The Islamist-Secular Divide

Islamism, Secularism and
Democracy after the Arab Spring
The Islamist-Secularist Divide…
2
And What It Means for Transitions in the Arab World
3
Overview of the Data
Unique, Time-Series Survey Data in Egypt:
7 surveys, 13,200 respondents, social and political questions
Survey Data in Tunisia: post-election survey (in-progress)
Interviews with Egyptians and Tunisians:
Voters, party elites, scholars, journalists
Observation:
Elections and other events
Secondary sources
4
Key Questions
To what extent does the Secularist-Islamist Divide drive elections?
Voters differentiate parties and candidates primarily on a secular – religious scale
Discourse mainly – and increasingly – focused on religion during campaigns
Do deep-seated beliefs explain the polarization over religiosity and the
strong showing of Islamists?
Strong results for the Islamist parties do not represent deep religious values
Rather, strong showing represents primarily organizational capacity of Islamists
What are the implications for democracy-promoters?
Need to resist temptation to limit liberal freedoms, discourse
International organizations need to avoid shoring up secularists vs. Islamists
Need to emphasize iterative processes and seek ways to avoid entrenchment of early
winners (ex. Need for local level elections)
5
Voters don’t distinguish
Candidates’ Positions on Economy
Tarek Masoud, Ellen Lust, Jakob Wichmann, Gamal Soltan, “The
Presidential Election in Egypt – Who voted for whom, and why?”
but they do on Religion
Tarek Masoud, Ellen Lust, Jakob Wichmann, Gamal Soltan, “The
Presidential Election in Egypt – Who voted for whom, and why?”
Generally, Voters Differentiated by Religion
1
2
Voters’ values of the parties differentiate on religious
-secular scale and not the economic scale
Voters differentiale placement of parties on the
religious – secular scale and not on the liberalsocialist scale
Political parties voters’ values
0,8
0,7
Socialist & religious
Placement of political parties
10
Liberalist & religious
0,5
0,4
Nour Party
8
Al Nour Party
7
0,3
0,2
Freedom and Justice party
Continuing Revolution Alliance
Wasat Party
6
0,1
Al Wasat party
0,0
5
-0,1
NDP offshots
-0,2
-0,3
Egyptian Bloc
4
The free Egyptians party
Al wafd party
-0,4
-0,5
-0,6
-0,7
Liberalist & religious
9
The Freedom and Justice party
0,6
Socialist & religious
Free Egyptians Party
Wafd Party
3
Egypt National Party
Egyptian Bloc
2
The Continuing Revolution Coalition
1
Socialist & secular
Liberalist & secular
-0,8
Socialist & secular
Liberalist & secular
0
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Source: Religious axis: (1)Religious leaders should not influence voters,(2)Religious leaders have a responsibility to direct voters to the right candidate,(3)Religious leaders should not
influence policies of elected governments,(4)Religious leaders should direct governments to policies which meet religious teachings. Economy axis: (1)Free economic competition should be
respected and the government’s interference in the economy kept at a minimum,(2)government has a big economic role, because competition does not serve the well-being of the public.
7
8
9
10
8
What Explains the Primacy of Religion in Politics?
9
I
It’s Not Just Values:
Egyptians voted more Islamist than their values indicate
1
2
…but it is only a small minority of Egyptians that
have the same strong religious values
The parties that voters place in the religious end of
the spectrum gained a majority of votes
% votes at
parliamentary
elections 2011
Placement of political parties on a
religious-secular scale
Voters’ Political Values
% of Egyptians
38
38
36
36
34
34
32
32
30
30
28 Nour Party
28
26
26
24
24
Freedom and Justice Party
22
22
20
20
37,5 %
18
18
16
14
16
8,9 %
Egyptian Bloc
27,8 %
14
12
12
10
10
8
8
6
Al Wasat
4
3,7 %
9,2%
Al Wafd
0
Religious 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
16.3%
8.6%
4
8
9 Secular
2
18.1%
12.1%
6
Revolution
Continue All. 2,8 % 1,6 %Egypt National Party
2
26.1%
4.4% 4.9%
4.7% 4.8%
0
Religious 1
2
3
4
5
Source: Parliamentary survey 2, 4, 5 & 6. *Religious and secular values is defined according to the scores on the two variables: Agreement on the phrase "Religious leaders have a
responsibility to direct voters towards the best candidate“ and agreement on the phrase "Religious leaders should not influence decision of elected government“. Party’s placement is
based on how the voters place them on a scale from 0-10
6
7
8
9 Secular
10
Support and favorability towards the Islamist parties varies,
growing in the lead up to the election
1
2
The Islamic parties’ support grew during the
election campaign
The citizens’ view of the Nour Party also grew more
favorable during the election campaign
FJP
55
52
50
47
45
50
44
Favorable
40
35
45
42
31
30
40
25
25
17
20
34
35
26
32
15
14
8
10
30
Al Nour Party
25
23
5
0
19
20
16 Favorable
minus
unfavorable
-8
-5
-10
-14
-15
15
10
10
10
7
7
-20
-25
-30
-30
5
-35
0
August
2011
-23
-25
-34
-39
-29
Unfavorable
-39
-40
September
2011
October
2011
November
Early
Late
2011
December December
2011
2011
August
2011
September October November
Early
Late
2011
2011
2011
December December
2011
2011
Source: Parliamentary survey 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6.
11
While values appear stable over time:
Preferences for Islamic, democratic and strong state remain similar
Islamic state
Democratic- civil state
Strong state
38%
42%
46%
44%
38%
55%
56%
47%
53%
51%
39%
46%
7%
9%
10%
8%
6%
6%
August 2011
September 2011
October 2011
November 2011
May 2012
June 2012
Source: Parliamentary survey 1,2,3 4,5 & 6. Presidential survey 1, 2
12
Voters with religious values is a minority in all the major parties in Egypt
6%
12%
25%
Religious values
40%
94%
88%
75%
Secular values
60%
Al Nour Party
The Freedom and Justice party
Al wafd party
Egyptian Bloc
Source: Parliamentary survey 4,5 & 6.
13
To some extent, this is an issue of identity:
100%
Strong state even though not democratic
9%
Muslim or Christian
50%
54% Islamic state
Civil state 37%
Strong state even though not democratic
Egyptian
10%
37%
43%
Islamic state
Arab
A human being
Saedi, coastal
Citizen of the world
2%
2%
2%
1%
52%
Civil state
What is the first word you
would use to describe yourself
Source: Parliamentary survey 3
14
But the Center is the Largest Group of Egyptians
Size of Segments
Segment Definitions
Consistent Islamist
Islamist
party
Mixed
Secular political
values and voted
FJP and Nour
19%
Consistent
Islamist
Religious political
values and voted
for FJP and Nour
Party
preference
51%
Secular
party
Consistent
Secular
Secular political
values and voted
for secular party
Mixed
Religious political
values and voted
for secular parties
30%
Mixed
Secular
Religious
Consistent Secular
Political Values
Source: Parliamentary survey 4,5 & 6
15
Why Did Islamists Do Well?
16
Catering to Populations in Need:
1
Car ownership, as a poverty indicator,
shows that a fewer percentage of
Islamic party voters own a car
Car owner
14%
2
3
Islamic party voters have lesser education
than non-Islamic party voters
Islamic party voters are
living more in rural areas than
non-Islamic party voters
9%
Illiterate/
barely read
22%
29%
36%
Urban
Below High
School
48%
17%
19%
No
86%
91%
High and Upper
Highschool
44%
39%
64%
Rural
College
Non-islamic
party voter
Islamic
party voter
17%
Non-islamic
party voter
52%
13%
Islamic
party voter
Non-islamic
party voter
Islamic
party voter
Source: Parliamentary survey 4, 5 & 6.
17
Islamist are more politically active than secularist
1
2
The segments have joined
political parties to the same extent
Yes
No
2%
98%
Islamist
2%
98%
Mixed
Islamist were more active in
protests
2%
Yes
11%
8%
6%
No
89%
92%
94%
Islamist
Mixed
Secular
98%
Secular
Source: Parliamentary survey 4,5 & 6
18
With superior organizational resources at their disposal
1
Islamic parties mobilized
more volunteers for their
campaigns
Total number of campaign volunteers
2
3
Islamic parties have four
times as many active members
Total number of active members
The Islamic parties have a
greater share of full time staff
working in the parties
Type of staff in parties
25%
25.000
63%
Part-time
38%
Full time
100.000
75%
11.900
24.500
Islamic parties
Source: Presidential survey 1
Non-Islamic
parties
Islamic parties
Non-Islamic
parties
Islamic parties
Non-Islamic
parties
19
Conclusions and Implications
Conclusions
Implications
• Egyptian electorate has a large
center
• Respond to the needs of the center
• Need to emphasize iterative
processes and seek ways to avoid
entrenchment of early winners
• Roles of local level elections
Discourse
• The discourse of the campaigns
were increasingly religious
• Need to resist supporting efforts to
limit liberal freedoms, discourse
• Emphasis on media freedoms,
freedom of association, political
parties laws, etc
Transition
Politics
• Transition politics
fundamentally shaped by
religious-secular divide
The Centre
• International actors need to avoid
temptation to shore up secularists vs.
Islamists
• Undermines secular forces
• Reinforces the divide at the expense of
democracy
20
Conclusions from the Data
Transition politics fundamentally shaped by religious-secular divide:
• Religion was the main dividing line in the elections and the voters are primarily able to
differentiate the parties on a secular – religious scale
• This is partly related to a divide in identity, between Egyptians focusing on Egyptian national
identity and those focused on Muslim identity.
Ideological competition not reflecting deep-seated beliefs:
• The strong results for the Islamist parties should not be interpreted as religious values
running deep in Egyptian society, as only a small segment of 19 % harbour strong Islamist
values.
• The largest group in Egypt is clustered around the middle having not strong preferences for
either a secular or an Islamist state.
Organizational capacities a key factor in explaining Islamist current success, but fluid:
• Islamist parties had superior campaign strategies and organizational capacity
21
Implications for Transitional Politics?
• Secularists – domestic and abroad – tend to view “Islamist
takeover” reflecting deep-seated, values
• Fear of spreading message and power prompts support for
illiberal and anti-democratic policies
However,
• Illiberal policies have potential for inducing preference
falsification that strengthens Islamist parties
22
Moving Forward: Recognize Fluidity and Keep the
Playing Field Open
•
Need to resist supporting efforts to limit liberal freedoms, discourse
•
International actors need to avoid temptation to shore up secularists
vs. Islamists, focus on liberal/democratic vs. illiberal, anti-democratic
• Counter-productive
• Not necessarily more liberal, democratic outcomes
•
Respond to the needs of the center
• Need to emphasize iterative processes and seek ways to avoid
entrenchment of early winners
• Roles of local level elections
• Emphasis on media freedoms, freedom of association, political
parties laws, etc
• Push toward mult-issue elections
23
Appendix
24
Only minor difference in the evaluation of state institutions
1
2
Islamist are more negative
towards the judiciary
Evaluation of judiciary
Very good
13%
17%
3
Islamist are slightly more positive
towards the SCAF
Evaluation of the SCAF
Evaluation of the Sharaf government
Very good
10%
Good
33%
8%
9%
29%
27%
17%
Very good
Good
Only minor difference on
evaluation of Sharaf’s second
government
38%
36%
35%
38%
42%
41%
16%
Mediocre
Mediocre
Good
17%
13%
38%
38%
15%
16%
38%
13%
28%
30%
Poor
23%
21%
19%
Mediocre
5%
Poor
12%
9%
12%
Very poor
10%
8%
11%
Islamist
Mixed
Secular
Very poor
7%
Islamist
Poor
29%
Very poor
13%
8%
13%
4%
7%
Mixed
Secular
Islamist
16%
Mixed
20%
Secular
Source: Parliamentary survey 4,5 & 6
25
Appendix: islamist, mixed and secular
Dependent variable 0=islam, mixed=1 and
secular=2
Independent
Dependent (0=islamist) and (1=mixed +
secular)
Coeff.
Sign
Urban/ Rural
-,161
,000
Edu_rec
-,011
,649
Age_rec
Income: Does the family own a car?
,071
-,116
***
Independent
Coeff.
,000 ***
,017
Sign
Income: Does the family own a car?
-,182
,396
Urban/rural
Education
Age
-,492
,000 ***
-,019
,845
,202
,015 **
**
Dependent (0=islamist+mixed) and (1=secular)
Independent
Coeff.
Sign
Income: Does the family own a car?
-,395
,006 ***
Urban/rural
Education
Age
-,422
,000 ***
-,036
,621
,194
,001 ***
26
Overview of Egyptian Surveys
Date of collection, number of respondents and contents
Survey
Parliamentary survey 1
Date of collection
Respondents
• 5 – 17 August, 2011
• 2400
Contents
• Current issues
Parliamentary survey 2
• 11 – 22 September, 2011
• 2400
• Future prospects
• Political participation and election
Parliamentary survey 3
• 10 – 26 October, 2011
• 2400
Parliamentary survey 4
• 7 – 17 November, 2011
• 1200
• Political competence
• Political system
• Political parties
Parliamentary survey 5
Parliamentary survey 6
• 1 – 8 December, 2011
• 1200
• Presidential candidates
• 17 – 27 December, 2011
• 1200
• Values
• Trust
Presidential survey 1
• 19 – 22 May, 2012
• 1200
• Identity
• Social networks
Presidential survey 2
• 6 – 11 June, 2012
• 1200
27
Content
1
Introduction and survey data overview
2
Ideology and religion
3
Depth of the divide
4
Who are the Islamist and non-Islamist?
28
Support for Islamic parties has grown over time
30%
55%
Non-Islamic party
29%
55%
61%
70%
Islamic party
34%
45%
45%
September 2011
October 2011
66%
71%
39%
August 2011
November 2011
May 2012
June 2012
Source: Parliamentary survey 1,2,3 4,5 & 6. Presidential survey 1, 2
29
Content
1
Introduction and survey data overview
2
Ideology and religion
3
Depth of the divide
4
Who are the Islamist and non-Islamist?
30
Islamists are more rural and younger than secularists
1
2
Islamists live in rural areas
Urban
32%
3
No differences in education level
Illiterate
33%
31%
Islamists are younger
31%
40%
18-30
50%
Rural
Primary
school to
middle
diploma
68%
60%
54%
57%
48%
43%
37%
39%
55%
38%
31-50
38%
50%
College
and above
Islamist
Mixed
Secular
13%
12%
14%
Islamist
Mixed
Secular
51+
15%
Islamist
18%
Mixed
24%
Secular
Source: Parliamentary survey 4,5 & 6
31