Southern Political Science Association
Neutralists and Neutralism
Author(s): Samir N. Anabtawi
Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (May, 1965), pp. 351-361
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science
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NEUTRALISTSAND NEUTRALISM
SAMIR N. ANABTAWI
Vanderbilt University
HE PAST DECADE has witnessed the rise of a new phenomenon
:)n the international scene called neutralism. In its name, causes
have been championed, treaties abrogated, attachments formed, and
policies justified.1 Scores of newly independent countries, still groping
for particular identities, emerged to statehood certain that neutralism
was indispensable to the fulfillment of their national ethos. But
what this neutralism was supposed to denote has been subject to
a variety of interpretations. Some have explained it as meaning
"neutral with respect to attachment to military alliances."2 Others
have equated it with "non-involvementin either the Soviet or Western bloc,"3 while still others have looked upon it as "an obsolete,"
"immoral," and "shortsighted conception"-"a pretence that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate
of others."'
Most observers seem to agree, however, that neutralism is not
synonymous with neutrality. It is pointed out that whereas neutrality
can only be predicated upon the existence of a state of belligerency,5
neutralism is said to mean noninvolvement in times of peace. FurT
'George Liska is of the opinion that "non-alignment poses the most arduous
single problem that the West, and the United States in particular, has had to
face in the area of foreign policy since it first decided to contain Communist
power proper." "The 'Third Party': The Rationale of Nonalignment," in
Neutralism and Nonalignment, Laurence Martin, ed. (New York, 1962), p.
80.
'From President Eisenhower's press conference, June 6, 1956. For the full
text of President Eisenhower's remarks on neutralism, see U. S. Department of
State, American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1956 (Department of State
Publication 6811, Washington, 1959), p. 32.
'Prime Minister Nehru, quoted in The New York Times July 7, 1956, p. 1.
'Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in U. S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1956, op. cit., p. 34.
'H. Lauterpacht, ed., Oppenheim's International Law, (Vol. 2, Seventh
Edition, London, 1961), p. 655. "Since neutrality is an attitude during a state
of war only, it calls into existence special rights and duties which do not
generally obtain." For the most comprehensive study of neutrality, see Philip
Jessup, ed., Neutrality, Its History, Economics and Law, 4 Vols. (New York,
1935-1936).
[351]
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THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS
[Vol. 2 7
thermore,neutrality carries with it certain rights and duties generally
established and recognized under international law, while neutralism
does not possess an equivalent code of behavior legally binding on
all states. And, finally, a status of permanent neutrality entails
definite restrictions on the activity of a state,6 whereas in this age of
nationalism neutralists constantly remind us that they would brook
no limitations to their sovereignty.
But, if neutralism, unlike neutrality,, does not possess juridical
foundations and axioms,, then what are its guidelines? Are there
any rules or principles to which a neutralist state must subscribe?
Or, to put it differently, what should a state do in order to qualify
as a neutralist?
It is the purpose of this article to examine what neutralists
profess neutralism to be, and to determine whether their international conduct does in reality conform to such professions. An attempt will also be made to distinguish between two major types
of neutralism and to analyze the conditions and risks attending
each. Finally, some of the sources of neutralist influence in the Cold
War will be briefly discussed.
I
Individual pronouncements on neutralism by neutralist leaders
are legion. But the only explicit statement on the subject that presumably met with their collective approval was made at the preparatory neutralist conference held in Cairo in 1961. At that gathering
it was decided that countries invited to the Belgrade Conference of
Non-aligned Countries must adhere to the following:7
1. Each country concerned should follow an independent policy
based on non-alignment and peaceful coexistence with nations of
differing social and political structures.
'See for instance the restrictions placed on Austria, a permanent neutral, in
"Communique on the Talks between Government Delegations of Austria and
the Soviet Union, Moscow, April 15, 1955," Documents on Foreign Relations,
1955 (Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1956), pp. 121-122.
'Arab Information Center, Arab News and Views, Vol. VII, No. 13, July 1,
1961. "It was not immediately obvious whether these criteria were to refer to
past performances or to promises about behaviour in the future. In the event
it seems that the former was more important than the latter." Peter Lyon,
Neutralism (Leicester, 1963), p. 182.
1965]
NEUTRALISTS AND NEUTRALISM
353
2. It should consistently support popular liberation and independence movements.
3. It should not participate in collective military pacts, nor be
involved in East-West cold war disputes.
4. If it were a party to any bilateral agreement with a major
power, or a member of a regional defense pact, it should not take
sides in the cold war, nor involve itself in East-West disagreements.
5. It should have entered into no agreement to establish military
bases on its territory for the benefit of either side in the cold war.
However, cogent as these rules of conduct may seem to their
framers, they are in fact meaningless yardsticks for assessing
whether or not a state is neutralist. For one thing, the "independence" of a policy of a state is largely a matter of degree and interpretation. If it is meant that a neutralist state, being a sovereign
political unit, should not be totally subservient to the interests of
another, then there is hardly a state in the world today which would
admit otherwise. Be that as it may, in addition to the perennial
considerations of economics, politics, and security, the process of
foreign policy making must take into account the possible reactions
of other states to the policies contemplated. In this age of Cold
War rivalries and overlapping interests no country can afford to
conduct its foreign relations without at least a careful assessment
and some understanding of the concerns of others. A state may
have to postpone, or indeed abandon certain goals the pursuit of
which could jeopardize a vital interest that is dependent for its
attainment or preservation upon the cooperation of another. So
while a state may follow an "independent policy," such independence is in reality highly circumscribedby the dictates of expediency.
And in this respect, neutralists do not constitute an exception. As
early as 1948, Prime Minister Nehru interpreted his foreign policy
to the Indian Constituent Assembly in the following terms:8
. . .Therefore, purely from the point of view of opportunism . . . an
independent policy is the best. What the policy should be at a particular moment, it is very difficult for me or this House to say, because
things change rapidly from day to day. It may be that we have to
choose what might be a lesser evil in certain circumstances . . . It may
be that sometimes we have to side with this power or that power. I
can quite conceive of our siding with an imperialist power.
8Quoted in J. C. Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-1954 (Groningen
[Netherlands], 1955), p. 51.
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Leaving aside for the moment the stipulation of "non-alignment"
as a necessary pre-requisite to neutralism, many of the neutralists
themselves have rarely heeded their own pronouncementadvocating
"peaceful coexistence with nations of differing social and political
structures." Indeed, much of the current conflicts in the Middle
East, Southeast Asia, and Africa can perhaps be partly attributed
to a lack of tolerance of different political and social systems. Nor
have they consistently "supported popular liberation movements"
other than those arising from traditional western colonialism.9 And
as to their eschewal of collective military pacts, it is quite apparent
that the Arab states, the majority of whom profess to be neutralist,
are banded together militarily under the terms of the Arab League.
Non-involvement in East-West disagreements we are often told
is a cardinal principle of neutralism. But what does non-involvement
mean? Clearly it does not mean aloofness or abstention as the
"positive neutralists" assure us.'0 In an address delivered before
the Congress of the United States, Jawaharlal Nehru said:11
We have to achieve freedom and to defend it. We have to meet
aggression and resist it and the force employed must be adequate to
the purpose ....
We are neither blind to reality nor do we propose to
acquiesce in any challenge to man's freedom from whatever quarter it
may come. Where freedom is menaced or justice threatened or where
agression takes place, we can not and shall not be neutral . . .
Still, non-involvement in cold war disputes is presumably not an
end in itself, but an instrument through which a state could more
easily assume a neutral posture in the event of an outbreak of
9For their stand on the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, for instance, see the
author's "The Afro-Asian States and the Hungarian Question," International
Organization, Vol. XVII, No. 4 (Autumn, 1963).
"Shukri Al-Kuwatly, the former President of Syria, described positive
neutralism in the following terms: ". . . this neutralism does not signify
passivity or isolationism. On the contrary . . . this positive neutralism [is]a
genuine call for positive and effective cooperation in dealing with international
problems and preserving at the same time all the fundamentals of freedom and
sovereignty vis-a-vis the various trends of international power politics and
groupings." "A Champion of Neutralism" in A Study of Nehru, Rafig Zakaria,
ed. (Bombay, 1959), p. 118. Former Premier Abdul Karim Kassim of Iraq
defined the aims of the "policy of positive neutralism [as] to alleviate the evergrowing tension between the two contending Powers, by creating what may be
called a third force in the world." "A Maker of History" in A Study of Nehru,
loc. cit., p. 92.
"lJawaharlalNehru's Speeches, 1949-1953 (New Delhi, 1954), p. 122.
1965]
NEUTRALISTS
AND NEUTRALISM
355
hostilities.l2 However, a unilateral declaration of neutrality does
not in itself guarantee against involvement. True, a neutral status
implies certain rights, as well as duties, but as has painfully been
proven all too often it does not guarantee immunity from attack.
In other words, the decision of a belligerent as to whether or not
to respect the neutrality of a state is not based on any consideration
for the moral or legal force of the doctrines of international law.
Rather, it is usually dependent upon a careful assessment of the
power of the neutral and upon an evaluation of the power distribution pertinent to the conflict. A belligerent has to weigh the political
and military advantages to be derived versus the possible adverse
consequences from engaging a neutral and forcing it to align itself on
the side of the opposing camp. It was on the basis of such calculations, or, to put it more accurately, miscalculations, that Hitler decided to declare war on the United States. So non-involvement as a
cornerstone of foreign policy does not necessarily insulate a state
from a future conflict. Indeed, in certain circumstancesit may invite
an attack. So tenaciously may a state hold to a policy of neutralism
that another state bent on aggression may feel that it could pursue
limited military objectives at the expense of the former without
jarring it into an alliance with a third power. While one can only
speculate, such reasoning may have contributed to the 'Chinese decision to invade the northeasternregion of India.
It should not be interpreted from the above discussion that it
is the intention to reduce neutralism merely to a level where it can
only be equated with non-alignment, for this, too, has certain drawbacks. Admittedly, a neutralist state has to be non-aligned. But,
apparently, a non-aligned state is not necessarily a neutralist one.
Israel, for instance, which is not tied to any alliance system, has
never been looked upon as a neutralist. If it is argued that this
is due to her ideological commitment to the Western cause, then,
clearly, Cuba, an avowedly Communist state, should not have been
invited to the Belgrade Conference.Besides, the injection of ideological considerations could only add to the already present confusion
as to the meaning of neutralism. It would almost prove an impossible task to try and evaluate the variety of political philosophies
and orientations espoused by a number of neutralist leaders, rang12J. C. Kundra, places non-involvement in a third world war as the primary
aim of Indian foreign policy. Op. cit., passim.
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[Vol. 27
ing from "Arab Socialism" in the UAR to "Guided Democracy" in
Indonesia, and fit them within the context of the over-all ideological
struggle between East and West.13 Furthermore,it is no secret that
Communist parties in some neutralist countries have been subjected
to different forms of political repression and that several neutralist
leaders have a genuine antipathy to Marxist Leninist doctrines. In
his autobiography, Jawaharlal Nehru writes:14
My roots are still perhaps in the 19th century, and I have been too
much influenced by the humanist liberal tradition to get out of it completely. This bourgeois background follows me about and is naturally
a source of irritation to many Communists. I dislike dogmatism, and
the treatment of Karl Marx's writings or any other books as revealed
scripture which cannot be challenged, and the regimentation and heresy
hunts which seem to be a feature of modern communism. I dislike
also much that has happened in Russia and especially the excessive use
of violence in normal times.
The assumption of neutralism on the part of many states in recent years seems to suggest that what is also needed for the attainment of neutralism is an affirmationof a neutralist status. In other
words, in addition to being non-aligned, a state has to declare itself
neutralist in order to be regarded as such. A country's prior leanings
and orientation apparently become irrevelant. Thus, Tunisia and
Lebanon, for example, despite their long-standing support for the
West, became fullfledged participants in neutralist gatherings after
announcing their neutralist intentions. Neither is there the expectation that a newly acquired neutralist posture should radically and
quickly alter previous relationships.'5 Indeed, rather than curtailing
a state's scope of activities, neutralism is looked upon as a liberating
force allowing the establishment of additional associations from
which economic and other benefits could be derived and which had
hitherto been deemed unavailable to it. In return, there is an implicit
expectation that a neutralist would not take sides on matters of vital
concern to the two Great Power blocs, and that if circumstancesprevent a fully detached position it should display no more than an
"3Fora synopsis of the political ideas of neutralists, see Paul Sigmund, Jr.,
ed., The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York, 1963).
"Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography (London, 1942), p. 203.
"5This is so except in the case of a state that had been previously aligned,
e.g., Iraq. However, Saudi Arabia, for instance, continues to lease a base to
the United States, as it had done so in the past.
1965]
NEUTRALISTS
AND NEUTRALISM
357
attitude of concern. However even the most cursory examination of
the behaviour of neutralists would surely indicate that such expectations have not fully materialized. Neutralists have not only sided
with this Great Power or that on a variety of issues, but, on occasions, have even gone so far as to condemn certain Great Power
activities. But, curiously enough, such "un-neutralist" conduct does
not appear to detract from their neutralist standing. On the contrary,
one is led to believe that the occasional indictments of both the
United States and the Soviet Union are perhaps viewed by the
neutralists as an additional reinforcementof their neutralist position
-a manifestation of their independence, and evidence of a lack of
subservience to either protagonist. Indeed, one suspects that the
Great Powers have themselves begun to share this view by their
understanding, if not sympathetic, reactions to the criticism of
neutralists.16
II
Non-alignment is a term that often tends to conceal more than
it reveals. When it is said that a state is non-aligned, it is generally
meant that it does not belong to any alliance system of either the
East or West. In effect, an objective situation is described in which
the state in question is withholding its power from others at a time
when states are coagulating, so to speak, into power constellations.'7
A non-aligned state may choose, either upon a rational calculation
of its security needs, or on the basis of ideological conviction to
abstain totally from involvement and relegate itself to a position
akin to that of Switzerland's. Or, it may pursue an activist policy,
seeking to derive maximum advantage from the prevailing power
distribution. In this latter respect, the influence of the non-aligned
state is dependent upon its own power resources and capabilities as
well as upon the balance of power between the contending factions.
Clearly, the majority, if not all, of the so-called neutralist and
non-aligned countries have not been content to "withdraw" in the
sense that Switzerland and Austria have. Instead, they have sought
to utilize the existing bi-polar situation in the pursuit of their pecu"'See the statements of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Ambassador
Henry Cabot Lodge, quoted in L. Martin, ed. op. cit., p. xviii.
"George Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore, 1962), p. 203.
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liar national interests. Some, such as India, even though anti-alliance
as a matter of ideological conviction, find in the present nuclear
stalemate a contributing element to their security and to the maintenance of the status quo in their respective regions; while others,
such as Indonesia and the United Arab Republic, look upon the same
situation as a somewhat liberating influence, allowing the pursuit of
revisionist policies.
A status quo neutralist policy is enhanced either when the two
Great Powers see certain advantages to be derived from its preservation, or when one of them is willing to go to great lengths to prevent a change. However, a danger arises when a third lesser power
appears on the scene bent on altering the status quo in the region
and which the two Great Powers are either unable or unwilling to
go to great lengths to contain. Thus, for instance, while both the
United States and the Soviet Union may have been content with
the status quo neutralist policy of India, China still managed to
undermine the interests of both Great Powers with relative impunity
by invading the northeasternpart of the Indian sub-continent.
A neutralist revisionist policy is even more fraught with danger.
Not only is it likely to lead to a conflict which may bring about a
direct confrontation between the Great Powers,, but it is possible
in certain instances for the neutralist country to find itself without
any support from any major power in the pursuit of its objectives.
While, for example, the Soviet Union found it convenient to assist
President Nasser in his drive for Arab unity, it discovered in 1959
that Nasser's revisionism was undermining Soviet interests in Iraq,
and as a result relations between Cairo and Moscow suffered a severe
strain.18 In addition, the non-aligned revisionist country may exaggerate the likelihood of one Great Power checking the other, or
under-estimate the commitment of one of them to the status quo.
In this respect, for instance, the UAR may have misjudged in 1958
the United States' determinationto preserve the integrity of Lebanon
while perhaps overestimating the value of Soviet support in that
situation.
The success of a non-aligned activist policy is in large measure
dependent upon its having a high degree of flexibility. The neutralist
country must be sufficiently agile and fully capable of moving rapidly
18See Ernest Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism,"in
LaurenceW. Martin, ed., Neutralismand Non-alignment,op. cit., p. 112.
1965]
NEUTRALISTS
AND NEUTRALISM
359
from one side to another in order to derive maximum benefit from a
policy of "play-off." However, this in turn is contingent upon its
having an internal political pattern in which power is vested in a
single charismatic leader or in a small clique. In short, the greater
the degree of power concentration in a country is, the greater is its
maneuverability. But where the political base is wide and open, and
where the power structure is diffuse, the ability of a state to make
quick and abrupt shifts in policy becomes highly circumscribed.
Nasser, Nkrumah, and Sukarno, for example, have demonstrated
such nimble dexterity precisely because they are relatively free from
the internal restraints which characterize democratic regimes in
which various organized and competing political entities are constantly making claims for leadership, and which are deemed indispensable to the democratic process. As such, it could perhaps be
argued that the more democratic and open the non-aligned countries
become, the more constrained they will be in their maneuverings.
But it should be borne in mind that the neutralist policy of the
"play-off"must also take into account the degree of flexibility which
the Great Powers themselves possess. This may be of marginal significance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union whose monolothic political structure allows it to make drastic policy changes almost overnight,,but
it is a genuine consideration in regard to the United States where
public opinion and domestic political factors are often important
elements in the formulation of foreign policy. It may prove exceedingly difficult for a country to receive support from the United States
by a quick shift in orientation after having pursued for some time
policies that were regarded by the American leadership and public
as highly inimical to their interests. It is unlikely, for instance, that
Nasser could have struck a responsive cord had he abruptly turned
to the United States soon after denouncing her and nationalizing
the Suez Canal.
Viewed within this perspective, varying types and shades of
non-alignment and neutralism can be discerned, with each having
particular objectives and attendant liabilities. All too often, analysts
speak of the "non-aligned countries" as though they were all united
by a common cause or were prompted by the same considerations.
True, not only do these countries often seek to maximize their influence by banding together as a bloc, but they seem to reflect a
peculiar kind of cohesiveness. Attachment to common ideals forms
a bond of sympathy; a shared historical experience creates a point
360
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of view; an absence of inherited rivalries provides an opportunity for
cooperation. The presence of these elements creates among many
of the non-aligned nations a standard of values and a point of approach very real in their pragmatic effects. But more than this can
hardly be said. The implementation of high policy is another matter
altogether. Each nation strives for its objectives and seeks to maximize its particular values within the context of its peculiar situation
and the opportunities available to it.
III
The question remains, however, what is there in the present
bi-polar situation which affords a non-aligned state a peculiar opportunity for the attainment of its national objectives? To put it
bluntly, what does a non-aligned state possess for which both the
United States and the Soviet Union are willing to court it? Certainly,
except under very special circumstances,none of the neutralist countries can either add to, or detract from, the nuclear capabilities of
the United States and the Soviet Union. And it is also quite apparent
that no single one could vastly add to the technological and economic viability of either. How is it, then, that a non-aligned state
exercises influence over the Great Powers?
The answer lies perhaps in the tendency of the major powers
themselves to attach substantial significance to the non-aligned
countries. In other words, they are important because the Great
Powers regard them as important. However, this is more than merely
a manifestation of the anxieties of the Cold War. Militarily selfsufficient as the United States and the Soviet Union may be., the
nature of their arsenals is such as to make the exercise of these
weapons in their struggle unthinkable, to say the least. Moreover,
with several states firmly fixed in their respective orbits the number
of countries over which the contest between the United States and
the Soviet Union could more safely take place has been diminished.
As such, the main element of flexibility is provided by the prospective moves of those states which, for a variety of reasons choose
to remain uncommitted.19The nature of the struggle and the rules
of the game, so to speak, have become such that the absorption of
"9Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd Edition, (New York,
1960), p. 351.
1965]
NEUTRALISTS
AND NEUTRALISM
361
a neutralist by one of the two camps is regarded as a victory for
one and a defeat to the other. Therefore, each of the two major
powers seeks through ideological conversion and the lure of economic gain to entice a neutralist to its side or to prevent its defection to the other. In this competition the non-aligned countries
have acquired an importance far disproportionate to their intrinsic
strength. And some of the neutralists further maximize their position
by affecting the expectations of the Great Powers in the contest
of which they, the uncommitted, have become a part. It is basically
for these reasons that these minor states are influential.