Volume 13 | Issue 28 | Number 2 | Jul 13, 2015
The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus
Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in United
States–Japan–China Relations
Kimie Hara
The dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
There was no such dispute over these islands
erupted in the 1970s, but the territorial dispute
before the end of the Second World War, that is,
between Japan and China itself had started
when both Okinawa and Taiwan were territories
earlier, over Okinawa, immediately after the
of the Japanese Empire.
Second World War. The major point of dispute in
Many studies have been written on the cross-
the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue is whether these
Taiwan Strait and Okinawa problems. There are
islands are part of Okinawa or part of Taiwan.
also many Senkaku/Diaoyu studies, but as with
The former is the position of the Japanese
the Takeshima/Dokdo dispute between Japan
government, while the latter is
and Korea, little attention has been paid to the
Cold War context. The reason for this is, in
addition to the fact that Taiwan (ROC) remained
in the “West,” that the dispute surfaced during
the period of détente when major states in the
West, including the United States and Japan,
were improving relations with China (PRC).
Also, newly discovered maritime resources,
particularly potential oil and gas reserves, in the
neighboring areas began to attract attention.
However, the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue is also a
dispute between “China,” which (except for
Japan’s MOFA claims to the
Senkakus/Diaoyu Islands
Taiwan) became communist after the Second
World War, and Japan, which became a “client
the position of both Chinese governments, that is,
state” (McCormack, 2007) of the United States in
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing
the San Francisco System against the background
and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan.
of the Cold War.
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as Okinawa Prefecture. The Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands were incorporated into Okinawa
Prefecture by a cabinet decision in January 1895.
Three months later, in April 1895, Taiwan was
ceded to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, as a
result of the First Sino-Japanese War.
Half a century later, at the end of the Second
World War, between April and June 1945,
Chinese Defense Ministry Map showing
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and Air Defence
Identification Zones. 2015
Okinawa and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were
occupied by the US military. Taiwan was
This article looks at how the territorial
incorporated into China (ROC) as a province
disposition of Okinawa, Taiwan, and the
after the Japanese surrender in August 1945. Six
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were dealt with in the
years later in September 1951, Japan formally
process of constructing the post-war
renounced Taiwan in the peace treaty signed in
international order in East Asia and how the
San Francisco. Okinawa was placed under US
territorial disputes between Japan and China
administration together with the other US-
emerged, developed, and remained in the
occupied islands, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu.
regional Cold War system, with particular
However, as with so many other contested
attention paid to the relations between Japan,
islands of the postwar era, the treaty specified
China, and the United States. In doing so, it
neither precise limits nor the final designation of
attempts to provide a broader international
the disposed territories (Hara, 2007, 2015). The
context beyond the China-Japan bilateral
problems surrounding Okinawa, Taiwan, and
framework to consider possible solutions.
Senkaku/Diaoyu are closely related to the postwar territorial dispositions of Japan, particularly
Okinawa and Taiwan in the Allies’ Blueprint
in the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
for Post-war Regional Order
Cairo Declaration and the Principle of “No Territorial
Okinawa was once an independent kingdom
Expansion”
(Ryukyu) and became a tributary state to Japan
in 1609. It also retained tributary relations with
Several wartime international agreements
China until 1872, when it was incorporated into
covered the post-war disposition of the territories
Japan as Ryukyu-han. In 1879, 16 years before
formerly under Japanese control. A key
Japan’s acquisition of Taiwan, it was designated
agreement made by the Allied leaders was the
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Cairo Declaration of 1943. This was a
communiqué
agreed
on
during
(US State Department 1943, p. 324).
the
China had by then publicly shown strong interest
US–UK–China summit meeting held in Cairo
in the future possession of Okinawa; the
from November 22 to November 26, and released
Nationalist (ROC) government on several
on December 1, after the US–UK–USSR summit
occasions indicated its wish to secure the islands’
held in Tehran between November 28 and
transfer to China. In a press statement on
December 1, 1943. It stipulated that Japan would
November 5, 1942, for example, Foreign Minister
be expelled from all the territories it had taken
T.V. Soong included the islands among the
“by violence and greed” adopting the principle
territories that China expected to “recover” (Hara
of “no territorial expansion,” which was
2007, p. 161). It appears that, having been briefed
originally laid down in the Atlantic Charter, a
about the Chinese interest in obtaining Okinawa,
blueprint for the post-war world signed in
Roosevelt asked Chiang about the Chinese
August 1941 by Anglo-American leaders on a
preference for treatment of the islands. However,
battleship off the shores of Newfoundland. The
Chiang instead proposed joint occupation and
Cairo Declaration specifically referred to Taiwan
eventual joint administration with the United
as territory to be “restored to the Republic of
States under international trusteeship. Chiang
China.”
noted in his diary that he had responded this
Cairo Declaration, 1943 (Excerpt):
The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for
themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in
the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories
Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of
China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three
great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become
free and independent.
way 1) to “put the US at ease” by not pursuing
China’s territorial ambitions, 2) because the
Ryukyus had belonged to Japan prior to the Sino-
The Cairo Declaration made no specific mention
Japanese War, and 3) as joint control with the US
of Okinawa or Senkaku/Diaoyu. However, the
is more valid than our exclusive control (Chiang
future of Okinawa was discussed by President
1977, p.122; Zhang 2007, pp. 683–4).
Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo.
According to Wada’s study of the Cairo
According to the record of their meeting, the
communiqué and its preparation, the United
“President referred to the question of the Ryukyu
States and United Kingdom did not originally
Islands and enquired more than once whether
plan to include the sentence reflecting the
China would want the Ryukyus.” To this, “the
principle of no territorial expansion: “They covet
Generalissimo replied that China would be
no gain for themselves and have no thought of
agreeable to joint occupation of the Ryukyus by
territorial expansion.” It did not appear in the
China and the United States, and, eventually,
first and second drafts, and was likely a last-
joint administration by the two countries under
minute addition at Chiang’s suggestion (Wada
the trusteeship of an international organization”
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2013).
adopted at this conference presented a competing
strain of rhetoric to that of the Anglo-American
Three weeks prior to the Cairo Conference, on
Atlantic Charter. It stated that the “countries of
November 5-6, 1943, Japan had hosted the
Greater East Asia, with a view to contributing to
Greater East Asia Conference in Tokyo. This
the cause of world peace, undertake to cooperate
epoch-maing event was the very first
toward prosecuting the War of Greater East Asia
international conference held among non-
to a successful conclusion, liberating their region
Caucasian states on the basis of Japan's "Greater
from the yoke of British-American domination,
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" initiative. The
and ensuring their self-existence and self-
major participants were Tojo Hideki (prime
defense,” and listed dignifying principles,
minister of Japan), Zhang Jinghui (prime minister
including “abolition of racial discrimination,” in
of Manchukuo), Wang Jingwei (president of the
constructing a Greater East Asia. However, no
Reorganized National Government of China in
phrase such as “no territorial expansion” was
Nanjing), Ba Maw (head of state, Burma), José P.
included here, as Japan planned to expand its
Laurel (president of the Second Philippine
territories to Southeast Asia, building on the
Republic), Subhas Chandra Bose (head of state of
territorial expansion in the wake of the attack on
the provisional Government of Free India), and
Pearl Harbor in December 1941.
Wan Waithayakon (envoy of the Kingdom of
The Joint Declaration of the Greater East Asia Conference, 1943
It is the basic principle for the establishment of world peace that the nations of the world have each its proper place, and
enjoy prosperity in common through mutual aid and assistance.
The United States of America and the British Empire have in seeking their own prosperity oppressed other nations and
peoples. Especially in East Asia, they indulged in insatiable aggression and exploitation, and sought to satisfy their
inordinate ambition of enslaving the entire region, and finally they came to menace seriously the stability of East Asia.
Herein lies the cause of the recent war. The countries of Greater East Asia, with a view to contributing to the cause of
world peace, undertake to cooperate toward prosecuting the War of Greater East Asia to a successful conclusion,
liberating their region from the yoke of British-American domination, and ensuring their self-existence and self-defense,
and in constructing a Greater East Asia in accordance with the following principles:
The countries of Greater East Asia through mutual cooperation will ensure the stability of their region and construct an
order of common prosperity and well-being based upon justice.
The countries of Greater East Asia will ensure the fraternity of nations in their region, by respecting one another's
sovereignty and independence and practicing mutual assistance and amity.
The countries of Greater East Asia by respecting one another's traditions and developing the creative faculties of each race
will enhance the culture and civilization of Greater East Asia.
The countries of Greater East Asia will endeavor to accelerate their economic development through close cooperation
upon a basis of reciprocity and to promote thereby the general prosperity of their region.
The countries of Greater East Asia will cultivate friendly relations with all the countries of the world, and work for the
abolition of racial discrimination, the promotion of cultural intercourse and the opening of resources throughout the
world, and contribute thereby to the progress of mankind.
Thailand). They were the representative of
Japan's allies, friends, and puppet regimes.
1
However, no representative was invited from
Indonesia, which Japan had decided to
incorporate into its own territory.
For Chiang, the Cairo Conference was to counter
the Greater East Asia Conference, in which Wang
Jingwei of the Nanjing Government had
participated. Therefore, it is understandable that
he brought up the “no territorial expansion”
principle of the Atlantic Charter here as a
rhetorical device that contested and defied that of
Greater East Asia Conference, Tokyo
the Joint Declaration of the Greater East Asia
The Joint Declaration of the Greater East Asia
(Wada, 2013). But this principle had already
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become merely nominal among the Allied
Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War
Powers. At the Tehran Conference, which
Against Japan” signed by Stalin, Roosevelt, and
followed the Cairo Conference, the US and Soviet
Churchill in February 1945—the so-called Yalta
leaders discussed Sakhalin and the Kuriles in
Protocol—is an important agreement providing a
terms of Soviet conditions for joining the war
core blueprint for the post-war international
against Japan. Roosevelt, on returning to
order in the Asia-Pacific. It outlined the
Washington, informed the Pacific War Council
conditions under which the Soviet Union would
that “the Kuriles would be conceded to Stalin as
enter the war against Japan. In addition to the
a price for Soviet participation” (Allison, Kimura,
cession of territories (Southern Sakhalin and the
and Sarkisov 1992, p. 86).
Kurile Islands) from Japan to the USSR, it
included agreements concerning China, such as
Whereas the USSR had ambitions to acquire
the preservation of the status quo in Outer
Japan’s northern territories, China restated its
Mongolia"2 (1), the lease of Port Arthur as a naval
intention to acquire the southern territories of
base, the internationalization of Dairen with
Japan, referring to Okinawa. The ROC foreign
Soviet preeminent status (2-b), and joint
minister T.V. Soong stated on October 29, 1944,
Soviet–Chinese operation of the Chinese Eastern
that Japan would have to evacuate the Ryukyu
and South Manchurian railways (2-c) (US State
Islands; at a press conference a few days later, he
Department 1945, p. 984).
added that China would “recover” the islands
after the war. Furthermore, although the first
edition of Chiang Kai-shek’s China’s Destinydid
not mention the Ryukyus, its revised edition of
January 1, 1944, described them as integral parts
of China, particularly necessary for its national
defense (Hara 2007, p. 161).
Yalta Blueprint
"The Allies’ principle of no territorial expansion
had clearly become a dead letter at the
Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin at Yalta, Feb.
1945
US–UK–USSR Yalta Conference of February
1945, where Roosevelt and Churchill recognized
These arrangements, the protocol stated, would
Soviet territorial expansion in Eastern Europe as
“require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang
well as in its Far East. The “Agreement
Kai-shek,” and “the President will take measures
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in order to obtain this concurrence on advice
By every proper means to promote
from Marshal Stalin.” The protocol concluded:
establishment of a broadly
representative government which
will bring about internal unity,
For its part the Soviet Union
including
expresses its readiness to conclude
reconcilement
of
Kuomintang-Communist
with the National Government of
differences, and which will
China a pact of friendship and
effectively discharge its internal and
alliance between the USSR and
international responsibilities. (US
China in order to render assistance
State Department 1945, p. 356)
to China with its armed forces for
the purpose of liberating China from
the Japanese yoke. (US State
The United States expected an independent
Department 1945, p. 984)
China to act as a stabilizing factor in the Far East,
without falling into any power bloc (Soeya 1997,
p. 35). In addition, cooperation between China
The above conditions were concessions by the
and the United Kingdom was considered an
United States and United Kingdom to have the
essential part of UN solidarity and necessary for
USSR break its neutrality pact with, and declare
the development of independent China. For that
war on, Japan. They were rewards for the USSR’s
purpose, the briefing paper even mentioned that:
cooperation in ending the war quickly. It should
be noted that “China” here was the Republic of
China (ROC), led by Chiang Kai-shek, which the
We [US] should welcome the
USSR, as well as the United States and the United
restoration by Great Britain of Hong
Kingdom, then supported as the legitimate
Kong to China and we are prepared
government of China. According to the record of
in that event to urge upon China the
a meeting with Roosevelt at Yalta, Stalin thought
desirability of preserving its status
that “Chiang Kai-Shek should assume
as a free port. (US State Department
leadership” for the purpose of having “a united
1945, pp. 352–7)
front against the Japanese” (US State Department
1945, p. 771).
At the time of the Yalta Conference, whereas the
United States wished China to become a stable
According to a briefing paper prepared by the
power in the Far East, the United Kingdom
State Department before the Yalta Conference,
appeared to have a different preference; that is, it
the goal of US China policy was:
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desired “a weak and possibly disunited China in
eliminated, cooperation soon collapsed.
the post-war period” (US State Department 1945,
However, US–USSR confrontation had already
pp. 352–3). For the United Kingdom—a prewar
begun before the Japanese surrender. After the
colonial power in major parts of South and
German surrender, the third and last
Southeast Asia, including India, Burma, and
US–USSR–UK summit was held in Potsdam from
Malaya—recovery of its colonial interests was an
July 17 through August 2. In Potsdam, US–USSR
important objective, and applied also to China. In
confrontation surfaced over the post-war
contrast with the United States, which preferred
treatment of Europe, especially of Germany and
building cooperative relations with China by
Poland. On July 16, just before the conference
welcoming the reversion of Hong Kong, the
opened, the United States successfully tested the
United Kingdom was interested in regaining its
first atomic bomb. The attitude of Truman, who
prewar semi-colonial status in China and its
succeeded Roosevelt after his death in April, at
direct control over Hong Kong. In short, the Big
the conference became firm and rigid, leading to
Three had already shown some signs of
a grim confrontation with Stalin. The
difference over their China policy. Nevertheless,
US–UK–China ultimatum to Japan was issued on
at Yalta in February 1945 they were groping for
July 26 from Potsdam, with Chiang Kai-shek
ways to construct the post-war international
(who was not present) concurring by wire. The
order by maintaining their cooperative relations
Soviets, hosts of the conference, were not
(Hara 2004).
consulted. As Averell Harriman noted in his
memoirs, the US leaders preferred to end the war
The Yalta Protocol makes no specific mention of
without the Soviets, if possible (Harriman 1975,
Okinawa or Taiwan. There was general
p. 492).
agreement at Yalta that territorial trusteeship
Potsdam Declaration, 1945 (Excerpt)
The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu,
Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.
would apply to “territory to be detached from
the enemy” as a result of the Second World War,
In the Potsdam Declaration, Japanese territories
but no specific territories were discussed.
were to be limited to the four main islands and
“minor islands” determined by the Allies, but
Potsdam
their limits were not defined. On August 8, two
The emergence of the Cold War has often been
days after the atomic bomb was dropped on
described as a process in which the character of
Hiroshima, the USSR declared war against Japan,
Soviet–US relations was transformed from
joining in on the Potsdam and Cairo declarations.
cooperation to confrontation (Hara 2012). When
Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration one
the war ended and the common enemy was
week later, signing the Instrument of Surrender
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The San Francisco Peace Treaty (Excerpts)
Article 2(b)
Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.
Article 3
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with
the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu
Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the
Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action
thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction
over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.
on September 2.
Taiwan, Okinawa, and Senkaku/Diaoyu in the
San Francisco System
Senkaku/Diaoyu was not discussed in the
In September 1951, six years after signing the
process of preparing the peace treaty. It was the
Instrument of Surrender, 48 countries including
disposition of Taiwan and Okinawa that had
Japan signed a peace treaty. Vast territories,
become contentious and accordingly required a
extending from the Kurile Islands to Antarctica
number of discussions and deliberations. In the
and from Micronesia to the Spratlys, were
six years between the Japanese surrender and the
disposed of in the treaty. The treaty, however,
signing of the peace treaty in San Francisco, the
specified neither their final devolution nor their
international political environment surrounding
precise limits, thereby sowing the seeds of
Japan had changed significantly. The Cold War
various “unresolved problems” in the region. In
had intensified, becoming hot in places, and
Article 2(b), Japan renounced Taiwan, called
developed in complex ways. After the Japanese
“Formosa” in the treaty. The treaty, however, did
withdrawal,
not specify to which country or government
independence movements in some parts of the
Japan renounced it. In the case of Okinawa, or
region had turned to civil war over governing
“the Ryukyu Islands,” Article 3 specified that the
principles for the new states, where competition
islands were to be under US administration until
between the superpowers over spheres of
a trusteeship proposal was submitted by the
influence supervened. The disposition of Taiwan
United States and passed by the United Nations.
and Okinawa in the San Francisco Peace Treaty
In other words, the United States could
was closely related to such changes, especially
exclusively control Okinawa, until such time that
with regard to the situation in China.
it made a trusteeship proposal. Trusteeship is a
post-war
liberation
and
Formosa (Taiwan) in the San Francisco Peace Treaty
transitional arrangement, not a final disposition,
of territorial sovereignty. Thus, the treaty also left
After the war, Formosa was returned to China as
the final devolution of these territories
the province of Taiwan, while the civil war
unresolved. Furthermore, neither government of
between the Nationalists and Communists re-
China was invited to the peace conference in San
erupted. Over the next few years, China’s
Francisco, where this treaty was signed. The
political conditions changed drastically from
USSR sent representatives to the conference, but
those envisaged at Yalta. In 1947, President
refused to sign the treaty.
Truman officially proclaimed the US Cold War
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policy to be the containment of Communism.
Sho), Crag (Menka Sho), Pinnacle
This policy, however, initially focused solely on
(Kahei Sho), ... (cited in Hara 2007,
Europe—US policy toward China was officially
p. 60)
one of non-intervention, even after the
Communist government was established in
“Pinnacle” might be interpreted as the English
October 1949. The United States then foresaw the
name of Senkaku/Diaoyu. However, the
possibility that in the long run China would split
parenthesis with the Japanese name “Kahei Sho”
from the USSR, as Tito’s Yugoslavia already had.
makes it clear that it is not the “Pinnacle”
This possibility was mentioned in the US
currently disputed by China and Japan.
National Security Council policy document NSC
With the outbreak of the Korean War in June
48/1, approved by the president on December 23,
1950, US China policy changed drastically to one
1949 (Etzold and Gaddis 1978). The US defense
of active containment. The dispatch of the US
line in the Western Pacific, stretching from the
Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to protect
Aleutians through Japan to the Philippines, came
Taiwan from invasion added intervention in the
to be known as the “Acheson Line,” after being
Chinese civil war to that already under way in
mentioned in a speech by Dean Acheson, the
Korea (Soeya 1997, p. 47). Since then, the Taiwan
secretary of state in January 1950. Acheson did
Strait has been a Cold War frontier in the region.
not mention Taiwan, which the United States
then saw as capable of being “lost” to
In 1950, John Foster Dulles was appointed to
Communism, as continental China already had
oversee the drafting of the Japanese peace treaty;
been.
the first draft prepared under his supervision
was completed on August 7. From this point on,
From late 1946 onward, the State Department
“China” as the country to receive Formosa
prepared several drafts of a peace treaty with
disappeared from US drafts. For example, the
Japan. Until December 1949, all those drafts had
August draft stated (in Chapter IV, Territory,
specified “China” as the country to which Japan
Article 5):
would cede Formosa. For example, Article 2 of
the August 1949 draft read:
Japan accepts whatever decision
may hereafter be agreed upon by
Japan hereby cedes to China in full
the United States, the United
sovereignty the island of Taiwan
Kingdom, the USSR and China with
(Formosa) and adjacent minor
reference to the future status of
islands, including Agincourt (Hoka
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Formosa, the Pescadores, Sakhalin
major turning point. In late November 1950, a
south of 50 degrees north latitude
Chinese “volunteer” army crossed the border
and the Kurile Islands. In the event
and began large-scale military intervention in the
of failure in any case to agree within
Korean War. Anti-Chinese emotion erupted
one year, the parties of the treaty
domestically in the United States, affecting the
will accept the decision of the
issue of Chinese participation in the peace
United Nations General Assembly.
conference. US policy toward Chinese
(cited in Hara 2007, pp. 61–2)
representation thereafter hardened in favor of the
ROC (Hosoya 1984, p. 116).
The same formula appeared in the September
The next year, after a series of negotiations, a
draft and also in the “seven-point statement of
new draft was completed on March 1, 1951. “The
principles,” which was prepared for the
Four Powers or UN resolution” formula of the
forthcoming peace negotiations. In these drafts,
previous year was dropped. Formosa was
the “UN resolution formula” was adopted for the
mentioned along with Korea in Chapter III,
disposition of Korea (Hara 2007, pp. 35–6). This
“Territory,” as follows: “Japan renounces all
was presumably because the Korean War was
rights, titles and claims to Korea, Formosa and
being fought in the name of the United Nations,
the Pescadores” (cited in Hara 2007, p. 38).
that is, it reflected Dulles’s desire to justify US
intervention in the Taiwan Strait as well as that in
The alteration in this draft was due to the change
Korea in the peace treaty. On October 23, 1950,
in the Korean situation, as Chinese (PRC)
Dulles met Wellington Koo, the ambassador from
intervention prompted Washington to consider
China (ROC), and other Chinese diplomats who
the “loss of Korea” as a possibility (Hosoya 1984,
had misgivings about this Formosa disposition.
p. 150). As for Formosa, there was a danger
Dulles told them that “Formosa represents a
within the UN framework that it might be ceded
problem which should be settled by international
to the PRC, which the British had already
agreement that we [US] were able to protect
recognized in January 1950. The British
Formosa with the Seventh Fleet” (US State
participated in the Korean War alongside the
Department 1951, p. 1,325). Southern Sakhalin
Americans, but did not change their policy of
and the Kurile Islands, promised to the USSR in
recognizing the PRC. The United Kingdom had
the Yalta blueprint, were also dealt with in the
its own national interests to protect, particularly
same article.
its remaining colonial interest in Hong Kong and
economic interests in the Chinese market.
In the meantime, the war in Korea reached a
Through the fiction that the Chinese troops were
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“volunteers,” China avoided declaring itself at
Incidentally, as late as the May 1951 draft, “the
war.
USSR” had been specified as the country to
which Japan would renounce the Southern
The Japanese peace treaty was drafted jointly by
Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. However, Dulles
the United States and the United Kingdom.
proposed that the territorial clauses be consistent:
However, in the process, difficulties arose over
consequently, “the USSR” disappeared from the
policies toward China. While the United States
June draft (Hara 2007, pp. 93–5). In its
supported Chiang Kai-shek’s ROC, the United
negotiations with the USSR/Russia over the
Kingdom insisted that the PRC government
Northern Territories, Japan has taken the position
should represent China. This caused a serious
that the final designation and attribution of these
split between the two countries over issues such
territories was not specified in the peace treaty
as the disposition of Formosa and Chinese
and therefore is still pending. However, this logic
participation in the peace treaty. In the end, they
does not seem to have been applied to China:
finalized the peace treaty on the following bases:
that is, Japan never proposed that China
that Japan should choose its own future
negotiate the final designation of Taiwan based
relationship with China, that Taiwan’s future
on the fact that its final disposition was not
would not be determined by the peace treaty
specified in the peace treaty.
itself, and that neither China would be
represented at the peace conference (Hosoya
Senkaku/Diaoyu was not considered in the
1984, p. 281). The US–UK joint draft was thus
context of the disposition of Taiwan. These
prepared on June 14, 1951 (US State Department
islands were placed under US control, together
1951, p. 1,120).
with Okinawa, which will be discussed in the
next section. While those islands were under US
For Formosa, this June draft became the final one
occupation, the ownership of Senkaku/Diaoyu
signed at the peace conference. In the wartime
was hardly questioned. Nevertheless, the seeds
Allies’ agreements and in earlier treaty drafts,
of a future dispute were sown, because no clear
Formosa had been to be returned to “China” but
border demarcation was made in the 1951 San
it became an “unresolved problem” in the San
Francisco Treaty.
Francisco Peace Treaty. Certainly, the peace
treaty by itself did not divide China. However,
On April 28, 1952, the same day that the San
by leaving the status of the island undecided,
Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect, Japan
various options remained open for its future,
signed a peace treaty with the Chinese
including possession by the PRC or the ROC, or
Nationalist government (ROC), effectively
even independence.
recognizing that regime as the legitimate
11
13 | 28 | 2
APJ | JF
government of China. The United States
in possessing or controlling Okinawa from the
pressured Japan to do so, warning that Congress
wartime period. US wartime studies suggested
would not otherwise ratify the San Francisco
that Japanese sovereignty was most valid, but left
treaty and the security alliance with Japan, also
other options open, respecting China’s interest.
signed on the same day. The 1952 Japan–ROC
Japan was then an enemy—defense there meant
peace treaty contained provisions in its own
“defense against Japanese aggression”—while
Article 2 that were similar to those in the San
China was an ally, thus plans for the post-war
Francisco treaty:
period took account of its cooperation and
interests.
It is recognized that under Article 2
After the Second World War, with the
of the Treaty of Peace with Japan
development of the Cold War in Asia, the US
signed at the city of San Francisco in
interest in Okinawa shifted to the defense of its
the United States of America on
sphere of influence, especially to “defense of
September 8, 1951, Japan has
Japan”. Whereas US military leaders, including
renounced all right, title and claim
MacArthur, insisted on exclusive and permanent
to Taiwan (Formosa) and P’eng-hu
control, or annexation, of the islands, the State
(Pescadores) as well as the Spratly
Department explored ways to secure US bases
and the Paracel Islands. (United
through the UN trusteeship system instead of
Nations 1952, p. 38)
outright annexation, which would be criticized as
“imperialism” or “expansionism.” In 1947,
This simply recognized the Japanese
tactically linking and negotiating its position of
renunciation of Formosa, as well as of the
the Kuriles with the USSR during the UN
Spratlys and the Paracels, but without specifying
Security Council meetings, the United States
their geographical limits or future ownership.
secured its exclusive strategic trusteeship of
Micronesia, where it had already begun to carry
Okinawa and Senkaku/Diaoyu in the San
out nuclear testing (Hara 2007, ch. 4). In 1951,
Francisco Peace Treaty
without actually placing the islands under a
The problems of both Okinawa and
trusteeship, the United States secured exclusive
Senkaku/Diaoyu are in their origin deeply
control of Okinawa in the carefully elaborated
related to US policy toward Asia, especially
provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The
China. Both the Chinese Nationalist (ROC)
United States also placed Senkaku/Diaoyu,
government and US military had had an interest
together with Okinawa, under its control as part
12
13 | 28 | 2
APJ | JF
of “Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude”
Acheson Line, Okinawa too was a “wedge” to
although there is no specific mention of those
secure Japan under the US sphere of influence, as
islands in the treaty.
well as an important base for the defense of
Taiwan in US China policy.
Both the retention and renunciation of Okinawa
by Japan were considered in the course of the
Interestingly, at the time of the San Francisco
peace treaty preparation; after all, the status of
conference, China (PRC) openly supported the
the territories mentioned in Article 3 was not
return of Okinawa to Japan. Prior to the
clearly defined in the treaty. Article 3 of the
conference, Chinese media had stated the PRC’s
treaty does not specify renunciation of territorial
position that Okinawa was part of Japanese
sovereignty by Japan. But neither does it confirm
territory, supporting demands made in Okinawa
Japanese sovereignty. Examination of the other
for the return of administrative rights to Japan. In
territorial dispositions suggests that Dulles
a statement on August 15, 1951, Zhou Enlai flatly
considered it convenient to leave the devolution
opposed the idea of putting Okinawa under US
of the territories vague. The same thinking was
trusteeship, declaring “these islands have never
probably applied to Okinawa. The absence of any
by any international agreement been separated
phrase specifying “renunciation by Japan” means
from Japan.” However, the PRC’s support for
that Japan was not excluded from future
Okinawa’s reversion to Japan was really a
possession. But it did not necessarily close off
demand for the removal of US military bases
ways for alternative settlement, such as
from Okinawa and a peace treaty with Japan that
possession by the United States or China, or even
would expand PRC influence (Hara 2007, ch. 7).
independence. Thus, the treaty did not
Okinawa Reversion, Resources, and the
completely guarantee Japanese sovereignty over
Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute
Okinawa and Senkaku/Diaoyu. Their future
status was left undecided. Here, with the reality
For almost two decades after the signing of the
of danger of Taiwan’s “liberation” by the PRC, a
treaty, no party questioned Japan’s sovereignty
“wedge” of territorial dispute was inserted
over Senkaku/Diaoyu, and none claimed that
between China and Japan through the ROC’s
these islands should have been allocated as part
demand for Okinawa. The Senkaku/Diaoyu
of Taiwan, which Japan had renounced in the
problem that erupted in the 1970s thus actually
peace treaty. It was not until around 1970 that
started when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was
both the PRC and the ROC began to claim that
signed, designating the islands not as part of
the islands were part of Taiwan.
Taiwan, but as part of Okinawa.3 Lying on the
The United States had by the early 1970s
13
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APJ | JF
returned to Japan its administrative rights over
Defense sent a memorandum to the State
all the territories mentioned in Article 3 of the
Department, recalling that the United States had
peace treaty, without placing them under UN
recognized and treated Senkaku/Diaoyu as part
trusteeship. As it did so, both the PRC and the
of Okinawa in the past. However, this point was
ROC began to claim ownership of
not reflected in US policy. There are reasons for
Senkaku/Diaoyu, at least in part motivated by
this.
5
the value of natural resources in the waters near
The first is obviously the PRC. The time was one
the islands that began to receive attention.
of US-PRC détente, the centerpiece of a dramatic
Because the Senkakus had never been disputed
transformation in the structure of Asia-Pacific
before, it was for Japan a “problem that emerged
and global international relations. The primary
suddenly,” as described in a government
diplomatic agenda of the Nixon administration,
pamphlet published in 1972 (Gaimusho joho-
inaugurated in 1969, was normalizing relations
bunka-kyoku 1972). The government in Taiwan
with the PRC. It had inherited the Okinawa
retained the position that Okinawa was not
reversion agreement from the Johnson period,
Japanese territory, and opposed its “reversion” to
but had no intention of allowing the tiny islands
Japan.4 The PRC also criticized this “reversion,”
of Senkaku/Diaoyu to impede the development
but for a different reason, calling it “a fraud”
of its policy toward China.
because the US military bases were retained
(Hara 2007, ch.7).
The next is Okinawa. The US aim was to ensure
retention of the bases on the islands. In the late
US policy over Senkaku/Diaoyu at the time of
1960s, President Johnson had promised to return
the Okinawa reversion deserves special attention,
Okinawa to Japan. However, the United States
as it is perhaps the key to understanding the
had no incentive for reversion; on the contrary,
problem. Before the reversion of Okinawa, there
during the Johnson administration, Okinawa’s
was certainly an understanding in the US
strategic importance increased in connection with
government that Senkaku was part of Okinawa.
the war in Vietnam. Johnson’s promise was a
However, the Nixon administration adopted a
political one, rendered necessary by the growth
policy of taking “no position on sovereignty”
of movements demanding reversion, not only in
when returning “administrative rights” over
Okinawa, but all over Japan. Many Japanese
these islands to Japan along with Okinawa, thus
opposed US intervention in the Vietnam War and
leaving the dispute to the Japanese and the
the increased use of the Okinawa bases for that
Chinese. This policy was in fact questioned at the
war further provoked anti-US demonstrations,
time. In March 1971, the US Department of
with signs that the Japanese Socialists and
14
13 | 28 | 2
APJ | JF
Communists were gaining in popularity. Hence
especially over islands near Okinawa, has in fact
the Johnson administration’s compromise was
rendered the US military presence in Okinawa
undertaken to appease anti-US feeling among the
more acceptable to Japan. While emphasizing the
Japanese and to prevent the Communists from
“China threat” and the “defense of Japan” to the
exploiting the situation.
Japanese, Nixon managed to secure tacit Chinese
approval of the US presence in Okinawa as
Thus, though the United States would “return”
“defense against Japan,” thus exploiting China’s
Okinawa to Japan, it would retain its bases there.
fear of a revival of Japanese militarism. The
Nor was the Vietnam War its only reason for so
United States achieved a series of difficult
desiring to retain the bases on Okinawa. The 1969
diplomatic objectives, such as withdrawal from
Nixon–Sato Communiqué contained a specific
Vietnam, reconciliation with Communist China,
promise of Okinawa’s return, but also included
and retention of bases in Okinawa, one after
the so-called “Taiwan and South Korean
another, by recognizing their relationship and
provisions” (Soeya 1997, pp. 113–14). The
tactically linking them to its advantage. The
implication of these, which directly linked
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute was merely another
Japan’s security to that of Taiwan and South
element of that emergent reality that could be
Korea, was that the PRC continued to be
used, according to the logic of Henry Kissinger,
perceived as a threat in the region.
the architect of Nixon’s diplomacy, “to create a
network of incentives and penalties to produce
In his annual presidential address in February
the most favorable outcome” (Kissinger 1994, p.
1971, President Nixon stated:
717) for the United States.6 It is not clear whether
the ROC ever officially abandoned its claim to
We are prepared to establish a
Okinawa. As noted earlier, the PRC’s support for
dialogue with Peking. We cannot
Okinawa’s reversion to Japan was a political
accept its ideological precepts, or the
move, directed against the US bases there. As
notion that Communist China must
with Vietnam’s claim in the South China Sea, the
exercise hegemony over Asia. But
PRC’s position on Okinawa could be reversed,
neither do we wish to impose on
and China’s “traditional” claim espoused after
China an international position that
reunification. Until both the PRC and the ROC
denies its legitimate national
recognize Japan’s sovereignty over Okinawa, the
interests. (Kissinger 1994, p. 724)
possibility remains for China to revive its claim.
A territorial dispute between Japan and China,
Conclusion
15
13 | 28 | 2
APJ | JF
The ally-foe relations between the United States,
the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan
Japan, and China were reversed in wartime and
adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on June
the post-war period. Whereas Japan changed
19, 1947. Peace treaty drafts prepared in July and
from a former enemy to an important ally as a
August 1947 provided detailed specification of
cornerstone of the US strategy in Asia, China,
territorial dispositions, in order to avoid future
that is the PRC, turned into a threat. The
conflict, specifying names of minor islands such
disposition of Taiwan and Okinawa, including
as “Takeshima” and “Kunashiri” or providing
Senkaku/Diaoyu, in the Japanese peace treaty
clear demarcations using latitude and longitude
reflected these developments and, accordingly,
(Hara 2007, ch. 2 and ch. 3).
changes in the US strategy in East Asia.
If a peace treaty had been signed according to the
During the early post-war period, the United
premises of the US State Department around this
States prepared for the disposition of Japan based
time, the situation in East Asia would have
on the principle of “no territorial expansion,”
developed quite differently. Some, at least, of the
proclaimed in both the Atlantic Charter and
existing disputes would not have emerged.
Cairo Declaration. For example, a peace treaty
However, the actual outcome was different.
draft prepared by the State Department in March
Against the background of the escalating Cold
1947 stated: “The territorial limits of Japan shall
War, which turned into “hot” wars in Asia, peace
be those existing on January 1, 1894, subject to
treaty drafts went through various changes and
the modifications set forth in Articles 2, 3 … [sic]”
eventually became simplified. Countries that
(cited in Hara 2007, p.26). In principle, Japan was
were intended to receive such islands as Formosa
envisaged to become what it had been prior to its
(Taiwan), the Kuriles, and other territories
territorial expansion in the Sino-Japanese War.
disappeared from the text, leaving various
The same draft, however, specified that Japan
“unresolved problems” among the regional
was to renounce “the Ryukyu Islands forming
neighbors. Including the Okinawa provisions, the
part of Okinawa Prefecture” as well (cited in
equivocal wording of the peace treaty was the
Hara 2007, p. 166). According to these principles,
result neither of inadvertence nor error—issues
Senkaku/Diaoyu, incorporated into Okinawa
were deliberately left unresolved. It is no
Prefecture in January 1895, would have been
coincidence that the regional conflicts derived
removed from Japan.
from the San Francisco Peace Treaty—the
Northern
The United States initially prepared peace treaty
Territories/Southern
Kuriles,
Takeshima/Dokdo, Senkaku/Diaoyu (Okinawa),
drafts according to the Cairo Declaration, the
Spratly/Nansha,
Yalta Agreement, the Potsdam Declaration, and
16
and
Paracel/Xisha
13 | 28 | 2
APJ | JF
problems—all line up along the Acheson Line. In
further. In the meantime, the origin of the
all of these instances the US would play a
problem as a by-product of the Cold War has
decisive role, whether denying territorial gains to
been forgotten.
rivals or forcing allies such as Japan to accept
The issue of US bases after the Okinawa
terms favourable to US interests such as the
reversion experienced a major turning point in
reversion of Okinawa with US bases intact.
the 1990s and in late 2000s. With the collapse of
In the early 1970s, the structure of international
the Yalta System and the demise of the USSR and
political relations in the Asia-Pacific changed
the advent of the so-called “post–Cold War” era,
drastically, especially those centering on China.
the necessity of keeping US bases in Okinawa
The split in the Eastern Camp contributed to the
began to be questioned by many in the US media
emergence of a China–US–USSR tripolar system
and politics (Johnson and Keen 1995, pp. 103–14).
in the political map of this region. However, the
The “Okinawa problem” developed into a hot
shift to policy by the US and its allies to one of
issue in Japan in 1995, after a schoolgirl was
“engagement” with China did not necessarily
raped by three US military personnel. However,
mean the collapse of the Cold War structure. The
due to cooperative efforts between the US and
basic structure of the regional Cold War, in
Japanese governments, the issue of “withdrawal”
which the two Chinas confront each other across
(tettai) was somehow replaced by “transfer”
the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan is protected by the
(iten).
US umbrella, has not changed to this date.
Although waves of the global “post–Cold War”
The territorial problem between Japan and China
transformations in international relations such as
originally centered on Okinawa. In the 1970s, as
globalization and regionalism have reached East
the “administrative rights” of Okinawa were
Asia, they have not necessarily denied the
returned to Japan, the focus of the Sino-Japanese
remaining structure of confrontation founded in
territorial dispute shifted to the Senkaku/Diaoyu
the early post-war years. The relaxation of
Islands, where resource nationalism was
tensions seen in the Cold War thaw in the 1950s
accented by the new energy potential discovered
and US-China détente in the 1970s in both
in the vicinity of those islands. The emergence of
instances gave way to a deterioration of
new factors, including valuable resources around
East–West relations. Similar phenomena have
the islands and the adoption of the United
been observed in East Asia, including tensions
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
across the Taiwan Strait and over the Senkakus,
(UNCLOS) granting even small islands large
thereby contributing to the continued importance
territorial rights, complicated the problem
of US bases in Okinawa and throughout the Asia17
13 | 28 | 2
APJ | JF
Pacific.
environment may not necessarily be ideal for
settling these problems in East Asia. As with the
Although economic interdependence has
Northern Territories and many other
deepened and efforts to enhance confidence-
international disputes, time may again present
building measures have been repeated over the
opportunities for solutions. It seems worthwhile
past decades, as far as these conflicts remain
that scholars, researchers, and intellectuals bring
unresolved, there is always danger for their
together their wisdom and prepare ideas and
escalation. Unless the sources of the conflicts are
recommendations in advance of the time when
removed, not only Japan–China relations but the
an opportunity does present itself again. The
entire region of East Asia will never be released
complex threads of international relations cannot
from the vicious circle of instability and
be easily disentangled. Yet, while there are clues,
uncertainty.
by mobilizing wisdom and conscience, solutions
to problems should never be impossible.
Resolution of the problems originating in the
post-war territorial disposition of Japan may
Adapted by permission of the publisher from Chapter
better be sought in a broader multilateral context,
2 ‘Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
just those problems were created in such a
in United States–Japan–China Relations’ in Tim F.
context, rather than in limiting the framework to
Liao, Kimie Hara and Krista Wiegand eds.
The China-
parties with territorial claims—an approach that
Japan Border Dispute: Islands of Contention in
has not seen success for many years. Although
Multidisciplinary
there is no space here to introduce concrete
Perspective
(http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9781472442994)
,
details, there have indeed been several projects
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2015),pp. 37-55.
by international group of scholars to consider
Kimie
these regional conflicts and their resolution in a
Hara(email
(http://apjjf.org/mailto:[email protected])
) is the
multilateral framework.7
Director of East Asian Studies at Renison University
In the 1990s, against the backdrop of the “end of
College, the Renison Research Professor at the
the Cold War” and the relaxation of tensions in
University of Waterloo (Canada), and an Asia-Pacific
East Asia, a window of opportunity appeared to
Journal contributing editor. Her books include
open, and expectation for settling the Northern
Northern Territories, Asia-Pacific Regional Conflicts
Territories dispute between Japan and Russia
and the Aland Experience: Untying the Kurillian
also heightened. Yet none of the proposals
Knot
presented then was acceptable to both Japan and
(http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415666
046/) (with Geoffrey Jukes), “Zaigai”
nihonjin
Russia. Including Japan, the present political
18
13 | 28 | 2
APJ | JF
kenkyusha ga mita nihon gaiko
(Japanese Diplomacy T a i w a n
and
Japan
through the Eyes of Japanese Scholars Overseas
(http://apjjf.org/-Mark-Selden/4061/article.htm
(http://www.fujiwara-shoten.co.jp/shop/index.php?ma
l)
in_page=product_info&products_id=1078)
), Cold
War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: Divided Territories• Kimie Hara, The San Francisco Peace Treaty
in
the
San
Francisco
S y s t e m and Frontier Problems in the Regional Order in
East Asia: A Sixty Year Perspective
(http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415646
789/) and Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since(http://apjjf.org/-Kimie-HARA/3739/article.ht
1945:
A
Difficult
P e a c e ml)
(http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415194
(http://apjjf.org/-Kimie-HARA/3739/article.ht
990/).
ml)• Wada Haruki, Resolving the China-Japan
Recommended citation: Kimie Hara, "Okinawa, Conflict Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
(http://apjjf.org/-Wada-Haruki/3433/article.ht
Taiwan, and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in United
ml)
States–Japan–China Relations",The Asia-Pacific
Journal, Vol. 13, Issue 28, No. 2, July 13, 2015.
(http://apjjf.org/-Wada-Haruki/3433/article.ht
ml)• Kimie Hara, Untying the Kurillian Knot:
Related articles
•
Reinhard
Drifte,
The
Toward an Åland-Inspired Solution for the
Japan-China
Russo-Japanese
Confrontation Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
Territorial
Dispute
(http://apjjf.org/-Kimie-HARA/3170/article.ht
– Between “shelving” and “dispute escalation
ml)
(http://apjjf.org/-Reinhard-Drifte/4154/article.
• Kimie Hara, Micronesia and the Postwar
html)
Remaking of the Asia Pacific: "An American
(http://apjjf.org/-Reinhard-Drifte/4154/article.
Lake"
html)• John W. Dower, The San Francisco
(http://apjjf.org/-Kimie-HARA/2493/article.ht
System: Past, Present, Future in U.S.-Japan-China
ml)
Relations
(http://apjjf.org/-John_W_-Dower/4079/article.
(http://apjjf.org/-Kimie-HARA/2493/article.ht
html)
ml)• Kimie Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the AsiaPacific: The Troubling Legacy of the San
(http://apjjf.org/-John_W_-Dower/4079/article.
Francisco
html)• Yabuki Susumi, Mark Selden, The Origins
Treaty
(http://apjjf.org/-Kimie-HARA/2211/article.ht
of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute between China,
ml)
19
13 | 28 | 2
APJ | JF
———. 2009. “Envisioning Åland-inspired
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Soeya, Yoshihide. 1997. Nihon gaigo to chugoku
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1945–1972. Tokyo: Keio gijuku daigaku shuppan-
independent state within the Soviet sphere.
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3
Dulles warned that the United States would not
Tsukamoto, Takashi. 1991. “Bei kokumusho no
return Okinawa to Japan if it made concessions
tainichi heiwa joyaku soan to hoppo ryodo
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4
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2007, p. 176).
———. 1945. FRUS: The Conferences at Malta and 5
Yalta 1945. Washington, DC: Government
It states: “Our [DOD’s] search has indicated that
the coordinates proposed in the cable call for
Printing Office.
identical points to those found in Civil
Administration Proclamation No. 27 of December
———. 1951. FRUS: Vol. VI. Washington DC:
Government Printing Office.
25, 1953, and these in turn are found in Army
Wada, Haruki. 2013. “The Cairo Declaration and
and Ogasawara-Gunto, published in October
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undoubtedly the source of the Proclamation
Zhang, Xiuzhang (ed.). 2007. Secrets Exposed in
Chiang Kai-shek’s Diary, Part Two
. Beijing: Tuanjie
Senkakus, contrary to the neutral position
Notes
assumed by the United States … Unquestionably
the United States ‘administered’ the Senkaku
Subhas Chandra Bose was present only as an
Islands as part of the Okinawa administration,
“observer” since India was still under British
and such an administration took place (a)
rule.
2
[Diaoyu] as part of the Okinawa prefecture. It
would therefore dignify the Japanese claim to the
Publishing House.
1
coordinates refers at this point to the Senkakus
without question or issue raised by the United
States as to its powers to administer, and (b)
Mongolian Peoples Republic (1924-1992), an
21
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APJ | JF
apparently without Taiwan making a claim or
China, commented on the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue
attempting to claim the Senkaku until oil
as follows, responding to a question at a press
becomes an issue. Under these circumstances, the
conference at the Japan National Press Club in
United States ‘position’ is not entirely free from
1978. “It does not matter if this question is
an element of recognition …” (March 19, 1971,
shelved for some time, say, 10 years. Our
Memorandum for Mr. Mark Greenwood,
generation is not wise enough to find common
Department of State, from Harry H. Almond, Jr.,
language on this question. Our next generation
Office of the Assistant General Counsel,
will certainly be wiser. They will certainly find a
International Affairs, Department of Defense,
solution acceptable to all." (Deng, 1978)
cited in Hara 2007, p. 180).
6
7
Deng Xiaoping, Deputy Prime Minister of
See for example, Hara and Jukes 2009; Hara
2015.
22