The Role of the Government in Cultural Industry

Keio Communication Review No. 33, 2011
The Role of the Government
in Cultural Industry: Some Observations
From Korea’s Experience
By Milim KIM*
Introduction
It is difficult for countries to be independent of foreign cultural influences.
Since the 1960s, several theories and models regarding international information
flow, which includes news and popular culture, have been published, based on
a fundamental belief that the information flow is considered to be imbalanced
and inappropriate. Those studies set out to explain cultural dependency and its
role in international information flow. Dependency was the result of developed
countries’ influence on less developed countries from the 1960s to the 1980s, and
most of applied studies were published around that time. The studies related to
these theories have primarily approaches from the perspective of the country of the
information sender.
From the 1980s, other approaches illustrating the imbalance of international
information flow have emerged, although these approaches are not related to
dependency. One such study analyzed the imbalance from an economic viewpoint
and investigated the export pricing of American TV programs. Other studies
examined and identified which factors had determined the direction and inequality
of the information flow. These theories are different from the dependency theory
model mentioned above, but none of them predicted the fact that the information
flow has an inherent possibility of change.
However, these traditional theories of international information f low
have been challenged by opposing theories and results published from several
applied research — both quantitative and qualitative. It is clear that international
information flow is far more complex than is suggested by those theories. Today,
several developing countries are producing and exporting media materials,
including films from India and Egypt, and television programs from Mexico
and Brazil (SREVERNY, A., 2002). Japan imported and organized foreign TV
programs in the 1960s that had been broadcast and began to produce and start
*Milim KIM is a researcher of Institute for Media and Communications Research, and an
instructor of Keio University and Sagami Women’s University. This paper is based on the author’s
PhD thesis.
163
exporting their own TV programs since the 1980s (ITO & KOCHEVAR, 1983;
ITO, 1990; ITO, 1999). It is important to investigate these changes in international
information flow in a developing country internally, (i.e., from its perspective) in
order to better understand the context of these changes. It is relevant to monitor the
changes in information flow from a developing country’s perspective, because the
traditional hypothesis of information flow, although challenged, is based on the
experiences and perspectives of developed countries. The traditional theories are
still accepted in the communications field of academia; however, they are unable
to explain the reverse information flow in such countries as Mexico, Brazil, and
India. Many research papers have been published in the last decade in developing
countries that have experienced these reverse changes.
Korea — the object of this study — is an example of a typical peripheral
country. Throughout its history, Korea has been heavily influenced by outside
sources. It has colonial experience under Japanese rule and was influenced
politically, economically, and culturally by the U.S. military administration from
1945 to 1948. All public influences left by Japan in Korea or on Korean culture
have since been banned. However, the U.S. influence on Korean culture remains
strong, especially through American media imports. Nevertheless, Korea began
domestic production and broadcasting of their own films and TV dramas in the
1960s. The quality of media and its popularity gradually increased until the late
1990s, when American media imports decreased. At that time, Korea also started
exporting its TV dramas and films to other Asian countries. Its cultural industry
has steadily grown and now extends its influence to different cultural regions,
including the Middle East, Russia, and South America. The case of Korean media
is one of many cases that clearly show the reverse international information flow,
in stark contrast to the traditional theories.
While the main focus of the precedent studies was the volume of information
flow across borders and the changes of the information sender’s market power
in developing countries’ domestic markets, this study focuses on policies and
industrial environmental changes in the information recipient country. This
research is meaningful as it pays special attention to policies and the active role
of the information receiver. The strategic analysis conducted in this study differs
from the previous studies, because its primary objective is policies related to
the receiver’s role. Thus, this study provides various new viewpoints in the field
of international information flow, including the following three examples: The
formation of new relationships between public and private sectors bridged by
policies, the capital formation process, and the production and market power of
visual content.
The purposes of this research are: ① To explain how a policy contributes to
the process of evolving from an information receiver to an information sender; and
② to provide several suggestions on how to enhance the possibility and promote
164
Keio Communication Review No. 33, 2011
the process, based on observations made during the Korea’s several developmental
stages. This study focuses on the following research questions: (1) What kind of
policies were created and carried out at each of the developmental stages? (2)
Did policies succeed or fail at each of the stages? (3) What were the reasons for
the success or failure of the policies? (4) What were the factors that influenced a
policy to be ineffective at the times of expansion? (5) What were the implications
of changing from an information receiver to an information sender in the case of
Korea?
Firstly, this study reviews several sources that describe the media flow.
Secondly, it explains Hallyu, or “the Korean Wave,” which resulted from the
change of the media flow. Then the study describes the development of the Korean
broadcasting and film industries as well as the policies issued at each important
stage of their development. Finally, it analyzes the impact of Hallyu.
One-Way Flow and Contra-Flow
During the 1960s and 1970s, many studies pointed out a one-way flow of
television programs, news, and music, from a few countries of the First World to
the rest of the world (STRAUBHAAR, 2003). These studies, developed under
the framework of neo-Marxism, include Wallerstein’s “world system,” Frank’s
“dependency theory,” Galtung’s “center-periphery” relations, and “cultural
imperialism/media imperialism.” These theories attempted to show the structure of
the world and the dependent relationship between central countries and peripheral
countries. Although very different, the theories commonly explain that the
unidirectional nature, or the imbalance in international information flow, is caused
by the politico-economic structure of the capitalist system, and they insist that the
one-way flow of information is a reflection and a result of domination of the First
World and its exploitation of the Third World (ITO, 1990). LEE (1980) illustrates in
full detail that many broadcasters from the countries of the Third World imported
TV programs from “metropolitan” countries — namely, the U.K., France, West
Germany, and the U.S. According to his research, American TV programs were
popular in other industrial nations and Latin American neighbors, whereas British
programs are popular in ex-colonies in Southeast Asia, Africa, Australia, and New
Zealand in the 1970s.
However, since the end of the 1980s, several cases related to more complex
flow have emerged. Several scholars defined new concepts that explained the
complex flow. HOSKINS & MIRUS (1988) have created a useful concept to
examine the audience’s attraction to national programming, known as the “cultural
discount.” Straubhaar advanced the concept of cultural proximity: All things
being equal, audiences will tend to prefer programming that is closest or more
165
relate to their own culture. Using those concepts, Straubhaar researched Brazilian
audiences and a cultural-linguistic market. The results from the research suggest
that audiences do seem to prefer cultural tastes that are closest to their accumulated
tastes, corresponding to their cultural capital.
Hallyu, which refers to the popularity of Korean cultural objects, is another
case of the complex flow, as Korea has been an information receiver in the
international community for a long time. This study approaches it from the policy
perspective and suggest to other information receivers which policy would be
effective in order to become an information sender. Previous researches focused
on the volume of trades and considered audience characteristics in the field of
international information flow. However, this study’s approach differs from that of
previous studies.
Growth of the Korean Popular Culture Industry
Hallyu: the Korean Wave in the global market
In 2003, the Korean drama Winter Sonata was aired on NHK, Japanese
broadcasting station, and quickly gained popularity in Japan. As a result, the
word Hallyu ( 韓流 ) came to be recognized as one of the words symbolizing
Korea’s cultural impact on Japan. The word Hallyu was used in every situation
related to Korea; for instance, “Hallyu boom,” “Hallyu star,” “Hallyu drama,” or
“Hallyu cosme (cosmetics).” However, the word Hallyu was first become popular
via Chinese media. It first appeared in a Chinese magazine and was printed in
the context of warning Chinese readers to be cautious of Korean popular culture.
The magazine’s name was “Qingnianbao ( 青年報 )” published in 1999, but this
was only the beginning (YU, 2005 : 1). Soon after, the word Hallyu came to be
used widely, because the weekly magazine “Yazhouzhoukan ( 亜州週刊 ),”with a
tremendous influence in the Chinese cultural sphere, printed a special report on
Hallyu, featuring Korean actress Kim Heesun on the cover (HAN, 2004 : 125).
The etymology of the word Hallyu comes from the Chinese characters 寒 “han”
流 “lyu,” which when put together mean “a sudden cold wave.” It seems that the
name was aptly acquired due to the unexpected, sudden popularity of Korean mass
culture overseas (HAN,2004 : 123-125). The popularity of Korean mass culture,
along with the name Hallyu, quickly spread from China to other surrounding
Asian countries, and finally to Japan. As the sphere of Korean influence expanded,
the concept of Hallyu came to include not only the popularity of Korea’s popular
culture but also the country’s economic effects associated with expansion.
Figure1 illustrates the expansion of Hallyu more concretely. GO, researcher
at SAMSUNG Economic Research Institute, explains that the expansion of
166
Keio Communication Review No. 33, 2011
Hallyu have developed through four stages. The first stage is the expansion
stage of popular culture, including the production of TV programs, films, and
K-pop. In the second stage, charmed by Korean TV programs, films, and K-pop,
people buy products related to Korean popular culture, such as a soundtrack of
a popular TV drama, a pendant which an actress wore in a TV drama, or tickets
for a package tour that offers tourists a Korean popular culture experience. In the
third stage, people buy Korean products other than those are directly related to
Korean popular culture, such as electronic products and cosmetics. Once people
become charmed by Korean popular culture, buy products related to Korean
popular culture, and then start buying other Korean products, they come to adopt
a favorable, new impression of Korea; this is the fourth — and final — stage of
Hallyu’s developmental cycle. It should be noted that export of various Korean
products increased at the same time that Hallyu spread. Furthermore, the number
of tourists traveling to Korea to visit locations of popular Korean TV dramas also
increased. In conclusion, the influence of the Korean cultural industry in foreign
countries opened doors for other Korean industries. This was made possible by
allowing other Korean industries easier access to foreign markets where successful
completion of Hallyu’s first two developmental stages had taken place.
The success of Korean popular culture overseas was also noted by the Western
media (Wall Street Journal, October 20 2010: New York Times, February 22 2007:
1. Popularity of
Korean popular
culture
Purchase
▷ 2. of
Korean
popular culture
products
of
▷ 3. Purchase
▷ 4. Favorable
other Korean
impression of
products
Foreigners
become charmed
by Korean
popular culture
and Korean TV
and pop stars.
Foreigners start
to purchase
products related
to Korean mass
culture.
Korean products
related to
popular culture
are imported and
purchased.
Mexico / Egypt /
Russia
Japan / Taiwan /
Hong Kong
China / Vietnam
Korea
Foreigners adopt
good feelings
and a favorable,
new perspective
of the Korean
lifestyle and
Korean culture.
?
Source: GO (2005)
Figure 1: Stages of the spread of Hallyu
167
New York Times, January 29 2006: New York Times, January 2 2006: New York
Times, June 28 2005: New York Times, December 23 2004). The Wall Street
Journal featured an article, titled “Riding the ‘Korean Wave’: Exporting ideas and
culture, not just steel and silicon” in 2009 (Wall Street Journal, May 19 2009). The
article reported that the rise of Hallyu came unexpectedly and was a surprise to the
West, as Korea had been previously known only for its success in manufacturing
steel and silicon. The export of ideas and culture from an Eastern country to other
countries broke the stereotype that Korea simply produced raw materials for IT
purposes.
Change in the Korean domestic market
According to one statistic, the amount of export of Korean TV programs
has increased steadily since 1988. More specifically, the growth rate of the
export of Korean TV programs has risen at the same time that Hallyu has spread
throughout Asia and the amount of import of foreign TV programs to Korea has
decreased. When broadcasting service was established and launched in Korea,
all broadcasting stations and networks carried many American TV programs, as
the stations lacked the technology, technical skills, and experience necessary to
produce and broadcast enough of their own programs. Korean Broadcasting System
(KBS), Korea’s national broadcasting station, was established in 1961. Although it
lacked resources and a solid infrastructure with few studios, KBS was still able to
broadcast sports, films, and foreign TV dramas to its viewers. Korea could not help
but depend on American facilities and technologies, which introduced the TV set,
radio transmitter, and innovative production equipment to Korea. The introduction
of color TV to the Korean market was also made possible in part by the U.S. The
other reason that color TV broadcasting was made possible in Korea was a change
in an international policy by which foreign companies universally agreed to stop
the production of TV sets manufactured for monochrome broadcast (JOUNG &
JANG, 2000:142).
According to an audience rating survey in 1966, American TV dramas
topped the most viewer charts and held first, second, and third places. The share
of time allotted to foreign TV programs, compared to domestic TV programs, had
increased until the middle of the 1970s, at which point a quarter of broadcasting
time was dedicated to showing these programs. However, domestic TV programs
gradually improved in quality and saw an increase in broadcasting time,
particularly in prime time slots. Although American TV series, such as Wonder
Woman, The Six Million Dollar Man, and The Bionic Woman, gained popularity in
the 1970s, domestic programs began catching up in the early 1980s, continuously
receiving high audience ratings. While improving production and broadcasting
technologies and capabilities reduced the volume of imported TV programs, there
168
Keio Communication Review No. 33, 2011
was also a political factor for the decline. The military government ordered that
broadcasting stations dedicate only a limited amount of their prime time slots to
foreign TV programs due to political reasons. The Korean TV broadcasting stations
filled the allocated time slots with as many imported TV programs as their newly
imposed restrictions would allow. These restrictions forced Korean broadcasting
stations and networks to have a highly competitive race to attain better ratings for
their domestic programs. The audience ratings race, in return, forced the Korean
broadcasting stations and networks to improve their infrastructures and obtain
better equipments, and therefore, to enhance the quality of domestic programs,
in order to compete under these government restrictions. Moreover, the audience
ratings for domestic TV programs rose, while the imported TV program ratings
declined in the 1980s. This is due in large part to the Korean broadcasting industry
profiting from the Asian Games and Olympics that were held in Seoul.
On the other hand, the market share of domestic films, which depends
on ticket sales, did not increase until the end of the 1990s. Few domestic films
broke box office records in the 1970s, although over 200 domestic movies were
produced in Korea at that time. Unlike the TV industry, the Korean film industry
was able to produce films from the beginning of the 1960s. The government
controlled the content, production, and distribution of movies, which were the
most effective media available to the public at that time. There were over 70
Korean film production companies at the beginning of the 1960s; however, the
number of companies was reduced to less than 20 after the establishment of
“the law of cinema.” Furthermore, the government censorship controlled movie
content, making it difficult for filmmakers to practice their right to freedom of
expression. While many movies were produced in the 1970s, most were boring due
to the censorship. Also, there were import restrictions which prevented importers
from acquiring without permission from the government until the beginning of
the 1980s. In 1984, revisions were made to the “law of cinema.” These revisions
changed the censorship standards and entry regulations, and therefore, the rate
of cinema attendance increased. Although at this point freer expression became
possible, “the law of cinema” would still undergo three more significant revisions.
The entry regulation policy evolved from the one in which domestic filmmakers
having to ask for government permission to the one that they simply have to fill
out a registration form to release a movie to the public. Moreover, foreign film
companies could now enter the Korean film market. Foreign films, including
movies from Hollywood film companies, started distributing directly to Korean
movie theaters in 1987, advancing the growth effect of foreign films in the Korean
market. It was not until 1999 that the market share of domestic films caught up
with foreign film’s share of the Korean market.
Although there were several factors that led to the change of the Korean
domestic cultural industry, the regulations, which set the broadcasting limitations
169
at the time, were one of the most important factors. The following chapter
will examine the content of regulations and policies carried out by the Korean
government and the influence of those regulations and policies in both domestic
and international markets.
Change of the Regulatory Regime: Paradigm Shift
Broadcasting Regulations and Policies
As explained in the previous chapter, the Korean military government
enforced regulations that restricted foreign media’s influence until the domestic
market was sustainable. During the period of authoritarian regimes (1962–92),
the state used television broadcasting to project its aims and goals onto the public
as part of the process of shaping and changing society in accordance with its
vision, while the networks were forced to serve the interests and priorities of the
state rather than those of the public or other interests (KWAK, 2009). During
those times, policies for entry regulations, content regulations, and the regulations
regarding quantitative distribution in the broadcasting industry, were monitored
and controlled by the military government. The military government also imposed
temporary regulations outside the current laws, which were called “administrative
advice” and “practice outline,” in order to control the content of programs and
the quantitative distribution of broadcasting. Under another temporary regulation,
named “purification of the broadcast,” the government created several rules
concerning prohibition of content. It is also important to note that at that time
ongoing regulations prohibiting the import of Japanese cultural goods was still in
effect. This regulation, created in 1945, prohibited the import and distribution of
Japanese TV programs, films, J-pop, animation, and manga. Although the content
regulations infringed upon the right to freedom of expression, they forced the
networks to concentrate on producing higher quality domestic TV programs.
Moreover, due to the voids left behind by imported TV programs, there was
an urgent demand to fill the vacant broadcasting slots. The networks had to manage
the responsibility of program production and quantitative distribution without
any foreign influence. Table 1 summarizes how each regulation changed in each
decade.
In the 1990s, the regulation paradigm shifted in Korea. The democratization
of politics, which was carried out in 1993, influenced broadcasting policies. Until
the 1980s, the purpose of the broadcasting regulation regime was protection and
restriction; since the 1990s, however, it has changed to support and improvement.
This was particularly evident from 1988 to 1997, the time when the protective
regulation and supporting policies coexisted. From 1990, the Korean government
170
Keio Communication Review No. 33, 2011
began several supporting policies for the purpose of developing the broadcasting
industry.
Table 1: Changes in Korean Broadcasting Industry due to Government Regulations
Entry
Regulation
Content Regulation
Quantitative Distribution
Regulation
Japanese
Cultural
Goods
1960s
Foreign media
company entry
forbidden
Discussion of deliberate
censorship in broadcasting
No records in the law
Forbidden
1970s
Foreign media
company entry
forbidden
Deliberate censorship and
temporary regulations
No records in the law
Forbidden
1980s
Foreign media
company entry
forbidden
(1980~1986)
Deliberation and temporary
regulations
(1987~)
Korean Broadcasting
Commission established to
regulate censorship.
No records in the law
Temporary regulations
enforced
(percentage of foreign
programs on domestic
networks limited to 15% or
less).
Forbidden
1990s
Foreign media
company entry
forbidden
Deliberation in the Korean
Broadcasting Commission
Quantitative distribution of
foreign programs on domestic
networks rose to 20% or less.
Forbidden
2000s
Foreign media
companies
permitted
(~2007)
Deliberation enforced
by Korean Broadcasting
Commission
(2008~)
Changed to deliberation in
the Korean Communications
Standards Commission
Quantitative distribution of
domestic programs given by a
genre
Permitted
First, the government added the clause related to ownership for commercial
broadcasting to the policies. Second, the formation of outsourcing production
programs was obliged. Third, a system for human resource training for
broadcasting professionals was launched. Fourth, a policy that supported the
participation in a trade fair was enacted. Those policies were practiced by the
Bureau of Cultural Industry which was established under the government in
1993. This government organization was ramified several times through the next
decade, and support methods were diversified. The final supporting plan was
the “broadcast video industry promotion plan,” announced by the Ministry of
Culture and Tourism in 1998. Since then, the following policies have been still
practiced by the government: Production support, distribution support, human
resources development, and infrastructure establishment and management. To offer
171
these supports, the government created a fund that is made up of money from the
broadcasting networks, and is invested in from the public purse. Table 2 shows the
content of the main support policies.
Table 2: Supporting Policies for the Korean Broadcasting Industry
Head
Contents
Production Support
1. Direct support
2. Indirect support: Accommodation, organization of
investment association
Distribution Support
1. Domestic market: Obliging broadcasting times for
outsourcing production programs
2. International market: Supporting participation of the trade
fair, supporting reproduction for exportation, holding the
Korean trade fair (Broadcasting World Wide (BCWW)),
supporting co-productions with foreign companies
Infrastructure Establishment and
Management
1. Construction of accumulation facility for program
production, lending to production companies
Human Resources Development
1. Training programs for broadcasting professionals
2. Training programs for people who want to be broadcasting
professionals
Film Regulations and Policies
Like the broadcasting industry, the film industry was also regulated by the
government. Policies for film industry’s entry regulation, content regulation, and
regulations regarding quantitative distribution, were monitored and controlled.
The film industry was most strictly monitored in the 1970s. Those who wanted
to produce films had to obtain permission from the government. The government
allowed import of foreign films only for companies that produced films in
domestic markets. The “screen quota” system, which obligates film theaters to
set aside a certain amount of screening time for Korean films, also controlled the
share of foreign films (SEO, 2006:334). Moreover, all of film scripts had to be
submitted to the government prior to their release. Then deregulation began in
1984. Importers and the filmmakers were separated, and those who wanted to enter
the market simply had to register their names with the government. The obligation
for submitting scripts was demolished. Foreign companies could enter the Korean
market from 1987. In the case of Japanese films, the Korean government admitted
the import of films that received a prize in an international film festival in
1998. For about two years, the speed of film deregulation was faster than that of
broadcasting market deregulation. Table 3 explains the regulation changes in each
decade.
172
Keio Communication Review No. 33, 2011
The history of policies supporting the film industry dates back to the early
1970s. Although the Korean government enforced strict regulations on the film
industry, it attempted to expand the domestic film market at the same time. The
government established the Korean Motion Picture Promotion Corporation
(KMPPC) in 1973. Funds made by profits from foreign film import were used to
support domestic films through the KMPPC. The government used this fund to
execute its supporting policy, which involved distributing publicity brochures on
Korean movies to foreign markets. In 1984, the Korean government founded the
Korean Academy of Film Arts (KAFA), an organization that focused on developing
professional filmmakers through the KMPPC. It was 1994 that the supporting
policies executed in earnest. The following table illustrates the content of main
supporting policies in each decade.
Table 3: Changes in Korean Film Industry due to Government Regulations
Entry
Regulation
Content Regulation
Quantitative Distribution
Regulation
Japanese
Cultural
Goods
1960s
Foreign entry (1962~1965)
forbidden
permission for showing
(1966~)
Censorship
(1967~)
Screen quota:
Foreign movies cannot exceed
1/3 of the number of domestic
movies.
Forbidden
1970s
Foreign entry
forbidden
Screen quota:
Film theaters have to show
domestic films 146 days per
year.
Forbidden
1980s
(~1986)
(1980~1984)
Foreign entry Censorship
forbidden
(1985~)
(1987~)
Deliberate censorship
Foreign entry
permitted
Screen quota:
Film theaters have to show
domestic films 146 days per
year.
Forbidden
1990s
Foreign entry
permitted
(~1996)
Deliberate censorship
(1997~)
Classification of film ratings
Screen quota:
Film theaters have to show
domestic films 146 days per
year.
(~1997)
Forbidden
(1998~)
Permitted
2000s
Foreign entry
permitted
Classification of film ratings (~2006)
Screen quota:
Film theaters have to show
domestic films 73 days per year.
Censorship
Permitted
A close look at the table 4 will reveal that the policies support diversification.
In the 1980s, KMPPC concentrated on infrastructure support, such as facilities
construction, and directly participated in the exportation and importation of
173
films. However, the direction of support has changed since 1985. While films that
reflected government’s goals became the object of support prior to 1985, films with
artistic values have became the ones to receive support since 1985.
Table 4: Supporting Policies in Korean Film Industry
Year
~
1979
1989
Open call for participants of scenario
Infrastructure
Construction of studios, recording studios, editing equipments, preview
rooms; support program of foreign visit for domestic film festival winner;
foreign induction course of producers; technical training program;
selecting good movies and financial support
Distribution
Holding a domestic film festival; support program of the film exportation;
intercession of the foreign film importation; support program of exhibition
for international film festivals
Production
Open call for participants of scenario; selecting good movies and financial
support; discovery of Korean materials; open call of inventive idea; open
call of scenario
Infrastructure
Construction of film studio; introduction of equipment; technical training
in foreign country; investment fund financing and mortgage loans for
screening facilities
Distribution
Support program of participation in a film trade fair; support program for
international films interchange event
Production
Support program for art film production; support program for HD film
production; support program for independent film production; support
program for international co-production film; low budget film production
program; investment fund financing and mortgage loans for screening
facilities
Infrastructure
Independent & student film post-production support; support program for
script market; support for film organization; support for regional media
center; support program for North-South Korean film exchange preproduction development funding
Distribution
DVD production & distribution support for independent film; marketing
support for diversity; support program for subtitle translation and print
production; Asia film industry network; Asia film professional training
program; building overseas network; business R&D campus; publication
of books on Korean cinema; standardization of title and spellings;
support program for commercial Korean film distribution in Japan;
support program for independent Korean film distribution in Japan;
support program for Korean filmmakers participation in international
film festivals; support program for Korean filmmakers’ participation at
international producer’s lab
1999
~
2000
Contents
Production
~
1990
Type
2010
Furthermore, legislation in favor of deregulations, influenced by the trend of
globalization, went into effect in the end of the 1980s. Since the 1990s, indirect
supporting policies, such as investment or mortgage loans, have increased, and
KMPPC has attempted to develop a film market, including an establishment of
174
Keio Communication Review No. 33, 2011
foreign network and marketing support. The next chapter will categorize the
Korean broadcasting and film industry into several development stages and explain
the characteristics and the effect of policies on each stage.
The Categorization of Development Stages and the Effect of Policies
on Each Stage
The Broadcasting Industry
This section categorizes the development of the Korean broadcasting industry
into five stages in terms of market size as a standard (See Figure 2). The time of
category change accidentally corresponded to the changes in the government.
In the Pre-takeoff Stage, since few studios and facilities existed and the spread
of TV receivers was slow, TV broadcasting was not yet an important media.
With the transition from the Pre-takeoff Stage to the Takeoff Stage Ⅰ, as the
national networks of each broadcasting station were expanded, TV broadcasting
became an important media. Therefore, the government’s control over the
broadcasting industry began to be reinforced. In addition, the military’s control
of the government was another reason that the government strictly regulated
broadcasting.
With the transition from Takeoff Stage Ⅰ to Takeoff Stage Ⅱ, the government
unified several broadcasting stations into only two networks. The government
ordered the networks to extend their grid and scale. The scale of networks in Korea
was extended under the government’s control at this stage.
Pretake off
Stage
take off take off
Stage Ⅰ Stage Ⅱ
Maturity
Stage
Expansion
Stage
1972~1979
1988~1997
1998~now
1980~1987
1963~1971
10 trillion won
Hallyu
5 trillion won
1960s
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000s
2005
Figure 2: Development Stage Division of the Broadcasting Industry in Korea
175
At the time of the transition from the Takeoff Stage Ⅱ to the Maturity Stage,
the democratization of politics strongly influenced the broadcasting industry. The
entry of commercial broadcasters and the change in the government’s perception of
the broadcasting industry to one that it is a cultural by-product were the important
factors to cause the change at this time. The policies for activating the market
began to be carried out in the 1990s (See page 10~11).
With the transition from the Maturity Stage to the Expansion Stage, the
government implemented full-scale supporting policies for the broadcasting
industry. The policies for infrastructure, production, and distribution were
diversified. The change of the direction of policy in this time significantly affected
the change in the Korean broadcasting industry, and the supporting policies surely
contributed to the growth of the domestic broadcasting industry. Although the
domestic broadcasting industry was obviously changed by the policies, the effect
of these policies was different in foreign markets. Additionally, the same policy
brought different effects according to the period. In other words, the policy caused
different effects depending on the period and the market. The following is the
effect of the policies in both domestic and foreign markets:
1. The regulation of foreign influence and the implementation of supporting
policies for the domestic industry were effective to ensure the expansion of the
domestic broadcasting market.
(1) Obliging broadcasting times for outsourcing production programs partly
contributed to the increase in the number of independent production
companies and to a competitive environment in the broadcasting industry,
although several problems, including those pertaining to copyright, still
remain.
(2) The supporting policies for infrastructure, which allowed the rental of
production facilities to small independent production companies, provided
a supportive environment to small independent companies, allowing them
to produce many TV programs.
(3) The restriction on broadcasting Japanese TV programs brought more time
for the Korean government to develop the industry.
2. The supporting policies to promote the Korean broadcasting industry overseas
were partially effective.
(1) The government’s support for the participation in TV program trade
fairs was not necessarily effective in each negotiation. In fact, many TV
program negotiations took place outside the trade fair.
(2) The government support for re-production activities for export, such as
re-editing and subtitling, contributed to the diversification of countries
to export TV programs, because the standard of broadcasting programs
176
Keio Communication Review No. 33, 2011
differs in each country.
(3) Direct financial support did not influence the export of domestic programs.
Financial support was concentrated on documentary programs. Moreover,
TV drama that was popular in foreign countries did not receive financial
support.
The Film Industry
This section categorizes the development of the Korean film industry into four
stages with respect to market size as a standard (See Figure 3). The film industry
had a long Pre-takeoff Stage unlike the broadcasting industry. It took time to
increase the domestic film market size, because the economic environment for this
industry was different from that of the broadcasting industry. Since the source of
revenue for the broadcasting industry was advertisements, the country’s economic
development was immediately reflected in the broadcasting market size. However,
since the source of revenue for the film industry was box office sales only, the
size of domestic film market had not increased until other sources of revenue were
introduced and blockbusters were made.
Pretake off Stage
Take off Stage
1979~1988
1962~1978
Maturity
Stage
Expansion
Stage
1989~1998
1999~now
1 trillion won
Hallyu
500 billion won
1960s
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000s
2005
Figure 3: Development Stage Division of the Film Industry in Korea
In the Pre-takeoff Stage, “the law of cinema” was established, and the military
government attempted to control and supported the film industry. The government
produced “national policy movies,” which reflected the government’s goals. The
government thought that if the size of production companies grew, they could
produce a good many movies. Wishing to grow the film industry in a short period,
177
the government restricted entry into the film industry. Therefore, to enter the film
industry in the Pre-takeoff Stage, production companies had to have a significant
amount of human resources and production facilities. However, since film content
was strictly censored, it was difficult to produce movies that could be universally
accepted. In other words, the government regulations and policies that were intended
to promote the film industry failed, although the infrastructure was decisively put in
place.
After the transition from the Pre-takeoff Stage to the Takeoff Stage, the
theater entrance fee was increased by the government. That was the main reason
the market size seemed to grow in the Takeoff Stage. The environment in which
the film market operated had not changed; there existed still strong censorship
of content, and entry into the market was strictly regulated. However, those
regulations were lifted by the government in 1984, and the change would influence
the next Maturity Stage. The Takeoff Stage was a preparatory period of the growth
along with regulation.
In the Maturity Stage, the number of film companies increased because of
the abolishment of entry regulations. Even if there was no money, very talented
people entered the film industry. As foreign distribution companies could enter
the Korean film markets at the same time, the principle of competition began to
work at the Maturity Stage. In addition, the video industry grew in this period, and
major electronic companies became interested in the film market. The government
changed the direction of policy from restrictive one to supportive one in the
Maturity Stage.
With the transition from the Maturity Stage to the Expansion Stage, the share
of domestic films in the market increased, and at the same time, the amount of
export of Korean films to foreign markets increased. The competitive environment
of the domestic film market served to improve the quality of domestic film, and
there was an increase in film prizes that Korean films won at international film
festivals.
The followings are the impacts of the policies on both domestic and foreign
markets:
1. The regulation of foreign influence and the supporting policies for the
domestic industry were partially effective to ensure the expansion of the
domestic film market.
(1) A screen quota system, which obligated film theaters to set aside a certain
amount of screening time for Korean films, was effective to protect the
domestic industry before increasing the domestic films’ competitiveness.
(2) Several regulations for censorship and the entry regulations obstructed the
development of the domestic film industry. Since deregulation, Korea’s
film industry has grown and extended.
178
Keio Communication Review No. 33, 2011
(3) The educational support provided through the “Korean Academy of Film
Arts (KAFA)” was effective to develop the domestic film industry. Alumni
of the academy included directors who made Korean blockbusters and
received prizes at international film festivals.
(4) Indirect financial support, such as a loan system or an investment
association, allowed other investors to invest in the film industry.
2. The supporting policies for the promotion of the Korean film industry overseas
were partially effective.
(1) The foreign distribution policies, which included publication of books
on Korean cinema and support programs for Korean filmmakers’
participation in international film festivals and for building of overseas
networks, contributed to establishing global networks and promoting
Korean films.
(2) In the Pre-takeoff Stage, although the Korean government attempted to
increase the amount of film export, several foreign distribution policies did
not work, because films that the government was trying to export were not
interesting. As times changed, the same policy had a different effect.
Conclusion
In summary, in the period of domestic development, indirect financial support
and infrastructure support were more effective than direct financial support.
Moreover, the regulation of foreign influence and the deregulation of the domestic
broadcasters and filmmakers were effective in developing the domestic industry.
At the same time, government policies were partially effective in expanding the
industry into foreign markets. An example of a successful policy is the one in which
the government subsidized the costs of the re-editing and adding subtitles to films
for export and marketing. This contributed to the diversification of export markets
and increased sales. Although some policies somewhat contributed to the growth
in exports, Hallyu had more to do with increased demand in each foreign market,
and not a force by policies, which indicates that the most important element of
expanding export is the free market mechanism, not government policies. Judging
from the Korean case, it is clear that a powerful domestic market is a prerequisite
to foreign expansion. To establish a powerful domestic market, regulations and
policies that interrupt freedom of expression and free market mechanisms must
be abolished. At the same time, restrictive protection policies are necessary until
the ability of the domestic broadcasters and filmmakers matures. However, the
broadcasting industry and film industry differ from other industries. Therefore, the
government policy should concentrate on developing their infrastructure. Finally,
179
government policies must not interfere with the content of cultural objects.
Korea is a significant case where a receiver of media products became a
sender. Although the approach of this study is different from those of previous
studies, the description of the case and demonstration of the factors affecting
change prove its usefulness.
180
Keio Communication Review No. 33, 2011
REFERENCES
CHALABY Jean K. (eds.) (2005). Transnational Television Worldwide: Towards a
new media world, I. B. TAURIS.
CURRAN James and GUREVITCH Michael, (eds.) (2000). Mass Media and
Society, London: Arnold. 93-119.
DATOR James Allen, PRATT Richard, SEO Youngseok (2006). Fairness,
globalization, and public institutions: East Asia and Beyond, University of
Hawaii Press.
ELASMAR Michael G. (eds.) (2003). The Impact of International Television: A
Paradigm Shift, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
GO Jungmin (2005) “Hanryu ui Jisok gwa Kiup ui Hwaldong”, Samsung Gyonje
Yonguso.
GOONASWKWEA Anura & LEE Paul S. N. (eds.) (1998). TV Without Borders:
Asia Speaks Out, AMIC (Asian Media Information and Communication
Center).
HAN Hongsuck (2004) “Tyunguk Dejyung Munhwa Hyongsung gwa Yoguku
Dejyung Munhwa ui Suyong” [Jyungguk un ue Hanryu rur Suyong Hanunga],
Hakkobang
HOSKINS & MIRUS (1988) Reasons for the US dominance of the international
trade in television programmes, Media Culture & Society. 499-515.
ITO Yoich., & KOCHEVAR J. (1983). Factor accounting for the f low of
international communication, Keio Communication Review, 4, 13-37.
ITO Yoich (1990). The Trade Winds Change: Japan’s Shift from an Information
Importer to an Information Exporter, 1965-1985, Communication Yearbook
12, 430-465.
ITO Yochi (1999) “Ajia taiheiyoutiikini okeru Jyouhou Kouryuuno Patan to
Kiteiyouin [Factor accounting for the flow of international communication in
Asia pacific region]”, media komyunikeisyon , No.48. 67-90.
JOUNG Sunil & JANG Hansung (2000) “Hanguk TV 40Nyon ui Baljachui”, Hanul
Academy.
KIM Milim (2008) “Eizou Kontentuno Kokusai Kouryu Hendouto Seihu no
Yakuwari ni Kansuru Kenkyu: Kanryu wo Jirei ni” Keio Daigaku Daigakuin
Seisaku Media Kenkyuka Hakase Ronbun.
KIRBY Mark (2000). Sociology in perspective, Heubemann.
181
KWAK Kisung (2009). Broadcasting Deregulation in South Korea, KEI Academic
Paper Series, Vol. 4. No. 6, KEI (Korea Economic Institute).
LEE Chin-Chuan (1980). Media Imperialism Reconsidered: The Homogenizing of
Television Culture, SAGE.
SEO Yongseok (2006) East Asian Response to the Globalization of culture,
Fairness, globalization, and public institutions: East Asia and beyond,
University of Hawaii Press, 319-338.
SREBERNY A. (2002). The Global and the Local in International Communications,
The anthropology of media: a reader, Blackwell Publishing. 337-356.
STRAUBHAAR Joseph (2003). Choosing National TV: Cultural Capita, Language,
and Cultural Proximity in Brazil, The Impact of International Television: A
Paradigm Shift, 77-110. Lawrence Erlbaum Associate.
TOMLINSON J. (1991). Cultural Imperialism, London, Pinter.
TUNSTALL J. (1977). The Media are American, London, Constable.
YU Sangchul (eds.) (2005) “Hanryu ui Bimil”, Senggak ui Namu.
New York Times, December 23 2004
New York Times, June 28 2005
New York Times, January 2 2006
New York Times, January 29 2006
New York Times, February 22 2007
Wall Street Journal, May 19 2009
Wall Street Journal, October 20 2010
182