Economic History Association
Inheritance Laws Across Colonies: Causes and Consequences
Author(s): Lee J. Alston and Morton Owen Schapiro
Source: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 44, No. 2, The Tasks of Economic History
(Jun., 1984), pp. 277-287
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History Association
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Inheritance Laws Across Colonies:
Causes and Consequences
LEE
J. ALSTON AND MORTON OWEN SCHAPIRO
We examinein this paperboth the causes and consequencesof inheritancelaws in
the colonies. We arguethat the continuationof intestateinheritancelaws over the
colonial periodwas due in partto their compatibilitywith economic efficiency.In
the North, multigeniturehelped motivate family labor, whereas the passive
acceptanceof the Britishinheritancesystem of primogeniturein the South rested
on its promotionof large plantationsthat could capture economies of scale. In
terms of effects, a strong bequest motive in the colonies adoptingmultigeniture
reducedthe variabilityin demographicexperiences across colonies with different
inheritancesystems.
SURPRISINGLY little has been written about the laws, practices,
and effects relating to an important aspect of colonial economic,
legal, and social history: the system of intergenerationaltransfer of
wealth.' In this paper we examine the compatibilitybetween intestate
inheritancelaws (governingthe disposition of wealth in the absence of a
will) and agricultural economic efficiency in colonial America. In
addition, we analyze the demographicconsequences of these laws.
Inheritancetransfersare divided into two principaltypes-primogeniture (passingall wealth to the eldest son) and multigeniture(dividingthe
wealth among all the sons or, possibly, all the children). Partibility
(where the land is divided among the children) usually accompanies
multigeniture,whereas impartibility(keeping the land as a single piece)
accompanies primogeniture.Although the common law regardingthe
intergenerationaltransfer of wealth in most of feudal England was
primogeniture, County of Kent (in particular, the manor of East
Greenwich) had a different system. There they practiced a gavelkind
tenure, which essentially was partiblemultigeniturefor sons. Although
many of the colonies followed the common law of England,the Kentish
laws were extremely importantin other parts of the country.
Table 1 presents informationon intestate inheritancelaws in colonial
Journal of Economic History, Vol. XLIV, No. 2 (June 1984). C The Economic History
Association. All rightsreserved. ISSN 0022-0507.
The authorsare AssistantProfessorsof Economics,WilliamsCollege, Williamstown,Massachusetts 01267.The genesis of this paperwas an independentstudy projectby TimothyWrightof the
University of Washingtonundertakenfor Lee Alston in 1982. We thank Mary Alston, Stanley
Engerman,RobertHiggs, JonathanR. T. Hughes, and Gary Libecapfor numerouscommentson
an earlierdraft.
' A noteworthyexception, discussing in detail colonists' rightsin land, is Ch. 6, "Plantingthe
Tenures and Inheritance," Jonathan R. T. Hughes, Social Control in the Colonial Economy
(Charlottesville,Virginia,1976).
277
Alston and Schapiro
278
TABLE I
INTESTATE INHERITANCE LAWS
Location
Inheritance Law
New England Colonies
Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont
Massachusetts
Plymouth
Rhode Island
Connecticut
multigeniture
multigeniture
multigeniture
multigeniture
multigeniture
primogeniture until 1798 (except for 1718-1728)
multigeniture
Middle Colonies
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Delaware
primogeniture until 1786
multigeniture
multigeniture
multigeniture
Southern Colonies
Maryland
Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
primogeniture
primogeniture
primogeniture
primogeniture
primogeniture
until
until
until
until
until
1786
1785
1784
1791
1777
Source: Robert B. Morris, "Primogeniture and Entailed Estates in America," Columbia Law
Review, 27 (Jan. 1927), 24-51.
America. The southerncolonies followed the prevailinglaw in England
by employing a system of primogeniturein the case of intestacy.2With
two exceptions, Rhode Island and New York, the New England and
Middle colonies followed the example of Kent by adopting multigeniture, subject to the rights of the survivinghusbandor wife (althoughit
was common to follow Mosaic law, which provideda double portionfor
the eldest son and, in some cases, a half portionor less for daughters).
In all cases, multigeniturewas the law within a brief period following
independence and the double portion provision, where in effect, was
dropped.3
There have been scattered conjectures about why particularcolonies
deviated from the predominant English practice of primogeniture.
These can be separatedinto two categories: philosophical/religiousand
economic reasons.4 Both interacted to affect colonists' initial prefer2 Widowshad "dower" rightsthat providedthem with a certainportionof land (often one-third
of the landed estate), which they could neither give away nor sell. In much of the country, a
husbandcould not eliminatedower rights by selling or giving away his land.
3This can be contrastedwith the experienceof Englandwhere, in the event of intestacy,descent
to the eldest son lasted until 1926.
4 For the former, see George L. Haskins, "The Beginnings of Partible Inheritancein the
American Colonies," The Yale Law Journal, 51 (May 1941-42), 1280-1315; Hughes, Social
Control, and Morris, "Primogeniture."For explanationsbased on an economic rationale, see
LawrenceM. Friedman,A Historyof AmericanLaw (New York, 1973),PhilipJ. GrevenJr., Four
Generations (Ithaca, 1970), and Marshall Harris, Origin of the Land Tenure System in the United
States (Ames, 1953).
Inheritance Laws Across Colonies
279
ences for inheritancelaws, and it is difficultto test separatelyfor their
impact. We conjecture, however, that with the possible exceptions of
New-York and Rhode Island, the maintenanceof the same inheritance
law in each colony over the entire colonial period was the result of the
consistency of inheritance laws with economic efficiency. We suggest
that it was fortuitousthat, in general, religious/philosophicalmotivation
concurredwith economic interests.
In our model of the colonial legislative process, we assume that since
multigeniturerequired active legislation whereas primogeniturewould
prevail in the absence of legislation, a necessary but not sufficient
conditionfor multigeniturewas a strongcentralgovernment.We further
assume that laws are enacted and maintainedif they are in the interests
of those with political power-the wealthy residents. The wealthy cared
about intestate laws since they were subject to the widely observed
reluctance to write a will, uncertaintyabout when death would occur,
and the high cost of writing a will. While wills were, nevertheless,
apparentlycommon in early colonial history, it was not unusualfor wills
generally to follow the provisions of intestate law.5 For example, even
when intestate law provides for multigenitureand it is desired that the
estate be divided, the division mandatedby law may not be acceptable.
Surprisingly,many wills even followed exactly the provisionsof intestacy law.6 Further, there are many cases where it was desired that the
eldest son inherit the farm and primogenitureintestacy laws were in
effect but intestacy was associated with a type of primogeniturethat was
unacceptable.For example, in Virginiawills were sometimes used even
when primogeniturewas preferred,since under intestate law the eldest
son received the land but none of the slaves or personal property.7 Most importantly,althoughtestacy was a simple matterin the early
colonial period, it became increasingly complicated and costly over
time. The result was that by the end of the period testate transferswere
rare.8 Further evidence consistent with the view that intestacy laws
were not superfluouswas the fightthat southernaristocratswaged in an
effortto maintainthem and the costs the Puritansincurredto have their
charter signed in Kent where a form of multigeniture was legal.9
Obviously, had the legislation been costless to evade, people would not
have expended resources to maintainor change the laws.
The issue we examine is what factors encouragedthose with economic and political power to maintaina particularinheritancesystem. We
hypothesize that legislators acted in the interests of their wealthy
5 See Haskins, "The Beginnings,"and Harris, Origin.
See Haskins, "The Beginnings."
7 Ray C. Keim, "Primogenitureand Entail in Colonial Virginia," The Williamand Mary
6
Quarterly, 25 (Oct., 1968), 545-86.
8 See Friedman,A History, pp. 220-21.
9 See H. J. Eckenrode, The Revolution in Virginia (Boston, 1916); Allan Nevins, The American
States During and After the Revolution, 1775-1789 (New York, 1924), pp. 442-43; and Charles
Ramsdell Lingley, The Transition in Virginia from Colony to Commonwealth (New York, 1910).
280
Alston and Schapiro
constituents by maintainingthe political power of the elite and sustaining efficientagriculturalunits. Primogeniturepromotedlarge agricultural units that could capture economies of scale-if they existed and
fostered the concentration of assets that enabled owners to retain
political power.
Multigeniture provided motivation for family farm labor. Labor
supervision costs of family labor are lower under multigenituresince
each child, knowing that he or she will receive a share of the assets in
the future, has an incentive to work toward improvingthe estate. Of
course, the larger the estate and the fewer the numberof siblings, the
greateris the motivationto work hard. Even in largefamilies, however,
the free rider problem is minimized by the threat of disinheritance.
Multigeniture,although it provides a work incentive, leads to smaller
agriculturalproduction units than does primogeniture.To this extent,
economies of scale, when present, cannot be captured.
Under what circumstances will the benefits of economies of scale
outweigh the costs of employing a work force not motivated by the
expectation of inheritance?We propose that large plantationsarose in
the South-and hence preference for primogeniturein order to prevent
fragmentation-because of the South's comparativeadvantagein monitoring slave work effort.'0 The South's comparative advantage in
supervisingslave work effort rested on climatic conditions that allowed
the cultivation of labor-intensive crops such as rice and tobacco. We
maintainthat supervisory costs are lower the greater the proximity of
workers and supervisors." Economies of scale in monitoringwere the
basis for economies of scale in southern plantationagriculture.In the
land-extensivegeneral farmingof the North, supervisionof slave work
effortwould be more costly than in the South because tasks tended to be
more diverse and there was considerable spatial separation between
workers and supervisors. Since the costs of monitoring slave work
performancewere less in the South, the South outbid the North for
slaves and family farms emerged in the North accompanied with
multigenitureto motivate family members to remain on the farm and
work with little supervision.
10
Numerousscholars have pointed to the associationbetween plantationsand primogeniture.
See, for example, Haskins, "The Beginnings," Lewis C. Gray, History of Agriculturein the
Southern United States to 1860 (Boston, Massachusetts, reprinted 1958), Friedman, A History, and
Harris, Origin. Simply letting the analysis stand with the association between plantationsand
primogeniture,however, begs the questionof why the plantationsystem was prevalentin the South
and not in the North. We are also not the first to recognize the comparativeadvantage in
monitoringslaves in labor-intensivecrops. See especially Gray, History of Agriculture,pp. 458,
463, 469, and 478-480. Yet, no one appears to have linked slave supervision costs to the
maintenanceof primogeniture.
" See Lee J. Alston, "Tenure Choice in SouthernAgriculture,1930-1960," Explorationsin
EconomicHistory, 18 (July, 1981),211-32 and Lee J. Alston and RobertHiggs, "ContractualMix
in SouthernAgriculturesince the Civil War: Facts, Hypotheses, and Tests," this JOURNAL, 42
(June 1982), 327-53, for tests of the importance of labor supervision costs in determining
contracturalmix in Southernagricultureafter the Civil War.
Inheritance Laws Across Colonies
281
Primogeniture, by fostering large estates and agriculturalwealth,
permittedeasier access to political power. Political power in turn may
yield high psychic or monetary benefits. Across colonies, the greater
the ability to transform agriculturalwealth into political power, the
greaterthe incentive to favor primogeniture.
The above hypotheses imply that: (1) if legislatorswere motivatedby
desires to maintain efficient agriculturalunits, we should observe a
positive association between primogenitureand plantationsand multigeniture and family farms; and (2) if legislators in the upper tail of the
wealth distributionderived their income from agriculture,primogeniture would more likely prevail.
Evidence consistent with the motivation to maintainpolitical power
and hence, primogeniture, includes the observed tendency for the
wealthy in the South to be engaged in agriculture,whereas in the North
the very wealthy were more frequently engaged in commerce. Further
evidence of the desire to maintainpoliticalpower is found in the debates
surroundingthe abolitionof entails and primogeniture.It was the landed
aristocratswho advocated the retention of primogeniture.'2
This evidence of a desire for political power does not preclude the
existence of a motivation for efficient farm units. Since the southern
states favored primogeniture,where both plantationsprevailedand the
very wealthy owned plantations, it is an empiricalquestion whether it
was the desire for an optimal size farm or the desire for political power
that dominated. A test that can differentiatebetween the two hypotheses would be whether plantation owners of multiple estates kept
ownershipintact by giving all estates to the eldest son or simplykept the
operatingunits intact by giving plantationsto more than one child. The
latter observation is consistent with the incentive for primogeniture
arising from a desire to maintain the most efficient agriculturalunits,
whereas the former observation includes the desire for political power
as well as efficiency. The evidence by Ray Keim indicates that in
Virginiaplantation owners with multiple units tended to keep plantations intact, with the eldest son often receiving the home plantationand
the other plantations and assets distributed among the remaining
children.'3 Further evidence consistent with the desire to maintain
efficientagriculturalunits is the widespreadadoptionof multigeniturein
the North where family farms prevailed. Family farms outcompeted
largescale units that relied on hiredlaborbecause, as WilliamN. Parker
has noted, "the members of the family were not free; they were bound
to the entrepreneurby ties of custom, law, fear and affection."'4 These
familialbonds affectingwork incentives arose partly, we argue,from the
expectation of inheritance. Bidwell and Falconer, in presenting an
12
Eckenrode, The Revolution, Nevins, The American States; and Lingley, The Transition.
" Keim, "Primogenitureand Entail."
14 WilliamN. Parker,in American Economic Growth by Lance E. Davis, RichardA. Easterlin,
WilliamN. Parker,et al. (New York, 1972), quote from p. 395.
282
Alston and Schapiro
economic rationale for multigeniture in the North, quote Governor
Talcott's defense of multigeniturein Connecticutin 1699;". . . much of
our lands remain yet unsubdued and must continue so without the
assistance of the younger sons, which in reason can't be expected if
they have no part of the inheritance . . '15
The existence of primogeniturein New York is also consistent with
our model. One might expect that New York, because of its Dutch
heritage, would favor multigeniture,because in Holland intestate law
mandated equal division of estates. Despite its roots, New York
accepted primogenitureafter England usurped Dutch rule. The rationale, we believe, lies with the reliance on nonfamily labor by the
wealthy estate holders.
As a result of its Dutch ancestry, New York had many large estates
called patroonships. The prevalence of these estates is at issue, but
there appears little doubt that the patroons were amongst the colony's
wealthiest and politically most influentialresidents.'6 One acquired a
patroonshipby establishinga colony of fifty or more people over the age
of fifteen. By law, these people were bound to stay on the estate of the
patroonfor a certain numberof years. The patroons, therefore, did not
rely on family labor but instead had a sort of large-scale indentured
servant system.'7 Since they did not need to worry about family labor
incentive problems and their landed wealth presumably conveyed
politicalpower, the passive acceptance of primogeniturein New York is
consistent with our model.
Rhode Island, on the other hand, may have passively accepted
primogeniturenot because it was the inheritance system most consistent with agriculturalefficiency but rather because it lacked a strong
central government to take the necessary positive action to enact a
multigenitureintestate law. This conjecture is consistent with evidence
indicatingthat Rhode Island may not have enforced primogeniture.'8
Before Rhode Island was formed as a colony, it consisted of four
independenttownships. CharlesM. Andrews points out that throughout
its colonial history, Rhode Island was threatenedfrom the outside by
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Plymouth and from within by the
separate townships.'9 We argue, therefore, that the law of primogeni's
Percy Wells Bidwell and John I. Falconer, History of Agriculture in the Northern United
States (Washington,D.C., 1925), p. 63.
6 Even thoughpatroonshipsappearto have declinedin importanceearly in the Colonialperiod,
largegrantsof land in the form of manorscontinuedto be made by Stuyvesantand early English
governors. See Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, Vol. 2
(New York, 1904), pp. 31-33.
'' It appearsthatthe manorsthatsucceededthe patroonshipssimilarlyreliedon nonfamilylabor.
8 See Morris, "Primogeniture,"p. 78.
9 Charles M. Andrews, Our Earliest Colonial Settlements, reprinted(U.K., 1973). For a
summaryof the importanceof town governmentversus a centralcolonial governmentin Rhode
Island,see WilliamE. Foster, "Town Governmentin RhodeIsland,"in Johns HopkinsUniversity
Studies in Historical and Political Science, Vol. 4 (Baltimore, 1896).
Inheritance Laws Across Colonies
283
ture existed in Rhode Island because of a weak central government
rather than because of the economic superiority of primogeniture.
Despite the existence of large holdings of slaves, many of whom may
simply have been held as inventory for the Caribbeanslave trade, the
agriculturalsystem of Rhode Island may have been best suited to
family-size farms. Edward Channing's claim that multigeniturewas
often practiced is consistent with this conjecture.20
Overall, the evidence we have presented is consistent with the
hypothesis that the motive of agriculturalefficiency influencedlegislators' preferences for either primogeniture or multigeniture. In the
South, primogeniturefostered large estates, able to reap the benefits of
economies of scale because of low slave monitoring costs in the
cultivationof rice and tobacco. Multigeniturein the North was compatible with family farms and provided a positive work incentive for
children.
INHERITANCE LAWS AND POPULATION GROWTH
There are a variety of demographiceffects typically associated with
the differentinheritancepractices. Scholarshave arguedthat primogeniture should lead to low levels of populationgrowth as all but the eldest
son feel pressure to postpone marriage, to eventually have fewer
childrenand to move to other areas. On the other hand, multigeniture,
by providingopportunitiesfor all of the children, should result in more
rapid populationgrowth through little outmigration,a high proportion
married,early marriages,and large families.'
These demographiceffects were not observed in colonial America,
we argue, because the impact of inheritancelaws on populationgrowth
was insignificantcomparedto the role played by land availability.When
land is easily available, it is possible for younger childrento marryand
to set up farms of their own, thereby leading to similar high rates of
populationgrowth under multigenitureor primogeniture.If, however,
land is scarce, we expect population growth to decline under both
systems of inheritance. Under primogeniturethe large families of the
eldest sons would be counterbalancedby the small families and outmigrationof the other children. Similarly,multigenituremay encourageall
of the children to marryearly but, if available land is scarce and farms
are already small and unproductiveas a result of prior fragmentation,
economic pressures may lead them to limit their family size.
In addition, if parentspracticingmultigenituresought to provide each
20 Edward Channing, "The NarragansettPlanters," in Johns Hopkins University Studies in
Historical and Political Science, Vol. 4 (Baltimore, 1896).
See H. J. Habakkuk,"FamilyStructureand EconomicChangein 19thCenturyEurope,"this
15 (Mar. 1955), 1-12, for a particularlyvaluablediscussion of demographiceffects of
inheritancepractices.
21
JOURNAL,
284
Alston and Schapiro
of their children with assets, then the fertility decline associated with
land scarcity would be enhanced.22 In an economy dominated by
agriculture,this motive would imply providing farmlandor the funds
needed to purchase farmland. This "bequest" hypothesis implies a
variant of multigeniturein which population growth is constrained by
the desire to transfer a farm of some minimum efficient size.23 The
ability to satisfy a bequest aspiration falls as land becomes scarcer,
thereby decreasing the demand for children so as not to exceed the
desired numberof heirs.24
In sum, land availabilitymay alter the typicallyassumeddemographic
results of inheritance practices. It has generally been assumed that
primogeniturewill lead to lower rates of populationgrowth because of
the incentive for postponementof marriagesand outmigrationof all but
the eldest son. Under conditions of abundantland, however, we expect
that primogeniture and multigeniture will lead to similar rates of
population growth. Under primogeniture,because cheap farm land is
available, even though sons will not receive an inheritance, marriage
need not be postponed or the number of children desired reduced.
Similarly, under multigeniturethere is no incentive to limit population
growth when land is readily available.
Under conditions of land scarcity the incentives under primogeniture
will lead to low population growth, and we expect similar population
growthpatternsundermultigeniture,if there existed social pressurenot
to bequeath inefficientsmall farms. In the latter case, impartibilitywill
become the dominant practice, parents will have incentives to reduce
fertility, and all sons except the one who receives the farm will have
incentives to migrate. If a bequest motive is absent, we expect to
observe higher populationgrowth rates under multigeniturethan under
primogeniture.
Although data limitationsmake it extremely difficultto evaluate our
hypotheses systematically, a brief examinationof the availableevidence
provides a roughtest of the conjectures presentedabove. This evidence
consists of detailed studies of particularareas of the country, as well as
populationestimates for each of the colonies.
22 This is the basis of RichardA. Easterlin's, "PopulationChangeand FarmSettlementin the
NorthernUnitedStates," this JOURNAL, 36 (Mar.1976),45-75, bequestmodel. He arguesthatthis
was the prevailingpractice in the North. We-suggest that the existence of a bequest motive was
facilitatedby the availabilityof economic opportunitiesoff the farm.
23 Efficientfarm size is generally associated with impartibilityof land. Partibility,however,
wouldoccur if familyfarmswere largeenoughto subdivideinto smalleryet still efficientsize farms.
24 This hypothesisprovides a possible rationalefor the success of land availabilitymeasuresin
accountingfor the cross-sectionaland time-seriesvariationin U.S. birthrates. See MortonOwen
Schapiro, "Land Availabilityand Fertility in the United States, 1760-1870," this JOURNAL, 42
(Sept. 1982), 577-600. The notion that land scarcity may create pressure to limit fertility is
consistent with Frederic Le Play's L'Organizationde la Famille (Paris, 1871) analysis of the
decline in birthrates in nineteenth-centuryFrance. He argues that parentswantedto maintaina
systemof impartibilitybut were forced into partibilityby the CivilCode. The resultwas a declinein
birthrates in orderto minimizethe division of farmland.
Inheritance Laws Across Colonies
285
Greven, in tracingthe history of four generationsin colonial Andover,
Massachusetts, provides valuable insight into the relationshipbetween
land availability,inheritancepractices, and populationgrowth.25In the
mid-seventeenth century, available land was relatively abundant and
large families and little outmigrationcombined to create rapid population growth. The ensuing populationexplosion, however, created land
pressures that threatened the ability of parents to continue to provide
land for their children. Outmigrationincreased, birth rates fell, and,
although some parents were still able to establish their sons on family
land, it became increasingly common to establish children in trades.
Although partibility was a prominent aspect of inheritance practices
when land was readily available, as land became more scarce impartibility became increasingly common. Specifically, it appears that parents
were reluctant to partition farmlandbelow a minimumlevel of about
thirty acres.26Patricia J. Tracy's study of eighteenth-century Northampton, Massachusetts reinforced Greven's findings.27Her evidence
indicates that men marriedthree years later in the eighteenth century
than did their counterpartsin the seventeenth century, a period when
land was relatively abundant.28
The interpretationof population statistics across colonies and over
time is complicated by difficultyin differentiatingbetween the relative
impactof naturalincrease, internalmigration,and immigration.Nevertheless, comparing data on the decennial rate of population increase
with a measure of land availabilityand informationon intestate inheritance laws provides further insight into the role of these factors in
accountingfor populationgrowth.
Table 2 presents data on population growth rates and on land
availability for most of the colonies during the eighteenth century.29
There is little observable difference in the pattern of growth rates
between states with similar settlement levels but differentinheritance
laws. The following comparisons are illustrative: 1) New Hampshire,
with a settlement level of 10 percent in 1750, where multigenitureruled
and Virginia, with a settlement level of 14 percent in 1750, where
primogenitureprevailed, had populationgrowth rates for 1750 to 1760
that were approximatelyequal (23 percentand 26 percent, respectively);
and 2) Pennsylvania,with a settlement level of 4 percent in 1750,where
multigeniturewas adopted and New York, with a settlement level of 3
percent in 1750, where primogeniturereigned, had populationgrowth
25
26
Greven, Four Generations.
Ibid., p. 224.
Patricia J. Tracy, Jonathan Edwards, Pastor: Religion and Society in Eighteenth Century
Northampton (New York, 1980).
27
Ibid., p. 102.
Our land availabilitymeasureis the ratio of ruralpopulationat time t to the maximumrural
populationreachedwhen ruralpopulationinitiallypeaked. See Schapiro,"LandAvailability,"for
a more complete descriptionof this land availabilityproxy.
28
29
Alston and Schapiro
286
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Inheritance Laws Across Colonies
287
rates that were approximatelyequal duringthe subsequent decade (47
percent and 41 percent, respectively).
This simple analysis provides evidence consistent with the hypothesis
that the availability of land rather than inheritance laws had the
dominant effect on population growth rates.30Had the choice under
conditions of land scarcity been between primogenitureand multigeniture without a bequest motive, then we would expect that the demographiceffects of inheritancepractices would have been larger.It seems
that the existence of a bequest motive, accompanied as it appears to
have been by the maintenance of efficient farm size, played a role in
reducingthe potential impact of differences in inheritancepractices.
30 We are presently extending our research to include regression analysis to differentiate
statisticallyamongthe variousfactorshypothesizedto influencepopulationgrowth.In this way we
will be able to assess more rigorouslythe importanceof inheritancelaws.