
relations between Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews, religious and secular
Israelis, as well as relations with the Arab community of Israel (which
accounts for about 18 percent of the country’s total population). In recent
years the arrival of approximately one million new immigrants from the
former Soviet Union has also added another important sub-group whose
needs and relations with other groups must be considered. These social
tensions between disparate groups of Israeli citizens have called into
question the current efficacy of the “melting pot” model (Shokeid 1998;
Lissak and Horowitz 1989). Thus the State of Israel is being increasingly
challenged to address various manifestations of diversity and
multiculturalism.
A MICRO EFFORT TO DEAL WITH DIVERSITY IN ISRAEL
In an effort to grapple with Israel’s increasing social diversity and offer a
new model in place of the “melting pot” framework, an experimental M.A.level course in conflict management has been taking place at Bar-Ilan
University over the past six years. The course, which was conceived by this
researcher and run in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
(Foundation), has been designed to acquaint the students––current and
future practitioners in the field of conflict management––with federal
approaches to interaction as articulated by Elazar, one of its foremost
proponents. This course amalgamated federalist thinking, which emphasizes
diversity within unity, with fostering familiarity of the cultural backgrounds
of a number of important sub-groups in Israeli society as part of the effort at
promoting multi-cultural competency (LeBaron 1997).
The course has offered a “federally” oriented model as an organizing
theme based on the work and thought of Elazar, a pioneer in the twin areas
of federalism and the Jewish political tradition which he saw as intrinsically
related. Against this background, this paper focuses on exploring the limits
and possibilities of a “federally” oriented model as an alternate approach for
the Israeli reality as evidenced by the results of the six-year-old
experimental seminar within the framework of the Graduate Program on
Conflict Management at Bar-Ilan University.
Elazar, a noted political scientist, was a product of the American, Jewish
and Sephardic experiences and a pioneer in the area of the Jewish political
tradition and federalism, which he saw as intrinsically related. Elazar took
up residence in Israel in the early 1970s and taught political science at BarIlan University virtually until his death in 1999. Based on important and
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path breaking research undertaken first in the context of the development of
American federalism, and later within a global perspective, Elazar argued
that the essence of federalism was the goal of advancing “diversity within
unity.” His research also pointed to the goal of promoting social partnership
among diverse entities required to coexist within a larger framework.
In the American context, for instance, he argued that a pattern of
cooperation existed between the states and the federal government virtually
from the beginning of the American republic (Elazar 1962, 1966). In an
international context he emphasized that federalist-oriented solutions could
be highly relevant to increasingly heterogeneous societies striving to
maintain social cohesion despite increasingly diverse linguistic and ethnic
realities (Elazar 1982, 1996). He offered the “federal principle as one
possible resource for resolving these problems” (Elazar 1987:11).
Elazar even expanded the relevance of the federalist approach to the
basic dynamics of human relationships. This was emphasized in his 1994
monograph entitled Federalism and the Way to Peace. He described the
essence of federalism with relevance to the effort to improve inter-group
relations in these terms: “While federalism is normally understood as
having to do with political structures, in fact the federal idea speaks
principally to the character of human relationships” (Elazar 1994:5).
Perhaps at the core of the effort to “think federally” (Elazar 1987), is the
principle that in managing conflict interactions are more important than
definitions for the effort to maintain stability. This is an important and
potentially extremely useful element in the array of tools that federalist
thinking can offer for conflict management efforts, for in the current
international setting many groups must coexist under larger umbrellas in
which there may or may not be agreement on definitions concerning even
core issues. Elazar, it seems, saw the importance of this approach and it is
even relevant to indicate that Martin Buber, the apostle of dialogue, was
considered to be a “federalist thinker” insofar as he emphasized the
importance of human relations that can even transcend disagreement on
issues and definitions (Susser 1979).
Thus, in an Israel in which Jewish sub-groups across the political and
cultural spectrum disagree, often substantially, on core issues such as what
the character of a Jewish state should be, or for that matter if Israel should
be a “Jewish state,” or only a “state of the Jews,” the principle of
emphasizing interactions over agreement on definitions can be a useful way
of approaching problems. The schism between Jews and Arabs in Israel and
gaps between positions on what the significance of the Jewish state should
be is even more significant. Documents such as the fairly recent “Vision
statement,” compiled and published by Arab political leaders and
intellectuals, highlights an even more significant conflict within Israeli
society in that the very idea of Israel having a Jewish core character is
rejected.
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An allied concept to federalism is that of consociationalism which has
advanced important forms of power sharing and modus vivendi between
groups in conflict was also presented to the students (Lipjhart 1971, 1977).
Indeed, it should be noted that consociationalism as an expression of the
federalist philosophy is not without roots in Israeli nation building. Lipjhart
(1977) and Don-Yihyeh (1999) point to the modus vivendi relations
established among religious and secular groups in Israel after its founding,
which were anchored in consociational cooperation, in particular the
decision to develop two parallel tracks of education––the secular and
religious under the umbrella of the Ministry of Education––is an important
example of such cooperation. In the course based on the unifying theme of
federalism, the students in effect were being asked to consider an extension
of consociational approaches in Israel, albeit under the title of “thinking
federally,” particularly given federalism’s roots in Jewish thought as will be
discussed in the next section.
FEDERALISM AND THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION
As noted, Elazar was a pioneer in the area of the “Jewish political
tradition” and saw the concept of federalism as inherently linked to the
Jewish political tradition particularly through the concept of brit. He saw the
basis of the Jewish political tradition as fundamentally encapsulated in the
idea of brit, and federalism as the secularized version of this concept. In
pointing to the scriptural and theological foundations of federalism, he
writes:
Before its political character had become clear [federalism] had emerged
as a theological concept used to define the proper relationship between God
and man. The federal theology saw God and man linked by covenant in lasting
yet limited union, in a partnership designed to make both partners jointly
responsible for the world’s welfare while preserving their respective
integrities. (Elazar 1971:4).
In a milestone work he published after moving to Israel, Kinship and
Consent: The Jewish Political Tradition and Its Contemporary Uses (1981),
Elazar argued that the concept of brit is essential to the Jewish political
tradition from biblical to modern times. Indeed, he saw the dynamics of
federalism and the Jewish political tradition expressed by the impetus for
social partnership. He connected the concept of brit to partnership, which
Elazar expressed in these terms: “This covenant idea is of great importance
because of what it offers in the way of building relationships. The Bible
develops a whole system of relationships based upon covenants, beginning
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with the covenants between God and mankind, which serve as initial
political acts” (Elazar 1981:9).
Elazar further underlines the role of brit in imparting vitality to societies:
As the Bible itself makes clear, the covenantal bonds transform what most
religions understand as the mystical union into a real one, making life––
including political life––possible in an all-too-real world. In many ways, the
progress of civilization can be traced as corresponding to the periods in human
history when significant groups of people have recognized the covenant idea
and sought to concretely apply it to the building of human, political and social
relationships (Elazar 1981:26).
ISRAEL’S MULTICULTURAL REALITY
Aligned with federalist thinking, the greater evidence of increased
cultural expression and distinctiveness of sub-groups within both the Jewish
and non-Jewish sectors of Israel today calls for exploring the possibilities of
multi-culturalism (Kymlicka 1995) in Israeli society, which in the course
was amalgamated with federalism. According to this researcher, the
challenge was to maintain Israel’s central core as a Jewish-Zionist state
while expanding the possibilities of sub-group expression (Dowty 1999).
Indeed, current public discourse in Israel has related to the possibilities of
maintaining the “melting pot” model in the face of an increasingly evident
multicultural reality. Based on the difficulty in maintaining this paradigm,
the idea of a “state of all its citizens” has been increasingly proposed which
would deprive Israel of its particular Jewish-Zionist character. The federalist
multicultural model rooted in the Jewish political tradition along with
fostering multicultural competency has therefore been deemed a promising
means of advancing diversity within unity for a more complex Israeli
society than that which existed during the pre-state period of nation building
and its early years of existence following independence in 1948.
This “third way” paradigm for Israel was one of the main issues
discussed in the course combined with efforts to advance multicultural
competency. In the course of the program students were exposed to the
following group narratives: the ethnic Sephardi sector (as represented by the
Shas Party), the Ashkenazi Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) sector, the Russianspeaking community in Israel, the Arab sector, the National Religious sector,
the liberal secular outlook and the Ethiopian community. Lecturers intensely
familiar with these communities gave empathic presentations offering
insights into the narratives, core values and political agendas of these
communities, which were often enigmatic to many in the course.
Furthermore, readings were assigned to further elaborate on the narratives,
including the work of researchers such as Friedman (1991), Peled (1998),
Smooha (1998), Lissak and Leshem (1999) and Weil (1997). Insights
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gained concerning these communities by the students participating (mostly
Ashkenazi, female and secular) were significant and helped to promote
empathy.
For instance, the ethnic Sephardi community was least familiar in many
cases to the students and the background of more flexible Sephardic
religious practice than that of Ashkenazic counterparts was described. In
addition, customs not easily comprehensible to many of the students, who
were generally of Ashkenazic secular background, such as prayer for
instance at the graves of saints, was more fully explained. Further, the
internalized shame experienced by waves of Sephardic Jewish immigrants
in the early years of state building was highlighted.
The pluralistic and complex character of the Russian-speaking
community was similarly brought home to the students. This community
came to Israel in various waves––initially in the “heroic period” of strongly
identified and Zionistically committed Jews following the Six-Day War in
1967. Many of those migrants paid a high price in defying the Soviet regime
when seeking to come to Israel. From 1989, however, larger waves of
immigrants came with a greater emphasis on quality of life concerns. In
addition, the implications of the extremely difficult effort to maintain Jewish
identity during the Soviet regime and the complex nature of the Soviet
Jewish community has led to situations in which there are many examples
of dissonance between the degree of Jewish identity and actual religious
status of the immigrants (i.e., situations in which the Russian-speaking
immigrants identify Jewishly but are not formally Jewish by
Halachic/Jewish law standards––or the opposite). All these elements helped
to foster greater empathy and understanding for this important sector of
Israeli society.
In more recent cycles of the course, the narrative and characteristics of
the Ethiopian Jewish community have also been presented. Again, the more
heterogeneous character of this community came as new insight to the
students and helped to create a more accurate perception of this sub-group
in Israeli society. Sensitive issues such as the socio-economic status of the
community in Israel, the background of their religious practices and
perceived insults such as health concerns by medical personnel in receiving
blood transfusions given their background in Africa were all discussed in
the session on this community.
Of all the schisms that were discussed in the course, the Arab community
narrative engendered the most controversy and was thought to be the most
difficult to bridge. Representing about 18% of the Israeli population, this
community is increasingly identifying with the Palestinian narrative, which
affects its very attitude in being able to accept Israel as the homeland of the
Jewish people. The political and socio-economic background of the
community and its situation in Israeli society was also described. However,
the most controversy was generated by discussions of the Arab “Vision
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Statement,”1 which gave the most pause to students. Many of the Jewish
students were deeply surprised by the rejection of the Jewish-Zionist
narrative by much of the Arab community in Israel as described by the guest
lecturers. However, the depth of Arab rejectionism of the fundamental
Jewish-Zionist narrative rooted in worldview, religious culture and modern
history is such a crucial element that a particular strategy to deal with the
clash of narratives is essential for conflict management also in Israeli
society, and will be addressed later on in this paper.
CASE STUDY
Starting in the spring semester of 2002, the first cycle of a continuing
experimental graduate seminar focusing on the theme of “New Approaches
to Conflict Resolution in Israeli Society” was held in cooperation with the
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. The course conducted as part of the Graduate
Program on Conflict Management at Bar-Ilan University was anchored in
federalist thinking rooted in the idea of brit as articulated by Elazar.
Furthermore, it was integrated with ideas of multiculturalism as advanced
by Kymlica (1995).
Empirical Output and Attitudes of Students
To track the impact of the course on the students this researcher (a
political scientist) worked with colleague Dr. Zev Kalifon (an applied
anthropologist) to assess student reaction. Quantitative questionnaire-based
data were collected from the students both before and after the course.
These questionnaires, which included queries on various public policy
questions and perceptions of the “other” in Israeli society, were distributed
at the start and conclusion of the course and analyzed by Kalifon according
to an adoption of the “consensus analysis.” Methods and conclusions have
been discussed thoroughly elsewhere (Mollov, Kalifon and Steinberg 2004).
In general, students achieved more empathic perceptions of other groups in
Israeli society, while for the most part still affirming the central character of
Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state, albeit allowing more room for multicultural
expression.
1
See Dialogue no. 6, www.bitterlemons.org, March 2007 for an analysis of this issue.
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Qualitative Data
In addition to the quantitative data, qualitative feedback in terms of
weekly summaries and reaction papers were a vital part of the course. In
their weekly reports some student comments suggested that adopting the
federalist model exclusively for the State of Israel could deprive the nation
of its fundamental Jewish character; however, certain elements of a
federalist orientation could provide needed acknowledgment for the special
character of various sub-groups in Israel, “reduce anger” and “facilitate
dialogue.” In this vein another student assessed the potential benefits of the
federalist model as “contributing to the ability to think in more flexible as
opposed to rigid communal terms.” Another student, however, warned that
excessive recognition of sub-group identities could undermine the solidarity
of the larger collective and facilitate a “splintering of Israeli society.”
As indicated earlier, a major part of the course was devoted to the
exposition of group narratives. As the narrative of the ethnic Sephardi sector
was generally most distant from the life experiences of the student
participants, their reaction to this narrative was most instructive. Following
the session devoted to the worldview and inner world of this sector, students
gained a much stronger appreciation of the sense of “cultural shame” which
Sephardi immigrants to Israel in the early years of Israel’s existence seemed
to have absorbed from the dominant Ashkenazi elites. The students came to
better understand the complex aspects of Sephardi culture, such as an easier
synthesis of religious Orthodoxy and modern lifestyle than that prevalent
among the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox, along with reliance on “saints” and
religious ceremonies at the graves of “saints.”
In their written feedback, the students seemed to appreciate the need to
promote Sephardi ethnic pride, but asked hard questions as to whether the
role of the Shas party had been constructive in promoting the interests of the
group. Thus, in much of their written feedback, the students expressed
empathy for the need of the ethnic Sephardi sector to regain a sense of pride
in practices and lifestyle that the Ashkenazi sector often belittles. However,
they expressed doubt as to whether the Shas party had acted positively by
channeling ethnic pride often into avenues of anti-Ashkenazi feeling.
This observation parallels with insights from the literature concerning
social identity, concerning the fragility of adequate and “inadequate”
identity among minority groups, which experience a range of negative and
positive associational perceptions concerning their own identity. Attempts at
group distinction relate to elements concerning identity within itself and in
comparison to other groups (Turner and Brown 1978; Taylor and
Moghaddam 1999).
Another case that was instructive and further acquainted the students
with the complexities of another sub-group was that of the Russian
immigrant community in Israel. Now a sizable community, this group of
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immigrants has come to Israel in several waves since the late 1960s. The
different waves represent different mind-sets ranging from the highly
ideological struggle against the Soviet regime in the 1960s and early 1970s
to the more pragmatic “quality of life”-oriented immigration in more recent
years. In their feedback students noted the pluralistic and complex nature of
this community which they were not familiar with, along with elements of
belief systems and complex identities (which can allow for a distinction
between Jewish ethnic and religious affiliation), which were hard in some
cases for them to fathom, but nevertheless added to their ability to
empathize with this sector.
The narrative of the Israeli-Arab sector was also highly instructive for the
students, who were given a deeper understanding of the background of the
Israeli Arab community, its development, problems and aspirations. While
socio-economic improvement is a major part of this community’s agenda,
identity issues, particularly those connected to their identity as Arabs in a
Jewish state, were dealt with in the class discussion. Though students
became more acquainted with the concrete needs of this community, they
acknowledged certain ongoing tensions concerning the fact of this
community’s identification with the Arab narrative while remaining citizens
of Israel, and yet echoed the need for ongoing dialogue with this community.
Students were also required to submit a final project, which called upon
both theoretical and practical tools to deal with conflict in Israeli society
based on hypothetical reality-based challenges. For instance, as one option
for their final projects, students were asked to evaluate the potential efficacy
of the federal model for Israel. Their evaluations ought to be compared to
impressions at the beginning of the course, in which most students
expressed skepticism concerning the applicability of the federalist model to
Israel (despite the examples of movement by many ethnically plural states in
this direction). By the end of the course, albeit with reservations, students
saw certain benefits to Israel’s societal cohesion through adoption of at least
some federalist elements.
Perhaps the most interesting qualitative results were a portion of the
students’ final projects in which they were asked to formulate a micro-level
solution to a hypothetical task of constructing a joint community center in
the northern Galilee which was to serve a larger community composed of
four sub-groups: secular liberal Israelis, Russian immigrants, ethnic
Sephardi Jews and Israeli Arabs. Drawing on the importance of identifying
commonalities (Newcomb 1961; Rokeach 1960) among disparate groups,
utilizing the various conflict management strategies referred to earlier in this
paper and based on the narratives to which they were exposed, the students
sought in their work to identify the means to promote a sustained dialogue
(Saunders 1999). This effort to develop links across social cleavages on the
level of inter-group relations is actually an expression of consociational
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strategy for advancing stability in divided societies (Daalder 1974; Lipjhart
1977).
The approaches that the students suggested in order to promote more
positive relations among the various sub-groups were instructive. For
instance, in a number of cases students suggested that types of cultural
coalition could be created between the ethnic Sephardic population
component and the Arab community of the area around traditional family
values. More Western-oriented culture and quality of life orientations were
identified as commonalities between the liberal secular community and
immigrants from the former Soviet Union.
Class discussions were also a means of assessing student attitudes.
Referring to the earlier cycles, at the beginning of the course the very notion
of introducing the federal idea in relation to Israel met with significant
resistance. As academic course organizer, I indicated that the course was
experimental and that I, along with the class, was exploring this possibility
together with them. However, as the course progressed, and despite their
initial misgivings, students began to express at least limited support for a
federal conception of society as opposed to the more unitary mold that they
were used to.
In addition, in a final summation session when students were asked to
evaluate the course in discussion, students who had little contact, knowledge
and perhaps even sympathy for the culture of sub-groups such as the ethnic
Sephardi sector, expressed far greater empathy and openness towards the
particular cultural behavior and values of this group. Students also noted
that they gained much in understanding and empathy for the complex nature
of the Russian population in Israel.
THE JEWISH-ARAB SCHISM AND
INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE
As noted earlier the most significant schism in Israeli society is that
between Jews and Arabs. In this area,the challenge of promoting “diversity
within unity” is sharpest. Given current trends in polarization between
civilizations according to Huntington’s (1993, 1996) thesis of emerging
intercivilizational conflict, the Jewish-Arab schism within Israel is an
example of intercivilizational conflict occurring within one nation state.
Indeed, as the course cycles have progressed over time it became evident
from student responses and class discussions that the domestic dimension of
conflict within Israel cannot be divorced from regional dynamics, i.e., the
Middle East as a predominantly Arab/Islamic area, with implications
particularly for the Jewish-Arab schism within Israel. Thus, an increasing
amount of class time became directed to conflict management strategies
between Jews and Arabs. Here, too, intercultural approaches have been
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emphasized as a resource drawing upon previous work conducted by this
researcher together with colleagues (Mollov 2006a; Mollov and Lavie 2001,
2006; Mollov, Meir and Lavie 2007). This approach has included: (1) field
work in inter-cultural dialogue; (2) empirical research concerning the impact
of Israeli-Palestinian/Arab-Jewish inter-cultural dialogue; and (3) the
presentation of a paradigm model of inter-cultural/inter-religious dialogue
that integrates political issues with individual perception change.
The federalist approach which emphasizes the importance of interactions
over definitions seems particularly relevant to this schism given the vast gap
between much of the Arab sector and the Jewish majority of Israel in respect
to the very definition of Israel as a Jewish state. However, in line with the
cultural approach to dialogue highlighted in the course it has been argued
that the inter-religious dialogue holds a promising approach to improving
Jewish-Arab understanding both within the State of Israel and in the larger
Israeli-Palestinian track. Furthermore, in the context of empirical tracking of
the course it became evident to both the student participants and this author
(as faculty initiator and coordinator) that schisms within Israeli society
cannot be treated effectively without reference to the regional context as it
impinges upon Jewish-Arab relations within Israel, which in some ways
reflects intercivilizational conflict within domestic society. In this regard,
intercultural approaches to Arab-Jewish dialogue, which are consistent to
federalist thinking, are also relevant.
At first thought, however, the idea that culture based on religion could
serve as a basis of understanding between Jews and Arabs might seem
counterintuitive and it is commonly assumed that injection of religion into a
conflict that is assumed by many to be solely a “political” conflict can only
serve to escalate that conflict further (Appleby 2000). However, this
researcher has argued that the Arab-Israeli conflict is fundamentally rooted
in religion and culture and is the product of parallel attempts by both Jews
and Arabs to renew earlier heroic periods (Mollov 2006a). Indeed, the rise
of the modern Zionist movement reflected the effort by the Jewish people to
return to their ancient homeland and renew their civilization on the model of
the period of the Bible. This was in response to the anti-Semitic persecution
and degradation of the exile experience (Garfinkle 1991). However, the
Arab peoples also underwent a parallel transformation in the form of the
Arab awakening that sought to renew the Arab-Islamic empire and heroic
era in the form of a new Arab state along with renewed cultural dignity
(Garfinkle 1991). This background gave rise to two conflicting narratives
ultimately rooted in religiously based culture, which was described to the
students as the basis of the Arab-Israeli conflict with important implications
for the Jewish-Arab schism in Israeli society.
How can this approach be translated into a practical conflict management
or dialogue strategy as part of the conceptual basis of the course? The
federalist approach, which Elazar (1979, 1991) sought to extend to the
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Middle East and to the Arab-Israeli conflict, can also provide an umbrella
for cultivating this type of cultural dialogue. What follows below is a
general overview of work conducted by this researcher and colleagues in
connection with the efficacy of Jewish-Arab inter-religious dialogue, which
was also cited in the course.
EMPIRICAL WORK IN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN
INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE
Starting in the mid-1990s, I helped to initiate, together with a group of
Palestinian students from the Hebron area, a series of dialogues between
those students and Jewish students from Bar-Ilan University studying at the
time in my course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. These meetings and activities
continued in various forms until virtually the start of acute IsraeliPalestinian violence in the fall of 2000, focusing on commonalities between
Islam and Judaism.
The format of these meetings revolved around one particular theme, such
as prayer, charity, dietary laws, and even the story of creation in the
respective holy books of the two religions. Presentations were made by a
student from each side and then opportunity for discussion and clarifications
took place, as students would frequently discover significant commonalities
between the two religious traditions. In one meeting, a visiting professor
from India spoke about the nature of poverty as a psychological
phenomenon in which the participants also found common ground.
Following this more formal part of the meeting students then partook of
refreshments and had the opportunity to continue discussions informally on
other issues––even charged political topics, albeit in a more positive
atmosphere than if politics had been the initial and primary focus.
Participants reported on a warm atmosphere in these face-to-face meetings
and attributed that achievement to the discovery of commonalities in the
other’s religious culture (Mollov and Barhoum 1998). Approximately 90
students on each side had at some point been directly involved in the
process.
Meetings were not only held in a face-to-face context, but also included
two phases of a virtual CMC (Computer Mediated Communication)
dialogue in which first comparisons between observances in the two
religions, such as those concerning the Sabbath, were discussed. In the
second dialogue, the Muslim observances of Ramadan and those of the
Jewish New Year (Rosh Hashana) were compared by the participants. These
activities involving Israeli-Palestinian student teams from both sides have
been reported on elsewhere (Mollov et al., 2001; Mollov 2006b) and
augmented “relationship building” (Saunders 1999) by the participants,
which was fostered by the discussion of similarities between Islam and
Judaism.
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In quantitative research carried out by me and political scientist and
partner Chaim Lavie, a social psychologist, field efforts in intercultural
dialogue were augmented by research efforts to assess the impact of these
exchanges, and in 1999 an Israeli-Palestinian inter-religious dialogue held in
Gaza provided a venue to collect such data, which have appeared in Mollov
and Lavie (2001). In this Friday-Saturday (Sabbath) encounter in which
approximately 80 participants on each side participated, Jewish and Muslim
prayer rituals were discussed, the services of both religions were conducted,
and the religious dietary requirements of the Jewish guests were respected.
To assess the impact of this encounter, Israelis and Palestinians were
asked to fill out questionnaires reflecting their mutual perceptions, both
before and after the encounter. While the questionnaire has appeared in its
entirety elsewhere (Mollov and Lavie 2001), questions which the
participants responded to related to the willingness of the subjects to have
work or school contact with each other and perception of each sides
personality and character traits. The answers were rated on a scale of one to
five, with one indicating the most favorable perception of the other group
and five indicating the most negative.
The evaluation of the Gaza meeting was compared with an evaluation of
control data collected among both Israeli Jewish students at Bar-Ilan
University and Palestinian Arab students at several Palestinian universities.
Consistent with accepted assumptions, it was found that religious students
on both sides (average score of 3.3 by Israeli Jews and average score of 4.3
by Palestinian Arabs) held the most negative preconceptions of each other
(Mollov and Lavie 2001). However, Mollov and Lavie (2001) found that
there is corroborated potential for the inter-religious encounter to change
mutual perceptions in a more positive direction. Data collected from the
participants at the Gaza encounter (admittedly a small sample based on a
single encounter) indicated that perceptions among Palestinian Muslim
participants shifted to a more favorable position than any other sub-group
among the Palestinian participants (moving from 2.5 before the encounter to
2.1 after the encounter).2
These quantitative findings added further credence to the anecdotal
evidence offered by Mollov and Barhoum (1998) and Mollov (1999) in
regard to the dialogue co-initiated by us, which involved students from BarIlan University and Palestinian students from the Hebron area referred to
earlier. In that dialogue, as noted, religion, and in particular, similarities in
structure and practices between Islam and Judaism, became a constructive
basis for interactions and relationship building as students began to perceive
something important and familiar in the other side. The literature of social
psychology corroborates the favorable impact on inter-group relations when
2
In this particular case, perceptions of the Israeli Jewish participants, both religious and
non-religious, began and remained favorable.
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groups in conflict are able to discern something in common with the other
group, which, as we noted in this case, is connected to religious culture and
practice (Amir 1969; Pettigrew 1998; Rokeach 1960)
Not only does the inter-religious dialogue appear to have potential in
fostering more positive perceptions and interactions between Israelis and
Palestinians but also between Jews and Arabs within the State of Israel.3
Dialogues taking place between these two groups within the State of Israel
have shown potential as well in fostering improved relationships, and have
been reported upon elsewhere (Mollov and Lavie 2006). Indeed, this study
reporting on meetings held in Acre and Nazareth took place following the
violent events of late 2000, and therefore the relatively positive conclusions
offer some encouragement for their efficacy even during the current difficult
political climate.4
The overall approach presented above as a conflict management strategy
was presented to the students in the course. Many of the students were
skeptical in their first reaction to the religiously based dialogue particularly
given the fact that many saw themselves as secular in their orientation.
However, when the notion of clashing narratives was emphasized as the
basis for the Arab-Israeli conflict there was far more openness to this
approach and its potential efficacy. Its further implications will be discussed
below.
INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AND MACRO LEVEL CONFLICT
While changing perceptions on the interpersonal level based on the
similarities between the two religions is an important effort, could this have
an impact on the macro level of political conflict? As suggested earlier the
Arab-Israeli conflict is an outgrowth of two narratives rooted in the attempt
by two civilizations (the Jewish and Arab-Islamic) to renew themselves
according to the model of an earlier heroic era. In the case of the Jews, the
modern movement that began in the late 19th century, which led to the
establishment of the State of Israel, sought to restore the Jewish people to
the land of Israel based on its ancient religious longings. Furthermore, this
movement intended to revive Jewish dignity and culture on the model of the
period of the Bible particularly in response to the anti-Semitism and
persecution, which the Jewish people experienced for centuries.
Similarly, the Arab peoples in their awakening starting in the 19th
century also protested against the decline of Arab identity and external
3
Approximately 18% of the population of the State of Israel is composed of Arab citizens.
It is acknowledged here that it would be extremely useful to gather newer data concerning
the impact of such encounters between Israelis and Palestinians when conditions on the
ground allow for such activities to be organized again.
4
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oppression, and sought to renew itself according to the heroic era of the
Arab-Islamic Empire which existed at its peak during the seventh to 10th
centuries.
Both these movements, however, collided during the 20th century. The
models that both peoples saw as the ideal of revival existed in the absence
of the other party. The Jewish civilization of the Bible in the land of Israel
existed before the rise of Islam, and the Arab-Islamic Empire came into
control of the area when the Jews were no longer an active political force in
the region.
However, this narrative clarification is useful as it elucidates key
elements of the conflict, which can be a step for conflict transformation. As
part of the inter-religious dialogue the basis of each side’s connection to the
“Holy Land” can be challenged and explained. Given this clash, ultimately
some form of narrative re-formulation will need to take place in order for
both sides to take into account the reality of the other side in our current era
of the 20th and 21st centuries. Ideally as well, some point of transcendent
contact should be fostered between the sides, which believers can share if
the inclusive aspects of religion are emphasized (Appleby 2000; Gopin
2000). This was illustrated for instance by the ability of Jews and Muslims
to wish each other well in the acceptance of their prayers and in the
fulfillment of other religious rituals.
While not giving up respective identities as Israelis and Palestinians––
and their states––the commitment to building a “Holy Land” could also
serve as the animating spirit for both. In part, it could also draw on the
tolerant “tradition of Cordova” adapted to the conditions of the 20th and
21st centuries (Harvey 2005; Laskier, forthcoming) in which Israel exists as
a sovereign state. This model, in fact, was presented previously in Malaysia
and has been described elsewhere (Mollov 2006b).
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has discussed the challenges of multiculturalism, which is also
an expression of intercivilizational conflict, within Israeli society. It has
proposed that a federalist approach rooted in the thought of Daniel J. Elazar,
a pioneer both in federalism and the Jewish political tradition, can offer an
important new approach in viewing Israeli society as one in which greater
diversity can be acknowledged, while the Jewish-Zionist foundations of the
State of Israel can still be affirmed.
As part of an empirical case study an overview of an experimental course
that has been conducted over the past six years within the framework of the
Program on Conflict Management at Bar-Ilan University on the theme of
“New Approaches to Conflict Management in Israeli Society” has been
presented. The course has been organized around the theme of federalism as
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articulated by Elazar. The course amalgamated Elazar’s federalist approach,
which seeks to advance “diversity within unity,” with multicultural thinking
and narrative exposure as a means of seeking to cope with increasing social
schisms within Israel. It also suggests that Elazar’s federalist model rooted
in the Jewish idea of brit can potentially serve as a “third way” between the
classic melting pot model of social integration in Israel, which has become
less relevant for its social cohesiveness on the one hand, and a “state of all
its citizens” model which would deprive Israel of its distinct Jewish-Zionist
narrative.
Moreover, in the context of the course’s progression it became evident to
both the student participants and this author (as faculty initiator and
coordinator) that schisms within Israeli society cannot be treated effectively
without reference to the regional context. For the Jewish-Arab schism with
Israel, which is a reflection of intercivilizational conflict within a state, is
the most significant conflict in the Israeli context. Intercultural conflict
management strategies emphasizing cultural commonalities between
Judaism and Islam have shown promise based on previous field work and
research to moderate perceptions and help advance more positive
interactions. The basis of narrative clarification rooted in culture and
religion and attempts to deal with this clash have also been advanced by this
cultural approach. Furthermore, federalist thinking, which emphasizes the
importance of “interactions” over “definitions,” is particularly relevant in
dealing with this schism.
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LeBaron, Michelle. 1997. Intercultural disputes – mediation, conflict resolution,
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Inter-Religious Dialogue: Lessons from a
Practitioner’s Perspective
DANIEL ROSSING
This paper offers a “hands-on” perspective for dealing with inter-religious
dialogue in the “Holy Land.” Within an analytic context it emphasizes the
importance of inter-religious dialogue for moderating intercivilizational
tensions, and based on the author’s personal experience in Jewish-Christian
dialogue it offers a number of concrete recommendations for improving interreligious dialogue. In addition, it provides some statistical information
regarding attitudes toward the “other” in Israeli society.
Inter-religious dialogue, which is a vital tool for advancing any peace
process, has been insufficiently appreciated by both policy makers and the
public at large for its potential efficacy. This paper focuses on the
importance of such dialogue, particularly in a region like the Middle East
that is so politically and religiously charged. Furthermore, it offers some
concrete suggestions from a practitioner’s perspective as to how to
successfully advance inter-religious dialogue so that it may better achieve
its objectives.
The narrow strip of land at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea is
variously known by Jews, Christians and Muslims worldwide as the Land of
Israel, the Holy Land or Palestine. For millennia, this land bridge between
three continents has been a crossroads of cultures and civilizations and a
meeting point for different religious, ethnic and national groups. The
“homeland,” over which two peoples and two modern-day national
movements have been fighting for decades, is at the same time the “holy
land” of three faiths––Judaism, Christianity and Islam––which has greatly
influenced and enriched one another over the centuries, but has also brought
competition and conflict, particularly over the coveted “promised” land,
leading some to describe the land as the “over-promised” or “compromised” land.
This is a land in which it is difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle
people, territory and faith. The resulting complex compounds of ethnicity,
nationality and religion frustrate attempts to describe the core of the current
conflict as essentially ethnic, strictly political or fundamentally religious. It
is equally difficult to say whether we are working today in a situation of
conflict in which effective conflict management or conflict resolution skills
are required, or in a post-conflict context that calls for activities to foster
healing and reconciliation, especially activities that promote better interreligious understanding and relations.
The lack of clarity as to where we are and what is necessary stems in part
from the fact that in their hearts and minds different groups have collective
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memories based on different centuries, whether it be the days of the
Philistines and the Kingdom of David, the centuries of the Roman and
Byzantine Empires, the age of the Crusades and Salah a-Din, the era of
European colonialism in the area, or the years of the Holocaust. The local
environment is saturated, and in some ways polluted, with the diverse
selective memories of different groups, both memories of power and glory
and memories of victimhood and carnage.
In many respects the current conflict contains within it, and is fueled by,
the post-conflict fallout of conflicts of ages past and the residue of the
traumas resulting from those conflicts, many of which were largely wars of
religion. Many of the deep-seated wounds, and the consequent
predisposition to fear and demonize the “enemy” in the present conflict,
have their source in the long, sad history of the relations of Jews, Christians
and Muslims. Thus for example, many Israeli Jews project onto both local
Arab Christians, who were not part of the tragic history of Jewish-Christian
relations in the West, and Muslim Arabs, unresolved grievances and deepseated suspicions that have their origin in other times and places.
The Muslim Arab side of the conflict, with equal injustice, often regards
the Jewish “enemy,” and sometimes also Arab Christians, as simply
modern-day reincarnations of the Crusaders and/or as agents of the cultural
and religious imperialism of the Christian West in the modern era. The
result is disregard of the intimate link of both Jews and Christians with the
land, as well as the lingering impact of the nearly two millennia of Jewish
suffering in Christian lands and of the centuries of dhimmi status which was
the fate of Jews and Christians in Muslim lands.
I basically agree with the argument of the Swiss theologian Hans Kung
that there can be no peace among nations without peace among religions
and that there can be no peace among religions without dialogue. Nowhere
would this seem to be more true than in the case of Israel/the Holy
Land/Palestine, where influential segments of the population are informed
and inspired by deeply held religious convictions, and where the negative
fallout from centuries of religious competition and conflicts among Jews,
Christians and Muslims still casts a long shadow over the land and has yet
to be deactivated and dispersed through constructive inter-religious
dialogues, which are an essential, but often neglected, component of any
process of peace building in the Holy Land.
A PRACTITIONER’S PERSPECTIVE
During the past 40 years I have worked in diverse settings and in a
variety of frameworks in the field of what is generally referred to as
interfaith or inter-religious relations and dialogue, mainly in the field of
Jewish-Christian dialogue and relations. For a number of years in the late
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1960s, I participated in discussions among Protestants, Catholics and Jews
in the United States. Protestants participated as Protestants and Catholics as
Catholics, while Jews, a tiny minority in that society, often came to the
dialogue as Americans, or wearing the mantle of a cosmopolitan or
international individual.
Jacob Neusner has noted that in the modern era, disputations that
characterized relations between Jews and Christians in the Middle Ages
have been replaced by a dialogue founded on the conviction that the two
religions say the same thing and that the differences between them are
trivial. He offers a caricature of the dialogue in the West:
For the past two centuries Judeo-Christian dialogue served as the medium of a
politics of social conciliation, not religious inquiry into the convictions of the
other. Negotiation took the place of debate and to lay claim upon truth in
behalf of one’s own religion violated the rules of good conduct. (Neusner
2007)
In this atmosphere, he notes, “religions emerged as obstacles to the good
order of society.”
Although I think this evaluation of Jewish-Christian dialogue in the West
is too dismissive, it is clear that the ideal of interfaith dialogue was given a
set of concrete meanings in a very specific and unique historic-cultural
constellation that emerged in the modern era in the West. These meanings
continue to dictate their form and content, as well as their limitations,
wherever they are practiced. The phenomenon of interfaith dialogue
developed mainly in reaction to a dual crisis in the modern Western world:
loss of innocent faith in God as a result of the “Enlightenment” and loss of
naïve faith in man, largely as a consequence of World War I and World War
II, and especially the Holocaust.
My own experience of Western Jewish-Christian dialogue, whether
practiced in the West or in Israel confirms the impact of the particular
setting and circumstances in which that dialogue emerged. There has always
been a lack of symmetry and an imbalance between the two sides in this
dialogue. Thus, for example, the centrality of the issue of anti-Semitism and
the Holocaust in the dialogue automatically means that the Christian side
comes to the dialogue from a position of weakness and with a severe
handicap inherited from its religious and moral crises during and after the
Holocaust in the heart of Christendom.
There has been a corollary imbalance with regard to the representatives
of the two faith communities. The Christian side is usually represented by
clergy and theologians, while the Jewish side until recently was often
represented by academics or representatives of Jewish organizations that are
not essentially religious but rather specialize in public or communal
relations. That which motivates Christians to participate in the dialogue
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seems to be primarily a religious crisis; what prompts Jews to join the
dialogue are primarily practical social and historical considerations, and
most especially a concern to combat anti-Semitism or to defend the State of
Israel.
Finally, there has been a lack of symmetry of expectations. Most of the
demands come from the Jewish side, which has asked Christians to
fundamentally re-examine Christian theology as regards Christian attitudes
toward Judaism and Jews. In practice, there have been few expectations
from the Christian side, and when Christians make demands, for example
with regard to certain policies of the government of Israel, some Jews are
quick to cry, “anti-Semitism.”
Since 1971, I have worked in the markedly different setting and
conditions of this contested land. Prof. R. J. Zwi Werblowsky has rightly
noted that, “the evasive maneuvers possible in interfaith relations elsewhere
simply will not work in Jerusalem.” He argues:
Jerusalem in its perhaps more irritating than edifying concreteness prevents
interfaith relations from floating in the theological stratosphere. They cannot
even be put into orbit in the usual social-denominational atmosphere.
Jerusalem, for people of faith, is a spiritually loaded symbol whose spirituality
is ‘incarnate’ (to borrow a term from Christian theology) in the aspirations,
ambiguities, fears, suspicions, and ideas surrounding political realties.
Israel is also a land where Jews, Christians and Muslims, or Israelis and
Palestinians, do not share a common native tongue. Marc Gopin, in his book
Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring Peace to the Middle East
(2002), observes that words and the exchange of words are the principal
means of reconciliation and peacemaking in Western culture and Western
interfaith dialogue. He notes that a fixation on the exchange of words
“frustrates and disempowers those who engage in reconciliation through
gestures, symbols, emotions, and shared work.” More than three decades of
working with the two peoples and three faiths in the Holy Land has taught
me the profound power of non-verbal communication and the importance of
symbols in any attempt to build relations based on respect for and sensitivity
to the other and the other’s culture and religion.
Furthermore, as already noted, Israel is a land in which different groups
seem to live in different centuries. Jerusalem is composed of competing
mountains of memory on which each group builds its particular
eschatological skyscraper or rival vision of the future. One of the byproducts of this reality is a profound confusion of minority and majority
roles. The painful memory of 2,000 years of living precariously everywhere
as a minority makes it difficult for Jews to assume the role of an empowered
majority with responsibility. The proud memory of centuries of dominance
makes it hard for Muslims to live as a minority under the rule of one of
yesterday’s dhimmis. Roman Catholics in Israel constitute perhaps less than
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half a percent of the population, but they belong to a church, which globally
has over a billion members.
Since the 1950s, a number of interfaith groups have nurtured a fruitful
dialogue between Jews and Christians in Israel. Among organizations of
special note are the Israel Interfaith Association (1957), Jerusalem Rainbow
Group (1965), Ecumenical Theological Research Fraternity (1966), Israel
Jewish Council for Interreligious Relations (1972), Interreligious
Coordinating Council in Israel (1991), Elijah School (1996), and the
Interfaith Encounter Association (2001). Numerous Western Christian
institutions and organizations in the country have made a major contribution
to deepening the understanding of Jews and Judaism among Christians from
abroad, and several Jewish institutions of higher learning offer Christian
scholars and clergy further opportunities for interfaith discovery.
I have been a regular participant in all of these frameworks and forums
for interfaith dialogue and have served on the boards of some of them. Most
of the other participants are also members of all these organizations, leading
some to suggest in jest that it would save time to schedule the annual
general meetings of all these organizations in the same place on the same
day. The principal participants comprise a very small circle of not more than
a couple of hundred individuals, the vast majority of them of Western,
liberal, largely Anglo-Saxon background. The dialogue has not attracted
local Christians or Muslims, or Jews from other segments of Israeli society.
Rather than asking if their Western-style dialogue perhaps needs to be
adapted to the special climate and soil of this land, participants often accuse
the “locals” of being “medieval” or “pre-modern,” and lacking any notion of
pluralism, or faulting them for “politicizing” relations.
Not surprisingly, the dynamics and agenda of the dialogue differ only
minimally from those that prevail in Europe or America. Even the reversal
of minority-majority roles between Jews and Christians in the Holy Land is
hardly noted. Furthermore, many existing forums and frameworks for
interfaith dialogue follow the principle that politics should be banned from
the discussions in order to achieve understanding among the different faith
communities, just as much of the extensive work being done in Israel in the
field of Jewish-Arab co-existence, and indeed many initiatives for peace
between Israelis and Palestinians, are premised on the assumption that
tolerance and peace can be achieved only if religion is kept at a safe
distance.
Parallel to my involvement in the abovementioned frameworks for
interfaith understanding, I have focused most of my energy during the last
35 years on the relations of the Jewish majority in Israel with the tiny
indigenous, largely Palestinian Arab, Christian minorities in the Holy Land.
I engaged in this work during the 1970s and 1980s in the framework of my
then position as the director of the Department for Christian Communities in
the Israel Ministry for Religious Affairs. That position placed me between
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the Jewish state and local Christian communities, which have a long history
of struggling for survival as minorities on the margins of a dominant, and at
times intolerant and oppressive, society. The job also often required that I
mediate disputes between religious communities, particularly as concerns
holy places claimed by more than one community or in which more than
one community is present, such as the Church of the Holy Sepulcher.
TOWARDS MORE SUCCESSFUL DIALOGUE STRATEGIES
This work, and my intense daily encounter with the Christian minorities,
has led me to two principal conclusions regarding interfaith relations and
dialogue. The first conclusion is that while interfaith dialogue is a vital
value of universal import, it must be adapted to the particular soil and
climate of each country and context if it is to make an effective contribution
to peace building and moderating intercivilizational and inter-cultural
conflict. Until now, interfaith dialogue in this land has had little impact
largely because it has not been adapted to local realities and requirements.
My close relations with the local Christian communities have taught me
that I cannot conduct a dialogue with Christians exclusively from the
position of a minority or only as a victim. I gradually recognized that there
is a need, indeed dire urgency, to examine my own attitudes and theology of
the other. I am now of the opinion that there can be no significant
breakthrough in interfaith relations in Israel until there is a sincere change of
heart and mind, and a genuine reaching out to these communities on the part
of the dominant Jewish and Muslim populations. The Jerusalem Center for
Jewish-Christian Relations (JCJCR), which I currently direct, was founded
in 2003 to meet this challenge on the Jewish side.
My second conclusion is that interfaith relations and dialogue indeed
have a vital role to play in peace building and the management and
reduction of intercivilizational and inter-cultural conflict. However, for
interfaith dialogue to be an effective agent for healing in the context of this
contested land, it must strive not only to transform outlooks and attitudes
over time, but also to urgently address the immediate problems and
challenges arising from the aspirations, ambiguities, fears, suspicions, ideas
and symbols surrounding political realties about which Werblowsky speaks.
In this regard, there is a place for Jewish-Christian-Muslim interfaith
meetings, but my experience with such trialogues is that they have two
inherent weaknesses. Trialogues by nature focus on topics that are common
to all three groups and tend to overlook or ignore potent issues that are
specific to two groups, which are often the most important problems that
need to be dealt with in order to heal the wounds of both the past and the
present and to achieve sustainable reconciliation. As the Israeli-Jewish
author Yossi Klein Halevi points out in his book At the Entrance to the
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Garden of Eden: A Jew’s Search for God with Christians and Muslims in
the Holy Land (2002), our relationships with Christianity and Islam each
contain its own distinct ambivalence: we share with Christians a shattering
past, but a promising present, while with Muslims the situation is essentially
the reverse. Trialogue can bring about agreement on the lowest common
denominator (for example, “our common ancestry in Abraham” or “our
shared values”), but this achievement will be endangered by the failure of
trialogues to address more influential problematic issues that are specific to
two groups.
The other inherent weakness in trialogues stems from the fact that if there
is a significant lack of parity among the three partners, the weakest partner
is often overlooked by the other two or is reluctant to openly and freely
present its specific views, concerns and interests. In the case of modern-day
Israel, the weakest partner is clearly the Arab Christian, who is in the
precarious position of being a minority within a minority. Experience has
shown that in trialogues in Israel, Muslims and Jews freely and manifestly
participate as Muslims and Jews, while Arab Christians are hesitant to
participate as Christians and prefer to emphasize almost exclusively their
Arab and/or Palestinian identity and downplay their specific concerns and
outlooks as Christians. As noted earlier, in a similar way in interfaith
meetings among Protestants, Catholics and Jews in the United States in the
1950s and 1960s, Protestants and Catholics participated as Protestants and
Catholics, while Jews, as the weakest element, preferred to stress their
American identity and were too insecure at that time to interject a
specifically Jewish agenda.
As an example, the challenges arising from the aspirations, ambiguities,
fears, suspicions, ideas and symbols surrounding political realties in our
local context, as well as an illustration of problematic issues that are specific
to two groups and that are not easily dealt with in a trialogue of Jews,
Christians and Muslims, I would note, on the basis of research conducted by
the Jerusalem Center for Jewish-Christian Relations, that 46 percent of the
adult Jewish population in Israel do not think that Jerusalem is a central city
for the Christian world and 75% think that Christian organizations should
not be allowed to purchase land in Jerusalem to build new churches. Fortyone percent view Christianity as an idolatrous religion, 39% feel that
soldiers serving in the Israeli army who define themselves as Christians
(mainly immigrants from the FSU) should not be allowed to take their oath
of allegiance on the New Testament rather than the Jewish Bible; 37%
believe that it is forbidden for a Jew to enter a church; 23% think that
Christian clergy should not be allowed to live anywhere in Israel; 23% are
greatly or considerably bothered when meeting a Christian in the street who
is wearing a cross; 22% believe that the Israeli government does not have to
guarantee freedom of religion for its Arab Christian citizens, and 20%
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believe that the government of Israel should restrict the activities of the
churches in Israel.
These findings expose very concrete and important issues, which are
specific to the relations of Jews and Christians in Israel and which cannot
easily be addressed in the setting of a trialogue among Jews, Christians and
Muslims, but which must be dealt with through honest and open JewishChristian dialogue. Furthermore, although similar attitudes toward
Christianity and Christians may exist among Jews living as minorities in the
Western Christian world, the need to deal with them is far more critical and
urgent in a setting such as Israel where Jews are an empowered majority and
Arab Christians constitute only 2% of the population and find themselves in
the precarious position of a minority within a minority.
I conclude by noting that most of the major initiatives for resolving the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict (such as the Oslo Process and the Geneva
Accords) have been largely secular peace plans imposed by secular leaders
and politicians on a Holy Land where large and influential minorities of
both Jews and Palestinians are motivated by deeply held religious
convictions. None have sought the input of religious personalities, not even
from the religious peace camp, nor attempted to enlist the public support of
religious leaders. In the end, by failing to address core issues of faith and
identity, secular negotiators allowed radical, extremist religious forces to
dominate this crucial area.
The question of the relative importance of investing in political processes
and accords or in inter-religious relations and reconciliation (obviously both
are necessary) contains within it the difference between peace making and
peace building. “Peace-making” is the work of politicians, diplomats and
lawyers and focuses on producing treaties or agreements that are either
effectively implemented and faithfully honored, or remain nothing more
than pieces of paper.
“Peace building” is the work of religious leaders, educators and many
other sectors of civil society and involves changing hearts and minds in
ways that can create a firm foundation for sustainable peaceful relations and
fruitful cooperation over time. This work is inherently religious, educational
and dialogical, and requires patience and perseverance, especially in the
midst of an ongoing conflict and against the backdrop of the residue of postconflict trauma from ages past.
I obviously share the view that there is a critical role for interfaith
relations and dialogue, most especially in Israel, where two-dimensional
political space with maps and borders and separation must be transformed
by a third dimension of responsibility, reconciliation and relationship, of
holiness, harmony and wholeness, which are the essence of religious
teachings and aspirations. Then, borders, physical and psychological, will
no longer be barriers but a place “between,” a threshold of meeting where
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personal and communal identity, and conflict itself, can be transformed
through the encounter with the other.
REFERENCES
Marc Gopin. 2002. Holy war, holy peace: How religion can bring peace to the Middle
East. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Halevi, Yossi Klein. 2001. At the entrance to the Garden of Eden: A Jew’s search for
God with Christians and Muslims in the holy land. New York, NY: William Morrow.
Neusner, Jacob, My argument with the pope, The Jerusalem Post Online Edition, May
29, 2007.
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1180450948925&pagename=JPost%2FJPAr
ticle%2FPrinter
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Symposium: What Can Scholars of Conflict Situations,
Conflict Management and Policy Makers Learn From
Each Other?
EPHRAIM TABORY
The essays relating to the question posed in this symposium—what can
scholars of conflict management and policy makers learn from each
other?—is perhaps the most innovative contribution of this volume to the
actual handling of conflict. Academicians who deal with conflict thrive on
intercivilizational friction, the topic of this special issue. There are enough
conflict situations around to enable us to produce articles, books, symposia,
theses and dissertations (and, indeed, a new journal) with no end in sight.
The contribution of religion to intractable conflict is so pronounced that one
might cynically thank God for this situation.
But it is people who war with one another in the name of their
perceptions, interpretations and beliefs regarding their ideologies and
identity systems. It is people who fight over the allocation of resources and
who judge arrangements to be fair or unfair, just or inequitable. It is people
who need to live with one another in a spirit of tolerance and understanding,
and be secure enough to evaluate accommodation as something other than
appeasement and betrayal of one’s sense of self, as well as to stand up to
possible accusations of being a traitor to one’s group. It is people who need
not just to talk to one another but to hear what others are saying and feeling.
That is the sign of true communication. To assist in bringing this about,
academicians and policy makers must also have a fruitful dialogue of
understanding.
Tapes of former U.S. president Richard Nixon speaking with his adviser,
Henry Kissinger, released on December 2, 2008, illustrate just how difficult
it is to achieve this: “Never forget, the press is the enemy. The establishment
is the enemy. The professors are the enemy.”
In the taped Oval Office conversation, the former U.S. president then
repeats to Kissinger, his security adviser: “Professors are the enemy. Write
that on a blackboard 100 times and never forget it.”
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1091608/The-Pressestablishment-professors-enemy--latest-archive-recordings-reveal-depthNixons-paranoia.html (accessed December 4, 2008)
Beyond the fact that the released tapes reveal prejudices and stereotypes,
they also indicate that deeper factors may impact on critical decisions that
are different from those gleaned from official documents and selective
memos (Clymer 2003).
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It is, of course, incumbent upon policy makers to overcome their
stereotypes and prejudices and to listen to analysts (whether they be
university professors or not) in an objective manner. It is also important for
academicians to realize that their analyses are not always impartial, and that
they often rely on sources that are only partial, in both senses of the term.
Criticism of academicians as not really living in this world may be justified,
in the sense that they base their studies on the information that they possess,
and not on the information that they, of course, do not have. A true
exchange of views might lead to better understanding, and more sound
decisions.
Such an exchange is not easy, because politicians (and even)
academicians are, at the end of the day, just people. There are two basic
motives of human behavior that at times clash with one another. Many
people have a need to maintain a high level of self-esteem—to see
themselves as competent and decent persons (Baumeister 1998; Tavris and
Aronson 2007). On the other hand, a cognitive approach to social behavior
begins with the assumption that people want to view the world as accurately
as possible (Markus and Zajonc 1985; Fiske and Taylor 1991). Aronson,
Wilson and Akert (2007:19) captivatingly illustrate the dilemma that might
ensue:
Imagine you are the president of the United States and your country is
engaged in a difficult and costly war… The war seems to be at a stalemate; no
end is in sight… You deplore all the carnage that is going on [but you also]
don’t want to go down in history as the first American president to lose a
war… Some of your advisers tell you that… if you intensify the bombing, the
enemy will soon capitulate and the war will be over… [In this case] not only
will you have succeeded in achieving your military and political aims, but
history will consider you a hero. Other advisers, however, believe that
intensifying the bombing will only strengthen the enemy’s resolve; they
advise you to sue for peace.
The idea that one more push might lead to a glorious victory can
overcome any well-conceived constructive suggestion for the management
or resolution of conflict in a peaceful manner. But questions of ego affect
academicians as well, and this too needs to be recognized. Our participants
in this symposium open the door for a dialogue between policy makers and
academicians. We invite both sides to welcome each other in a spirit of
understanding and tolerance and to not only listen (no small feat in itself, to
judge by Israeli political talk shows) but to actually hear what each side has
to say. Conflict management and resolution might well benefit if each side
resists the belief that it is its proper role to teach the other side, and
instead—at least occasionally—accepts the possibility that it might learn
from the other side as well.
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REFERENCES
Aronsonn, Elliot, Timothy D. Wilson and Robin M. Akert. 2007. Social psychology. Upper
Saddle River, NJ.: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Baumeister, Roy F. 1998. The self. In The handbook of social psychology 1, edited by
Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske and Gardner Lindzey, pp. 680–740. New York: McGrawHill
Clymer, Adam. 2003. Reviewing presidential tapes and their place in history. The New
York Times, December 3.
Fiske, Susan T. and Shelley E. Taylor. 1991. Social cognition. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Markus, Hazel R. and Robert B. Zajonc. 1985. The cognitive perspective in social
psychology. In The handbook of social psychology 1, pp. 137–230. New York: McGrawHill.
Tavris, Carol and Elliot Aronson, 2007. Mistakes were made (But not by me). New York:
Harcourt Brace.
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Methodological Issues
JONATHAN FOX
Academia is notorious for producing scholars who focus on narrow issues.
An efficient path to a successful academic career is to establish a reputation
in a specific field and continue to research and publish on that topic. Given
the often large amount of literature produced on a yearly basis on even subfields within subfields, this is perhaps inevitable. Of course, some scholars
have focuses which are narrower than others, but those who successfully
publish, or are even fully up-to-date on a wide range of topics, are becoming
increasingly rare. As a consequence, scholarly discussion often becomes
parochial in the sense that there is little communication across disciplines
and sub-disciplines.
One example of this phenomenon is the study of conflict. This academic
pursuit can be divided along many lines, such as methodology (quantitative
vs. qualitative), and whether the conflict is international or domestic.
Among domestic conflicts, there are divisions over issues of types of tactics
(civil war, guerilla war, terrorism, etc.) and participants’ identities––whether
the sides are differentiated by ethnic and/or religious identity. Yet, perhaps,
one of the most stark divisions is between those who study the causes of
conflicts and those who study the resolution and management of conflicts.
In my experience, those who study the causes of conflicts rarely address
how they can be resolved and those who study conflict resolution do not
address the large literature that exists on their causes. There are, of course,
some rare exceptions to this rule (Gurr 1980; Horowitz 1985).
Yet there is much these two bodies of scholarship could learn from each
other. It seems obvious that an accurate understanding of a conflict’s root
causes would aid in resolving that conflict. It also seems obvious that the
study of the resolution of conflicts would produce unique insights into a
conflict’s causes. Practitioners of conflict resolution who are present at
encounters between two sides of a conflict, whether these encounters are
diplomatic or grass roots, are likely to witness exchanges that provide
insight into a conflict’s causes in a way that could not be achieved in any
other format. Also, a successful resolution of a conflict can, in hindsight,
provide a perspective on the causes of conflict that may have been
previously obscured.
From the perspective of one who studies the causes of conflicts which
occur within states, I would like to provide two examples of findings that I
feel could benefit practitioners of conflict resolution. Both of these findings
are based on studies which show that commonly held assumptions about
certain types of conflict are inaccurate.
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First, a commonly held assumption is that economic deprivation is a
major root cause of conflict. This is a theme that recurs repeatedly in the
media. It is the basis for many government and NGO policies. It has also
been formalized into scholarly theories such as relative deprivation theory.
(For examples of the relative deprivation literature, see Davies 1962;
Feierabend and Feierabend 1973; Gurr 1970; Olson 1963). Yet this theory is
one of the most criticized in the social sciences. (For a detailed discussion
and critique of relative deprivation theory, see Rule 1988).
One study that examined a long list of previous studies found there was
no consistent link between economic inequality and conflict (Lichbach
1989). Another, which tracked all articles citing Ted Gurr’s classic book on
the subject, Why Men Rebel, found that while the theory was mostly
accepted after it came out, over time research has found that the theory does
not reflect reality.
In recent decades a majority of those citing the book have disagreed with
relative deprivation theory (Brush 1996). Gurr himself, in more recent
studies, found no significant link between economic factors and ethnic
violence (Gurr 2000). A study based on survey data from 14 Muslim
countries in 2002 found that the poor were less likely to support terrorism
(Fair and Shepard 2006). Also, in an illuminating study, Donald Horowitz
demonstrates that in separatist conflicts, should the separatists be successful
in gaining independence their economic situation would deteriorate in the
short to medium terms, and the independence would likely also have a
negative impact on long-term economic performance (Horowitz 1985:105–
134).
Thus, in these cases, solving any issues of economic inequality will not
resolve a conflict because the root issue is a desire for self determination. In
fact, ethnic groups show a considerable willingness to sacrifice
economically in order to gain self-determination (Horowitz 1985). Arguably,
increasing the economic resources of such a minority may aggravate and
prolong the conflict by giving them additional resources with which to
pursue their aims.
Second, religion is often assumed to be the root cause of a conflict when,
in fact, the evidence shows that it is less central. Consider a study that
compared the impact of a desire for self determination and religion on
ethnic conflict. The study divided all ethnic conflicts into four categories
based on these two factors: (1) conflicts that are neither religious nor
separatist; (2) conflicts that are religious but not separatist; (3) conflicts that
are separatist but not religious; and (4) conflicts that are both separatist and
religious.
The findings showed that categories 1 and 2 showed little violence, thus
only conflicts that were separatist were violent. In fact, no case in category
2––religious but not separatist––exhibited any organized purposeful
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violence.1 Among separatist conflicts, those that involved religion (category
4) were significantly more violent that those that were not (category 3). The
conclusion based on these results was that separatism is the root cause of
violence in ethnic conflicts. That is, separatism alone is enough to cause
violence in ethnic conflicts and in the absence of separatism levels of
violence are low, especially among religious minorities. Religion only
comes into play when an ethnic group desires separatism, in which case it
exacerbates the level of violence (Fox 2004).
Consider the implications of these two findings for resolving a conflict
that is both ethnic and religious, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. That
the Palestinians who live in the West Bank and Gaza are economically
deprived in comparison with the Israelis is not in dispute. Yet the findings
presented here show that this has little to do with the causes of the conflict.
In fact, this deprivation is arguably at least, in part, a consequence of the
conflict.
In the course of the conflict, the Israelis have placed a number of
economic sanctions on the Palestinians and taken a number of military and
security measures, which have had a severely negative economic impact on
the Palestinians. Thus, there is clearly a correlation between economic
deprivation and conflict in this case, but the direction of causality is the
opposite of the relationship predicted by relative deprivation theory.
Also, there is a widely held perception that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
is a deeply religious one. Yet, as a conflict which includes both religion and
separatism, the findings described here show that the root cause is most
likely the Palestinian desire for separatism. An examination of the history of
the conflict supports this argument. Before the late 1980s the conflict was
carried out by secular-nationalist organizations such as the PLO and
Marxist-Leninist organizations such as the PFLP.
Even today there exist many Palestinian organizations, both religious and
secular, that take part in the conflict. There are many disagreements between
these organizations but there is little disagreement on the general desire for
separatism.
It is possible to argue that religious organizations such as Hamas and
Islamic Jihad have increased the level of violence in this conflict. It is even
possible to argue that these organizations use religious ideology to fuel the
desire for separatism. However, should the separatist-nationalist demands of
the Palestinians be satisfied there would be no root grievance to fuel.
In sum, these findings show that in the case of the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, focusing on anything other than resolving the separatist demands of
the Palestinians will not resolve the conflict. They have shown a willingness
to suffer economic deprivation in order to achieve this goal. Focusing on
1
This means that the violence was intentional and planned. This does not include organized
protests that became violent, or spontaneous violence.
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religion would be to focus on what is essentially a side issue. Thus, lessons
such as these two from the study of the root causes of conflict can provide
important insights for those who study and practice the resolution of
conflicts.
REFERENCES
Brush, Stephen G. 1996. Dynamics of theory change in the social sciences: Relative
deprivation and collective violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution 40(4):523–545.
Davies, James C. 1962. Toward a theory of revolution. American Sociological Review
27:5–19.
Fair, C. Christine and Bryan Shepard. 2006. Who supports terrorism: Evidence from
fourteen Muslim countries. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29(1):51–74.
Feierabend, Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend. 1973. Systemic conditions of political
aggression: An application of frustration-aggression theory. In Anger, Violence and
Politics. Edited by Ivo Feierabend, et al. New York: Prentice-Hall.
Fox, Jonathan. 2004. The rise of religious nationalism and conflict: Ethnic conflict and
revolutionary wars from 1945 to 2001. Journal of Peace Research 41(6), November: 715–
731.
Gurr, Ted R. 1970. Why men rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
––––. 1980. Handbook of political conflict: Theory and research. New York: Free Press.
––––. 2000. Peoples versus states: Minorities at risk in the new century. Washington D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press.
Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic groups in conflict. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Lichbach, Mark I. 1989. An evaluation of “Does economic inequality breed political
conflict?” studies. World Politics: 431–70.
Olson Jnr, Mancur. 1963. Rapid growth as a destabilizing force. Journal of Economic
History 23.
Rule, James B. 1988. Theories of civil violence. Berkeley: University of California Press.
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The Religious Factor
ISRAELA SILBERMAN
My presentation will focus on intercivilizational conflicts where religion is a
factor. This is a particularly important issue since we are already involved in
a third world war between radical Islam and the rest of the world. Starting
with this “optimistic” statement, I would like to suggest that in the context
of intercivilizational conflicts where religion is a factor, scholars and policy
makers can collaborate successfully on three basic issues: (1) facilitating
conflict resolution; (2) fighting religious violence and terrorism; and (3)
coping with the results of religious violence and terrorism.
FACILITATING CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Facilitation of intercivilizational conflict where religion is a factor
requires an acknowledgement of the complicated role of religion as a
double-edged sword that can facilitate both conflict and peace.
Researchers can help policy makers by exploring two basic questions: (a)
How is it possible for religion to play both the villain and the hero in
international relations? (b) How can religious leaders and communities be
directed toward peace and away from violence?
A conceptual framework that can help answer the first question is the
view of religion as a complex system of meaning that can develop and
change. More explicitly, major religions can be described as unique systems
of meaning that can give sense to every aspect of human life, from birth to
death and beyond, and from the beginning of history until the end of time.
Such religious meaning systems often include a variety of messages that can
be contradictory. For example, they can include religious calls for peace, as
well as religious calls for violence and wars.
This complexity of the religious systems offers religious leaders and
individuals some flexibility in choosing certain subsets of religious
messages from within their religion to guide them in their lives. For
example, they can choose either peace-oriented messages or war-oriented
messages. In turn, religious leaders have the ability to direct their religions
and their religious communities toward peace or war.
The struggle over the soul of Islam today, for example, can be described
as the struggle between leaders such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or Osama
bin Laden, who direct Islam toward wars, and more moderate Muslims who
try to redirect Islam toward peace.
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In order to answer the second question––how can religious leaders and
communities be directed toward peace and away from violence?––
researchers who endorse the meaning system approach to religion could
explore issues such as the following:
● What are the psychological and sociological processes through
which religion has facilitated both violence and peace? For example,
what religious values can facilitate peace (e.g., forgiveness, sanctity
of life), and what religious values can facilitate wars (e.g., revenge,
hostile evaluation of others as inferior or as threats to salvation)?
● What religious behaviors can facilitate wars (e.g., holy wars,
evangelism), and what religious behaviors can facilitate peace (e.g.,
repentance, Sulh)?
In addition they can explore:
● The context variables, such as the social, political, economic and
historical conditions that determine whether religion facilitates
conflicts or their resolution.
● The psychological variables that predispose religious leaders to
choose violent goals over peaceful goals from within their religious
systems.
Based on this type of research, researchers collaborating with peaceoriented policy makers and religious leaders can develop conflict resolution
strategies that take into account the religious background of the participants.
They can also evaluate the effectiveness of existing conflict resolution
strategies. Finally, they can offer recommendations for changing
problematic context variables.
FIGHTING RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM
We can probably agree that voluntary redirection of religious
communities toward peaceful goals seems to be the best solution to intercivilizational conflicts where religion is a factor. However, being realistic,
we need to realize that some individuals and communities may not be
collaborative in this context. Those entities will need to be deterred and
fought in order to bring about world peace. Researchers could help in many
ways in this context.
For example, psychologists and other researchers who understand the
religious meaning systems of terrorists and their decision-making processes
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could suggest creative ways to deter potential homicide (suicide) bombers
by changing their perceptions of the cost-benefit ratios that guide them in
their actions. In other words, using creative measures of deterrence,
researchers working together with policy makers and religious leaders may
be able to convince potential homicide bombers that acts of terrorism are
less desirable than those terrorists originally thought.
In another example, research on the meaning of the strong connection
between some religious terrorist organizations––such as Hizbullah––and
drug industries could facilitate the global fight against terrorism. Research
suggests that these terror organizations view their connection with the drug
industries in their countries as a justified means of achieving their goals.
These connections offer them a strong financial basis for their activities and
can help them weaken the social fabric of the societies that they are fighting,
such as those of Israel and the USA. This line of research could help
policymakers fight terrorism by overcoming the problem of defining
terrorism. In other words, more countries would be willing to fight
Hizbullah as a crime organization dealing with drugs rather than as a
terrorist organization.
Beyond that, educating the American and Israeli societies about the
terrorism-drug connection may contribute to the fight against terrorism by
reducing the usage of drugs within these societies.
COPING WITH THE RESULTS OF RELIGIOUS
VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM
Until we solve the problems of religious violence and terrorism, we need
to cope with their terrible consequences. In this context, psychologists who
endorse the meaning system approach to religious terrorism could contribute
to individual and communal efforts to cope with this dangerous
phenomenon. For example, they could help increase the awareness of
policymakers, security personnel, media representatives and the public of
the nature of religious terrorism as a war that is fundamentally
psychological. They can particularly emphasize the psychological
manipulations used by terrorists in order to magnify the fears of populations
and increase their support of the terrorists’ cause. Such awareness could
facilitate more responsible and effective reactions by policy-makers and by
the media, as well as contribute to the psychological resiliency of the public.
In this context, psychologists and other conflict resolution experts could
be the leaders in discouraging prejudice and discrimination toward innocent
individuals who belong to the same religion as certain terrorists, e.g., by
discouraging anti-Islamic and anti-Middle Eastern hate crime incidents.
In the context of intercivilizational conflicts where religion is a factor,
researchers can help policymakers by illuminating the complex role of
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religion as a meaning system and by offering conflict resolution strategies
that can direct religious communities toward more peaceful goals. In
addition, they can help the fight against religious violence and terrorism and,
contribute to improving the individual and communal efforts to cope with
their results. It is important to emphasize that for such efforts to succeed,
they would often need the collaboration of interdisciplinary teams of
researchers with peace-oriented policymakers and religious leaders.
CONCLUSION
The 21st century continues to find religious movements facilitating
conflict, war and terrorism all over the world. Hopefully, through the
collaborative efforts of researchers, policymakers and religious leaders, this
century will yet become a special and memorable one by revealing the
unique potential of religions to facilitate conflict resolution and create
cultures of peace.
REFERENCES
Appleby, R. Scott. 2000. The ambivalence of the sacred: Religion, violence and
reconciliation. Lahman, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Fox, Jonathan. 2002. Ethnoreligious conflict in the late twentieth century. Laham, MD:
Lexington Books.
Gopin, Marc. 2000. Between Eden and Armageddon: The future of world religions,
violence, and peacemaking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kimball, Charles. 2002. When religion becomes evil. San Francisco: HarperCollins
Publishers.
Silberman, Israela, ed. 2005. Religion as meaning system. Journal of Social Issues 61(4).
––––. 2005. Religious violence, terrorism and peace: A meaning system analysis. In
Handbook of the psychology of religion and spirituality, edited by Raymond F. Paloutzian
and Crystal L. Park, pp. 529–549. New York: The Guilford Press.
Silberman, Israela, E. Tory Higgins and Carol S. Dweck. 2005. Religion and world change:
Violence and terrorism versus peace. Journal of Social Issues 61(4):761–784.
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Why the Government Does Not Learn from Academia
MOTY CRISTAL
The following essay is the contribution of a “pracademic.” This hybrid
creature is considered to be “too academic” when trying to bring conceptual
frameworks or apply theoretical knowledge to political moves, and “too
practical” and “not academic enough” when trying to teach master’s
students about how international negotiations are conducted in the real
world. This should, therefore, be read as an observational note from an excivil servant who, at some point, while studying at Harvard after four years
of government service, realized that an immense body of knowledge exists
in the field of negotiation and conflict resolution and that it is hardly being
used by politicians, nor is it helping to frame international negotiation
processes in which Israel was and is still involved.
The purpose of this article is to try to bridge the gap between academia
and government, and, despite its title, to try to offer prescriptive advice on
how to enable government officials to use academic knowledge in the field
of negotiation processes and conflict resolution.
International conflicts and the answer to the title question have one
fundamental thing in common: they are perpetuated due to lack of clear and
clean communication between the two sides, a result of a perceptional gap
between them and the lack of ability to overcome it.
As an anecdote, one could claim that the fact that one of Israel’s foremost
Zionist leaders, Chaim Weizmann––who was also a leading scientist––was
given only the ceremonial position of the president of the newborn State of
Israel, was the first sign of the emerging gap between academic and
scientific knowledge and the political system. In the political and
ideological debate between Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, the founding
fathers of the State of Israel, Weizmann adopted a more pragmatic approach,
based on political rather than military rationale. This, together with the fact
that he lacked a military background, as well as his deteriorating health,
afforded him presidential status without real political power.
This anecdote, a result of power politics among Jewish institutions prior
to the establishment of the State of Israel, can serve as an indicator to the
three main reasons that government does not learn from academia.
The first and the deepest, is the lack of (Israeli) cultural appreciation for
knowledge. Unlike France or Russia, where philosophers and novelists were,
and still are, integral, legitimate and influential participants in policymaking,
the Israeli political culture reflects more our street culture than a university
culture. Being a “practical society,” Israelis and the Israel political system
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don’t appreciate knowledge per se, and find it difficult, mainly with regard
to the social sciences and humanities, to “apply” it to their daily challenges.
The occasional meetings––always highly publicized––of writers,
humanities professors or philosophers with Israeli prime ministers serve as a
proof of this cultural characteristic.
This lack of appreciation for knowledge might be wrongfully attributed
to the mass media rating culture in which we live. However, we believe
rather that the lack of appreciation of knowledge comes from preferring the
language of power to the power of language. The lack of appreciation for
knowledge might be a result of Zionist circumstances rather than a people’s
choice. The common claim is that Israel was born and survives not because
of its universities and the knowledge created within, but rather because of its
military power. And public appreciation exists––beyond the American
cultural mentality of glorification of celebrities––mainly for the military
rather than for academia. More streets, squares and children are named after
Yoni Netanyahu, the legendary commander killed in the heroic 1976 rescue
of the Israeli hostages in Entebbe, Uganda, than after Israeli Nobel Prize
winners.
As an aside to this fundamental observation, it is important to indicate a
shift in this leading cultural behavior. In the past decade, more and more
Israelis, together with young Jews throughout the world, are seeking to
strengthen the civic dimension of the Jewish state, without undermining its
necessary military capacities. Increased appreciation of knowledge, culture
and art is a well-received side effect of this shift, an effect that within five to
10 years will “hit” the political system as well.
The second reason for the gap that exists between government and
academia are the mainly political stereotypes that each community holds
regarding the other group, mainly the political ones. In Israel, where
everyone is considered to be either “right-wing” or a “leftist,” government
officials and politicians attribute political affiliation to academics, and hence
to the knowledge they bring or create. The politicians, who, for their own
survival, need to categorize people around them as to whether they belong
to their “camp” or to the opponent camp, judge academics in the same
manner. A social scientist who publishes an academic article that is based
on years of research, and wants to make it accessible to the general public or
to decision-makers, knows that once published it will be immediately
classified as being “in favor of” or “against” the government.
When I was deputy head of the Negotiation Management Center in Ehud
Barak’s Prime Minister’s Office (1999–2001), my team had to prepare
Israel’s negotiation files for the permanent status negotiations. Consulting
with many academics, we had to consult with the “right” border, water or
economic experts, in order to guarantee that the information and knowledge
provided to the prime minister was along his political lines. It took the
professional teams a while to convince the political people around the prime
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minister that Israel’s negotiation capabilities would benefit from hearing and
gaining knowledge from those academics who did not necessarily support
the division of Jerusalem. Serving under several prime ministers, and
working with their political teams, I found this notion was true for any
prime minister. This is the nature of the political system.
Moreover, politicians and government officials in policy-making or
decision-making positions look for pragmatic views to enrich their thinking
and assist them in decision-making. I have met only a few academics who
considered themselves to be pragmatic when it comes to the knowledge they
bring to the table. Knowledge itself is not always pragmatic, hence
academics who hold knowledge, are perceived by political figures to be
normative rather than pragmatically prescriptive in their engagement with
the political field.
In a post-mortem analysis of the Camp David negotiations, a leading
conflict resolution scholar said, upon being confronted with real-life
developments across the negotiation table: “That is impossible. It never
happened. It is against all theories of conflict resolution.” On a different
occasion, when preparing for the Camp David negotiation in the spring of
2000, I prepared a process analysis for the prime minister, building on
ripeness theory, one of the leading theories in international negotiations.
The analysis argued that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at that point (May–
June 2000) was not ripe for resolution due to fact that the parties were not
facing a “Mutually Hurting Stalemate.” The officials surrounding prime
minister Ehud Barak did not “approve” this document, as the paper was “too
academic” and “irrelevant to our current context.”
The third reason for the gap between academia and government is the
general Israeli politician’s level of ignorance and arrogance. Rooted in a
military mentality, Israeli government officials and political figures are, in
general, reluctant to learn from the experience of others. While Israeli
private sector leaders take advantage of knowledge, tend to consult with
experts and use professional consulting services, Israeli officials strongly
believe that they have very little to learn from others.
Studying at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and seeing how
the “revolving door” exists between government and academia in the field
of government and political science in the United States, and how
politicians and senior government officials become faculty members and
then go back to senior positions in government, helped me to understand the
significant difference between Israeli and U.S. academia-government
relations. In Israel, ex-official and political figures indeed find themselves in
think tanks and political science departments. But once away from political
responsibility their advice and wisdom is hardly sought or accepted by
current officials, and hardly any of them are or will be called back to service.
However, with the increasing interaction between government officials
and private sector leaders, this mindset of “you can teach me nothing” has
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become slowly and slightly diluted in recent years, and one can notice
changes in the willingness of government officials to genuinely (and not for
public relations purposes) learn from others’ experience.
In conclusion, while close cooperation exists between academia and
government in technological fields, in the humanities and social sciences,
and particularly in government and political science, we hardly see any
strategic and institutional cooperation between government and academia.
The three main reasons are the general lack of appreciation of knowledge
that exists in Israel, the stereotypes that each community has of the other,
and the general “you can teach me nothing” mindset, which is common in
the Israeli political system.
The challenge, however, is how to overcome these obstacles and increase
cooperation and mutual learning between government and academia. From
our own experience, we can argue that there are certain ways that increase
the likelihood for cooperation. The first suggestion is to work with political
staffers rather than senior figures. Some of the young aides to senior
politicians and government officials are still open to knowledge, and are still
close to their university days. Working with staffers grants the scholar
access and indirect influence.
Second, suggest alternatives rather than criticism. While working with
government officials, many scholars tend to implicitly or explicitly criticize
their “client’s” actions as if there were, indeed, one single “right” way to do
things. By acting in this way they alienate the politicians from their advice.
If scholars would adopt a more prescriptive, consultative mode of operation,
rather than provide advice in a criticizing, normative manner, they would
find political leaders more open to knowledgeable advice.
The third suggestion is to join forces. Politics in the academic world are
no less passionate and emotional than in government. If a group of political
scientists is seeking influence and striving to bring its knowledge to
decision-makers, it will significantly enhance its chances if it would join
forces and come armed with a clear, comprehensive and prescriptive
message.
Last but not least, a comment: it is imperative to reiterate the importance
of the continued effort to bring academic and conceptual knowledge to
political and decision-making processes. As an individual who worked for
years in prime ministers’ offices, coming in and out of lecture halls, and
serving in the last years as a close consultant to political figures and senior
officials, I would argue that if the knowledge is brought in the right context,
through the right people, and with the right intentions, the knowledge, its
content and its context will be received positively.
Finally, while working as a young legal intern for Supreme Court Judge
Elyakim Rubinstein, then the Ministry of Defense’s legal adviser and a
senior civil servant, I used to stare at his wall where a little metal plaque
said: “There is no limit to what a man can do and where he can he go––if he
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
doesn’t mind who gets the credit.” Adopting this idea [attributed to Robert
Woodruff of the Coca Cola Company] is the first move to opening up
government officials and politicians to academic knowledge.
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Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009
The Public’s Understanding of Politics
HILLEL WAHRMAN
Underlining this discussion is an assumption that managing conflict in a
society is related to the public’s ability to understand its complexities, i.e., the
multiplicity of causes, interests, participants, views, processes, sensitivities,
mechanisms, possible policies, etc., involved in the conflict. This means that
conflict management can also be understood as a down-up process (from
people and not only from leaders) and that favorable attitudes among the
public toward constructive management of conflict is also affected by its
cognitive understanding of it.
I argue that when a public has a low ability to understand conflict
complexities, it is less prone to support conflict management (Wahrman
2004). For example: (1) there is a lesser ability to foresee political
developments and therefore politics is perceived as a frustrating chaos and
reason for pessimism; (2) ignorance of the internal logic of other’s visions
and ideologies helps to promote stereotypes, misunderstandings and,
eventually, a total delegitimization of others’ ideas or vision; (3) there is a
tendency to comprehend “simple” answers or solutions thus stressing
polarized political views and blurring the larger spectrum of more complex
agendas of the political “middle.” Polarized policies are non-conducive to
conflict management, (4) there is less understanding for the need for the
institutions that manage the conflict and prevent escalation (i.e., government
agencies, courts, committees, law-making), and therefore impair their
legitimization, (5) tolerance toward the other can develop––if at all––in a
weak form and not in a strong form, i.e., based on indifference or
permissiveness instead of comprehensive knowledge of clashing viewpoints
and interests, yet choosing to tolerate these differences and deal with them
“with arguments rather than blows, reasoning rather than abuse, ballots
rather than bullets” (Crick 1978:32). A weak form of tolerance does not
hold once some of these clashing interests surface. Thus, it is argued that
low ability within a public to cognitively comprehend the complexities of a
conflict can negatively affect attitudes toward conflict management and
therefore its implementation.
The republican strain of political thought since antiquity (see Plato’s
view in Jowett 1937:778) is pessimistic regarding the ability of any public
to be trusted to hold responsible, complex views on sensitive political issues
and our hopes should be invested with the aristocratic elite. Others are more
optimistic. Liberal political philosophy tended to assume that in dealings in
the private sphere, individuals accumulate better complex understanding
than any government and that this is conducive to general peaceful practices
(Locke 1988 [1690]). Friedman (2000) took this point further to stress that
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
individuals’ capacity continues to grow in modern Western societies as the
economy becomes sophisticated and in need of better human resources.
More people in these societies need to be holding basic abilities of reading,
analyzing, criticizing and acting than ever before to get the economy
continually growing. Some point at measures that indicate a continual rise
of IQ of the populace in Western societies and link this to the rise of
democracy in the Western countries (Flynn 1987, 1999; Neisser 1998).
Others show mechanisms in which the general public can better understand
and participate in complex state politics. Lupia (1994) and Lupia and
McCubbins (1998) point at cognitive shortcuts available to the public in
making wise political judgments on complex issues. Habermas (1984, 1993,
1996) and others developed their ideas regarding deliberative democracy
that can, in their view, allow the public to share wisdom better than any
single closed governing elite, and hold on to “collective wisdom.” In
essence these views share an optimism regarding the public’s potential for
understanding political complexities.
Utopian or true? We obviously have an interest in studying mechanisms
that might affect the public’s ability to comprehend political complexities.
In this paper I wish to further focus attention on a phenomenon that occurs
in teaching politics in public schools. Modern society’s public school
systems reach almost all of the young population and moreover, they do so
during the age of developing political awareness (Falangan and Sherrod 1998;
Ichilov 1989; Niemi and Hepburn 1995; Sears 1990). School agendas can be
changed by intended policy and can be manipulated, and they should be
closely monitored. It is my purpose to point out a problematic phenomenon
that can occur while teaching politics in state schools. I will portray this
phenomenon in an examination of a case study of the current Israeli civics
curriculum. Once construed, we should be more able to identify it in other
instances as well.
This phenomenon is in essence a gap between the stated guidelines and
their realization in textbooks or school practice––guidelines that state the need
to teach pupils the complexities of conflicts in their society vs. textbooks that
do not “do the job.” What makes this an interesting phenomenon is that the
gap tends to remain unnoticed by regulators, evaluators, teachers and pupils
since the textbooks maintain the appearance of the official statement and pose
as “teaching conflict.” A kind of “optical illusion” takes place in which
teachers and pupils feel they are learning, while in reality they are not.
This phenomenon can occur when terms used in the texts remain vague
to the reader. When these terms are central, i.e., are basic to understanding
issues discussed in the text itself, this can create confusion. This situation is
almost parallel to reading a text with holes in it and these holes are exactly
where the most important basic concepts are. Alas, unlike a text with real
holes (such as texts found during archeological digging that were physically
damaged by time), the lacunae we are referring to are not so apparent. The
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Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009
readers are reading words and sentences––they exist, but it is hard to
pinpoint their exact meanings. A very confusing mind-set can result, in
which you think you understand, while you don’t, and assuming you have
learned while you haven’t.
Obviously, this can happen because of sloppy writing. But regular
scrutiny of textbooks can be helpful in correcting that. What is harder to
detect are situations in which experts read into the text meanings that are not
available to lay readers. In such cases we can identify at least two readings
of the text: the expert and the layman, and they are not the same. While the
expert sees a comprehensive text with no need for correction, the layman
sees a text with many signifiers but little signified. The second reading is a
very unclear sensation of vagueness and confusion.
This phenomenon can happen in any text in any subject. However, I
assume here that it is prevalent particularly in texts that deal with political
issues. This is because of the particular nature of political language that
tends toward vagueness and manipulation (see Tocqueville 1953 [1835]).
Political terms are also political tools and are continually used with changed
meanings to fit changing needs (Wahrman 2004). As such, text that includes
basic political terminology may be more prone to flexible usage of major
concepts and therefore to vagueness. While an expert may maneuver
through meaning, the laymen may not.
My evidence for this kind of phenomenon is based on a case study
research I conducted of a contemporary, widely circulated Israeli civics
textbook. The study identified 11 terms in the textbook that held key
importance in understanding the analysis of Israeli internal politics. These
terms are: (a) state; (b) proprietary; (c) the object of political action; (d)
legislation; (e) democracy; (f) nationality; (g) liberty and equality; (h) civil
rights and obligations; (i) sovereignty of the people; (j) social contract, and
(k) power.
These are terms that are important for understanding issues discussed in
the Israeli textbook itself. However, the study found that the textbook gave
these 11 terms meanings suitable for only some of the uses made of them.
The textbook provided them with the following significances: (a) checks
and balances; (b) peculium; (c) the good of the individual; (d) agreed upon
legislation; (e) democracy as individual rights; (f) political nationality; (g)
negative liberty and equality of opportunities; (h) citizen’s rights; (i) the will
of the nation; (j) social contract, and (k) formal power mechanisms.
To take checks and balances for example, the textbook discusses the state
apparatus such as parliament, government and the judiciary through the
concept of checks and balances expressing the limitation of each. The
second means that proprietary is understood as private and as one of the
basic human rights.
Conversely, the textbook offers contexts in which these implications lack
meaningful significance and are irrelevant. These contexts require other
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
significances that are not currently portrayed in the textbook. These are,
respectively: (a) state; (b) public possession; (c) the general good; (d) public
legislation; (e) mixed or participatory democracy; (f) organic nationality; (g)
positive liberty and economic equality; (h) civil obligations; (i) the good of
the people; (j) contract for the generations, and (k) informal power
mechanisms.
Again, elaborating on only two examples, this means that the textbook
does not explain what is a state, and as such the readers cannot understand
what a state is, what it does, how it comes to be, is it a “good” or “bad”
thing, etc. This means that the reader cannot really understand what the
parliament, government and the judiciary really do, what they hold in
common, i.e., running a state for the public need. Regarding the second
concept, the reader understands what private property is but not what public
property is. Again the layman reader is vague as to what is the government’s
budget. To who does it belong? Who is responsible for it? Is a state
basically the same as a large private company? Is Israel the same as Google
or Microsoft?
The partial nature of the definition of these 11 terms, omitting the last list
of meanings, creates situations in which these terms in the textbook are not
helpful to the pupils in comprehending the analysis. They are “empty” of
significant meaning.
In order to explain why certain meanings were included for specific
terms and others were omitted, the patterns of inclusion and exclusion were
analyzed. In each of these terms the textbook tends to clarify significances
related to individual liberties, and avoids clarifying meanings related to their
restraint; clarifies significances related to the characteristics unique to
democratic national states, and avoids meanings connected to universal
characteristics that apply to all nations; clarifies significances connected to
liberal values, and avoids meanings clarifying conservative and radical
values. Analysis of these patterns in the study indicates how they reflect the
covert basic assumptions of the textbook authors, according to which human
nature is autonomous, human awareness is positivistic, and political science
is a neutral discipline.
According to the analysis conducted in this study, completing the profile
of the terms used in the textbook will require the adoption of a number of
alternative basic assumptions according to which humans are social beings,
human awareness is also interactive and political science is also a field of
ideological knowledge.
The contribution of the study is at several levels:
● Developing a new theoretical pivot that places the question of
“empty signifiers” as the central concern and that focuses on
analyzing the curricular contribution to promoting thinking at the
level of “understanding.”
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Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009
● Identifying the need to continue developing the textbook that
has been used officially for teaching citizenship in Israel since
2000 and focusing on the organization of the materials that are
taught and their theoretical clarity.
● Providing an alternative proposal for organizing existing
information in the citizenship textbook in Israel by
supplementing the existing definitions of eleven terms, and also
addressing and complementing the basic assumptions reflected
in the textbook pertaining to human nature, human awareness
and the essence of the discipline, and establishing politics as the
main conceptual framework.
● This alternative to the organization of the information
appearing in the Israeli textbook may serve as a preliminary
basis for examining the theoretical clarity of curricula that deal
with instilling political knowledge and understanding in Israel
and the world. The study develops tools for testing the
phenomenon and proposes means of dealing with it in
citizenship curricula.
To summarize, the present study may indicate ways to improve the
theoretical clarity of curricula that instill political knowledge and
understanding and help to deepen the political orientation and functioning of
youth as citizens in democratic societies in general, and in Israeli society in
particular. It is this paper’s claim that this is a contribution to better
practices of conflict management in a divided society.
REFERENCES
Crick, Bernard. 1978. Political education and political literacy. London: Longman.
De Tocqueville, Alexis. 1953 (1st Edition 1835). Democracy in America. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Flynn, James R. 1987. Massive IQ gains in many countries: What IQ tests really measure.
Psychological Bulletin 101:171–191.
––––. 1999. Searching for justice: The discovery of IQ gains over time. American
Psychologist 54:5–20.
Friedman, Thomas. 2000. Lexus and the olive tree. Anchor Books: New York.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1984. The theory of communicative action. Boston: Beacon Press.
––––. 1993. Struggles for recognition in constitutional states. European Journal of Philosophy
12:128–55.
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
––––. 1996. Between facts and forms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law and
democracy. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Ichilov, Orit, ed. 1989. Political socialization, citizenship education, and democracy. New
York; London: Teachers College Press.
Jowett, Benjamin. 1937. Plato’s republic. New York: P. F. Collier & Son.
Locke, John. 1988 [1690]. Two treatises of government. Student edition. Cambridge texts in
the history of political thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lupia, Arthur. 1994. Shortcuts versus encyclopedias: Information and voting behavior in
California insurance reform elections. APSR 88:63–76.
Lupia, Arthur and Matthew D. McCubbins 1998. The democratic dilemma: Can citizens learn
what they need to know? New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lupia, Arthur, Matthew D. McCubbins and Samuel L. Popkin. 2000. Beyond rationality:
Reason and the study of politics. In Elements of reason: Cognition, choice and the bounds of
rationality, edited by Arthur Lupia, Matthew D. McCubbins and Samuel L. Popkin.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Neisser, Ulkrich. 1997. Rising scores on intelligence tests. American Scientist 85:440-447.
Niemi, Richard and Mary Hepburn. The rebirth of political socialization. Perspectives on
Political Science 24. Winter 1995:7–16. EJ 515 395.
Sears, David O. 1990. Whither political socialization research: The question of persistence. In
Political socialization, citizenship education, and democracy, edited by Orit Ichilov, pp. 69–
97. New York: Teachers College Press.
Wahrman, Hillel. 2004. The subtle silencing of conflicts in civics textbooks: The case of
the Jewish state topic in Israeli civics textbooks. International Textbook Research 26:289–
311.
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Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009
List of Contributors
Moty Cristal is the founder of Nest Consulting, a negotiation and crisis
management consulting firm that works with senior private and public
sectors executives. He graduated from Bar-Ilan University law school and
the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, and is a PhD research student
at the London School of Economics. He teaches advanced negotiations,
international negotiation and crisis management at Tel Aviv University and
the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya.
Jonathan Fox is an associate professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan
University, a senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for
Strategic Studies and the director of the Religion and State project. His
research focuses on the intersection between religion and various political
and social phenomena, including conflict, state religion policy and
international relations. His recent publications include: A World Survey of
Religion and the State (2008), Bringing Religion into International
Relations (2004) and Religion, Civilization, and Civil War (2004).
Jeffrey Haynes is a professor of politics at London Metropolitan University.
His research interests are religion and politics; religion and international
relations; comparative politics and globalization; democracy and
democratization, and development issues. He is the author of 17 books. His
most recent books are: Comparative Politics in a Globalizing World (2005),
Advances in Development Studies (2005), The Politics of Religion. A Survey
(2006), An Introduction to Religion and International Relations (2007),
Religion and Development: Conflict or Cooperation? (2007), Development
Studies: A Short Introduction (2008) and Handbook of Religion and Politics
(2008).
Katelyn Y. A. McKenna (Yael Kaynan) is a senior lecturer at the Sammy
Ofer School of Communications, IDC, Herzliya and at Ben-Gurion
University. Her research interests include relationship cognition, the self,
social identity and intergroup conflict and negotiation, particularly as
regards the role of social influence. She has published over 30 journal
articles, book chapters and conference proceedings in the field. Her first
book, Consequences of the Internet for Self and Society: Is Social Life Being
Transformed? (with John Bargh), was published in 2002 and she is the
editor of the recently published book, The Oxford Handbook of Internet
Psychology (with Adam Joinson, Tom Postmes and Ulf-Dietrich Rieps).
With a grant from the Burda Center for Innovative Communications, she is
currently conducting a longitudinal natural experiment with the Good
Neighbors Blog, examining the effectiveness of the contact hypothesis for
stereotype and conflict reduction within a Middle East setting.
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
Ben Mollov is on the faculty of the Interdisciplinary Department of Social
Sciences and the Graduate Program on Conflict Management at Bar-Ilan
University, and directs the university’s Project for the Study of Religion,
Culture and Peace. He specializes in conflict management from an
intercultural perspective and aspects of the Jewish political tradition. He is
the author of Power and Transcendence: Hans J. Morgenthau and the
Jewish Experience (2002) and co-author of “Culture, Dialogue and
Perception Change in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” and “Federalism and
Multiculturalism as a Vehicle for Perception in Israeli-Jewish Society,”
in The International Journal of Conflict Management. He has organized
several international conferences at Bar-Ilan University in cooperation with
the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and in December 2005 appeared in the
Perdana Global Peace Forum in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Fania Oz-Salzberger is senior lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of
Haifa, where she heads the Posen Research Forum for Political Thought,
and is professor and Leon Liberman Chair of Modern Israel Studies at
Monash University, Melbourne. She was a fellow at the Institute for
Advanced Studies in both Jerusalem and Berlin. Among her publications are
Translating the Enlightenment (1995) and Israelis in Berlin (2001; German
translation 2001). Edited volumes include Adam Ferguson’s Essay on the
History of Civil Society (1995) and Political Hebraism (2008).
Tal Samuel-Azran is a lecturer at Ben-Gurion University and the strategic
manager of the Burda Center for Innovative Communications. He cofounded two information technology ventures and served in management
positions at several information technology companies (Babylon, Ynet,
Walla!). His main fields of research are conflict resolution, political
communication, new media and media globalization. He is the co-editor
(with Dan Caspi) of New Media and Innovative Technologies.
Johan Saravanamuttu is currently a visiting senior research fellow at the
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. He was professor of
political science at Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) in Penang, serving as
dean of the School of Social Sciences (1994–1996) and of the Research
Platform on Social Transformation (2003–2006). In 1997, he was visiting
chair in ASEAN and International Studies, University of Toronto. His
published works include the first major study of Malaysia’s foreign policy
(1983), ASEAN regional NGOs (1986) and the nexus between
industrialization and the institutionalization of authoritarian regimes in
Southeast Asia (1991). Recent publications include New Politics in
Malaysia (2001) (edited with Francis Loh), Political Islam in Southeast Asia,
Special Issue (guest editor), Global Change Peace & Security 6(2), June
156
Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009
2004. He is currently writing a book on Malaysia’s Foreign Policy: The
First 50 Years.
Ali Yaşar Saribay was educated in economics and political science at
Istanbul University. He studied political method and sociology in the
University of Iowa, USA, and spent a year as a Fulbrighter studying
political psychology at Ohio State University. He has been a faculty
member of the department of Public Administration at Uludag University,
Bursa, Turkey since 1976. He has written several books in Turkish and
some articles in English and German on political sociology, political science
and Turkish politics.
Israela Silberman is currently an associate research scientist in the
Department of Psychology at Columbia University. She has written
extensively on the relations between religion and individual and societal
well being in general, and on the role of religion in recent world events in
particular. She edited a special issue of the interdisciplinary Journal of
Social Issues on “Religion as a meaning system” (2005).
Natalie Sutton-Balaban is an honors undergraduate in communications at
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. Her research interests focus on
conflict resolution and interpersonal interaction and she intends to pursue an
advanced degree in Communication Studies following graduation.
Ephraim Tabory is a member of the Department of Sociology and
Anthropology, Bar-Ilan University, and is director of the university’s
Interdisciplinary Graduate Program on Conflict Management and
Negotiation. His research concentrates on religious denominations and
intergroup conflict, primarily focusing on the relations between religious
and nonreligious Jews, Jewish and Israeli identity and religious
denominations. His recent articles include “Contemporary evidence
regarding the impact of state regulation of religion on religious participation
and belief” (Sociology of Religion, with Jonathan Fox) and “Crossing the
threshold: The opposition of Jewish Israelis to state religious wedding
ceremonies” (Review of Religious Research, with Sharon Shalev Levtzur). He
is currently working on a research project (with Ted Sasson, Brandeis
University) analyzing the discourse of religious and nonreligious Jews in the
United States and Israel on political and social issues that threaten to divide
those societies.
Hillel Wahrman is a lecturer and researcher at UNESCO/Burg Chair in
Education for Human Values Tolerance and Peace in the School of
Education, Bar-Ilan University, is on the faculty of Oranim Teachers
College and the Zinman College of Physical Education and Sport Sciences,
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Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution
Wingate Institute, and is a member of the Israeli Civic Education Research
Group at Van Leer Institute. His areas of research include philosophy of
education, curriculum theory and civic/political education. He has published
articles and co-edited books incorporating these fields.
158
‫‪Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009‬‬
‫‪Inter-Religious Dialogue: Lessons from a‬‬
‫‪Practitioner’s Perspective‬‬
‫‪DANIEL ROSSING‬‬
‫דיאלוג בין‪-‬דתי‪ :‬מסקנות של פעיל‪-‬שטח‬
‫דניאל רוסינג‬
‫מאמר זה מציע גישה מעשית להתמודדות עם קונפליקטים בין‪-‬דתיים ב"ארץ הקודש"‪.‬‬
‫המסגרת האנליטית מדגישה כאן את החשיבות של דיאלוג בין‪-‬דתי להפחתת מתחים בין‬
‫ציווילזציות‪ .‬המחבר מציע‪ ,‬בהתבסס על נסיונו האישי בדיאלוג יהודי‪-‬נוצרי‪ ,‬מספר המלצות‬
‫ממוקדות לשיפור דיאלוגים בין‪-‬דתיים‪ .‬בנוסף‪ ,‬מוצגים כאן נתונים סטטיסטיים בנושא עמדות‬
‫כלפי ה"אחר" בחברה הישראלית‪.‬‬
‫‪159‬‬
‫‪Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution‬‬
‫הכוונה לאירועים שהתרחשו באיזור והביאו לטלטול הסטטוס‪-‬קוו על ידי חיזוק תחושת‬
‫הזהות הלאומית של המשתתפים‪ ,‬לחיזוק השימוש בסטריאוטיפים או שימשו כזרזים לבחינה‬
‫ביקורתית של המשתתפים את תרבותם‪ ,‬את הפעולות של עמם או של שכניהם‪.‬‬
‫‪Conflict and Compromise in Inter-Religious Issues‬‬
‫‪in Malaysia‬‬
‫‪JOHAN SARAVANAMUTTU‬‬
‫קונפליקט ופשרה בסוגיות בין‪-‬דתיות במלזיה‬
‫ג'ון סרבנמוטו‬
‫המאמר מתאר היסטוריה מקוצרת של מלזיה‪ ,‬על פי קווי‪-‬המתאר של היחסים האתניים בה‪.‬‬
‫טענתי היא כי יחסים אלה נכנסים לעידן חדש‪ ,‬בשל ההסכם השיתופי שהושג בין שלוש‬
‫הקבוצות האתניות המרכזיות‪ :‬מלאים‪ ,‬סינים והודים‪ .‬במאמר נסקרות נקודות הקונפליקט‬
‫והחיכוך המרכזיות בין הקבוצות האתניות במלזיה‪ .‬המערך הרב‪-‬תרבותי במלזיה הוא מבנה‬
‫חברתי‪-‬פוליטי שסיפק מודוס ויונדי לפיוס דתי ואתני במשך ‪ 50‬שנות קיומה‪ .‬יחד עם זאת‪,‬‬
‫הזירה הפוליטית במלזיה מתובלת בויכוחים אתניים וקונפליקטים על זכויות תרבותיות‪ .‬מאמר‬
‫זה מתמקד בניסיון להקמת ועדה בין‪-‬דתית בשנת ‪ 2005‬ואת ההשלכות החברתיות והפוליטיות‬
‫של מהלך כושל זה‪ .‬האסטרטגיה הפוליטית של המנעות מסכסוך מצליחה אמנם להחניק‬
‫סכסוכים אתנו‪-‬דתיים ברמה היום‪-‬יומית‪ ,‬אך משפיעה באופן חמור על ההתנהלות הדמוקרטית‬
‫והרב‪-‬תרבותית במדינה‪.‬‬
‫‪Federalism, Multiculturalism and Intercultural Dialogue for‬‬
‫‪Conflict Management in Israeli Society‬‬
‫‪BEN MOLLOV‬‬
‫פדרליזם‪ ,‬רב‪-‬תרבותיות ודיאלוג בין‪-‬תרבותי ככלים לניהול סכסוכים בחברה‬
‫הישראלית‬
‫בן מולוב‬
‫קונפליקט בין‪-‬תרבותי או בין ציוויליזציות נחשב בדרך כלל כקונפליקט ברמה‬
‫הבינלאומית‪-‬בין מדינות או גושי‪-‬מדינות‪ ,‬אך למעשה קונפליקטים כאלה יכולים להתקיים גם‬
‫ברמת המדינה‪ .‬מאמר זה יסקור מספר ביטויים של קונפליקט בין‪-‬תרבותי בישראל‪ ,‬הן בתוך‬
‫המגזר היהודי והן בין המגזר היהודי למגזר הערבי‪ ,‬ויציג תכנית ניסיונית המתקיימת‬
‫באוניברסיטת בר‪-‬אילן במטרה לספק כלים להפחתת מתחים בין‪-‬קבוצתיים בישראל‪ .‬קורס‬
‫ניסיוני זה מעוגן בתאורית הפדרליזם שפותחה על ידי דניאל אלעזר ומשלב תיאוריה עם‬
‫הכשרה לטיפול במצבים בין‪-‬תרבותיים‪ .‬המאמר מתייחס גם לתאוריות העוסקות בשסע‬
‫היהודי‪-‬ערבי בגישה בין‪-‬תרבותית שלוקחת בחשבון את הדינמיקה האיזורית‪ .‬בהתבסס על‬
‫שש שנות ניסיון אני סבור כי רעיון הפדרליזם‪ ,‬המבוסס על העיקרון היהודי של "ברית"‪,‬‬
‫ומקדם את רעיון הגיוון‪ -‬בתוך‪-‬אחדות‪ ,‬ניתן ליישום בחברה הישראלית בדרך שתאפשר‬
‫שמירה על לכידות חברתית מבלי לוותר על הנרטיב היהודי‪ -‬ציוני‪.‬‬
‫‪160‬‬
‫‪Volume 1 • Number 1 • Spring 2009‬‬
‫‪The Logic of Clash of Civilizations in a Global Context‬‬
‫‪with Special Reference to Turkish Politics‬‬
‫‪ALI YAŞAR SARIBAY‬‬
‫העקרון של התנגשות הציוויליזציות בהקשר הגלובאלי‪ ,‬ביחס לפוליטיקה‬
‫התורכית‬
‫עלי יסר‪-‬סריבאי‬
‫מאמר זה מנתח את המצב הפוליטי בתורכיה בהקשר הרחב יותר של מושג החברה הגלובלית‪.‬‬
‫מבחינה תיאורטית‪ ,‬נבחן במאמר זה את הדינמיקה של תהליכי גלובליזציה במדינת לאום כמו‬
‫תורכיה‪ .‬כמו כן נציג את מעמדה הפוליטי‪-‬חברתי של תורכיה בפוליטיקה הבינלאומית‪,‬‬
‫בהקשר של תפקיד האיסלאם הפוליטי‪ .‬ניתן להסיק מהמקרה של תורכיה את המסקנה הבאה‪:‬‬
‫איסלאם בעל יחס חיובי לדמוקרטיה‪ ,‬יכול בדרכי שלום להפחית את השפעתה השלילית של‬
‫הגלובליזציה‪ .‬בהמשך לכך‪ ,‬מאמר זה טוען כי ככל שמתקדמים תהליכי הגלובליזציה‪ ,‬וכאשר‬
‫יעלה הצורך להגיב לתהליכים אלה‪ ,‬יהפכו ערכים דתיים לגמישים יותר וטבעם ישתנה‬
‫ויאפשר לתמוך בדמוקרטיזציה‪ .‬במובן זה‪ ,‬ניתן למנוע את הפיכת רעיון הגלובליזציה לזירת‬
‫ההתנגשות בין ציווילזציות שסמואל הנטינגטון מדבר עליה‪ .‬ניתן יהיה לגבש מבנה של חברה‬
‫גלובלית שבה כל הציוויליזציות תוכלנה לחוש בנוח‪ .‬במקרה של תורכיה‪ ,‬האיסלאם יוכל‬
‫לקבל עליו תפקיד זה אם יסתגל ויכבד ערכים חילוניים‪ .‬מאמר זה מנתח גם את מקומו של‬
‫האיסלאם בתהליכי הגלובליזציה העוברים על תורכיה‪ ,‬ואת כוחו כמקור לזהות כמו גם כאבן‬
‫פינה להשקפת עולם אלטרנטיבית‪.‬‬
‫‪Virtual Meetings in the Middle East:‬‬
‫‪Implementing the Contact Hypothesis on the Internet‬‬
‫‪KATELYN Y. A. MCKENNA, TAL SAMUEL-AZRAN,‬‬
‫‪NATALIE SUTTON-BALABAN‬‬
‫מפגשים וירטואליים במזרח התיכון‪ :‬יישום תיאורית המגע ברשת‬
‫האינטרנט‬
‫קתלין מקיינה‪ ,‬טל שמואל‪-‬עזרן‪ ,‬נטלי סוטון‪-‬בלבן‬
‫השערת המגע תוארה כאחד הרעיונות המשגשגים ביותר בתחום הפסיכולוגיה החברתית‬
‫)‪ (Brown 2000‬אך כמעט ולא בוצעו מחקרים שבדקו באיזו מידה ניתן ליישמה‪ ,‬אם בכלל‪,‬‬
‫בחיי היום‪-‬יום‪ Amichai-Hamburger and McKenna (2006) .‬הביאו את הטיעון כי‬
‫יתכן שרשת האינטרנט היא הכלי האפקטיבי ביותר ליישום השערת המגע‪ .‬האתר "שכנים‬
‫טובים" )‪ (good neighbors‬הוקם במטרה לבחון האם ניתן ליישם ביעילות את השערת‬
‫המגע באינטרנט בהקשר של הסכסוך במזרח התיכון‪ .‬מאמר זה דן בהשלכות המעשיות של‬
‫יצירת סיטואצית מגע און‪-‬ליין‪ ,‬ומציג דגשים עיקריים מתוך אתנוגרפיה רחבת‪-‬היקף שנרשמה‬
‫במהלך ‪ 18‬החודשים הראשונים לקיומו של האתר‪ .‬המחקר האתנוגרפי התמקד במספר‬
‫"אירועי ה ְבזק" כנקודות מבחן לשינוי עמדות במסגרת השערת המגע‪:‬‬
‫‪161‬‬
‫‪Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution‬‬
‫‪HEBREW ABSTRACTS‬‬
‫‪Intercivilizational Conflict:‬‬
‫‪Some Guidelines and Some Fault Lines‬‬
‫‪FANIA OZ-SALZBERGER‬‬
‫ציווליזציות בקונפליקט‪ :‬קווים מנחים וקווי שבר‬
‫פניה עוז‪-‬זלצברגר‬
‫הרעיון של קונפליקט בין ציווליזציות התפתח בשיח האקדמי והציבורי מאז מאמרו של‬
‫סמואל הנטינגטון על התנגשות הציוויליזציות ב‪ ,1993-‬אם כי הנטינגטון לא המציא רעיון זה‪.‬‬
‫הפחד מהפונדמנטליזם האיסלאמי‪ ,‬בעיקר אחרי אירועי ה‪ 11-‬בספטמבר‪ ,‬הצמיח לרעיון‬
‫הציוויליזציות המתנגשות כנפיים עצמאיות‪ .‬מאמר זה מציע מספר נקודות לדיון‪ :‬הוא בוחן את‬
‫הסמנטיקה ההיסטורית של המונחים "תרבות" ו"ציוויליזציה" ואת המתח בינהם במהלך‬
‫ההיסטוריה של המחשבה האירופית‪ .‬לאורך הדרך הוא מתעכב על פילוסופים‪ ,‬כותבים‬
‫ומפתחי מחשבה חברתית מהמאה השמונה עשר ועד ימינו‪ .‬לאחר מכן הוא מציע נקודת מבט‬
‫מחודשת על ההבחנה בין תרבות לציוויליזציה‪ ,‬שמקורה במאה התשע‪-‬עשרה‪ :‬הפרשנות‬
‫המקובלת היתה לייחס לתרבות איכויות של ייחודיות ולציויליזציה‪-‬ערכים אוניברסליים‪.‬‬
‫לבסוף‪ ,‬הוא עוסק בבעיות עכשוויות הקשורות להבחנה בין פלורליזם תרבותי ואוניברסליזם‬
‫אזרחי‪ ,‬ובשאיפה לדו‪-‬קיום בין שני ערכים אלה‪.‬‬
‫‪The Political and Social Context of Intercivilizational‬‬
‫‪Conflict and the Possibilities of Peace Building‬‬
‫‪JEFFREY HAYNES‬‬
‫ההקשר הפוליטי והחברתי של קונפליקט בין‪-‬ציוויליזציות והאפשרויות‬
‫לבניית שלום‬
‫ג'פרי היינס‬
‫הדת חזרה באופן בולט למודעות הפוליטית בשנים האחרונות‪ ,‬הן בפוליטיקה פנימית והן‬
‫בתחום היחסים הבינלאומיים‪ .‬כיום ברור כי לדת יש משמעות חשובה כמרכיב בר‪-‬קיימא‬
‫בזהותם של מליוני אנשים ברחבי העולם‪ .‬ארגונים דתיים ואנשי דת מספקים רעיונות‬
‫שיכולים להשפיע על סכסוכים–או להביא לפתרונם‪ .‬מומחים בתחום הבחינו במיוחד בעליית‬
‫מעורבותה של הדת בקונפליקטים המכונים "בין ציוויליזציות" כמו במתיחות שבין העולם‬
‫המוסלמי לעולם המערבי בעקבות מאורעות ה‪ 11-‬לספטמבר‪ 2001 ,‬ו"קריקטורת מוחמד"‬
‫שהתפרסמה בדנמרק בספטמבר ‪ .2005‬טענתי היא‪ ,‬כי בניגוד להנחה לפיההבדלים דתיים‬
‫יכולים להביא ליצירתם או החמרתם של סכסוכים‪ ,‬הרי שהדת יכולה לשמש גם כגשר וכלי‬
‫לפתרונם‪ .‬מאמר זה בוחן את תפקידה של הדת בסכסוכים בין ציווליזציות‪ ,‬בהקשר של ה‪-‬‬
‫‪ 11.9‬והיום שאחרי‪.‬‬
‫‪162‬‬
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY PROGRAM ON
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND NEGOTIATION
The Interdisciplinary Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation at Bar-Ilan
University focuses on graduate level (MA and PhD) studies. Faculty and students examine
and test the utility of models and techniques in negotiation, diplomacy and conflict
management in a wide range of issues of central importance to Israeli society, and
internationally.
The program primarily concentrates on three fields:
❑ International and Regional Conflicts
Analysis of international political and regional negotiations, including Middle East peace
efforts; comparative studies of the structures, processes and results in regional conflicts,
such as Northern Ireland, Cyprus, the Balkans, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, South Asia, etc.; and
examination of the fundamental assumptions about human nature and society, and the
causes of war, as well as factors impinging on and contributing to peace.
❑ Dialogue and Conflict Management in Israel
Analysis of efforts to deal with conflict within Israeli society and domestic politics,
including religious-secular divisions, tensions between new immigrants and veteran
Israelis, relations between ethnic groups, relations between Israel’s Jewish majority and
Arab minority in the context of a Jewish democratic framework, and relations between
different socio-economic groups, etc.
❑ Interpersonal and Community Mediation and Conflict Reduction
Techniques
Introduction of mediation and conflict reduction techniques at the family, community and
society levels in order to reduce the level of violence within Israeli society, particularly
within the context of Jewish tradition and culture. We emphasize transformation from zerosum to positive sum, or win-win cooperative frameworks.
Faculty and Staff
Director: Dr. Ephraim Tabory
Deputy-Director: Prof. Gerald Steinberg (Founding Director)
Academic Coordinator: Dr. Amira Schiff (on leave 2009)
Conferences and Special Projects Coordinator: Shlomit Stern (Hazan)
Program Coordinator: Michal Roness
Mediation Center Director: Rivka Albeck-Solomon
Field Work Coordinator: Revital Hami-Ziniman
Core Faculty: Dr. Michal Alberstein, Prof. Rachel Ben-Ari, Dr. Ben Mollov,
Prof. Moshe Rosman
In Tribute
The late Hans Bachrach of Melbourne, Australia was the visionary behind the
founding of the Interdisciplinary Program on Conflict Management and
Negotiation at Bar-Ilan University. The Bachrach family’s continued support has
made possible the program and its many activities.
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