Defense & Security Analysis
ISSN: 1475-1798 (Print) 1475-1801 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cdan20
Saving lives with speed: Using rapidly deployable
forces for genocide prevention
Micah Zenko
To cite this article: Micah Zenko (2004) Saving lives with speed: Using rapidly
deployable forces for genocide prevention, Defense & Security Analysis, 20:1, 3-19, DOI:
10.1080/1475179042000195474
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1475179042000195474
Published online: 03 Jun 2010.
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Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 3–19, March 2004
Saving Lives with Speed:
Using Rapidly Deployable Forces for
Genocide Prevention
Micah Zenko1
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Department of Politics, Brandeis University, Olin-Sang 204 MS 058, Waltham, Massachusetts,
02454-9110, USA
“Why did the world stand by and do nothing while the genocide in Rwanda unfolded?”
This question has been repeatedly asked by journalists, policy-makers and scholars
since the systematic massacre of 500,000–800,000 Tutsis and Hutu moderates by their
Hutu countrymen in 1994. As a result of the global indifference to the Rwandan
genocide and the mass killings in Bosnia, these analysts and policy practitioners have
extensively discussed the strategic, ethical and legal aspects of the emerging norm of
humanitarian intervention.2 Some have opposed this emerging norm on the grounds
that it hinders state sovereignty, or that it exacerbates the dynamics of internal conflicts
by not allowing civil wars to “burn themselves out”.3 Nevertheless, nearly all international commentators on humanitarian intervention would agree with the words of an
international panel commissioned by the Canadian government: “In extreme cases,
[intervention] is supportable when major harm to civilians is occurring or imminently
apprehended, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, or is
itself the perpetrator.”4
While most believe that it is best to intervene as soon as possible to deter or halt a
Rwanda-type massacre, few open-source examinations have fully considered how
international forces could best intervene in the early stages of genocide. Those who
have investigated the issue have either conducted counterfactual historical analyses of
single cases, or have prudently focused on the political–military difficulties presented
with conducting military interventions in multinational coalitions.5
This paper builds upon these earlier works, as well as relevant US Army Field
Manuals, to show that the deployment of a robust force is crucial to deter or halt acts of
genocide or mass violence in their earliest stages. With the concept of swift interventions in mind, what follows is an argument for rapidly deployable forces (RDFs)
designed to prevent genocide through early entry operations, and an examination of
what those forces should resemble. For this paper, genocide is defined as: “A form of
one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as
that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.”6 While humanitarian
ISSN 1475-1798 print; 1475-1801 online/04/010003-18 © 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/1475179042000195474
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interventions can separate domestic parties at war, for the sake of parsimony this work
does not consider traditional peacekeeping roles, but describes intervention when
genocide occurs as a process of internal wars, revolutions and regime collapse.7
The paper begins with a discussion and clarification of the term “rapidly deployable”, and spells out the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing such forces in
humanitarian intervention operations designed to prevent genocide. The second
section offers an exploratory “How-to” proscription for what a forcible entry operation
would ideally look like, including a description of how to size an intervention force
against a likely opponent, how to overcome the tremendous logistical difficulties of
transporting troops and combat equipment over long distances, and a scenario for
engaging and defeating agents of mass violence. The final section assesses global RDF
anti-genocide capabilities and determines that any such campaign in the next five to ten
years should be American-led.
RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE FORCES
The many advantages of speed in warfare has been a recurrent concept of military
thinkers for thousands of years. These comments come from writers as diverse as SunTzu: “War is such that the supreme consideration is speed”,8 to Clausewitz: “The
second principle: act with the utmost speed. No halt or detour must be permitted
without good cause”,9 to Mao: “Quick decision is sought in campaigns and battles, and
this is true at all times and in all countries. In a war as a whole, too quick decision is
sought at all times and in all countries, and a long drawn-out war is considered
harmful.”10 Speed in this sense refers to swift decisions to go to war by political and
military leaders, and the rapid and decisive maneuver of ground troops on the battlefield within tactical engagements.
While speed on the battlefield remains integral to modern combat, in this paper
“rapid deployment” refers to the ability to quickly move combat troops and equipment
strategically (from a homeland to a theater of operations, or from one theater to
another). The concept is not an absolute one, but should be assessed only in relation to
the distance that needs to be covered and the political or humanitarian urgency of the
mission. The forces that conduct such missions are defined as medium-sized and lightly
equipped ground troops that can be mobilized and transported to a theater of operations within a week to ten days.11 As designed by most modern militaries, these forces
are sized at the regiment (800–1,000 troops) or brigade level (3,000–5,000 troops).
They are flexible, highly mobile forces, intended by their governments to engage in
both low- and high-intensity combat operations against a range of potential opponents,
on short notice, anywhere in the world. RDFs also have a combined arms focus,
meaning that numerous arms and weapons systems are employed jointly, to maximize
the overall combat effectiveness of the force.12 For RDFs, such arms include: airborne
and light infantry, lightly armored ground transport, tube-launched artillery, and
attack and reconnaissance helicopters.
RDF units either existing or in development include: the US Army’s 82nd Airborne,
and the US Marine’s Marine Expeditionary Units, the British Joint Rapid Reaction
Forces, the French Ground Reaction Force Command and Ground Logistics Force
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Command, and the Chinese 15th Airborne Army, 43rd, 44th and 45th Brigades.13
While the doctrinal roles for these forces vary according to the strategic goals of each
country, the general rationale for RDF development is to undertake a broad range of
missions, in a variety of geographical locations, at short notice.
RDFs are larger and more lethal than smaller special operations units, such as the
American Special Forces or British Special Air Services (SAS). Such teams are utilized
for quick-strike hostage extraction and counter-terrorist missions, and are designed to
operate covertly and to leave a small footprint, while RDFs are capable of conducting
overt, full-spectrum war-fighting. However, RDFs are smaller, less lethal – and less
survivable – than tank-centered, heavily armored mechanized divisions, such as those
involved in World War II and the first Gulf War.
Although they can conduct autonomous missions, RDFs should be visualized as the
first echelon of a multi-phased military operation. They execute their mission during
the early-entry phase of the operation to “kick down the door”, or “create overmatch”
against an opponent. This opening phase may last from a few days to two weeks before
additional troops and equipment can be introduced to the theater. Such follow-on
forces, consisting of more ground troops and greater combat capabilities, are inserted
into the theater in overlapping sequences as best determined by the combat
commander’s interpretation of the situation. US Army doctrine states that “Individual
phases gain significance only in the larger context of the campaign or major
operation.”14 Nevertheless, the first phase carried out by RDFs shapes – or determines
– the environment for all successive phases. Particularly in humanitarian interventions,
due to heated domestic political constituencies, a disastrous outcome at the front end
can disrupt or prematurely terminate the campaign.
ADVANTAGES OF RDFS
There are several advantages to utilizing RDFs to prevent genocide and campaigns of
mass civil violence. First, as the Rwandan genocide made statistically clear, motivated
and well-organized bands of thugs can kill at a rate that makes delayed response to save
lives futile. Armed with machetes and limited small arms, Hutu militia groups killed
500,000–800,000 moderate Hutus and Tutsis at a rate of 333 an hour, or five and a half
per minute, over 100 days.15 Although this rate of killing is unprecedented in the history
of modern genocides, given the global proliferation of small arms and conventional
weapons, future motivated perpetrators could easily possess killing tools of increased
firepower and lethality which would quickly result in mass casualties.16
Second, intervening early can be far more effective in terms of combat casualties and
the number of troops involved than larger, much more costly interventions later in the
crisis. Responding rapidly to credible reports of mass violence will avoid being
presented with a fait accompli on the ground to confront opponent forces before they
can seize key territory and commit more murders. Arriving to a combat theater later
limits the interveners’ options to manage the conflict in way that is beneficial to their
forces and tactics.
For timely interventions, states and international organizations desperately need to
develop the capacity to quickly sort through intelligence and identify early-warning
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signals from countries of possible concern. As one net assessment of American efforts
in the 1980s to develop RDFs noted: “Time bought with warning is cheaper than time
bought with force.”17 From the myriad methodological approaches for forecasting
inter-state and intra-state crises, two issues stand out within the early-warning literature. First, from their inception, early-warning systems must be designed and managed
so that they are engaged with the complex political, social and cultural dynamics within
a troubled state. A close connection with the parties in-country, and an awareness of
tensions between them, can allow analysts to identify escalatory signals that predate
genocide apart from the day-to-day background static coming from the country. Often,
such triggering signals are readily perceptible via documented human rights violations,
hate media broadcasts, declarations by politicians inspiring followers to kill, and
warnings of imminent violence from intelligence sources.18
The other facet of early-warning systems is that they must be intimately connected
with the decision-making process to reduce the warning–response gap.19 This is not
always the case. In Rwanda, information about the killings was presented to decisionmakers in a manner not consonant with the country’s realities. We now know that
during the April 1994 Security Council debates about how to respond to the deteriorating situation in Rwanda, UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali either did
not pass on field reports describing a well-organized ethnic cleansing, or colored them
to emphasize the killings as chaotic and spawning from the long-running civil war. As
one observer of the discussions in New York wrote: “The Secretariat’s focus on the civil
war and portrayal of spasmodic violence chilled the international impulse [to
intervene].”20
Third, the demonstrable capacity to intervene rapidly in a systematic campaign of
mass violence would deter parties contemplating such acts. The deterrent effect that
external interveners can have on an environment where mass civil attacks may soon
occur is a matter of debate. Some contend that well-armed and trained combat forces
can dissuade poorly organized civilian groups or paramilitary units from carrying out
massacres.21 Other critics of intervening to deter point out that motivated spoilers
could pre-empt the intervention force with “last-minute” killings; thus sabotaging the
original intent of the intervention and undermining the credibility of the international
community to deter future acts of genocide by observant parties.22 Furthermore,
scholars note that using force to deter genocidal acts has not been empirically tested.23
These sober concerns should be balanced by decision-makers before making a
deterrent threat, but they do not absolve the international community of its duty to
respond to genocide.
Fourth, since acts of genocide have taken place on three continents in the last
quarter-century, it is difficult to forecast the next occurrence. This does not imply that
candidate countries for genocide are limitless; but the variety in location and government typology of past genocides suggest that preparation for only a handful of
countries, or one continent, would be unwise. By organizing RDFs to act in response to
a specific contingency and not merely for geographical regions, the international
community will have a greater capacity and flexibility to deter, halt or prevent future
genocides.
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DISADVANTAGES OF RDFS
Although there are many advantages to intervening early in a mass violence campaign,
this conceptual use of force overlooks three noteworthy issues and difficulties. First,
such theoretical uses of military force are contrary to three central components of past
deployments of UN-sponsored peacekeeping and peace-support operations: the
consent of warring parties, impartiality of the intervening force, and a minimum
necessary use of force to accomplish the mission legitimated by the UN Security
Council. To illustrate the distinction between humanitarian interventions and earlier
conceptions of peacekeeping operations, it is worthwhile to address these three components to show how they are irrelevant to interventions required to end extraordinary
cases of genocide.
While consent is an admirable goal in civil wars for reasons of sovereignty and incountry legitimacy, when one group commits mass killings against another, permission
from either the victims or the perpetrators becomes unnecessary (and is unlikely to be
received in any case). Too often, the international community avoids its moral responsibilities to genocide victims, and uses the concept of consent as a “cowardly and
dysfunctional shield”, in effect becoming a tacit accomplice to the violence.24 Any
group planning and organizing the mass killing of others will delay the approval of
third-party interventions until it has successfully reconstituted the population of the
disputed territory. For example, in September 1999, Indonesia delayed a UNsponsored intervention into East Timor for two weeks while its armed militias carried
out a campaign of target killings and mass displacement after the Timorese voted to
leave Indonesia.25 Prior to Australia’s dispatch of peacekeepers to East Timor, the
rampaging militias killed at least 3,000 Timorese and displaced over 200,000 into West
Timor.26 Of course, the absence of consent of the victims or potential victims of mass
killings, in East Timor or elsewhere, can be assumed.
Although impartiality, like consent, is generally desirable, impartiality is only applicable in situations when both sides have agreed to a peace accord and require external
monitors to verify the terms of that peace.27 Impartiality is not pertinent in scenarios
where the two parties are grossly unequal in the distribution of power, and one side has
opted to take advantage of this disparity by massacring members of the weaker party.
Furthermore, when an intervening force does not pick sides, it recognizes a moral
equivalency between the actions of the perpetrator and the victim. Clearly, acts of
genocide do not fit such scenarios requiring the impartiality of the interveners.
Also, applying the minimum use of force in humanitarian interventions is a worthwhile goal because any application of military force can have dire consequences for
innocent civilians and be counterproductive to larger political goals. To ameliorate
these concerns precise rules of engagement for ground forces must be adopted to afford
special care for protecting innocent civilians. If there is no discernible difference
between the perpetrators and victims of genocide, or where the perpetrators dress in
civilian clothing, this can be a difficult but not impossible undertaking.
Second, RDFs can be invaluable for halting or deterring mass violence, but not for
solving the underlying ethnic, social, economic or political problems that initially
created the environment for such killings. Any state requiring an external military inter-
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vention to end a genocide certainly has long-term problems that cannot be solved with
only the swift introduction of military troops. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
stated, “any armed intervention is itself a result of the failure of prevention”.28 To be
sure, the capabilities for RDFs to carry out such interventions must not be procured at
the expense or disadvantage of non-military conflict prevention efforts. Nevertheless,
preventive efforts too often collapse when the political will is lacking, and/or decisionmakers fail to make decisive early choices about how to respond to an evolving crisis. In
instances where mass killings are apparent, once political efforts have failed, the
response time for effectively using force becomes greatly compressed. If the military
option is then chosen, only forces that can project power in a rapid and decisive manner
will be useful to halt further killings.
Third, from the perspective of military campaign planners, swift and decisive operations may not be optimal when conquering an enemy or controlling contested terrain.
Under certain circumstances where large armies are attempting to conquer and occupy
a large state, a methodical advance might be preferable to a swift, all-out attack. Also,
political leaders might prefer a gradualist approach to avoid escalating the problem
beyond the theater of operations, or to maintain coalition unity for the entire course of
the campaign. Even during the pre-war deployment process, political leaders might
slow troop movements either to assure that an increasingly threatening military posture
does not close off diplomatic avenues, or to avoid a situation where the force is primed
to strike, but waits on the future battlefield for months to attack. While the judgment of
both military planners and political decision-makers is not disputed, when genocide is
known and well documented, such incremental operations are inappropriate for protecting hunted populations, and the political credibility of concerned actors will be
damaged by delaying decisive actions.
FORCE SIZING
Because the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) airpower played a significant role in reversing the 1999 Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, some have
suggested that precise aerial bombing can protect endangered civilians. While longrange precision fires can cause significant damage to standing physical infrastructure,
defeating – or even identifying – tactical forces in the field or loosely organized groups
of killers from afar is very difficult.29 As the debatable effects of NATO’s bombing of
Serbian armed forces demonstrated, combat troops on the ground remain the best
strategy for defeating violent perpetrators going from village to village and door to door
in search of victims. As American naval commander, Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, noted:
“The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with the gun”.30 Therefore,
infantry personnel and assorted support vehicles are the forces most necessary for the
type of intervention described below. Airpower, particularly helicopter gunships and
troop transport helicopters, can assist genocide prevention forces, but usually as a complementary component within an overall campaign.
Although there are several published metrics over how to size an intervention force,
and numerous historical examples to rely upon, consensus about the best options for
modern combat remains elusive. Of course, ultimately, combat commanders should
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have the authority to tailor forces and sequence their deployment to meet the specific
requirements of the mission.31 Nevertheless, as a rudimentary and illustrative rule of
thumb, a rapidly deployable intervening force should attempt to be “comparable in
total numbers to the largest potential opposition they could face in battle”.32 This
parity is prudent to better enhance operational effectiveness and to address the political
concerns of putting intervening troops in danger.33 A similarity in force-to-force ratios
need not hold for the entire target-state, but opposing forces should be roughly
analogous in terms of troop numbers at the initial points of entry where resistance is
expected. Follow-on forces, which take longer to deploy, will require larger numbers to
conduct counterinsurgency and stability operations to root out perpetrators and
protect victims across the entire state.
While the intervening force should maintain parity in terms of force-to-force ratios
with its expected opponents, it would presumably have advantages in other key areas,
because almost all acts of genocide occur in the developing world. If post-1945 history is
any indicator, future genocides will likely occur in non-industrialized countries, and
interventions to halt them will be conducted, or directed, by industrialized ones. It is a
general principle in the history of warfare that militaries with a reputation for competence, realistic training, toughness, overwhelming firepower and professionalism receive
greater respect on the battlefield and impart superior political influence, than incompetent ones.34 RDFs prepared for rapid interventions and rigorously trained in the tactics
presented below would enjoy a strong qualitative edge over the probable perpetrators of
genocide. Adding the quantitative technological advantage of developed countries to the
equation (such as night-vision goggles and secure communications) further skews the
overall fighting capabilities between the two parties towards the intervention force.
TRANSPORTATION LOGISTICS
The primary impediment to such expeditionary operations is large bodies of water over
which power must be projected. In order to intervene quickly, and overcome the
boundaries of geography, RDFs should be trained, organized and maintained at a high
level of operational readiness. Since there may be a short actionable warning time
between scheduled training exercises and rest periods, forces must be geared up and
situated near areas of embarkation within a home country, with support equipment
maintained in fighting shape.35 To remain at a level of high alert, standing RDFs
generally require three separate forces – one at rest, one in training, and one ready to
roll. On the whole, to improve the chances of success in time-sensitive operations,
RDFs must internalize standard contingency planning based on stand-by readiness
and decisive movement.
Projecting troops and materiel into a distant theater also requires transportation,
corresponding ground facilities, and the logistics to oversee and co-ordinate the intervention. There are two appropriate means to move RDFs into a distant theater of
operations: strategic airlift and strategic sealift. Strategic airlift consists of wide-body
transport aircraft that can fly from a homeland to a target area without intermittent
landings and take-offs. To avoid these time-consuming stops, strategic aircraft need enroute aerial refueling tankers to supply fuel. Strategic airlift also requires over-flight
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permission from countries through which the aircraft transit. Historically, securing
over-flight rights has been contingent on the type of mission proposed by the requesting state and the perception of whether the mission accords with the over-flight state’s
national goals. In the case of life-saving interventions, stressing the humanitarian aspect
of the mission should increase the likelihood of obtaining permission, when such
appeals are perceived as authentic.
Airfields large enough to handle wide-body aircraft and the ground facilities (parking
ramp space, fuel storage capabilities, maintenance) to facilitate them and their cargo
are also required for strategic airlifts. Every airfield has unique characteristics that limit
the range of resources that can be processed through the facility in a given time.36 Only
pre-assessing the optimal throughput of the airfield can determine how rapidly a force
can move to a theater of operations. Although airfield capabilities can be augmented
later, these capabilities are largely static for the short term. In other words, when
landing RDFs by air, what you see is what you get.
The other way to transport an intervention force rapidly, for a target-state with
maritime access, is with fast naval transport.37 Cargo ships can move significantly
greater numbers of troops and heavy, or oversized, combat equipment than strategic
airlift at much less cost. When militaries have a long time to assemble, transport and
unload combat equipment prior to a war in a distant theater, naval transport will carry
the bulk of the load. The downside is that even fast naval transport is often much slower
than strategic airlift, making it less desirable to use with medium-sized and lightly
equipped RDFs.38
For example, a light infantry brigade weighs approximately 6,000 tons.39 To move
that weight a distance of 5,000 kilometers with US C-17s would require 25 aircraft
making three fully loaded sorties to the theater.40 Assuming a sortie every other day, a
single ready brigade could be deployed to a theater in less than three days. To move that
same brigade an equal distance with one fast naval transport would take a week, and
probably longer given the need to unload at a port and move the force overland.41 This
illustration overlooks two real-world facts. First, only the United States currently has
such a level of “organic” strategic transport. The rest of the world is negligently
deficient in strategic transport assets and other aspects of force projection.42 Second,
the inherent “friction” in all transport operations would increase these deployment
times somewhat. Nevertheless, strategic air transport is the preferred means of
movement for RDFs.
Using off-shore or afloat pre-positioned equipment can ameliorate the difficulties of
strategic mobility. These packages are climate-controlled barges or warehouses containing combat-ready equipment that are continuously situated near regions of
concern. While pre-positioned packages do not provide all of the equipment necessary
for expeditionary forces to conduct early-entry operations, they supply enough materiel
to sustain themselves for short times without extensive supporting airlift sorties from a
home country. To be useful for time-sensitive operations, these packages must be
suitable for the mission at hand and be quickly pre-positioned to the theater of operations to support early arriving combat forces. The US Army maintains such
pre-positioned material in Europe, the Persian Gulf, South Korea, and aboard a fleet of
roll-on/roll-off container ships.43
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From a large airport capable of handling strategic transport planes, an intervention
would need to be deployed from a forward base closer to the targeted state. These Intermediate Staging Bases (ISBs) would serve as logistics support transit points for
deploying units to a combat theater and for the headquarters command. Small teams of
logistics specialists should be sent in before the intervention force to assess and prepare
the airfield to handle strategic and tactical transport planes. Under ideal conditions, US
Air Force engineers specially trained for this crucial mission can make undeveloped
airfields operable within four hours.44 An abundant amount of technical information
about the location and operating capacities of the world’s airports already exists in the
public domain.45 However, additional detailed intelligence of austere airfields and
facilities in potential problem regions is sorely needed to allow intervening forces access
to even more ISBs. For example, a 1999 Army report identified 300 airfields in Africa
capable of handling C-17 and C-130 aircraft. With further study of accessible terrain
the Army estimated that Africa might contain 1,500 potential airfields suitable for
transport aircraft. In addition, transport planes modified with soft landing gear can use
road segments and open fields surveyed prior to an operation.46
From the ISBs, the intervening force has to transit to the target-state. To secure a
lodgment for follow-up reinforcements, most intervention missions opt to use the cover
of night to seize one or more prominent airfields. However, before the first tactical
transport planes could land, small numbers of airborne troops would need to clear the
airfield of disabled equipment as well as spikes designed to puncture airplane tires, and
then mark the airfield with lights or smoke. Other anti-access capabilities, such as
artillery and mortar salvos, mines, unconventional force penetrations, or Weapons of
Mass Destruction attacks, also must be considered. The force protection component of
intervenors can be greatly enhanced with pre-crisis knowledge of opponent capabilities, controlling probable areas of approach, and employing mobile fire-finder radars
and man-portable air defense systems.47 In total, roughly 500–800 soldiers are required
to defend a moderately developed airfield (3–5 kilometers in diameter) from harassing
attacks.48 History demonstrates that airfield seizure is a difficult but achievable mission
when interveners use surprise, tactical ingenuity and overwhelming force.49
Along with the physical infrastructure necessary to move the force, RDFs need an
appropriate command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network to facilitate the disparate elements of the
invasion. These systems consist of the sensors and receptors allowing for the rapid
transmission of information to the appropriate agents, in the command post and on the
battlefield. For ground troops, these components are low-volume, lightweight, digital
radio transmitter sets networking in real-time with command and control elements, as
well as airborne and artillery fire-support.50 When intimately connected with the transportation infrastructure and ISB-based command posts, these enabling capabilities are
vitality necessary for early-entry forces to build and maintain momentum. For RDFs,
C4ISR capabilities need to be flexible and adaptive enough to cover a range of potential
interventions, while similarly light enough for quick transport.
Before discussing the engagement phase of the operation, what has the RDF accomplished so far in this illustrative scenario? First, it established a presence in the theater,
as well as gave notice of its intent and its commitment against the perpetrators of
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genocide. Second, and most importantly, it has identified and secured ports or airfields
to allow the intervention force’s build-up. Third, logistics sustainment has been established, so later intervening echelons can proceed with the tactical aspects of the
mission.
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DEFEATING AN ENEMY
There are two types of early-entry operations in a combat theater: unopposed entry and
forced entry. Though there may be scenarios in which perpetrators of genocide would
not defend their home country from an external force, humanitarian intervention
forces should assume that a forced entry operation is necessary for three reasons. First,
an intervention will be preceded by a diplomatic crisis in which the intervenors have
threatened military action to compel the perpetrators to halt the genocide. The perpetrators will prepare for the intervention in advance by adopting defensive strategies.
This diplomatic crisis also reduces the opportunity for surprise attacks by the intervenors. Second, all acts of genocide since the Holocaust were carried out by
perpetrators that possessed either outright, or contested, political control of the state
where the atrocities occurred. In future genocides, perpetrators should attempt to fight
off an external intervention not only to protect themselves, but also to retain political
control of the state by disallowing an occupying force to expel them from power.
Finally, to enhance the survivability of one’s own forces and enhance operational
success, military planning must be conducted considering “worst case” scenarios. If
interventions are uncontested by the perpetrators of genocide, then such planning will
allow the campaign to proceed faster.
Since opposition must be expected, what can an RDF do to save lives? Once the
intervention force has secured a lodgment, it needs to quickly transition to undertake
offensive operations to halt an ongoing genocide. Before proceeding, it is worth remembering two things: first, the RDF has a short amount of time – perhaps a week to ten
days – to operate independently from follow-on forces; and second, if the killings are
not being conducted by a uniformed military, the RDF might be unable to adequately
distinguish perpetrators from victims.
With these caveats, four different missions for the first echelon emerge. The first is a
territory-based approach, with the RDF quickly establishing a presence in strategically
important terrain. These may be chokepoints through which large numbers of
internally displaced persons travel. For instance, during the Rwanda genocide, Hutus
established police barriers along main roads to select out Tutsis, by examining papers
and searching for signs of Rwandan Patriotic Front loyalty. By restricting the Tutsis’
movement, the Hutu killers were able to more efficiently murder or rape their victims.51
Interveners could have overtaken these poorly defended chokepoints with mobile
ground assaults. Another option is to set up temporary zone defenses around relatively
homogenously demographic areas within which the victim group is located.52 If there
are no homogenous areas, the intervention force might immediately deploy to protect
vulnerable refugee camps. Finally, other important terrain to capture includes communication sites and politically significant buildings – such as schools, churches, or athletic
fields – which in Rwanda served as temporary safe havens for hiding Tutsis.53
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A second task for the intervening force would be to assist extant peacekeepers and
aid agencies already inside the target-state. The experiences of the UN in Bosnia and
Rwanda exemplify the inadequacy of employing peacekeeping forces that are too weak
and restricted by political authorities, to provide security for defenseless people, or
themselves. After each mission came under attack, they called out for any level of help
from the outside world. RDFs could have tried to rescue the rescuers by providing additional personnel and firepower. Again, in Rwanda and Bosnia, the eventual
perpetrators of genocide constantly monitored the international media to determine
whether international support was forthcoming before deciding to drive out the beleaguered peacekeepers and accelerate the killings. Where there are no peacekeepers,
interveners could provide security or logistics support to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) by protecting storage warehouses, transportation routes and personnel
in the field.
A third mission is to search out and engage perpetrators of genocide through
applying precise and overwhelming force. In general, the violence employed by the perpetrators should condition the tactics used by the interveners.54 The preferred tactic of
direct engagement for such operations is to conduct “movement to contact” mobile
ground patrols into areas where perpetrators have recently operated or are currently
encamped. Once an enemy force has been located – through precise intelligence and
surveillance, or through the exchange of fire – it would be attacked by both mobile,
small-unit, direct-fire and from close air support provided by roving helicopter
gunships.55 When perpetrators are clearly differentiated from the victims, less discriminating firepower from the air, or nearby artillery, can be employed.
Finally, early-entry forces can also attempt to confuse or harass the perpetrators by
conducting non-military psychological/covert-operations missions. One option is to
silence hate-radio broadcasts, like those used to identify specific targets in Rwanda, by
destroying broadcast antennae, transmitting “counter-broadcasts” urging perpetrators
to halt the killings and telling them that they will be held accountable for their actions,
or by jamming the hateful communications through electronic airborne platforms.56 In
extreme cases, the intervening force might apprehend individuals clearly responsible
for organizing and directing the killings. In Bosnia, no more than a dozen commanders
approved and oversaw the genocide in Srebrenica, while in the entirety of the Rwandan
killings, it has been estimated that around only 200 individuals directly planned and
organized the genocidal attacks.57 Even in the Cambodian genocide, once considered
an unplanned, ideological killing spree, researchers now proclaim: “(T)he Khmer
Rouge had a highly organized structure with a clear chain of command that linked the
central leadership with the killings and abuses.”58 If but a handful of these ringleaders
had been identified and apprehended at the time, such networks could have been
broken up, thus curtailing the killings.
Alongside these conceptual missions, two events could unfold quickly for which an
RDF and its political leaders must be prepared. The perpetrators could choose to avoid
direct firefights, or simply hide their weapons and attempt to melt back into the population. This ideal scenario would demonstrate the tactical success of an early-entry
force. Follow-on forces operating in traditional peacekeeping roles would still be
needed to ensure that mass attacks did not flare up again. Alternatively, in rare
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situations, the RDF could capitalize on the shock of their intervention and achieve a
coup de main against a state perpetrating genocide. A coup de main is a sudden attack
against the political infrastructure of a state, causing the ruling government to
collapse.59 It is unlikely that RDFs would successfully conduct such an action, unless
the target-state was small or poorly defended.
When a coup de main does not occur, when is the point of victory achieved? From the
outset it should be noted that any declaration of success would be tempered by the
political calculations of the intervening parties. Political scenarios aside, rapid humanitarian interventions will be successful from a military perspective once they have
largely accomplished the following goals. First, the perpetrators of the genocide have
been defeated in battle to such an extent that their will to continue fighting against the
interveners has been eliminated, and their ability to engage in misconduct against their
victims has been greatly reduced. This might not result in a traditional “victory”, but
reducing the continued power of resistance from the perpetrators to a level where the
genocide is severely curtailed remains a desirable goal.
Second, and interrelated to the first goal, is the mission to save potential victims of
mass violence from further attempts on their life. For the most part, this is a longerterm goal, because the maintenance of humanitarian safety zones and demarcated
refugee camps will be the mission of follow-on forces and NGOs. Nevertheless, RDFs
can undertake tailored missions to provide security to victim groups when they are
amassed in defined locations. The relative accomplishment of these goals, more so than
the traditional signs of victory, such as formal ceasefire and surrender, are what the
intervening body should attempt to achieve.
WHEN THINGS GO WRONG
After an intervening combat force suffers its first batch of casualties, it can respond in
several ways. First, the force can completely withdraw its troops from the theater of
operations, as the United States did in Somalia, and the Dutch did in Rwanda. In
multinational operations, where responsibility can be dispersed among participating
members, each country’s political will to maintain its forces in the face of casualties might
be lacking. However, once a multinational coalition is formed, countries considering
withdrawal may fear appearing “less humanitarian” than others. Second, the force can
enlarge its war goals and introduce more troops as casualties accumulate. Since the
human “sunk costs” cannot be recovered, the objectives of the initial mission may be
expanded to include capturing, or eliminating, the perpetrators of the first killings.
Third, the intervening mission can choose a middle course by refocusing, and perhaps
even limiting, its initial objectives to make greater consideration for force protection.
In cases where an RDF suffers some casualties, this third option is the most prudent,
and this is the inherent tension within combat operations that aim to save lives. On the
one hand, if the intervening force suffers too many casualties, the political pressure to
leave would become great. Once a genocide prevention force is removed entirely, there
would be no outsiders left to protect, or at a minimum, bear witness to the mass killings.
The need to remain committed to protect the lives of a persecuted population is
obvious enough, but staying only to document the massacre is important as well.
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Furthermore, anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that perpetrators of mass civil
violence commit fewer attacks in regions where third parties are present.60 The reason
for this is simple: perpetrators of genocide or mass civil attacks either do not want to get
caught, or they want the world to believe that the attacks have stopped.61 Even during
the height of the massacres, these killers go through great lengths to bury, burn or
drown the evidence.
On the other hand, staying in country after an intervening force has suffered significant casualties can further weaken the combat effectiveness of the force, making force
protection and life saving difficult. Remaining in the target-state with a weakened intervention force can also affect the ability to protect follow-on forces. Yet, a humanitarian
intervention designed from the outset only to minimize casualties, at best will accomplish little else.62
GLOBAL RDF CAPABILITIES AND THE FUTURE OF
INTERVENTION
There is a clear global trend towards developing, or to consider developing RDFs, by
many national, regional and international actors, other than the US. At the national
level these include most European Union and/or NATO states, and countries as diverse
as Taiwan, Ukraine, Mongolia and Australia.63 Regionally, five multilateral organizations have shown an interest in RDFs: the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force, the African
Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction
Corps and Response Force.64 Meanwhile, the long-standing international drive to
create an expeditionary UN army has recently shown strong signs of coming to fruition.
In addition, some have also proposed using rapid expeditionary forces composed of
private military corporations in humanitarian interventions.65
Unfortunately, with the possible exception of an American-supported NATO force,
none of these RDFs will be capable of undertaking a rapid genocide prevention
campaign on their own within the next five years. This inability derives from two
problems. First, the forces discussed above will likely remain on the drawing board for
the immediate future, and not be fully funded and able to undertake combat operations
for the next decade.66 Second, most of these RDFs are not standing armies, but simply
commitments to deploy national expeditionary forces in support of multilateral organizations. This means that most RDFs will be unable to intervene in a target-state within
a week to ten days; the deployment target for the EU’s RRF is an unhurried and
leisurely two months. This timeframe is entirely inadequate in a Rwanda-type scenario,
where 250,000 people were killed during the first two weeks alone.67
Thus, for the time being, the use of RDFs to prevent mass civilian attacks or
genocide will have to be led, or supported by, the United States. Like many other
countries, America has shown a disturbingly high tolerance for genocide in the last 30
years. In Samantha Power’s detailed examination of the subject, every American
encounter with a potential genocidal situation since World War II was met with either a
refusal to adequately acknowledge the problem, or a refusal to take risks in order to
suppress it.68 Washington’s inaction into the 1990s stemmed from a lack of concern
rather than a lack of capabilities.
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Since the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides, recent administrations have indicated
that halting genocide in the future will be a national interest of the United States.
President Clinton articulated this position repeatedly after NATO’s Kosovo intervention, and forcefully in person upon visiting Rwanda.69 President George W. Bush, upon
entering the White House, received a memo detailing America’s inaction during
Rwanda. Bush set down a strong message of intent to his administration, when he
reportedly wrote in the margins of the memo, “NOT ON MY WATCH”.70 Whether
George W. Bush or future presidents act in response to genocide, either through the
UN Security Council, with a multilateral coalition, or unilaterally, will be a matter
based upon the politics of that moment. Nevertheless, without American leadership to
rally allies in support of an intervention to prevent genocide, and a commitment of
American forces, nothing will happen when the next Rwanda arises.
This means that the rest of the world has a role to play as well in preventing genocide.
Despite its collective condemnation and revulsion of the Holocaust, the international
community has shown a disturbingly high tolerance for genocide in the last halfcentury. For many of these countries – now developing their own RDFs – quick
interventions to halt genocide are impossible because of a lack of capabilities. What is
now most needed from them is a hurried expansion of the global capabilities necessary
to conduct rapid and decisive operations.71 This expansion requires additional defense
spending to procure the strategic transport and aerial refueling tankers that increase the
deployability of standing forces.
Ultimately, for all Genocide Convention signatories, past indifference is no excuse
for future inaction. What is evident from recent humanitarian interventions is that the
efficacy of such missions in saving lives is largely dependent on factors under the interveners’ control: motivation, capabilities and response time.72 Preventing mass civilian
attacks and genocide is no different, and as this paper has shown, RDFs are the best
option for such interventions. Although long-term solutions are necessary to stabilize
post-conflict countries, without an initial strong show of force to shape the situation on
the ground, follow-on phases may never occur, or they may be irrelevant in terms of
saving lives. Therefore, based on knowledge derived from recent events, the hypothetical intervention described above is the most likely future scenario to occur. In such
situations, RDFs will face a very serious and dangerous mission, but one which is indispensable to stopping the penultimate crime against humanity – genocide.
NOTES
1. Micah Zenko is a doctoral student in the Department of Politics at Brandeis University. He
wishes to thank Robert Art, Jason Forrester, Kelly Greenhill, Rebecca Johnson and Adam
Zenko for their helpful comments and suggestions. The author accepts all responsibility for
all errors of fact or omission.
2. N. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000.
3. E. Luttwak, “Give War a Chance”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 1999, pp. 36–44. See also, A.
Kuperman, The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda, Washington, DC:
Brookings, 2001; and M. Bloom, Failures of Intervention: The Unintended Consequences of
Mixed Messages and the Exacerbation of Ethnic Conflict, unpublished dissertation, Columbia
University, 1999.
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4. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, Ottawa, ON: Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 2001, p. 16.
5. S. Feil, Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda, Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, April 1998; Kuperman op.
cit.; K. Greenhill, “Mission Impossible?: Preventing Deadly Conflicts in the African Great
Lakes Region”, Security Studies, 11(1), 2001; and M. O’Hanlon, Saving Lives With Force:
Military Criteria for Humanitarian Intervention, Washington, DC: Brookings, 1997.
6. The definition differs from the UN Genocide Convention. See F. Chalk and K. Jonassohn,
The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies, New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1990, p. 23.
7. B. Harf, “No Lessons Learned From the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and
Political Mass Murder Since 1955”, American Political Science Review, 97(1), 2003, pp.
57–73.
8. Sun-Tzu, The Art of Warfare, translated by R. Ames, New York: Ballantine, 1993, p. 157.
9. C. V. Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by M. Howard and P. Paret, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 617.
10. M. Tse-Tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, Peking: Foreign Language Press,
1963, p. 141.
11. There is no definitive metric for what is “rapid deployment”. For a basic approach, see
K. Muller, “Flexible Power Projection for a Dynamic World: Exploiting the Potential of Air
Power”, in C. Williams (ed.), Holding the Line: US Defense Alternatives for the Early 21st
Century, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, pp. 223–4.
12. J. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century, Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 2001, pp. 1–11.
13. United States: Briefing by 82nd Airborne Public Affairs Officer, Ft Bragg, NC, 23 July
2002; United Kingdom: Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review: Modern Forces for the
Modern World, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command
of Her Majesty, July 1998; Richard M. Connaughton, “Organizing British Joint Rapid
Reaction Forces”, Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 2000, p. 91; France: G. Bloch, “French
Military Reform: Lessons for America’s Army?”, Parameters, Summer 2000, pp. 33–45;
Germany: US Government Accounting Office (GAO), European Security: US and European
Contributions to Foster Stability and Security in Europe, Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, November 2001, p. 72; China: K. Allen, G. Krumel and J. Pollack, China’s
Air Force Enters the 21st Century, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995, p. 169; and P. Goodwin,
“From Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine, Strategy and Capabilities Towards 2000”, in
D. Shambaugh and R. Yang (eds), China’s Military in Transition, Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1997, p. 218.
14. “Conducting Full Spectrum Operations”, in US Army Field Manual 3-0 Operations, 14 June
2001.
15. P. Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will be Killed with Our Families:
Stories from Rwanda, New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1998, p. 18.
16. Kuperman, op. cit., p. 16.
17. J. Epstein, Strategy and Force Planning: The Case of the Persian Gulf, Washington, DC:
Brookings, 1987, p. 62.
18. A. Suhrke and B. Jones, “Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda: Failure to Act or Failure of
Actions?”, in B. Jentleson (ed.), Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive
Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World, Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 2000, pp. 238–64.
19. A. George and J. Holl, The Warning–Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive
Diplomacy, Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, May
1997.
20. M. Barnett, Eyewitness to Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2002, p. 120.
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21. S. Power, “Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy
Happen”, The Atlantic Monthly, September 2001, pp. 84–108.
22. Greenhill, op. cit., p. 32.
23. Kuperman, Tragic Challenges and the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: How and
Why Ethnic Groups Provoke Genocidal Retaliation, unpublished dissertation, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 2002, pp. 277–93.
24. Barnett, op. cit., p. 43.
25. K. Richburg, “Jakarta Asks UN Force to End E. Timor Turmoil”, Washington Post, 13
September 1999, p. A1.
26. See R. Chandrasekaran, “A Killing Ground Without Corpses”, Washington Post, 22 October
1999, p. A1.
27. R. Betts, “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention”, Foreign Affairs, November/December
1994, p. 20–33.
28. UN, “Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General Assembly”, press release
SG/SM/7136 GA/9596, 20 September 1999.
29. S. Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy,
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002, pp. 28–38.
30. Quoted in C. Gray, “The Changing Nature of Warfare?”, Naval War College Review, Spring
1996, p. 9.
31. “Strategic Responsiveness”, in US Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations.
32. O’Hanlon, op. cit., p. 38.
33. Greenhill, op. cit., p. 21.
34. B. Blechman and S. Kaplan, Force Without War: US Armed Forces as a Political Instrument,
Washington, DC: Brookings, 1978, p. 5.
35. R. Betts, Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences, Washington, DC: Brookings,
1995, pp. 78–9.
36. J. Stucker and R. Berg, Understanding Airfield Capacity for Airlift Operations, Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 1998.
37. Ships that can sustain speeds above 30 knots.
38. For transporting heavier combat brigades, sealift deployment times can be competitive with
airlift, even when a road march to the target-state is required. See A. Vick et al., The Stryker
Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Times,
Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002, pp. 28–9, 53–4.
39. This number is extrapolated by dividing the weight of a light infantry division by three. US
Congressional Budget Office, “Moving US Forces: Options for Strategic Mobility”, Washington DC: The Congress of the United States, February 1997, Table A-1.
40. C-17s have a maximum payload capacity of 85 tons. US Air Force Fact Sheet, C-17 Globemaster III.
41. US Navy Fact File, Fast Sealift Ships – T-AKR, last updated: 26 May 1999.
42. M. O’Hanlon, Expanding Global Military Capacity for Humanitarian Intervention, Washington, DC: Brookings, 2003.
43. US Government Accounting Office, Military Prepositioning: Army and Air Force Programs
Need to Be Reassessed, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 1998, p. 2.
44. E. Schmitt and J. Dao, “Busy Skies Over Asia Controlled From US”, New York Times, 14
October 2001, p. B7.
45. For a sampling of airfield data on the Internet, see, Federal Aviation Authority, International
AIP Library [http://www.faa.gov/ats/aat/IFIM/ (accessed 1 August 2002)].
46. Army Science Board, FY 1999 Summer Study: Final Report, Enabling Rapid and Decisive
Strategic Maneuver for the Army Beyond 2010, Washington, DC: Department of the Army,
August 1999, pp. M-18–19.
47. “Ground Tactical Plan”, in US Army Field Manual 90–26, Airborne Operations, 18
December 1990.
48. “Airborne and Air Assault Operations”, in US Army Field Manual 3-90, Tactics, 4 July 2001.
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49. Past examples include the July 1960 Belgian operations in Congo; the Israeli Entebbe raid;
American efforts in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti; and the British operations in Sierra Leone
in May 2000.
50. R. Pengelley, “Improved Flexible Communications for Rapid Deployment Forces”, International Defense Review, November 2001, pp. 45–51.
51. A. Des Forges, “April 1994: The Month That Would Not End”, in Leave None to Tell the
Story: Genocide in Rwanda, New York: Human Rights Watch, March 1999.
52. B. Posen, “Military Responses to Refugee Disasters”, International Security, 21(1), 1996,
p. 97.
53. Feil, Preventing Genocide.
54. Posen, op. cit., p. 98.
55. “Offensive Opertaions”, in US Army Field Manual 7-30, The Infantry Brigade, 3 October
1995; and Greenhill, Mission Impossible?, p. 18.
56. S. Power, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, New York: Basic Books,
2002, pp. 371–3.
57. N. Kritz, Rwanda: Accountability for War Crimes and Genocide, Special Report, United States
Institute for Peace, January 1995.
58. S. Mydans, “Researchers Put Together Story of the Khmer Rouge”, New York Times, 15
September 2002, p. 18.
59. Two instances of a coup de main are the American captures of Grenada in 1983 and Panama
in 1989.
60. See Power, op. cit., p. 368.
61. Des Forges, “Extending the Genocide,” in Leave None to Tell the Story, op. cit.
62. M. Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, New York:
Basic Books, 2002, p. 325.
63. W. Cohen, The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait, Report to Congress pursuant to the
FY99 Appropriations Bill, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1999, p. 10;
“Mongolia”, Jane’s Worlds Armies, Mongolia: Army Organization, (online), 10 May 2002;
Ukraine, Ministry of Defence, The State Program of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Reform
and Development Until 2005, 28 July 2000; and Australia, Ministry of Defence, Defence
2000: Our Future Defence Forces, 2000, p. 80.
64. NATO, “Prague Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002”,
21 November 2002, press release, 127; AU, Assembly of the African Union, First Ordinary
Session: Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union, Article 13 African Standby Force, Durban, South Africa, 9 July 2002; and
CIS, S. Lambroschini, “Central Asia: CIS Plans Rapid-Reaction Force To Fight
Terrorism”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 22 May 2001.
65. E. Smith, “The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and Its Implications”, Parameters, 32(4), 2002–3, p. 115.
66. C. Wolf Jr and B. Zycher, European Military Prospects, Economic Constraints, and the Rapid
Reaction Force, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001.
67. Kuperman, op. cit., p. 16.
68. Power, op. cit.
69. W. Clinton, Remarks by the President to Genocide Survivors, Assistance Workers, and US
and Rwanda Government Officials, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 25 March
1998.
70. “Power, Genocide and America”, New York Review of Books, 14 March 2002.
71. Michael O’Hanlon provides a policy analysis for developing such forces. See, O’Hanlon, op.
cit.
72. T. Seybolt, “What Makes Humanitarian Interventions Effective?”, Stockholm: Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, unpublished paper.