!
!
Turkey and the Arab Spring, the End of Zero-Problems ?
!
The Arab Spring created a number of significant regional challenges for Turkey,
whom was caught off guard by the magnitude and speed of events. Several
neighbouring regimes quickly became destabilised, threatening the delicate balance of
regional relations that Turkey had built in the preceding years via its foreign policy
DSSURDFK GXEEHG µZero-SUREOHPV ZLWK QHLJKERXUV¶ 7KH Zero-problems approach
entailed actively seeking positive engagement with neighbouring states, including
those whom Turkey has had strained/hostile relations in the past, such as Syria. This
approach was designed to enable a de-securitisation in Turkish regional policy,
promoting economic and diplomatic tLHVWRLQFUHDVH7XUNH\¶VVWDQGLQJLQWKHUHJLRQ
However with the onset of the Arab Spring, neighbouring regimes have engaged in
brutal
crackdowns
on
their
dissenting
populaces,
drawing
International
condemnation1. The Zero-problem approach has since come under significant
criticism, with observers describing the approach as a failure, incompatible and
obstructive towards 7XUNH\¶VDLPVDQGDFWLRQVVLQFHWKHXSULVLQJV.
However Turkish foreign policy has not been driven solely by a doctrine of Zeroproblems, but rather Strategic Depth. Outlined by adviser turned foreign minister
Ahmet Davutoglu 6WUDWHJLF GHSWK VHHNV WR XWLOLVH 7XUNH\¶V XQLTXH JHRVWUDWHJLF
position to bolster its International role. By cultivating pragmatic and positive
relations with its neighbours, Turkey has sought to position itself as a bridge between
the West and the Middle East for trade and diplomacy. The introduction of Strategic
depth has completed a longer running shift in Turkish foreign policy dynamics: from
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
7XUNH\¶V:HVWHUQDOOLHVKDYHEHHQSURPLQHQWLQWKHLUFULWLFLVPRIUHJLPHFUDFNGRZQVZKLOH5XVVLD
and China have been muted: this has manifested with inconsistent responses from the UN regarding the
uprisings.
Page | 1
!
!
behaving as a Western orientated isolationist power, to a regional activist. Intended to
LQFUHDVH 7XUNH\¶V LQIOXHQFH ZLWK both the West and Middle Eastern countries ±
particularly when dealing with each other ± Strategic depth seeks to establish Turkey
as an indispensable partner in the region. The Zero-problems approach is best
understood as sub-component of Strategic depth, allowing Turkey to establish
friendly ties with neighbours enabling D JUDGXDO ULVH LQ 7XUNH\¶V UHJLRQDO LQIOXHQFH
via soft power projection. By building ties with neighbouring states, Turkey could
theoretically reduce its dependency on Western actors and increase its regional
influence. With this increasing LQIOXHQFH LQ D YLWDO DUH RI LQWHUHVWV 7XUNH\¶V JOREDO
influence would also benefit, increasing its weight and leverage when interacting with
its traditional Western allies.
It is argued here that the end of Zero-problems does not constitute the fundamental
VKLIWLQ7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\VRPHKDYHVXJJHVWHGDnd that departures from ZeroSUREOHPVKDYHEHHQFRQVLVWHQWZLWK7XUNH\¶Vcore doctrine of Strategic depth.
Zero-Problems before the Arab Spring
Since instituting the Zero-SUREOHPV7XUNH\¶VLQIOXHQFHLQWKHUHJLRQKDVLQFUHDVHG
manifesting with it mediating in various disputes, acting as a point of contact for
KRVWLOHDFWRUVVXFKDV,UDQLQLW¶VVWDQGRIILQWKH:HVWDQGIRU,VUDHOLQLWVGLVSXWHVin
Palestine and Syria. The Zero problems approach has also encountered significant
difficulties, with initial improvements in relations with Greece, Cyprus, and Armenia
failing to last in the longer term. The most substantial challenge to the viability of the
Zero-problem approach prior to the Arab Spring has been the deterioration in relations
with Israel.
Page | 2
!
!
The disruption of the Turkish-Israeli alliance, coupled with faltering relations
elsewhere, significantly undermined the coherence of the Zero-problem approach.
Turkey, although subject to Israeli mistakes, made no significant efforts to assuage the
rising tensions with its former strategic partner. Acrimonious relations with Israel
LQHYLWDEO\DIIHFWHG7XUNH\¶VUHODWLRQVZLWKWKH86thus both the western and eastern
GLPHQVLRQVRI7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSolicy faced an apparent setback. However in regards
WR 6WUDWHJLF GHSWK 7XUNH\V¶ ZLOOLQJQHVV WR SURORQJ LWV WHQVLRQV ZLWK ,VUDHO DUH
explicable, with Turkey capitalising on soaring positive Turkish sentiment in Arab
FRXQWULHVHQKDQFLQJ7XUNH\¶VLQIOXHQFHLQWKHUHJLRQ. It is clear that Zero-problems
has not been a strictly adhered to principle of Turkish foreign policy prior to the Arab
Spring, and is not a constantly active component of Strategic depth.
The challenge of the Arab Spring
The Arab Spring presented a significant challenge to Turkey, the political break
between the regimes Turkey had carefully fostered relations with and popular political
opposition, presented Turkey with many uncomfortable dilemmas. The Zeroproblems approach ± already a difficult balancing act - was swiftly in danger of
rendering Turkish Foreign policy impotent. The Arab Spring has equally threatened
Turkeys standing and presented opportunities, with other key regional powers finding
themselves inhibited, isolated or involved2;Turkey has found itself with a unique
opportunity to exercise leadership in the region.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
Saudi Arabia was initially occupied with the Bahrain uprisings and efforts to ensure internal
loyalty and stability, Iran as a non-Arab country has faced criticism for perceived interference
in Bahrain and Syria, while Egypt has been immobilised by its own successful uprising.
Page | 3
!
!
Caught off-guard by the speed and scale of the uprisings, Turkey recovered quickly
back protestors in Egypt. Turkey¶s trade links with Egypt were unimpressive, and
although relatively cooperative, both states considered each other as probable rivals
for regional influence. Despite the implications for the US-Egypt alliance, Turkey
calculated that Mubarak would likely fall, and that this could increase Turkey¶s
stature within the region, in this regard, the departure from Zero-Problems is
consistent with Strategic Depth.
Following the Egyptian challenge, Turkey encountered a new set of problems in
Libya, having fostered close relations with the Qadhafi regime, Turkey understood
that should it fall then its influence in North Africa may suffer accordingly. Libya was
perhaps tKHILUVWWUXHWHVWRI7XUNH\¶V6trategic depth doctrine. Turkey found itself in
danger of being perceived as an apologiser for the Libyan regime; risking its regional
influence and threatening relations with Turkey¶V WUDGLWLRQDO :HVWHUQ SDUWQHUV WKXV
both the regional and global dimensions of Turkish foreign policy were endangered.
7XUNH\¶V VKLIW LQ EHKDviour in Libya can be explained as a combined response to
international pressure and regional opinion. Seeking to preserve its carefully built
regional influence, Turkey calculated that engaging with authoritarian regimes amid
their crackdowns would seriously undermine the Strategic depth it has sought to
achieve via the Zero-problems approach. By participating in the subsequent
International action in Libya, Turkey balanced its regional aspirations with its wider
commitments, supporting its Western allies¶ intervention, yet limiting its visibility in
the western dominated operation ± the long-term success and popularity of which was
Page | 4
!
!
not assured3. In this case, adherence to Zero-problems proved incompatible, even
actively obstructive to the pursuit of Strategic depth.
In the Syrian uprising, Turkey initially utilised a similar but advanced formula of its
approach in Libya, seeking positive engagement with the beleaguered Assad regime.
Turkey hoped its laborious efforts in crafting positive relations with Syria would
provide sufficient influence to ease the crackdown and persuade Assad to implement
political reforms 7KXV LQ WKH HDUO\ SKDVHV 7XUNH\¶V behaviour adheres closely to a
Zero-problems template; aiming for retention of the friendly Assad regime but also
calling for political reform - consistent with its now established pro-spring footing.
However the obstinacy of the Assad regime in implementing reforms and the
intensification of violence within Syria (creating an influx of asylum seekers at the
Syro-Turkish border) compelled Turkey to take a harsher line, breaking away from its
previous Zero-problem compatible stance.
7XUNH\¶VEUHDNIURPWKH Zero-problem approach can be explained with relation to a
Strategic depth; JLYHQ 7XUNH\¶V HIIRUWV WR LQcrease its influence with Zero-problems
via diplomatic and economic means, Syria ± previously considered the hallmark of
VXFFHVV LQ 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ DSSURDFK ± presented Turkey with a major
problem. If it could not influence Syria despite significant diplomatic and economic
progress ± the success of its influence building strategy would be seriously
questioned, this conundrumFRPSRXQGHGE\7XUNH\¶VVWDQFHRIVXSSRUWIRUWKHArab
SpringPHDQWLQDFWLRQRQ6\ULDZRXOGVHULRXVO\XQGHUPLQH7XUNH\¶VFUHGibility as a
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3
Turkey participated in the NATO operation primarily with Naval support
Page | 5
!
!
regional power. To preserve its claims to be a regional leader, escalation was a
necessary move for Turkey4.
In the on-JRLQJ 6\ULDQ FULVLV 7XUNH\¶V KDV GHFLVLYHO\ DOWHUHG LWV UROH IURP DQ
interested mediator to a determined antagonist. Although concerned over recent
unrest in its Kurdish population- raising spectres of past issues with Syria -Turkey
QRZOLHVDW WKHIRUHIURQW RILQWHUQDWLRQDO RSSRVLWLRQWR WKH6\ULDQUHJLPH¶VYLROHQFH
and has become a haven for the Syrian political opposition. Despite this decisive
break from the Zero-problem approach, caution has been a persistent theme in the
Turkish response- having lead in the isolation of the Assad regime - Turkey has been
wary of actively seeking its ousting, struggling to outline a clear strategy or endgame.
Only recently has Turkey taken more direct moves to undermine the Assad regime,
manifesting in increased cooperation with its Western partners and the Syrian
Opposition as they pursue the downfall of the incumbent regime.
Underpinning Turkish wariness is the decline in relations with Iran, a direct result of
the Syrian crisis; the positive relations previously enjoyed under the Zero-problems
approach have given way to a cold but very real confrontation over the future of
Syria. Turkey¶V6trategic Depth strategy will not be aided by an Israeli-style break in
relations with Iran: this would compromise 7XUNH\¶V prized role as a key mediator for
the region. Thus its Syrian stance is in danger of undermining this significant role;
however there is much to be gained for Turkey aside from shoring up its position as a
regional leader. Should the Assad regime fall it is likely Iranian influence west of the
Euphrates will decrease precipitously, allowing room for Turkey to further expand its
influence in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. 7XUNH\¶VSXUVXLW of Strategic depth via a
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4
By this point Turkey had established itself as a proponent of Democracy and human rights,
this had come to underpin her increasing influence in the region in the wake of the uprisings.
Page | 6
!
!
combative role against Syria has significant potential gains, but is in serious danger of
compromising the Iranian dimension of its Strategic depth, this impasse reflects the
high-stakes gamble Turkey has taken on Syria.
Characterising the Turkish Response ± The end of Zero-problems?
In its response to the Arab Spring, Turkey has not followed its Zero-problems
approach when dealing with the uprisings and a compelling case can be made that the
Arab Spring has brought an end to the Zero-problems foreign policy. Interpreting the
Zero-problems foreign policy in a literal sense is however overtly simplistic as an
analysis of Turkish foreign policy. Turkish ministers havH PDGH FOHDU 7XUNH\¶V
foreign policy prioritises long term outcomes over short term; otherwise it can be
argued that the Zero-problems foreign policy was defunct prior to the Arab Spring,
given Turkish issues with Cyprus, Greece, Armenia and especially Israel.
With the onset of the Arab Spring, Turkish commitment to its Zero-problems
approach has been tested by the course of events, in which perceived diplomatic
fumbling was followed by a series of pressured calculations, that saw Turkey side
against the autocratic regimes. IQERWK(J\SWDQG/LE\D7XUNH\¶VLQIOXHQFHORRNVVHW
to rise, especially given the weakened, uncertain nature of the newly democratic states
and the prospect of a potential strategic partnership between Egypt and Turkey. In
Syria, a more complex picture arises; Turkey has been compelled to act based on its
prior stances, seeking to affirm its regional influence and leadership. With its
acquiescence in Libya and firm stance in Syria, Turkey has managed to substantially
repair its relations with the West, particularly the US, which have been in decline
since 2003. As a result of these decisions, a serious challenge has arisen concerning a
Page | 7
!
!
major pillar of Turkish strategic depth prior to the Arab Spring: its positive relations
ZLWK ,UDQ 7XUNH\¶V wider regional influence is now at stake, while Iran faces the
prospect of losing its only long-standing state-ally in the region. In Syria, to preserve
Strategic depth Turkey had to abandon its Zero-problems approach, but abandoning
Zero-SUREOHPVLQ6\ULDKDVFRPSURPLVHG7XUNH\¶V=HUR-problems approach towards
Iran, risking the Iranian dimension of its Strategic depth5.
:KHWKHU RU QRW 7XUNH\¶s Strategic depth doctrine is a success remains ambiguous;
Turkey has faced an immense struggle in attempting to balance the West-East
dimensions of its foreign policy.
Engagement with Iran and Syria has risked
alienation from the West, while reciprocity in action and goodwill from Iran and Syria
over the Nuclear issue and Arab Spring respectively have not been forthcoming,
KRZHYHU LW LV DFFHSWHG WKDW 7XUNH\¶V VWDQGLQJ DQG LQIOXHQFH LQ WKH UHJLRQ KDYH
increased significantly in recent years and there is consensus among observers that the
Arab Spring is likely to enhance these gains.
Turkish foreign policy has not been driven by the goal of adhering to a strict principle
RI µZero-SUREOHPV¶ EXW UDWKHU WKH soft power promotion of Turkish influence and
interests in the pursuit of Strategic depth. The Zero-problem approach has previously
been promoted or sidelined dependant on circumstance; it is a preferred framework
for relations, rather than the end-state objective of Turkish foreign policy. The Arab
Spring has demonstrated this policy¶V flexibility in an extreme sense, with Turkey
altogether bypassing Zero-problems in Egypt, and more cautiously jettisoning it in
Libya and Syria when it failed to achieve results. The Arab Spring has in effect
brought DQ HQG WR WKH µZero-SUREOHP¶ DVSHFW RI 7XUNLVK IRUeign policy, but the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
Turkeys relations with Iran have cooled, even reducing its Oil purchases ± in favour of
Libyan Oil ± it is unclear what role Turkey will play in future discussions between Iran and
the West
Page | 8
!
!
implications of this are often overstated and it may be more suitable to classify Zeroproblems as suspended. Turkish foreign policy has undergone significant changes in
content since the onset of the Arab Spring, but not character: the fundamental aims of
7XUNH\¶V SROLFLHV UHPDLQ LQWDFW, Strategic depth remains the core principle. This is
XQGHUOLQHG E\ 7XUNH\¶V FRQWLQXHG DFWLYLVP: if Zero-problems had formed the core
principle ± as opposed to main framework ± of Turkish foreign policy, then its demise
should have resulted in Turkey slowing or reversing its activist behaviour, possibly
towards an intermediate position between activism and its more traditional isolationist
footing. As evidenced by Turkey quickly seeking positive engagement with the
nascent Libyan and Egyptian regimes, and its continuing opposition to the Syrian
regime, the pursuit of Strategic depth remains the active guiding principle of Turkish
foreign policy. The Zero-problems approach is dormant, not defunct, and may be
reactivated should it present advantages for Turkey¶s pursuit of Strategic depth.
Page | 9