Lebanon
2017 Country Review
http://www.countrywatch.com
Table of Contents
Chapter 1
1
Country Overview
1
Country Overview
2
Key Data
4
Lebanon
5
Middle East
6
Chapter 2
8
Political Overview
8
History
9
Political Conditions
10
Political Risk Index
122
Political Stability
137
Freedom Rankings
152
Human Rights
164
Government Functions
167
Government Structure
169
Principal Government Officials
180
Leader Biography
181
Leader Biography
181
Foreign Relations
188
National Security
214
Defense Forces
217
Chapter 3
219
Economic Overview
219
Economic Overview
220
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
223
Nominal GDP and Components
227
Government Spending and Taxation
229
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
232
Trade and the Exchange Rate
234
The Balance of Payments
235
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
237
Nominal GDP and Components
240
Government Spending and Taxation
242
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
245
Trade and the Exchange Rate
247
The Balance of Payments
248
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
250
Nominal GDP and Components
253
Government Spending and Taxation
255
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
258
Trade and the Exchange Rate
260
The Balance of Payments
261
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
263
Nominal GDP and Components
266
Government Spending and Taxation
268
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
271
Trade and the Exchange Rate
273
The Balance of Payments
274
Economic Performance Index
276
Chapter 4
288
Investment Overview
288
Foreign Investment Climate
289
Foreign Investment Index
293
Corruption Perceptions Index
306
Competitiveness Ranking
318
Taxation
327
Stock Market
327
Partner Links
328
Chapter 5
329
Social Overview
329
People
330
Human Development Index
331
Life Satisfaction Index
335
Happy Planet Index
346
Status of Women
355
Global Gender Gap Index
358
Culture and Arts
368
Etiquette
369
Travel Information
370
Diseases/Health Data
380
Chapter 6
386
Environmental Overview
386
Environmental Issues
387
Environmental Policy
388
Greenhouse Gas Ranking
389
Global Environmental Snapshot
400
Global Environmental Concepts
411
International Environmental Agreements and Associations
425
Appendices
Bibliography
450
451
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Chapter 1
Country Overview
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Country Overview
LEBANON
In 1516 Lebanon was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. Following the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire after World War I, the League of Nations mandated the five provinces that
comprise present-day Lebanon to France. The country gained independence in 1943, but its
history since independence has been marked by periods of political turmoil. From 1975 until 1991
Lebanon suffered a bloody civil war in which regional powers - particularly Israel, Syria and the
Palestine Liberation Organization - used the country as a battlefield for their own conflicts. Syrian
troops moved in shortly after the war started. Israeli troops invaded in 1978 and again in 1982, and
withdrew in May 2000. The assassination of Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22
others in February 2005 led to massive demonstrations in Beirut against the Syrian presence and
Syria withdrew the remainder of its military forces in April 2005. In July 2006 two Israeli soldiers
were kidnapped by the Hizballah guerillas, leading to a 34-day conflict between Israel and Lebanon
in which approximately 1,200 Lebanese civilians were killed. The battle caused enormous damages
to homes, businesses, and infrastructure. Unlike many of its Middle Eastern neighbors, Lebanon
does not have petroleum reserves and has few natural resources. However, with its high literacy
rate and traditional mercantile culture, Lebanon has been an important commercial hub for the
region.
Editor's Note -Since the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri -- a noted politician
with an anti-Syrian orientation -- Lebanon has slowly retrenched into a state of dissonance. The
period saw short-term transformation when the Cedar Revolution swept pro-Western and antiSyrian factions to power at the polls later that year, along with the withdrawal of Syrian troops
from Lebanon for a three-decade long presence in that country. While the Cedar Revolution was
viewed as the dawning of a new day in Lebanon, the aftermath was not so pleasant. Political
stability devolved, as exemplified by a spate of political assassinations, which were blamed on proSyrian elements. As well, Lebanon was the main venue of violent conflict during the 2006 war
between Hezbollah and Israel. In recent times, the country has been caught in a political deadlock
and intransigence over presidential succession, largely due to prevailing acrimony between proSyrian/pro-Hezbollah factions and pro-reform/Western-backed members in the Lebanese
parliament. The establishment of the May 2008 Doha Agreement was intended to end the political
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impasse and move the country forward. The opening of corresponding embassies in Beirut and
Damascus in 2009 was viewed as a step not only towards positive bilateral engagement, but also
towards greater stability in Lebanon. However, as noted above, the collapse of the unity
government at the start of 2011, the May 2011 attack on United Nations peacekeepers, and the
June 2011 appointment of a Hezbollah-dominated government, together augured further instability
in Lebanon. The assassination of the Lebanese internal intelligence chief, Wissam al-Hassan in
2012 re-opened old wounds, as they stoked the memories of the assassination of Rafik Hariri,
ultimately deepening the political cleavages between pro-Syrian and Hezbollah factions on one side,
and the pro-Western opposition on the other. The ascendancy of Hezbollah as the dominant power
in Lebanon since 2011 and well into 2013, as well as Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian war
across the border, in many ways suggested that the progress of the Cedar Revolution had been
reversed. The postponement of the 2013 elections as a result of the involvement of Hezbollah in
the Syrian conflict across the border only underlined the turbulence that characterizes the Lebanese
political landscape in recent times. In the domestic sphere, Lebanon's failure to elect consensus
president after a 2014 deadline passed was a sign that the political arena was dominated by
dissonance.
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Key Data
Key Data
Region:
Middle East
Population:
4151234
Climate:
Mediterranean; mild to cool, wet winters with hot, dry summers; Lebanon
mountains experience heavy winter snows.
Languages:
Arabic (official), French (official), Armenian, English
Currency:
1 Lebanese pound (£L) = 100 piasters
Holiday:
Independence Day is 22 November (1943), Martyr's Day is 6 May
Area Total:
10400
Area Land:
10230
Coast Line:
225
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Lebanon
Country Map
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Middle East
Regional Map
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Chapter 2
Political Overview
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History
Lebanon is the historical home of the Phoenicians, the Semitic traders whose maritime culture
flourished in the Eastern Mediterranean for more than 2,000 years (3000 before the common era,
or B.C.E. - 450 in the common era, or C.E.). Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks and Romans,
settled, and sometimes, even ruled the land during that era.
By 325 C.E., Christianity came to the area during the Byzantine Empire. Islam followed in the
seventh century C.E. In later centuries, Lebanon's mountains were a refuge for Christians, and
crusaders established several strongholds there.
By 1516, Lebanon was incorporated into Turkey's Ottoman Empire, and ruled by the Ottomans
for 400 years. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the five Ottoman
provinces that had comprised present-day Lebanon were mandated to France by the League of
Nations. The country gained independence in 1943, and French troops withdrew in 1946.
Since the establishment of the Lebanese state, its origin and identity has been highly contested.
While some-mostly Christians-choose to emphasize the country's Phoenician heritage, othersmostly Muslims-saw Lebanon as an artificial state, belonging to Syria and as a great Arab nation.
Both sides have sought to involve and seek moral, economic and military support from foreign
actors and powers supporting their version of Lebanon.
The history and politics of Lebanon can not be understood without this in mind; there emerges the
struggle to impose and finally compromise on the identity of the Lebanese state. In addition to
inter-Lebanese fighting, neighboring and foreign powers have sought to influence their Lebanese
allies and have on several occasions manipulated the fragile Lebanese situation to serve their own
interest.
The unwritten 1943 National Pact sought to establish a political syst em that all parties could live
with. The president should be a Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of
the parliament a Shia Muslim. Parliamentary seats were distributed according to sect and region,
ensuring the Christians a majority of seats.
The principle of sectarianism was also applied to posts within the government and the bureaucracy.
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In addition to the political "advantage" awarded to the Christian sects, an economic cleavage
existed with Christians generally being more well off than the Sunnis, and the Sunnis better off
than the Shias.
Note on History: In certain entries, open source content from the State Department Background
Notes and Country Guides have been used. A full listing of sources is available in the
Bibliography.
Political Conditions
Introduction
Lebanon's political history since independence can be defined largely in terms of its presidents,
each of whom shaped Lebanon by a personal brand of politics: Sheikh Bishara al-Khoury (19431952), Camille Chamoun (1952-1958), Fuad Shihab (1958-1964), Charles Helou (1964-1970),
Suleiman Franjieh (1970-1976), Elias Sarkis (1976-1982), and Amin Gemayel (1982-1988). From
the end Amin Gemayel's term in September 1988 until the election of Rene Moawad in November
1989, Lebanon had no president. This was due to a constitutional crisis over the existence of both
an interim government and a de facto government. After Moawad's assassination in 1989, only two
weeks after he was elected, he was replaced with Elias Harawi (1989-1998). Emile Lahoud was
elected president in November 1998. Controversy swirled around the successor to Lahoud in 2007
(see below for details). In 2008, Michel Suleiman became Lebanon's most recent president. A
presidential contest was to be held in 2014 but the deadline passed without a consensus candidate
being found (see below for details).
The Early Post-independence Period
The terms of the first two presidents ended in political turmoil. In 1958, during the last months of
President Chamoun's term and the height of Egyptian Presiden t Nasser's pan-Arabism ideology,
an insurrection broke out over opposition to Lebanon's close ties to the West. In July of that year,
in response to an appeal by the Lebanese government and justified by the Eisenhower doctrine of
resistance to "international communism," United States (U.S.) forces were sent to Lebanon. They
were withdrawn in October, after the inauguration of President Shihab and a general improvement
in the internal and international aspects of the situation.
By the 1970s, yet another crisis emerged, as a consequence of post-World War II restructuring
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efforts. Specifically, the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the 1967 war had displaced the
non-Jewish Palestinian people, and led to the influx of a stream of Palestinian refugees into Jordan,
Syria and Lebanon. By 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had been formed, and it
engaged in the training of members in military activities, and mobilizing "fedayeen" (commandostyle martyrs) by 1968. The mass killings of Palestinian civilians and guerrillas in the Jordanian
government's "Black September" operation in 1970 saw the final expulsion of Palestinian guerrillas
from Jordan. The PLO moved its headquarters to Beirut, and began operating bases out of
Lebanon, launching attacks out of South Lebanon on Israel.
Civil Conflict
President Franjieh's term saw the outbreak of full-scale civil conflict in 1975. Prior to 1975,
difficulties had arisen over the large number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and the presence of
Palestinian guerrillas, mirroring the internal Lebanese sectarian identity struggles. Frequent clashes
involving Israeli forces and the "fedayeen" endangered civilians in South Lebanon and unsettled the
country. Many Christians were especially vocal about controlling the activities of the "fedayeen."
Following minor skirmishes in the late 1960s and early 1970s, serious clashes erupted between the
"fedayeen" and Lebanese government fo rces in May 1973.
Exacerbated by the Palestinian problem, the already existing Muslim-Christian political, social and
economic differences grew more intense. The Muslims were dissatisfied with what they considered
an inequitable distribution of political power and social benefits. The Palestinian problem pitted
leftist, pan-Arab, mostly Muslims against right wing, Western-oriented, mostly Christians.
In April 1975, after shots were fired at a church, a busload of Palestinians was ambushed by
gunmen in Ain al-Ramaneh in the Christian sector of Beirut-an incident widely regarded as the
spark that touched off the civil war. Palestinian militia forces joined the predominantly leftistMuslim side as the fighting persisted, eventually spreading to most parts of the country. Almost
40,000 people were killed in this first phase of what was going to be a 15-year long civil war.
Elias Sarkis was elected president in 1976. In October, Arab summit s in Riyadh and Cairo set
forth a plan to end the war. The resulting Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), composed largely of Syrian
troops, moved in at the Lebanese government's invitation to separate the combatants, and most
fighting ended soon thereafter.
As an uneasy quiet settled on Beirut and parts of Lebanon, security conditions in southern
Lebanon began deteriorating. A series of clashes occurred in the south in late 1977 and early 1978
between the PLO and Lebanese leftists on the one hand, and the pro-Israeli, southern Lebanese
militia, eventually known as the South Lebanese Army (SLA), on the other.
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After a raid on a bus in northern Israel left large numbers of Israeli and Palestinian guerrilla
casualties, and whose purpose undoubtedly was to cause civilian Israeli casualties, Israel invaded
Lebanon in March 1978, occupying most of the area south of the Litani River. The United Nations
(U.N.) Security Council passed Resolution 425 calling for with drawal of Israeli forces from
Lebanon and creating a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), charged with
maintaining peace. When the Israelis withdrew, they turned over positions inside Lebanon along
the border to their Lebanese ally, the SLA, and formed a "security zone" under the effective
control of Israel and the SLA.
In mid-1978, clashes between the Arab Deterrence Force and the Christian militias erupted. Arab
foreign ministers created the Arab Follow-Up Committee, composed of Lebanon, Syria, Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait, to end fighting between the Syrians and Christians. After the Saudi ambassador
was wounded in an attack in December 1978, the committee did not meet again formally until June
1981, when it was convened to address security and national reconciliation. The committee was
unsuccessful in making progress toward a political settlement and was inactive from November
1981.
The 1980s
Israeli-Palestinian fighting in July 1981 was ended by a cease-fire arranged by the United States.
The cease-fire was respected during the next 10 months, but a string of incidents, including PLO
rocket attacks on northern Israel, led to the June 6, 1982, Israeli ground attack into Lebanon to
remove PLO forces. Israeli forces moved quickly through South Lebanon, encircling west Beirut
by mid-June and beginning a three-month siege of Palestinian and Syrian forces in the city.
Throughout this period, which saw heavy Israeli air, naval and artillery bombardments of west
Beirut, American special envoy Philip C. Habib worked to arrange a settlement. In August 1982,
he was successful in bringing about an agreement for the evacuation of Syrian troops and PLO
fighters from Beirut. The agreement also provided for the deployment of a three-nation
Multinational Force (MNF) during the period of the evacuation, and by late August, U.S. Marines,
as well as French and Italian units, had arrived in Beirut. When the Palestinian fi ghters had left
Lebanon for Tunis and the Israeli evacuation ended, the MNF departed. The U.S. Marines left on
Sept. 10, 1982, but would soon return.
In spite of the invasion, the Lebanese political process continued to function, and Bashir Gemayel
was elected president in August. However, on Sept. 14, 1982, he was assassinated by unidentified
gunmen. The next day, on Sept. 15, Israeli troops entered west Beirut. During the next three days,
Lebanese militiamen massacred hundreds of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee
camps in west Beirut, an area under the control of Israeli forces. The massacres caused
international outcry, and Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon was forced to resign.
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Bashir Gemayel's brother, Amin, was elected president by a unanimous vote of the parliament. He
took office Sept. 23, 1982. The MNF forces returned to Beirut at the end of September as a
symbol of support for the government. President Gemayel and h is government placed primary
emphasis on the withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian and Palestinian forces from Lebanon, and in late
1982, Lebanese-Israeli negotiations commenced with U.S. participation.
In February 1983, a small British contingent joined the American, French and Italian MNF troops
in Beirut. On May 17 , an accord was signed by the representatives of Lebanon, Israel and the
United States, which provided for Israeli withdrawal. Syria declined to discuss the withdrawal of its
troops, effectively stalemating further progress.
Opposition to the negotiations, as well as to U.S. support for the Gemayel regime, led to a series of
terrorist attacks in 1983 and 1984 on U.S. interests. The bombing of the U.S. Embassy in west
Beirut on April 18, 1983 left 63 people dead; the bombing of the U.S. and French MNF
headquarters in Beirut on Oct. 23, 1983 left 298 people dead; and the bombing of the U.S.
Embassy annex in east Beirut on Sept. 20, 1984 left eight people dead.
The general security situation in Beirut had remained calm through late 1982 and the first half of
1983. A move by Christian militiamen into the Druze-controlled Chouf area southeast of Beirut
following the Israeli invasion, however, led to a series of Druze-Christian clashes of escalating
intensity beginning in October 1982.
When Israeli forces unilaterally withdrew from the Chouf at the beginning of September 1983, a
full-scale battle erupted between the Druze, backed by Syria, and the Christian Lebanese forces
supported by the Lebanese army. American and Saudi efforts led to a cease-fire on Sept. 26. This
left the Druze in control of most of the Chouf. Casualties were estimated to be in the thousands.
The virtual collapse of the Lebanese army in February 1984, following the defection of many of its
Muslim and Druze units to opposition militias, was a major blow to the government. As it became
clear that the depa rture of the U.S. Marines was imminent, the Gemayel government came under
increasing pressure from Syria and its Muslim Lebanese allies to abandon the May 17 accord. The
Lebanese government announced on March 5, 1984, that it was canceling its unimplemented
agreement with Israel. The U.S. Marines left the Lebanon for the second time later that month.
Further national reconciliation talks at Lausanne in Switzerland, under Syrian auspices, failed. A
new "government of national unity" under Prime Minister Rashid Karami was declared in April
1984, but made no significant progress toward solving Lebanon's internal political crises or its
growing economic difficulties.
The situation intensified with the deterioration of internal security. The opening rounds of the
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savage "camps war" in May 1985, a war that flared up twice in 1986, pitted the Palestinians living
in refugee camps in Beirut, Tyre, and Sidon against the Shiite Amal militia, which was concerned
w ith resurgent Palestinian military strength in Lebanon. Eager for a solution in late 1985, Syria
began to negotiate a "tripartite accord" on political reform among the leaders of various Lebanese
factions, including the Lebanese forces.
Gemayel nonetheless opposed the accord, and his hard-line anti-Syrian rival, Samir Geagea
overthrew the leader of the Lebanese forces in January 1986. Syria responded by inducing the
Muslim government ministers to cease dealing with Gemayel in any capacity, effectively paralyzing
the government. In 1987, the Lebanese economy worsened, and the currency began a precipitous
slide. On June 1, Prime Minister Rashid Karami was assassinated, further compounding the
political paralysis. Salim al-Huss was appointed acting prime minister.
As the end of President Gemayel's term of office neared, the different Lebanese factions could not
agree on a successor. Consequently, when his term expired on Sept. 23, 1988, Gemayel appoi nted
Army Commander Gen. Michel Aoun as interim prime minister. Gemayel's acting prime minister,
Salim al-Huss, also continued to act as the de facto prime minister.
As a result, Lebanon was placed in a constitutional crisis with two governments claiming
legitimacy-an essentially Muslim government in west Beirut, and an essentially Christian
government in east Beirut. The working levels of many ministries, however, remained intact and
were not immediately affected by the split at the ministerial level.
In February 1989, Gen. Aoun attempted to close illegal ports run by the Lebanese forces. This led
to several days of intense fighting in east Beirut, and an uneasy truce between Aoun's army units
and the Lebanese forces. In March, an attempt by Aoun to close illegal militia ports in
predominantly Muslim parts of the country led to a six-month period of shelling of east Beirut by
Muslim and Syrian forces, and the shelling of west Beirut and the Chouf by the Christian units of
the army and the Lebanese forces. This barrage caused nearly 1,000 deaths, several thousand
injuries, and further destruction to Lebanon's economic infrastructure.
In January 1989, the Arab League appointed a six-member committee on Lebanon, led by the
Kuwaiti foreign minister. At the Casablanca Arab Summit in May, the Arab League empowered a
higher committee on Lebanon, composed of Saudi King Fahd, Algerian President Bendjedid, and
Moroccan King Hassan, to work toward a solution in Lebanon. The committee issued a report in
July 1989, stating that its efforts had reached a "dead end" and blamed Syrian intransigence for the
blockage.
After further discussions, the committee arranged for a cease-fire in September, followed by a
meeting of Lebanese parliamentarians in Taif, Saudi Arabia. After a month of intense discussions,
the parliamentarians informally agreed on a charter of national reconciliation, also known as the
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Taif Agreement.
The parliamentarians returned to Lebanon in November, where they approved the Taif Agreement
and elected Rene Moawad, a Maronite deputy from Zghorta in North Lebanon, president on Nov.
5. Gen. Aoun, claiming powers as interim prime minister, issued a decree in early November
dissolving the parliament, and did not accept either the ratification of the Taif Agreement or the
election of President Moawad.
President Moawad was assassinated on Nov. 22, 1989, by a bomb that exploded as his motorcade
was returning from Lebanese Independence Day ceremonies. The parliament met on Nov. 24 in
the Bekaa' Valley and elected Elias Harawi, a Maronite Christian deputy from Zahleh in the Bekaa
Valley, to replace him. President Harawi named a prime minister, Salim al-Huss, and a cabinet on
Nov. 25. Despite widespread international recognition of Harawi and his government, Gen. Aoun
refused to recognize Harawi 's legitimacy, even when he was officially replaced by the new
president as army commander in early December.
The 1990s
In late January 1990, Gen. Aoun's forces attacked positions of the Lebanese forces in east Beirut
in an apparent attempt to remove the Lebanese forces as a political force in the Christian enclave.
In the heavy fighting that ensued in and around east Beirut, over 900 people died and over 3,000
were wounded.
In August 1990, the National Assembly approved, and President Harawi signed into law,
constitutional amendments embodying the political reform aspects of the Taif Agreement. These
amendments gave some presidential powers to the Council of Ministers, expanded the National
Assembly from 99 to 108 seats, and divided those seats equally between Christians and Muslims.
In October 1990, a joint Lebanese-Syrian military operation forced Gen. Aoun to capitulate and
take refuge in the French Embassy. On Dec. 24, 1990, Omar Karami was appointed prime
minister. Gen. Aou n remained in the French Embassy until Aug. 27, 1991 when a "special pardon"
was issued, allowing him to leave Lebanon safely and take up residence in France in exile. The
Syrian air bombardment on east Beirut on Oct. 13, effectively ended the Lebanese civil war. The
war had left some 150,000 dead, 300,000 wounded and 500,000 people displaced.
Considerable advancement in efforts to reassert state control over Lebanese territory took place in
1991 and 1992. Militias, with the significant exception of Hezbollah, were dissolved in May 1991,
and the armed forces moved against armed Palestinian elements in Sidon in July 1991. In May
1992 the remaining Western hostages taken during the mid-1980s by Islamic extremists were
released.
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In October 1991, under the sponsorship of the United States and the Soviet Union, the Middle
East peace talks were convened in Madrid, Spain. This was the first time that Israel and its Arab
neighbors had direct bilateral negotiations on the Middle East conflict. Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and
representatives of the Palestinians concluded round 11 of the negotiations in September 1993.
A social and political crisis, fueled by economic instability and the collapse of the Lebanese pound,
led to Prime Minister Omar Karami's resignation May 6, 1992. He was replaced by former Prime
Minister Rashid al-Sulh, who was widely viewed as a caretaker to oversee Lebanon's first
parliamentary elections in 20 years.
The elections were not prepared and carried out in a manner to ensure the broadest national
consensus. Elements of the 1992 electoral law, which paved the way for elections, represented a
departure from stipulations of the Taif Agreement, expanding the number of parliamentary seats
from 108 to 128, and employing a temporary districting arrangement designed to favor certain
sects and political interests.
The turnout of eligible voters in some Christian areas was extremely low, with many voters not
participating in the elections because they objected to voting in the presence of non-Lebanese
forces. There also were widespread reports of irregularities. The electoral rolls were themselves in
many instances unreliable because of the destruction of records and the use of forged identification
papers. As a consequence, the results did not reflect the full spectrum of Lebanese politics and did
not help the process of national reconciliation.
Following the election of the National Assembly, according to the Taif Agreement, the Syrian and
Lebanese governments had agreed that by September 1992 Syrian troops would be withdrawn
from the Bekaa region. That date passed and it became clear that no such compliance would take
place until a comprehensive peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon had been completed.
In early November 1992, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri formed a new cabinet, retaining the finance
portfo lio for himself. The formation of the Hariri government, with the inclusion of a number of
technocrats, was widely seen as a sign that the government would seriously grapple with
reconstructing the Lebanese state and reviving the economy.
In June 1995, a constitutional amendment was passed that allowed President Harawi another term
in office, which would otherwise have expired in October of that year. In 1996, the Hariri
government was renewed in the next set of parliamentary elections. The elections did not produce
a parliament much different from the previous one. Syrian meddling was obvious, election fraud
and irregularities were many. Many Christians continued the call for boycotting the elections as
long as there were foreign forces on Lebanese soil.
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Since the beginning of the Middle East peace talks at Madrid, Spain in 1991, Lebanon has
participated in the process. An escalation in fighting between Hezbollah and Israel-supported, took
place from late 1992 into early 1993. Such conflicts continued well into 1994. Lebanon and other
Arab nations withdrew from the peace talks once again in 1994 following the murder of a group of
Muslim worshippers in Hebron, by an Israeli extremist. Another escalation in fighting between
Hezbollah and Israeli forces took place, as a consequence of the incident. Hezbollah ceased its
attacks later that year when United States (U.S.) President Clinton visited the region, but resumed
activity after his departure.
Intensive Israeli air attacks on Lebanon occurred in 1993, 1994 and 1996, in response to Hezbollah
operating from positions within Lebanon. Israeli authorities warned Lebanese authorities that
civilians would be endangered by the attacks on Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon, and some
400,000 Lebanese were displaced as a result. Operation "Grapes of Wrath" in April 1996, saw air
attacks directed at a village north of Beirut (where Hezbollah had never operated from) as well as
the infamous attack on a U.N. post in the village of Qana which sheltered civilians. The Israeli
attack killed 106 Lebanese civilians, and it became crucial to find an immediate diplomatic solution.
On April 27, 1996, a cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah took effect, and as a
result of the devastating consequence of Operation Grapes of Wrath, the two parties agreed to
avoid civilian targets. An international committee monitored it in July, and the larger Middle
Eastern peace process continued. In the wake of the cease-fire, in 1998, Emile Lahoud replaced
Harawi as the president. The former general, who had successfully rebuilt the army, was approved
by the Syrians and entrusted with the presidency. Personal differences between Lahoud and Hariri
led to the naming of Salim al-Hoss as prime minister-his fourth term.
President Lahoud emphasized the battle against corruption and economic reform in inaugural
speech. However, due to Sy ria's and its supporters' role in Lebanese politics, Lahoud has been
unable or unwilling to clean up the system. This is particularly illustrated by the fact that Lahoud
chose to include Michel al-Murr as minister of interior in his government. Murr has been known as
Syria's strong man in the Lebanese regime, and is a feared and corrupt man.
From 2000-2004
Israeli attacks on South Lebanon continued almost on a daily basis in 1998, 1999 and 2000. On
two occasions, in June 1999 and in February 2000, Israeli planes bombed Lebanese infrastructure
causing substantial damages to roads and power stations. Several people were killed in both
instances. Also, the Israeli army and the South Lebanese Army (SLA) suffered heavy losses in the
beginning of 2000.
The election of Ehud Barak and his promise to withdraw Israeli soldiers from South Lebanon
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within a year led to the anticipation of the departure of Israeli soldiers in July 2000. However,
intensified Hezbollah attacks a nd the killing of several Israeli soldiers -- in addition to the low
morale and the desertion of SLA soldiers -- led to a hasty end of the Israeli occupation on May 25,
2000. The SLA once numbered 2,500 fighters. Some 2,200 of them surrendered to Lebanese
authorities or were captured after Israel withdrew, while the rest, mostly ranking SLA officers and
their families fled to Israel. A Lebanese military court has sentenced more than 1,000 people to jail
terms of up to 15 years since the trials of alleged collaborators began on June 5, 2000. The military
court's verdicts cannot be appealed.
Civilians flooded the roads and villages of the liberated zone that had been occupied for 22 years in
the days following the withdrawal. Peace and order was not restored immediately, and it was not
until June 18 that the U.N. Security Council confirmed the Israeli withdrawal. More than a month
went by before U.N. peacekeepers could deploy in the area on July 28.
Du ring the summer of 2000, the Lebanese army was still in the process of returning to and
restoring law and order in the area. South Lebanon remained relatively quiet and stable since the
Israeli withdrawal, but low-level tensions existed on almost a daily basis. The new border stations
became points of attractions, where Lebanese came to throw stones and bottles on Israeli soldiers,
and tourist to experience the absurd closeness of the conflict-now being within an arm's reach of
Israeli soldiers.
The death of Hafez al-Assad in Syria and the coming to power of his son, the self-proclaimed
reformer and modernizer, Bashar al-Assad, had, in addition to the opposition's sweeping victory,
given rise to the hopes of changes in Syrian-Lebanese relations. The election campaign saw, for the
first time, calls for the re-evaluation of Syrian-Lebanese relations. The return to Lebanon of former
President Amin Gemayel, after 12 years of self-imposed exile in France, signalled Christi an hopes
for a fairer political process in the future.
Despite the liberation of South Lebanon, the Hoss government had been unable to improve the
economic situations and failed to implement promised economic reforms. In the parliamentary
elections on Aug. 27 and Sept. 3, 2000, government opposition candidates, and in particular former
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and his supporters, won a landslide victory. The elections were less
tainted by obvious fraud, but the pre-elections restrictions, such as Syrian approval of most
candidates, the centrality of money and the need for "wasta" (connections) in the campaign, does
still disqualify the elections from a free and fair label.
The new parliament convened on Oct. 17, 2000, and within a few days Rafik Hariri was appointed
prime minister. The new government faces enormous economic challenges as Lebanon spends half
of its national budget serving the sky rocketing debt-ironically acquired during Hariri's fir st period
as prime minister. The new 30-member cabinet includes some of Hariri's former ministers,
amongst others the controversial former Finance Minister Fouad Siniora who is under investigation
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for embezzlement of public funds. Armenian and Maronite groups who complain of lack of
representation criticized the new cabinet. The fact that all members of the new cabinet were
approved by Syria and that no politician in vocal opposition to Syria's influence were amongst the
ministers appointed, underlined the continued influence of Syria on domestic Lebanese politics.
With the death of the older Assad, a psychological barrier seems to have been brought down. The
politically marginal, but symbolically important, success of some opposition candidates in the
elections has spawned an increasingly vocal and intense opposition to the Syrian presence and
domination of Lebanese politics. An unprecedented anti-Syrian statement was issued on September
20 by the Council of Ma ronite Bishops, which called for the redeployment of the Syrian army.
Maverick Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, has on several occasions strongly criticized the Syrian
presence. Jumblatt's fierce anti-Syrian comments have earned him new allies among Christian
opposition politicians and the Maronite clergy, but also a persona non grata is status in Damascus.
Not surprisingly, Syrian troops' patrols around Jumblatt's strongholds in the Chouf area have
intensified.
In an attempt to demonstrate Lebanon's commitment to freedom of statement, and simultaneously
testing former Gen. Aoun's willingness to observe the "red lines" of public discourse, Murr TV
(MTV) was allowed to broadcast a live interview with Aoun on Feb. 12, 2001. However, those
who believed that Aoun would tone down his criticism of Syria, in order to "earn" his right to
return to Lebanon were wrong. Aoun continued his fierce criticism of Syria, and even said that
Lebanese President Emile Lahoud had been appoi nted by Syria. However, threats that charges
would be filed against both Aoun and MTV were dropped when MTV officially denounced the
views presented by Aoun, and after Prime Minister Hariri returned from France in mid-February,
arguing that such charges would damage Lebanon's relation with France and the West. Despite the
government's displeasure with criticism of Syria, former President Amin Gemayel, only recently
returned to Lebanon from exile, launched a fierce tirade against Syrian occupation of Lebanon in a
lecture in late February 2001.
In early August 2002, Murr TV was in the headlines again -- accused of slandering the country's
president and its security services, as well as damaging the country's ties with Syria, which is the
major political force in Lebanon.The charges followed similar accusations against Lebanese
Broadcasting Corporation International, the most popular Christian-owned channel, earlier in the
week.
Many Christians oppose Syria's continued influence in Lebanon, where it maintained 20,000
troops. Against this backdrop, the Lebanese and Syrian regimes' fear of the growing overt
opposition to Syria's role in Lebanon increased. On March 14, 2001, several thousand students
demonstrated on the 12th anniversary for the launching of Aoun's "War of Liberation" against
Syria. Lebanese security forces virtually sealed off the capital in a bid to contain demonstrations,
and more than 35 demonstrators were detained. However, a demonstration against the Aoun
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demonstration a week later dispersed some security personnel around the capital.
Lebanon's human rights violations record was still bleak with scores of people continuing to be
arrested on political grounds, including students arrested after demonstrations. Dozens of people
accused of "collaborating" with Israel received trials, which fell short of international fair trial
standards. There were also reports of torture and ill treatment. Lebanon 's press enjoys relatively
more freedom than other Middle Eastern countries, but influential individuals and politicians often
own media organizations although statements of overt, anti-Syrian opinions are seldom tolerated,
and the media practices self-censorship. In December 2000, around 50 Lebanese citizens were
released from Syrian prisons, and handed over to Lebanese authorities. Syria claimed that its held
no Lebanese prisoners, but this was disputed by several international human rights organizations.
In January 2002, former Lebanese Christian militia leader, Elie Hobeika, a key figure in the
massacres of Palestinian refugees in 1982, died in a blast shortly after disclosing that he held
videotapes and documents challenging the Israeli version of the story of the massacres. Hobeika,
46, was linked to the 1982 massacres at Sabra and Chatilla refugee camps, where Israeli-allied
Lebanese Christian militiamen allegedly killed about 2,000 Palestinian refugees. However, just
before his death, Hobeika -- who has repeatedly denied any link -- told Belgian senators
investigating the massacres he had information which he believed would contradict the Israeli
version of events.
The Hariri government was struggling to renew faith in the Lebanese economy and restructure its
government organization. However, some steps toward administrative reform were taken. The
government's TV station "Tele Liban" was closed down on March 1, 2001 -- but later re-opened.
Other government services, including the electricity company, are expected to be privatized as a
part of the government's efforts to revamp the debt-ridden Lebanese economy and its surplusstaffed administration. Lebanon's national debt stood at $25 billion in March 2001, and was
expected to rise to more than $30 billion within the year. In February 2001, Lebanon obtained
$485 million in loans and grants from international finance groups such as the World Bank, the
European Commission and the Mediterranean Development Agency.
Nevertheless, with increasing internal dissatisfaction regarding economic and political conditions, a
Middle East peace process in deadlock, and meager prospects for help from an improved regional
situation to boost economic and political confidence in the region, Lebanon faced some dire times
ahead in 2002.
In the first part of 2003, international relations dominated the political landscape. Following the war
in Iraq, the United States insisted that Hezbollah fighters on the Lebanese border with Israel be
replaced with the government's military forces instead. For the most part, the Lebanese position
regarding Hezbollah is similar to that of the Syrians; the vast majority of Lebanese believe that
Hezbollah enacts legitimate resistance against Israeli occupation. In the case of Lebanon, however,
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Hezbollah has been legitimized by the government in Beirut. The An-Nahar newspaper reported
that Lebanese President Emile Lahoud told United States Secretary of State Colin Powell that
Hezbollah is recognized "as a legal political party." Although there was no verification of this quote
by the government of Lebanon, it was certainly true that Lebanese Hezbollah is a political party
that holds seats in the parliament. President Emile Lahoud was largely unresponsive to the
requisition by the United States.
Also in the first part of 2003, Iranian President Mohammed Khatami traveled to Lebanon for the
first official visit by an Iranian head of state since the Islamic revolution in 1979. At the airport,
Khatami was met by the Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, several
Cabinet members, as well as the deputy head of Hezbollah, Sheik Naim Kassem. Khatami's
presence was also greeted with throngs of enthusiastic Shi'a supporters in the streets of Beirut. In
addition to signing a loan agreement valued at about $50 million, Khatami discuss ed the role of
Hezbollah with the Lebanese leadership. Although Hezbollah has operated in Lebanon, its activities
have often been funded by Iran. Lebanon, Iran, and also Syria, have been pressured by the United
States to withdraw their support of Hezbollah.
In August 2003, violence returned to the Lebanese landscape when a car bomb exploded in the
streets of the capital city of Beirut, killing a member of Hezbollah. Both the controversial group as
well as the Lebanese government placed the blame on Israel for the explosion.
Several months later in December 2003, Lebanese security forces detained two suspects on the
grounds that the men were plotting to attack the embassy of the United States in Beirut. Roughly
around the same period in late 2003, close to thirty people were sentenced to imprisonment for
association with various attacks in Lebanon on commercial enterprises or interests from the United
States and the United Kingdom.
Meanwhile, also in late 2003, the government put forth a strict budget aimed at economic reform
and dealing with the country's terribly high debt. The debates and disagreements about the
economy in recent times have not helped the country to deal with the debt challenge, and certainly
has not helped the privatization program and necessary cost-cutting measures. As such, the need
for the budget to pass appeared to be of vital interest. The provisions of the budget, however,
allow for very little social program expenditures and also seeks to raise taxes. The result has been
an extended debate within parliament and even street protests over wage freezing in certain sectors.
In early 2004, one of the most significant political decisions made involved the resolution to
reinstitute capital punishment. In this regard, in January 2004, three convicted murderers were
executed.
By August 2004, the main political issue involved the declaration by President Lahoud that he
wished to continue to serve in office after his six-year term ended. In this regard, the president's
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office issued a statement noting that Lahoud had not yet completed his political and administrative
reform strategy. Accordingly, the statement said that Lahoud was "ready for the mission" of
continuing his work, if parliament wished to provide him with a mandate. Such a mandate would
entail constitutional changes since at present, Lebanon's constitution prevents consecutive terms for
presidents.
Although neighboring Syria was reportedly enthused about the idea of such a constitutional change,
other countries such as the United States, were not nearly as pleased about the possibility.
Moreover, at home in Lebanon, people were generally skeptical about the idea of a constitutional
change aimed at extending one person's grip on power.
Nevertheless, a vote in the Lebanese parliament resulted in a provision for the Syrian-favored
Lahoud to stay on for three more years. This step was seen as a virtual agreement to allow Syria
to maintain its power in the Lebanese political scene.
In September 2004, four members of Lebanon’s parliament planned to resign to protest the
passage of this amendment. Then, in October 2004, Prime Minister Hariri resigned from office.
The resignation was the culmination of a long standing dispute with President Lahoud over political
and economic reforms, although spurred in large part by the decision to extend Lahoud's tenure.
Hariri, at the time, had been in political office for almost 15 years and had enjoyed the stature of
being a leading political figure in Lebanon since the end of the civil war in 1990. In the period after
his resignation, he became increasingly known as an opposition voice. In particular, Hariri joined
the opposition's calls for a withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon -- a move not favored by
Syrian-aligned factions.
Meanwhile, in the fall of 2004, the United Nations Security Council narrowly passed a United
States-proposed resolution demanding the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. The
resolution also called for full respect for Lebanese sovereignty. Presumably, the measure was
directed at Syrian forces, which, as discussed throughout, first entered Lebanon as peacekeepers
in the 1970s. The impetus for the United States-proposed resolution was believed to have been
associated with its shift in policy toward Syria. Whereas Syria was viewed favorably in the 1990s
for its support of the Gulf War to liberate Kuwait, it was now viewed negatively due to its
opposition to the invasion of Iraq, as well as its supposed ties to Palestinian terrorist groups such as
Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Earlier in 2004, the United States went so far as to place sanctions on
Syria demanding cessation of support for these groups, which often claim responsibility for attacks
on Israeli citizens. By extension, this stance may have impacted Lebanon.
The Assassination and the Aftermath
On Feb. 14, 2005, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was killed in what appeared to
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have been a political assassination. A car bomb exploded came just after Hariri had left a political
session in parliament and his convoy was around the area of the St. George's Hotel.. The attack
left around 10 people dead and several injured. Included in those reported to have been killed
were members of his convoy; a former minister, also in his convoy, was reported to have been
seriously injured.
As noted above, Hariri resigned from his political office as prime minister in 2004 over differences
with President Emile Lahoud. For his part, Lahoud is regarded as a favorite of the Syrian
government, which ha s been highly influential of Lebanese politics. In recent times, however,
relations between the two countries became more tense. Nevertheless, Syrian President Bashar alAssad condemned Hariri's assassination. As well, Arab League Secretary General Amr Mussa
characterized it as an act of terrorism, which was sure to have political ramifications.
In the period after Hariri's death, relations between Lebanon and Syria plummeted. The late prime
minister's funeral was itself transformed into a spontaneous rally of Lebanese nationalism mixed
with protest against Syrian's military presence in Lebanon. Such protests continued in Lebanon
after the time of the funeral. Indeed, Lebanese opposition groups scheduled a rally in Beirut on
Feb. 28, 2005, to protest the killing of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and to call for a formal
investigation into the assassination. Meanwhile, another pro-government rally was scheduled to
protest the arrival of United States diplomat David Satterfield, who traveled to Beirut to call for the
withdrawal of Syrian troops. In order to prevent political clashes, a ban against such
demonstrations was put into place by the government. Nevertheless, protests and rallies became
regular fare during this period. Indeed, emotions ran so high that President Emile Lahoud offered
to step down from office.
For Syria, pressure was exerted by external factions. Notably, very soon after Harare's death, the
United States entered the fray by calling for Syria's military withdrawal from Lebanon. Of
particular significance was the decision by the United States to demand the implementation of
United Nations Security Resolution 1559, which calls for the withdrawal of "all remaining foreign
forces" from Lebanon. By Feb. 21, 2005, the Arab League announced that plans were in the
works to go forward with the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. The announcement
followed a meeting between the leadership of the Arab League and Syrian President Bashar Assad.
In the backdrop of these developments was the parliamentary debate on Hariri's assassination,
during which the opposition was expected to call for a vote of non-confidence in the government.
Before the vote could be called, on Feb. 28, 2005, pro-Syrian Prime Minister Omar Karami and
his government resigned. Ten days after his resignation, Karami was asked by the president to
form a new government and resume his post as prime minister. Karami had the backing of the
majority of parliamentarians and continued on as head of government in somewhat of a "caretaker"
capacity.
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By April 2005, however, Karami again submitted his resignation, which was accepted by President
Lahoud. On April 14, 2005, Karami said that the reason for his resignation was the inability to
form a cabinet. After consultations with other politicians, many with competing interests, demands
and agendas, Karami said that the process had reached a dead end. President Lahoud said he
would begin new consultations with the parliament for the purpose of naming a new prime
minister. Complicating matters was the fact that parliamentary elections were scheduled for May
2005. Nevertheless, Nagib Mikati was eventually named as the prime minister-designate. He soon
formed a government and was able to command some popular support despite his perceived ties to
Syria.
In another development, it was announced in late April 2005 that Saad Hariri, son of the late Rafik
Hariri, would take on the task of continuing his father's work. A statement was issued noting that
the young Hariri would assume the "historical responsibility and leadership" required to pursue the
goals of independence and national unity. While Saad Hariri had already assumed the role of
administering his late father's business interests, it was not known precisely how his political
commitments might be met. For example, it was not made clear whether Saad Hariri would be a
candidate in parliamentary elections to be held in May 2005.
Meanwhile, in March 2005, after weeks of intensifying pressure, Syrian President Basha al-Assad
announced the redeployment of Syrian troops in Lebanon. The pull-back was scheduled to begin
first with redeployment to the eastern Bekaa Valley, and then to the Syrian border, as part of a
phased withdrawal. Talks making official the details of the withdrawal were to commence between
the Syrian and Lebanese leadership. President Bashar al-Assad said that following the
redeployment, Lebanon and Syria "will have fulfilled our obligations under the Taif accord and
under [United Nations Security Council] Resolution 1559." Even though United States authorities
said that the redeployment did not go far enough, Lebanese and Syrian groups eschewed
intervention by the Americans. These events followed a mass protest in Beirut in regard to the
killing of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
Then, in early April 2005, United Nations envoy Terje Roed-Larsen announced that Syria would
withdraw all its troops from Lebanon by the end of that very month . The announcement came
after a meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara. The
date was viewed as something of a surprise because it indicated a rapid pace for the full withdrawal
of Syrian troops, military assets and intelligence apparatus. Nevertheless, the scheduled
withdrawal was intended to meet the requirement of the 1989 Taif agreement, which set the course
for the end of the 1975-90 Lebanese civil war. It was also intended to fulfill the requirements set
forth in United Nations Security Resolution 1559.
Editor's Note: The 1989 Taif accord, which ended the Lebanese civil war, specified a phased
withdrawal, while the 2004 United Nations resolution called for the withdrawal of foreign forces
from Lebanon and the disarming of militant groups.
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As these developments were unfolding in the spring of 2005, Lebanon was in a state of political
turmoil. A spate of bombings, mostly in Christian areas where anti-Syrian sentiment had been high,
only exacerbated the grim situation. Indeed, the violence sparked anxieties about the return of
sectarian violence in a country which suffered frequent car bombings during its civil war from 1975
to 1990. While Lebanon's political opposition lashed out at Syria for the attacks, leaders in
Damascus denied any involvement and pointed to their plan to withdraw their troops from
Lebanon. Meanwhile, Lebanon's pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud called on political parties to
participate in "crisis talks."
Elections of 2005
By early May 2005, attention was turned to the upcoming parliamentary elections scheduled to
begin later that month in the capital city of Beirut.
In late May 2005, an opposition bloc claimed victory over all the seats in the capital city of Beirut
amidst Lebanon's parliamentary elections. The anti-Syrian opposition in Beirut has been led by
Saad Hariri, the son of former Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, who was assassinated months earlier.
But even before voting had commenced, nine out of the 12 Beirut seats had gone unchallenged to
the "Martyr Rafik Hariri list."
The Beirut vote preceded voting in other parts of the country, which was scheduled to take place
over the course of weeks during June 2005.
In the south of the country, the two main Shi'a groups, Hezbollah and Amal, formed an alliance
under the Resistance, Liberation and Development list. As expected, they were the victors in the
southern part of the country when voting took place a week later in early June 2005. Early results
suggested that Hezbollah and its ally, Amal, won all 23 seats in that area bordering Israel.
Within Maronite Christian enclaves, Michel Aoun led his own election list. During the following
phase of elections in the second week of June 2005, the anti-Syrian opposition appeared to have
suffered something of a defeat in the central area of Mount Lebanon. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt,
who was able to hold on to this own seat, admitted that Aoun's pro-Syrian Christian hardliners had
defeated his own more moderate compatriots. Although Aoun, who had once functioned as prime
minister in the late 1980s led a campaign to expel Syrian troops from Lebanon in years gone past,
in more recent times, he had aligned with pro-Syrian candidates from the Druze community.
Elections also took place in the Bekaa Valley, in the eastern part of the country. There, another
strong contest ensued between pro- and anti-Syrian candidates. Then, in the fourth and final round
of Lebanon 's phased parliamentary elections, the main opposition anti-Syrian alliance appeared to
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have won victory in the northern part of the country.
This meant that after the successive phases of the parliamentary elections, the opposition alliance
leader, led by Saad Hariri – the son of the assassinated former prime minister, would hold a
majority in parliament. The vote also symbolized the desire among the Lebanese people for
change. Still, the Shi’a factions of Hezbollah and Amal, who won prior in the south of the county,
would also hold a significant number of seats in the parliament. As such, they would likely to
continue to be an influential contributor to the political process.
As the election transpired, voting took place to choose 128 members of parliament, with seats
allocated to equal numbers of Christians and Muslims. Within the two religious groupings, seats
were also allocated to various sects, such as Druze, Greek Orthodox, Shi'a and Sunnis. In
accordance with the 1943 National Pact, the president is supposed to be a Maronite Christian, the
prime minister is to be a Sunni Muslim, and the president of the National Assembly is to be a Shi'a
Muslim. This means that Lebanon's president is the only non-Muslim head of state in the Arab
world amidst a system of pluralistic religious representation.
In the wake of elections, an ally of assassinated former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was designated
to be the new head of government. Fouad Siniora (sometimes spelled Fuad Siniora), a former
Finance Minister, was nominated by the son of Rafik Hariri, who led the anti-Syrian political bloc
to victory. Siniora was also backed by an overwhelming majority of legislators.
Hariri's bloc held 36 seats in the 128-seat parliament. Still, with its allies, such as Druze leader
Walid Jumblatt and Christian leader Michael Aoun, the Hariri bloc actually controlled 72
parliamentary votes. Yet despite this level of political influence, even as Lebanese legislators voted
in favor of Siniora, they also re-elected the strongly pro-Syrian Nabih Berri as the Speaker of the
House for a fourth term. The election of Berri demonstrated that even in the aftermath of the
Syrian military withdrawal, Syrian influence continued to prevail on the Lebanese political
landscape.
Note: The popular uprising that occurred after Hariri's death, which largely contributed to an
election victory for modern, anti-Syrian, pro-Western factions in parliament, ultimately placing the
Siniora government in power and spurring the exit of Syrian forces from Lebanon, has come to be
known as the "Cedar Revolution" of Lebanon.
Violence, Unrest and Investigations
In late September 2005, a television new anchor for the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation
(LBC), May Chidiac, was terribly wounded by a bomb explosion in her car, just north of the
capital city of Beirut. Reports stated that the bomb had been planted under the driver's seat of her
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Range Rover vehicle and it exploded when she turned on the car's ignition. She was raced to the
hospital and was in critical condition after her arm and leg were amputated. LBC, a Christian
television station, was regarded as one of the main anti-Syrian media outlets in Lebanon. Since
the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri earlier in 2005, a number of anti-Syrian
figures have been targeted.
In October 2005, Syria's Interior Minister Ghazi Kanaan committed suicide. His death came a
month after he was questioned by a United Nations investigator about the murder of former
Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri. Hours before apparently taking his own life, Kanaan, who had
functioned as Syria's top security chief in Lebanon for several years, said in an interview that he
had served Lebanon with honesty. This statement, in conjunction with the timing of his death
following questioning by the United Nations, led to suspicions about how Kanaan would be
represented in the United Nations report, which was to be published at the end of the month. Some
suggested that Syria's intelligence community was likely to be implicated, but how Kanaan's
suicide was linked with this outcome remained unknown.
The United Nations report on the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri
alleged the involvement of Syria's ruling Assad family, as well as key Lebanese associates. In
concluding section of paragraph 123, the report stated in strong terms that the decision to
assassinate Rafik Hariri could not have been reached without approval from the very top of the
Syrian security apparatus. The report also noted that Hariri's murder could not have been
organized without "the collusion of their counterparts in the Lebanese security services." The
report suggested that the motive for Hariri's murder was rooted in the belief that he was an enemy
of Syria and its Lebanese allies. The document did not, however, foreclose a more complex
constellation of rationales, including corruption and fraud.
One individual named in the report was Sheikh Ahmed Abdel-Al who seemingly telephoned
Lebanese President Emile Lahoud only moments after the bomb exploded killing, Hariri and
several others. Lahoud, significantly, had been at odds with Hariri and had enjoyed a strong
alliance with Syria. The timing of the call, thus, was deemed to be highly suspicious. Its
revelation appeared to fuel further calls for Lahoud's resignation from office. The report also
named one of Lahoud's closest security advisors -- General Mustapha Hamdan, the commander of
Lebanon's presidential guard -- as a witness. The report alleged that four months prior to the
assassination, he claimed that Hariri was "pro-Israeli" and said, "We are going to send him on a
trip; bye bye Hariri." As well, paragraph 96 of the report discussed testimony of a witness who
claimed to have worked for Syrian intelligence. In that testimony, a series of apparent (but
unconfirmed) meetings in Damascus between Lebanese and Syrian security officials were
described, including plans for Hariri's assassination. The brother-in-law o f Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad, Asef Shawkat, who led Syria's military intelligence, as well as Maher al-Assad, the
president's own brother, were reportedly mentioned in the report as well, although their actual
names were redacted. More broadly, the report criticized Syrian authorities of failing to cooperate
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with the investigation.
An investigator for the United Nations, Detlev Mehlis, warned that the report evoked further
investigatory work, and cautioned that those named should enjoy the presumption of innocence.
Nevertheless, he did not back away from the overall charges of conspiracy to commit murder,
which appeared to involve key Syrian and Lebanese officials. The report has been sent to the
United Nations Security Council for discussion. Before the commencement of those discussions,
the United States had already demanded action against Syria. Throughout, Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad said that there was no evidence to suggest that Syria was involved in Hariri's death.
A bomb exploded in Lebanon in December 2005 killing Gibran Tunei, a prominent anti-Syrian
parliamentarian and managing editor of a well-known newspaper. Tunei's death came only days
after his return from Paris, where he had been residing due to fears of attempts on his life.
The murder of Tunei, who had been a vocal critic of Syria's occupation of Lebanon, was the latest
in a series of more than a dozen political assassinations over the course of 2005. The attacks led
Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to state that he would call for an United Nations Security Council
investigation into the killings, which have been allegedly linked with Syria. For its part, Syria said
the specific killing of Tunei may have been timed in order to damage its standing just ahead of
meetings scheduled with the United Nations. Whether or not Syrian involvement could be
ascertained, it was certainly true that with each political assassination of an anti-Syrian voice in
Lebanon, the fires of political conflict have been sparked. Indeed, well-known Lebanese politician
and leader of the country's Druze community, Walid Jumblatt, accused Syria of being behind
Tunei's assassination.
In late 2005, a Syrian-born suspect was arrested in connection with the killing of Tunei. The
suspect, Abdul Qadir, allegedly made telephone calls immediately before and after the bombing
that killed Tunei, and apparently rented a plot of land located near the place where the attack took
place.
Lahoud's Future
In the the first part of 2006, Lebanon's political sphere was dominated by the debate over the
political career of Lebanon's pro-Syrian president. Politicians in Lebanon were ensconced in a new
round of discussions about the country's political future, including the question of whether or not
President Emile Lahoud should be dismissed from office. Several rounds of discussions have been
ongoing ever since an anti-Syrian majority took power in the last elections, however, there has
been little consensus on the fate of Lahoud.
Although many of the political players in Lebanon shared the view that Lahoud should not remain
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in the country's top post, there was little agreement about who should replace him. Other issues on
the table for debate included the procedure for the disarmament of Hezbollah's militia, as set forth
in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559.
Special Extended Coverage Report: Israeli-Hezbollah Conflict in Lebanon
Prelude
On May 28, 2006, the United Nations (U.N.) announced that it brokered a truce following
incidences involving mutual missile attacks along the Israel-Lebanon border. In one of the most
significant attacks since December 2005, Katyusha rockets from Lebanon were fired across the
border toward northern Israeli bases around Mount Miron. While no specific militant group
claimed responsibility, it the past, such attacks have been carried out by the likes of Hezbollah as
well as Lebanon-based Palestinian militants. In retaliation, Israeli jets fired on guerilla bases in
Lebanon. Clashes between guerillas and Israeli troops then ensued along the boundary between
Israel and Lebanon and residents in the area were instructed to take cover. The area has been a
particularly volatile zone despite the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon in 2000,
following an occupation that lasted close to two decades. Still, there has remained a contested
territory in the border region called the Shebaa Farms, which remains the site of periodic
confrontations.
Background and Primer
In mid-July 2006, the leader of Lebanon-based Hezbollah announced that his militant Islamic
group had captured two Israeli soldiers. The Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, asserted that the
soldiers would only be returned through a combination of dialogue and prisoner exchange. He
added that the operation had been planned in advance of the capture of another Israeli soldier by
Palestinian militants in Gaza. Underscoring his militant stance, the head of Hezbollah also said that
if Israel wanted to escalate the crisis, his group would be ready to deal with a possible
confrontation.
The Israeli government held urgent cabinet meetings regarding the situation and approved a strong
military offensive in Lebanon -- in response to Hezbollah's actions and also for the purpose of
finding the two captured soldiers. Israel warned that it would hold Lebanon responsible for the
fates of the two captured soldiers, pointing to the fact that Hezbollah had been allowed to attack
Israel from within Lebanese borders with impunity and irrespective of the parameters of
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international law. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert characterized the actions of Lebanon-based
Hezbollah as an "act of war." The Israeli leader's promise of "painful" and "far-reaching"
consequences was issued just as its forces launched a military assault on southern Lebanon.
The military assault left several Israeli troops and civilians dead, even as roads as well as Hezbollah
interests were attacked within Lebanon. Indeed, as the conflict raged on, parts of the Lebanese
capital of Beirut were decimated -- particularly southern suburban areas known to be Hezbollah
strongholds. The country's main infrastructure, including major highways, were bombed in order
to prevent Hezbollah from receiving arms and support - allegedly from Iran via Syria. The human
dimension was not to be ignored as hundreds of civilians were killed in Lebanon as a result of
Israel's military actions. On the other side of the border in Israel, the death toll and injury list,
albeit in notably lower numbers, continued to rise as a consequence of a relentless barrage of
rocket attacks by Hezbollah. Indeed, rocket attacks became systematically more pronounced over
time -- traveling further distances and more deeply into Israeli territory and with greater frequency.
The two main players in the drama unfolding in the Middle East had their own perspectives as
well. With no sign that the conflict was easing, the government of Lebanon called for a ceasefire
with Israel and also requested assistance from the United Nations. Lebanon was desperate for an
end to the violence as its terrain bore the brunt of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. As a
result, the Lebanese people, a first outraged at Hezbollah for placing them in an untenable position,
had now turned their anger toward Israel. Meanwhile, Israel maintained the view that its two
soldiers had to be returned and Hezbollah rocket attacks against Israel had to be stopped. To these
ends, Israel was willing to take radical actions to achieve a long-term solution.
On the international scene, leaders laid primary blame for the situation at the feet of Hezbollah.
They echoed Israel's demand for the release of the two abducted soldiers and a cessation of rocket
attacks on Israel, which had left scores of people dead and hundreds injured. Nevertheless, they
also demanded that Israel cease its military operation, which had destroyed several Hezbollah
interests at a terrible cost. They pointed to the devastation of the city of Beirut, as well as
hundreds of civilian Lebanese lives and thousands of injuries, which were taken as collateral
damage. The deaths of the United Nations peacekeepers as well as the deaths at Qana were
particularly bleak examples of the high cost of Israel's operation. Israeli Prime Minister Olmert
asserted that his country was cognizant of the humanitarian aspect of the situation regarding
Lebanon's civilians. In fact, his Lebanese counterpart, Fuad Siniora, said on United States
television that it was something the two of them had discussed. That said, Olmert maintained the
position that Israel was compelled to defend itself against terrorism.
Diplomatic efforts were underway to try to bring an end to the violence. Attempts to draft a
United Nations Security Council Resolution on the matter were marred somewhat by different
policy imperatives of various countries. Lebanon's failure to enforce a previous United Nations
Security Council Resolution (1559), which was intended to disarm militias from attacking Israel
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from within its borders, was a key concern. Indeed, it led to discussions about the creation of a
new international force, which would be tasked with ensuring that security was maintained in the
border region. Israel's heavy-handed military operation was also a source of great concern with
many critics wondering whether it would not result in increased animosity in the Middle East,
rather than regional peace and stability. Iran and Syria became increasingly implicated in the
conflict as backers of Hezbollah, while the United States' support for Israel and its refusal to call
for an immediate ceasefire became the source of global debate.
On August 11, 2006, United Nations Security Resolution 1701 called for an end to the hostilities
and provided for the stablishment of more robust United Nations enforcement in the border
region. By August 14, 2006, the ceasefire was officially in effect. A few days later, Lebanese
troops crossed the Litani River to take up positions on the southern border with Israel. Their
presence, however, was viewed as more of a symbolic development than a strategic one since it
remained unknown how they would control the region that had become a Hezbollah stronghold
over a period of decades. The fragile ceasefire was holding despite occasional flare-ups of
violence. Still, the United Nation was warning that the ceasefire was at risk of collapsing in the
aftermath of a raid by Israelis in the Bekaa Valley due to apparent attempts by Hezbollah to rearm
itself. In the last days of August 2006, there were also rising accusations about the violations of
humanitarian law during the conflict.
Meanwhile, displaced Lebanese people were returning home. As well, the United Nations said that
it was hoping to establish 3,500 troops in southern Lebanon within two weeks and up to 15,000 in
a month. There was also a call for European countries to contribute troops since Israel objected to
the presence of peacekeepers from countries that do not recognize its right of existence. In
addition to the orchestration and deployment of the United Nations peacekeeping mission on the
Lebanese-Israeli border, there were also efforts underway to raise funds to be used to
reconstruct Lebanon's destroyed infrastructure.
In the backdrop of these developments both Israel and Hezbollah made competing claims of
victory. However, by the close of August 2006, Hezbollah's leader expressed regret that his orders
to capture two Israeli soldiers had sparked a war that had left more than 1,000 people dead and
which had decimated southern Lebanon.
Editor's Notes:
Hezbollah (Hizbollah) -Hezbollah (also known as Hizbollah) is a militant movement founded with the assistance of Iran's
late revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. Although it is accused of being a terrorist
organization by the West, it is regarded as a legitimate resistance movement by many Arabs and
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Muslims. The group endeavors to restructure Lebanon as an Islamic state and has called for the
destruction of the state of Israel. Functionally, it has had control of the border region between
Israel and Lebanon since the withdrawal of Israeli forces in 2000. Like the militant group, Hamas,
in the Palestinian territories, Hezbollah also has a political wing, which has won representation in
government. Indeed, there is a Hezbollah representative serving as a government minister in
Lebanon.
The following countries made pledges toward the peacekeeping mission along the Lebanese-Israeli
border -France: Leadership and 2,000 troops
Italy: 2,500-3,000 troops; also offered to take on leadership of the mission
Bangladesh: Two battalions (up to 2,000 troops)
Malaysia: One battalion
Spain: One battalion
Indonesia: One battalion, an engineering company
Nepal: One battalion
Denmark: At least two ships
Poland: 500 troops
Finland: 250 troops
Belgium: 302 troops to be increased to 392
Germany: Maritime and border patrols but no combat troops
Norway: 100 soldiers
Introduction to Day-to-Day Coverage: Positions in the Conflict
The initial assault left several Israeli troops and civilians dead, even as roads as well as Hezbollah
interests were attacked within Lebanon. Israel was now dealing with crises on two fronts. First, it
was carrying out an operation in the Gaza Strip to rescue Corporal Galid Shalit, who had been
captured by Palestinian militants. As a result, there was an ongoing conflict between Israeli forces
and Palestinian militants taking place in Gaza. A second operation into Lebanon was now being
launched to rescue Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev -- the two soldiers captured by Lebanonbased Hezbollah. Nevertheless, despite the overwhelming task of fighting on two fronts, Prime
Minister Olmert ruled out any negotiations with Hezbollah, just as it had foreclosed the discussions
with Hamas. Additionally, his government filed a complaint with the United Nations, calling on the
Security Council to enforce an existing resolution [1559] that required the Lebanese government to
disarm militias.
For its part, Lebanon said it had no knowledge of Hezbollah's activities and would not take
responsibility for the abduction of the two Israeli soldiers. To this end, Lebanese Prime Minister
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Fuad Siniora said, "The government was not aware of and does not take responsibility for, nor
endorses what happened on the international border." Experts on the ground in Lebanon also
pointed to the fact that despite the existence of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559,
the country simply was not in the position -- politically or militarily -- to disarm Hezbollah on its
own.
July 13, 2006
On July 13, 2006, the situation intensified after Israeli forces bombed the Beirut international
airport and later a main Lebanese army base in the Bekaa Valley. As well, Israeli warships blocked
Lebanese ports. An assault on targets across southern Lebanon at that time left approximately 50
people -- most of whom were civilians -- dead. There were also reports of several Israeli casualties
as a result of attacks by Hezbollah in the northern part of Israel.
With a war-like scenario unfolding, both Israelis and Lebanese on their respective sides of the
border were fleeing to safety. Tourists in the region also joined the exodus, with many trying to
cross the northern border into Syria. Special emergency flights were being planned to pick up
stranded tourists trying to escape the escalating violence.
Lebanon's Social Affairs Minister, Naila Mouawad, called for the two Israeli soldiers to be returned
home. She also reiterated Lebanon's previously-noted position that her government was neither
aware of Hezbollah's plan, nor supported it. That said, Mouawad criticized Israel's response for
being too heavy-handed, particularly with regard to the lives of Lebanese civilians. She warned
that Lebanon was experiencing a catastrophe and explained that her government could not disarm
Hezbollah by force.
In the late hours of July 13, 2006, at least two rockets hit Haifa. Hezbollah quickly denied firing
them. Nevertheless, the timing of the attacks -- only hours after the group had threatened to carry
out this very act -- did little to assuage suspicions that Hezbollah was responsible. That said, it
should be noted that although Hezbollah fired several rockets into Israel over the course of the
previous days, none had traveled more than 12 miles (approximately 20 kilometers). As such,
there was some skepticism that Haifa could be hit at all. Regardless, the distance traversed by the
rockets suggested that since Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah had been busy
accumulating more sophisticated weaponry. Left unsaid at the time was the matter of who would
have furnished more technologically-advanced rockets to Hezbollah. For its part, Israel reacted to
the rocket attacks on Haifa by characterizing it as a major escalation.
Global Reaction
With no sign that the conflict was easing, the government of Lebanon called for a cease-fire with
Israel and also requested assistance from the United Nations. To this end, the United Nations
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Security Council was set to meet on July 14, 2006 to discuss the crisis unfolding in the Middle
East. The European Union said that it would deploy its head of foreign policy, Javier Solana, to the
region to try to assist in bringing an end to the violence. The Arab League was also reported to
have scheduled an emergency session.
Meanwhile, there was a growing state of anxiety across the globe, with many countries calling for
restraint from all parties involved. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan condemned both
the abduction of the Israeli soldiers as well as the resulting offensive by Israeli forces into Lebanon.
Russian, France and the European Union expressed the view that Israel's response to the capture
of two soldiers was disproportionate. But Israeli spokesman, Mark Regev, said that Israel was
simply responding to an "unprovoked act of aggression." United States President George W. Bush
characterized Hezbollah as terrorists and supported Israel's right to defend itself. However, he
also warned that whatever action Israel took, it should be mindful of the stability of the Lebanese
government. Margaret Beckett, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, took a similar
position saying that while Israel had to ensure its own security, it should do so in a way that
avoided civilian deaths. The Vatican later added its condemnation of the situation - calling for the
release of the soldiers by Hezbollah and decrying Israel's strikes against the sovereignty of
Lebanon.
Conditions on the Ground
Amidst these varied calls for restraint, the crisis intensified further. Along the Israeli-Lebanese
border, heavy fighting took a toll. Reports suggested that Israel had endured its worst losses in the
area in several years. Hezbollah fired rockets in the direction of northern Israel and threatened to
attack Israel's port city of Haifa if any attacks on Beirut took place. As noted above, Israel did,
indeed, bomb the airport in Beirut earlier in the day and further strikes on the city followed.
July 14, 2006
By the early hours of July 14, 2006, reports emerged that Israeli forces were carrying out a new
round of attacks on Hezbollah targets inside Lebanon. Among the targets were various Hezbollah
interests in the southern part of Beirut --buildings believed to house Hezbollah weapons caches and
offices of Hezbollah's leader (Sheik Hassan Nasrallah). Other strategic targets, such as a power
plant and the main highway between Beirut and Damascus (Syria), were also hit by Israeli strikes.
Several spokespersons said that in addition to trying to free their two captured soldiers (as noted
above), Israeli forces were also endeavoring to stop Hezbollah's flow of weaponry between
Lebanon and Syria, which have been used to carry out terrorist attacks against Israel. Earlier,
Israel had warned Lebanon that the suburbs of the country's capital city should be evacuated -presumably a foreshadowing of what was to follow.
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Later on July 14, 2006, Israeli forces struck bridges, Hezbollah's media and security headquarters,
and the Beirut offices of Hassan Nasrallah. The Hezbollah leader was not hurt in the attack. In an
address broadcast after the striking of his offices, Nasrallah declared "open war" on Israel.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah continued to systematically launch rocket attacks into northern Israel. The
violence left several people dead on both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border.
On that day, the United Nations Security Council met to discuss the crisis, which was taking on the
characteristics of warfare. Lebanon's ambassador to the United Nations, Nouhad Mahmoud,
called for an end to Israel's operation in Lebanon saying, "The Security Council meets today in the
shadow of a widespread, barbaric aggression waged by Israel to this very moment against my
nation, Lebanon." But Israeli Ambassador Dan Gillerman responded by saying that his country had
no choice but to respond to Hezbollah's actions. He also noted that the Lebanese people were the
ones suffering because of their government's ineffectiveness in disarming Hezbollah, as set forth in
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559. United States Ambassador John Bolton called
for disarmament saying, "All militias in Lebanon, including Hezbollah, must disarm and disband
immediately, and the Lebanese government must extend and exercise its sole and exclusive control
over all Lebanese territory."
July 15, 2006
By July 15, 2006, the level of violence was escalating. In one attack by Hezbollah, an Israeli
warship off the Lebanese coast was hit by an Iranian-made missile. Three Israeli sailors were
reported missing while Israeli media said that the body of a fourth sailor had been found. The
leader of Hezbollah had earlier alluded to such an attack in his aforementioned address threatening
"open war" on Israel. Then, Israeli air strikes on southern Lebanon resulted in the deaths of several
Lebanese civilians who were attempting to flee the region. Israeli strikes on targets across
Lebanon, stretching as far north toward the border with Syria, were ongoing. Beirut continued to
bear the brunt of the Israeli offensive with the city's port, gas stations, key roads and Hezbollah
interests being struck. Meanwhile, Hezbollah continued its systematic pounding of northern Israel
with rocket attacks. The town of Tiberius was among those hit in Israel. There were reports of
casualties on the ground.
Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora repeatedly emphasized his country's call for a cease-fire,
calling on the United Nations to administer such a move. In response, the United Nations said it
would send a peace delegation to the region to assess the situation. For his part, Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert said he would concur with a cease-fire so long as certain conditions were
met. He said that Hezbollah had to release the two abducted soldier and cease rocket attacks at
northern Israel, while Lebanon had to comply with the existing United Nations Security Council
resolution [1559]. Israel also accused Syria and Iran of conspiring with Hezbollah and the
Palestinian group, Hamas, against the Jewish state. In this regard, Israel particularly drew attention
to the Iranian-made missiles, which allegedly hit its warship, as noted above. Iran, however,
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denied supplying Hezbollah with the missiles. Earlier, in a telephone conversation with Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reportedly warned of a
strong response to any Israeli military offensive against Syria.
July 16, 2006
On July 16, 2006, an attack by Hezbollah on Haifa killed several Israelis. Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert warned that the attack on Haifa -- the country's third largest city -- would yield grave
consequences. Indeed, the resulting retaliation came in the form of intensified Israeli air raids
across Lebanon, including the northern part of that country. About seven Lebanese soldiers at a
military post at Abdeh were killed in the strikes. The city of Tripoli was also among the areas
struck by Israeli forces. Israeli air strikes ongoing in southern Lebanon also left a number of
people dead. An attack on Tyre and a border village left several more people dead, including some
holding Canadian citizenship. Strikes against strategic interests, such as fuel tanks at the Beirut
airport, also continued. Meanwhile, Hezbollah's rockets were traveling more deeply into northern
Israel, as exemplified by attacks on the town Afula, located close to Nazareth. In this way, the
death toll was also mounting on the Israeli side of the Lebanese-Israeli border. Nazrallah, the
leader of Hezbollah, promised that the battle against Israel had only just begun.
July 17, 2006
A day later on July 17, 2006, Israeli strikes resulted in the deaths of about 10 Lebanese as they
crossed a bridge; several others died in strikes elsewhere in Lebanon as the death toll in that
country rose. There were some reports that Israeli forces crossed the border into southern
Lebanon, however, this activity was not regarded as a large-scale operation. In Israel, the
continuous series of rocket attacks by Hezbollah resulted in Israeli casualties. Also, Hezbollah said
that it had brought down an Israeli F-16 fighter jet over Beirut, however, that claim was dismissed
by Israeli authorities who said all their jets were accounted for.
Within the Israeli parliament, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made it clear that strikes on Lebanon
would continue unless the two abducted soldiers were released, Hezbollah was disarmed and
Lebanon showed that it was taking control over its own southern border with Israel. Olmert said,
"When missiles are launched at our residents and our towns, our answer will be war waged at full
strength, with all determination, courage and sacrifice." He also noted that Israel was not looking
for war or direct conflict, but it would deal with that reality if necessary. The Israeli government
continued to assert that militant groups, such as Lebanon-based Hezbollah and Hamas in Gaza and
the West Bank, were functioning in tandem with accused state sponsors of terrorism, Iran and
Syria. Those two countries were referred to as "an axis of terror."
Also on July 17, 2006, French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin traveled to Beirut as a
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measure of French solidarity with the people of Lebanon and to try to advance a ceasefire
agreement. As the French head of government was arriving in Lebanon, the foreign policy head of
the European Union, Javier Solana, was returning from his trip to that country and warned that a
ceasefire might not be quickly reached. Likewise, United Nations Special Envoy Vijay Nambiar
said that although he had made some initial progress during ceasefire talks in Beirut, much was yet
to be done. Nambiar also noted that it was imperative that Lebanon be more involved in the
ceasefire process. Clearly, Hezbollah's unilateral actions against Israel served to essentially
marginalize the Lebanese government. The government was also faced with the reality that
conflicting ideas about where to place blame served only to create dissonance within the military -a condition that could spark factionalism or another civil war.
July 18, 2006
The following day, Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora again blamed Hezbollah for sparking the
conflict and repeated his call for the release of the Israeli soldiers. At the same time, he
condemned Israel for its harsh military response. Indeed, he reportedly said in an interview with
British media that Israel had opened "the gates of hell and madness" on Lebanon. Lebanon's proSyrian President Emile Lahoud took a somewhat different view as he promised to stand by
Hezbollah's leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. The different stances of Siniora and Lahoud laid
bare the brewing political discord within Lebanon.
July 18, 2006 was also the day a delegation from the United Nations, led by Vijay Nambiar, was
set to meet with Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni to discuss the terms of a possible ceasefire. At
that meeting, Livni asserted that there could be no ceasefire until its conditions (delineated above)
were met. Israel also hinted that its offensive in Lebanon could last for another week in order to
ensure that it had destroyed as much of Hezbollah's arsenal of weaponry as possible. A day later
on Arabic television, Hassan Nasrallah made it clear that the Israeli soldiers captured by Hezbollah
would only be released if there was a prisoner exchange with Israel. The respective positions of
Israel and Hezbollah made the notion of a resolution appear rather elusive.
The casualty list on July 18, 2006 included the deaths of 11 Lebanese soldiers as a result of Israeli
strikes. One Israeli was killed in Nahariya as a consequence of Hezbollah rocket attacks. Across
northern Israel, a barrage of Hezbollah rockets hit cities and towns such as Haifa, Safed, Acre,
Kiryat Shemona, and the Gush Halav region.
July 18, 2006 also marked the day in which the United States Senate passed a non-binding
resolution of support for Israel.
July 19, 2006
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The next day saw little change from the previous ones. Indeed, July 19, 2006 appeared to have
been a day of even greater bloodshed and violence in Lebanon and Israel respectively. Israeli air
strikes targeted eastern and southern Lebanon and left over 50 people dead. In one case, around a
dozen people died in one village. Meanwhile, Israel lost some of its soldiers in heavy clashes with
militants from Hezbollah on the ground, just inside the border of Lebanon. The Israeli forces were
attempting to locate and destroy weapons and facilities used for terrorist attacks. A spokesperson
for the Israeli government, Miri Eisin, told both British and American media that her country would
not allow a terrorist organization to deploy along its border. In the city of Nazareth in northern
Israel, three people died as a result of rocket attacks by Hezbollah.
July 20, 2006
On July 20, 2006, United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, called for an immediate
ceasefire, blaming Hezbollah for sparking the conflict and Israel for using excessive retaliatory
force. The United Nations chief also indicated that because of the destruction of Lebanon's
infrastructure, a humanitarian crisis was evolving. Indeed, several sources noted that there were
now hundreds of thousands of displaced people across the country. Annan noted that the crisis
could only be dealt with via urgent funding and the European Union - which had also called for an
end to the violence - pledged to contribute financially to the cause. Recognizing that a ceasefire
would be difficult to achieve but that the humanitarian crisis had to be addressed nonetheless, the
French government put forth a proposal for the establishment of safe corridors in Lebanon by
which aid could be transported. In response, the Israeli government agreed to the proposal of a
humanitarian corridor between Lebanon and Cyprus.
It was also announced that the Secretary General would hold a private meeting with the European
Union's Foreign Policy Chief, Javier Solana, as well as United States Secretary of State,
Condoleezza Rice. For her part, Rice later characterized the notion of an immediate ceasefire as
"a false promise."
The casualty list on July 20, 2006 included the deaths of two Arab Israeli children in Nazareth as a
result of Hezbollah rockets. The Hezbollah leader expressed regret for their deaths. As well, four
Israeli soldiers died in clashes with Hezbollah fighters on the border. Israeli forces also lost two of
its Apache helicopters when they collided near the Lebanese border. One officer died and three
others were injured in that incident.
July 20, 2006 also marked the day in which the United States House of Representatives passed a
non-binding resolution expressing solidarity with Israel.
July 21, 2006
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On July 21, 2006, the situation took a turn for the worse when thousands of Israeli reservists were
called up for duty in anticipation of a possible land incursion. Although it appeared that Israeli
troops were already in Lebanon fighting against Hezbollah, they had been operating on a smallscale level. The call for reservists augured the possibility of a larger-scale operation. Another
ominous warning came in the form of a directive from the Israeli government that civilians exit
southern Lebanon as quickly as possible, presumably in order to escape imminent peril.
Israel's Defense Minister, Amir Peretz, said that although Israel had no intention of conquering
Lebanon, his country was prepared to do whatever was necessary. The president of Lebanon,
Emile Lahoud, warned that the Lebanese army would battle Israel if it invaded Lebanon. Syria,
through its Information Ministry, warned that it would enter the conflict if Israel carried out a
ground invasion of Lebanon that threatened its own security.
The fighting between Israel and Hezbollah continued across the border. Israeli strikes further
degraded thoroughfares and infrastructure in Lebanon while Hezbollah rockets rained on northern
Israel, hitting the city of Haifa once again. There were at least 15 casualties. A Hezbollah rocket
attack hit Masarik and left three people injured. Other incidences were reported, including the
striking of a United Nations observation post, however, no injuries occurred in that case. Israel also
announced that it had bombed a Hezbollah bunker and destroyed much of that group's stock of
missiles. It was a claim that Hezbollah disputed.
July 22, 2006
On July 22, 2006, fighting between Israeli forces and Hezbollah resulted in serious injury to an
unarmed United Nations observer. The incident happened in the town of Maroun al-Ras, which
according to some reports, had been the site of a major clash between the two sides. Some reports
concluded that the fight at Maroun al-Ras resulted with Israel taking control of the town.
The Evacuation Process and Humanitarian Relief
Meanwhile, with the conflict ongoing, roads across Lebanon were filled with people attempting to
flee the aerial bombardment but unsure of where exactly to go. Foreign nationals were being
evacuated as governments of Western countries sent ships and aircrafts to rescue people stranded
on the conflict-ridden terrain of Lebanon. Some governments began considering the need for
special operations to rescue foreign nationals trapped in cut-off parts of Lebanon. In particular, the
French Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie said that France would launch a special mission to
rescue some of its citizens trapped in southern Lebanon.
The evacuation process was winding down by the close of July 2006, although a Canadian ferry
was set to evacuate foreign nationals trapped in the southern part of Lebanon from the city of
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Tyre. At the same time, humanitarian efforts were underway with lorries of food and medical
supplies arriving at key points in the conflict, such as Beirut and Tyre.
As the last week of July 2006 began, the evacuation of foreign nationals began to be the source of
great consternation among local Lebanese who accused the international community of caring only
about people carrying certain passports, while failing to act on behalf of local civilians who were
bearing the brunt of the violence.
July 23, 2006
By July 23, 2006, the head of the emergency relief agency for the United Nations, Jan Egeland,
characterized the damage caused by Israeli strikes on Beirut as "horrific." He decried the
devastation caused by Israel's retaliatory action against Hezbollah, calling it excessive, while at the
same time condemning Hezbollah for cloaking itself among the civilian population, thus worsening
their casualties. He called on both sides to cease their attacks and noted that humanitarian aid
would begin arriving shortly in Lebanon. In that latter regard, he appealed for safe access. As
noted above, Israel had earlier said that it would lift its blockade on the port of Beirut and respect a
humanitarian corridor. He also said that the United Nations would be launching an appeal for
humanitarian aid amounting to $150 million dollars (USD).
Egeland arrived in Beirut on the heels of an Israeli strike against the Hezbollah-dominated portion
of Lebanon's capital city. In Beirut, there were four injuries when one strike hit a mosque. While
Hezbollah said the facility was used only for prayer, Israel contended that it was one of several
legitimate targets used not only for conventional purposes, but also by Hezbollah for its activities.
On that same day [July 23, 2006], Israel's aerial bombing of southern and eastern Lebanon
continued in the early hours of Sunday. In the east, Israeli strikes caused engineers, who had been
attempting to repair impassable roads, to retreat for safety reasons. The southern town of Sidon,
where several people had fled seeking safety, was hit by Israeli strikes. As well, the city of Tyre
was the site of action from both sides. It was one of several places from which some Hezbollah
militants were firing missiles and, as such, Israel made it a target of retaliatory strikes. There were
eight deaths reported across Lebanon. They included a young boy, a photographer, three people
fleeing in a minibus, as well as three Hezbollah fighters. On the other side of the border, two
Israelis died in Haifa and over twenty people were injured as a result of repeated Hezbollah rocket
attacks.
In other developments, Kim Howells, a Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
of the United Kingdom, was scheduled to meet with the Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister, Tzipi
Livni. Howells issued a rebuke of Israel for essentially attacking the Lebanese nation in its effort
to fight Hezbollah. However, he also expressed understanding of Israel's imperative to defend itself
and condemned Hezbollah for exacerbating the conflict by hiding weapons in civilian-dominated
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areas. For its part, the United States appeared reticent about getting actively involved since the
start of the crisis. Nevertheless, United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was expected
to depart for the Middle East on July 23, 2006. As well, foreign ministers from France and
Germany were expected to travel to Israel for peace talks. Iran, which had been notably silent for
some time, entered the mix with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad suggesting that Israel's current
conundrum had been self-inflicted.
Diplomacy and Ceasefire Demands
On July 24, 2006, United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived in the Middle East
for talks regarding the crisis. Before arriving in the Middle East, Rice mentioned to reporters that
the United States still had an embassy in Syria. Her statement was interpreted by some as a
reminder that the United States and Syria still shared diplomatic relations that could be leveraged, if
necessary. Her first stop was Lebanon where she met with Prime Minister Fuad Siniora. In that
meeting, she expressed concern for the Lebanese people, while also making clear that Hezbollah's
attacks on Israel from within Lebanese territory could not be permitted to continue. She then left
for talks with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. There was no call issued for an immediate
ceasefire. In the backdrop of these developments, the White House announced that it had
authorized humanitarian aid to be sent to Lebanon.
Secretary Rice, and later President Bush, both conveyed the view that the only possible solution to
the conflict was a sustainable ceasefire and enduring peace. The United States' stance has been
that a ceasefire might result in only Israeli compliance, thus subjecting Israel to future attacks.
Clearly, this view has not been shared by many world leaders and foreign policy chiefs who have
called for an immediate ceasefire, arguing that continued hostilities were untenable, regardless of
optimal long-term objectives. Many Middle Eastern experts have further said that no long-term
objectives can be achieved, at all, without addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Intensive talks between Western and Middle Eastern ministers were scheduled to take place on July
26, 2006 in Rome. Prior to the meeting, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan said it was
crucially important to achieve concrete results aimed at resolving the conflict.
July 24, 2006
On the ground in the conflict zone in the last week of July 2006, Israeli forces moved northward
from Maroun al-Ras, the southern Lebanese town it had earlier taken control of, and were
engaging Hezbollah fighters around the town of Bint Jbeil. In that fighting, ten Israeli soldiers were
injured while two Hezbollah fighters were captured. The level of operations suggested that Israel
was still carrying out only small-scale incursions across the border in Lebanon. In one case, an
Israeli helicopter crashed in northern Israel. While Hezbollah said it had shot down the aircraft,
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Israeli authorities said it crashed as a result of technical difficulties.
There was a lull in the Israeli strikes on Beirut on July 24, 2006, presumably due to the presence
of Rice in the city on that day. Clashes and blasts elsewhere in Lebanon ensued nonetheless. In
one case, there were allegations that clearly-marked Red Cross vehicles had been hit by Israeli
strikes. Israeli efforts in Bint Jbeil appeared to have been successful because it was later reported
that they had taken control of the town and were advancing toward Yaroun. As well, Israel
subsequently said during its incursions in southern Lebanon, that it had managed to kill Abu Jaafar,
a key Hezbollah commander. Both Israel and Hezbollah confirmed that several of their troops had
been killed in the fighting.
July 25, 2006
On July 25, 2006, the conflict was ongoing with blasts heard on both sides of the border -- from
Beirut to Haifa. Clearly, Israeli strikes on Lebanon's capital had resumed with explosions heard in
Hezbollah-controlled areas of the city. Hezbollah's efforts against Israel continued with a constant
volley of rockets raining down on northern Israeli. In one case, a young Arab-Israeli girl was killed
in the village of Maghar. At the same time, Haifa continued to endure Hezbollah's ceaseless rocket
offensive. Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, appeared on Lebanese television on this day
warning that his forces were ready to attack more deeply into Israeli terrain.
The Deaths of the United Nations Peacekeepers
Meanwhile, several days earlier on July 25, 2006, there were reports that a United Nations
observation post in southern Lebanon had been hit by Israeli military aircraft. There were
unconfirmed reports that four peacekeepers might have killed. This was later confirmed when it
was reported that four unarmed peacekeepers from Austria, Canada, China and Finland died when
the United Nations post was struck.
United Nations Secretary Kofi Annan expressed shock at the "apparently deliberate targeting of the
post," especially since he claimed that Israel had assured him of the safety of United Nations
personnel. Israel responded by conveying its regret over the matter. Some Israeli spokespersons
criticized Annan for "irresponsibly" accusing their country of deliberate action before an
investigation could be carried out.
A day later, an initial report into the deaths of the United Nations peacekeepers was released. The
report indicated that despite repeated contacts by the United Nations -- 10 in total -- with Israeli
troops regarding the closeness of Israeli strikes in the area, and regardless of promises from the
Israelis that the shelling would stop, the United Nations post was hit by a precision-guided missile
following a period of about six hours of constant shelling.
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One diplomat familiar with the report argued that if Israel had actually acted on the basis of the
contacts, "rather than deliberately ignoring them," the peacekeepers would still be alive. As well,
the Irish Foreign Ministry said that one of its soldiers working for the United Nations warned Israel
that its military activities were placing the lives of the peacekeepers at risk.
United Nations humanitarian aid chief, Jan Egeland, said on United States television that (1) the
post had been a known and clearly-marked structure for decades; (2) the Israeli prime minister had
given personal assurances of safety to head of the United Nations; (3) repeated contacts by the
United Nations had been made regarding the dangerously close range of the shelling; (4) although
Hezbollah operated generally in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah was not in close proximity of that
particular post; and (5) the post had, in the end, been hit by a missile known for its precision.
For its part, Israel expressed deep regret regarding the deaths of the four United Nations
peacekeepers and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert personally telephoned United Nations
Secretary General Kofi Annan to express his condolences over what had happened.
Both Israel and the United Nations agreed to pursue a joint investigation into what transpired. At
the same time, the United Nations said that it would meet to deliberate what course of action it
should take. After lengthy talks on July 27, 2006 in which no real consensus could be reached on
the wording of a position statement, the United Nations Security Council released a declaration
expressing deep shock and distress over the Israeli air strikes that killed four peacekeepers. China
criticized the statement for being needlessly weak.
A few days after the deaths of the four United Nations peacekeepers, another two peacekeepers
were injured as a result of the ongoing violence. There was rising concern that many countries
might be reluctant to contribute to future peacekeeping efforts, as a result of these incidences.
July 26, 2006
On July 26, 2006 -- crisis talks in Rome ensued and ended with no agreement on the call for an
immediate ceasefire, despite an impassioned plea from Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora.
United States Secretary of State Rice was apparently one of few voices arguing against the
ceasefire, which gave rise to difficult discussions among the parties present. The Rome summit
ended with the release of a declaration expressing "determination to work immediately to reach
with utmost urgency a ceasefire to put an end to the current hostilities." The declaration also
included a description of a ceasefire as "lasting, permanent and sustainable." The Rome summit did
manage to advance calls for the creation of an international force that would enforce peace and
stability along the Israel-Lebanon border.
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On the ground in the conflict zone, Israeli troops experienced one of their bloodiest and most
challenging days. Eight soldiers died and around 22 were injured in clashes with Hezbollah; it was
the most significant loss of troops to Israel since the start of the conflict. The clashes ensued at
Bint Jbeil -- the very town that Israel said it had taken control of a day earlier. In a separate
incident of fighting, a ninth Israeli, this time an officer, was killed. In the city center of Tyre in
Lebanon, a huge explosion destroyed a multi-storey complex, supposedly regarded as the offices of
another Hezbollah commander. On the other side of the border, Hezbollah continued its rocket
assault on Israel, leaving about 31 people injured. It was estimated that Hezbollah was firing
rockets at a rate of over 100 per day into Israel.
The Imperative for Stability
The escalation of hostilities between Israeli forces and Lebanon-based Hezbollah, in conjunction
with Israel's ongoing conflict in Gaza, spurred fears that the entire Middle Eastern region was at
risk of being acutely destabilized. Keeping these anxieties in mind, United Nations Secretary
General Kofi Annan and United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair called for an international
force to be deployed to Lebanon. The force would be tasked with stopping Hezbollah's attacks on
Israel, and in so doing, it would remove Israel's rationale for bombarding Lebanon. Although a
United Nations mission, UNIFIL, has been monitoring the Israeli-Lebanese border since 1978, it
numbers less than 2,000 in strength and has few means to enforce peace. As such, a new
stabilization force would have to be enshrined with far more power and capabilities.
Amir Peretz, the Defense Minister of Israel, expressed support for the idea of an international
peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon on July 23, 2006. He particularly conveyed his backing
for such a force to be led by NATO. A day later, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert confirmed
his country's support for this plan, so long as the forces deployed were both robust and enshrined
with sufficient power as to be able to carry out their mandate. The European Union's chief of
foreign policy, Javier Solana, further affirmed the plan when he stated that several European
countries would contribute to such a force, which might function under the aegis of the United
Nations Security Council.
Israel announced that it would maintain control over southern Lebanon until the proposed
international force was activated. In this regards, Amir Peretz, Israel's Defense Minister, explained
on July 25, 2006 that his country had no alternative saying, "We have no other option. We have to
build a new security strip that will be a cover for our forces." It was not clear if Israel intended to
hold control over a security zone even after the deployment of the proposed international force.
Following the Rome summit on July 26, 2006, there had been a call for the creation of an
international force, working under a United Nations mandate, and with the mission of fully
implementing existing United Nations Security Council resolutions. The statement also called for
the disarmament of militias and the deployment of Lebanese troops on the border.
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July 27, 2006
On July 27, 2006, Hezbollah rockets continued to rain on northern Israel. Targets hit the town of
Kiryat Shmona and ignited fires. Rockets also fell on fields close to Safed, Carmiel, Maalot and
Shlomi. As well, the terrorist group al-Qaida, which has traditionally not worked in sync with
Hezbollah, issued a statement suggesting that it would not sit on the sidelines as the conflict in
southern Lebanon raged on. That same day, Israeli authorities said that while they did not intend to
expand their military offensive in Lebanon, they would call up additional troops from their reserve
divisions to fortify their operations against Hezbollah. Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz said
that Israel's military operation would go on until a secure border strip could be established,
preventing Hezbollah's return to current positions. His statement came a day after failed peace
talks in Rome in which no agreement could be reached on a ceasefire.
July 28, 2006
On July 28, 2006, United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair and United States President George
W. Bush held talks in Washington D.C. The crisis in the Middle East factored highly during those
discussions, which were followed by a call by the two leaders for "lasting peace" in the region.
Bush also said that he and his British counterpart both supported the establishment of an
international force, which would work with the Lebanese military to maintain stability along the
Israeli-Lebanese border zone. Despite increasing international pressure for the cessation of
hostilities, however, there was no call for an immediate ceasefire from the respective British and
American leaders. Meanwhile, the United Nations made its own call for a 72-hour truce aimed at
facilitating the transportation of aid and supplies.
On the ground in the conflict zone, Hezbollah reportedly fired a long-range rocket, the Khaibar-1,
in the direction of Israel; it landed just south of Haifa. It was an apparent attempt to make good on
an earlier threat to fire longer range rockets more deeply into Israeli territory. Another Hezbollah
rocket -- this one of unknown origin and packed with explosives -- hit an area around the town of
Afula. Several Israelis were injured as a result of these and other rocket attacks on that day. At
the same time, the Israeli military was carrying out strikes against targets in Lebanon, leaving at
least a dozen people dead. Israel also reported that it had killed a number of Hezbollah fighters in
the town of Bint Jbei, which had been the site of serious clashes in recent days. Civilians were
again the unfortunate casualties of the hostilities when mortar rounds struck a convoy of civilian
vehicles as they tried to flee southern Lebanon. There was no conclusive knowledge about who
might be responsible for those injuries. Two members of the German media were also injured
during the chaos of the day. Elsewhere in Lebanon, Israeli strikes left a Jordanian man dead and
three people wounded in Kfar Joz. Strikes were also being carried out on the Bekaa Valley in the
east and southern villages around Tyre.
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July 29, 2006
A day later on July 29, 2006, Israeli air strikes in the north of Lebanon resulted in the closure of
the border crossing between Lebanon and Syria. It was reported that missiles hit the area between
the two countries' respective immigration stations. Israeli raids on southern Lebanon left several
people dead. There were reports that a mother and her five children were among those killed.
Israeli troops were still engaging Hezbollah fighters in Bint Jbeil, however, on July 29, 2006, Israeli
troops withdrew from the Hezbollah stronghold. On the other side of the conflict, Israel continued
to be hit by volleys of rockets from Hezbollah. Safed was among the towns affected on July 29,
2006. Israeli anxiety also increased on this day as Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, promised
that towns in the center of Israel could well be targeted.
On the diplomatic front, United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was in the region for
further talks -- this time with a focus on the creation of an international force that would ensure
security and stability in the conflict zone. Rice warned that, at this point, negotiations were
expected to be very difficult. Meanwhile, Rice and other foreign policy leaders were also trying to
craft a United Nations resolution, which would set forth key conditions associated with the longterm resolution of the crisis.
Also on July 29, 2006, British Prime Minister Tony Blair expressed similar views to those
previously-articulated by his American counterpart, saying that there could not be a ceasefire until
certain conditions [presumably those that would ensure a long-term solution] were in place. Jack
Straw, the leader of the British House of Commons and the former Foreign Minister, endeavored
to carve out quite a different stance. Following on the heels of Minister of State Kim Howells,
who had issued strong sentiments on the matter, Jack Straw criticized Israeli's military operation in
Lebanon as "disproportionate." International Development Secretary Hilary Benn also raised
concerns about the conflict.
Civilian Deaths at Qana
July 30, 2006 was likely to be remembered as one of the darkest days in the conflict taking place
between Israeli forces and Lebanon-based Hezbollah. An Israeli air raid at Qana left more than 50
civilians dead -- the vast majority of whom were women, children and senior citizens. They had
been seeking shelter from the violence in the basement of a three-story house. Survivors, as well
as relatives of those killed, were reported to have been anguished about the bloodshed and
confused about why they had been targeted.
Israeli authorities responded by saying that they had warned civilians to leave the area. They also
furnished aerial footage, apparently filmed two days earlier, which showed missiles being fired
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from the area around Qana, as well as what seemed to be a missile launcher surreptitiously hidden
in a house there.
Despite this explanation, Lebanon's Prime Minister Fouad Siniora characterized the Israeli strikes
in Qana as "heinous crimes against civilians." For Siniora, along with many Lebanese, it was
possible that this incident at Qana evoked memories of a similar strike that took place a decade
ago. In 1996, Israel launched its "Grapes of Wrath" operation, which was similarly aimed at
destroying Hezbollah's base in Lebanon. A United Nations post was hit by Israeli strikes and
approximately 100 people, who had come to the post seeking refuge from the violence, died as a
result. Now, ten years later, a similar scenario had transpired.
For its part, Hezbollah promised retaliatory attacks. Hezbollah soon acted upon that ominous
promise and fired successive waves of rockets into Israel later in the day, some of which hit the
Israeli border town of Kiryat Shemona. Israelis said that they were experiencing the worst barrage
of rocket attacks ever.
Regardless, the deaths at Qana evoked recriminations and condemnations from the international
community. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan called for a vociferous rebuke by the
international community and reiterated his demand for an immediate ceasefire. After several hours
of discussions during an emergency session, the United Nations Security Council issued a
statement in which it unanimously expressed "extreme shock and distress" over what had happened
at Qana and deplored the loss of life there. The Security Council, however, did not call for an
immediate ceasefire, despite Kofi Annan's earlier's appeal for one.
Nevertheless, the deaths at Qana appeared to have shifted the position of United Kingdom's leader,
Tony Blair, significantly. Only a day after he said that certain conditions had to be met before a
ceasefire could ensue, Blair on July 30, 2006 said that some sort of resolution had to be forged "as
soon as possible," in order to resolve the "catastrophe" that befallen Lebanon. Blair said, "What
has happened at Qana shows that this is a situation that simply cannot continue." It was apparent
that the events at Qana had spurred a notable change in perspective on his part. Indeed, Blair
issued a joint statement with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, asserting that the tragedy of Qana
emphasized the "urgency of the need for a ceasefire as soon as possible."
Overall, perhaps the most important outcome of the Qana deaths appeared to have been a
renewed sense of urgency from among the international community to end the crisis, if only to stop
further tragedies of this sort from occurring.
July 31, 2006
By July 31, 2006, Israel had agreed to an immediate suspension of air strikes over southern
Lebanon for a 48-hour period, in order to facilitate an investigation into what had transpired. Dan
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Gillerman, the Israeli ambassador to the United States, said in an interview with British media that
the suspension would allow the inquiry to take place, while also providing remaining civilians with
time to evacuate the area.
The agreement to cease air strikes temporarily was reached following urgent talks between Israeli
officials and the United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. For its part, however, the
United States had not shifted its position and did not join the increasing chorus of calls for an
immediate ceasefire.
That was not to say that the views of all American politicians were unified on the matter. Despite
expressed support by the two houses of Congress for Israel on July 18, 2006 and July 20, 2006
respectively, United States Senator Chuck Hagel, Republican of Nebraska, broke ranks with his
party and the Bush administration to call for an immediate ceasefire. On July 31, 2006, Hagel
declared, "The sickening slaughter on both sides must end and it must end now. President Bush
must call for an immediate ceasefire. This madness must stop."
August 1, 2006
By August 1, 2006, the Blair government was experiencing some internal dissonance as a result of
differing approaches to the ongoing conflict between Israel and Lebanon-based Hezbollah.
Whereas the British Foreign Office indicated its support for an immediate ceasefire, the stance
from Downing Street was one that stopped short of that particular call. The Foreign Office was
not the only source of dissonance regarding Blair's stance. As noted above, comments from the
Minister of State, the former Foreign Minister and leader of the House of Commons, as well as the
International Development Minister, indicated that several members of the Blair's Labour Party
was departing company with the prime minister. Now, days later, a number of cabinet ministers
were reported to have dispatched notes to the British prime minister during a cabinet meeting
suggesting that their silence was not to be interpreted as actual consent for Blair's position.
While the internal struggle was going on within government of the United Kingdom, British Foreign
Minister Beckett joined her counterparts within the European Union in the Belgian capital of
Brussels to draft a proposal calling for an "immediate cessation of hostilities," which would be
followed by a sustainable ceasefire. That two-step process would eventually facilitate both a
political accord and the deployment of a multinational force to enforce stability in the conflict
zone. The elements of the proposal were somewhat adapted to accommodate the varying
perspectives of European governments on the conditions of a ceasefire.
In other diplomatic efforts, French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy was in Beirut and met
with his Iranian counterpart, Manouchehr Mottaki. Taking a different approach than that of the
United States, the French diplomat complimented the Iranian nation and its heritage, presumably
paving the way for harmonious discussions aimed at resolving the conflict. The Foreign Minister's
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objectives were somewhat frustrated by the call from a senior Iranian cleric for Muslims to lend
support to Hezbollah's fight against Israel.
On the ground in the conflict zone, Israeli tanks moved into southern Lebanon. Following a
security cabinet meeting, Israel had indicated that it was going to expand its ground offensive.
Heavy fighting was reported in the southern part of Lebanon in several locations between Israeli
troops and Hezbollah fighters. Israeli warplanes struck at targets on the ground, even as Israeli
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert claimed that his country was succeeding in its efforts to nullify
Hezbollah. But at the same time, Hezbollah was responding with fierce resistance. Casualties
were reported on both sides as a result of the clashes. In the Lebanese town of Lweizeh, an Israeli
strike was said to have left a mother and her two children dead. In Ait al-Shaab, where the
strongest exchange of fire was reported, an anti-tank missile killed three Israeli soldiers and injured
25 others. Israel said that it had killed dozens of Hezbollah fighters there. Hezbollah fighters
were also reported to have been killed at Kfar Kila, Adiasse and Taibe, while Bint Jbeil continued
to be the site of clashes. On the other side of the border, Hezbollah fired mortal shells into
northern Israel, however, there were no rocket attacks. The last day rockets were fired at Israel
was July 31, 2006.
Despite his claim that Israeli forces were winning the military battle against Hezbollah (noted just
above), Ehud Olmert acknowledged that Israel would not be able to completely destroy
Hezbollah's arsenal of weapons. That said, he asserted that Israel's objective was to lessen the
threat posed by Hezbollah. Israel's Infrastructure Minister said that his country's troops would
likely require another two weeks to finish this task. In this regard, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer said on
Israeli Army Radio that this timeline would be needed "to complete the job, and by that I mean
that the area in which we want [an] international force to deploy is cleansed of Hezbollah."
Reports suggested that Israel's operations in Lebanon also involved forcing Hezbollah fighters to
retreat as far as the Litani River, located 18 miles (or 30 kilometers) north of the border.
Also on Aug. 1, 2006, irrespective of previous announcements about a temporary halt on air strikes
(made in late July 2006) and the establishment of a humanitarian corridor (made in the third week
of July 2006), two Belgian aircraft carrying humanitarian aid were prevented from landing in Beirut
when Israel warned that it could not guarantee safe passage. Nevertheless, a day later,
humanitarian efforts were underway with the World Food Programme saying that they had been
given safe passage into Lebanon.
August 2, 2006
After a lull, Hezbollah resumed its attacks on Israel on Aug. 2, 2006 with intensity. Indeed,
Hezbollah launched more than 220 rockets into Israel from Lebanon. It was the heaviest barrage
of rockets in a single day since the start of the conflict. Intensity aside, this spate of attacks was
also distinguished for the distance traveled. Indeed, there were reports that the rockets were hitting
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the targets deeply into Israeli territory. One person was reported to have been killed in Nahariya
while several others were injured. One rocket hit Beit Shean on the edge of the West Bank, while
another hit the West Bank itself.
For his part, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said that Israel was successfully destroying
Hezbollah's infrastructure. He also foreclosed any hope of an immediate ceasefire by asserting that
no such action would be taken until an international force was deployed in southern Lebanon. His
comments suggested confidence in the operations being carried out by the Israeli military. Indeed,
earlier in the day, Israeli troops assaulted a Hezbollah stronghold, Baalbek, located in the north
eastern part of Lebanon. There, Israeli troops raided a hospital that was said to be used by
Hezbollah fighters and seized five people. Israeli authorities claimed that the five individuals were
Hezbollah fighters, but Hezbollah disputed the claim and said they were civilians. Regardless, the
fact that Israeli commandos had managed to infiltrate Lebanese territory, even reaching a part of
the country located close to the border with Syria, served to bolster Israeli claims of mission
success.
In southern Lebanon, clashes between Israeli troops and Hezbollah fighters were ongoing.
On the diplomatic front the United Kingdom's ambassador to the United Nations expressed the
view that an initial Security Council resolution aimed at end the violence was close at hand.
Amidst these developments, Iran's supreme leader echoed the earlier words of a senior cleric and
called on the Muslim world to stand with Hezbollah against Israel.
August 3, 2006
Israel continued to carry out its offensive operation into southern Lebanon, destroying several
interests in the region along the way, but taking a toll in the form of the lives of four Israeli
soldiers. Nevertheless, Israeli authorities appeared to be planning intensified attacks, as evidenced
by the dropping of leaflets in Beirut warning residents of a new military operation against
Hezbollah. As well, Defense Minister Amir Peretz was reported to have informed top military
commanders that they should prepare to advance northward of the border with Lebanon toward
the River Litani.
On the other side of the conflict, Hezbollah's rocket attacks on August 3, 2006 resulted in the
deaths of at least eight civilians in northern Israel. As well, Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah,
warned that further attacks by Israel would result in the bombing of Tel Aviv.
Meanwhile, diplomats at the United Nations were attempting to craft a resolution that would bring
an end to the fighting. Such a result was to be welcomed by humanitarian agencies, which warned
that their relief operations were being hampered by the destruction of infrastructure as well as fuel
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shortages.
August 4, 2006
On August 4, 2006, an Israeli strike left 26 people dead and at least 20 people injured. Most of the
victims were Syrian Kurdish farm workers in the village of Qaa, located in the Bekaa Valley along
Lebanon's north-eastern border with Syria. Israeli strikes also hit bridges in Christian areas in
northern Beirut, as well as bridges along Lebanon's coastal highway. Five people were reported to
have been killed when the coastal bridges were decimated. As well, an Israeli air raid on Taibeh in
the southern part of Lebanon resulted in the deaths of seven people and injuries to 10 others.
Meanwhile, Israeli fighters continued to engage Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon, in an
attempt to push Hezbollah's forces northward from the border toward the Litani River.
On the other side of the conflict, Hezbollah fired 190 rockets into Israel, leaving three civilians
dead. The attacks evoked fears about Hezbollah's capacities since some rockets landed as many
as 50 miles (80 kilometers) from the border. Indeed, the town of Hadera, just 30 miles (45
kilometers) north of Tel Aviv, was among the areas hit. In addition to concerns about the
increased range of the rockets being fired by Hezbollah, there was anxiety about the amplified
volume of rockets. In recent days, the number of rocket attacks by Hezbollah had increased
substantially to close to 200 per day -- double the number of attacks that had become the norm in
the first few weeks of the conflict. In anticipation of a possible missile attack against Tek Aviv,
Israeli authorities urged the city's residents to ensure that they were able to access bomb shelters.
On the diplomatic front, United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice suggested that a United
Nations resolution regarding the conflict could be pass within days. At issue was the phraseology
of a possible ceasefire resolution. However, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert signaled that with
or without a resolution, Israel's offensive would continue until an international force was actually
deployed in southern Lebanon.
August 5, 2006
Clashes between Israeli forces and Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon continued on Aug. 5,
2006. Several casualties were reported as a result of a raid by Israeli troops on an apartment in
Tyre, which was said to house Hezbollah fighters. The Israeli military claimed that Hezbollah
militants made up the casualty list; the Israeli military also acknowledged that eight of its own
soldiers had been wounded in the raid. Israel additionally warned people in Sidon to avoid areas
where rockets might be launched, presumably auguring strikes against such targets.
On the other side of the border, Israel continued to be pounded by a barrage of rocket attacks from
Hezbollah. Again, the number of rocket attacks far exceeded the previous volume and numbered
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in excess of 170 on August 5, 2006, leaving three women dead. Haifa was among the places hit by
the rocket attacks on this day, and five people were reported to have been injured as a result.
On the diplomatic front, differences regarding the wording of a possible ceasefire agreement were
being worked out as the United States and France came to agreement on the matter. The draft of
the proposed United Nations Security Council Resolution apparently called for a "full cessation of
hostilities," demanded that Hezbollah immediately cease all attacks, and declared that Israel
immediately halt its offensive military operations. The wording was deliberately crafted to allow
Israel some room to defend itself in the face of attack. It was hoped that the resolution, which still
had to be passed in the 15-member Security Council of the United Nations, would bring a quick
end to the violence. United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair and United States President
George W. Bush lauded the diplomatic progress being made.
In other developments, humanitarian aid agencies warned that the destruction to infrastructure in
Lebanon, and particularly to bridges, was making it very difficult to transport supplies to people in
need of help. Meanwhile, the situation in the Middle East was spurring people from across the
world to take to the streets to protest the violence and to call for a ceasefire. Such demonstrations
were taking place from Baghdad to London.
August 6, 2006
August 6, 2006 was the bloodiest day experienced on the Israeli side of the conflict. At least 15
people were killed in northern Israel as a result of relentless rocket attacks by Hezbollah. The port
city of Haifa was especially hard hit on this day, with three deaths, dozens of injuries and the
collapse of a building. Israelis were also dying on Lebanese soil as evidenced by the deaths of 12
soldiers during an attack on the town of Kfar Giladi. It was the highest number of Israeli deaths in
a single incident since the start of the conflict.
In Lebanon, Israeli strikes killed approximately 14 people. In the coastal town of Naquora, three
people were killed in strikes while five civilians died as a result of an air raid in the village of Ansar.
The Israeli military reported that its forces had launched strikes on a site in Qana where it said
rocket launchers were being housed. The military also said that it had destroyed rocket launchers
to the north of Tyre. Fresh strikes were carried out on the southern suburbs of Beirut, the area of
Tyre, as well as the eastern Bekaa Valley. Clashes between Israeli soldiers and Hezbollah fighters
in southern Lebanon were also ongoing.
In the diplomatic sphere, Lebanon formally issued a request of the United Nations Security
Council. In that request, Lebanon asked that a provision be added calling on Israel to withdraw
from Lebanese terrain. Syria also weighed into the diplomatic process by characterizing the current
draft of the proposed resolution as a "recipe for the continuation of the war." For its part, the
Israeli government was generally happy with the draft resolution. A spokesperson for the Israeli
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government noted that Israeli forces were prepared to withdraw from Lebanon once the resolution
was passed, and so long as Israel had satisfactorily incapacitated Hezbollah's strongholds.
August 7, 2006
Israeli air raids on Lebanon on August 7, 2006, resulted in the deaths of almost 50 people. Among
those killed were up to 30 people in southern Beirut who died in air strikes. Lebanon's Prime
Minister Fuad Siniora corrected a claim that an earlier Israeli air strike had left 40 civilians dead.
Instead, five people were reported to have been killed in the earlier strike. Clashes between Israeli
forces and Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon were ongoing with three Israeli soldiers and five
Hezbollah militants killed at Bint Jbeil. On the other side of the conflict, Hezbollah fired more than
100 rockets into northern Israel, resulting in civilian casualties.
The issue of civilian casualties was the topic of a report issued by United Nations Secretary
General Kofi Annan, in which the targeting of civilians was strongly criticized. Annan said that
military operations by both sides, in which civilians suffered the consquences of indiscriminate
attacks, constituted a violation of international law. The bombing at Qana was specifically noted in
this regard.
On the diplomatic front, United States President George W. Bush conveyed strong support for the
United Nations draft resolution, stating that he wanted to see the document passed in the Security
Council as soon as possible. That said, the draft resolution remained in doubt, as Arab ministers
echoed Lebanese demands for changes to the proposed resolution.
August 8, 2006
On August 8, 2006, Israeli fighter jets struck at Hezbollah targets in Lebanon. In the village of
Ghaziyeh, at least six people were killed and two dozen injured. Another strike left 13 villagers
dead as they attended a funeral for those previously killed in air raids. One person died when
Israeli strikes hit Lebanon's largest Palestinian refugee camp at Ein el-Hilweh. Clashes between
Israeli forces and Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon were ongoing, with at least three Israeli
soldiers dying in addition. There was not word about casualties among Hezbollah factions. On the
other side of the border, Hezbollah continued its barrage of rocket attacks against southern Israel.
With rocket attacks increasing, Israel said that it would temporarily relocate remaining residents
from the city of Kiryat Shmona to a safer area. Compared to the rest of northern Israel, Kiryat
Shmona had suffered the most attacks by Hezbollah.
Meanwhile, Israel was stepping up its operations to move toward the Litani River. Israel had earlier
dropped leaflets in Tyre, the largest Lebanese city south of the Litani River, warning of military
strikes to come. But with many roadways in the area bombed and destroyed, those still in the
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villages around Tyre were expected to have difficulties trying to get out. Israel also warned that as
its forces advanced toward the river, any moving vehicles spotted in the area south of the Litani
would be destroyed. Given the clear risk outlined by Israel, the United Nations decided to stop its
aid convoy from traveling in that zone.
In the realm of diplomacy, the United Nations Security Council debated the draft resolution aimed
at ending the violence and bloodshed. At the same time, a delegation from the Arab League
traveled to the headquarters of the international body to officially express backing for Lebanon's
demands. Lebanon had argued that the draft resolution should be altered so that it expressly called
for Israel's immediate withdrawal from Lebanese terrain. As well, there were differences over the
phrasing in some parts of the draft, which called on Israel to end its "offensive" military operations,
while madating that Hezbollah end "all" its attacks. It was not clear how these demands for
changes to the document would be received by the Security Council, especially since many key
members appeared supportive of the current version of the draft. Moreover, France and the
United States, who made great headway in agreeing to the current terms of the draft, were not apt
to make any changes. On the other side of the equation, however, Russia said that it could not vote
for a resolution that did not have the backing of Lebanon. A vote on the resolution was not
expected until later in the week.
August 9, 2006
On August 9, 2006, heavy fighting in Lebanese villages close to the Lebanese-Israeli border
resulted in the deaths of 15 Israeli soldiers and 40 Hezbollah fighters. Israeli soldiers later
commenced an operation against Hezbollah in Khiam. Meanwhile, Israeli strikes continued to
bombard targets in Lebanon. As a result of air strikes in the Bekaa Valley, a building believed to
have housed a Hezbollah fighter collapsed, killing six people. Beirut continued to be hit by Israeli
strikes, resulting in deaths of several people. On the other side of the border, Israel was still
dealing with Hezbollah's rocket attacks.
On the same day, the Israeli cabinet approved sending troops further north toward the Litani
River. However, the cabinet also agreed to delay the advancement of the troops in the hopes that a
diplomatic resolution could be found. The plan to deploy Israeli troops northward was not new; it
had been discussed for several days in advance of the official approval by cabinet.
In the realm of diplomacy, France and the United States worked on redrafting the original text of
the proposed United Nations resolution. The redrafting exercise occurred after the two countries
disagreed on the proper course of action. Given Lebanon's opposition to the original text on the
basis that it did not expressly call for Israel's withdrawal from its own terrain, France said that it
would work toward adjustments in the text. By contrast, however, the United States was reluctant
to make any changes. The situation set the stage for a possible impasse, and by extension, the
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continuation of hostilities. Consequently, French President Jacques Chirac argued that it would be
"immoral" to relinquish diplomatic efforts to secure a ceasefire.
August 10, 2006
On August 10, 2006, Israel dropped another wave of warning leaflets over south Beirut auguring
further air strikes to come, and urging residents to flee. Clashes between Israeli forces and
Hezbollah fighters were reported in Marjayoun. At the same time, Hezbollah rocket attacks were
pounding targets in Israel, leaving two people dead in the Arab village of Deir al-Assad. Meanwhile,
Jan Egeland, the head of the United Nations' humanitarian agency, decried both Israel and
Hezbollah for creating a humanitarian crisis in Lebanon by preventing the transportation of muchneeded aid and relief supplies. On the diplomatic front, further efforts were being extended to
forge a dipomatic resolution that would bring an end to the violence and bloodshed, while setting
the terms for sustainable peace in the region.
August 11, 2006
As diplomatic efforts were going on in New York on August 11, 2006, to try to resolve the conflict
in the Middle East, violence was unabated. Israeli troops were moving toward the Litani River,
with the objective of pushing back Hezbollah fighters and thusly establishing a de facto security
zone. In Beirut, Israeli strikes were ongoing. Elsewhere in Lebanon, an attack by an Israeli drone
left about four people dead in the town of Marjayoun, located in the south of the country.
Hundreds of Lebanese soldiers and police stranded at barracks in that very town of Marjayoun
were being evacuated by United Nations troops. To the north, Israeli air strikes at a bridge near
the Lebanon-Syria border left approximately 12 civilians dead. One Israeli soldier died in fighting
in western Lebanon, while close to 20 were reported to have been injured in southern Lebanon.
On the other side of the border, several casualties were reported in northern Israel as a result of a
barrage of missile attacks by Hezbollah.
On the diplomatic agenda, media reports on August 11, 2006 suggested that the United Nations
Security Council was set to debate and vote on a new draft resolution calling for a ceasefire
between Israel and Hezbollah. The text of the draft, which had been changed to reflect concerns
articulated by Lebanon about a withdrawal of Israeli troops, called for a "full cessation of
hostilities," and made provisions for Israeli troops to pull back from Lebanese terrain as local and
United Nations forces were deployed along the border. The draft also authorized an expansion of
the United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon, known by the acroym UNIFIL, along with
increased enforcement powers. Left out of the text was a reference to Chapter 7 of the United
Nations Charter, which would facilitate the use of force if certain conditions were not met.
Illustrating Israel's dual-pronged approach toward a mix of military tactics along with a diplomatic
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strategy, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was reported to have said that he accepted the new
ceasefire plan. This revelation came after Olmert had already directed Israeli troops to expand its
offensive operations in Lebanon, presumably because of the bleak prospect of an acceptable
resolution being passed by the United Nations Security Council earlier in the day. Now, with a
shift in the proverbial winds, Olmert was expected to call on his cabinet to sanction the resolution
within the next few days. It was expected that Israeli's military operations would continue until
that time.
Meanwhile, an affirmative vote within the United Nations Security Council was expected shortly.
While not perfectly in line with the desires of either Israel or Lebanon, the new draft appeared to
be acceptable to both parties as well. In a passionate speech at the convening of the Security
Council session, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan decried the international body's
failure to act in a more timely manner, saying that it had "badly shaken" the international
community's confidence in the United Nations. Still, later on August 11, 2006, the United Nations
Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1701.
A policy adviser in the government of Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora cautiously
welcomed the passage of the new resolution. United States Secretary of State, Condoleezzza Rice,
declared that agreement would "open a path to lasting peace between Lebanon and Israel." Her
French counterpart, Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy, characterized called the passage of
the resolution as "a historic turning point." United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair lauded the
resolution and called for an immediate end to hostilities. He also said that he intended to travel to
the Middle East to personally revitalize the stalled peace process between Israelis and Palestinians.
But on the other side of the equation, Qatar, which at the time held a seat on the Security Council
as a non-permanent member, criticized the resolution for containing provisions that favored Israel.
August 12, 2006
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan announced on August 12, 2006 that that the
ceasefire called for in Security Council Resolution 1701 would go into effect at 05:00GMT on
August 14, 2006.
Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, said that his group intended to abide by the United Nations
ceasefire, however, he warned that fighting would prevail while Israeli troops were still inside
Lebanon. Such a position promised that there would be no immediate end to the hostilities. This
was because Israel had said that it would take some time to draw down its troops while UNIFIL
forces were deployed -- a process that could well take close to a month. For his part, Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert issued praise for Resolution 1701, characterizing it as both positive and
acceptable. He also said that he would seek approval from his cabinet on August 13, 2006 to abide
by the ceasefire agreement.
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Meanwhile, Israel's ground assault in Lebanon continued, with particular effort expended by forces
moving north to the Litani River. In southern and northern Lebanon, air strikes by Israeli fighter
jets carried on with some deaths reported in the southern city of Tyre.
August 13, 2006
On August 13, 2006, the Israeli cabinet endorsed United Nations Security Resolution 1701, but
warned that its troops would not exit Lebanon until UNIFIL forces were deployed. That position,
in conjunction with the stance articulated earlier by Hezbollah that it would abide by the ceasefire
only when Israeli troops were out of Lebanon, suggested that fighting was destined to continue
until the deployment of the newly-madated United Nations forces (UNIFIL). Indeed, United
Nations Deputy Secretary General Mark Malloch Brown said that it could take up to a month to
install UNIFIL in southern Lebanon. For its part, Lebanon's cabinet postponed an important
meeting to discuss the disarmament of Hezbollah -- a key directive set forth in Security Resolution
1701.
Meanwhile, the conflict raged on in Israel and Lebanon. Israeli strikes on Hezbollah targets in
Lebanon, including the cities of Tyre and Beirut, left close to 20 people dead. Aid personnel and
rescue workers said that Israeli air strikes had resulted in the collapse of several buildings in
southern Beirut. There were also reports of strikes in eastern Lebanon. In fighting between Israeli
troops and Hezbollah fighters, five Israeli soldiers were reported to have been killed. Among those
who died was Uri Grossman, the son of renowned Israeli writer and peace activist, David
Grossman. The younger Grossman died as a result of an anti-tank missile only days after the older
Grossman joined a call by Israeli intelligentsia for an end to the violence. On the other side of the
conflict, Hezbollah fired a relentless barrage of rockets into Israel, this time numbering around 250
in total.
August 14, 2006
On the first day of the ceasefire, relative calm reigned both in northern Israel and across Lebanon,
with only sporadic fighting reported in disparate areas. The easing of hostilities ensued despite
earlier assertions by Hezbollah that it would continue its fighting until Israel left Lebanon, and
regardless of the fact that Israel said it would remain in Lebanon until UNIFIL forces were
installed. Israel also issued a statement noting that it intended to pursue Hezbollah leaders.
Displaced Lebanese attempted to traverse bombed-out roads to return to their homes despite the
fact that travel restrictions were still in place. On the other side of the border, few people in
northern Israel left their bomb shelters, evidently not quite willing to trust yet that the ceasefire
would hold.
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Later in the day, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert expressed satisfaction in his country's
elimination of Hezbollah's dominance in southern Lebanon, and Hezbollah's leader Hassan
Nasrallah gave a televised address in which he claimed "historic victory."
In the backdrop of these competing claims of victory, President George W. Bush of the United
States and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad blamed one another for spurring the conflict.
August 15, 2006
The second day of the tenuous ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah was marked by occasional
spurts of fighting. In one case, five Hezbollah gunmen were reported to have been shot by Israeli
soldiers. In another case, Hezbollah militants fired several mortars in the direction of Israel,
however, none landed across the border. Amidst these intermittent bursts of violence, efforts were
underway to try to find bodies of the dead.
Meanwhile, the United Nations said that it was hoping to establish 3,500 troops in southern
Lebanon within two weeks and up to 15,000 within a month. Most of the soldiers were expected
to come from France. In the backdrop of this announcement, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad
hailed Hezbollah's victory and said that it augured a new Middle East. At the same time, he
assailed the United States' perspective of the region.
August 16, 2006
The third day of the fragile ceasefire ensued much like the previous day -- with the truce holding in
spite of sporadic violence. Israel warned that southern Lebanon was vulnerable to the resumption
of violence until United Nations troops were deployed and the Lebanese military was operating in
the border region.
Negotiations were ongoing to formulate a United Nations peacekeeping force as called for in
United Nations Security Resolution 1701 to enforce the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah.
France was contributing the lion's share of troops, also the force would also include the Lebanese
army. France said that it might be prepared to command the peacekeeping mission but only if
certain conditions were in effect. Other than France, other countries said that they might be joining
the effort, but no formal pledge of troops was made.
Meanwhile, the United Nations said that approximately 250,000 Lebanese people had returned to
their homes with half a million Lebanese en route.
August 17, 2006
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August 17, 2006 was marked by the crossing of the Litani River by Lebanese military, which then
took up positions in the area of the strategically-located waterway as Israeli troops withdrew. The
Israeli military also said that it had transferred control of up to half of its positions in southern
Lebanon to the current (not-yet fortified) United Nations peacekeeping mission there. In order to
stave off the chance of bloodshed should a wave of attacks resume, Israel dropped new leaflets
urging people not to travel in and around southern Lebanon. Despite this warning, displaced
Lebanese people worked their way home.
August 18, 2006
In the Lebanese capital of Beirut on August 18, 2006, Hezbollah representatives handed out
disbursements of $12,000 to residents whose homes and businesses had been decimated in the
conflict between its group and Israel. By this day, up to 400,000 Lebanese had returned home to
southern Lebanon. In the town of Qana where a number of people were killed in an Israeli air
strike that garnered international condemnation, relatives of the dead hosted a mass funeral.
Meanwhile, the United Nations called on European countries to come forward and contribute
troops to the peacekeeping force in Lebanon, which had been provided for in United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1701. Thus far, only France had expressed the possibility of
contributing troops, however, Italy added its bid to the list of countries willing to participate in the
peacekeeping mission. Italy also said that it was prepared to take the leadership role in the
operation. The call from the United Nations came on the heels of a complaint by Israel that it
would be "inconceivable" that peacekeepers be accepted from countries like Indonesia and
Malaysia, which deny the right of Israel to exist.
August 19, 2006
On August 19, 2006, Israel carried out an air raid in the Bekaa Valley deep within Lebanese
territory. One Israeli and three Hezbollah fighters were reported to have been killed. The
Lebanese government described the air raid as a blatant violation of the existing ceasefire, however,
the Israeli government said it was responding to an attempt by Hezbollah to rearm itself. It thus
claimed that Hezbollah and not Israel was in violation of the ceasefire agreement. The scenario
unfolded only hours after United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan characterized the situation
in the conflict zone as "fragile."
Meanwhile, the first of the new deployments of United Nations peacekeepers arrived on the
ground; these included 50 engineers from France.
August 20, 2006
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A day after Israel said that it had carried out an air raid in the Bekaa Valley to prevent Hezbollah
from rearming itself, Lebanon's Defense Minister Elias Murr warned that anyone firing rockets into
Israel from the south would be regarded as a traitor. His warning came along with an expression of
confidence regarding Hezbollah's commitment to the existing ceasefire set forth un United Nations
Security Resolution 1701. In the backdrop of these developments. United Nations Secretary
General Kofi Annan rejected Israel's explanation for the air raid, noting that it was indeed a
violation of the ceasefire agreement.
Meanwhile, France called on the European Union to convene a meeting to discuss involvement in
the United Nations peacekeeping mission in southern Lebanon. At issue were Israel's concerns
about the composition of the force, as well as overall concerns about deployment. Emphasizing
what had already been noted, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said that peacekeepers from
countries that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel were not acceptable.
August 21, 2006
Attention turned on August 21, 2006 to reconstruction of the conflict-ravaged region when United
States President George W. Bush said that there would be an aid package earmarked for Lebanon's
reconstruction worth approximately $230 million in United States currency (USD). Bush also
called for the deployment of a United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping force in Lebanon as quickly as
possible.
On that particular issue, Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi was reported to have told U.N.
Secretary General Kofi Annan that Italy was willing to lead the peacekeeping mission. As regards
Israel's opposition to the participation of certain countries as peacekeepers -- notably from
countries that did not recognize the state of Israel -- U.N. Deputy General Mark Malloch Brown
noted that Israel did not have the power to foreclose participation by any specific country,
regardless of whether or not there were diplomatic ties.
At home in Israel, hundreds of Israeli army reservists signed an open letter calling for a massive
investigation into the handling of the war against Hezbollah. At issue was the lack of decisive
leadership by the military and politicians, exemplified by ever-shifting objectives of the war.
Across the border in southern Lebanon, the discovery of British-made night-vision equipment in
Hezbollah bunkers was believed to be British, led to the launching of an investigation by the
British authorities. At issue in this case was the question of how that equipment came to be in
Hezbollah's possession.
Meanwhile, sporadic hostilities ensued, exemplified by the killing of two Hezbollah fighters by
Israel. The Israeli military explained that the Hezbollah fighters were among a group of men who
approached their troops in a "threatening manner" in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah did not concur
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approached their troops in a "threatening manner" in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah did not concur
with this version of events. For its part, Hezbollah's deputy leader Sheikh Naeem Kassem rejected
requirements for the militant group's disarmament saying on al-Jazeera Arabic television that the
resistance would continue. Nevertheless, Terje Roed-Larsen, a senior U.N. envoy, expressed
optimism regarding the prevailing ceasefire.
August 22, 2006
On the heels of the news that Italy was willing to both contribute troops and act lead the
peacekeeping mission in the conflict zone, Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema tempered
the announcement by noting that his country's involvement was contingent upon a commitment to
respect for the prevailing ceasefire. The Italian Foreign Minister also called on the European Union
to convene an urgent meeting of foreign ministers to discuss the contribution of European forces to
Middle East peacekeeping efforts.
On the issue of the peacekeeping mission, senior United Nations envoy Terje Roed-Larsen warned
that Lebanon would likely experience a security vacuum while organization was being established.
In other developments, the human rights group, Amnesty International, accuse Israel of committing
war crimes by deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure in Lebanon. It was a claim vociferously
denied by Israel. Amnesty International also demanded a United Nations investigation into war
tactics of both Israel and Hezbollah aimed at determining of any humanitarian laws had been
breached.
August 23, 2006
A meeting between European Union ambassadors and military official convened in Belgium at
which the issue of Europe's contribution to a United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping force on the
Israeli-Lebanese border was discussed.
Meanwhile, a day after a senior U.N. envoy warned of a security vacuum in Lebanon as the
proposed peacekeeping mission was being established, Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni called
for quick action on the matter. She particularly noted that time was running short for the
application of the U.N. ceasefire resolution along the Lebanese-Irsaeli border.
In a related development, Israel also suggested that U.N. peacekeeping troops also patrol the
Lebanese-Syrian border in order to prevent the movement of arms by Hezbollah. But Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad soundly rejected Israel's suggestion, stating that such a measure would
be viewed as a "hostile act." Syria later said that it would close its border with Lebanon if such a
move was implemented.
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In a separate development, one Israeli soldier was killed and three others were injured when their
military tank hit a landmine in southern Lebanon.
August 24, 2006
Finland, which held the presidency of the European Union in late August 2006, said that United
Nations (U.N.) troops should be deployed to the conflict zone within a week. The announcement
by Finland came at a time of increasing urgency regarding the establishment of peacekeeping forces
along the Lebanese-Israeli border. Also on the subject of the peacekeeping mission, France
pledged an additional 1,600 troops to the effort and registered its willingness to continue to lead the
force.
Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese were returning home. In southern Lebanon,
returning residents faced the problems of a lack of proper sanitation and no potable water. To this
end, the U.N. launched a 60-day plan to deal with the humanitarian situation in Lebanon.
August 27, 2006
On August 27, 2005, Hezbollah's leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, expressed his regret regarding
the war between his group and Israel on Lebanese terrain. In an interview on Lebanese television,
Nasrallah acknowledged that he had ordered the capture of the two Israeli soldiers -- the incident
that resulted in Israel's military response and effectively sparked the war. He said that had he
known the extent of the repercussions of his actions -- a conflict lasting approximately one month
and resulting in the deaths of more than 1,000 people -- he would have acted differently. In the
interview, Nasrallah also said that he did not expect fighting to resume, effectively suggesting that
his group was likely to hold to the ongoing truce.
August 30, 2006
The issue of Israel's blockade of Lebanon came to the fore at the close of August 2006. Despite
the presence of an ongoing truce, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert rejected calls for an end to
his country's seven-week blockade of Lebanon. Following discussions with United Nations (U.N.)
Secretary General Kofi Annan, Olmert said the blockade would be lifted when all the ceasefire
requirements were implemented. Olmert particularly specified one of the central conditions for an
end to Israel's blockade of Israel as being the release of two Israeli soldiers captured by Hezbollah.
He said that unless the two Israeli soldiers were freed, the U.N. Security Council Resolution could
not "be considered as fully implemented." Annan echoed Olmert's call for this condition to be met
and appealed for the "unambiguous and unconditional release" of the soldiers.
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It was unclear if such a measure would actually materialize. Indeed, Lebanese Energy Minister
Mohammed Fneish who was also a member of the political wing of Hezbollah said that the
unconditional release of the Israeli soldiers was "not possible." He said that the Israeli soldiers
would only be freed within the constraints of a prisoner exchange with Israel.
The close of August 2006 was also marked by the denunciation of Israel's use of cluster bombs
during its conflict with Hezbollah on Lebanese terrain. The U.N said that the cluster bombs had
caused death and injuries, and the U.N. Mine Action Coordination Center said that up to 100,000
unexploded cluster “bomblets” had been found at hundreds of sites in Lebanon. The U.N.'s
humanitarian head, Jan Egeland, characterized the use of cluster bombs in the conflict between
Israel and Hezbollah as "immoral." He argued that the majority of the cluster bomb strikes had
taken place in the last days of the conflict, when a resolution appeared likely. He thusly said that
the strikes made at that sensitive time were "shocking."
For its part, Israel said that its use of such munitions was compliant with international law. That
said, there were some media reports that the bombs had been purchased from the United States on
the basis of conditional use, the requirements of which may not have been met. The United States
said that it was investigating whether or not Israel had used the cluster bombs on non-military
targets, which was prohibited under the terms of the sale agreement. Even so, a conditional use
agreement between Israel and the United States would not constitute an actual violation of
international law.
In other developments, the European Commission pledged 42 million euros toward the
reconstruction of Lebanon. At home in Lebanon, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora said that his
government would allot $33,000 in compensation to tens of thousands of families whose homes
were destroyed in the conflict.
August 31, 2006
A donor conference in Sweden on August 31, 2006 focused on raising funds to be used toward
Lebanon's post-war reconstruction. The Swedish Foreign Minister Jan Eliasson said that $940
million in new funds had been pledged -- bringing the total reconstruction funds to $1.2 billion.
The event was an apparent success given the fact that the conference's organizers had aimed to
collect $500 million.
September 4, 2006
By the start of September 2006, United Nations (U.N.) Secretary General Kofi Annan said
that Israel and Hezbollah had accepted his offer to mediate the dispute over two captured Israeli
soldiers. Despite this announcement by the U.N. head, Israel publicly reiterated its stance that the
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soldiers had to be released unconditionally and noted that this was a condition of the U.N. Security
Council resolution, which brought an end to the war between Israel and Hezbollah. Within this
context, Israel said that Annan would assist in the release of its soldiers, rather than mediate an
agreement. Many analysts surmised that despite its public pronouncements, Israel may have
privately acknowledged that a deal would have to be brokered in order to garner the release of the
two soldiers.
September 6, 2006
On September 6, 2006, Israel said that it intended to lift its air, land and sea blockade of
Lebanon. The announcement came days after Israel firmly stated that it would not lift its
blockade until all conditions of the prevailing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701
were met. Israel said that it was holding its position in order to prevent Hezbollah for accessing
weaponry. Israel said that it did not intend to to lift the embargo until international forces were
fully deployed in the conflict zone and could ensure that the transport of weaponry did not take
place. News that French, Greek and Italian troops would patrol the conflict zone, followed later by
German forces, appeared to have assuaged Israel in some measure.
As well, the shift in stance may have been attributed partially to mounting international pressure, in
conjunction with efforts to release the two Israeli soldiers, whose capture sparked the war
between Israel and Lebanon. For its part, Israel has publicly said that it will not negotiate with
terrorists -- a reference to Hezbollah. That said, some sources suggest that efforts are underway
to try to secure the release of the soldiers -- a process that may well involve engagement by Israel
at some point, as well as the possibility of deal-making.
Later in September, 2006
Later in September 2006, with the truce in full force, the human rights group, Amnesty
International, accused Hezbollah of war crimes. It had previously made a similar charge against
Israel. Amnesty said that Hezbollah's conduct of aggression from civilian terrain was classified as a
war crime. Also in September 2006, Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, led a victory rally in
southern Beirut to proclaim the success of his group's efforts, and also to assert that Hezbollah was
still in possession of a number of rockets. Nasrallah was also championing the idea of a new
government in Lebanon with greater Hezbollah representation, presumably with greater ties to
Syria and Iran. the natural corollary of such a government would entail the resignation of Fuad
Siniora's moderate government. On the other side of the border, Israelis were carrying out periodic
demonstrations against the Israel government, and particularly Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Many
Israelis called for the Israeli prime minister's resignation and protested his leadership during the war
with Hezbollah. In this way, the aftermath of the war yielded clear political ramifications, not the
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least of which was the precariousness of the positions of the leaders of both Israel and Lebanon.
October 2006
By the start of October 2006, the United Nations said that Israel had fulfilled a core conditions of
the ceasefire agreement by withdrawing the vast majority of its troops from Lebanon. Only in a
border village of Ghajar were there some Israeli troops left. Monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire
were both Lebanese troops and international peacekeepers. On the other side of the equation,
however, Hezbollah was yet to comply with the requirement that it disarm. Instead, the group
refused to comply, saying that it intended to keep its fighters equipped to resume operations.
On October 22, 2006, Israel acknowledged its use of phosphorus during its war with Hezbollah in
Lebanon in mid-2006. The admission that it had dropped phosphorus munitions on military targets
contravened against earlier statements that phosphorus weapons were used only to mark targets.
Because of the severe chemical burns caused by phosphorus weapons, its use has been regarded as
strongly controversial. In fact, the Red Cross and other humanitarian agencies have said that
phosphorus munitions should be regarded as chemical weapons. At the same time, the Geneva
Conventions expressly prohibits the use of white phosphorus against civilian populations and in air
attacks against military forces in civilian areas. For its part, Israel said that its use of these weapons
did not contravene against international law. Meanwhile, Hezbollah was also facing criticism for its
warfare tactics. The group Human Rights Watch accused both Hezbollah and Israel of using
cluster bombs during its war in mid-2006. For its part, Hezbollah denied that it had used cluster
munitions.
Post-War Developments
On October 15, 2006, three grenades were fired in the center of the capital city of Beirut. There
was some structural damage and several people were injured as a result. The area of the attacks
was the site of a number of nightclubs -- a location in close proximity to the headquarters for the
United Nations. It was the third such incident in the Lebanese capital within ten days, leading
government officials to say that they believed the three attacks were connected. In particular,
Interior Minister Ahmed Fatfat expressed the view that the attacks were aimed destabilizing the
country, which was not recovering from the war between Israel and Lebanon-based Hezbollah
months earlier. To this end, he said, "It is clear that there is an attempt to ignite security strife in
the country."
A month later, Lebanon was embroiled in a domestic struggle for power between the Westernbacked and democratically-elected Siniora government and pro-Syrian Hezbollah. The situation
took a turn for the worse when, in the first week of November 2006, six cabinet ministers aligned
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with Hezbollah resigned from government, following the collapse of multi-party unity talks.
At issue was the demand by Hezbollah for substantially more power and influence in the political
sphere in the aftermath of the war with Israel, which raised the profile of Hezbollah, and cast
relations with Syria in more favorable light. Buoyed by that change in the political landscape,
Hezbollah was demanding more of a say in the country's political decision-making.
On the other side of the equation, however, Siniora was vowing not to bend to "the tyranny of the
minority" -- a possible reference to the small number of Hezbollah-affiliated members in
government prior to their resingations. Siniora's position was echoed by Druze leader, Walid
Jumblatt, who foreclosed the possibility of Hezbollah and the pro-Syrian faction having a decisive
say in government. Indeed, Jumblatt noted that Hezbollah and its allies already had control of the
presidency (a reference to Emile Lahoud), important ties to Iran and Syria, as well as possession of
weaponry -- all of which, he alleged, had a negative effect on Lebanese democracy and
sovereignty.
The situation was further complicated by the decision by the cabinet -- now without the proSyrian and Hezbollah-affiliated members -- to approve the statutes drafted by the United Nations
to establish a special tribunal charged with prosecuting those responsible for the assassination of
former Lebanese leader, Rafik Hariri. Siniora, Jumblatt and other anti-Syrian leaders had
criticized their pro-Syrian colleagues for trying to block the creation of the tribunal. Indeed, proSyrian factions have been implicated by the United Nations (as intimated earlier) in Hariri's
assassination. Not one to accept the situation as it stood, Syrian-backed President Lahoud issued a
letter to the office of the United Nations Secretary General charging that the approval of the
statutes by Siniora's government was not legitimate since he had not given his approval, and
because some of the cabinet members had resigned. For its part, the Siniora government said that
its decision was fully constitutional.
On November 21, 2006, Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel was assassinated in the Christian
suburb of Jdaideh in Lebanon's capital city of Beirut. Gemayel's car was rammed by
three gunmen, who then sprayed the vehicle with gunfire and shot the cabinet minister at close
range. Gemayel was taken to the hospital in critical condition where he died. At only 34 years of
age, Gemayel was one of the youngest politicians in Lebanon, and certainly one of the youngest to
ever suffer political assassination. A Maronite Christian, he was known for his anti-Syrian stance,
as well as his well-known Gemayel family, who formed something of a modern political dynasty
in the Lebanese political spectrum. His grandfather, Pierre Gemayel, for whom he was named,
had been the founder of the Phalange Party; his father, Amin Gemayel, once served as the
country's president.
Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora reacted to the tragic news by saying, "Assassinations will
not terrorise us. We will not let the criminal killers control our fate." In a poignant moment during
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his press conference, Siniora addressed the late Gemayel, asking him to give regards to Hariri -- the
former Lebanese leader who was also assassinated over a year earlier -- promising that both their
deaths would not be in vain. The international community was quick to condemn Gemayel's
assassination. United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair said the killing was "completely without
any justification" and said, "We condemn this murder utterly." United States President George W.
Bush called for an investigation in Gemayel's death, and said that his country would stand in
support of the Siniora government.
Despite appeals for calm from the victim's father, former President Amin Gemayel, crowds of
people -- both infuriated and wracked by grief -- gathered in the streets, particularly outside the
hospital where the cabinet minister died. Other protests were reported to be taking place in various
Christian districts of Beirut, the Christian town of Zahle in the eastern part of the country, as well
as Gemayel's homtown of Bikfaya to the east of Beirut. In an effort to stave off violence, the
Lebanese army was being deployed in and around Beirut.
Gemayel's death was the latest in a list of assassinations since 2005 that began with the murder of
former Prime Minister Hariri, but went on to include journalist Samir Kassir, ex-communist leader
George Hawi, and parliamentarian / newspaper editor Gebran Tueni. During the same period,
journalist May Chidiac survived an assassination attempt. All of the victims were known for being
vocal critics of Syria's influence in Lebanon. In the immediate aftermath of Gemayel's murder,
Saad Hariri, the son of the assassinated former prime minister and the current leader of the antiSyrian majority in parliament, accused Syria of being involved. That said, Syria was quick to
condemn Gemayel's death, even characterizing it as "a dispicable crime," and expressing
sympathy. As such, there was also some speculation about Hezbollah being responsible for the
murder, Syria's possible involvement notwithstanding. Behind this hypothesis was the view that
Hezbollah was becoming more aggressive in demanding political power from the Siniora
government, which was itself at risk of collapse.
With Gemayel's death now in the forefront of the consciousness of many Lebanese, it was difficult
to determine how Hezbollah's influence would be affected. Likewise, it was too soon to tell if the
Siniora government could withstand collapse, or if Gemayel's assassination could rally support by
anti-Syrian factions -- and in a direction away from Hezbollah's sphere of influence.
In late 2006, the Lebanese capital of Beirut was overwhelmed by mass protests by pro-Hezbollah
and pro-Syrian factions, demanding the end of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's government.
Protestors were calling for a new government that would include more allies of Hezbollah and the
pro-Syrian opposition, and would be capable of wielding more influence. But with Siniora and his
government still refusing to resign, a political crisis seemed inevitable.
The situation was not helped by the fact that emotions were still running high in the aftermath of
the aforementioned assassination of Pierre Gemayel only a week earlier. Complicating matters
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was the fact that the demonstrations were taking on a sectarian cast, as evidenced by the clashes
erupting between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims. Moreover, sectarian affiliations appeared to be linked
with particular political allegiances. Whereas Shi'as were largely allied with Hezbollah, on the other
side of the equation, Sunnis, Christians and Druze tended to align with Siniora's government.
Analysts were, therefore, warning that civil strife could potentially be rekindled in Lebanon. That
type of destabilization would inevitably have regional implications.
In response, regional blocs, such as the Arab League, as well as envoys from the United Arab
Emirates, Bahrain and Tunisia, were extending their assistance. They offered to facilitate
negotiations between the Siniora government and the pro-Syrian opposition, along with its
Hezbollah allies.
The second week of December 2006 saw further protests with hundreds of thousands of people
taking to the streets of Beirut and demanding that the Siniora government give more power to the
pro-Hezbollah and pro-Syrian opposition. In an effort to prevent the eruption of violence,
Lebanese military troops were deployed to the streets of the capital city, and were seen barricading
the key roads around the two squares where the demonstrations were taking place. Also visible on
the streets of Beirut were Hezbollah security agents.
By January 2007, a general strike in Lebanon exacerbated the chaos. Clashes between proHezbollah supporters and government supporters resulted in over 100 injuries and some deaths,
while thousands of protestors brought the capital city of Beirut to a virtual standstill. Protestors
were also participating in the strike in the Shi'a south and east of Lebanon. The northern part of
the country, which was inhabited by both Christians and Muslims, saw a complex mix of
institutional support and opposition to the government. At issue remained the demand for greater
power and influence by pro-Hezbollah and pro-Syrian factions in government, and an orientation
away from influence by the West.
Prime Minister Fouad Siniora responded to the brewing crisis in Lebanon by stating in a televised
address that he intended to stand squarely against the "intimidation" by the opposition and its
supporters. To this end, he said, "Today's general strike turned into actions and harassment that
overstepped all limits and rekindled memories of times of strife, war and hegemony." But the
opposition warned that it would not let up its efforts.
The situation turned particularly grim when clashes erupted at Beirut's Arab University between
Sunni pro-government factions and Shi'a opponents. Several people were killed and over 150
others were injured as the two sides turned violent and hurled rocks, clubs and other items at one
another, eventually spreading the violence beyond the university campus and across the capital.
The fighting came to a close after the military fired into the air and an overnight curfew was
imposed.
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The developments overshadowed a donor's conference aimed at helping Lebanon rebuild and
restore its infrastructure following the damaging war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006.
Lebanon was wracked by bombs on February 13, 2007 -- the eve of the second anniversary of the
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. The bombs exploded on two buses in a
Christian area and left at least three people dead and more than 20 injured.
Conflict and the Palestinian Refugee Camp
On May 20, 2007, intense fighting between Lebanese soldiers and radical Islamic fighters from a
Palestinian refugee camp left at least 50 people dead close to the city of Tripoli in the northern part
of Lebanon. Among those killed on that day were more than 20 Lebanese troops and at least 20
gunmen from the Fatah Islam group. Two civilians also died as a result of the fighting, while
scores more people, including several soldiers, were injured.
The group, Fatah Islam, which split from Fatah al-Intifada in late 2006, has been based at the Nahr
al-Bared refugee camp. It was believed to have ties to the terrorist enclave, al-Qaida, although the
group denies this claim. There were also suspicions of a connection to Syrian intelligence. The
group has been largely shunned by other Palestinian organizations.
The fighting was said to have been sparked by the raid of a building aimed at arresting of bank
robbery suspects in Tripoli. The suspects, also allegedly radical Islamic militants, resisted arrest
and then attacked the army posts of the Nahr el-Bared refugee camp where 30,000 displaced
Palestinians were said to be living. Lebanese forces then retaliated by storming the camp.
In separate attacks, an explosion was reported in the capital city of Beirut. It was unknown
whether it was related to a blast in the Christian district of Ashrafieh, which left one woman dead
and at least 10 people wounded.
A day later, on May 21, 2007, Lebanese troops and Palestinian Islamic militants continued to battle
for another day around the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp close to Tripoli. Lebanon's Information
Minister Ghazi Aridi promised that the military would continue its efforts against the Palestinian
extremist group. Arizo also noted that leading figures of Fatah Islam were among the fighters who
had been killed the day before, and he alleged they were responsible for past attacks as well as the
planning of future attacks. To this end, Lebanese security officials said that one militant was
wanted in Germany in connection with an unsuccessful train bombing plot in mid-2006.
While the conflict appeared to be lessening as Lebanese troops took control of the perimeter of the
Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, the exchange of gunfire continued through the next day. Caught in
the cross-fire were civilians inside the camp. As a result, the death toll was expanding with reports
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of the deaths of several civilians, including Lebanese citizens and Palestinian refugees. The list of
those suffering from injuries was also increasing and there were attempts to move the wounded to
hospitals for treatment. Meanwhile, there were burgeoning humanitarian concerns about
deteriorating conditions on the ground.
That situation was not helped on May 22, 2007 when a convoy carrying aid entered the Nahr alBared camp came under heavy fire and shelling, thus forcing its retreat. The convoy of six truck
was transporting food, water, medical supplies, an electrical generator, and other necessities. In
the midst of this development, heavy fighting appeared to have resumed between the two sides,
effectively nullifying reports of a supposed ceasefire.
At the national level, the Lebanese government authorized the military to intensify its efforts in
dealing with the extremist fighters. Internationally, the United States said the extremist forces had
to be "reined in." European Union foreign policy head Javier Solana was set to convene meetings
with Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in Beirut to discuss the situation.
Meanwhile, Lebanese Trade Minister Sami Haddad said in an interview with the British media that
he believed Syria was responsible for orchestrating the violence for the purpose of destabilizing the
Lebanese government. But Bashar Jaafari, the Syrian ambassador to the United Nations dismissed
this notion, asserting that there was no link between his government and Fatah Islam. He also
made note of the fact that some members of the group had been imprisoned in Syrian jails for their
support for al-Qaida.
After a week of ongoing clashes between the Lebanese army and radical Islamic fighters at a
Palestinian refugee camp, the situation remained unresolved. While an official from the United
Nations said that about 25,000 civilians had managed to flee the Nahr al-Bared refugee compound,
about 6,000 people remained trapped there -- effectively caught in the crossfire of violence.
On May 26, 2007, Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora said in an interview with British media
that if the radical Islamic fighters of Fatah Islam surrendered, they would be treated fairly. He
warned, however, that if the radical Palestinian Islamists continued to fight, the army would deal
with them. In the meanwhile, an uneasy cease-fire was ongoing as the Lebanese authorities
allowed Palestinian factions a few days to try to forge a peaceful end to the crisis.
Despite this uneasy cease-fire and negotiation plan, on May 27, 2007, Lebanese troops came under
attack from the Islamist militants inside the Palestinian refugee camp. In the background of this
development was the clear rejection of a resolution on the part of Fatah Islam leader, Shaker alAbssi, who in a videotaped message promised to "fight Jews, Americans and their allies."
Weeks after fighting ensued between Lebanese troops and Islamic militants at the Nahr-al-Bared
refugee camp near Tripoli, a new site of similar violence broke out at the Ain al-Hilweh camp close
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to Sidon. In this case, the fighting involved Lebanese soldiers and militants from the group, Jund
al-Sham. Reports suggested that the situation at Ain al-Hilweh was provoked after militants fired a
rocket-propelled grenade at an army checkpoint. Lebanese soldiers responded to the attack with
gunfire. The mayor of Sidon, Abdul Rahman Bizri, later said the incident was limited in scope and
was ultimately contained.
But on June 4, 2007, a commander for Fatah Islam warned it would enter the fray and escalate the
newly-sparked conflict at Ain al-Hilweh. The warning from Commander Abu Hureira came after
two Lebanese soldiers were reported to have been killed in the fighting there with the other
extremist group, Jund al-Sham.
On June 5, 2007, the head of the Palestinian Fatah political party in Lebanon (distinct from the
extremist group Fatah Islam), announced that seven militants had surrendered and laid down their
arms. Khaled Aref explained to the media, "They surrendered on Monday and Tuesday to Fatah
men in the Nahr al-Bared camp." He continued, "We can confirm that men from Fatah al-Islam
turned themselves in and handed over their weapons."
While that announcement was welcomed, two days later on June 7, 2007, the violence was
ongoing at Nahr al-Bared. Lebanese troops, fortified by air power, carried out heavy shelling of
the refugee camp. Clashes on the ground were also going on, with one Lebanese soldier reported
to have been killed as a result.
Meanwhile, violence was not limited to the two camps. In Beirut, four bombs exploded in the
weeks since the start of the fighting. In one case, a bomb exploded on a bus; several people were
reported to have been injured as a result. It was unknown as to who was responsible, however,
Lebanese authorities alleged that the bombings were likely connected to the conflict at the two
camps. Complicating matters even further was the discovery of three vehicles packed with
explosives close to Lebanon's border with Syria. Lebanese officials said that the vehicles were
intended to be used as car bombs; they also noted that two Syrians and one Iraqi had been
arrested.
At the start of July 2007, attention returned to the ongoing conflict at the aforementioned Nahr alBared refugee camp. Palestinian refugees were trying to get past a security checkpoint, in an
attempt to return to their homes, and were fired on by the Lebanese army. As a result, at least
three people were said to have been killed, and over 40 people were reportedly injured. While it
was unclear whether the protestors provoked the soldiers or not, the Lebanese army said the
troops were responding with warning shots to the fact that throngs of people were burning tires and
attacking soldiers with sharp objects. Human Right Watch called for an independent inquiry into
the situation.
By the middle of July 2007, the conflict between Lebanese troops and Fatah Islam militants was
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continuing at the Palestinian refugee camp, with the army taking on more of an offensive stance.
In fact, reports suggested that Lebanese forces took up positions just outside the camp and were
shelling at the compound. The offensive move came after many of the remaining residents fled
the camp and two soldiers were shot by snipers at the edge of the compound. Lebanese officials
denied that the relentless shelling was a final assault aimed at flushing out or killing the militants.
Note: Since the start of the conflict, more than 85 soldiers, 60 militants and 40 civilians were
killed.
Other Developments in 2007
Meanwhile, on June 13, 2007, an explosion in Beirut's waterfront left eight people dead, including
anti-Syrian parliamentarian Walid Eido, and at least 10 people injured. The attack was the latest in
a spate of blasts plaguing Lebanon in the spring of 2007, and Eido was the most recent victim in a
series of assassinations in the last few years involving high profile anti-Syrian individuals. Eido
was a member of Future Movement, and a political ally of Saad Hariri, the son of Lebanon's
former head of government.
The timing of the attack was regarded as significant since it came two weeks after a decision by the
United Nations Security Council to establish a tribunal to prosecute suspects in the assassination of
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Throughout, there has been suspicion about Syrian
involvement in the Hariri's assassination as well as the subsequent attacks on political opponents in
Lebanon. For its part, Syria has dismissed such accusations.
In the third week of June 2007, even as the Lebanese army continued to battle with militants from
Fatah Islam at the Nahr-al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp, the country continued to be plagued by
violence. Less than two weeks after the assassination of another leading anti-Syrian figure in the
country, parliamentarian Walid Eido (discussed just above), six United Nations (U.N.)
peacekeepers were killed when their vehicle was hit by an explosive device. The peacekeepers
were functioning under the aegis of Spanish forces. The attack took place between the towns of
Khiyam and Marjeyoun, close to the border with Israel, in a zone that has been part of the U.N.
operation in Lebanon since 1978. (Note: In 2006, the U.N. operation in Lebanon was intensified
following the Hezbollah-Israel conflict.)
There was no claim of responsibility although the Spanish Defense Minister, Jose Antonio Alonso,
stated that it was a "premeditated attack," noting also that his government was "working on the
theory of a terrorist attack." Indeed, extremists groups in Lebanon have made threats against U.N.
peacekeepers in the past. Most notably, some of the militants of Fatah Islam who were arrested
and interrogated since the start of the aforementioned conflict at Nahr-al-Bared, admitted to a plot
to attack the U.N.
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On Aug. 5, 2007, tens of thousands of Lebanese voters went to the polls to cast ballots in key byelections. Turnout was reported to have been high and Prime Minister Fouad Siniora said that
voting took place in an orderly manner. There was no deadly violence reported on election day,
presumably as a result of tight security at polling stations.
At stake were the two vacant seats previously held by two assassinated parliamentarians, both of
whom belonged to the anti-Syrian and Western-backed ruling coalition. The elections would, thus,
result in replacements for the seats held by Sunni Muslim parliamentarian, Walid Eido, who had
been assassinated in a car bomb in Beirut in June 2007 as noted above, and Christian cabinet
minister, Pierre Gemayel, who was gunned down in November 2006, as aforementioned. Both
deaths were a result of the spate of murders and violent attacks that have plagued Lebanon since
the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri who had been a harsh and vociferous critic
of Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs.
Now, two years later, Lebanon was deeply divided on sectarian grounds between Shi'ite Muslims,
Sunni Muslims and Maronite Christians (its Jewish population having long since dwindled).
Lebanon was also politically fragmented between pro-Syrian and pro-Hezbollah factions on one
end of the equation, and anti-Syrian, nationalist, and pro-Western enclaves, on the other end. In
many ways, the fractures that characterized Lebanon's civil war were resurfacing, most especially
in the form of renewed violence, power struggles, strategic machinations, and political tensions.
The by-elections were thus imbued with grave symbolic significance, irrespective of the fact that
they did not have the approval of either President Emile Lahoud or recognition of the
parliamentary speaker, Nabih Berri. Both Lahoud and Berri were aligned with Hezbollah-led
opposition in parliament, which had been calling for the resignation of Fouad Siniora's government
since late 2006.
In the period leading up to the 2007 by-elections, Eido's seat in western Beirut was expected to be
won by the pro-government candidate, Mohammed Amin Itani. With the votes counted, it
appeared that projections for a victory by Itani were on target with the pro-government Sunni
politician winning by a substantial margin.
Gemayel's seat in the Maronite Christian stronghold of Metn was another matter, largely because
of the divided nature of the population base. Amin Gemayel, the father of the murdered cabinet
minister, was contesting the election and hoping to replace his son. A former president and
Phalange Party leader, Gemayel, was regarded as a strong contender. However, the Free Patriotic
Movement (FPM), was hoping that its candidate, Camile Khoury, would win the seat. Supporters
of the two parties were reported to have been embroiled in clashes with one another, which ended
only after the army intervened. While the situation was calm in Metn as voters cast their ballots,
there were allegations of voting irregularities. Then, prior to the announcement of the election
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result, Gemayel called for a re-run of the vote in a particular district. Nevertheless, once the votes
were counted, it appeared that Khoury had won a slim victory.
The race was regarded as a precursor to the upcoming presidential election for a successor to proSyrian President Emile Lahoud. This was because Gemayel was viewed as a possible (albeit
unconfirmed) candidate for the country's leadership position against former military chief and
FPM leader, Micheal Aoun. While Phalange has been an establishment of sorts within the
Maronite Christian community, FPM had never been regarded as a bitter rival until the last year.
In 2006, Aoun of FPM, who had once been a strong critic of Syrian involvement in Lebanese
affairs, became increasingly allied with the extremist group, Hezbollah, which has itself been tied to
Syria. There was some speculation that Aoun crafted his alliance with Hezbollah strategically, for
the purpose of advancing his presidential ambitions. Regardless of the motivation, his efforts were
successful because Hezbollah indicated that Aoun was its preferred candidate in the impending
presidential contest.
Clearly with Aoun aligned with Hezbollah and other pro-Syrian forces in Lebanon, and with
Gemayel and his allies being strong advocates of the pro-Western and anti-Syrian orientation of the
ruling coalition, there was a clear choice before the voters in the by-election, and also in the
presidential election later in 2007, regarding the path to be charted by the Lebanese people. To this
end, Gemayel said, "Lebanon is at a crossroad. The people have to make a choice whether they
want an independent and democratic Lebanon, or whether they want to vote for the opposition and
a country ruled by Syria."
On Sept. 19, 2007, another anti-Syrian parliamentarian was assassinated in an apparent car
bombing that took place in the Lebanese capital. Antoine Ghanim, a member of the Maronite
Christian party known as Phalange, was killed when his car exploded in the mainly Christian
district of Sin al-Fil in Beirut. Ghanim was an attorney who was first elected to parliament in
2000 and re-elected in 2005. Several other people were killed as well in the attack, which also
caused serious injuries to even more victims, as well as damage to nearby cars and buildings.
The Lebanese government expressed its sorrow over Ghanim's death while governments across the
world, as well as regional and international groups, conveyed both sympathy and outrage over the
turn of events. As the country mourned Ghanim, government offices, banking institutions, schools
and universities were closed. A funeral was expected to be held within days.
Ghanim's killing came months after the murder of Walid Eido, less than a year after the death of
Pierre Gemayel, the son of the one of the leaders of the Phalange Party [Amin Gemayel], and
more than two years after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Since the killing
of Hariri, which gave rise to the Cedar Revolution (referenced above), several political
assassinations have ensued in Lebanon. All the victims have been high-profile figures with antiSyrian stances.
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There have been allegations that Syria has been behind the political killings, presumably as a result
of its declining power and influence upon -- and within – Lebanon in recent years. While an
investigation by the United Nations suggested that Syria, indeed, played a role in Hariri's
assassination, the government of Syria in Damascus has steadfastly denied any role in the wave of
killings. Nevertheless, pro-Western interests both inside Lebanon and internationally have noted
that the latest assassination fit the pattern of past assassinations in Lebanon.
Ghanim's death had political implications on two levels. In broad scope, it was the latest
manifestation of political violence rocking Lebanon, destabilizing the Siniora government, and
ripping away the democratic foundations that were beginning to take shape in the last decade after
a long period of civil war. In the immediate future, Ghanim's death had the practical effect of
reducing the governing bloc's majority in parliament to only two seats, thus strengthening the
position of pro-Syrian elements, such as Hezbollah, in parliament.
The Lebanese parliament, or National Assembly, was made up of a slight majority of modern, antiSyrian, and pro-Western factions, as noted above. However, the pro-Syrian factions, such as
Hezbollah, have also held a great deal of political power. Much of that power had been
consolidated after the war between Israel and Hezbollah on Lebanese terrain in 2006. Since that
time, Hezbollah had been demanding a greater say in the governing realm. In fact, the year 2007
had seen Lebanon become increasingly mired in an ongoing political crisis between the two sides
in parliament.
The parliamentary breakdown and climate of relations were of significant relevance, given the fact
that Lebanese parliamentarians were set to vote on the country's new president. The winner of
this vote within parliament would succeed outgoing pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud. All
candidates for the post of head of state were Maronite Christian*, in accordance with existing
political provisions.
(*Note: In accordance with the 1943 National Pact, the president is supposed to be a Maronite
Christian, the prime minister is to be a Sunni Muslim, and the parliamentary speaker is to be a
Shi'a Muslim. This means that Lebanon's president is the only non-Muslim head of state in the
Arab world amidst a system of pluralistic religious representation.)
In the wake of the assassination of Ghanim, there were prevailing questions as to whether or not
the vote on the presidency would go forward as planned. But only days after Ghanim's death,
Lebanon's government said the election would indeed take place. Prime Minister Fuad Siniora
made a point of noting that those responsible for the assassination of Ghanim should not be
allowed to succeed in their objectives to undermine the democratic process and to silence the
people. To these ends, the Lebanese head of government said, "The hand of terror will not win
and will not succeed in subduing us and silencing us." He also called for a United Nations inquiry
into the assassination.
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On Sept. 25, 2007, the situation changed when the Lebanese parliament adjourned its session
intended elect the country's new president and, instead, set a new date of Oct. 23, 2007, to do so.
The decision was made due to the absence of pro-Syrian opposition members at the session. As
such, there were insufficient parliamentarians present to form the two-thirds quorum, effectively
making a vote impossible. While Lebanon's leadership contest remained unresolved, there was
some hope that the delayed vote would provide additional time to, perhaps, consult across party
lines and reach agreement on a consensus candidate.
Apart from the aforementioned candidate, Michael Aoun, who was supported by Hezbollah, others
contesting the election included the following: pro-government candidate and industrialist Nassib
Lahoud, pro-government parliamentarian and former cabinet minister Boutous Harb, former
Foreign Minister Jean Obeid, Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh, and former Army
Commander Michel Suleiman. Obeid was rapidly being viewed as a consensus candidate, while
Salameh's positive domestic and international reputation was regarded as a strong asset.
Suleiman's prospects appeared weak since a constitutional amendment would have to be passed to
allow him to become president.
Months later, there was no sign of a successor to President Lahoud. In fact, the highly anticipated
presidential election was postponed until Nov. 21, 2007. Parliamentary speaker, Nabih Berri, said
that more time was needed to settle on a compromise candidate who would be acceptable to the
Western-backed government of Lebanon as well as the Syrian-supported opposition. That date
was again postponed until Nov. 23, 2007, due to the failure to agree on a compromise candidate
even with the assistance of international mediators.
If no successor to Lahoud was selected by Nov. 24, 2007, when the outgoing president was
scheduled to step down from office, interim leadership would be named. Indeed, that deadline
approached and passed with no selection of a successor. The vote, in fact, was unable to take
place since the pro-Syrian opposition would not allow a quorum to be formed. Instead, a new vote
was scheduled for Nov. 30, 2007.
In the interim, as Lahoud left the presidential palace, he instructed the army to take presidential
control. To that end, Lahoud issued a statement noting that the army would take on responsibility
for ensuring that stability and order was maintained. For his part, however, army chief General
Michel Suleiman refrained from comment, prefering to present the military as a neutral entity. But
Lahoud's declaration was not accepted as fact. Pro-Western Prime Minister Siniora forthrightly
rejected the position that the army was in charge saying that he and his cabinet held temporary
power in keeping with constitutional provisions.
In the background of these developments, there have been grave anxieties about a power vacuum,
constitutional crisis and civil unrest if the political impasse is not ultimately resolved.
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Increasingly unstable Lebanon sunk deeper into a vortex of chaos in mid-December 2007 when
one of the country's top generals, General Francois al-Hajj, was assassinated in a car bombing.
The attack, which also killed two other individuals including Hajj's bodyguard, took place in the
Christian enclave of Baabda, located near to the presidential palace in the capital city of Beirut.
The location of the attack had, until this time, been regarded as a highly secure area.
General Hajj, who had been the Lebanese army's chief of operations, was rumored to be in line for
the position of army chief, if the current army chief, General Michel Suleiman, was chosen to
become the country's new president. Since Emile Lahoud's rule as president ended in late
November 2007, the country had been in a state of political crisis with no resolution between the
pro-Western ruling government and pro-Syrian/pro-Hezbollah opposition factions in parliament.
Both sides were unable to agree on a successor to Lahoud for several months, and as such, the
power vacuum has loomed large. Only by December 2007 did the two sides agree on Suleiman
being a consensus candidate, however, their dissonance prevailed as there was no agreement on
how to amend the constitution to allow a senior civil servant to be elected to the presidency. As
well, no concurrence could be reached on the government, which the opposition refused to
recognize.
Hajj's untimely death was another one in a long line of political assassinations in Lebanon since
2005 when former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was murdered. The assassinations of Hariri and a
number of anti-Syrian public figures have long since been blamed on Syria. As such, it was not
surprising that some pro-Western voices placed the blame for Hajj's assassination on Syria once
again. To that end, Lebanese telecommunications minister Marwan Hamadeh accused the "SyrianIranian axis" of targeting the Lebanese military because it was the only entity that could "balance
the power of Hezbollah and other militias in the country." However that charge was somewhat
tempered by the fact that both Syrian-backed Hezbollah and Hezbollah-backed Christian politician
Michel Aoun both condemned Hajj's murder. Indeed Aoun said that he backed the idea of Hajj
succeeding Suleiman as army chief.
Attention then turned to other motivations. Because of Hajj's involvement as chief of operations in
the fight against Islamic militants at the Palestinian Nahr al-Bared refugee camp earlier in the year,
there was some belief that his assassination was a revenge killing. However, the location of the
attack, as noted above, would have required militants to have had access to high level logistical
intelligence, thus casting some doubt about that particular theory.
Regardless of who was responsible for Hajj's assassination, such action was unprecedented. To
date, the Lebanese military has been viewed as a unifying force in this fragmented country, and
senior military officials have not been targeted in assassination attacks. Hajj's death, thusly, could
be regarded as an omen of further political conflict on the horizon for Lebanon.
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Developments in Early 2008
The ongoing political crisis that had gripped Lebanon for months over the choice of president was
extended once again by the start of 2008. The presidential election, which had already been
postponed approximately a dozen times due to political dissonance on the matter, was delayed
again until Feb. 11, 2008. Attempts to mediate a solution by the Arab League had yielded little
success. Amr Moussa of the Arab League met with the Lebanese parliament to advocate a plan
that would result in the election of Suleiman as president, the formation of a national unity
government and the passage of a a new electoral law.
On Jan. 25, 2008, a powerful bomb blast in the Lebanese capital of Beirut rocked the city and
resulted in the deaths of several people. Included in the death toll was Wissam Eid -- a senior
intelligence officer. Close to forty others were injured in the bomb blast.
Wissam Eid had been carrying out an investigation of the attacks against notable anti-Syrian
political and media figures that had plagued Lebanon since 2004 and left the country in a state of
instability. It was thus believed that Wissam Eid was the clear target of the attack, coming on the
heels of the late 2007 high profile assassination of a top general. To that end, the Internal Security
Forces chief, Ashraf Rifi said, "This is a message to the Internal Security Forces, following the
message sent to the army in December when General Francois el-Hajj was killed in a car bomb."
Meanwhile, Saad Hariri -- the country's majority leader in parliament and son of the assassinated
former head of government -- implicated Syria in the attack and demanded that the neighboring
country cease its interference into Lebanese affairs. For its part, as it has before, Damascus,
denied any involvement.
Recent Developments: Doha Agreement and Presidential Election
In the first part of 2008, attention turned to the prospect of the impending presidential election.
The indirect presidential election in Lebanon had been delayed over and over several times, with
new dates put forth on a successive basis.
The main presidential candidates, listed in brief above, are discussed more fully following -One of the strongest candidates has been Michel Suleiman, the chief of the Lebanese armed
forces. Suleiman is a highly decorated official and he is positively seen by both sides of the
Lebanese debate as the best option for the next president. He has been functioning in a
leadership role since President Emile Lahoud left office and the presidency has remained vacant.
Nassib Lahoud is a member of the Democratic Renewal Movement, which is anti-Syrian. This
movement gained momentum in opposition to the pro-Syrian former president (Emile Lahoud).
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He believes that Lebanon must put an end to Syrian intrusion in their affairs.
Michael Aoun is a highly controversial candidate for the presidency. Having served as a Prime
Minister to one of the governing bodies in Lebanon imposed by former President Amine
Gemayel, Aoun’s government was defeated by Syrian forces in 1990 and he was exiled. After his
return in 2005 and the exit of the Syrian forces, Aoun became a member of the Free Patriotic
Movement that gained support in the 2005 elections and he, himself, was elected to the National
Assembly in that same year. Aoun has been criticized for his support of the 2006 Memorandum
of Understanding with Hezbollah, though he criticized them openly during his exile. He is
endorsed by Hezbollah.
Michael Edde was chosen as a candidate by the head of the Lebanese Maronite Church (a sect
that produces the majority of Presidents chosen by the Parliament) as a candidate that most
parties involved could agree upon. He has worked as a minister in Lebanon for upwards of 30
years.
Riad Salameh is a very successful banker in Lebanon and is supported by the French. He has
maintained a stable monetary policy, though his candidacy would require a constitutional
amendment to allow him to take the position of president.
Boutros Harb is an anti-Syrian candidate for the presidency. He has been an active protestor of
the Hezbollah’s involvement in the Lebanese government since the assassination of their Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2004. He insists upon national unity and wishes to work on mutual
respect for sovereignty and independence with Syria.
Jean Obeid is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and is seen as a consensus candidate, as he
served as an advisor to two former Lebanese presidents on the Syrian affairs.
The election was intended to bring an end to the impasse that had plagued the country since the
departure of former President Lahoud. However, no election would take place unless the Westernbacked government and Hezbollah-allied opposition could come to agreement on the backing of a
consensus candidate. Several successive postponements marked the lack of consensus on the
matter of the presidency. However, even with emerging agreement over Michel Suleiman as the
consensus candiate, there remained no agreement regarding a plan to pass a new electoral law, that
would allow the army chief to take on the position of head of state.
To that end, Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa was attempting to broker a three-point
plan aimed at resolving the political dissonance between the opposition and the Western-backed
government. That plan called for the election of Suleiman as president, the formation of a unity
government with no group having the right to veto, as well as the passage of a new election law.
The main sticking point for the opposition bloc was the issue of veto power, which it demanded.
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At the core of the political dissonance in Lebanon was the very one keeping the country from
securing a leader: the relationship with Syria and the Hezbollah. Indeed, the conflict between the
pro-Western government of Lebanon and the parliament (composed of opposed pro-Western and
pro-Hezbollah factions) has kept the process from moving forward since November 2007 when
President Emile Lahoud left office.
By May 2008, even as Lebanon was once again delaying its presidential election due to lack of
consensus among rival factions of parliament, a violent conflict between Hezbollah and the
Lebanese government was brewing.
The violence, which resulted in scores of deaths in the streets of Beirut and beyond, had been
sparked when the leader of Hezbollah, characterized the government's decision to close its
telecommunications network as a "declaration of war." The network had been deemed a threat to
security. Hassan Nasrallah also railed at the government for firing the chief of security at the
Beirut airport, also on the basis of security concerns. The Hezbollah leader thusly promised to
"cut off the hand" trying to dismantle its operations.
On the other side of the equation, Saad Hariri, the leader of the pro-Western parliamentary
majority, called for an end to the bloodshed saying, "My appeal to you is to stop the language of
arms." This call was not realized. Hezbollah had taken control over the airport and key transport
arteries and attacked interests associated with the government in Beirut. In fact, the area was
plagued by several successive days of bloodshed between Hezbollah and pro-government forces,
reminiscent of the period in which the country had been plunged into a civil war. The Westernbacked government of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora said that an "armed and bloody coup" was
taking place in his country.
Meanwhile, the Lebanese military warned that the country's security would be at risk if the crisis
went on, and it also suggested that its neutral status could be compromised if it was forced to
intervene to stop the violence.
While there was a temporary lull in the violence on May 10 and 11, 2008, and even though
Hezbollah withdrew some of its fighters from the capital, fighting resumed again outside Beirut in
the hills to the east of the capital. The area was a stronghold of the Druze community and was
emerging as the site of violent battles between pro-Hezbollah forces and government supporters.
The Druze community was fearful that without the deployment of military troops in the area,
Hezbollah would take control by force, as per Beirut. In order to prevent such an end in the
northern part of the country, military troops were deployed to Tripoli to tamper down clashes
between pro-Hezbollah forces and government supporters. In the background of these
developments, thousands of Lebanese people were trying to flee regions of the country affected by
the conflict.
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Later in May 2008, the Arab League mediated talks in which a deal was forged to bring an end to
the fighting. Central to the agreement were provisions for electoral reform and the formation of a
national unity cabinet. Earlier, the government had reversed its actions against Hezbollah regarding
the telecommunications network and the security chief. As well, Hezbollah agreed to end its street
blockades, re-open the airport and end its siege of Beirut. On May 18, 2008, rival political leaders
from Lebanon were convening talks in Qatar, aimed at putting the peace deal into action.
However, the meeting was somewhat stymied by differing views on Hezbollah's possession of
vast stores of weapons.
By May 21, 2008, Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr al-Thani of Qatar
announced in Doha (Qatar) that rival Lebanese factions had agreed on a plan to resolve the
political crisis. Central to the Doha Agreement was the provision for the formation of a unity
government according to the "16-11-3 formula." To this end, the Western-backed ruling majority
would hold 16 cabinet seats and would have the right to select the prime minister, while the
Syrian/Hezbollah-backed opposition would hold 11 cabinet seats and have veto power. The
president would have the right to nominate options for three cabinet seats. Another core
component of the Doha Agreement was the election of a new president within 24 hours, which
would itself bring an end to the ongoing political standoff in Lebanon. Other provisions were
included, such as electoral reform, the prohibition of the use of weaponry in internal conflict, and
the removal of protests camps in central Beirut. The weapons ban and closure of the protest
camps were intended to prevent Lebanon from spiraling into a state of violent civil unrest.
The first tangible sign that the Doha Agreement was clearly activated came when Army
Commander Michel Suleiman was elected by parliament and became Lebanon's new president.
The indirect vote gave Suleiman 118 votes out of 127. In his first official address to Lebanon's
parliament, President Michel Suleiman urged national reconciliation saying, "Let us unite... and
work towards a solid reconciliation... we have paid dearly for our national unity, let us preserve it
hand-in-hand." This rallying call did not ignore the recent dark events, as he also noted that the
country was "starting to wake up from self-destruction." The new head of state additionally called
for "quiet dialogue" on the most contentious issues facing Lebanon, such as Hezbollah's role as an
armed resistance movement. Suleiman also addressed the thorny matter of the assassination of
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri by saying the country should cooperate with the
United Nations in bringing those responsible to justice.
The biggest test facing Lebanon now was the formation of the new unity government. Until that
government could be formed, outgoing Prime Minister Fuad Siniora would lead the caretaker
government. In late May 2008, Siniora was nominated to reprise his role as prime minister under
the provisions of the Doha Agreement. The only other name being considered for the post was
that of the son of former Prime Minister Hariri, who had been assassinated years prior. Newlyelected President Suleiman was expected to be presented with the news that Siniora had been
selected for the role of head of government, and the process of government formation would then
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commence.
In July 2008, in the wake of the concurrence reached in the Doha Agreement, Lebanese political
leaders agreed to form a national unity government, in accordance with the "16-11-3 formula"
noted above. With the government to be formed, it was expected that Fuad Siniora (at the time,
functioning as the caretaker head of government) would continue on as prime minister and head of
government, albeit with a very divided cabinet. Addressing this fact, Siniora said, "Our differences
will not be resolved overnight, but we have decided to resolve them through institutions and
dialogue rather than in the streets."
On July 11, 2008, Lebanon finally formed a 30-member national unity government after several
weeks of difficult negotiations. Indeed, the fractious period was marked by contentious debate
among political power brokers and violent clashes in the streets of Beirut among supporters of the
two rival sides. The new cabinet was composed of 16 ministers of the Western-backed ruling
majority, 11 allied with the Shiite Hezbollah-led opposition, and the rest three named by President
Michel Suleiman.
With the new government set to take office, Prime Minister Siniora was faced with a plethora of
challenges. Chief among these challenges was the task of unifying the rival factions in the cabinet.
Prime Minister Siniora remarked on some of the objectives of this new cabinet saying, "This
government has two main tasks: regaining confidence in the Lebanese political system... and
securing the holding of transparent parliamentary elections.
In early August 2008, the Lebanese parliamentary speaker, Nabih Berri, called parliament to
discuss a possible confidence vote for the newly-established unity government. The vote would
make clear whether the uneasy coalition of unlikely partners -- pro-Western factions and proHezbollah factions-- would be able to maintain functioning viability in parliament. That vote
passed off successfully reifying the new unity government's authority and influence in parliament.
Other Recent Developments
Meanwhile, in late July 2008 saw sectarian violence break out in Lebanon as rival factions of Alawi
and Sunni Muslims clashed in the northern city of Tripoli. Sniper fire and rocket-propelled
grenades were reported to have been used by the two sides. Officials said that at least five people
died as a result of this bout of violence, however, a number of deaths and injuries had already
taken place earlier in the month as a result of the factional fighting. The clashes occurred in the
wake of the formation of a unity government and appeared to have been sparked by differences
over militia weaponry and disarmament.
On Aug. 13, 2008, a bomb explosion in the Lebanese port city of Tripoli killed between 10 and
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20 people and wounded more than 30 others. According to the Lebanese military, the bomb
exploded in proximity of a bus carrying several off-duty soldiers and some of those troops were
among the dead.
There was no immediate claim of responsibility, however, the city had been the site of sectarian
fighting between the dominant Sunni community, which supports the pro-Western forces of
government, and the Alawaite community, with its Shi'a roots and connection to pro-Syrian
Hezbollah. This particular attack occurred one day after the new government of national unity
won a key confidence vote and just as newly-elected President Michel Suleiman was set to visit
Syria. As such, there was speculation that the attack was intended to upset reconciliatory
movement both at home and abroad between typically-conflicted pro-Western and pro-Syrian
factions.
For his part, President Suleiman described the explosion as "a terrorist act" and promised that the
country's military would not stand for such action. In a statement, he said, "The army and security
forces will not be terrorized by attacks and crimes that target it and civil society, and the history of
the army attests to that."
Update:
October 2008 saw Syrian President Bashar al-Assad initiate plans to forge diplomatic relations with
Lebanon for the first time in decades. Indeed, the two Arab countries have been at odds with one
another since gaining independence from France in the 1940s. The plans, which have been backed
by France, includes the establishment of a Syrian embassy in the Lebanese capital of Beirut. The
move would be a symbolic acknowledgment of Lebanese sovereignty after decades of what many
have viewed as Syrian inteference in Lebanese affairs. On the other side of the
equation, Lebanese Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh said that he would travel to the Syrian capital
of Damascus to commence establishing ties with his Syrian counterpart ,Walid al-Moualem. That
would constitute the first step in the diplomatic process, ultimately aimed at the exchange of
ambassadors by the close of 2009.
In March 2009, there was a stall on the proceedings of the special tribunal, established by the
United Nations at The Hague, to try those individuals believed to be responsible for the
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. At issue were the upcoming general
elections. The court decided to halt its call to transfer four generals held in connection with Hariri's
assassination until after the elections in June 2009.
Meanwhile in January 2009, the Lebanese Interior Ministry issued a decree calling for the
parliamentary elections to take place in June 2009. The parliamentary elections were to take place
according to the 1960 election law, as urged by the opposition, and signed by Lebanese rival
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leaders in Doha in 2008 as a way of ending the prevailing political power struggle between proWestern and pro-Hezbollah factions in government.
On the issue of the elections scheduled for June 2009, President Michel Suleiman vowed in March
2009 to hold the general elections on time, saying in the An-Nahar daily publication that elections
are "democratic means of competition." He went on to note, "The elections represent one step in
the political life, and not the end of the road."
At stake was representation in the 128-seat parliament, which according to Lebanon's powersharing system, divides seat allocation along sectarian and communal lines. In effect, that means
that there were 64 seats for Muslims and 64 seats for Christians. The two main factions contesting
the elections were as follows--The pro-Western "14 March Coalition," made up of Future movement, Progressive Socialist
Party, Christian Lebanese Forces and Christian Phalangist party.
-The Hezbollah-led bloc, composed of Hezbollah, Amal movement of Speaker Nabih Birri, and
Free Patriotic Movement of Michel Aoun.
Lebanese voters finally went to the polls on June 7, 2009 to cast their ballots and, in so doing,
select members of parliament. Turnout was said to be high at close to 55 percent -- the highest
level of voter participation since the 1975-91 civil war. Former United States President Jimmy
Carter led a team of international monitors who concluded that the voting took place in a free and
fair manner.
At issue in the election was the ongoing power struggle between the Lebanon's governing proWestern coalition and the Hezbollah-led bloc on the other side of the equation. The two sides have
been deadlocked in a political battle for supremacy for several years. But with the votes counted,
it was clear that the ruling pro-Western coalition would retain its majority in the 128-member
parliament. The actual official results indicated that the pro-Western coalition won 71 seats and the
Hezbollah bloc secured 57 seats. With these results confirmed, the pro-Western coalition actually
increased its parliamentary representation and consolidated its political power.
Saad Hariri-- the leader of the pro-Western coalition and the son of assassinated anti-Syrian
politician Rafiq Hariri -- claimed victory. In a speech before jubilant supporters, Hariri said,
"Congratulations to you, congratulations to freedom, congratulations to democracy." He
continued, "There is no winner and loser in these elections, the only winner is democracy and
Lebanon." On the other side of the equation, the Hezbollah-led bloc was reported to have
conceded defeat. Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, said: "I would like to congratulate all those
who won, those in the majority and those in the opposition."
Western countries, such as the United States, were likely relieved to hear the election results, which
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decisively averted the prospect of victory and increased political influence for the Hezbollah bloc.
In fact, United States President Barack Obama reportedly, "It is our sincere hope that the next
government will continue along the path towards building a sovereign, independent and stable
Lebanon."
Fresh on the heels of election victory, Lebanese majority leader Saad Hariri said in an interview
with Italian media that he was ready to lead a new government. On Italy's Italian TV Rai Uno,
Hariri said, "I did not have the experience and was not ready after my father's assassination to
take office, but now after four years I do not fear taking this position."
Of course, Saad Hariri was referring to his father, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri,
who was assassinated in a car bomb in Beirut on Feb.14, 2005. Saad Hariri became the leader of
the coalition that won election in what came to be known as the "Cedar Revolution" just after his
father's assassination. However, the younger Hariri did not lead the government, instead leaving
that task to Prime Minister Fouad Seniora. Going forward, though, Hariri was indicating that he
had effectively earned the right to head the new incoming government.
Striking an assertive tone, Hariri said, "We are keen on doing what the Lebanese want and not
what the United States, Europe or Israel want." He also said that the new government would be
fully representative and that his hands were outstretched to political opponents "for the interest of
Lebanon." This statement was viewed as a veiled hint toward the Shi'ite militant group, Hezbollah,
especially as he made clear that his government would solve its problems via dialogue and not with
violence.
On June 27, 2009, Lebanese President Michel Suleiman announced that Hariri would be the
country's new prime minister. In this way, the younger Hariri would take on the role once held by
his late father. Prime Minister-designate Hariri was tasked with forming a new government, which
he said would include members of the opposition. It was not known if the opposition membership
in government would extend to Hezbollah.
That said, there was a sense that Lebanon was entering a period of stability after several years of
insecurity and volatility that came with Rafiq Hariri's assassination and continued well after the socalled Cedar Revolution, and reached its nadir during the war between Hezbollah and Israel.
Relations with Israel came to the fore in September 2009 when two rockets were fired into
northern Israel from Lebanon; the explosions were reported in the Israeli city of Nahariya only six
miles from the border with Lebanon. The Israeli military responded by firing eight shells into a fruit
plantation near the city of Tyre. There were no reports of deaths or injuries as a result, although
Israeli police said they did manage to find the remnants of a Katyusha rocket.
United Nations peacekeepers in Lebanon urged both sides to exercise restraint in response to the
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situation. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil) said that it was deploying extra
troops and released the following statement: "Unifil is in contact with both sides, urging them to
exercise maximum restraint, uphold the cessations of hostilities and avoid taking steps which would
lead to further escalation."
Unifil was established in 1978 following Israel's incursion into Lebanon and was expanded after
Israel's 2006 war with the militant Islamic group, Hezbollah. That situation was spurred by a
Hezbollah offensive from Lebanese terrain into Israel, in which two Israeli soldiers were seized at
the onset. Israel retaliated and Lebanese citizens -- more than 1,000 in total -- were killed in the
crossfire of violence. As well, about 160 Israelis, most of whom were soldiers, also died in the war
as a result of rocket fire and fighting. The border region maintained a sense of uneasy calm since
the end of the 2006, although there have been occasional flare ups of rocket fire and clashes
between the two sides.
On July 30, 2010, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Saudi King Abdullah were in Beirut for
landmark talks with Lebanese President Michel Suleiman. The meeting was significant largely
because of the complicated relationship between Lebanon and Syria through the years, which
translated into a complex political terrain in Lebanon defined by pro-Syrian/Hezbollah-backed
factions at odds with anti-Syrian/pro-reform factions, who have had tenuous control of the
government. Those tensions reached a nadir years ago as discussed in the "Editor's Note" below
and have functioned as the main dynamics of the Lebanese political sphere. Now tensions were on
the rise once again.
At issue was the possible indictment of members of Hezbollah by a United Nations tribunal
investigating the assassination of vocal anti-Syrian former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. As noted
below in the "Editor's Note," Hariri's murder marked a turning point in Lebanon's modern history,
functioning as a harbinger for the Cedar Revolution that forced the Syrian military from Lebanon
after a 30-year long presence there. Despite its tragic roots, the Cedar Revolution was a political
victory for pro-Western and reformist forces in Lebanon, and concomitantly enflamed the passions
of pro-Syrian elements in the country, many of whom were allied with Hezbollah and sought to
assert their authority in Lebanon. Now, in mid-2010, the possible indictment of members of
Hezbollah in Hariri's assassination, in many ways, re-opened the wounds of that period.
Still, years after Syrian forces were compelled to exit Lebanon, Syrian President al-Assad was in
Lebanon for his first visit since that fateful period. While some Lebanese would likely interpret the
visit as a sign of progress between the two neighboring countries, others could well view it as a
rallying cry for renewed hostility between pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian factions. But the presence of
Saudi King Abdullah on the scene underlined the imperative for regional powers to work in
lockstep for Middle Eastern stability. To this end, both the leaders of Syria and Saudi Arabia
appealed for calm during unprecedented talks in Lebanon and urged that country's rival factions to
refrain from violence despite the politics of the moment. Moreover, with al-Assad and King
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Abdullah saying that resolution should be reached through "legal institutions," there was a message
of unity and a tacit endorsement of the United Nations tribunal process.
On Aug. 3, 2010, Lebanese and Israeli soldiers have exchanged fire along their shared border.
There were competing claims as to what spurred the incident. Lebanese officials claimed that it
started firing only after warning Israeli soldiers not to uproot a tree impeding their view on the
Lebanese side of the border; they said that Israeli troops responded with artillery fire. Lebanese
authorities also accused Israeli troops of crossing the border into Lebanon and said that three of
their soldiers and a journalist had been killed in the fracas. Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri
criticized Israel for its "aggression." For its part, Israel said that it also had casualties with two of its
soldiers being shot in the border zone; Israel also denied ever encroaching on Lebanese territory.
Indeed, Israel said that its armed forces were on the Israeli side of the internationally-sanctioned
"blue line" separating the two countries, carrying out routine operations, when they were warned to
withdraw from the area. The Israeli Defense Forces said that individuals in Lebanese army
uniforms then opened fire on them.
It was the most serious diplomatic imbroglio between Israel and Lebanon since the 2006 conflict
between Israel and the Lebanon-based militant extremist organization, Hezbollah. Perhaps not
surprisingly, United Nations peacekeeping forces stationed in southern Lebanon called on both
sides to exercise "maximum restraint" at a time of heightened tensions.
Special Entry
Western political bloc refuses to join new Lebanese government and calls for new "Cedar
Revolution"
Background -On Jan. 12, 2011, the government of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri collapsed when
members of the Hezbollah faction and its allies resigned from the cabinet. In fact, ten of the prime
minister's 30 cabinet ministers withdrew from unity government while Saad Hariri was in the
United States for talks with President Barack Obama.
At issue for the members of the Hezbollah faction was a United Nations-backed Special Tribunal
for Lebanon, which has been investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik
Hariri -- the father of the current Prime Minister Hariri. Indications suggested that the United
Nations-backed tribunal was going to indict members of Hezbollah for Rafik Hariri's assassination,
even handing over supporting documents to a pre-trial judge. For its part, Hezbollah wanted the
government to convene an emergency session aimed at opposing the tribunal. Hezbollah has
further characterized the tribunal as a joint Israeli-United States project intended to discredit the
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extremist Shi'ite anti-Israel entity.
Gebran Bassil, the country's energy minister for the opposition March 8 alliance, read a statement
on behalf of opposition ministers. He said on Hezbollah's al-Manar news service: "Following our
last bid to resolve matters through our call for an immediate cabinet session, and after our call was
turned down by the other bloc, and in order to pave the way for the formation of a new
government that would be able to assume its duties in the upcoming stage, we announce our
resignation from the government."
Clearly, the resignations and collapse of the government meant that talks led by Syria, Turkey and
Saudi Arabia intended to avert a political crisis had not ended successfully. Lebanon's cause of
stability was not helped by the fact that Saudi Arabia decided to abandon its mediation efforts.
New government -Nevertheless, attention would refocus on Lebanese President Michel Suleiman with an eye on
forming a new cabinet. To that end, President Suleiman was expected to launch consultations with
the various political factions. For his part, Prime Minister Hariri -- now the head of a caretaker
government -- was making the international rounds as he conducted talks in France and Turkey,
aimed at shoring up support for a new government with him at the helm. Hezbollah was hinting
that it would not sanction a government headed by Hariri; however, Hariri was insisting that he
intended to hold onto his job.
But on Jan. 24, 2011, it was Najib Mikati, an American-educated businessman, who was
nominated by Hezbollah for the post of prime minister during talks with President Michel
Suleiman. Mikati had served briefly as prime minister between April and July 2005 -- a period of
heightened tensions following Prime Minister Rafik Hariri's assassination. Now, in 2011, Mikati
won the backing of a bare majority in the Chamber of Deputies -- 65 of 128, thanks to support
from Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, and six members of his Progressive Socialist Party, who swung
the vote in the direction of Mikati and away from Hariri.
Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah suggested that if that group's candidate (Mikati) was
appointed prime minister, efforts would be made to form another national unity government
inclusive of Hariri's Western-backed Future Movement. Caretaker Prime Minister Hariri was quick
to dismiss such a move, making clear he would not serve in a government chosen by the Iranbacked Hezbollah, and issuing a statement that read as follows: "The Future Movement... rejects
taking part in any government headed by an 8 March candidate." [Note that March 8 refers to the
coalition that includes Hezbollah, the Shi'a Amal movement, and the bloc of the Maronite Christian
leader, Michel Aoun.] Supporters of Hariri and his Future Movement took to the streets in angry
protests across the country. President Suleiman was hoping to act as peacemaker, saying in an
interview with the media, "We are all one hand for the sake of Lebanon."
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In the backdrop of these developments was the ongoing power struggle between Hezbollah and the
Western-backed pro Hariri factions. For its part, Hezbollah's supporters were taking to the streets
to carry out demonstrations, presumably aimed at showing the group's political influence in
Lebanon. Opponents said that Hezbollah was trying to intimidate the Lebanese populace. At the
same time, Hariri's Future Movement parliamentary block and their Western-backed March 14
Alliance were accusing Hezbollah and its allies of trying to turn Lebanon into "an Iranian base."
The dissonance was contributing to fears of a resumption civil war in Lebanon. Such anxieties
reached new heights on Jan. 25, 2011, when Mikati was officially appointed to become the new
prime minister, spurring further protests across Lebanon by Sunnis alarmed at the consolidation of
Hezbollah's political power. For his part, former Prime Minister Saad Hariri praised fellow
Lebanese who "denounced the attempts of hegemony over our national citizens," but also
expressly rejected violent forms of expression.
At the international level, the Obama administration of the United States said it had "great concerns
about a government within which Hezbollah plays a leading role." Indeed, the United States has
designated Hezbollah to be a terrorist organization.
Meanwhile, it should be noted that on Jan. 17, 2011, international prosecutors for the United
Nations-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon issued a sealed indictment for the 2005 assassination
of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. It was expected, as noted above, that members of
Hezbollah would be named in the indictment. Yet to be seen was the matter of whether or not a
pre-trial judge would issue warrants. In Lebanon, assuming that Mikati would indeed become
prime minister, it was not known if he could cooperate with Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
Update -On Feb. 27, 2011, Lebanon's Western-backed March 14 Alliance made clear that it would not be
joining the new government of Prime Minister-designate Najib Mikati. The Western-backed
political bloc said that Mikati was unwilling to give clear commitments relating to the
aforementioned United Nations-backed tribunal investigating the assassination of the late Prime
Minister Rafiq Harriri. The March 14 Alliance also accused Shi'ite militant extremist group
Hezbollah of working with allies to carry out a coup aimed at bringing down the government of
Saad Hariri. Accordingly, former Prime Minister Faoud Siniora, speaking on behalf of the bloc,
issued the following statement: "The March 14 forces refuse to legitimize this coup and will not
stand silent in the face of violations being committed." Siniora continued, "The March 14 camp will
confront this coup through all means available in the framework of its commitment to the practice
of democracy."
By mid-March 2011, tens of thousands of Lebanese were taking to the streets in Beirut to demand
the disarming of Hezbollah, which was now the dominant force in government. The rallies ensued
on the sixth anniversary of the "Cedar Revolution," which swept Syrian forces from Lebanese soil
after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. On this occasion, former Prime
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Minister Siniora formally posed the questions asked by many of Lebanese at the rallies: "Do you
accept the formation of a government that imposes its weapons on its people? Do you accept a
government who would topple and stop the funding of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon?" In
answer to that question, Siniora's Maronite Christian ally, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea,
said: "I am announcing today with you this is the second Cedar Revolution that will not stop until
the end of the (Hezbollah) ministate."
See below under "Update" for details related to the development of a new Hezbollah-dominated
government in June 2011, and the geopolitical challenges emerging as a result.
2011 Update
On May 27, 2011, a bomb hit a United Nations convoy in Lebanon, injuring at least six Italian
peacemakers. The bomb exploded close to the coastal city of Sidon. According to the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil*), the bomb appeared to have been aimed at a logistics
convoy. Lebanese Prime Minister-designate Najib Mikati condemned the attack but there was no
immediate indication of who might be responsible.
*Note: Unifil operates in Lebanon with about 13,000 troops deployed to southern Lebanon. Its
mission has been to keep the peace along the conflict-ridden border with Israel. First formed in
1978 when Israeli troops entered southern Lebanon, Unifil's mission was expanded in 2006
following the war between Israel and the Lebanese militant extremist Islamic group, Hezbollah.
On June 13, 2011, Lebanon announced that it had finally formed a new government. The
announcement was made following meetings between Lebanese President Michel Suleiman,
House Speaker Nabih Berri, and Prime Minister-designate Najib Mikati, and occurred almost five
months after the collapse of outgoing Prime Minister Saad Hariri's government.
Indeed, on Jan. 12, 2011, conflict between the Western-backed March 14 Alliance and the Iran and
Syria-backed Hezbollah bloc led to the unraveling of that unity government. At issue for the
members of the Hezbollah faction was a United Nations-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon,
which has been investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri -- the
father of the younger Prime Minister Saad Hariri. Indications suggested that the United Nationsbacked tribunal was going to indict members of Hezbollah for Rafik Hariri's assassination, even
handing over supporting documents to a pre-trial judge. For its part, Hezbollah wanted the
government to convene an emergency session aimed at opposing the tribunal. No concurrence on
the matter led to the exit of the opposition ministers from cabinet and the fall of the Hariri
government.
The political scene became more tense when Najib Mikati, the Hezbollah nominee, was chosen for
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the post of prime minister following talks with President Michel Suleiman. The Western-backed
March 14 Alliance of outgoing Prime Minister Hariri made it clear that it would not sanction such a
move and would not participate in any new Hezbollah-backed government of Mikati. Now, in
June 2011, as the new cabinet line-up was unveiled, even as Mikati promised a government that
would be for "all the nation," it was apparent that the government was not representative of the
wide array of political parties of Lebanon. Instead, it was heavily dominated by members of
Hezbollah and its closest ally, Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement. It should be noted that
Aoun, a Christian, was once an enemy of Shi'a Hezbollah, but has since reconciled with the
Islamic militant extremist group for strategic political reasons. He has, therefore, been viewed as a
traitor by many Christian Lebanese.
Not surprisingly, the nature of the new Lebanese government signaled alarm bells across the West
in response to this move. Indeed, Hezbollah has been designated as a terrorist organization by the
United States, Canada, and several other Western powers. Moreover, the ascendancy of
Hezbollah as the dominant power in Lebanon was illustrative of the resurgence of Syrian and
Iranian power on the Lebanese scene.
It should be noted that the aforementioned United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon was
scheduled to announce its findings by July 2011. A list of indictments was expected to include
members of Hezbollah, therefore compelling the government of Lebanon to arrest those
individuals. To that end, at the close of June 2011, the United Nations-backed tribunal
investigating the assassination of the late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri reportedly moved to issue
arrest warrants for four members of Hezbollah.
The son of Hariri, Saad Hariri, said that he welcomed these moves, characterizing them as
"historic" developments in Lebanese recent history. As reported by Agence France Presse, the
younger Hariri said: After many years of patience, of struggle... today, we witness a historic
moment in Lebanese politics, justice and security."
At a news conference, newly-selected Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati said, "All suspects are
innocent until proven guilty." Prime Minister Mikati said his government intended to deal
"responsibly and realistically" with the United Nations indictments, but that it would bear in mind
"that these are accusations and not verdicts."
Despite Prime Minister Mikati's public claims that Lebanon’s international responsibilities include
its support for the tribunal, his view was not echoed by the rest of the Hezbollah-dominated
government. Indeed, it was Hezbollah's objections to the very United Nations Special Tribunal
for Lebanon that led to the collapse of the previous government, ushering in the current Hezbollahdominated government, headed by Mikati. As expected, Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah,
quickly rejected the indictments, insisting that no power would be allowed to arrest four indicted
individuals, whom he characterized as the "honorable brothers." He has also insisted that there
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was "no direct evidence" against the four suspects despite the existence of incriminating telephone
records.
Clearly, with this assertion from Nasrallah, there was little optimism that the new Lebanese
government would actually act on the basis of the indictments and arrest the four Hezbollah
individuals at stake. Regardless, Lebanon now had 30 days to serve the arrest warrants; should the
Lebanese authorities fail to act, then the Special Tribunal for Lebanon would be empowered to
publicize the indictments and summon the suspects to appear before the court. In fact, if the
Lebanese authorities failed to act upon the dictates of international law, the United Nations Security
Council would have to make a decision on its next course of action. The entire situation placed
Lebanon at risk of international isolation.
Note that by July 10, 2011, Interpol was circulating arrest warrants for the named in the
aforementioned indictments over the assassination of the late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik
Hariri. The suspects' names, photographs, and other biographical information were made public at
that time. According to a spokesperson for the United Nations-backed Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, Marten Youssed, "The tribunal has requested Interpol to notify all states of the arrest
warrants."
More than a month later, on Aug. 17, 2011, the United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon
publicized the charges against four named suspects, who were expected to be tried in absentia. In
the indictment, Mustafa Badreddine, a high-level figure in the Lebanese Hezbollah, was identified
as the central director of the operation. Another Hezbollah figure, Salim Ayyash, was accused of
orchestrating the actual assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri. The other two suspects
were charged with complicity due to their attempts to craft a false claim of responsibility. The
tribunal's chief prosecutor, Daniel Bellemare, said that the publication of the indictment would
serve to "finally inform the public and the victims about the facts." He continued, "The full story
will, however, only unfold in the courtroom, where an open, public, fair and transparent trial will
render a final verdict."
Meanwhile, on Aug. 11, 2011, a bomb exploded at a parking lot in a northern suburb of the
Lebanese capital city of Beirut. Two people were killed as a result of the explosion while at least
one passerby was injured. According to police, the two people who died had been handling
explosives at the time of the blast. Accordingly, there was speculation that the two individuals may
have been either assembling the bomb or trying to dismantle it. Regardless, Lebanese authorities
indicated that they were treating the incident as an act of terrorism. The situation recalled the
period between 2004 and 2008 when there were a spate of car bombings in Lebanon -- most of
which targeted anti-Syrian figures.
In the realm of foreign relations, Hezbollah claimed that it uncovered a Central Intelligence
Agency spy ring in Lebanon. A Hezbollah member of parliament, Hassan Fadlallah, confirmed in
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an interview with Agence France Presse that "Lebanese intelligence vanquished U.S. and Israeli
intelligence in what is now known as the intelligence war." A report by the Associated Press
reflected the same claims with acknowledgment from officials in the United States. Of course, the
dynamics of the respective governments notwithstanding, the lives of the individuals accused of
spying were now broadly regarded to be at risk.
The notion of foreign agents inflitrating Hezbollah-dominated Lebanon resurfaced in February
2012 when a military tribunal in Lebanon sentenced three people to death for spying on
Hezbollah on behalf of Israel. The men reportedly passed on information about Hezbollah officials
to Israeli contacts over the course of a decade. The cases have come to light since 2009 when
Lebanese authorities began a crackdown against Israeli spies, leading to the arrests, convictions,
and death sentencing of several suspects.
2012 Update:
In 2012, Lebanon was being rocked by spill-over sectarian violence from Syria. In May 2012,
sectarian clashes in northern Lebanon left a number of people dead and several more injured, with
blame being placed on brewing conflict between Alawite supporters of Syrian President Bashar alAssad and Sunnis, who back the Syrian opposition. Syrian President Assad was himself an Alawite
-- a variant of the Shi'a sect of Islam. Of particular concern was the outbreak of violence in the
Lebanese city of Tripoli and the deaths of at least five people there.
At issue was the eruption of violence when a Sunni cleric, Shadi al-Moulawi, was arrested on
terrorism charges. Supporters of al-Moulawi said he was detained because of his assistance to
Syrian refugees. Of course, Lebanon's current government -- dominated by members of
Hezbollah -- has held a more favorable orientation to Syria, and could presumably be less lenient
with anti-Syrian activists. Despite calls by political and religious leaders to end the violence,
fighting has continued in Lebanon, which has increasingly become a bastion of refuge for Syrian
refugees fleeing the violence in Syria.
By the third week of the month (May 2012), the spillover violence continued when Sheikh Ahmed
Abdul Wahid, an opponent of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, was shot to death at a Lebanese
army checkpoint. The incident occurred in a part of Lebanon where the sympathies of the people
were clearly with the Syrian rebels. The incident, therefore, brought into high relief the
aforementioned tensions between Lebanon's current government (dominated by members of
Hezbollah and pro-Assad in orientation) -- and -- Sunni Muslims in Lebanon who have some
loyalty to the anti-Syrian former Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri, and thus feel connected to the
Syrian opposition.
Sheikh Wahid's death triggered violent street battles, which reached new heights at the funeral of
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the Sunni Muslim cleric. Demonstrations ensued in the northern province of Akkar, while protests
in Beirut spurred gun battles as well as the firing of rocket-propelled grenades. In Beirut, the street
battle were between members of the Future Movement (aligned with supporters of former Prime
Minister Saad al-Hariri), and pro-Syrian activists. At least two people died as a result. The
violence in Lebanon served as a reminder of the episodes of sectarian strife that has periodically
plagued the country over the years, and raised the specter of another sectarian conflict erupting in
Lebanon.
By the start of June 2012, around ten people were killed and more than 20 were injured in Tripoli
when clashes broke out in the northern port city. As before, they were seemingly sparked by the
crisis unfolding in neighboring Syria. In this case, pro-Syrian Alawites and anti-Assad Sunni
cadres became embroiled in violent clashes on June 2, 2012 in the Sunni Bab al-Tebbaneh district
and inthe pro-Syrian and Alawite Jabal Mohsen neighborhood of Tripoli. Lebanese Prime
Minister Najib Mikati visited Tripoli, held talks with ministers and officials, and promised that
security forces would work to stop the violence. However, the passions of the two sides were
clearly inflamed and were sparking sectarian tensions in a manner unseen in recent times. With no
end in sight to the Syrian crisis, it was unlikely that the spill-over sectarian violence in Lebanon
would spontaneously end. The main question was whether or not it could trigger a return to
Lebanon's previous political landscape of sectarian conflict.
In mid-August 2012, four Arab countries -- Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait -urged their citizens to exit Lebanon due to spillover sectarian violence from Syria.
The call was made following a series of kidnappings of Sunni Muslims by a powerful Shi'a clan in
Lebanon. The al-Meqdad clan claimed that the 20 individuals (most of whom were Syrian
nationals but also included at least one Turkish and one Saudi national) had ties to the Syrian
rebels. They further claimed that the kidnappings had been carried out in retaliation for the
abduction of an al-Meqdad clan member by Syrian rebels in Damascus. The Syrian rebels had
their own counterclaim; they said that the man they seized in Damascus was fighting for the Syrian
government on behalf of Lebanon's Shia Hezbollah movement. The situation was further
complicated when seven Lebanese hostages held by Syrian rebels were wounded as Syrian
warplanes struck the town of Azaz to the north of the Syrian city of Aleppo. Meanwhile, the
Lebanese city of Tripoli had already seen no shortage of violence between supporters and
opponents of Syrian President Assad.
As a result of these developments, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait were clearly
responding to the fact that the Syrian de facto civil war was not only slipping over into Lebanese
terrain, but was also being imprinted with a sectarian dimension. Indeed, it was pitting Shi'a and
Sunni against one another, with implications for the entire region. Of course, Saudi Arabia and
Qatar -- both countries with predominantly Sunni Muslim citizens -- have offered support to the
Syrian rebels fighting the Assad regime.
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Also in August 2012, the pro-Hezbollah cabinet of Lebanon approved a new electoral law based on
proportional representation and referred it to the parliament for ratification. If passed in the
legislative chamber, the new legislation would divide Lebanon into 13 electoral districts for the
2013 legislative elections, effectively reducing the number of constituencies in half from its current
26 districts. With the vote in parliament pending, former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri,
who was now serving as the pro-Western opposition leader, made clear that he and his party would
reject the legislation. Hariri explained that the draft electoral law would disadvantage half the
Lebanese population, saying: "This draft law is directed against more than half of the Lebanese...
This project is unacceptable and will not pass." Hariri also accused the government of adopting the
electoral law because it would give the militant party of Hezbollah an advantage at the polls.
On Oct. 19, 2012, Lebanon was rocked by shocking violence when a massive car bombing
occurred in the mainly Christian district of Ashrafiya within the capital city of Beirut. Three people
were killed as a result and as many as 80 others were wounded. Among the dead was the internal
intelligence chief, Wissam al-Hassan.
There was no immediate claim of responsibility although it was apparent that Hassan may have
been the target of an assassination plot. Hassan's close ties to the anti-Syrian opposition led to
suspicion that the violence in Lebanon was intrinsically connected to the de facto civil war raging in
Syria between the Assad regime in that country, and the anti-government opposition movement.
Of course, Hassan was also a close associate of opposition leader Saad Hariri, who was also a
vocal critic of the Assad regime in Syria. It should be noted that Saad Hariri's father, former Prime
Minister Rafik Hariri, was assassinated in 2005. Pro-western in orientation, Hariri's assassination
was linked towards his anti-Syrian orientation. The Hassan-Hariri connection to Syria was a strong
one since Hassan led the investigation into the 2005 assassination, which ultimately implicated
Syria. More recently, Hassan was behind the arrest of a Lebanese politician who was allegedly
plotting a terror campaign in Lebanon, with Syria as the supposed sponsor of such action. Thus,
suspicion in the Hassan assassination was quickly pointing in the direction of Syria once again.
At home in Lebanon, protesters took to the streets to register their outrage. The emerging unrest
led Prime Minister Najib Mikatis to offer his resignation to President Michel Suleiman. The
president, however, urged him to remain in his role in the interests of national unity and stability,
and in order to prevent a power vacuum.
With the government of Mikati supported by the political wing of Hezbollah, and with Hassan
linked with the 14 March opposition alliance of Saad Hariri, the notion of national unity seemed
illusive. Indeed, the two political blocs have long been on a collision coure. The assassination of
Hassan likely re-opened old wounds, as they stoked the memories of the assassination of Rafik
Hariri, ultimately deepening the political cleavages between pro-Syrian and Hezbollah factions on
one side, and the pro-Western opposition on the other. Not surprisingly, the opposition reacted
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unfavorably to the idea of Mikati staying on at the helm of a national unity government, even as
efforts soon shifted towards the goal of forming a new coalition government.
The Western-backed 14 March opposition alliance made it known that it was holding Mikati
"personally responsible for Hassan's blood and the blood of innocent people." It also demanded
the resignation of Mikat's government. Further, former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora of 14
March opposition alliance warned, "The Lebanese people won't accept, after today, the
continuation of the government of assassination." Stung by these accusations, Mikati responded by
rescinding his offer of resignation and instead insisting that he would remain as head of
government.
In an additional twist, the opposition alliance's leader, Said Hariri, unequivocally accused Syrian
President Bashar Assad of being behind Hassan's assassination.
2013 Update
In February 2013, Bulgarian officials were placing the blame on Lebanon-based Hezbollah for a
bus bombing that killed five Israelis and a local bus driver, in the Black Sea resort town of Burgas
in mid-2012.
The attack on July 18, 2012, which also resulted in the death of the suspected suicide bomber,
occurred at the Burgas airport in Bulgaria. The bombing appeared to target a bus carrying Israeli
tourists and ensued on the 18th anniversary of a deadly attack on a Jewish community center in
Argentina, raising the likelihood that the Bulgaria bombing was another instance of anti-Jewish
terrorism by extremist elements.
At the time, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wasted little time in blaming Iran for the
act of terrorism. A day later, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak expanded on Netanyahu's claim
that Iran was behind the act of terrorism, explaining that the Lebanese Hezbollah was the direct
perpetrator of the attack, but had been acting under the aegis of Iran. Netanyahu himself
explained the connection using the following phrase: "Hezbollah, the long arm of Iran." Analysts
were suggesting that the terror attack in Bulgaria was likely another manifestation of the covert
war between Israel and Iran. To that end, there were intimations that the Bulgaria bombing might
have been a retaliatory attack for the series of targeted strikes against Iranian nuclear scientists.
For its part, Iran dismissed the accusation and expressed condemnation for "all terrorist acts." No
statement, though, came from Hezbollah in Lebanon.
In mid- 2012, United States officials were suggesting that the suicide bomber on the bus in Bulgaria
was a member of Hezbollah. According to the New York Times, their sources did not wish to be
identified as the investigation was under way, however, the suicide bomber was in Bulgaria on a
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mission to attack Israeli interests. The New York Times' unnamed sources also observed that
Hezbollah was being guided and sponsored by Iran in this effort. Bulgarian Interior Minister
Tsvetan Tsvetanov was on the record confirming that the suicide bomber had been "in country" for
several days prior to the terror attack.
More than six months later in February 2013, and with an investigation having taken place,
Bulgarian officials were now officially saying that there were "obvious links" to Lebanon and
Hezbollah. Bulgarian Interior Minister Tsvetan Tsvetanov said that two suspects involved in the
Burgas bombing plot were directly linked to Hezbollah. He said, "We have established that the
two were members of the militant wing of Hezbollah. There is data showing the financing and
connection between Hezbollah and the two suspects."
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wasted little time re-entering the fray. He accused
Lebanon-based Hezbollah and Iran of "waging a global terror campaign across borders and
continents" and called on Europe to "reach the required conclusions regarding the true nature of
Hezbollah." That latter call appeared to reference the fact that many European countries have not
gone so far as Israel and the United States in classifying Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.
In the third week of February 2013, Bahraini authorities were saying that they had foiled an
Iranian-backed terror plot that targeted military and civil installations as well as certain public
figures. The public security chief, Major General Tariq Al Hassan, accused an Iranian national,
Abu Nasser, of dispatching funds to a terror cell named "Army of Imam," presumably to carry
out the operation. As well, five suspects linked with the terror cell were arrested in Bahrain and
Oman. Bahrain's Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid bin Abdullah al-Khalifa confirmed that a
"terrorist cell" linked to Iran and Lebanon had been uncovered. For its part, Iranian politicians
dismissed the claimed of an Iran-linked terrorist cell. Indeed, Hoseyn Naqavi Hoseyni, the
spokesman of Iran Majlis Committee on National Security and Foreign Policy, described the
allegation as part of Bahrain's campaign of "Iranophobia." Meanwhile, a Lebanese member of
parliament and leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, Michel Aoun, actively entered the Shi'iteSunni fracas in Bahrain when he accused the international community and the Arab League for
failing to support Bahrain's Shi'ite protest movement. It should be noted that Aoun's Free
Patriotic Movement has been Hezbollah's main Christian ally in Lebanon.
In March 2013, Lebanese President Michel Suleiman and Prime Minister Najib Miqati signed a
decree calling for parliamentary elections to be held in June 2013. Later in the month on March
23, 2013, Lebanese President Michel Sleiman accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Najib
Mikati. Although Mikati claimed his resignation was for "personal reasons," the general consensus
was that he resigned amidst political disagreements with the Hezbollah bloc in government. At
issue, according to the Beirut Daily Star, was the fact that Hezbollah members of the cabinet
objected to a proposal to establish an electoral supervisory body ahead of parliamentary elections
to be held in Lebanon. Also contributing to the dissonance between Hezbollah and Mikati was the
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Hezbollah political bloc's rejection of Mikati's plan to extend the term of the internal security chief.
The growing chasm between Hezbollah and Mikati -- one time political allies -- appeared to be the
latest manifestation of the political crisis gripping Lebanon. For his part, Mikati said that the
internal divisions in Lebanon were only serving to create deep wounds and urged the various
political parties to "come together to bring Lebanon out of the unknown."
In the first week of April 2013, Tammam Salam -- a moderate independent and the son of former
Prime Minister Saeb Salam -- was named as the new head of government. He was something of a
consensus selection, as he won the support of both the pro-Western March 14 bloc and the
Hezbollah-controlled March 8 alliance.
Note that in 2009, following a parliamentary victory for the pro-Western coalition, Lebanese
President Michel Suleiman announced that Saad Hariri would be the country's new prime minister.
In this way, the younger Hariri would take on the role once held by his late father. Prime Ministerdesignate Hariri was tasked with forming a new government, which he said would include
members of the opposition. The prime minister is appointed by the president in consultation with
the National Assembly. Hariri's government collapsed in January 2011 when the Hezbollah faction
withdrew from the unity government, making way for Hezbollah-sanctioned Najib Mikati to take
on the role as the new prime minister. In March 2013, Lebanese President Michel Suleiman and
Prime Minister Najib Miqati signed a decree calling for parliamentary elections to be held in June
2013. Shortly thereafter, Mikati issued his resignation due to conflicts with Hezbollah and as noted
above, in April 2013, Tammam Salam was named as the new head of government. See below for
primer on 2013 elections and an announcement on the postponement of those polls.
Violence from Syria reaches Lebanon due to Hezbollah's involvement in Syrian conflict
In mid-August 2013, Lebanon was struck by Hezbollah-related violence. An explosion in a
southern suburb of Beirut killed about two dozen people and injured 200 others. The blast also
exacted massive damage to buildings and vehicles in the vicinity. A week later as August 2013
was coming to a close, the northern city of Tripoli was the venue of further attacks. The
bloodshed was being attributed to Hezbollah's ongoing involvement in the civil war in Syria, which
has exacerbated sectarian tensions between Shi'ites (such as pro-Assad Hezbollah) and Sunni
Muslims (of the type that form the base of the Syrian rebel opposition). Indeed, that connection
was made clear when a Syrian rebel group took responsibility for a bombing in Beirut a month
earlier (discussed below) and threatened to continue its assault against Hezbollah.
Going back to the start of July 2013, a car bomb exploded in the Lebanese capital city of Beirut,
resulting in injuries to scores of people. The bombing occurred in the Beir el-Abed area of Beirut,
which was known to be a stronghold of the Shi'a Islamic extremist militant entity, Hezbollah.
Although there was no claim of responsibility for the attack, Hezbollah's role in the Syrian civil war
next door raised questions about spillover violence into Lebanon from Syria. To be clear,
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Lebanon-based Hezbollah has increasingly taken a high profile role on the side of the Assad regime
as it has fought a relentless battle to hold onto power in Syria against a rebel movement supported
by other Arab countries and the West. For their part, rebels have railed against Hezbollah for siding
with the Assad regime and involving itself in the Syrian conflict. They have accordingly threatened
to target Hezbollah in Lebanon for its intervention into the Syrian civil war.
It was not known if this bombing was the work of Syrian rebels in retaliation for Hezbollah's
activity in Syria. That being said, by mid-July 2013, the United Nations Security Council was
demanding that Lebanon-based Hezbollah end its involvement in the conflict in neighboring Syria.
A statement from the United Nations Security Council read as follows: "The Security Council
calls upon all Lebanese parties to recommit to Lebanon's policy of disassociation, to stand united
behind President Michel Suleiman in this regard and to step back from any involvement in the
Syrian crisis."
On July 16, 2013, a roadside bomb in Lebanon, close to the Syrian border, appeared to target a
convoy carrying members of Hezbollah. The explosion killed one Hezbollah official and wounded
two others. Because Syrian opposition rebels have warned they would strike against Hezbollah, in
retaliation for the militant Shi'a Islamic entity's involvement in the Syrian civil war, all suspicion
rested on the rebels for this attack. It was vividly clear that the Syrian civil war, and specifically,
Hezbollah's involvement in that conflict, was having an effect on the other side of the border in
Lebanon.
Spillover violence from Syria reached new heights on July 17, 2013, when a well-known
commentator on Syrian state television was assassinated in the southern Lebanese town of
Sarafand. Mohammad Darra Jamo worked for the Syrian state media, but also appeared frequently
on other Arab networks; he was known to be a strong supporter of Syrian President Bashar alAssad. According to reports, gunmen were hiding in Darra Jamo's house prior to the attack; the
gunmen opened fire and killed him. The Syrian state news agency, SANA, said that an "armed
terrorist group" carried out the attack while Lebanese security officials said the assassination was
carried out by supporters of the Syrian rebel movement.
Meanwhile, the 15-member United Nations body conveyed its anxieties about the rising death toll
in Syria -- now estimated to be approaching 100,000 since the start of the conflict in 2011 -- as
well as the increasing number of internally displaced persons -- now estimated to be as many as
four million with two million fleeing to neighboring countries. Lebanon, especially, was bearing
the brunt of the exodus of from Syria, as refugees sought to escape the cross-fire of bloodshed and
violence. To this end, the United Nations Security Council noted in its statement: "The Security
Council underlines the need for assistance on an unprecedented scale, both to meet the needs of
the refugees and of host communities, and to assist the Lebanese authorities who face
extraordinary financial and structural challenges as a result of the refugee influx."
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Nawaf Salam - Lebanon's ambassador to the United Nations - addressed the matter of Syrian
refugees in his country saying, "Lebanon will not close its borders. Lebanon will not turn back any
refugees. Lebanon will continue to provide assistance to all Syrian refugees. But let's be clear,
Lebanon cannot cope with the burden of the refugee crisis. Lebanon needs international support."
In mid-August 2013, as noted above, Lebanon was struck by further Hezbollah-related violence.
An explosion in a southern suburb of Beirut left about two dozen people dead, up to 200 others
wounded, and exacted massive damage to buildings and vehicles in the vicinity. The high number
of injuries was due to the fact that the explosion -- caused by a car bomb -- occurred in a densely
populated part of Beirut. Of course, the area was also a stronghold of Hezbollah. Accordingly, the
violence was being attributed to Hezbollah's ongoing involvement in the civil war in Syria, which
has exacerbated sectarian tensions between Shi'ites (such as pro-Assad Hezbollah) and Sunni
Muslims (of the type that form the base of the Syrian rebel opposition). That claim gained traction
when a Syrian rebel group took responsibility for a bombing in Beirut a month earlier (discussed
above). In a video posting, the Battalions of Ayesha indicated their involvement in the Beirut
bombing in July 2013 and promised to continue to target Hezbollah strongholds, which it described
as "colonies of Iran."
Politicians from Hezbollah's government wing characterized the car bombing as a "terrorist
attack," but they were seemingly cognizant of the deleterious consequences of the militant wing's
activities in Syria as they also urged their supporters to exercise "restraint." But Hezbollah's militant
wing was in no mood for the rhetoric of restraint. A day after the bombing, Hassan Nasrallah, the
leader of Hezbollah referred to the Sunni Muslim militants from Syria behind the attack promising
to personally fight in Syria against them. Speaking on his own television channel, Nasrallah said, "I
will go myself to Syria if it is necessary in the battle against the takfiris (Sunni radicals)." He also
indicated that Hezbollah had no intention of retreating from its effort to support the Assad regime
in Syria. Dispelling the notion that spill-over violence would make Hezbollah rethink its activities,
Nasrallah declared that his movement would re-intensify its involvement in Syria by doubling its
forces fighting in that country.
Meanwhile, no conflict involving Lebanon-based Hezbollah could occur without some reference to
Israel. Some politicians in Lebanon were casting blame on Israel for the mid-August 2013 attack in
Beirut. At a joint news conference with United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Israeli
President Shimon Peres dismissed that notion with a succinct declaration as follows: "Why should
they look to Israel? They have a Hezbollah that collects bombs, that goes and kills people in Syria
without the permission of the Lebanese government."
Violence continued to punctuate the Lebanese political landscape a week later. On Aug. 23, 2013,
the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli was rocked by explosions, which left more than 40 people
dead and another 400 injured. The blast occurred at the al-Taqwa mosque during Friday prayers;
a second explosion ensued minutes later at the al-Salam mosque. Noteworthy was the fact that the
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well-known Sunni cleric opposed to Shi'a Hezbollah, Sheikh Salem Rafii, was in attendance at the
al-Taqwa mosque; the general consensus was that he was the target of the attack although he
escaped unharmed. The city of Tripoli has long been a flashpoint of sorts, representing the
sectarian division between the majorty Sunni population of the city which also contains a small
Alawite community aligned with the Assad regime in neighboring Syria.
It should be noted that the 15-member United Nations body conveyed its anxieties about the rising
death toll in Syria -- now estimated to be approaching 100,000 since the start of the conflict in
2011 -- as well as the increasing number of internally displaced persons -- now estimated to be as
many as four million with two million fleeing to neighboring countries. Lebanon, especially, was
bearing the brunt of the exodus of from Syria, as refugees sought to escape the cross-fire of
bloodshed and violence. To this end, the United Nations Security Council noted in its statement:
"The Security Council underlines the need for assistance on an unprecedented scale, both to meet
the needs of the refugees and of host communities, and to assist the Lebanese authorities who face
extraordinary financial and structural challenges as a result of the refugee influx."
Nawaf Salam - Lebanon's ambassador to the United Nations - addressed the matter of Syrian
refugees in his country saying, "Lebanon will not close its borders. Lebanon will not turn back any
refugees. Lebanon will continue to provide assistance to all Syrian refugees. But let's be clear,
Lebanon cannot cope with the burden of the refugee crisis. Lebanon needs international support."
Note on Elections:
Parliamentary elections were set to take place in Lebanon in June 2013 (although, as noted here,
the elections were subsequently postponed and 2013 ended without those polls taking place). At
stake would be the composition of the "Majlis al-Nuwab"/ "Assemblée Nationale" (National
Assembly) -- a unicameral body where 128 seats are allocated on the basis of regional and
sectarian affiliation. Christian and Muslim sects are equally represented. Within the two religious
groupings, seats are also allocated to various sects, such as Druze, Greek Orthodox, Shi'a and
Sunnis.
Special Reports: Violence Rocks Lebanon (late 2013-2014):
Suicide bombing of Iranian embassy in Beirut -On Nov. 19, 2013, a double suicide bombing outside the Iranian embassy in the Lebanese capital
of Beirut left more than 20 people dead and more than 140 others injured. The first bombing was
carried out by a suicide attacker on a motorcycle, while the second was executed by a suicide
bomber in a a four-wheel drive vehicle. Among the dead was the Iranian cultural attache, Sheikh
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Ibrahim Ansari, who had just assumed his diplomatic post a month prior.
Because Iran has been a well-known supporter of the Lebanese Shi'a Islamic extremist group,
Hezbollah, which deployed fighters to Syria to help the government of Bashar al-Assad hang onto
power against rebel forces, there were suggestions that this attack was a manifestation of spillover
violence from the Syrian civil war.
Certainly, the violence and bloodshed augured negatively for Lebanon as it pushed the country
further into a state of turmoil. Noteworthy was the fact that it was the first since Lebanon's 197590 Civil War that an embassy had been targeted. Moreover, the brazen act of violence illustrated
the ease with which Lebanon was being pulled into Syria's destructive orbit.
There was also a sectarian element to the attack as the Sunni Jihadist group, Abdullah Azzam
Brigades, claimed responsibility for the violence at the Iranian embassy in Beirut. Via the Twitter
account of the group's religious guide, Sheikh Sirajeddine Zuraiqat, Abdullah Azzam Brigades
issued its formal claim of responsibility, declaring: "The Abdullah Azzam brigades - the Hussein bin
Ali cells - may they please God - are behind the attack on the Iranian embassy in Beirut." The
group, which is linked with the notorious terror enclave, al-Qaida, also said that the bombings were
a "double martyrdom operation carried out by two heroes from the heroic Sunnis of Lebanon."
The group threatened more attacks in Lebanon until Iran withdrew its forces from Syria,
bolstering the view that a sectarian conflict that transcended borders was emerging in the Middle
East.
In Lebanon, caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati condemned the violence, calling it "a cowardly
terrorist act." Lebanese Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri -- a member of the Hezbollah faction
in the Lebanese parliament -- warned that the terrorists behind the attack on the Iranian embassy
were the people who attempted to assassinate him a year prior. He was quoted in Lebanon's
Daily Star newspaper as saying, "Those who targeted the embassy [Tuesday] are the same team
that threatened to assassinate me."
There was also a global outcry against the bombings, especially given the fact that a diplomatic
post was the target. United Kingdom Foreign Secretary William Hague said: "The U.K. is strongly
committed to supporting stability in Lebanon and seeing those responsible for this attack brought to
justice." United States Secretary of State John Kerry said, "The United States knows too well the
cost of terrorism directed at our own diplomats around the world, and our hearts go out to the
Iranian people after this violent and unjustifiable attack."
At the start of January 2014, DNA tests confirmed that a man arrested in Lebanon was likely
wanted in connection with the bombing of the Iranian Embassy in Beirut months earlier in
November 2013. The man was identified as Majid al-Majid, the head of the Abdullah Azzam
Brigades, which claimed responsibility for bombing. According to the Daily Star in Beirut, Majid
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had been captured by the Lebanese army and was on Saudi Arabia's list of 85 most wanted
individuals for his links to the Islamist Jihadist terror enclave, al-Qaida.
Sectarian spill-over violence from Syria hits Lebanon -Note that at the start of December 2013, Lebanon was struck by spillover violence from the war in
Syria as clashes broke out in the northern city of Tripoli, leaving six people dead, and as many as
50 people wounded, including more than 10 soldiers. The city of Tripoli is home to a small
Alawite community -- the same ethnic group as Syria's President Bashar al-Assad. But the city is
also surrounded by a larger Sunni community, which was aligned with the rebel movement
opposing the Assad regime in Syria. In response to the violence in Tripoli, and with an eye on
halting the sectarian bloodshed, the Lebanese authorities instituted military rule in that city.
These sectarian fault lines were occurring not only in Syria where the conflict was unfolding, but
also in Lebanon. The sectarian tensions in Lebanon were sparked when some residents of an
Alawite district in Tripoli began flying Syrian flags to show support for President Assad; residents
of the Bab al-Tabbana district responded by flying the flag of the Syrian rebels. The acrimony led
to violent clashes, with the deadly results noted here.
Senior Hezbollah commander killed in Beirut -On Dec. 4, 2013, reports emerged that a senior Hezbollah leader was killed in the Lebanese
capital city of Beirut. Hassan Lakkis was a senior commander of the Lebanese Shi'a extremist
terror group, Hezbollah, known to be a stalwart of the Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and an
expert in the manufacture of sophisticated weapons and explosives.
Hezbollah reacted to the news of Lakkis' death by releasing a statement in which they noted that
the senior commander was attacked by assailants and shot in the head as he was returning from
work late at night. Hezbollah also placed the blame for Lakkis' death on Israel, noting that the
Jewish state had carried out several assassination attempts against the Hezbollah commander
before. Israel denied any involvement in the death of Lakkis, saying via Yigal Palmor, its
spokesperson for the Israeli foreign ministry, "These automatic accusations are an innate reflex
with Hezbollah, They don't need evidence, they don't need facts. They just blame anything on
Israel."
Indeed, there were parallel accusations emerging about rival Sunni Jihadists being behind the death
of Laqqis. There was even a claim of responsibility for the assassination of Lakkis from a
previously unknown group, the Brigades of the Free Sunnis in Baalbek. Coming on the heels of
the attack on the Iranian embassy in Beirut a week before at the hands of the Sunni Jihadist group,
Abdullah Azzam Brigades, it was a more plausible explanation of the assassination, rather than the
standpoint anti-Israel explanation for Hezbollah's problems. The so-called "blame game" aside, it
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was certainly clear that Lebanon was once again at risk of sectarian conflict.
Explosion in Lebanon kills Sunni politicians with anti-Assad and anti-Hezbollah ties -On Dec. 27, 2013, Mohamad Chatah -- an opposition politician and former Lebanese cabinet
minister -- was killed during a car bombing in central Beirut. The attack took place between the
Starco Centre and Phoenicia Hotel close to the Lebanese parliament building. The blast killed
several other individuals and left as many as 50 people injured. For his part, Chatah was a Sunni
Muslim who worked as an adviser to former pro-Western Prime Minister Saad Hariri; he was
known as a moderate but also a critic of both Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the Lebanonbased Shi'a extremist entity, Hezbollah.
Given this background, there were suggestions that Chatah was the latest casualty in the ongoing
Sunni-Shi'a sectarian conflict that was spreading across the Middle East, but particularly
influencing the Syrian civil war and contributing to spill-over violence in Lebanon. Of note was the
fact that Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon have become an integral part of the pro-Assad forces
fighting in Syria to the consternation of Sunni Muslims in Lebanon. Tensions from both sides have
manisfested in an increase in the number of sectarian attacks and assassinations on Lebanese soil.
In this case, former Prime Minister Saad Hariri intimated that Hezbollah may have been involved
in the apparent assassination of Chatah, accusing "those who are hiding from international justice
and who have spread the regional fire to the [Lebanese] nation" of being responsible. This
statement appeared to be a tacit reference to the fact that the United Nations implicated Hezbollah
in the 2005 assassination of Saad Hariri's father -- former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Indeed,
Rafiq Hariri -- like Mohamad Chatah -- shared an antipathy for the Syrian regime and was wary of
the power of Hezbollah with its funding from Iran and its ties to Assad in Syria. In many senses,
the assassination of Chatah recalled the painful historic memory of the assassination of Hariri.
That event -- the killing of Hariri in 2005 -- raised the ire of the Lebanese people, spurring the socalled Cedar Revolution, and ridding Lebanon of the presence Syrian forces from Lebanese soil.
The subsequent findings that Hezbollah was likely behind the older Hariri's death have been
rejected by that extremist Shi'a entity but nonetheless highlighted the influence of Hezbollah on the
political landscape in Lebanon. Although Hezbollah denied the charges, five members of the
organization were due to face trial at The Hague in connection with Rafiq Hariri's assassination.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah characterized the 2013 assassination of Chatah as a "heinous crime" and
attempted to distance itself from the violence, declaring, "No-one benefits from [the bombing] but
Lebanon's enemies." As well, Syria was quick to deny any involvement in Chatah's killing.
However, the fact of the matter was that the assassination occurred as Chatah was en route to a
meeting of the anti-Syrian/pro-Western March 14 bloc -- led by Saad Hariri -- when his convoy
was struck by the blast. There were suggestions that the killing of Chatah was not so much a
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targeted assassination as it was a message to Hariri's anti-Syrian/pro-Western March 14 bloc.
Regardless, former Prime Minister Fuad Siniora of the March 14 bloc was not backing down from
a political confrontation with Hezbollah. At the funeral for Chatah, Seniora demanded that
Lebanon be freed from Hezbollah's militancy. He said, "We have decided to liberate the country
of the occupation of illegitimate weapons to preserve its independence, its sovereignty and its civil
peace." Siniora indicated that a popular but peaceful movement opposed to the violence and
conflict-ridden ethos of Hezbollah was in the offing as he said: "We have decided to engage with
the Lebanese people in peaceful, civil and democratic resistance... We call for liberty and justice,
we will not surrender, we will not back down, we will not be afraid." The notion that his
statements were aimed in opposition to Hezbollah became clear when funeral goers cried out,
"Hezbollah is the enemy of God," and "Hezbollah are terrorists."
Instability update -Violence against struck the Lebanese capital of Beirut on Jan. 2, 2014 when a car bomb killed at
four people and injured nine others. The area of the car bombing was a busy shopping area not far
from Hezbollah's offices. Because human remains were found close to the car, which was
seemingly laden with explosives, experts surmised the bombing was a suicide attack. The car
bomb marked the second attack in the Lebanese capital in less than a week.
As discussed above, a car bombing in central Beirut in late December 2013 left Mohamad Chatah
-- an opposition politician and former Lebanese cabinet minister -- dead along with several others.
As discussed above, blame was placed (at least at the popular level) on Hezbollah.
In this case, because the target was in the densely populated area of Haret Hreik district of Beirut
-- a Hezbollah stronghold of the city -- suspicion rested on an anti-Hezbollah faction. With
Hezbollah -- a Shi'a extremist entity -- controversially involved in fighting on behalf of the Alawite
Assad regime in Syria, there were suggestions that this January 2014 bombing might be the work
of anti-Assad Sunni Islamic militants. Both incidences highlighted the increased Sunni-Shi'a
tensions plaguing the entire region of the Middle East, with particular attention to Syria, which was
in the throes of its ongoing civil war, and with spill-over violence in neighboring countries like
Lebanon.
Hariri assassination trial convenes amidst flare of sectarian tensions in Lebanon -In mid-January 2014, the trial of four members of the Shi'a extremist entity, Hezbollah,
commenced at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague over the 2005 assassination of
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Hariri was a pro-Western politician who opposed
Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs, and by extension, was an antagonist of Hezbollah, which
has long been aligned with the Alawite-ruled regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Hariri's
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assassination in 2005, followed by the assassinations of several other key pro-Western figures in
Lebanon, fueled speculation that Syria and its local proxies, such as Hezbollah, were behind the
bloodshed.
The allegations against the four members of Hezbollah has long been a source of contention in
Lebanon. Hezbollah has denied that any of its members were involved in the dark chapter in
Lebanese modern history, but the pro-Western opposition has clamored for justice after so many
long years of what they perceive was impunity for Hezbollah.
The inclusion of Hezbollah in government in 2011 signaled alarm bells across the West as
Hezbollah has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, Canada, and several
other Western powers. Moreover, the ascendancy of Hezbollah as the dominant power in Lebanon
was illustrative of the resurgence of Syrian and Iranian power on the Lebanese scene.
But in that same year -- 2011 -- the United Nations-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon
announced its indictments of four members of Hezbollah in relation to the assassination of the
late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Among the suspects were Mustafa Badreddine, a high-level
figure in the Lebanese Hezbollah, who was identified as the central director of the operation to
assassinate Hariri. Another Hezbollah figure, Salim Ayyash, was accused of orchestrating the
actual assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri. The other two suspects -- Hussein Oneissi
and Assad Sabra -- were charged with complicity due to their attempts to craft a false claim of
responsibility. The charges thus ranged from conspiracy to commit a terrorist act to murder and
attempted murder.
The son of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, Saad Hariri, said at the time that he welcomed the
indictments, characterizing them as "historic" developments in Lebanese recent history. As
reported by Agence France Presse, the younger Hariri said: After many years of patience, of
struggle... today, we witness a historic moment in Lebanese politics, justice and security
Meanwhile, the special tribunal's chief prosecutor, Daniel Bellemare, has said that the case against
the four members of Hezbollah would serve to "finally inform the public and the victims about the
facts." At the time when the indictment came down, Bellemare said, "The full story will, however,
only unfold in the courtroom, where an open, public, fair and transparent trial will render a final
verdict."
Now, in 2014, the trial was finally set to begin with high hopes for a verdict being reached by
2015. All four suspects would be tried in absentia since not one of them has actually been arrested
and at least two were believed to be in Iran. In his opening statement, Prosecutor Norman Farrell
said the sheer quantity of explosives made it clear that the attackers intended to deliver "a terrifying
message and to cause panic among the population of Beirut and Lebanon." He added, "It is not
that the perpetrators simply did not care if they killed their fellow citizens. Rather they intended to
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do so."
It was clear that the trial would likely re-open the wounds of the past. In combination with the
civil war raging in neighboring Syria, which has increasingly included the involvement of
Hezbollah, the trial could exacerbate the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian conflict plaguing the Middle East,
with Syria and Lebanon at the center of that conflict. To that latter end, Lebanon was being
plagued with spill-over violence from the Syrian civil war thanks to the active involvement of
Lebanon-based Hezbollah in the Syrian crisis, and as that Shi'ite entity expressly supported the
Assad regime in Syria. The result has been a plague of sectarian violence in the streets of Lebanon.
Going back to late 2013, a car bombing in central Beirut in late December 2013 left Mohamad
Chatah -- an opposition politician and former Lebanese cabinet minister -- dead along with several
others. Blame was placed (at least at the popular level) on Hezbollah. Then, at the start of the
new year (January 2014), a car bomb killed at four people and injured nine others. The area of
the car bombing was a busy shopping area not far from Hezbollah's offices. Because the target
was in the densely populated area of Haret Hreik district of Beirut -- a Hezbollah stronghold of
the city -- suspicion rested on an anti-Hezbollah faction. With Hezbollah -- a Shi'a extremist entity
-- controversially involved in fighting on behalf of the Alawite Assad regime in Syria, there were
suggestions that this particular bombing might be the work of anti-Assad Sunni Islamic militants.
Then, just before the Hariri assassination trial was scheduled to begin, a suicide bomb occurred in
the town of Hermel - a Hezbollah stronghold close to the Bekaa Valley and near to the border with
Syria. That blast killed at least five people, including the suicide bomber, and wounded 20 others.
By the third week of January 2014, a suicide bombing in a residential district of southern Beirut,
known as a Hezbollah stronghold, left four people dead and more than 20 others wounded. A
Twitter account supposedly controlled by the Lebanese branch of the Syrian rebel group, al-Nusra
Front, claimed responsibility for this attack. Around the same time, further signs of spillover
violence from the Syrian civil war flared when fighting resumed in the northern city of Tripoli
between rival factions who support different sides of the Syrian conflict. Then, as January 2014
came to a close, a car bomb exploded in Hermel close to Lebanon's northern border with Syria,
killing at least three people. The area has been known as a Hezbollah stronghold and thus
reinforced the tensions going on within Lebanon and across the border with Syria.
Twin bombings by al-Qaida aligned extremists -On Feb. 19, 2014, twin bombings struck the Lebanese capital city of Beirut. The attacks ensued
in a Hezbollah-controlled southern suburb of Beirut close to an Iranian cultural center. Two
suicide bombers in a car and on a motorcycle respectively detonated the explosives strapped to
their bodies, killing the suicide bombers along with at least two other individuals. Several other
people were injured while massive damage was inflicted on shops and businesses in the vicinity.
The militants Sunni Islamist group, Abdullah Azzam Brigades, which was aligned with the terror
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enclave al-Qaida, immediately claimed responsibility for the attacks. Abdullah Azzam Brigades
also took the opportunity to claim responsibility for the November 2013 attack on the Iranian
embassy in Beirut that killed more than 20 people. Because Iran has been a well-known supporter
and funder of Hezbollah, there were suggestions that the embassy attack was carried out by Sunni
extremists opposed to the Shi'a militant group's engagement in the Syrian war. Now, it was clear
that that speculation was based on merit, especially with these February 2014 twin bombings taking
place in ezbollah stronghold close to an Iranian interest. It should be noted that civilians were the
primary victims in both cases.
Abdullah Azzam Brigades warned of more attacks to come unless Hezbollah withdrew from Syria;
it also demanded that its own fighters be released from jail in Lebanon. Via its website, the
militants Sunni Islamist group said, "We will continue -- through the grace of God and his strength
-- to target Iran and its party in Lebanon (Hezbollah) in all of their security, political, and military
centers to achieve our two demands: One, the exit of all fighters from the Party of Iran in Syria.
Two, the release of all our prisoners from oppressive Lebanese prisons."
The civil war raging in neighboring Syria has increasingly included the involvement of Hezbollah,
exacerbating the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian conflict plaguing the Middle East, with Syria and -increasingly -- neighboring Lebanon at the center of that conflict. To that latter end, thanks to the
active involvement of Lebanon-based Hezbollah in the Syrian crisis, there has been a
counterveiling plague of sectarian violence in the streets of Lebanon. Sunnis aligned with the
opposition in Syria have railed against Hezbollah's alignment with the Assad regime in Syria.
In the Syrian civil war, the rebel groups have not been united. Some groups have been aimed at
overthrowing the Assad regime from office for political reasons, while other Sunni extremist groups
have also sought to oust the Assad regime but for more ideological (read: sectarian) reasons as they
oppose the Shi'a elite that has long ruled Syria. In Lebanon, those dynamics were playing out in
similar form. Some Sunni enclaves were simply sympathetic to the rebel movement in Syria and
opposed to Hezbollah. Meanwhile, some Sunni factions were being motivated by religious
extremist ideology to use tactics of terrorism.
Suicide car bombing in Lebanon close to Syrian border kills three soldiers
A suicide car bombing in late March 2014 at an army checkpoint in Lebanon close to the border
with Syria left three soldiers dead and another four wounded. The attack took place in the town
of Arsal, which was home to a complex population base including thousands of Syrian refugees
and Syrian (Sunni) rebels. The attack in Arsal was thus linked with the civil war rocking Syria.
Indeed, it likely constituted another episode of cross-over violence.
The principal contributor to cross-over violence in Lebanon was the fact that Hezbollah -- a Shi'a
extremist entity based in Lebanon -- was controversially involved in fighting on behalf of the
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Alawite Assad regime in Syria. While many Shi'a Lebanese were supportive of Hezbollah's
engagement in the Syrian civil war, there were other swaths of the Lebanese populace who were
Sunnis and held allegiances instead to the rebel movement in Syria (the fact that some elements of
the Syrian rebel movement were extremist Islamists notwithstanding).
Tensions were already at an elevated level following the capture of the strategic Syrian border town
of Yabroud by the Syrian army earlier in the month. Then as March 2014 was coming to a close,
the Syrian army were making more gains as they captured the Syrian border towns of Flita and
Ras Maara. Collectively, these victories for the Assad regime in Syria likely created consternation
among Sunni antagonists across the border in Lebanon where many Sunni residents were more
sympathetic to the Syrian rebels than the Alawite Assad regime. Now, the attack in Arsal -- for
which the Sunni extremist group Ahrar al-Sunna claimed responsibility -- suggested these tensions
were escalating, and that Sunni militants were becoming increasingly active not only in Syria but
also in Lebanon.
The timing of the Arsal attack was key, coming as it did on the heels of a blustery speech by
Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in which he declared that he was protecting Lebanon by
fighting Sunni militants in Syria. Of course, around the same time, the Lebanese army raided the
house of a Sunni bomb maker in Arsal and killed him. Together, the two incidences were
illustrative of the competing loyalties and ethno-sectarian hostilities at play in Lebanon.
Collectively, the violence in Lebanon highlighted the increased Sunni-Shi'a tensions plaguing the
entire region of the Middle East, with particular attention to Syria, which was in the throes of its
ongoing civil war, and with spill-over violence in neighboring countries like Lebanon.
Attacks in Lebanon suggest continued spill-over sectarian violence from Syria -In June 2014, a suicide bombing in eastern Lebanon left a police officer dead and more than 30
other people injured. That attack was believed to have been an attempted assassination of the
security head, Major General Abbas Ibrahim, who was traveling in the area at the time. Soon
thereafter, Lebanese security forces carried out a raid on a hotel in the capital of Beirut and
arrested more than a dozen individuals who were linked with the attacks in Lebanon.
In the last week of June 2014, there was a suicide car bombing close to an army checkpoint in the
Lebanese capital of Beirut. An officer in Lebanon's General Security forces was killed and more
than a dozen other people were injured. This particular attack took place as people were watching
a football match. Because the attack took place in a southern suburb largely inhabited by Shi'a
Muslims and pro-Hezbollah elements, suspicion rested on Sunni activist lashing out at the Shi'a
militant group, Hezbollah, for its involvement in the Syrian civil war. However, an additional
element was the fact that Sunni terrorists from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
were advancing in Iraq, thus possibly emboldening other Sunni extremists in the region in what was
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quickly becoming a regional sectarian conflict.
Two days after the army checkpoint attack, another suicide bombing took place in Beiruit -- this
time at the Duroy hotel located in close proximity to the Saudi Arabian embassy. The suicide
bomber died in the incident. Several other persons -- mostly security personnel who approached
the assailant as he prepared to detonate the explosives - were wounded. In this case, with the
assailant believed to be a Saudi national and quite likely a Sunni Muslim, the sectarian and
geopolitical dimension was clearly evident.
Spillover violence from the Syrian civil war -Spillover violence from Syria was in late October and early November 2014 arising in Lebanon
where Islamic militants were engaged in battles with Lebanese military forces in the northern city
of Tripoli. Fierce battles went on for days and left Lebanese soldiers, civilians, and Islamic
extremist fighters dead. However, Lebanese authorities were ultimately able to gain the upper hand
and re-assert control over the city. Of concern was the fact that the Islamist militants appeared to
be a mix of Lebanese and Syrian fighters aligned with ISIL and the al-Nusra Front. This
development pointed to a closer alliance between the two extremist entities than previously
thought.
Additional Note:
Collectively, the recent violence in Lebanon has highlighted the increased Sunni-Shi'a tensions
plaguing the entire region of the Middle East, with particular attention to Syria, which was in the
throes of its ongoing civil war, and with spillover violence in neighboring countries like Lebanon.
The civil war raging in neighboring Syria has increasingly included the involvement of Hezbollah,
exacerbating the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian conflict plaguing the Middle East, with Syria and -increasingly -- neighboring Lebanon at the center of that conflict. To that latter end, thanks to the
active involvement of Lebanon-based Hezbollah in the Syrian crisis, there has been a
counterveiling plague of sectarian violence in the streets of Lebanon. Sunnis aligned with the
opposition in Syria have railed against Hezbollah's alignment with the Assad regime in Syria.
In the Syrian civil war, the rebel groups have not been united. Some groups have been aimed at
overthrowing the Assad regime from office for political reasons, while other Sunni extremist groups
have also sought to oust the Assad regime but for more ideological (read: sectarian) reasons as they
oppose the Shi'a elite that has long ruled Syria. In Lebanon, those dynamics were playing out in
similar form. Some Sunni enclaves were simply sympathetic to the rebel movement in Syria and
opposed to Hezbollah. Meanwhile, some Sunni factions were being motivated by religious
extremist ideology to use tactics of terrorism.
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New Government for Lebanon
In mid-February 2014, following more than 10 months of political wrangling, Lebanon finally
formed a new government. The new cabinet would be split equally between members of the proWestern March 14 bloc and the Hezbollah-led faction. The government would be led by the
incumbent Prime Minister Tammam Salam -- a moderate independent and the son of former Prime
Minister Saeb Salam -- who had been named as the consensus head of government. Salam would
continue in that role -- this time at the helm of an uneasy coalition between two rival alliances, as
noted below.
It should be noted that the office of the presidency has been occupied by President Michel
Suleiman since 2008. In accordance with the 1943 National Pact, the president is supposed to be a
Maronite Christian, the prime minister is to be a Sunni Muslim, and the president of the National
Assembly is to be a Shi'a Muslim. This means that Lebanon's president is the only non-Muslim
head of state in the Arab world amidst a system of pluralistic religious representation.
Going back to 2011, the pro- Western government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri's government
collapsed when the Hezbollah faction withdrew from the unity government, making way for
Hezbollah-sanctioned Najib Mikati to take on the role as prime minister. But in 2013, the prime
minister resigned amidst disagreements with Hezbollah. At issue, according to the Beirut Daily Star,
was the fact that Hezbollah members of the cabinet objected to a proposal to establish an electoral
supervisory body ahead of parliamentary elections. Also contributing to the dissonance between
Hezbollah and Mikati was the Hezbollah political bloc's rejection of Mikati's plan to extend the
term of the internal security chief. The growing chasm between Hezbollah and Mikati -- one time
political allies -- appeared to be the latest manifestation of the political crisis gripping Lebanon. As
noted above, Mikati was succeeded by Salam as the new head of government, although since being
named to that post, the actual composition of his government has been a matter of consternation.
There were high hopes that the formation of this new government -- as uneasy and unlikely a
coalition as it might be -- could at least chart the path towards elections.
Indeed, the new government was intended to end the political stalemate plaguing Lebanon, and it
would be tasked with crafting a new electoral law and preparing the country for elections. Those
elections had been scheduled to be held in mid-2013 but were delayed due to internal political
hostility between the Hezbollah-led faction and the pro-Western bloc; those tensions were
exacerbated by spill-over violence from the civil war in Syria. A spate of violent attacks in Lebanon
laid bare the sectarian hostilities between the stalwarts of Shi'a Hezbollah, who were now actively
supporting the Assad regime in Syria -- and -- the local (Lebanese) supporters of the Sunni
resistance and rebel movement in Syria. The cross-border interactions of Lebanon-based
Hezbollah and Syria have had a long and enduring imprint on the Lebanese political scene.
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Primer on 2014 Presidential Election in Lebanon
A presidential election was expected to be held in the spring of 2014 -- ahead of May 2014 when
the tenure of long-serving President Michel Suleiman was scheduled to come to an end.
In Lebanon, the president is elected by the National Assembly for a six-year term and may not
serve consecutive terms. In accordance with the 1943 National Pact, the president is supposed to
be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister is to be a Sunni Muslim, and the president of the
National Assembly is to be a Shi'a Muslim. This means that Lebanon's president is the only nonMuslim head of state in the Arab world amidst a system of pluralistic religious representation.
There is also supposed to be some transfer of powers from the president to the prime minister and
cabinet.
The last election was held in 2008. As a result of the Doha Agreement (discussed directly above),
Army Commander Michel Suleiman was elected by parliament and became Lebanon's new
president. The indirect vote gave Suleiman 118 votes out of 127. The vote brought an end to an
ongoing political impasse between rival pro-Western and pro-Syrian/Hezbollah factions, which
resulted in the presidency staying vacant for months after former President Emile Lahoud's term
ended. In the background of these developments, there had been grave anxieties about a power
vacuum, constitutional crisis and civil unrest if the political impasse was not ultimately resolved.
Now in 2014, it was to be seen who might succeed outgoing President Suleiman. One candidate
interested in entering the political waters was Lebanese Christian politician, Samir Geagea of the
Lebanese Forces Party who announced his bid for the presidency. It should be noted that Geagea
was known for his views opposed to Hezbollah and the Assad regime in Syria, and was thus
supported by the pro-Western March 12 political bloc. It was to be seen if Geagea could secure
the necessary two-thirds majority in parliament to win the presidency.
The recent political climate in Lebanon has been beset by bitter hostility between the rival proWestern and pro-Syrian/Hezbollah factions, and cross-over violence from the Syrian civil war.
That war has sparked ethno-sectarian violence and bloodshed on Lebanese soil as Shi'a Hezbollah
has involved itself in that war to the consternation of Lebanon's Sunni population, even forcing the
delay of the country's parliamentary elections that had originally been intended to be held in 2013
but were postponed to 2014. It was to be seen if in this climate of acrimony any candidate for the
presidency could capture a super-majority of support in the polarized legislative body.
Note that Lebanese Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri called for the presidential vote in
parliament to be held on April 23, 2014. Ongoing political dissonance and acrimony in Lebanon
ensured that the vote would not end successfully. Members of parliament in Lebanon failed to
elect a president since the main candidate, Geagea did not secure the required two-thirds majority.
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In fact, he felt significantly short of that goal, with the pro-Hezbollah members of parliament
issuing blank votes.
This result could open the race up to other potential candidates. The former army chief, Michel
Aoun, who is supported by Hezbollah, could now decide to throw his hat in the ring. Of course, it
was quite likely that the March 12 bloc would take on the spoiler role on that ballot and oppose
him, essentially producing another failed vote. It was also possible that both sides might support a
consensus candidate, such as the current army chief, General Jean Kahwaji, or even Central Bank
governor Riad Salameh; however, neither man has expressed any interest in becoming president.
A second round of voting to decide the presidency took place on April 30, 2014. That effort was
ultimately abandoned when several members of parliament -- mostly aligned with Michael Aoun
(mentioned above) -- opted to boycott the vote. No consensus candidate was agreed upon by both
of the two main political factions, suggesting that the process aimed at selecting and electing a
successor to outgoing President Suleiman could continue for some time. Of course a period of
protracted postponement in deciding the presidency would present a political challenge. Indeed,
Lebanon was in dire need of leadership at a time when divisions and sectarian conflict
characterized the landscape.
By the start of May 2014, former President Amine Gemayel of the party, Kataeb, had convened
talks with Walid Jumblatt, the head of the Progressive Socialist Party. According to the Daily
Star, Gemayel was trying to rally Christian support for his bid for the presidency bid as the proWestern March 12 bloc candidate. It was to be seen if he could become the official replacement
to Geagea. It was also to be seen if he could gain support (or at least a lack of resistance) from the
Hezbollah bloc.
A third round of voting on May 15, 2014, also ended in failure, and was followed by similarly
futile fourth and fifth rounds of voting later in May 2014 as no consensus could be found to satisfy
the two rival pro-Hezbollah and pro-Western factions. A sixth round was set for June 9, 2014,
amidst calls by the United Nation Security Council that Lebanon settle its political affairs and select
a new president in the interests of national and regional security. The statement by that
international body read as follows: “The Council urges the Parliament to uphold Lebanon’s
longstanding democratic tradition and to work to ensure that presidential elections take place as
soon as possible and without external interference."
But even with that external pressure, the sixth round of voting on June 9, 2014, ended in failure as
Lebanon's deadlocked politicians again could not agree on a successor to outgoing President
Suleiman. The failed vote occurred because the pro-Hezbollah faction in parliament boycotted the
session, thus depriving parliament of a quorum. Another voting session was set for June 18, 2014;
however, until the pro-Hezbollah and pro-Western coalitions could find agreement on a consensus
candidate, there was no expectation of success on that day.
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As expected, the seventh round of voting on June 18, 2014, in the same way as the previous round
-- without a president elected to power. Once again the Hezbollah faction boycotted the session.
Leading the boycott throughout has been Michel Aoun, who has been backed by Hezbollah.
Clearly, he would continue to sabotage the presidential vote until he was ready to prepare himself
as the presidential consensus candidate.
On June 17, 2014, ahead of the seventh round of voting, Aoun said, “I will announce my
nomination when the political situation in parliament becomes clear and when (the current
candidates) are dismissed." Disparaging Geagea, he said, “It is totally rejected to choose the
weakest Christian as president and I will not tolerate this." Making his intentions clear, Aoun
continued, “I’m the strongest and I’m the one who represents (the Christians). My popularity is on
the rise." However, it was unlikely that the pro-Western bloc in parliament would be prepared to
accept Aoun as president. As such, the impasse was expected to continue for some time although
news was emerging about an alternative presidential candidate in the form of Parliamentarian
Henry Helou.
Note that another attempt to elect a president took place on July 2, 2014, and ended in failure as
insufficient parliamentarians were present in the assembly, presumably due to another boycott.
Another attempt would be made later in July 2014.
In mid July 2014, former Prime Minister Saad Hariri demanded that members of parliament end
the political impasse and avoid the continuing power vacuum and elect a president. He said, "We
want parliamentary elections held on schedule, and we do not want an extension for the
parliament. But the entrance to the parliamentary elections is electing a president of the republic -today before tomorrow." Hariri, who was living in exile in France and Saudi Arabia due to fears of
assassination, also demanded that Hezbollah withdraw from its military engagement in the civil war
in neighboring Syria. He said, "Unfortunately Hezbollah believes that it will save the regime of
Bashar al-Assad. The truth is no one can save Assad's regime." While Hariri's demand was likely
to be ignored by Hezbollah, the fact of the matter was that Hezbollah's involvement in Syria has
only served to accentuate sectarian tensions in Lebanon. Those very tensions have done little to
alleviate the highly-polarized political environment that has set the Sunni pro-Western coalition of
Hariri against the Shi'ite/Allawite bloc dominated by Hezbollah.
Note: As of late 2014, a new president was not yet elected. As such, the outcome of this election
was yet to be determined.
Parliamentary elections in Lebanon postponed due to Syrian civil war
Parliamentary elections were originally set to take place in Lebanon in June 2013. As noted here,
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the elections were postponed and rescheduled to be held in 2014, and then again delayed until
2017, due to sectarian strife associated with the ongoing Syrian civil war across the border.
Meanwhile, political acrimony and in-fighting meant that successive rounds of voting in the
presidential contest had ended in failure. So even without a successor to President Michael
Suleiman decided to take the executive office of the presidency, there would now be a lengthy
delay until a fresh mandate could be democratically decided as regards the legislative branch of
government.
At the parliamentary level, elections would decide the composition of the "Majlis al-Nuwab"/
"Assemblée Nationale" (National Assembly) -- a unicameral body where 128 seats are allocated on
the basis of regional and sectarian affiliation. Christian and Muslim sects are equally represented.
Within the two religious groupings, seats are also allocated to various sects, such as Druze, Greek
Orthodox, Shi'a and Sunnis.
The previous elections took place on June 7, 2009. The two main factions contesting those
elections were the pro-Western "14 March Coalition" (made up of Future movement, Progressive
Socialist Party, Christian Lebanese Forces and Christian Phalangist party) and the Hezbollah-led
bloc(composed of Hezbollah, Amal movement of Speaker Nabih Birri, and Free Patriotic
Movement of Michel Aoun).
On election day in 2009, turnout was close to 55 percent -- the highest level of voter participation
since the 1975-91 civil war. Former United States President Jimmy Carter led a team of
international monitors who concluded that the voting took place in a free and fair manner. The
contest was a reflection of the ongoing power struggle between the Lebanon's governing proWestern coalition and the Hezbollah-led bloc on the other side of the equation. The two sides have
been deadlocked in a political battle for supremacy for several years.
After the voter were counted, it was clear that the ruling pro-Western coalition would retain its
majority in the 128-member parliament. The actual official results indicated that the pro-Western
coalition won 71 seats and the Hezbollah bloc secured 57 seats. With these results confirmed, the
pro-Western coalition actually increased its parliamentary representation and consolidated its
political power.
But the pro- Western government of Prime Minister Hariri enjoyed its ascendancy only until
January 2011 when it collapsed after the Hezbollah faction withdrew from the unity
administration, making way for Hezbollah-sanctioned Najib Mikati to take on the role as the new
prime minister. As noted below, Mikati resigned in 2013 due to disagreements with Hezbollah (his
one time ally) over an electoral law. He was replaced ultimately by Tammam Salam -- a moderate
independent and the son of former Prime Minister Saeb Salam. The new prime minister was
something of a consensus selection, as he won the support of both the pro-Western March 14 bloc
and the Hezbollah-controlled March 8 alliance.
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Meanwhile, in March 2013 -- ahead of Mikati's resignation and his replacement with Salam -Prime Minister Najib Mikati and President Michel Suleiman signed a decree calling for
parliamentary elections to be held in June 2013. But at the end of May 2013, just one month
ahead of the vote, Lebanon's parliament voted to again postpone the parliamentary elections due
to security concerns over the ongoing conflict in neighboring Syria, and a failure to find consensus
on the aforementioned electoral law. Members of parliament thus extended their mandate until
November 2014.
In October 2014, with the November 2014 election timeline looming just ahead, a decision was
made to postpone the elections even further -- until 2017. This decision was made in response to
the political instability and sectarian conflict, which were only aggravated by the ongoing Syrian
civil war crisis. The new 2017 schedule for elections would mean that the current parliament
would serve eight years before being subject to election once again.
In the first week of November 2014, Lebanon's parliament made the decision to postpone the next
elections officially by voting to extend its own mandate until 2017. The move had been criticized
by observers, with even the head of Lebanon's Maronite Christian community, Patriarch Beshara
al-Rai, as well as the European Union noting that it was likely an unconstitutional move.
It should be noted that while there would be no new parliament until 2017, Lebanon was already
without a new president. The process for electing a new president had been going on for months
without resolution due to continuing political acrimony between the two main political factions.
Thus, there was a growing call for the schedule for the parliamentary elections to be linked with a
provisions requiring a president to first be elected.
Why is this election -- and the news of its postponement -- important?
The decision by the Lebanese parliament to delay the elections was a significant move. Indeed, it
was the first time since the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990 that members of parliament have
chosen to effectively postpone elections and recalled that dark chapter in Lebanon's history. Of
particular concern was the growing involvement of Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon in the Syrian
conflict, battling to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The cross-border interactions of
Lebanon-based Hezbollah and Syria have had a long and enduring imprint on the Lebanese
political scene.
In 2005, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri -- a noted politician with an anti-Syrian
orientation -- was assassinated. Hezbollah and Syria have long been suspected of perhaps playing
a role in that act. Hariri's assassination gave rise to short-term transformation when Lebanon's
Cedar Revolution swept pro-Western and anti-Syrian factions to power at the polls later that year,
along with the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon after a three-decade long presence in
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that country. While the Cedar Revolution was viewed as the dawning of a new day in Lebanon, the
aftermath was not so pleasant. Political stability devolved, as exemplified by a spate of political
assassinations, which were blamed on pro-Syrian elements. As well, Lebanon was the main venue
of violent conflict during the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel. In recent times, the country
has been caught in a political deadlock and intransigence, largely due to prevailing acrimony
between pro-Syrian/pro-Hezbollah factions and pro-reform/Western-backed members in the
Lebanese parliament. The ascendancy of Hezbollah as the dominant power in Lebanon since 2011
and well into 2014, as well as Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian war across the border, in
many ways suggested that the progress of the Cedar Revolution had been reversed.
Exchange of fire between Israeli forces and Hezbollah leaves two Israeli soldiers and a
peacekeeper dead
In the worst eruption of violence between Israel and Lebanon-based Hezbollah since the 2006 war,
Israeli forces and Hezbollah fighters exchanged fire at the end of January 2015, leaving two Israeli
soldiers and a Spanish peacekeeper dead. The two Israeli soldiers died when Hezbollah fired five
missiles at a convoy of Israeli military vehicles along the border with Lebanon. The Spanish
peacekeeper, who was serving as part of a United Nations monitoring mission in southern
Lebanon died when Israel responded to the assault by Hezbollah with artillery fire and air strikes.
Hezbollah wasted little time claiming responsibility for the eruption of violence, saying that its
attack on Israel was carried out in retaliation for an Israeli air strike in southern Syria that killed an
Iranian general and several members of Hezbollah weeks earlier. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu promised retribution, saying "Those behind the attack today will pay the full price."
Across the border in Lebanon, supporters of Hezbollah in southern Beirut shot gunfire into the air
in celebration of the killing of the Israeli soldiers. But other residents of the city were preparing to
evacuate Beirut in the event that Israel made good on its promise of retribution, and with the
memory of the devastation associated with the 2006 war still fresh in their memories. That being
said, with an election in Israel looming ahead, there was deep skepticism that Netanyahu would
pursue a military effort against Hezbollah anytime soon.
Foreign relations note related to Syrian civil war:
In mid-May 2015, the pro-Assad Syrian military, backed by the Lebanon-based militant based
entity, Hezbollah, appeared to be preparing for a major offensive in the border area between the
two countries. For some time, Hezbollah -- an ally of the Alawite Assad regime -- has been
backing President Assad in Syria, and bolstering the fight against Sunni rebel groups (many of
them of the extremist Islamist type, such as al-Nusra Front) with whom the regime has been
ensconced in a civil war since the start of the Arab Spring in 2011. Now, however, with the Sunni
Islamist rebel groups gaining strength in the region, and with the Qalamoun mountains becoming a
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stronghold for Sunni militants and terrorists, joint Syrian military and Lebanese-based Hezbollah
forces were advancing on the area. Their aims were to regain control in strategic areas, such as
Assal al-Ward and Qarna Heights, and to cut off a major supply route for weapons and militants.
It should be noted that some anti-Hezbollah political factions in Lebanon have decried the
operation, warning that it will stimulate violence within Lebanese borders.
Islamic State claims responsibility of attack in Beirut; Lebanon increasingly becoming a
flashpoint in Syrian crisis
On Nov. 12, 2015, two suicide bombings rocked the Lebanese capital city of Beirut killing at least
40 people and injuring up to 200 more victims. The body of a third suicide bomber who had not
yet detonated the explosives strapped to his body was also reported at the site of the carnage. It
was the worst episode of terrorist violence in Lebanon since the time of that country's civil war.
The attacks occurred in a southern suburb of Beirut known to be a stronghold of Lebanon's Shi'a
Islamic militant group, Hezbollah. According to reports from the ground, the attacks were carried
out in succession by suicide bombers at the Mansur shopping plaza and at a storefront in Burj alBarajneh.
Because the bombings occurred in an area known to be controlled by Hezbollah, and because that
Shi'a Islamic militant group has been heavily involved in supporting Bashar al-Assad's regime in
Syria, all expectations were that these attacks were carried out by Sunni Islamists opposed to
Assad. In recent times, there have been several terror attacks in Lebanon, most of which have
been linked with Hezbollah's active military engagement in Syria on behalf of Syrian President
Assad. While there was no shortage of extremist Islamist groups opposed to Assad operating in
Syria, and they have certainly spread over the border into Lebanon, suspicions in this case
quickly rested on actors aligned with the notorious terror group, Islamic State. The Islamist terror
group itself soon confirmed these suspicions by disseminating a claim of responsibility.
Note:
Collectively, the recent violence in Lebanon has highlighted the increased Sunni-Shi'a tensions
plaguing the entire region of the Middle East, with particular attention to Syria, which was in the
throes of its ongoing civil war, and with spillover violence in neighboring countries like Lebanon.
The civil war raging in neighboring Syria has increasingly included the involvement of Hezbollah,
exacerbating the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian conflict plaguing the Middle East, with Syria and -increasingly -- neighboring Lebanon at the center of that conflict. To that latter end, thanks to the
active involvement of Lebanon-based Hezbollah in the Syrian crisis, there has been a
countervailing plague of sectarian violence in the streets of Lebanon. Sunnis aligned with the
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opposition in Syria have railed against Hezbollah's alignment with the Assad regime in Syria.
In the Syrian civil war, the rebel groups have not been united. Some groups have been aimed at
overthrowing the Assad regime from office for political reasons, while other Sunni extremist groups
have also sought to oust the Assad regime but for more ideological (read: sectarian) reasons as they
oppose the Shi'a elite that has long ruled Syria. In Lebanon, those dynamics were playing out in
similar form. Some Sunni enclaves were simply sympathetic to the rebel movement in Syria and
opposed to Hezbollah. Meanwhile, some Sunni factions were being motivated by religious
extremist ideology to use tactics of terrorism. Of particular note was the November 2015
bombings in a southern suburb of Beirut for which the notorious terror enclave, Islamic State,
claimed responsibility.
Renewed effort rises to find consensus on a president and end Lebanon's political stalemate
For two years, Lebanon has been without a president. Typically, the president in Lebanon is
elected by the National Assembly for a six-year term and may not serve consecutive terms. In
accordance with the 1943 National Pact, the president is supposed to be a Maronite Christian, the
prime minister is to be a Sunni Muslim, and the president of the National Assembly is to be a Shi'a
Muslim. This means that Lebanon's president is the only non-Muslim head of state in the Arab
world amidst a system of pluralistic religious representation. There is also supposed to be some
transfer of powers from the president to the prime minister and cabinet.
An election was to be held in 2014 when the term of outgoing President Michel Suleiman ended.
However, to date, despite successive attempts to elect his Christian successor, there has been no
consensus in filing the post with a consensus candidate. As a result, Lebanon has been mired by a
continuing power vacuum. By January 2016, there were new political alliances being formed with
an eye on finally inaugurating a new head of state; however, those political alliances remained
complicated and potentially contradictory. It was to be seen if an end to the political stalemate
would in the immediate offing.
In an additional political development, parliamentary elections in Lebanon had been postponed. In
October 2014, with the parliamentary elections looming just ahead, a decision was made to
postpone the elections even further -- until 2017. This decision was made in response to the
political instability and sectarian conflict plaguing Lebanon, both of which were only exasperated
by the ongoing Syrian civil war crisis. The new 2017 schedule for elections would mean that the
current parliament would serve eight years before being subject to election once again.
In the first week of November 2014, Lebanon's parliament made the decision to postpone the next
elections officially by voting to extend its own mandate until 2017. The move had been criticized
by observers, with even the head of Lebanon's Maronite Christian community, Patriarch Beshara
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al-Rai, as well as the European Union noting that it was likely an unconstitutional move.
The decision by the Lebanese parliament to delay the elections was a significant move. Indeed, it
was the first time since the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990 that members of parliament have
chosen to effectively postpone elections and recalled that dark chapter in Lebanon's history. Of
particular concern was the growing involvement of Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon in the Syrian
conflict, battling to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The cross-border interactions of
Lebanon-based Hezbollah and Syria have had a long and enduring imprint on the Lebanese
political scene.
Of course, as discussed here, while there would be no new parliament until 2017, Lebanon was
already without a new president. The process for electing a new president had been going on for
some time without resolution due to continuing political acrimony between the two main political
factions. Thus, there was a growing call for the schedule for the parliamentary elections to be
linked with a provisions requiring a president to first be elected.
By December 2015, former Lebanese prime minister and opposition leader Saad al-Hariri
expressed support for a power-sharing solution that could potentially end the political stalemate that
had left Lebanon without a president for close to two years. Hariri backed the candidacy of
Suleiman Franjieh, a Maronite Christian who was a stalwart of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,
for the role of president. Of note was the fact that the Hariri political family has long been
opposed to Syrian influence in Lebanon, which made the notion of consensus seem remote.
Nevertheless, productive discussions between Hariri and Franjieh appeared to herald a
breakthrough of sorts, in which both politicians agreed to "proceed on the joint path for the
election of the president."
This breakthrough was made official in mid-December 2015 when Franjieh said that he would
contest the presidency of Lebanon. Objections from other political players on the scene, such as
Michel Aoun and Samir Geagea, both of whom had their own personal presidential ambitions,
promised to complicate the situation.
That complication was manifest when in the third week of January 2016 Geagea said that he was
backing Aoun for the presidency. Since Gaegea was actually aligned with the March 14 alliance
of Hariri, his shift to the Aoun camp was a significant development and suggested something of a
political re-alignment. According to Geagea, his backing of Aon was due to his desire to rescue
the country from its political paralysis and return Lebanon to what he called " a normal life."
In mid-February 2016, Hariri made it clear that he retained his support for Franjieh for the
presidency. Hariri's continued commitment to Franjieh was made clear in his statement that read
as follows: "We have a commitment and our commitment to Suleiman (Franjieh) is clear." This
stance emphasized the reality that the political landscape in Lebanon in February 2016 continued to
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be marked by stalemate.
Hezbollah commander killed in Damascus
In mid-May 2016, the top military commander of the Lebanon-based and Iranian-backed Shi'ite
extremists group, Hezbollah, was killed in an explosion close to the Syrian capital of Damascus.
The elimination of Mustafa Badreddine appeared to be a targeted strike and there was little doubt
about the fact that it was a blow to the leadership of Hezbollah. There was no official
acknowledgment of who might be responsible for the strike; however, all expectations were that
Israel was likely behind it, although, as expected, Israel offered no comment. It should be noted
that the United States government had long believed Badreddine to be responsible for Hezbollah's
military operations in Syria where a civil war has been ongoing since 2011. Badreddine was
actually sentenced to death in 1983 in Kuwait for his role in a bombing, After escaping prison in
Kuwait in 1990 when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, he has gone on to be a terror
orchestrator. Of particular importance is the fact that he was one of five Hezbollah members
indicted by the United Nations-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon with regard to the 2005
assassination of prominent pro-Western politician, Rafik al-Hariri.
Editor's Note:
Since the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri -- a noted politician
with an anti-Syrian orientation -- Lebanon has slowly retrenched into a state of dissonance. The
period saw short-term transformation when the Cedar Revolution swept pro-Western and antiSyrian factions to power at the polls later that year, along with the withdrawal of Syrian troops
from Lebanon for a three-decade long presence in that country. While the Cedar Revolution was
viewed as the dawning of a new day in Lebanon, the aftermath was not so pleasant. Political
stability devolved, as exemplified by a spate of political assassinations, which were blamed on proSyrian elements. As well, Lebanon was the main venue of violent conflict during the 2006 war
between Hezbollah and Israel. In recent times, the country has been caught in a political deadlock
and intransigence over presidential succession, largely due to prevailing acrimony between proSyrian/pro-Hezbollah factions and pro-reform/Western-backed members in the Lebanese
parliament. The establishment of the May 2008 Doha Agreement was intended to end the political
impasse and move the country forward. The opening of corresponding embassies in Beirut and
Damascus in 2009 was viewed as a step not only towards positive bilateral engagement, but also
towards greater stability in Lebanon. However, the collapse of the unity government at the start of
2011, the May 2011 attack on United Nations peacekeepers, and the June 2011 appointment of a
Hezbollah-dominated government, together augured further instability in Lebanon. The
assassination of the Lebanese internal intelligence chief, Wissam al-Hassan in 2012 re-opened old
wounds, as they stoked the memories of the assassination of Rafik Hariri, ultimately deepening the
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political cleavages between pro-Syrian and Hezbollah factions on one side, and the pro-Western
opposition on the other. The ascendancy of Hezbollah as the dominant power in Lebanon since
2011 and well into 2013, as well as Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian war across the border,
in many ways suggested that the progress of the Cedar Revolution had been reversed. The
postponement of the 2013 elections as a result of the involvement of Hezbollah in the Syrian
conflict across the border only underlined the turbulence that characterizes the Lebanese political
landscape in recent times. It was to be seen if the formation of a joint pro-Hezbollah and proWestern government, headed by a consensus prime minister, would stabilize Lebanon and set it on
the path to elections in 2014 (now delayed from 2013). However ongoing cross-over violence
from the Syrian war meant that the election would be further delayed until 2017. Meanwhile,
Lebanon's failure to elect consensus president after a 2014 deadline passed was a sign that the
political arena was dominated by dissonance. As of 2015, Lebanon continued to be plagued by
cross-over violence from the Syrian civil war.
-- June 2016
Written by Dr. Denise Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch.com. General research sources
listed in Bibliography. Supplementary sources: Middle East Online, BBC News, Agence France
Presse, An-Nahar, Reuters.
Political Risk Index
Political Risk Index
The Political Risk Index is a proprietary index measuring the level of risk posed to governments,
corporations, and investors, based on a myriad of political and economic factors. The Political Risk
Index is calculated using an established methodology by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is
based on varied criteria* including the following consideration: political stability, political
representation, democratic accountability, freedom of expression, security and crime, risk of
conflict, human development, jurisprudence and regulatory transparency, economic risk, foreign
investment considerations, possibility of sovereign default, and corruption. Scores are assigned
from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the highest political risk, while a
score of 10 marks the lowest political risk. Stated differently, countries with the lowest scores pose
the greatest political risk. A score of 0 marks the most dire level of political risk and an ultimate
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nadir, while a score of 10 marks the lowest possible level of political risk, according to this
proprietary index. Rarely will there be scores of 0 or 10 due to the reality that countries contain
complex landscapes; as such, the index offers a range of possibilities ranging from lesser to greater
risk.
Lebanon Review 2017
Country
Assessment
Afghanistan
2
Albania
4
Algeria
6
Andorra
9
Angola
4
Antigua
8
Argentina
4
Armenia
4-5
Australia
9.5
Austria
9.5
Azerbaijan
4
Bahamas
8.5
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Pending
Bahrain
6
Bangladesh
3.5
Barbados
8.5-9
Belarus
3
Belgium
9
Belize
8
Benin
5
Bhutan
5
Bolivia
5
Bosnia-Herzegovina
4
Botswana
7
Brazil
7
Brunei
7
Bulgaria
6
Burkina Faso
4
Burma (Myanmar)
4.5
Burundi
3
Cambodia
4
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Cameroon
5
Canada
9.5
Cape Verde
6
Central African Republic
3
Chad
4
Chile
9
China
7
China: Hong Kong
8
China: Taiwan
8
Colombia
7
Comoros
5
Congo DRC
3
Congo RC
4
Costa Rica
8
Cote d'Ivoire
4.5
Croatia
7
Cuba
4-4.5
Cyprus
5
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Czech Republic
8
Denmark
9.5
Djibouti
4.5
Dominica
7
Dominican Republic
6
East Timor
5
Ecuador
6
Egypt
5
El Salvador
7
Equatorial Guinea
4
Eritrea
3
Estonia
8
Ethiopia
4
Fiji
5
Finland
9
Fr.YugoslavRep.Macedonia
5
France
9
Gabon
5
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Pending
Gambia
4
Georgia
5
Germany
9.5
Ghana
6
Greece
4.5-5
Grenada
8
Guatemala
6
Guinea
3.5
Guinea-Bissau
3.5
Guyana
4.5
Haiti
3.5
Holy See (Vatican)
9
Honduras
4.5-5
Hungary
7
Iceland
8.5-9
India
7.5-8
Indonesia
6
Iran
3.5-4
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Iraq
2.5-3
Ireland
8-8.5
Israel
8
Italy
7.5
Jamaica
6.5-7
Japan
9
Jordan
6.5
Kazakhstan
6
Kenya
5
Kiribati
7
Korea, North
1
Korea, South
8
Kosovo
4
Kuwait
7
Kyrgyzstan
4.5
Laos
4.5
Latvia
7
Lebanon
5.5
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Lesotho
6
Liberia
3.5
Libya
2
Liechtenstein
9
Lithuania
7.5
Luxembourg
9
Madagascar
4
Malawi
4
Malaysia
8
Maldives
4.5
Mali
4
Malta
8
Marshall Islands
6
Mauritania
4.5-5
Mauritius
7
Mexico
6.5
Micronesia
7
Moldova
5
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Monaco
9
Mongolia
5
Montenegro
6
Morocco
6.5
Mozambique
4.5-5
Namibia
6.5-7
Nauru
6
Nepal
4
Netherlands
9.5
New Zealand
9.5
Nicaragua
5
Niger
4
Nigeria
4.5
Norway
9.5
Oman
7
Pakistan
3.5
Palau
7
Panama
7.5
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Papua New Guinea
5
Paraguay
6.5-7
Peru
7
Philippines
6
Poland
8
Portugal
7.5
Qatar
7.5
Romania
5.5
Russia
5.5
Rwanda
5
Saint Kitts and Nevis
8
Saint Lucia
8
Saint Vincent and Grenadines
8
Samoa
7
San Marino
9
Sao Tome and Principe
5.5
Saudi Arabia
6
Senegal
6
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Serbia
5
Seychelles
7
Sierra Leone
4.5
Singapore
9
Slovak Republic (Slovakia)
8
Slovenia
8
Solomon Islands
6
Somalia
2
South Africa
7
Spain
7.5
Sri Lanka
5
Sudan
3.5
Suriname
5
Swaziland
5
Sweden
9.5
Switzerland
9.5
Syria
2
Tajikistan
4.5
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Tanzania
6
Thailand
6.5
Togo
4.5
Tonga
7
Trinidad and Tobago
8
Tunisia
6
Turkey
7
Turkmenistan
4.5
Tuvalu
7
Uganda
6
Ukraine
3.5-4
United Arab Emirates
7
United Kingdom
9
United States
9.5
Uruguay
8
Uzbekistan
4
Vanuatu
7
Venezuela
4
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Vietnam
5
Yemen
3
Zambia
4.5
Zimbabwe
3
*Methodology
The Political Risk Index is calculated by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on the
combined scoring of varied criteria as follows -1. political stability (record of peaceful transitions of power, ability of government to stay in office
and carry out policies as a result of productive executive-legislative relationship, perhaps with
popular support vis a vis risk of government collapse)
2. political representation (right of suffrage, free and fair elections, multi-party participation, and
influence of foreign powers)
3. democratic accountability (record of respect for political rights, human rights, and civil liberties,
backed by constitutional protections)
4. freedom of expression (media freedom and freedom of expression, right to dissent or express
political opposition, backed by constitutional protections)
5. security and crime (the degree to which a country has security mechanisms that ensures safety
of citizens and ensures law and order, without resorting to extra-judicial measures)
6. risk of conflict (the presence of conflict; record of coups or civil disturbances; threat of war;
threats posed by internal or external tensions; threat or record of terrorism or insurgencies)
7. human development (quality of life; access to education; socio-economic conditions; systemic
concern for the status of women and children)
8. jurisprudence and regulatory transparency (the impartiality of the legal system, the degree of
transparency within the regulatory system of a country and the durability of that structure)
9. economic conditions (economic stability, investment climate, degree of nationalization of
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industries, property rights, labor force development)
10. corruption ( the degree of corruption in a country and/or efforts by the government to address
graft and other irregularities)
Editor's Note:
As of 2015, the current climate of upheaval internationally -- both politically and economically -has affected the ratings for several countries across the world.
North Korea, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Zimbabwe -- retain their low rankings.
Several Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Iraq
and Yemen were downgraded in recent years due to political instability occurring in the "season of
unrest" sweeping the region since 2011 and continuing today. The worst downgrades affected
Syria where civil war is at play, along with the rampage of terror being carried out by Islamist
terrorists who have also seized control over part of Syrian territory. Iraq has been further
downgraded due to the rampage of Islamist terrorists and their takeover of wide swaths of Iraqi
territory. Libya has also been downgraded further due to its slippage into failed state status; at
issue in Libya have been an ongoing power struggle between rival militias. Yemen continues to
hold steady with a poor ranking due to continued unrest at the hands of Houthi rebels,
secessinionists, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and Islamic State. Its landscape has been
further complicated by the fact that it is now the site of a proxy war between Iran and Saudi
Arabia. Conversely, Tunisia and Egypt have seen slight upgrades as these countries stabilize.
In Africa, Zimbabwe continues to be one of the bleak spots of the world with the Mugabe regime
effectively destroying the country's once vibrant economy, and miring Zimbabwe with an
exceedingly high rate of inflation, debilitating unemployment, devolving public services, and critical
food shortages; rampant crime and political oppression round out the landscape. Somalia also
sports a poor ranking due to the continuing influence of the terror group, al-Shabab, which was not
operating across the border in Kenya. On the upside, Nigeria, which was ineffectively dealing with
the threat posed by the terror group, Boko Haram, was making some strides on the national
security front with its new president at the helm. Mali was slightly upgraded due to its efforts to
return to constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and
Islamists. But the Central African Republic was downgraded due to the takeover of the
government by Muslim Seleka rebels and a continued state of lawlessness in that country. South
Sudan -- the world's newest nation state -- has not been officially included in this assessment;
however, it can be unofficially assessed to be in the vicinity of "3" due to its manifold political and
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economic challenges. Burkina Faso, Burundi and Guinea have been downgraded due to political
unrest, with Guinea also having to deal with the burgeoning Ebola crisis.
In Europe, Ukraine was downgraded due to the unrest facing that country following its Maidan
revolution that triggered a pro-Russian uprising in the eastern part of the country. Russia was also
implicated in the Ukrainian crisis due to its intervention on behalf of pro-Russian separatists, as
well as its annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Strains on the infrastructure of
southern and eastern European countries, such as Serbia, Croatia, and Hungary, due to an influx of
refugees was expected to pose social and economic challenges, and slight downgrades were made
accordingly. So too, a corruption crisis for the Romanian prime minister has affected the ranking
of that country. Meanwhile, the rankings for Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy were maintained
due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone nation,
was earlier downgraded due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, no further downgrade was added
since the country was able to successfully forge a bailout rescue deal with creditor institutions.
Cyprus' exposure to Greek banks yielded a downgrade in its case.
In Asia, Nepal was downgraded in response to continuous political instability and a constitutional
crisis that prevails well after landmark elections were held. Both India and China retain their
rankings; India holds a slightly higher ranking than China due to its record of democratic
representation and accountability. Increasing violence and political instability in Pakistan resulted in
a downgrade for this country's already low rating. Meanwhile, Singapore retained its strong
rankings due to its continued effective stewardship of the economy and political stability.
In the Americas, ongoing political and economic woes, as well as crime and corruption have
affected the rankings for Mexico , Guatemala, and Brazil. Argentina was downgraded due to its
default on debt following the failure of talks with bond holders. Venezuela was downgraded due to
its mix of market unfriendly policies and political oppression. For the moment, the United States
maintains a strong ranking along with Canada, and most of the English-speaking countries of the
Caribbean; however, a renewed debt ceiling crisis could cause the United States to be downgraded
in a future edition. Finally, a small but significant upgrade was attributed to Cuba due to its recent
pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the Unitd States.
Source:
Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com
Updated:
2015
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Political Stability
Political Stability
The Political Stability Index is a proprietary index measuring a country's level of stability,
standard of good governance, record of constitutional order, respect for human rights, and overall
strength of democracy. The Political StabilityIndex is calculated using an established methodology*
by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on a given country's record of peaceful
transitions of power, ability of a government to stay in office and carry out its policies vis a vis risk
credible risks of government collapse. Threats include coups, domestic violence and instability,
terrorism, etc. This index measures the dynamic between the quality of a country's government
and the threats that can compromise and undermine stability. Scores are assigned from 0-10 using
the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the lowest level of political stability and an
ultimate nadir, while a score of 10 marks the highest level of political stability possible, according to
this proprietary index. Rarely will there be scores of 0 or 10 due to the reality that countries
contain complex landscapes; as such, the index offers a range of possibilities ranging from lesser to
greater stability.
Lebanon Review 2017
Country
Assessment
Afghanistan
2
Albania
4.5-5
Algeria
5
Andorra
9.5
Angola
4.5-5
Antigua
8.5-9
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Argentina
7
Armenia
5.5
Australia
9.5
Austria
9.5
Azerbaijan
5
Bahamas
9
Bahrain
6
Bangladesh
4.5
Barbados
9
Belarus
4
Belgium
9
Belize
8
Benin
5
Bhutan
5
Bolivia
6
Bosnia-Herzegovina
5
Botswana
8.5
Brazil
7
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Brunei
8
Bulgaria
7.5
Burkina Faso
4
Burma (Myanmar)
4.5
Burundi
4
Cambodia
4.5-5
Cameroon
6
Canada
9.5
Cape Verde
6
Central African Republic
3
Chad
4.5
Chile
9
China
7
China: Hong Kong
8
China: Taiwan
8
Colombia
7.5
Comoros
5
Congo DRC
3
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Congo RC
5
Costa Rica
9.5
Cote d'Ivoire
3.5
Croatia
7.5
Cuba
4.5
Cyprus
8
Czech Republic
8.5
Denmark
9.5
Djibouti
5
Dominica
8.5
Dominican Republic
7
East Timor
5
Ecuador
7
Egypt
4.5-5
El Salvador
7.5-8
Equatorial Guinea
4.5
Eritrea
4
Estonia
9
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Ethiopia
4.5
Fiji
5
Finland
9
Fr.YugoslavRep.Macedonia
6.5
France
9
Gabon
5
Gambia
4.5
Georgia
5
Germany
9.5
Ghana
7
Greece
6
Grenada
8.5
Guatemala
7
Guinea
3.5-4
Guinea-Bissau
4
Guyana
6
Haiti
3.5-4
Holy See (Vatican)
9.5
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Honduras
6
Hungary
7.5
Iceland
9
India
8
Indonesia
7
Iran
3.5
Iraq
2.5
Ireland
9.5
Israel
8
Italy
8.5-9
Jamaica
8
Japan
9
Jordan
6
Kazakhstan
6
Kenya
5
Kiribati
8
Korea, North
2
Korea, South
8.5
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Kosovo
5.5
Kuwait
7
Kyrgyzstan
5
Laos
5
Latvia
8.5
Lebanon
5.5
Lesotho
5
Liberia
3.5-4
Libya
2
Liechtenstein
9
Lithuania
9
Luxembourg
9.5
Madagascar
4
Malawi
5
Malaysia
8
Maldives
4.5-5
Mali
4.5-5
Malta
9
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Marshall Islands
8
Mauritania
6
Mauritius
8
Mexico
6.5-7
Micronesia
8
Moldova
5.5
Monaco
9.5
Mongolia
6.5-7
Montenegro
8
Morocco
7
Mozambique
5
Namibia
8.5
Nauru
8
Nepal
4.5
Netherlands
9.5
New Zealand
9.5
Nicaragua
6
Niger
4.5
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Nigeria
4.5
Norway
9.5
Oman
7
Pakistan
3
Palau
8
Panama
8.5
Papua New Guinea
6
Paraguay
8
Peru
7.5
Philippines
6
Poland
9
Portugal
9
Qatar
7
Romania
7
Russia
6
Rwanda
5
Saint Kitts and Nevis
9
Saint Lucia
9
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Saint Vincent and Grenadines
9
Samoa
8
San Marino
9.5
Sao Tome and Principe
7
Saudi Arabia
6
Senegal
7.5
Serbia
6.5
Seychelles
8
Sierra Leone
4.5
Singapore
9.5
Slovak Republic (Slovakia)
8.5
Slovenia
9
Solomon Islands
6.5-7
Somalia
2
South Africa
7.5
Spain
9
Sri Lanka
5
Sudan
3
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Suriname
5
Swaziland
5
Sweden
9.5
Switzerland
9.5
Syria
2
Tajikistan
4.5
Tanzania
6
Thailand
6
Togo
5
Tonga
7
Trinidad and Tobago
8
Tunisia
5
Turkey
7.5
Turkmenistan
5
Tuvalu
8.5
Uganda
6
Ukraine
3.5-4
United Arab Emirates
7
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United Kingdom
9
United States
9
Uruguay
8.5
Uzbekistan
4
Vanuatu
8.5
Venezuela
4.5-5
Vietnam
4.5
Yemen
2.5
Zambia
5
Zimbabwe
3
*Methodology
The Political Stability Index is calculated by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on the
combined scoring of varied criteria as follows -1. record of peaceful transitions of power ( free and fair elections; adherence to political accords)
2. record of democratic representation, presence of instruments of democracy; systemic
accountability
3. respect for human rights; respect for civil rights
4. strength of the system of jurisprudence, adherence to constitutional order, and good governance
5. ability of a government to stay in office and carry out its policies vis a vis risk credible risks of
government collapse (i.e. government stability versus a country being deemed "ungovernable")
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6. threat of coups, insurgencies, and insurrection
7. level of unchecked crime and corruption
8. risk of terrorism and other threats to national security
9. relationship with regional powers and international community; record of bilateral or multilateral
cooperation
10. degree of economic strife (i.e. economic and financial challenges)
Editor's Note:
As of 2015, the current climate of upheaval internationally -- both politically and economically -has affected the ratings for several countries across the world. The usual suspects -- North Korea,
Afghanistan, and Somalia -- retain their low rankings. The reclusive and ultra-dictatorial North
Korean regime, which has terrified the world with its nuclear threats, has exhibited internal
instability. Of note was a cut-throat purge of hundreds of high ranking officials deemed to be a
threat to Kim Jung-un. Despite their attempts to recover from years of lawlessness, war, and
warlordism, both Afghanistan and Somalia continue to be beset by terrorism and turmoil. In
Afghanistan, while international forces have seen success in the effort against the terror group, alQaida, the other Islamist extremist group, the Taliban, continues to carry out a vicious insurgency
using terrorism. In Somalia, while the government attempts to do the nation's business, the terror
group, al-Shabab continues to make its presence known not only in Somalia, but across the border
into Kenya with devastating results/ Also in this category is Iraq, which continues to be rocked
by horrific violence and terrorism at the hands of Islamic State, which has taken over wide swaths
of Iraqi territory.
Syria, Libya, and Yemen have been added to this unfortunate echelon of the world's most
politically unstable countries. Syria has been mired by the twin hazards of 1. a civil war as rebels
oppose the Assad regime; and 2. the rampage of terror being carried out by Islamic State, which
also seized control over vast portions of Syrian territory. Meanwhile, the post-Qaddhafi landscape
of Libya has devolved into chaos as rival militias battle for control -- the elected government of the
country notwithstanding. Rounding out this grim triad is Yemen, which was dealing with a Houthi
rebellion, secesionists in the south, as well as the threat of terrorism from al-Qaida in the Arabian
Peninsula as well as Islamic State, while also being the site of a proxy war between Shi'a Iran and
Sunni Saudi Arabia.
Meanwhile, several Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, and
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Bahrain were downgraded in recent years due to political instability occurring in the "season of
unrest" sweeping the region since 2011 and continuing today. All three of these countries have
stabilized in recent years and have been upgraded accordingly. In Bahrain, the landscape had
calmed. In Egypt, the secular military-backed government has generated criticism for its
crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood; however, the country had ratified the presidency via
democratic elections and were on track to hold parliamentary elections as the country moved along
the path of democratization. Perhaps the most impressive story was coming out of Tunisia -- the
country whose Jasmine Revolution sparked the entire Arab Spring -- and where after a few years
of strife, a new progressive constitution was passed into law and a secular government had been
elected to power. Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain have seen slight upgrades as these countries
stabilize.
In Africa, the Central African Republic was downgraded the previous year due to the takeover of
the government by Muslim Seleka rebels. Although the country has been trying to emerge from
this crisis, the fact of the matter was that it was difficult to halt the precipitous decline into
lawlessness in that country. Zimbabwe has maintained its consistently poor ranking due to the
dictatorial regime of Mugabe, who continues to hold a tight grip on power, intimidates the
opposition, squashes dissent, and oppresses the white farmer population of the country. Moving in
a slightly improved direction is Nigeria, which has sported abysmal ratings due to the government's
fecklessness in dealing with the threat posed by the Islamist terror group, Boko Haram. Under its
newly-elected government, there appears to be more of a concerted effort to make national
security a priority action item. Mali was also slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to
constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and
Islamists. Political instability has visited Burkina Faso and Burundi as the leaders of those
countries attempted to side-step constitutional limits to hold onto power. In Burundi, an attempted
coup ensued but quelled, and the president won a (questionable) new term in office; unrest has
since punctuated the landscape. In Burkina Faso, the political climate has turned stormy as a result
of a successful coup that ended the rule of the president, and then a putsch against the transitional
government. These two African countries have been downgraded as a result.
It should be noted that the African country of South Sudan -- the world's newest nation state -- has
not been officially included in this assessment; however, it can be unofficially assessed to be in the
vicinity of "3" due to its manifold political and economic challenges. Guinea has endured poor
rankings throughout, but was slightly downgraded further over fears of social unrest and the Ebola
heath crisis.
In Europe, Ukraine was downgraded due to the unrest facing that country following its Maidan
revolution that triggered a pro-Russian uprising in the eastern part of the country. Russia was also
implicated in the Ukrainian crisis due to its intervention on behalf of pro-Russian separatists, as
well as its annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Serbia and Albania were slightly
downgraded due to eruptions of unrest, while Romania was slightly downgraded on the basis of
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corruption charges against the prime minister. Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy were downgraded
due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone nation,
was downgraded the previous year due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, the country
successfully forged a rescue deal with international creditors and stayed within the Euro zone.
Greek voters rewarded the hitherto unknown upstart party at the polls for these efforts. As a
result, Greece was actually upgraded slightly as it proved to the world that it could endure the
political and economic storms. Meanwhile, Germany, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries continue to post impressive ranking consistent
with these countries' strong records of democracy, freedom, and peaceful transfers of power.
In Asia, Nepal was downgraded in response to continuous political instability well after landmark
elections that prevails today. Cambodia was very slighly downgraded due to post-election
instability that has resulted in occasional flares of violence. Despite the "trifecta of tragedy" in
Japan in 2011 -- the earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and the resulting nuclear crisis -- and the
appreciable destabilization of the economic and political terrain therein, this country has only
slightly been downgraded. Japan's challenges have been assessed to be transient, the government
remains accountable, and there is little risk of default. Both India and China retain their rankings;
India holds a slightly higher ranking than China due to its record of democratic representation and
accountability. Increasing violence and political instability in Pakistan resulted in a downgrade for
this country's already low rating.
In the Americas, Haiti retained its downgraded status due to ongoing political and economic woes.
Mexico was downgraded due to its alarming rate of crime. Guatemala was downgraded due to
charges of corruption, the arrest of the president, and uncertainty over the outcome of elections.
Brazil was downgraded due to the corruption charges erupting on the political landscape, the
stalling of the economy, and the increasingly loud calls for the impeachment of President
Rousseff. Argentina was downgraded due to its default on debt following the failure of talks with
bond holders. Venezuela was downgraded due to the fact that the country's post-Chavez
government is every bit as autocratic and nationalistic, but even more inclined to oppress its
political opponents. Colombia was upgraded slightly due to efforts aimed at securing a peace deal
with the FARC insurgents. A small but significant upgrade was attributed to Cuba due to its recent
pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the Unitd States. Meanwhile, the United
States, Canada, Costa Rica, Panama, and most of the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean
retain their strong rankings due to their records of stability and peaceful transfers of power.
In the Pacific, Fiji was upgraded due to its return to constitutional order and democracy with the
holding of the first elections in eight years.
In Oceania, Maldives has been slightly downgraded due to the government's continued and rather
relentless persecution of the country's former pro-democracy leader - former President Nasheed.
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Source:
Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com
Updated:
2015
Freedom Rankings
Freedom Rankings
Freedom in the World
Editor's Note: This ranking by Freedom House quantifies political freedom and civil liberties into a
single combined index on each sovereign country's level of freedom and liberty. The initials "PR"
and "CL" stand for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, respectively. The number 1 represents the
most free countries and the number 7 represents the least free. Several countries fall in the
continuum in between. The freedom ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results.
Country
Afghanistan
PR
6?
CL
Freedom Status
6
Not Free
Albania*
3
3
Partly Free
Algeria
6
5
Not Free
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Andorra*
1
1
Free
Angola
6
5
Not Free
2
Free
Antigua and Barbuda*
3?
Argentina*
2
2
Free
Armenia
6
4
Partly Free
Australia*
1
1
Free
Austria*
1
1
Free
Azerbaijan
6
5
Not Free
Bahamas*
1
1
Free
Bahrain
6?
5
Not Free ?
Bangladesh*
3?
4
Partly Free
Barbados*
1
1
Free
Belarus
7
6
Not Free
Belgium*
1
1
Free
Belize*
1
2
Free
Benin*
2
2
Free
Bhutan
4
5
Partly Free
Bolivia*
3
3
Partly Free
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Bosnia-Herzegovina*
Botswana*
Pending
4
3?
3
Partly Free
2
Free
Brazil*
2
2
Free
Brunei
6
5
Not Free
Bulgaria*
2
2
Free
Burkina Faso
5
3
Partly Free
Burma
7
7
Not Free
Burundi*
4
5
Partly Free
⇑
Cambodia
6
5
Not Free
⇓
Cameroon
6
6
Not Free
Canada*
1
1
Free
Cape Verde*
1
1
Free
Central African Republic
5
5
Partly Free
Chad
7
6
Not Free
Chile*
1
1
Free
China
7
6
Not Free
Colombia*
3
4
Partly Free
Comoros*
3
4
Partly Free
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Congo (Brazzaville )
6
5
Not Free
⇓
Congo (Kinshasa)
6
6
Not Free
⇓
Costa Rica*
1
1
Free
Cote d’Ivoire
6
5
Not Free
2
Free
Croatia*
1?
Cuba
7
6
Not Free
Cyprus*
1
1
Free
Czech Republic*
1
1
Free
Denmark*
1
1
Free
Djibouti
5
5
Partly Free
Dominica*
1
1
Free
Dominican Republic*
2
2
Free
East Timor*
3
4
Partly Free
Ecuador*
3
3
Partly Free
Egypt
6
5
Not Free
El Salvador*
2
3
Free
Equatorial Guinea
7
7
Not Free
Eritrea
7
7?
Not Free
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Estonia*
1
1
Free
Ethiopia
5
5
Partly Free
Fiji
6
4
Partly Free
Finland*
1
1
Free
France*
1
1
Free
Gabon
6
5?
The Gambia
5
5?
Partly Free
Georgia
4
4
Partly Free
Germany*
1
1
Free
Ghana*
1
2
Free
Greece*
1
2
Free
Grenada*
1
2
Free
4?
4
Partly Free
Guinea
7
6?
Guinea-Bissau*
4
4
Partly Free
Guyana*
2
3
Free
Haiti*
4
5
Partly Free
4?
4?
Partly Free
Guatemala*
Honduras
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Not Free ?
Not Free
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Hungary*
1
1
Free
Iceland*
1
1
Free
India*
2
3
Free
Indonesia*
2
3
Free
Iran
6
6
Not Free
Iraq
5?
6
Not Free
Ireland*
1
1
Free
Israel*
1
2
Free
Italy*
1
2
Free
Jamaica*
2
3
Free
Japan*
1
2
Free
Jordan
6?
5
Not Free ?
Kazakhstan
6
5
Not Free
Kenya
4
4?
Kiribati*
1
1
Kosovo
5?
4?
Partly Free ?
Kuwait
4
4
Partly Free
6?
5?
Kyrgyzstan
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⇓
⇓
Partly Free
Free
Not Free ?
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Laos
7
6
Not Free
Latvia*
2
1
Free
Lebanon
5
3?
Partly Free
Lesotho*
3?
3
Partly Free ?
Liberia*
3
4
Partly Free
Libya
7
7
Not Free
Liechtenstein*
1
1
Free
Lithuania*
1
1
Free
Luxembourg*
1
1
Free
Macedonia*
3
3
Partly Free
Madagascar
6?
4?
Partly Free
Malawi*
3?
4
Partly Free
Malaysia
4
4
Partly Free
Maldives*
3?
4
Partly Free
Mali*
2
3
Free
Malta*
1
1
Free
Marshall Islands*
1
1
Free
Mauritania
6
5
Not Free
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Mauritius*
1
2
Free
Mexico*
2
3
Free
Micronesia*
1
1
Free
Moldova*
3?
4
Partly Free
Monaco*
2
1
Free
Mongolia*
2
2
Free
Montenegro*
3
2?
Free ?
Morocco
5
4
Partly Free
4?
3
Partly Free
Namibia*
2
2
Free
Nauru*
1
1
Free
Nepal
4
4
Partly Free
Netherlands*
1
1
Free
New Zealand*
1
1
Free
Nicaragua*
4
4?
Partly Free
5?
4
Partly Free
Nigeria
5
4
Partly Free
⇓
North Korea
7
7
Not Free
⇓
Mozambique
Niger
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Norway*
1
1
Free
Oman
6
5
Not Free
Pakistan
4
5
Partly Free
Palau*
1
1
Free
Panama*
1
2
Free
Papua New Guinea*
4
3
Partly Free
Paraguay*
3
3
Partly Free
Peru*
2
3
Free
Philippines
4
3
Partly Free
Poland*
1
1
Free
Portugal*
1
1
Free
Qatar
6
5
Not Free
Romania*
2
2
Free
Russia
6
5
Not Free
Rwanda
6
5
Not Free
Saint Kitts and Nevis*
1
1
Free
Saint Lucia*
1
1
Free
Saint Vincent and
Grenadines*
2
1
Free
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Samoa*
2
2
Free
San Marino*
1
1
Free
Sao Tome and Principe*
2
2
Free
Saudi Arabia
7
6
Not Free
Senegal*
3
3
Partly Free
Serbia*
2?
2
Free
Seychelles*
3
3
Partly Free
Sierra Leone*
3
3
Partly Free
Singapore
5
4
Partly Free
Slovakia*
1
1
Free
Slovenia*
1
1
Free
Solomon Islands
4
3
Partly Free
Somalia
7
7
Not Free
South Africa*
2
2
Free
South Korea*
1
2
Free
Spain*
1
1
Free
Sri Lanka*
4
4
Partly Free
Sudan
7
7
Not Free
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Suriname*
2
2
Free
Swaziland
7
5
Not Free
Sweden*
1
1
Free
Switzerland*
1
1
Free
Syria
7
6
Not Free
Taiwan*
1?
2?
Tajikistan
6
5
Not Free
Tanzania
4
3
Partly Free
Thailand
5
4
Partly Free
Togo
5
4?
Partly Free
Tonga
5
3
Partly Free
Trinidad and Tobago*
2
2
Free
Tunisia
7
5
Not Free
Turkey*
3
3
Partly Free
Turkmenistan
7
7
Not Free
Tuvalu*
1
1
Free
Uganda
5
4
Partly Free
Ukraine*
3
2
Free
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Free
⇓
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United Arab Emirates
6
5
Not Free
United Kingdom*
1
1
Free
United States*
1
1
Free
Uruguay*
1
1
Free
Uzbekistan
7
7
Not Free
Vanuatu*
2
2
Free
Venezuela
5?
4
Partly Free
Vietnam
7
5
Not Free
Yemen
6?
5
Not Free ?
3
4?
6?
6
Zambia*
Zimbabwe
⇓
Partly Free
Not Free
Methodology:
PR and CL stand for political rights and civil liberties, respectively; 1 represents the most free and
7 the least free rating. The ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results.
? ? up or down indicates a change in political rights, civil liberties, or status since the last survey.
⇑ ⇓ up or down indicates a trend of positive or negative changes that took place but that were
not sufficient to result in a change in political rights or civil liberties ratings of 1-7.
* indicates a country’s status as an electoral democracy.
Source:
This data is derived from the latest edition of Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2010
edition.
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Available at URL: http://www.freedomhouse.org
Updated:
Reviewed in 2015
Human Rights
Overview of Human Rights in Lebanon
Lebanon is a parliamentary republic. Since 2005, Lebanon has been wracked by unrest and spate
of politically-motivated assassinations that threaten to destabilize the country. Of particular note
was the assassination of anti-Syrian former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. That incident spurred
what came to be known as the "Cedar Revolution" -- a nationalist uprising against Syrian influence,
which was believed to have been behind Hariri's murder.
Later in 2005, a Lebanese government was formed without the external influence and control of
Syria for the first time in 30 years. The elections were considered to be generally free and fair
albeit with a few minor irregularities. A new pro-democracy majority opposed to Syrian influence
selected Fouad Siniora as prime minister.
In the months after the end of Syrian control, the government has attepted to right some of the
human rights abuses of the past three decades. A new democratically elected parliament and
reform-minded government are in place and the government has worked to decrease the
restrictions on press, assembly, and media censorship.
Significant improvements have been made in some areas of human rights abuses, but overall the
record in Lebanon is still issue-ridden. The government lacks transparency and many officials are
considered corrupt. Frequently, the government limits the freedoms of speech and press,
movement, and assembly. Citizens’ privacy rights are also infringed upon arbitrarily. The judiciary
is also not independent. It is easily influenced by the executive branch and other authorities.
Palestinians in Lebanon are the victims of widespread, systematic discrimination.
Meanwhile, although official Syrian influence has ended in the region, Palestinian and Lebanese
militias, particularly Hezbollah, act as Syrian proxies and maintain undue influence over large parts
of the country. Though in recent times Lebanon has begun to take steps to limit Palestinian arms,
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no steps have been taken to disarm extra-legal armed groups or Hezbollah.
On July 12, 2006 the Lebanon-based organization Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers and
killed three others in a border raid from Southern Lebanon into Israel. Israel responded with
military action and the violence continued to escalate on both sides. It is estimated that over 1,500
people, mostly civilians, died in the conflict. An August 2006 United Nations brokered cease-fire
has theoretically ended the hostilities between the two sides.
From the time of the aforementioned Cedar Revolution, through the war between Hezbollah and
Israel, and in the post-war period in late 2006 well into 2007, Lebanon was marked by serious
unrest, violence and even murder. Such a climate, and in particular, one where Hezbollah's
influence is strong, cannot be hospitable to ensuring the protection of human rights across the
board. Since the formation of a new government in more recent times, there were hopes for
increased stability and, therefore, a climate more hospitable to upholding human rights.
Human Development Index (HDI) Rank:
See full listing of the Human Development Index located in the Social Overview of this report for
this country's current rank.
Human Poverty Index Rank:
18th out of 103
Gini Index:
N/A
Life Expectancy at Birth (years):
73.41 years
Unemployment Rate:
18%
Population living on $1 a day (%):
N/A
Population living on $2 a day (%):
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N/A
Population living beneath the Poverty Line (%):
28%
Internally Displaced People:
50,000-600,000
Note-404,000 Palestinian refugees are currently in Lebanon
Total Crime Rate (%):
N/A
Health Expenditure (% of GDP):
Public: 3.5%
% of GDP Spent on Education:
2.7%
Human Rights Conventions Party to:
• International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide
• International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
• International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
• Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
• Conventions on the Rights of the Child
*Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index that measures the level of well-being in
177 nations in the world. It uses factors such as poverty, literacy, life-expectancy, education, gross
domestic product, and purchasing power parity to assess the average achievements in each nation.
It has been used in the United Nation’s Human Development Report since 1993.
*Human Poverty Index Ranking is based on certain indicators used to calculate the Human
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Poverty Index. Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40, adult literacy rate, population without
sustainable access to an improved water source, and population below income poverty line are the
indicators assessed in this measure.
*The Gini Index measures inequality based on the distribution of family income or consumption. A
value of 0 represents perfect equality (income being distributed equally), and a value of 100 perfect
inequality (income all going to one individual).
*The calculation of the total crime rate is the % of the total population which has been effected by
property crime, robbery, sexual assault, assault, or bribery (corruption) related occurrences.
Government Functions
Background
Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy with a peculiar sectarian touch. According to the
constitution, direct elections must be held for the parliament every four years. Parliament, in turn,
elects a president every six years. The president and parliament together choose the cabinet.
Since the emergence of the post-1943 state, national policy has been determined largely by a
relatively restricted group of traditional regional and sectarian leaders. The 1943 National Pact, an
unwritten agreement that established the political foundations of modern Lebanon, allocated
political power on an essentially confessional system. Those religious groups most favored by the
1943 formula have sought to preserve it, while those who perceived themselves to be
disadvantaged sought to revise it on the basis of updated demographic data or to abolish it entirely.
The struggle gave a strongly sectarian coloration to Lebanese politics, and to the continuing civil
strife in the country.
The National Pact stipulates that the three top positions in the government shall be distributed as
follows: The president is to be a Maronite Christian; the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the
president of the National Assembly a Shia Muslim. The covenant provides that public offices shall
be distributed among the recognized religious groups.
Under the national reconciliation agreement reached in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in October 1989,
members of parliament agreed to alter the national pact to create a Christian-Muslim balance in the
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parliament and reorder the powers of the different branches of government. The Taif Agreement,
the political reform aspects of which were signed into law in September 1990, further modified the
constitution to permit greater power sharing and put in writing many of the provisions of the
National Pact.
Constitutional amendments embodying the political reforms stipulated in the Taif Agreement
became law in 1990. They included an expansion of the number of seats in parliament and the
division of seats equally between Muslims and Christians, and the transfer of some powers from
the president to the prime minister and the Council of Ministers.
Party Politics
In addition to its indigenous political groupings, Lebanon contains branches of many other political
parties of the Arab world. These covers the political spectrum from far left to far right, from totally
secular to wholly religious and often is associated with a particular religion or geographic region.
Palestinian refugees, numbering around 300,000 and predominantly Muslim, constitute an
important and sensitive minority.
Lebanese political parties are generally vehicles for powerful leaders whose followers are often of
the same religious sect. The interplay for position and power among these leaders and groups
produces a political tapestry of extraordinary complexity.
In the past, this system worked to produce a seemingly viable democracy. Changing demography
upset the delicate Muslim-Christian balance, and showed that the sectarian system was inherently
unable to deal with changes of this kind. The sectarian political system has resulted in a tendency
for Christians and Muslims to group themselves for safety into distinct geographical zones. All
factions have called for a reform of the political system, but people in power are benefiting from
the current system, and have taken few steps towards changing it. Some Christians favor political
and administrative decentralization of the government, with separate Muslim and Christian sectors
operating within the framework of a confederation. Muslims, for the most part, prefer a unified,
central government with an enhanced share of power for themselves commensurate with their
percentage of the population. The reforms of the Taif Agreement moved in this latter direction.
Executive Authority
The president is the chief of state and is elected by the National Assembly for a six-year term (may
not serve consecutive terms). Constitutionally, the president has a strong and influential position.
The president appoints the Council of Ministers and designates one of them to be prime minister.
The president also has the authority to promulgate laws enacted by the National Assembly, to issue
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supplementary regulations to ensure the execution of laws, and to negotiate and ratify treaties.
The prime minister is the head of government and presides over cabinet. The prime minister and
deputy prime minister are appointed by the president in consultation with the National Assembly.
The cabinet is chosen by the prime minister in consultation with the president and members of the
National Assembly.
Legislative Authority
The unicameral National Assembly or Majlis Alnuwab (Arabic) or Assemblee Nationale (French)
is made up of 128 members, who are elected by popular vote on the basis of sectarian proportional
representation to serve four-year terms. Most National Assembly members do not represent
political parties nor do they form groups in the assembly. Political blocs are usually based on
confessional and local interests or on personal allegiance, rather than on political affinities.
The assembly has traditionally played a significant role in financial affairs, since it has the
responsibility for levying taxes and passing the budget. It also exercises political control over the
cabinet through formal questioning of ministers on policy issues and by requesting a confidence
debate.
Legal System and Judiciary
The legal system of Lebanon is based on a mixture of Ottoman law, canon law, Napoleonic code,
and civil law. Juries are not used in trials. The Lebanese court system has three levels: courts of
first instance, courts of appeal, and the court of cassation. There is also a system of religious courts
that have jurisdiction on personal status matters within their own communities (i.e. rules on such
matters as marriage, divorce and inheritance).
Government Structure
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Names:
conventional long form:
Republic of Lebanon (Al Jumhuriyah al-Lubnaniyah)
conventional short form:
Lebanon (Lubnan)
local long form:
Al Jumhuriyah al Lubnaniyah
local short form:
Lubnan
Type:
Republic
Executive Branch:
Editor's Note:
In accordance with the 1943 National Pact, the president is supposed to be a Maronite Christian,
the prime minister is to be a Sunni Muslim, and the president of the National Assembly is to be a
Shi'a Muslim. This means that Lebanon's president is the only non-Muslim head of state in the
Arab world amidst a system of pluralistic religious representation. There is also supposed to be
some transfer of powers from the president to the prime minister and cabinet.
Chief of state:
Vacant. Typically, the president is elected by the National Assembly for a six-year term (may not
serve consecutive terms). An election was to be held in 2014 when the outgoing president's term
ended. However, to date, there has been no consensus in filing the post with a consensus
candidate. See "2014 Election Primer" below for details on the failed election exercise.
Note on the President:
President Michel Suleiman (May 2008-2014; term expired in 2014 as noted above); in 2008, the
National Assembly voted in favor of Suleiman with 118 out of 127 votes. A presidential election
was set for 2014 and would determine Suleiman's successor but ended in failure. See "2014
Election Primer" below for details on the failed election exercise.
Primer on failed 2014 presidential election in Lebanon:
A presidential election was expected to be held in the spring of 2014 -- ahead of May 2014 when
the tenure of long-serving President Michel Suleiman was scheduled to come to an end.
In Lebanon, the president is elected by the National Assembly for a six-year term and may not
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serve consecutive terms. In accordance with the 1943 National Pact, the president is supposed to
be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister is to be a Sunni Muslim, and the president of the
National Assembly is to be a Shi'a Muslim. This means that Lebanon's president is the only nonMuslim head of state in the Arab world amidst a system of pluralistic religious representation.
There is also supposed to be some transfer of powers from the president to the prime minister and
cabinet.
The last election was held in 2008. As a result of the Doha Agreement (discussed directly above),
Army Commander Michel Suleiman was elected by parliament and became Lebanon's new
president. The indirect vote gave Suleiman 118 votes out of 127. The vote brought an end to an
ongoing political impasse between rival pro-Western and pro-Syrian/Hezbollah factions, which
resulted in the presidency staying vacant for months after former President Emile Lahoud's term
ended. In the background of these developments, there had been grave anxieties about a power
vacuum, constitutional crisis and civil unrest if the political impasse was not ultimately resolved.
Now in 2014, it was to be seen who might succeed outgoing President Suleiman. One candidate
interested in entering the political waters was Lebanese Christian politician, Samir Geagea of the
Lebanese Forces Party who announced his bid for the presidency. It should be noted that Geagea
was known for his views opposed to Hezbollah and the Assad regime in Syria, and was thus
supported by the pro-Western March 12 political bloc. It was to be seen if Geagea could secure
the necessary two-thirds majority in parliament to win the presidency.
The recent political climate in Lebanon has been beset by bitter hostility between the rival proWestern and pro-Syrian/Hezbollah factions, and cross-over violence from the Syrian civil war.
That war has sparked ethno-sectarian violence and bloodshed on Lebanese soil as Shi'a Hezbollah
has involved itself in that war to the consternation of Lebanon's Sunni population, even forcing the
delay of the country's parliamentary elections that had originally been intended to be held in 2013
but were postponed to 2014. It was to be seen if in this climate of acrimony any candidate for the
presidency could capture a super-majority of support in the polarized legislative body.
Note that Lebanese Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri called for the presidential vote in
parliament to be held on April 23, 2014. Ongoing political dissonance and acrimony in Lebanon
ensured that the vote would not end successfully. Members of parliament in Lebanon failed to
elect a president since the main candidate, Geagea did not secure the required two-thirds majority.
In fact, he felt significantly short of that goal, with the pro-Hezbollah members of parliament
issuing blank votes.
This result could open the race up to other potential candidates. The former army chief, Michel
Aoun, who is supported by Hezbollah, could now decide to throw his hat in the ring. Of course, it
was quite likely that the March 12 bloc would take on the spoiler role on that ballot and oppose
him, essentially producing another failed vote. It was also possible that both sides might support a
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consensus candidate, such as the current army chief, General Jean Kahwaji, or even Central Bank
governor Riad Salameh; however, neither man has expressed any interest in becoming president.
A second round of voting to decide the presidency took place on April 30, 2014. That effort was
ultimately abandoned when several members of parliament -- mostly aligned with Michael Aoun
(mentioned above) -- opted to boycott the vote. No consensus candidate was agreed upon by both
of the two main political factions, suggesting that the process aimed at selecting and electing a
successor to outgoing President Suleiman could continue for some time. Of course a period of
protracted postponement in deciding the presidency would present a political challenge. Indeed,
Lebanon was in dire need of leadership at a time when divisions and sectarian conflict
characterized the landscape.
By the start of May 2014, former President Amine Gemayel of the party, Kataeb, had convened
talks with Walid Jumblatt, the head of the Progressive Socialist Party. According to the Daily
Star, Gemayel was trying to rally Christian support for his bid for the presidency bid as the proWestern March 12 bloc candidate. It was to be seen if he could become the official replacement
to Geagea. It was also to be seen if he could gain support (or at least a lack of resistance) from the
Hezbollah bloc.
A third round of voting on May 15, 2014, also ended in failure, and was followed by similarly
futile fourth and fifth rounds of voting later in May 2014 as no consensus could be found to satisfy
the two rival pro-Hezbollah and pro-Western factions. A sixth round was set for June 9, 2014,
amidst calls by the United Nation Security Council that Lebanon settle its political affairs and select
a new president in the interests of national and regional security. The statement by that
international body read as follows: “The Council urges the Parliament to uphold Lebanon’s
longstanding democratic tradition and to work to ensure that presidential elections take place as
soon as possible and without external interference."
But even with that external pressure, the sixth round of voting on June 9, 2014, ended in failure as
Lebanon's deadlocked politicians again could not agree on a successor to outgoing President
Suleiman. The failed vote occurred because the pro-Hezbollah faction in parliament boycotted the
session, thus depriving parliament of a quorum. Another voting session was set for June 18, 2014;
however, until the pro-Hezbollah and pro-Western coalitions could find agreement on a consensus
candidate, there was no expectation of success on that day.
As expected, the seventh round of voting on June 18, 2014, in the same way as the previous round
-- without a president elected to power. Once again the Hezbollah faction boycotted the session.
Leading the boycott throughout has been Michel Aoun, who has been backed by Hezbollah.
Clearly, he would continue to sabotage the presidential vote until he was ready to prepare himself
as the presidential consensus candidate.
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On June 17, 2014, ahead of the seventh round of voting, Aoun said, “I will announce my
nomination when the political situation in parliament becomes clear and when (the current
candidates) are dismissed." Disparaging Geagea, he said, “It is totally rejected to choose the
weakest Christian as president and I will not tolerate this." Making his intentions clear, Aoun
continued, “I’m the strongest and I’m the one who represents (the Christians). My popularity is on
the rise." However, it was unlikely that the pro-Western bloc in parliament would be prepared to
accept Aoun as president. As such, the impasse was expected to continue for some time although
news was emerging about an alternative presidential candidate in the form of Parliamentarian
Henry Helou.
Note that another attempt to elect a president took place on July 2, 2014, and ended in failure as
insufficient parliamentarians were present in the assembly, presumably due to another boycott.
Another attempt would be made later in July 2014.
In mid July 2014, former Prime Minister Saad Hariri demanded that members of parliament end
the political impasse and avoid the continuing power vacuum and elect a president. He said, "We
want parliamentary elections held on schedule, and we do not want an extension for the
parliament. But the entrance to the parliamentary elections is electing a president of the republic -today before tomorrow." Hariri, who was living in exile in France and Saudi Arabia due to fears of
assassination, also demanded that Hezbollah withdraw from its military engagement in the civil war
in neighboring Syria. He said, "Unfortunately Hezbollah believes that it will save the regime of
Bashar al-Assad. The truth is no one can save Assad's regime." While Hariri's demand was likely
to be ignored by Hezbollah, the fact of the matter was that Hezbollah's involvement in Syria has
only served to accentuate sectarian tensions in Lebanon. Those very tensions have done little to
alleviate the highly-polarized political environment that has set the Sunni pro-Western coalition of
Hariri against the Shi'ite/Allawite bloc dominated by Hezbollah.
Note: By the end of 2014, no president had been chosen and the outcome of this election was
thus yet to be determined.
Renewed effort rises to find consensus on a president and end Lebanon's political stalemate
For two years, Lebanon has been without a president. Typically, the president in Lebanon is
elected by the National Assembly for a six-year term and may not serve consecutive terms. In
accordance with the 1943 National Pact, the president is supposed to be a Maronite Christian, the
prime minister is to be a Sunni Muslim, and the president of the National Assembly is to be a Shi'a
Muslim. This means that Lebanon's president is the only non-Muslim head of state in the Arab
world amidst a system of pluralistic religious representation. There is also supposed to be some
transfer of powers from the president to the prime minister and cabinet.
An election was to be held in 2014 when the term of outgoing President Michel Suleiman ended.
However, to date, despite successive attempts to elect his Christian successor, there has been no
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consensus in filing the post with a consensus candidate. As a result, Lebanon has been mired by a
continuing power vacuum. By January 2016, there were new political alliances being formed with
an eye on finally inaugurating a new head of state; however, those political alliances remained
complicated and potentially contradictory. It was to be seen if an end to the political stalemate
would in the immediate offing.
In an additional political development, parliamentary elections in Lebanon had been postponed. In
October 2014, with the parliamentary elections looming just ahead, a decision was made to
postpone the elections even further -- until 2017. This decision was made in response to the
political instability and sectarian conflict plaguing Lebanon, both of which were only exasperated
by the ongoing Syrian civil war crisis. The new 2017 schedule for elections would mean that the
current parliament would serve eight years before being subject to election once again.
In the first week of November 2014, Lebanon's parliament made the decision to postpone the next
elections officially by voting to extend its own mandate until 2017. The move had been criticized
by observers, with even the head of Lebanon's Maronite Christian community, Patriarch Beshara
al-Rai, as well as the European Union noting that it was likely an unconstitutional move.
The decision by the Lebanese parliament to delay the elections was a significant move. Indeed, it
was the first time since the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990 that members of parliament have
chosen to effectively postpone elections and recalled that dark chapter in Lebanon's history. Of
particular concern was the growing involvement of Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon in the Syrian
conflict, battling to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The cross-border interactions of
Lebanon-based Hezbollah and Syria have had a long and enduring imprint on the Lebanese
political scene.
Of course, as discussed here, while there would be no new parliament until 2017, Lebanon was
already without a new president. The process for electing a new president had been going on for
some time without resolution due to continuing political acrimony between the two main political
factions. Thus, there was a growing call for the schedule for the parliamentary elections to be
linked with a provisions requiring a president to first be elected.
By December 2015, former Lebanese prime minister and opposition leader Saad al-Hariri
expressed support for a power-sharing solution that could potentially end the political stalemate that
had left Lebanon without a president for close to two years. Hariri backed the candidacy of
Suleiman Franjieh, a Maronite Christian who was a stalwart of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,
for the role of president. Of note was the fact that the Hariri political family has long been
opposed to Syrian influence in Lebanon, which made the notion of consensus seem remote.
Nevertheless, productive discussions between Hariri and Franjieh appeared to herald a
breakthrough of sorts, in which both politicians agreed to "proceed on the joint path for the
election of the president."
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This breakthrough was made official in mid-December 2015 when Franjieh said that he would
contest the presidency of Lebanon. Objections from other political players on the scene, such as
Michel Aoun and Samir Geagea, both of whom had their own personal presidential ambitions,
promised to complicate the situation.
That complication was manifest when in the third week of January 2016 Geagea said that he was
backing Aoun for the presidency. Since Gaegea was actually aligned with the March 14 alliance
of Hariri, his shift to the Aoun camp was a significant development and suggested something of a
political re-alignment. According to Geagea, his backing of Aon was due to his desire to rescue
the country from its political paralysis and return Lebanon to what he called " a normal life."
In mid-February 2016, Hariri made it clear that he retained his support for Franjieh for the
presidency. Hariri's continued commitment to Franjieh was made clear in his statement that read
as follows: "We have a commitment and our commitment to Suleiman (Franjieh) is clear." This
stance emphasized the reality that the political landscape in Lebanon in February 2016 continued to
be marked by stalemate.
Note on head of government:
In mid-February 2014, following more than 10 months of political wrangling, Lebanon finally
formed a new government. The new cabinet would be split equally between members of the proWestern March 14 bloc and the Hezbollah-led faction. The government would be led by the
incumbent Prime Minister Tammam Salam -- a moderate independent and the son of former Prime
Minister Saeb Salam -- who had been named as the consensus head of government. Salam would
continue in that role -- this time at the helm of an uneasy coalition between two rival alliances, as
noted below.
It should be noted that the office of the presidency has been occupied by President Michel
Suleiman since 2008. In accordance with the 1943 National Pact, the president is supposed to be a
Maronite Christian, the prime minister is to be a Sunni Muslim, and the president of the National
Assembly is to be a Shi'a Muslim. This means that Lebanon's president is the only non-Muslim
head of state in the Arab world amidst a system of pluralistic religious representation.
Going back to 2011, the pro- Western government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri's government
collapsed when the Hezbollah faction withdrew from the unity government, making way for
Hezbollah-sanctioned Najib Mikati to take on the role as prime minister. But in 2013, the prime
minister resigned amidst disagreement with Hezbollah. At issue, according to the Beirut Daily Star,
was the fact that Hezbollah members of the cabinet objected to a proposal to establish an electoral
supervisory body ahead of parliamentary elections. Also contributing to the dissonance between
Hezbollah and Mikati was the Hezbollah political bloc's rejection of Mikati's plan to extend the
term of the internal security chief. The growing chasm between Hezbollah and Mikati -- one time
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political allies -- appeared to be the latest manifestation of the political crisis gripping Lebanon. As
noted above, Mikati was succeeded by Salam as the new head of government, although since being
named to that post, the actual composition of his government has been a matter of consternation.
There were high hopes that the formation of this new government -- as uneasy and unlikely a
coalition as it might be -- could at least chart the path towards elections.
Indeed, the new government was intended to end the political stalemate plaguing Lebanon, and it
would be tasked with crafting a new electoral law and preparing the country for elections. Those
elections had been scheduled to be held in mid-2013 but were delayed due to internal political
hostility between the Hezbollah-led faction and the pro-Western bloc; those tensions were
exacerbated by spill-over violence from the civil war in Syria. A spate of violent attacks in Lebanon
laid bare the sectarian hostilities between the stalwarts of Shi'a Hezbollah, who were now actively
supporting the Assad regime in Syria -- and -- the local (Lebanese) supporters of the Sunni
resistance and rebel movement in Syria. The cross-border interactions of Lebanon-based
Hezbollah and Syria have had a long and enduring imprint on the Lebanese political scene.
See below for Elections Primer.
Cabinet:
Cabinet was chosen by the prime minister in consultation with the members of the National
Assembly but the cabinet list must be put to a vote in the parliament for approval.
Legislative Branch:
"Majlis al-Nuwab"/ "Assemblée Nationale" (National Assembly):
Unicameral - 128 seats allocated on the basis of regional and sectarian affiliation. Christian and
Muslim sects are equally represented.. Within the two religious groupings, seats are also allocated
to various sects, such as Druze, Greek Orthodox, Shi'a and Sunnis.
Primer on Elections:
Parliamentary elections were set to take place in Lebanon in June 2013 (although, as noted here,
the elections they were subsequently postponed and were then set to be held in 2014 and then
delayed further to 2017). At stake would be the composition of the "Majlis al-Nuwab"/
"Assemblée Nationale" (National Assembly) -- a unicameral body where 128 seats are allocated on
the basis of regional and sectarian affiliation. Christian and Muslim sects are equally represented..
Within the two religious groupings, seats are also allocated to various sects, such as Druze, Greek
Orthodox, Shi'a and Sunnis.
Previous elections -The previous elections took place on June 7, 2009. The two main factions contesting those
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elections were as follows--The pro-Western "14 March Coalition," made up of Future movement, Progressive Socialist
Party, Christian Lebanese Forces and Christian Phalangist party.
-The Hezbollah-led bloc, composed of Hezbollah, Amal movement of Speaker Nabih Birri, and
Free Patriotic Movement of Michel Aoun.
On election day, turnout was said to be high at close to 55 percent -- the highest level of voter
participation since the 1975-91 civil war. Former United States President Jimmy Carter led a team
of international monitors who concluded that the voting took place in a free and fair manner.
At issue in the election was the ongoing power struggle between the Lebanon's governing proWestern coalition and the Hezbollah-led bloc on the other side of the equation. The two sides have
been deadlocked in a political battle for supremacy for several years.
But with the votes counted, it was clear that the ruling pro-Western coalition would retain its
majority in the 128-member parliament. The actual official results indicated that the pro-Western
coalition won 71 seats and the Hezbollah bloc secured 57 seats. With these results confirmed, the
pro-Western coalition actually increased its parliamentary representation and consolidated its
political power.
Update on Government -The pro- Western government of Prime Minister Hariri's government collapsed in January 2011
when the Hezbollah faction withdrew from the unity government, making way for Hezbollahsanctioned Najib Mikati to take on the role as the new prime minister (see "Political Conditions"
for details).
Election Update -Note that in March 2013, Lebanese President Michel Suleiman and Prime Minister Najib Mikati
signed a decree calling for parliamentary elections to be held in June 2013.
Shortly thereafter, the prime minister resigned amidst disagreement with Hezbollah. Although
Mikati claimed his resignation was for "personal reasons," the general consensus was that he
resigned amidst political disagreements with the Hezbollah bloc in government. At issue, according
to the Beirut Daily Star, was the fact that Hezbollah members of the cabinet objected to a
proposal to establish an electoral supervisory body ahead of parliamentary elections to be held in
Lebanon. Also contributing to the dissonance between Hezbollah and Mikati was the Hezbollah
political bloc's rejection of Mikati's plan to extend the term of the internal security chief. The
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growing chasm between Hezbollah and Mikati -- one time political allies -- appeared to be the latest
manifestation of the political crisis gripping Lebanon. For his part, Mikati said that the internal
divisions in Lebanon were only serving to create deep wounds and urged the various political
parties to "come together to bring Lebanon out of the unknown."
Tammam Salam -- a moderate independent and the son of former Prime Minister Saeb Salam -was named as the new head of government. He was something of a consensus selection, as he
won the support of both the pro-Western March 14 bloc and the Hezbollah-controlled March 8
alliance. However, Tamman Salam was having difficulties actually forming a government.
Then, on May 31, 2013, due to security concerns over the ongoing conflict in neighboring Syria,
and a failure to find consensus on the aforementioned electoral law, Lebanon's parliament voted to
postpone the parliamentary elections scheduled to take place in June 2013. Members of parliament
extended their mandate until as late as November 2014.
In October 2014, with the November 2014 election timeline looming just ahead, a decision was
made to postpone the elections even further -- until 2017. This decision was made in response to
the political instability and sectarian conflict, which were only aggravated by the ongoing Syrian
civil war crisis. The new 2017 schedule for elections would mean that the current parliament
would serve eight years before being subject to election once again.
In the first week of November 2014, Lebanon's parliament made the decision to postpone the next
elections officially by voting to extend its own mandate until 2017. The move had been criticized
by observers, with even the head of Lebanon's Maronite Christian community, Patriarch Beshara
al-Rai, as well as the European Union noting that it was likely an unconstitutional move.
It should be noted that while there would be no new parliament until 2017, Lebanon was already
without a new president. The process for electing a new president had been going on for months
without resolution due to continuing political acrimony between the two main political factions.
Thus, there was a growing call for the schedule for the parliamentary elections to be linked with a
provisions requiring a president to first be elected.
Why is this election -- and the news of its postponement -- important?
The decision by the Lebanese parliament to delay the elections was a significant move. Indeed, it
was the first time since the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990 that members of parliament have
chosen to effectively postpone elections and recalled that dark chapter in Lebanon's history. Of
particular concern was the growing involvement of Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon in the Syrian
conflict, battling to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The cross-border interactions of
Lebanon-based Hezbollah and Syria have had a long and enduring imprint on the Lebanese
political scene.
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In 2005, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri -- a noted politician with an anti-Syrian
orientation -- was assassinated. Hezbollah and Syria have long been suspected of perhaps playing
a role in that act. Hariri's assassination gave rise to short-term transformation when Lebanon's
Cedar Revolution swept pro-Western and anti-Syrian factions to power at the polls later that year,
along with the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon after a three-decade long presence in
that country. While the Cedar Revolution was viewed as the dawning of a new day in Lebanon, the
aftermath was not so pleasant. Political stability devolved, as exemplified by a spate of political
assassinations, which were blamed on pro-Syrian elements. As well, Lebanon was the main venue
of violent conflict during the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel. In recent times, the country
has been caught in a political deadlock and intransigence, largely due to prevailing acrimony
between pro-Syrian/pro-Hezbollah factions and pro-reform/Western-backed members in the
Lebanese parliament. The ascendancy of Hezbollah as the dominant power in Lebanon since 2011
and well into 2014, as well as Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian war across the border, in
many ways suggested that the progress of the Cedar Revolution had been reversed.
Judicial Branch:
Four Courts of Cassation (three courts for civil and commercial cases and one court for criminal
cases); Constitutional Council (called for in Ta'if Accord - rules on constitutionality of laws);
Supreme Council (hears charges against the president and prime minister as needed)
Constitution:
May 23, 1926, amended several times, most recently Charter of Lebanese National Reconciliation
(Ta'if Accord) of October 1989
Legal System:
Mixture of Ottoman law, canon law, Napoleonic code, civil law, and religious law; no judicial
review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
Political Parties and Leaders:
14 March Coalition:
Democratic Left [Ilyas ATALLAH]
Democratic Renewal Movement [Nassib LAHUD]
Future Movement Bloc [Sa'ad al-HARIRI]
Kataeb Party [Amine GEMAYEL]
Lebanese Forces [Samir JA'JA]
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Tripoli Independent Bloc
8 March Coalition:
Development and Resistance Bloc [Nabih BERRI, leader of Amal Movement]
Free Patriotic Movement [Michel AWN]
Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc [Mohammad RA'AD] (includes Hizballah [Hassan NASRALLAH])
Nasserite Popular Movement [Usama SAAD]
Popular Bloc [Elias SKAFF]
Syrian Ba'th Party [Sayez SHUKR]
Syrian Social Nationalist Party [Ali QANSO]
Tashnaq [Hovig MEKHITIRIAN]
Independent:
Democratic Gathering Bloc [Walid JUNBLATT, leader of Progressive Socialist Party]
Metn Bloc [Michel MURR]
Suffrage:
21 years of age; compulsory for all males; authorized for women at age 21 with elementary
education. Army personnel are not allowed to vote
Administrative Divisions:
Six (6) governorates (mohafazat, singular - mohafazah); Beyrouth, Beqaa, Liban-Nord, Liban-Sud,
Mont-Liban, Nabatiye
Principal Government Officials
Government of Lebanon
Pres. VACANT
Prime Min. Tamam SALAM
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Dep. Prime Min. Samir MOQBIL
Min. of Agriculture Akram SHUHAYIB
Min. of Culture Rony ARAYJI
Min. of Defense Samir MOQBIL
Min. of Displaced People Alice SHABTINI
Min. of Economy & Trade Alain HAKIM
Min. of Education Ilyas ABU SAAB
Min. of Energy & Water Arthur NAZARIAN
Min. of Environment Muhammad al-MASHNUQ
Min. of Finance Ali Hasan KHALIL
Min. of Foreign Affairs & Emigrants Gibran BASSIL
Min. of Industry Husayn al-Hajj HASAN
Min. of Information Ramzi JRAYJ
Min. of Interior Nuhad al-MASHNUQ
Min. of Justice Ashraf al-RIFI
Min. of Labor Sejean QAZZI
Min. of Public Health Wael ABU FAOUR
Min. of Social Affairs Rashid DARBAS
Min. of Telecommunications Butrus HARB
Min. of Tourism Michel PHARAON
Min. of Transport & Public Works Ghazi ZUAYTIR
Min. of Youth & Sports Abd al-Mutalib HANAWI
Min. of State for Admin. Reform Nabil DE FREIJ
Min. of State for Parliamentary Affairs Muhammad FNAYSH
Governor, Central Bank of Lebanon Riad SALAMEH
Ambassador to the US Antoine CHEDID
Permanent Representative to the UN, New York Nawaf SALAM
Leader Biography
Leader Biography
President of Lebanon
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Editor's Note:
In accordance with the 1943 National Pact, the president is supposed to be a Maronite Christian,
the prime minister is to be a Sunni Muslim, and the president of the National Assembly is to be a
Shi'a Muslim. This means that Lebanon's president is the only non-Muslim head of state in the
Arab world amidst a system of pluralistic religious representation. There is also supposed to be
some transfer of powers from the president to the prime minister and cabinet.
Chief of state:
Vacant. Typically, the president is elected by the National Assembly for a six-year term (may not
serve consecutive terms). An election was to be held in 2014 when the outgoing president's term
ended. However, to date, there has been no consensus in filing the post with a consensus
candidate. See "2014 Election Primer" below for details on the failed election exercise.
Note on the President:
President Michel Suleiman (May 2008-2014; term expired in 2014 as noted above); in 2008, the
National Assembly voted in favor of Suleiman with 118 out of 127 votes. A presidential election
was set for 2014 and would determine Suleiman's successor but ended in failure. See "2014
Election Primer" below for details on the failed election exercise.
Primer on failed 2014 presidential election in Lebanon:
A presidential election was expected to be held in the spring of 2014 -- ahead of May 2014 when
the tenure of long-serving President Michel Suleiman was scheduled to come to an end.
In Lebanon, the president is elected by the National Assembly for a six-year term and may not
serve consecutive terms. In accordance with the 1943 National Pact, the president is supposed to
be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister is to be a Sunni Muslim, and the president of the
National Assembly is to be a Shi'a Muslim. This means that Lebanon's president is the only nonMuslim head of state in the Arab world amidst a system of pluralistic religious representation.
There is also supposed to be some transfer of powers from the president to the prime minister and
cabinet.
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The last election was held in 2008. As a result of the Doha Agreement (discussed directly above),
Army Commander Michel Suleiman was elected by parliament and became Lebanon's new
president. The indirect vote gave Suleiman 118 votes out of 127. The vote brought an end to an
ongoing political impasse between rival pro-Western and pro-Syrian/Hezbollah factions, which
resulted in the presidency staying vacant for months after former President Emile Lahoud's term
ended. In the background of these developments, there had been grave anxieties about a power
vacuum, constitutional crisis and civil unrest if the political impasse was not ultimately resolved.
Now in 2014, it was to be seen who might succeed outgoing President Suleiman. One candidate
interested in entering the political waters was Lebanese Christian politician, Samir Geagea of the
Lebanese Forces Party who announced his bid for the presidency. It should be noted that Geagea
was known for his views opposed to Hezbollah and the Assad regime in Syria, and was thus
supported by the pro-Western March 12 political bloc. It was to be seen if Geagea could secure
the necessary two-thirds majority in parliament to win the presidency.
The recent political climate in Lebanon has been beset by bitter hostility between the rival proWestern and pro-Syrian/Hezbollah factions, and cross-over violence from the Syrian civil war.
That war has sparked ethno-sectarian violence and bloodshed on Lebanese soil as Shi'a Hezbollah
has involved itself in that war to the consternation of Lebanon's Sunni population, even forcing the
delay of the country's parliamentary elections that had originally been intended to be held in 2013
but were postponed to 2014. It was to be seen if in this climate of acrimony any candidate for the
presidency could capture a super-majority of support in the polarized legislative body.
Note that Lebanese Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri called for the presidential vote in
parliament to be held on April 23, 2014. Ongoing political dissonance and acrimony in Lebanon
ensured that the vote would not end successfully. Members of parliament in Lebanon failed to
elect a president since the main candidate, Geagea did not secure the required two-thirds majority.
In fact, he felt significantly short of that goal, with the pro-Hezbollah members of parliament
issuing blank votes.
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This result could open the race up to other potential candidates. The former army chief, Michel
Aoun, who is supported by Hezbollah, could now decide to throw his hat in the ring. Of course, it
was quite likely that the March 12 bloc would take on the spoiler role on that ballot and oppose
him, essentially producing another failed vote. It was also possible that both sides might support a
consensus candidate, such as the current army chief, General Jean Kahwaji, or even Central Bank
governor Riad Salameh; however, neither man has expressed any interest in becoming president.
A second round of voting to decide the presidency took place on April 30, 2014. That effort was
ultimately abandoned when several members of parliament -- mostly aligned with Michael Aoun
(mentioned above) -- opted to boycott the vote. No consensus candidate was agreed upon by both
of the two main political factions, suggesting that the process aimed at selecting and electing a
successor to outgoing President Suleiman could continue for some time. Of course a period of
protracted postponement in deciding the presidency would present a political challenge. Indeed,
Lebanon was in dire need of leadership at a time when divisions and sectarian conflict
characterized the landscape.
By the start of May 2014, former President Amine Gemayel of the party, Kataeb, had convened
talks with Walid Jumblatt, the head of the Progressive Socialist Party. According to the Daily
Star, Gemayel was trying to rally Christian support for his bid for the presidency bid as the proWestern March 12 bloc candidate. It was to be seen if he could become the official replacement
to Geagea. It was also to be seen if he could gain support (or at least a lack of resistance) from the
Hezbollah bloc.
A third round of voting on May 15, 2014, also ended in failure, and was followed by similarly
futile fourth and fifth rounds of voting later in May 2014 as no consensus could be found to satisfy
the two rival pro-Hezbollah and pro-Western factions. A sixth round was set for June 9, 2014,
amidst calls by the United Nation Security Council that Lebanon settle its political affairs and select
a new president in the interests of national and regional security. The statement by that
international body read as follows: “The Council urges the Parliament to uphold Lebanon’s
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longstanding democratic tradition and to work to ensure that presidential elections take place as
soon as possible and without external interference."
But even with that external pressure, the sixth round of voting on June 9, 2014, ended in failure as
Lebanon's deadlocked politicians again could not agree on a successor to outgoing President
Suleiman. The failed vote occurred because the pro-Hezbollah faction in parliament boycotted the
session, thus depriving parliament of a quorum. Another voting session was set for June 18, 2014;
however, until the pro-Hezbollah and pro-Western coalitions could find agreement on a consensus
candidate, there was no expectation of success on that day.
As expected, the seventh round of voting on June 18, 2014, in the same way as the previous round
-- without a president elected to power. Once again the Hezbollah faction boycotted the session.
Leading the boycott throughout has been Michel Aoun, who has been backed by Hezbollah.
Clearly, he would continue to sabotage the presidential vote until he was ready to prepare himself
as the presidential consensus candidate.
On June 17, 2014, ahead of the seventh round of voting, Aoun said, “I will announce my
nomination when the political situation in parliament becomes clear and when (the current
candidates) are dismissed." Disparaging Geagea, he said, “It is totally rejected to choose the
weakest Christian as president and I will not tolerate this." Making his intentions clear, Aoun
continued, “I’m the strongest and I’m the one who represents (the Christians). My popularity is on
the rise." However, it was unlikely that the pro-Western bloc in parliament would be prepared to
accept Aoun as president. As such, the impasse was expected to continue for some time although
news was emerging about an alternative presidential candidate in the form of Parliamentarian
Henry Helou.
Note that another attempt to elect a president took place on July 2, 2014, and ended in failure as
insufficient parliamentarians were present in the assembly, presumably due to another boycott.
Another attempt would be made later in July 2014.
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In mid July 2014, former Prime Minister Saad Hariri demanded that members of parliament end
the political impasse and avoid the continuing power vacuum and elect a president. He said, "We
want parliamentary elections held on schedule, and we do not want an extension for the
parliament. But the entrance to the parliamentary elections is electing a president of the republic -today before tomorrow." Hariri, who was living in exile in France and Saudi Arabia due to fears of
assassination, also demanded that Hezbollah withdraw from its military engagement in the civil war
in neighboring Syria. He said, "Unfortunately Hezbollah believes that it will save the regime of
Bashar al-Assad. The truth is no one can save Assad's regime." While Hariri's demand was likely
to be ignored by Hezbollah, the fact of the matter was that Hezbollah's involvement in Syria has
only served to accentuate sectarian tensions in Lebanon. Those very tensions have done little to
alleviate the highly-polarized political environment that has set the Sunni pro-Western coalition of
Hariri against the Shi'ite/Allawite bloc dominated by Hezbollah.
Note: By the end of 2014, no president had been chosen and the outcome of this election was
thus yet to be determined.
Renewed effort rises to find consensus on a president and end Lebanon's political stalemate
For two years, Lebanon has been without a president. Typically, the president in Lebanon is
elected by the National Assembly for a six-year term and may not serve consecutive terms. In
accordance with the 1943 National Pact, the president is supposed to be a Maronite Christian, the
prime minister is to be a Sunni Muslim, and the president of the National Assembly is to be a Shi'a
Muslim. This means that Lebanon's president is the only non-Muslim head of state in the Arab
world amidst a system of pluralistic religious representation. There is also supposed to be some
transfer of powers from the president to the prime minister and cabinet.
An election was to be held in 2014 when the term of outgoing President Michel Suleiman ended.
However, to date, despite successive attempts to elect his Christian successor, there has been no
consensus in filing the post with a consensus candidate. As a result, Lebanon has been mired by a
continuing power vacuum. By January 2016, there were new political alliances being formed with
an eye on finally inaugurating a new head of state; however, those political alliances remained
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complicated and potentially contradictory. It was to be seen if an end to the political stalemate
would in the immediate offing.
In an additional political development, parliamentary elections in Lebanon had been postponed. In
October 2014, with the parliamentary elections looming just ahead, a decision was made to
postpone the elections even further -- until 2017. This decision was made in response to the
political instability and sectarian conflict plaguing Lebanon, both of which were only exasperated
by the ongoing Syrian civil war crisis. The new 2017 schedule for elections would mean that the
current parliament would serve eight years before being subject to election once again.
In the first week of November 2014, Lebanon's parliament made the decision to postpone the next
elections officially by voting to extend its own mandate until 2017. The move had been criticized
by observers, with even the head of Lebanon's Maronite Christian community, Patriarch Beshara
al-Rai, as well as the European Union noting that it was likely an unconstitutional move.
The decision by the Lebanese parliament to delay the elections was a significant move. Indeed, it
was the first time since the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990 that members of parliament have
chosen to effectively postpone elections and recalled that dark chapter in Lebanon's history. Of
particular concern was the growing involvement of Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon in the Syrian
conflict, battling to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The cross-border interactions of
Lebanon-based Hezbollah and Syria have had a long and enduring imprint on the Lebanese
political scene.
Of course, as discussed here, while there would be no new parliament until 2017, Lebanon was
already without a new president. The process for electing a new president had been going on for
some time without resolution due to continuing political acrimony between the two main political
factions. Thus, there was a growing call for the schedule for the parliamentary elections to be
linked with a provisions requiring a president to first be elected.
By December 2015, former Lebanese prime minister and opposition leader Saad al-Hariri
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expressed support for a power-sharing solution that could potentially end the political stalemate that
had left Lebanon without a president for close to two years. Hariri backed the candidacy of
Suleiman Franjieh, a Maronite Christian who was a stalwart of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,
for the role of president. Of note was the fact that the Hariri political family has long been
opposed to Syrian influence in Lebanon, which made the notion of consensus seem remote.
Nevertheless, productive discussions between Hariri and Franjieh appeared to herald a
breakthrough of sorts, in which both politicians agreed to "proceed on the joint path for the
election of the president."
This breakthrough was made official in mid-December 2015 when Franjieh said that he would
contest the presidency of Lebanon. Objections from other political players on the scene, such as
Michel Aoun and Samir Geagea, both of whom had their own personal presidential ambitions,
promised to complicate the situation.
That complication was manifest when in the third week of January 2016 Geagea said that he was
backing Aoun for the presidency. Since Gaegea was actually aligned with the March 14 alliance
of Hariri, his shift to the Aoun camp was a significant development and suggested something of a
political re-alignment. According to Geagea, his backing of Aon was due to his desire to rescue
the country from its political paralysis and return Lebanon to what he called " a normal life."
In mid-February 2016, Hariri made it clear that he retained his support for Franjieh for the
presidency. Hariri's continued commitment to Franjieh was made clear in his statement that read
as follows: "We have a commitment and our commitment to Suleiman (Franjieh) is clear." This
stance emphasized the reality that the political landscape in Lebanon in February 2016 continued to
be marked by stalemate.
Foreign Relations
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Overview of Foreign Relations
The foreign policy of Lebanon reflects its geographic location, the composition of its population,
and its reliance on commerce and trade. Lebanon's foreign policy has been heavily influenced by
neighboring Syria, which has also long influenced Lebanon's internal policies as well. Reflecting
lingering feelings in Syria that Lebanon was unjustly separated from Syria by European powers,
Syria and Lebanon have never formally agreed on their mutual boundaries. In an attempt to reduce
tension and political strife that started with the February 2005 assassination of former Prime
Minister Rafik Hariri and lasted until the May 25, 2008, election of President Michel Sleiman,
Syrian President Asad and President Sleiman agreed to establish diplomatic relations between the
two countries. On August 21, 2008, the Lebanese Council of Ministers approved the establishment
of diplomatic relations with Syria. Both Lebanon and Syria have opened embassies and appointed
ambassadors in Damascus and Beirut, respectively. On December 19, 2009, Prime Minister Saad
Hariri made the first visit by a Lebanese Prime Minister to Damascus since the 2005 assassination
of his father, former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The Higher Council for Bilateral Relations, first
codified in May 1991 when Lebanon and Syria signed a treaty of mutual cooperation, still exists.
This treaty came out of the Taif Agreement, which stipulated "Lebanon is linked to Syria by
distinctive ties deriving strength from kinship, history, and common interests." The Lebanese-Syria
treaty calls for "coordination and cooperation between the two countries" that would serve the
"interests of the two countries within the framework of sovereignty and independence of each."
Numerous agreements on political, economic, security, and judicial affairs have followed over the
years. Syria maintained troops in Lebanon from 1976 until 2005. Although Syria withdrew its
military forces from Lebanon in 2005, Syria continues to have a strong influence in Lebanese
politics.
Lebanon, like most Arab states, does not recognize Israel, with which it has been technically at war
since Israel's establishment. Lebanon participated in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and despite the
1948 Lebanon-Israel armistice, Lebanon's lack of control over the border region resulted in
repeated border hostilities, initiated mainly by Palestinian exile groups from 1968 to 1982 and later
by Hizballah. These attacks led to Israeli counterattacks, including a 1978 invasion, a 1982
invasion and occupation which ended in 2000, and the 2006 war. Lebanon did not participate in
the 1967 or 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, nor in the 1991 Gulf War. The success of the latter created
new opportunities for Middle East peacemaking. In October 1991, under the sponsorship of the
United States and the then-Soviet Union, Middle East peace talks were held in Madrid, Spain,
where Israel and a majority of its Arab neighbors conducted direct bilateral negotiations to seek a
just, lasting, and comprehensive peace based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338
(and 425 on Lebanon) and the concept of "land for peace." Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and
representatives of the Palestinians continued negotiating until the Oslo interim peace accords were
concluded between Israel and the Palestinians in September 1993 and Jordan and Israel signed an
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agreement in October 1994. In March 1996, Syria and Israel held another round of Madrid talks;
the Lebanon track did not convene. Lebanon has repeatedly called for a solution of the IsraeliPalestinian problem as a prerequisite to peace with Israel.
Lebanon concluded negotiations on an association agreement with the European Union in late
2001, and both sides initialed the accord in January 2002. Lebanon also has bilateral trade
agreements with several Arab states and is working toward accession to the World Trade
Organization. Aside from Syria, Lebanon enjoys good relations with virtually all of the other Arab
countries (despite historic tensions with Libya, the Palestinians, and Iraq), and hosted an Arab
League Summit in March 2002 for the first time in more than 35 years. Lebanon also is a member
of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and maintains a close relationship with Iran, largely
centered on Shia Muslim links. Lebanon is a member of the Francophone countries and hosted the
Francophone Summit in October 2002 and the Francophone Games in 2009.
Regional Relations
Relations with Israel
Lebanon did not participate in the 1967 or 1973 Arab-Israeli war or in the 1991 Gulf War. The
success of the latter created new opportunities for Middle East peacemaking. In October 1991,
under the sponsorship of the United States and the then-Soviet Union, Middle East peace talks
were held in Madrid, Spain, where Israel and a majority of its Arab neighbors conducted direct
bilateral negotiations to seek a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace based on United Nations
(UN) Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (and 425 on Lebanon) and the concept of "land
for peace." Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and representatives of the Palestinians continued negotiating
until the Oslo interim peace accords were concluded between Israel and the Palestinians in
September 1993 and Jordan and Israel signed an agreement in October 1994. In March 1996,
Syria and Israel held another round of Madrid talks; the Lebanon track did not convene.
In early April 1996, Israel conducted a military operation dubbed "Grapes of Wrath" in response to
Hizballah's continued launching of rockets at villages in northern Israel. The 16-day operation
caused hundreds of thousands of civilians in south Lebanon to flee their homes. On April 18,
Hizballah fired mortars at an Israeli military unit from a position near the UN compound at Qana,
and the Israeli Army responded with artillery fire. Several Israeli shells struck the compound, killing
102 civilians sheltered there. In the "April Understanding" concluded on April 26, Israel and
Hizballah committed themselves to avoid targeting civilians and using populated areas to launch
attacks.
The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group (ILMG), co-chaired by France and the United States, with
Syria, Lebanon, and Israel all represented, was set up to implement the Understanding and assess
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reports of violations. ILMG ceased operations following the May 2000 Israeli withdrawal from
south Lebanon.
On May 23, 2000, the Israeli military carried out a total withdrawal of Israeli troops from the south
and the Bekaa Valley, effectively ending 22 years of occupation. The SLA collapsed and about
6,000 SLA members and their families fled the country, although more than 3,000 had returned by
November 2003. The military court tried all of the SLA operatives who remained in the country
and the average sentence handed down was one-year imprisonment.
On June 16, 2000, the UN Security Council adopted the report of the Secretary General verifying
Israeli compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 425 and the withdrawal of Israeli troops to
their side of the demarcated Lebanese-Israeli line of separation (the "Blue Line") mapped out by
UN cartographers. (The international border between Lebanon and Israel is still to be determined
in the framework of a peace agreement.)
In August 2000, the Government of Lebanon deployed over 1,000 police and soldiers to the
former security zone, but Hizballah also maintained observation posts and conducted patrols along
the Blue Line. While Lebanon and Syria initially agreed to respect the Blue Line, both since have
registered objections and continue to argue that Israel has not fully withdrawn from Lebanese soil.
As regional tension escalated with the Palestinian intifada in September 2000, Hizballah cited Blue
Line discrepancies when it reengaged Israel on October 7, taking three Israeli soldiers captive in an
area known as Shebaa Farms. (In 2001, the Israeli Government declared the three soldiers were
believed to be dead.) Shebaa Farms is a largely unpopulated area of the Golan Heights, just south
of the Blue Line, that was captured by Israel from Syria in 1967.
As a result of secret mediation by the German Government, Israel released a number of Lebanese
prisoners held by Israel in early 2004 in exchange for Elhanan Tannenbaum, an Israeli reservist
abducted by Hizballah in late 2000.
Hizballah forces have continued to launch sporadic military strikes on Israeli forces, drawing
responses that produced casualties on both sides and, on two occasions in 2001, Israeli air strikes
on Syrian radar sites in Lebanon. Israel continues to violate Lebanese sovereignty by conducting
many overflights of Lebanese territory north of the Blue Line. UNIFIL has recorded numerous
violations of the Blue Line by both sides since the Israeli withdrawal. In general, however, the level
of violence along the Israeli-Lebanon front has decreased dramatically since May 2000.
On May 28, 2006, the United Nations announced that it brokered a truce following incidences
involving mutual missile attacks along the Israel-Lebanon border. In one of the most significant
attacks since December 2005, Katyusha rockets from Lebanon were fired across the border
toward northern Israeli bases around Mount Miron. While no specific militant group claimed
responsibility, it the past, such attacks have been carried out by the likes of Hizbollah as well as
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Lebanon-based Palestinian militants. In retaliation, Israeli jets fired on guerilla bases in Lebanon.
Clashes between guerillas and Israeli troops then ensued along the boundary between Israel and
Lebanon and residents in the area were instructed to take cover. The area has been a particularly
volatile zone despite the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon in 2000, following an
occupation that lasted 18 years. Still, the Shebaa Farms (discused above) has remained a
contested territory in the border region and the site of periodic confrontations.
In mid-July 2006, the leader of Lebanon-based Hizbollah (also known as Hezbollah) announced
that his militant Islamic group had captured two Israeli soldiers. The Hezbollah leader, Hassan
Nasrallah, asserted that they would only be returned through a combination of dialogue and
prisoner exchange. Refusing to negotiate with Hizbollah, which it has regarded as a terrorist
enclave, the Israeli government decided to respond with a strong military offensive in Lebanon -both in response to Hizbollah's actions, and also for the purpose of finding the two captured
soldiers. Israel also warned that it would hold Lebanon responsible for the fates of the two
captured soldiers and it characterized the actions of Lebanon-based Hizbollah as an "act of war."
Israel's promise of "painful" and "far-reaching" consequences was issued just as its forces launched
an assault on Lebanon, which left several Israeli troops and Lebanese civilians dead, even as
infrastructure and Hezbollah interests were attacked within Lebanon. Meanwhile, Hizbollah
launched systematic attacks on Israel, reaching towns inside the border and leading to the deaths of
several Israelis.
The situation intensified into a kind of undeclared war over the course of several days with both
Hizbollah and Israeli solidifying their antagonistic positions and Lebanon imploring both parties for
a ceasefire. Instead, Hizbollah's leader responded to Israeli strikes on his compound by promising
more war with Israel, while Israeli accused Syria and Iran of being state-sponsors of terrorism who
were using Hizbollah to carry out their agenda. The international community responded by (1)
blaming Hazbollah for causing the crisis, and demanding the return of the soldiers be returned and
the cessation of rocket attacks on Israel; and (2) calling on Israel to exercise restraint in what was
becoming a massively violent and bloody operation across Lebanese terrain.
The escalation of hostilities between Israeli forces and Lebanon-based Hezbollah, in conjunction
with the ongoing conflict in Gaza, spurred fears that the entire Middle Eastern region was at risk of
being acutely destabilized. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan and United Kingdom
Prime Minister Tony Blair called for an establishment of an international force to stabilize the
Israeli-Lebanese border by preventing attacks by Hizbollah into Israel, and thus, foreclosing Israel's
rationale for bombarding Lebanon.
Please see "Political Conditions" for details about this crisis.
In the first part of September 2009, two rockets were fired into northern Israel from Lebanon; the
explosions were reported in the Israeli city of Nahariya only six miles from the border with
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Lebanon. The Israeli military responded by firing eight shells into a fruit plantation near the city of
Tyre. There were no reports of deaths or injuries as a result, although Israeli police said they did
manage to find the remnants of a Katyusha rocket.
United Nations peacekeepers in Lebanon urged both sides to exercise restraint in response to the
situation. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil) said that it was deploying extra
troops and released the following statement: "Unifil is in contact with both sides, urging them to
exercise maximum restraint, uphold the cessations of hostilities and avoid taking steps which would
lead to further escalation." Unifil was established in 1978 following Israel's incursion into Lebanon
and was expanded after Israel's 2006 war with the militant Islamic group, Hezbollah. That situation
was spurred by a Hezbollah offensive from Lebanese terrain into Israel, in which two Israeli
soldiers were seized at the onset. Israel retaliated and Lebanese citizens -- more than 1,000 in total
-- were killed in the crossfire of violence. As well, about 160 Israelis, most of whom were soldiers,
also died in the war as a result of rocket fire and fighting. The border region maintained a sense of
uneasy calm since the end of the 2006, although there have been occasional flare ups of rocket fire
and clashes between the two sides.
On Aug. 3, 2010, Lebanese and Israeli soldiers have exchanged fire along their shared border.
There were competing claims as to what spurred the incident. Lebanese officials claimed that it
started firing only after warning Israeli soldiers not to uproot a tree impeding their view on the
Lebanese side of the border; they said that Israeli troops responded with artillery fire. Lebanese
authorities also accused Israeli troops of crossing the border into Lebanon and said that three of
their soldiers and a journalist had been killed in the fracas. Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri
criticized Israel for its "aggression." For its part, Israel said that it also had casualties with two of its
soldiers being shot in the border zone; Israel also denied ever encroaching on Lebanese territory.
Indeed, Israel said that its armed forces were on the Israeli side of the internationally-sanctioned
"blue line" separating the two countries, carrying out routine operations, when they were warned to
withdraw from the area. The Israeli Defense Forces said that individuals in Lebanese army
uniforms then opened fire on them.
It was the most serious diplomatic imbroglio between Israel and Lebanon since the 2006 conflict
between Israel and the Lebanon-based militant extremist organization, Hezbollah. Perhaps not
surprisingly, United Nations peacekeeping forces stationed in southern Lebanon called on both
sides to exercise "maximum restraint" at a time of heightened tensions.
In February 2012 when a military tribunal in Lebanon sentenced three people to death for spying
on Hezbollah on behalf of Israel. The men reportedly passed on information about Hezbollah
officials to Israeli contacts over the course of a decade. The cases have come to light since 2009
when Lebanese authorities began a crackdown against Israeli spies, leading to the arrests,
convictions, and death sentencing of several suspects.
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Exchange of fire between Israeli forces and Hezbollah leaves two Israeli soldiers and a peacekeeper
dead -In the worst eruption of violence between Israel and Lebanon-based Hezbollah since the 2006 war,
Israeli forces and Hezbollah fighters exchanged fire at the end of January 2015, leaving two Israeli
soldiers and a Spanish peacekeeper dead. The two Israeli soldiers died when Hezbollah fired five
missiles at a convoy of Israeli military vehicles along the border with Lebanon. The Spanish
peacekeeper, who was serving as part of a United Nations monitoring mission in southern
Lebanon died when Israel responded to the assault by Hezbollah with artillery fire and air strikes.
Hezbollah wasted little time claiming responsibility for the eruption of violence, saying that its
attack on Israel was carried out in retaliation for an Israeli air strike in southern Syria that killed an
Iranian general and several members of Hezbollah weeks earlier. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu promised retribution, saying "Those behind the attack today will pay the full price."
Across the border in Lebanon, supporters of Hezbollah in southern Beirut shot gunfire into the air
in celebration of the killing of the Israeli soldiers. But other residents of the city were preparing to
evacuate Beirut in the event that Israel made good on its promise of retribution, and with the
memory of the devastation associated with the 2006 war still fresh in their memories. That being
said, with an election in Israel looming ahead, there was deep skepticism that Netanyahu would
pursue a military effort against Hezbollah anytime soon.
Editor's Note:
Hizbollah (also known as Hezbollah) is a militant movement founded with the assistance of Iran's
late revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. Although it is accused of being a terrorist
organization by the West, it is regarded as a legitimate resistance movement by many Arabs and
Muslims. The group endeavors to restructure Lebanon as an Islamic state and has called for the
destruction of the state of Israel. Functionally, it has had control of the border region between
Israel and Lebanon since the withdrawal of Israeli forces in 2000. Like the militant group, Hamas,
in the Palestinian territories, Hizbollah also has a political wing, which has won representation in
government. Indeed, there is Hizbollah representative serving as a government minister in
Lebanon.
Relations with Syria
Lebanon's foreign policy was heavily influenced by Syria, which maintained 35,000 forces
throughout Lebanon until 2005.
In 2004, the United Nations Security Council narrowly passed a United States-proposed resolution
demanding the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, and full respect for Lebanese
sovereignty. Presumably, the measure was directed at Syrian forces, which first entered Lebanon
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as peacekeepers in the 1970s.
The impetus for the United States-proposed resolution might have resided primarily in its shift in
policy toward Syria. Whereas Syria was viewed favorably in the 1990s for its support of the Gulf
War to liberate Kuwait, it was later viewed negatively due to its opposition to the invasion of Iraq,
as well as its supposed ties to Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Earlier,
the United States went so far as to place sanctions on Syria demanding cessation of support for
these groups, who often claim responsibility for attacks on Israeli citizens.
In 2005, relations between Lebanon and Syria plummeted in the aftermath of the assassination of
former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri. Relations had already soured between the two countries in
2004 when Syrian-backed President Lahoud said that he would continue his lock on power in
Lebanon, to the dismay of Prime Minister Hariri who resigned in protest.
Following the assassination of Hariri in February 2005, the late prime minister's funeral was itself
transformed into a spontaneous rally of Lebanese nationalism mixed with protest against Syrian's
military presence in Lebanon. For Syria, pressure was exerted by external factions. Notably, very
soon after Hariri’s death, the United States entered the fray by calling for Syria's military
withdrawal from Lebanon. By Feb. 21, 2005, Arab League announced that plans were in the
works to go forward with the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. The withdrawal took
place later in 2005, however, Syrian influence continues to date.
Note: October 2008 saw Syrian President Bashar al-Assad initiate plans to forge diplomatic
relations with Lebanon for the first time in decades. Indeed, the two Arab countries have been at
odds with one another since gaining independence from France in the 1940s. The plans, which
have been backed by France, includes the establishment of a Syrian embassy in the Lebanese
capital of Beirut. The move would be a symbolic acknowledgment of Lebanese sovereignty after
decades of what many have viewed as Syrian inteference in Lebanese affairs. On the other side
of the equation, Lebanese Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh said that he would travel to the Syrian
capital of Damascus to commence establishing ties with his Syrian counterpart ,Walid al-Moualem.
That would constitute the first step in the diplomatic process, ultimately aimed at the exchange of
ambassadors by the close of 2009.
See "Update" and "Special Report" below for details related to more recent developments as
regards Syria.
Update on Regional Relations (re: Syria and Saudi Arabia)
On July 30, 2010, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Saudi King Abdullah were in Beirut for
landmark talks with Lebanese President Michel Suleiman. The meeting was significant largely
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because of the complicated relationship between Lebanon and Syria through the years, which
translated into a complex political terrain in Lebanon defined by pro-Syrian/Hezbollah-backed
factions at odds with anti-Syrian/pro-reform factions, who have had tenuous control of the
government. Those tensions reached a nadir years ago as discussed in the "Editor's Note" below
and have functioned as the main dynamics of the Lebanese political sphere. Now tensions were on
the rise once again.
At issue was the possible indictment of members of Hezbollah by a United Nations tribunal
investigating the assassination of vocal anti-Syrian former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. As noted
below in the "Editor's Note," Hariri's murder marked a turning point in Lebanon's modern history,
functioning as a harbinger for the Cedar Revolution that forced the Syrian military from Lebanon
after a 30-year long presence there. Despite its tragic roots, the Cedar Revolution was a political
victory for pro-Western and reformist forces in Lebanon, and concomitantly enflamed the passions
of pro-Syrian elements in the country, many of whom were allied with Hezbollah and sought to
assert their authority in Lebanon. Now, in mid-2010, the possible indictment of members of
Hezbollah in Hariri's assassination, in many ways, re-opened the wounds of that period.
Still, years after Syrian forces were compelled to exit Lebanon, Syrian President al-Assad was in
Lebanon for his first visit since that fateful period. While some Lebanese would likely interpret the
visit as a sign of progress between the two neighboring countries, others could well view it as a
rallying cry for renewed hostility between pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian factions. But the presence of
Saudi King Abdullah on the scene underlined the imperative for regional powers to work in
lockstep for Middle Eastern stability. To this end, both the leaders of Syria and Saudi Arabia
appealed for calm during unprecedented talks in Lebanon and urged that country's rival factions to
refrain from violence despite the politics of the moment. Moreover, with al-Assad and King
Abdullah saying that resolution should be reached through "legal institutions," there was a message
of unity and a tacit endorsement of the United Nations tribunal process.
Editor's Note:
Since the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri -- a noted politician with an
anti-Syrian orientation -- Lebanon has slowly retrenched into a state of dissonance. The period saw
short-term transformation when the Cedar Revolution swept pro-Western and anti-Syrian factions
to power at the polls later that year, along with the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon for a
three-decade long presence in that country. While the Cedar Revolution was viewed as the
dawning of a new day in Lebanon, the aftermath was not so pleasant. Political stability devolved,
as exemplified by a spate of political assassinations, which were blamed on pro-Syrian elements.
As well, Lebanon was the main venue of violent conflict during the 2006 war between Hezbollah
and Israel. In recent times, the country has been caught in a political deadlock and intransigence
over presidential succession, largely due to prevailing acrimony between pro-Syrian/pro-Hezbollah
factions and pro-reform/Western-backed members in the Lebanese parliament. The establishment
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of the May 2008 Doha Agreement was intended to end the political impasse and move the country
forward. The opening of corresponding embassies in Beirut and Damascus in 2009 was viewed as
a step not only towards positive bilateral engagement, but also towards greater stability in Lebanon.
Editor's Note:
See "Special Report" below on spill-over violence into Lebanon from the Syrian civil war starting
in 2011, as well as Lebanon-based Hezbollah's involvement in that conflict.
A Note on the Iraq War
In early August 2002, Lebanon declared strong opposition to United States' threats to strike at Iraq
under the pretext that Baghdad has possessed weapons of mass destruction. By the end of the
month, Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan was scheduled to arrive in Lebanon to hold
talks with Lebanese leaders to seek support. Ramadan was expected to hand over a letter from
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein seeking Lebanon's support against growing United States threats
to deal a military strike against Baghdad to topple the Saddam regime.
Other Significant Relations
United States
The United States ( U.S.) seeks to maintain it s traditionally close ties with Lebanon, to help
preserve its independence, sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity. The U.S. also
supports the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon as well as the disarming and
disbanding of all armed militias. The United States believes that a peaceful, prosperous and stable
Lebanon can make an important contribution to stability and peace in the Middle East.
The United States supports the programs of the central government to restore security and unity to
Lebanon and to rebuild that country's national institutions. One measure of U.S. concern and
involvement has been a program of relief and rehabilitation assistance, which, since 1975, has
totaled more than $250 million.
Twenty-two years of occupation and war had left of South Lebanon in dire need of development.
International organizations have postponed a donor conference scheduled for October 2000 , but
international aid money is expected to help boost development in the region.
The Bush administration's policy toward the Middle East was less active than the Clinton
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administration. The secretary of state (under the Bush administration), Colin Powell, did not visit
Lebanon as part of his first trip to the Middle East in February 2001, angering Lebanese leaders.
In mid-October 2001, the U.S. government expressed its appreciation to the Lebanese government
for its cooperation in the ongoing U.S.-led strikes against terrorism. Powell said in a letter to the
Lebanese that the U.S. government admired Beirut's efforts to condemn and crack down on all
forms of terrorism. This goodwill was marred slightly when, in July 2002, U.S. Senators who had
recently visited Lebanon and Syria, branded Hezbollah an "A-Team" of terrorism. They claimed
Lebanon and Syria have been harboring training camps that threaten U.S. national security.
Both countries had urged Washington to distinguish between terror activities and the legitimate right
to resist Israeli occupation of Lebanese land. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob
Graham led a congressional delegation to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Israel to gather information
for the September 11 investigation being conducted jointly with the House Intelligence Committee.
In comments to reporters in Washington, Graham noted that Hezbollah was "the most vicious and
effective terrorist organization in the world," and stated that if Washington is serious about
combating terrorism, it would have to target Hezbollah and its alleged training camps. An official
source in Beirut said the country's leadership was astonished at Graham's remarks.
In early August 2002, Lebanon declared strong opposition to United States' threats to strike at Iraq
under the pretext that Baghdad has possessed weapons of mass destruction. By the end of the
month, Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan was scheduled to arrive in Lebanon to hold
talks with Lebanese leaders to seek support. Ramadan was expected to hand over a letter from
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein seeking Lebanon's support against growing United States threats
to deal a military strike against Baghdad to topple the Saddam regime.
As noted above, in the fall of 2004, the United Nations Security Council narrowly passed a United
States-proposed resolution demanding the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, and full
respect for Lebanese sovereignty. By 2005, the United States was backing the withdrawal of
Syrian troops from Lebanon as well as a shift in policy away from the orbit of Damascus. The
United States has certainly backed the anti-Syrian factions of government since the Cedar
Revolution. See "Political Conditions" for details.
In 2006, with Lebanon as "ground zero" of Hezbollah's short war with Israel, ties with the United
States were tested; U.S. Secretary of State Rice traveled to the region to try to mediate a peaceful
conclusion. See "Political Conditions" for details.
More recently, with the change of government in the United States, strengthened bilateral ties
with Middle Eastern nation states were anticipated. There were hopes that United States' President
Barack Obama's landmark speech to the Islamic world from the Egyptian capital of Cairo would
pay diplomatic dividends in the long run. Such high hopes ended with the shift in government
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domestically in Lebanon as the extremist Islamist entity, Hezbollah, dominated the political scene in
2011.
In the realm of foreign relations in 2011, Hezbollah claimed that it uncovered a CIA spy ring in
Lebanon. A Hezbollah member of parliament, Hassan Fadlallah, confirmed in an interview with
Agence France Presse that "Lebanese intelligence vanquished U.S. and Israeli intelligence in what
is now known as the intelligence war." A report by the Associated Press reflected the same claims
with acknowledgment from officials in the United States. Of course, the dynamics of the respective
governments notwithstanding, the lives of the individuals accused of spying were now broadly
regarded to be at risk.
Europe
Lebanon enjoys close relationships with several European countries, and the European Union. The
Euro-Med Agreement between 12 Mediterranean countries envisions the establishment of "a
common era of peace and stability," but will, in the light of the stalled Middle East peace process
focus on the goal of establishing a free-trade zone by 2012.
In June 2002, Lebanon signed a long-awaited agreement with the European Union on closer trade
and political ties in a move the EU said would boos t the small Arab country's economy as well as
contribute towards Middle East stability. The EU-Lebanon Association Agreement envisages a
gradual liberalization of bilateral trade, closer cooperation in the fight against illicit drugs, money
laundering and immigration and a dialogue on human rights and Middle East peacemaking.
Lebanon was the first Arab country to host the Francophone Summit in October 2002, testifying
Lebanon's attempt to become a member of the international community again.
Special Entry
Lebanon-based Hezbollah implicated in terror attack on Israelis in Bulgaria
In February 2013, Bulgarian officials were placing the blame on Lebanon-based Hezbollah for a
bus bombing that killed five Israelis and a local bus driver, in the Black Sea resort town of Burgas
in mid-2012.
The attack on July 18, 2012, which also resulted in the death of the suspected suicide bomber,
occurred at the Burgas airport in Bulgaria. The bombing appeared to target a bus carrying Israeli
tourists and ensued on the 18th anniversary of a deadly attack on a Jewish community center in
Argentina, raising the likelihood that the Bulgaria bombing was another instance of anti-Jewish
terrorism by extremist elements. At the time, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wasted
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little time in blaming Iran for the act of terrorism. A day later, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak
expanded on Netanyahu's claim that Iran was behind the act of terrorism, explaining that the
Lebanese Hezbollah was the direct perpetrator of the attack, but had been acting under the aegis
of Iran. Netanyahu himself explained the connection using the following phrase: "Hezbollah, the
long arm of Iran." Analysts were suggesting that the terror attack in Bulgaria was likely another
manifestation of the covert war between Israel and Iran. To that end, there were intimations that
the Bulgaria bombing might have been a retaliatory attack for the series of targeted strikes against
Iranian nuclear scientists. For its part, Iran dismissed the accusation and expressed condemnation
for "all terrorist acts." No statement, though, came from Hezbollah in Lebanon.
In mid- 2012, United States officials were suggesting that the suicide bomber on the bus in Bulgaria
was a member of Hezbollah. According to the New York Times, their sources did not wish to be
identified as the investigation was under way, however, the suicide bomber was in Bulgaria on a
mission to attack Israeli interests. The New York Times' unnamed sources also observed that
Hezbollah was being guided and sponsored by Iran in this effort. Bulgarian Interior Minister
Tsvetan Tsvetanov was on the record confirming that the suicide bomber had been "in country" for
several days prior to the terror attack.
More than six months later in February 2013, and with an investigation having taken place,
Bulgarian officials were now officially saying that there were "obvious links" to Lebanon and
Hezbollah. Bulgarian Interior Minister Tsvetan Tsvetanov said that two suspects involved in the
Burgas bombing plot were directly linked to Hezbollah. He said, "We have established that the
two were members of the militant wing of Hezbollah. There is data showing the financing and
connection between Hezbollah and the two suspects."
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wasted little time re-entering the fray. He accused
Lebanon-based Hezbollah and Iran of "waging a global terror campaign across borders and
continents" and called on Europe to "reach the required conclusions regarding the true nature of
Hezbollah." That latter call appeared to reference the fact that many European countries have not
gone so far as Israel and the United States in classifying Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.
Special Entry
Lebanese connection in Bahrain plot
In the third week of February 2013, Bahraini authorities were saying that they had foiled an
Iranian-backed terror plot that targeted military and civil installations as well as certain public
figures. The public security chief, Major General Tariq Al Hassan, accused an Iranian national,
Abu Nasser, of dispatching funds to a terror cell named "Army of Imam," presumably to carry out
the operation. As well, five suspects linked with the terror cell were arrested in Bahrain and Oman.
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Bahrain's Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid bin Abdullah al-Khalifa confirmed that a "terrorist cell"
linked to Iran and Lebanon had been uncovered. For its part, Iranian politicians dismissed the
claimed of an Iran-linked terrorist cell. Indeed, Hoseyn Naqavi Hoseyni, the spokesman of Iran
Majlis Committee on National Security and Foreign Policy, described the allegation as part of
Bahrain's campaign of "Iranophobia." Meanwhile, a Lebanese member of parliament and leader of
the Free Patriotic Movement, Michel Aoun, actively entered the Shi'ite-Sunni fracas in Bahrain
when he accused the international community and the Arab League for failing to support Bahrain's
Shi'ite protest movement. It should be noted that Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement has been
Hezbollah's main Christian ally in Lebanon.
Special Entry
Spill-over violence from Syria
In 2012, Lebanon was being rocked by spill-over sectarian violence from Syria. In May 2012,
sectarian clashes in northern Lebanon left a number of people dead and several more injured, with
blame being placed on brewing conflict between Alawite supporters of Syrian President Bashar alAssad and Sunnis, who back the Syrian opposition. Syrian President Assad was himself an Alawite
-- a variant of the Shi'a sect of Islam. Of particular concern was the outbreak of violence in the
Lebanese city of Tripoli and the deaths of at least five people there.
At issue was the eruption of violence when a Sunni cleric, Shadi al-Moulawi, was arrested on
terrorism charges. Supporters of al-Moulawi said he was detained because of his assistance to
Syrian refugees. Of course, Lebanon's current government -- dominated by members of
Hezbollah -- has held a more favorable orientation to Syria, and could presumably be less lenient
with anti-Syrian activists. Despite calls by political and religious leaders to end the violence,
fighting has continued in Lebanon, which has increasingly become a bastion of refuge for Syrian
refugees fleeing the violence in Syria.
By the third week of the month (May 2012), the spillover violence continued when Sheikh Ahmed
Abdul Wahid, an opponent of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, was shot to death at a Lebanese
army checkpoint. The incident occurred in a part of Lebanon where the sympathies of the people
were clearly with the Syrian rebels. The incident, therefore, brought into high relief the
aforementioned tensions between Lebanon's current government (dominated by members of
Hezbollah and pro-Assad in orientation) -- and -- Sunni Muslims in Lebanon who have some
loyalty to the anti-Syrian former Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri, and thus feel connected to the
Syrian opposition.
Sheikh Wahid's death triggered violent street battles, which reached new heights at the funeral of
the Sunni Muslim cleric. Demonstrations ensued in the northern province of Akkar, while protests
in Beirut spurred gun battles as well as the firing of rocket-propelled grenades. In Beirut, the street
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battle were between members of the Future Movement (aligned with supporters of former Prime
Minister Saad al-Hariri), and pro-Syrian activists. At least two people died as a result. The
violence in Lebanon served as a reminder of the episodes of sectarian strife that has periodically
plagued the country over the years, and raised the specter of another sectarian conflict erupting in
Lebanon.
By the start of June 2012, around ten people were killed and more than 20 were injured in Tripoli
when clashes broke out in the northern port city. As before, they were seemingly sparked by the
crisis unfolding in neighboring Syria. In this case, pro-Syrian Alawites and anti-Assad Sunni
cadres became embroiled in violent clashes on June 2, 2012 in the Sunni Bab al-Tebbaneh district
and inthe pro-Syrian and Alawite Jabal Mohsen neighborhood of Tripoli. Lebanese Prime
Minister Najib Mikati visited Tripoli, held talks with ministers and officials, and promised that
security forces would work to stop the violence. However, the passions of the two sides were
clearly inflamed and were sparking sectarian tensions in a manner unseen in recent times. With no
end in sight to the Syrian crisis, it was unlikely that the spill-over sectarian violence in Lebanon
would spontaneously end. The main question was whether or not it could trigger a return to
Lebanon's previous political landscape of sectarian conflict.
In mid-August 2012, four Arab countries -- Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait -urged their citizens to exit Lebanon due to spillover sectarian violence from Syria.
The call was made following a series of kidnappings of Sunni Muslims by a powerful Shi'a clan in
Lebanon. The al-Meqdad clan claimed that the 20 individuals (most of whom were Syrian
nationals but also included at least one Turkish and one Saudi national) had ties to the Syrian
rebels. They further claimed that the kidnappings had been carried out in retaliation for the
abduction of an al-Meqdad clan member by Syrian rebels in Damascus. The Syrian rebels had
their own counterclaim; they said that the man they seized in Damascus was fighting for the Syrian
government on behalf of Lebanon's Shia Hezbollah movement. The situation was further
complicated when seven Lebanese hostages held by Syrian rebels were wounded as Syrian
warplanes struck the town of Azaz to the north of the Syrian city of Aleppo. Meanwhile, the
Lebanese city of Tripoli had already seen no shortage of violence between supporters and
opponents of Syrian President Assad.
As a result of these developments, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait were clearly
responding to the fact that the Syrian de facto civil war was not only slipping over into Lebanese
terrain, but was also being imprinted with a sectarian dimension. Indeed, it was pitting Shi'a and
Sunni against one another, with implications for the entire region. Of course, Saudi Arabia and
Qatar -- both countries with predominantly Sunni Muslim citizens -- have offered support to the
Syrian rebels fighting the Assad regime.
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Violence from Syria reaches Lebanon due to Hezbollah's involvement in Syrian conflict
On July 9, 2013, a car bomb exploded in the Lebanese capital city of Beirut, resulting in injuries to
scores of people. The bombing occurred in the Beir el-Abed area of Beirut, which was known to
be a stronghold of the Shi'a Islamic extremist militant entity, Hezbollah. Although there was no
claim of responsibility for the attack, Hezbollah's role in the Syrian civil war next door raised
questions about spillover violence into Lebanon from Syria. To be clear, Lebanon-based
Hezbollah has increasingly taken a high-profile role on the side of the Assad regime as it has fought
a relentless battle to hold onto power in Syria against a rebel movement supported by other Arab
countries and the West. For their part, rebels have railed against Hezbollah for siding with the
Assad regime and involving itself in the Syrian conflict. They have accordingly threatened to target
Hezbollah in Lebanon for its intervention into the Syrian civil war.
It was not known if this bombing was the work of Syrian rebels in retaliation for Hezbollah's
activity in Syria. That being said, by mid-July 2013, the United Nations Security Council was
demanding that Lebanon-based Hezbollah end its involvement in the conflict in neighboring Syria.
A statement from the United Nations Security Council read as follows: "The Security Council
calls upon all Lebanese parties to recommit to Lebanon's policy of disassociation, to stand united
behind President Michel Suleiman in this regard and to step back from any involvement in the
Syrian crisis."
On July 16, 2013, a roadside bomb in Lebanon, close to the Syrian border, appeared to target a
convoy carrying members of Hezbollah. The explosion killed one Hezbollah official and wounded
two others. Because Syrian opposition rebels have warned they would strike against Hezbollah, in
retaliation for the militant Shi'a Islamic entity's involvement in the Syrian civil war, all suspicion
rested on the rebels for this attack. It was vividly clear that the Syrian civil war, and specifically,
Hezbollah's involvement in that conflict, was having an effect on the other side of the border in
Lebanon.
Spillover violence from Syria reached new heights on July 17, 2013, when a well-known
commentator on Syrian state television was assassinated in the southern Lebanese town of
Sarafand. Mohammad Darra Jamo worked for the Syrian state media, but also appeared frequently
on other Arab networks; he was known to be a strong supporter of Syrian President Bashar alAssad. According to reports, gunmen were hiding in Darra Jamo's house prior to the attack; the
gunmen opened fire and killed him. The Syrian state news agency, SANA, said that an "armed
terrorist group" carried out the attack while Lebanese security officials said the assassination was
carried out by supporters of the Syrian rebel movement.
In mid-August 2013, Lebanon was struck by further Hezbollah-related violence. An explosion in a
southern suburb of Beirut left about two dozen people dead, up to 200 others wounded, and
exacted massive damage to buildings and vehicles in the vicinity. The high number of injuries was
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due to the fact that the explosion -- caused by a car bomb -- occurred in a densely populated part
of Beirut. Of course, the area was also a stronghold of Hezbollah. Accordingly, the violence was
being attributed to Hezbollah's ongoing involvement in the civil war in Syria, which has
exacerbated sectarian tensions between Shi'ites (such as pro-Assad Hezbollah) and Sunni Muslims
(of the type that form the base of the Syrian rebel opposition). That claim gained traction when a
Syrian rebel group took responsibility for a bombing in Beirut a month earlier (discussed above).
In a video posting, the Battalions of Ayesha indicated their involvement in the Beirut bombing in
July 2013 and promised to continue to target Hezbollah strongholds, which it described as
"colonies of Iran."
Politicians from Hezbollah's government wing characterized the car bombing as a "terrorist
attack," but they were seemingly cognizant of the deleterious consequences of the militant wing's
activities in Syria as they also urged their supporters to exercise "restraint." But Hezbollah's militant
wing was in no mood for the rhetoric of restraint. A day after the bombing, Hassan Nasrallah, the
leader of Hezbollah referred to the Sunni Muslim militants from Syria behind the attack promising
to personally fight in Syria against them. Speaking on his own television channel, Nasrallah said, "I
will go myself to Syria if it is necessary in the battle against the takfiris (Sunni radicals)." He also
indicated that Hezbollah had no intention of retreating from its effort to support the Assad regime
in Syria. Dispelling the notion that spill-over violence would make Hezbollah rethink its activities,
Nasrallah declared that his movement would re-intensify its involvement in Syria by doubling its
forces fighting in that country.
Meanwhile, no conflict involving Lebanon-based Hezbollah could occur without some reference to
Israel. Some politicians in Lebanon were casting blame on Israel for the mid-August 2013 attack in
Beirut. At a joint news conference with United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Israeli
President Shimon Peres dismissed that notion with a succinct declaration as follows: "Why should
they look to Israel? They have a Hezbollah that collects bombs, that goes and kills people in Syria
without the permission of the Lebanese government."
It should be noted that the 15-member United Nations body conveyed its anxieties about the rising
death toll in Syria -- now estimated to be approaching 100,000 since the start of the conflict in
2011 -- as well as the increasing number of internally displaced persons -- now estimated to be as
many as four million with two million fleeing to neighboring countries. Lebanon, especially, was
bearing the brunt of the exodus of from Syria, as refugees sought to escape the cross-fire of
bloodshed and violence. To this end, the United Nations Security Council noted in its statement:
"The Security Council underlines the need for assistance on an unprecedented scale, both to meet
the needs of the refugees and of host communities, and to assist the Lebanese authorities who face
extraordinary financial and structural challenges as a result of the refugee influx."
Nawaf Salam - Lebanon's ambassador to the United Nations - addressed the matter of Syrian
refugees in his country saying, "Lebanon will not close its borders. Lebanon will not turn back any
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refugees. Lebanon will continue to provide assistance to all Syrian refugees. But let's be clear,
Lebanon cannot cope with the burden of the refugee crisis. Lebanon needs international support."
***
Suicide bombing of Iranian embassy in Beirut
On Nov. 19, 2013, a double suicide bombing outside the Iranian embassy in the Lebanese capital
of Beirut left more than 20 people dead and more than 140 others injured. The first bombing was
carried out by a suicide attacker on a motorcycle, while the second was executed by a suicide
bomber in a a four-wheel drive vehicle. Among the dead was the Iranian cultural attache, Sheikh
Ibrahim Ansari, who had just assumed his diplomatic post a month prior.
Because Iran has been a well-known supporter of the Lebanese Shi'a Islamic extremist group,
Hezbollah, which deployed fighters to Syria to help the government of Bashar al-Assad hang onto
power against rebel forces, there were suggestions that this attack was a manifestation of spillover
violence from the Syrian civil war.
Certainly, the violence and bloodshed augured negatively for Lebanon as it pushed the country
further into a state of turmoil. Noteworthy was the fact that it was the first since Lebanon's 197590 Civil War that an embassy had been targeted. Moreover, the brazen act of violence illustrated
the ease with which Lebanon was being pulled into Syria's destructive orbit.
There was also a sectarian element to the attack as the Sunni Jihadist group, Abdullah Azzam
Brigades, claimed responsibility for the violence at the Iranian embassy in Beirut. Via the Twitter
account of the group's religious guide, Sheikh Sirajeddine Zuraiqat, Abdullah Azzam Brigades
issued its formal claim of responsibility, declaring: "The Abdullah Azzam brigades - the Hussein bin
Ali cells - may they please God - are behind the attack on the Iranian embassy in Beirut." The
group, which is linked with the notorious terror enclave, al-Qaida, also said that the bombings were
a "double martyrdom operation carried out by two heroes from the heroic Sunnis of Lebanon."
The group threatened more attacks in Lebanon until Iran withdrew its forces from Syria,
bolstering the view that a sectarian conflict that transcended borders was emerging in the Middle
East.
In Lebanon, caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati condemned the violence, calling it "a cowardly
terrorist act." Lebanese Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri -- a member of the Hezbollah faction
in the Lebanese parliament -- warned that the terrorists behind the attack on the Iranian embassy
were the people who attempted to assassinate him a year prior. He was quoted in Lebanon's
Daily Star newspaper as saying, "Those who targeted the embassy [Tuesday] are the same team
that threatened to assassinate me."
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There was also a global outcry against the bombings, especially given the fact that a diplomatic
post was the target. United Kingdom Foreign Secretary William Hague said: "The U.K. is strongly
committed to supporting stability in Lebanon and seeing those responsible for this attack brought to
justice." United States Secretary of State John Kerry said, "The United States knows too well the
cost of terrorism directed at our own diplomats around the world, and our hearts go out to the
Iranian people after this violent and unjustifiable attack."
At the start of January 2014, DNA tests confirmed that a man arrested in Lebanon was likely
wanted in connection with the bombing of the Iranian Embassy in Beirut months earlier in
November 2013. The man was identified as Majid al-Majid, the head of the Abdullah Azzam
Brigades, which claimed responsibility for bombing. According to the Daily Star in Beirut, Majid
had been captured by the Lebanese army and was on Saudi Arabia's list of 85 most wanted
individuals for his links to the Islamist Jihadist terror enclave, al-Qaida.
***
Other developments related to the sectarian spill-over violence from Syria
At the start of December 2013, Lebanon was struck by spillover violence from the war in Syria as
clashes broke out in the northern city of Tripoli, leaving six people dead, and as many as 50 people
wounded, including more than 10 soldiers. The city of Tripoli is home to a small Alawite
community -- the same ethnic group as Syria's President Bashar al-Assad. But the city is also
surrounded by a larger Sunni community, which was aligned with the rebel movement opposing the
Assad regime in Syria. In response to the violence in Tripoli, and with an eye on halting the
sectarian bloodshed, the Lebanese authorities instituted military rule in that city.
These sectarian fault lines were occurring not only in Syria where the conflict was unfolding, but
also in Lebanon. The sectarian tensions in Lebanon were sparked when some residents of an
Alawite district in Tripoli began flying Syrian flags to show support for President Assad; residents
of the Bab al-Tabbana district responded by flying the flag of the Syrian rebels. The acrimony led
to violent clashes, with the deadly results noted here.
On Dec. 27, 2013, Mohamad Chatah -- an opposition politician and former Lebanese cabinet
minister -- was killed during a car bombing in central Beirut. The blast killed several other
individuals and left as many as 50 people injured. For his part, Chatah was a Sunni Muslim who
worked as an adviser to former pro-Western Prime Minister Saad Hariri; he was known as a
moderate but also a critic of both Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the Lebanon-based Shi'a
extremist entity, Hezbollah.
Given this background, there were suggestions that Chatah was the latest casualty in the ongoing
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Sunni-Shi'a sectarian conflict that was spreading across the Middle East, but particularly
influencing the Syrian civil war and contributing to spill-over violence in Lebanon. Of note was the
fact that Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon have become an integral part of the pro-Assad forces
fighting in Syria to the consternation of Sunni Muslims in Lebanon. Tensions from both sides have
manisfested in an increase in the number of sectarian attacks and assassinations on Lebanese soil.
Syria was quick to deny any involvement in Chatah's killing. However, the fact of the matter was
that the assassination occurred as Chatah was en route to a meeting of the anti-Syrian/pro-Western
March 14 bloc -- led by Saad Hariri -- when his convoy was struck by the blast. There were
suggestions that the killing of Chatah was not so much a targeted assassination as it was a message
to Hariri's anti-Syrian/pro-Western March 14 bloc.
Instability update -Violence against struck the Lebanese capital of Beirut on Jan. 2, 2014 when a car bomb killed at
four people and injured nine others. The area of the car bombing was a busy shopping area not far
from Hezbollah's offices. Because human remains were found close to the car, which was
seemingly laden with explosives, experts surmised the bombing was a suicide attack. The car
bomb marked the second attack in the Lebanese capital in less than a week.
As discussed above, a car bombing in central Beirut in late December 2013 left Mohamad Chatah
-- an opposition politician and former Lebanese cabinet minister -- dead along with several others.
As discussed above, blame was placed (at least at the popular level) on Hezbollah.
In this case, because the target was in the densely populated area of Haret Hreik district of Beirut
-- a Hezbollah stronghold of the city -- suspicion rested on an anti-Hezbollah faction. With
Hezbollah -- a Shi'a extremist entity -- controversially involved in fighting on behalf of the Alawite
Assad regime in Syria, there were suggestions that this January 2014 bombing might be the work
of anti-Assad Sunni Islamic militants. Both incidences highlighted the increased Sunni-Shi'a
tensions plaguing the entire region of the Middle East, with particular attention to Syria, which was
in the throes of its ongoing civil war, and with spill-over violence in neighboring countries like
Lebanon.
Hariri assassination trial convenes amidst flare of sectarian tensions in Lebanon -In mid-January 2014, the trial of four members of the Shi'a extremist entity, Hezbollah,
commenced at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague over the 2005 assassination of
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Hariri was a pro-Western politician who opposed
Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs, and by extension, was an antagonist of Hezbollah, which
has long been aligned with the Alawite-ruled regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Hariri's
assassination in 2005, followed by the assassinations of several other key pro-Western figures in
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Lebanon, fueled speculation that Syria and its local proxies, such as Hezbollah, were behind the
bloodshed.
The allegations against the four members of Hezbollah has long been a source of contention in
Lebanon. Hezbollah has denied that any of its members were involved in the dark chapter in
Lebanese modern history, but the pro-Western opposition has clamored for justice after so many
long years of what they perceive was impunity for Hezbollah.
The inclusion of Hezbollah in government in 2011 signaled alarm bells across the West as
Hezbollah has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, Canada, and several
other Western powers. Moreover, the ascendancy of Hezbollah as the dominant power in Lebanon
was illustrative of the resurgence of Syrian and Iranian power on the Lebanese scene.
But in that same year -- 2011 -- the United Nations-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon
announced its indictments of four members of Hezbollah in relation to the assassination of the
late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Among the suspects were Mustafa Badreddine, a high-level
figure in the Lebanese Hezbollah, who was identified as the central director of the operation to
assassinate Hariri. Another Hezbollah figure, Salim Ayyash, was accused of orchestrating the
actual assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri. The other two suspects -- Hussein Oneissi
and Assad Sabra -- were charged with complicity due to their attempts to craft a false claim of
responsibility. The charges thus ranged from conspiracy to commit a terrorist act to murder and
attempted murder.
The son of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, Saad Hariri, said at the time that he welcomed the
indictments, characterizing them as "historic" developments in Lebanese recent history. As
reported by Agence France Presse, the younger Hariri said: After many years of patience, of
struggle... today, we witness a historic moment in Lebanese politics, justice and security
Meanwhile, the special tribunal's chief prosecutor, Daniel Bellemare, has said that the case against
the four members of Hezbollah would serve to "finally inform the public and the victims about the
facts." At the time when the indictment came down, Bellemare said, "The full story will, however,
only unfold in the courtroom, where an open, public, fair and transparent trial will render a final
verdict."
Now, in 2014, the trial was finally set to begin with high hopes for a verdict being reached by
2015. All four suspects would be tried in absentia since not one of them has actually been arrested
and at least two were believed to be in Iran. In his opening statement, Prosecutor Norman Farrell
said the sheer quantity of explosives made it clear that the attackers intended to deliver "a terrifying
message and to cause panic among the population of Beirut and Lebanon." He added, "It is not
that the perpetrators simply did not care if they killed their fellow citizens. Rather they intended to
do so."
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It was clear that the trial would likely re-open the wounds of the past. In combination with the
civil war raging in neighboring Syria, which has increasingly included the involvement of
Hezbollah, the trial could exacerbate the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian conflict plaguing the Middle East,
with Syria and Lebanon at the center of that conflict. To that latter end, Lebanon was being
plagued with spill-over violence from the Syrian civil war thanks to the active involvement of
Lebanon-based Hezbollah in the Syrian crisis, and as that Shi'ite entity expressly supported the
Assad regime in Syria. The result has been a plague of sectarian violence in the streets of Lebanon.
Going back to late 2013, a car bombing in central Beirut in late December 2013 left Mohamad
Chatah -- an opposition politician and former Lebanese cabinet minister -- dead along with several
others. Blame was placed (at least at the popular level) on Hezbollah. Then, at the start of the
new year (January 2014), a car bomb killed at four people and injured nine others. The area of
the car bombing was a busy shopping area not far from Hezbollah's offices. Because the target
was in the densely populated area of Haret Hreik district of Beirut -- a Hezbollah stronghold of
the city -- suspicion rested on an anti-Hezbollah faction. With Hezbollah -- a Shi'a extremist entity
-- controversially involved in fighting on behalf of the Alawite Assad regime in Syria, there were
suggestions that this particular bombing might be the work of anti-Assad Sunni Islamic militants.
Then, just before the Hariri assassination trial was scheduled to begin, a suicide bomb occurred in
the town of Hermel - a Hezbollah stronghold close to the Bekaa Valley and near to the border with
Syria. That blast killed at least five people, including the suicide bomber, and wounded 20 others.
By the third week of January 2014, a suicide bombing in a residential district of southern Beirut,
known as a Hezbollah stronghold, left four people dead and more than 20 others wounded. A
Twitter account supposedly controlled by the Lebanese branch of the Syrian rebel group, al-Nusra
Front, claimed responsibility for this attack. Around the same time, further signs of spillover
violence from the Syrian civil war flared when fighting resumed in the northern city of Tripoli
between rival factions who support different sides of the Syrian conflict. Then, as January 2014
came to a close, a car bomb exploded in Hermel close to Lebanon's northern border with Syria,
killing at least three people. The area has been known as a Hezbollah stronghold and thus
reinforced the tensions going on within Lebanon and across the border with Syria.
Twin bombings by al-Qaida aligned extremists -On Feb. 19, 2014, twin bombings struck the Lebanese capital city of Beirut. The attacks ensued
in a Hezbollah-controlled southern suburb of Beirut close to an Iranian cultural center. Two
suicide bombers in a car and on a motorcycle respectively detonated the explosives strapped to
their bodies, killing the suicide bombers along with at least two other individuals. Several other
people were injured while massive damage was inflicted on shops and businesses in the vicinity.
The militants Sunni Islamist group, Abdullah Azzam Brigades, which was aligned with the terror
enclave al-Qaida, immediately claimed responsibility for the attacks. Abdullah Azzam Brigades
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also took the opportunity to claim responsibility for the November 2013 attack on the Iranian
embassy in Beirut that killed more than 20 people. Because Iran has been a well-known supporter
and funder of Hezbollah, there were suggestions that the embassy attack was carried out by Sunni
extremists opposed to the Shi'a militant group's engagement in the Syrian war. Now, it was clear
that that speculation was based on merit, especially with these February 2014 twin bombings taking
place in ezbollah stronghold close to an Iranian interest. It should be noted that civilians were the
primary victims in both cases.
Abdullah Azzam Brigades warned of more attacks to come unless Hezbollah withdrew from Syria;
it also demanded that its own fighters be released from jail in Lebanon. Via its website, the
militants Sunni Islamist group said, "We will continue -- through the grace of God and his strength
-- to target Iran and its party in Lebanon (Hezbollah) in all of their security, political, and military
centers to achieve our two demands: One, the exit of all fighters from the Party of Iran in Syria.
Two, the release of all our prisoners from oppressive Lebanese prisons."
The civil war raging in neighboring Syria has increasingly included the involvement of Hezbollah,
exacerbating the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian conflict plaguing the Middle East, with Syria and -increasingly -- neighboring Lebanon at the center of that conflict. To that latter end, thanks to the
active involvement of Lebanon-based Hezbollah in the Syrian crisis, there has been a
counterveiling plague of sectarian violence in the streets of Lebanon. Sunnis aligned with the
opposition in Syria have railed against Hezbollah's alignment with the Assad regime in Syria.
In the Syrian civil war, the rebel groups have not been united. Some groups have been aimed at
overthrowing the Assad regime from office for political reasons, while other Sunni extremist groups
have also sought to oust the Assad regime but for more ideological (read: sectarian) reasons as they
oppose the Shi'a elite that has long ruled Syria. In Lebanon, those dynamics were playing out in
similar form. Some Sunni enclaves were simply sympathetic to the rebel movement in Syria and
opposed to Hezbollah. Meanwhile, some Sunni factions were being motivated by religious
extremist ideology to use tactics of terrorism.
Suicide car bombing in Lebanon close to Syrian border kills three soldiers
A suicide car bombing in late March 2014 at an army checkpoint in Lebanon close to the border
with Syria left three soldiers dead and another four wounded. The attack took place in the town
of Arsal, which was home to a complex population base including thousands of Syrian refugees
and Syrian (Sunni) rebels. The attack in Arsal was thus linked with the civil war rocking Syria.
Indeed, it likely constituted another episode of cross-over violence.
The principal contributor to cross-over violence in Lebanon was the fact that Hezbollah -- a Shi'a
extremist entity based in Lebanon -- was controversially involved in fighting on behalf of the
Alawite Assad regime in Syria. While many Shi'a Lebanese were supportive of Hezbollah's
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engagement in the Syrian civil war, there were other swaths of the Lebanese populace who were
Sunnis and held allegiances instead to the rebel movement in Syria (the fact that some elements of
the Syrian rebel movement were extremist Islamists notwithstanding).
Tensions were already at an elevated level following the capture of the strategic Syrian border town
of Yabroud by the Syrian army earlier in the month. Then as March 2014 was coming to a close,
the Syrian army were making more gains as they captured the Syrian border towns of Flita and
Ras Maara. Collectively, these victories for the Assad regime in Syria likely created consternation
among Sunni antagonists across the border in Lebanon where many Sunni residents were more
sympathetic to the Syrian rebels than the Alawite Assad regime. Now, the attack in Arsal -- for
which the Sunni extremist group Ahrar al-Sunna claimed responsibility -- suggested these tensions
were escalating, and that Sunni militants were becoming increasingly active not only in Syria but
also in Lebanon.
The timing of the Arsal attack was key, coming as it did on the heels of a blustery speech by
Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in which he declared that he was protecting Lebanon by
fighting Sunni militants in Syria. Of course, around the same time, the Lebanese army raided the
house of a Sunni bomb maker in Arsal and killed him. Together, the two incidences were
illustrative of the competing loyalties and ethno-sectarian hostilities at play in Lebanon.
Collectively, the violence in Lebanon highlighted the increased Sunni-Shi'a tensions plaguing the
entire region of the Middle East, with particular attention to Syria, which was in the throes of its
ongoing civil war, and with spill-over violence in neighboring countries like Lebanon.
Attacks in Lebanon suggest continued spill-over sectarian violence from Syria
In June 2014, a suicide bombing in eastern Lebanon left a police officer dead and more than 30
other people injured. That attack was believed to have been an attempted assassination of the
security head, Major General Abbas Ibrahim, who was traveling in the area at the time. Soon
thereafter, Lebanese security forces carried out a raid on a hotel in the capital of Beirut and
arrested more than a dozen individuals who were linked with the attacks in Lebanon.
In the last week of June 2014, there was a suicide car bombing close to an army checkpoint in the
Lebanese capital of Beirut. An officer in Lebanon's General Security forces was killed and more
than a dozen other people were injured. This particular attack took place as people were watching
a football match. Because the attack took place in a southern suburb largely inhabited by Shi'a
Muslims and pro-Hezbollah elements, suspicion rested on Sunni activist lashing out at the Shi'a
militant group, Hezbollah, for its involvement in the Syrian civil war. However, an additional
element was the fact that Sunni terrorists from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
were advancing in Iraq, thus possibly emboldening other Sunni extremists in the region in what was
quickly becoming a regional sectarian conflict.
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Two days after the army checkpoint attack, another suicide bombing took place in Beiruit -- this
time at the Duroy hotel located in close proximity to the Saudi Arabian embassy. The suicide
bomber died in the incident. Several other persons -- mostly security personnel who approached
the assailant as he prepared to detonate the explosives - were wounded. In this case, with the
assailant believed to be a Saudi national and quite likely a Sunni Muslim, the sectarian and
geopolitical dimension was clearly evident.
Spillover violence from the Syrian civil war -Spillover violence from Syria was in late October and early November 2014 arising in Lebanon
where Islamic militants were engaged in battles with Lebanese military forces in the northern city
of Tripoli. Fierce battles went on for days and left Lebanese soldiers, civilians, and Islamic
extremist fighters dead. However, Lebanese authorities were ultimately able to gain the upper hand
and re-assert control over the city. Of concern was the fact that the Islamist militants appeared to
be a mix of Lebanese and Syrian fighters aligned with ISIL and the al-Nusra Front. This
development pointed to a closer alliance between the two extremist entities than previously
thought.
Update
In mid-May 2015, the pro-Assad Syrian military, backed by the Lebanon-based militant based
entity, Hezbollah, appeared to be preparing for a major offensive in the border area between the
two countries. For some time, Hezbollah -- an ally of the Alawite Assad regime -- has been
backing President Assad in Syria, and bolstering the fight against Sunni rebel groups (many of
them of the extremist Islamist type, such as al-Nusra Front) with whom the regime has been
ensconced in a civil war since the start of the Arab Spring in 2011. Now, however, with the Sunni
Islamist rebel groups gaining strength in the region, and with the Qalamoun mountains becoming a
stronghold for Sunni militants and terrorists, joint Syrian military and Lebanese-based Hezbollah
forces were advancing on the area. Their aims were to regain control in strategic areas, such as
Assal al-Ward and Qarna Heights, and to cut off a major supply route for weapons and militants.
It should be noted that some anti-Hezbollah political factions in Lebanon have decried the
operation, warning that it will stimulate violence within Lebanese borders.
Islamic State claims responsibility of attack in Beirut
On Nov. 12, 2015, two suicide bombings rocked the Lebanese capital city of Beirut killing at least
40 people and injuring up to 200 more victims. The body of a third suicide bomber who had not
yet detonated the explosives strapped to his body was also reported at the site of the carnage. It
was the worst episode of terrorist violence in Lebanon since the time of that country's civil war.
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The attacks occurred in a southern suburb of Beirut known to be a stronghold of Lebanon's Shi'a
Islamic militant group, Hezbollah. According to reports from the ground, the attacks were carried
out in succession by suicide bombers at the Mansur shopping plaza and at a storefront in Burj alBarajneh.
Because the bombings occurred in an area known to be controlled by Hezbollah, and because that
Shi'a Islamic militant group has been heavily involved in supporting Bashar al-Assad's regime in
Syria, all expectations were that these attacks were carried out by Sunni Islamists opposed to
Assad. In recent times, there have been several terror attacks in Lebanon, most of which have
been linked with Hezbollah's active military engagement in Syria on behalf of Syrian President
Assad. While there was no shortage of extremist Islamist groups opposed to Assad operating in
Syria, and they have certainly spread over the border into Lebanon, suspicions in this case
quickly rested on actors aligned with the notorious terror group, Islamic State. The Islamist terror
group itself soon confirmed these suspicions by disseminating a claim of responsibility.
Editor's Note:
Collectively, the recent violence in Lebanon has highlighted the increased Sunni-Shi'a tensions
plaguing the entire region of the Middle East, with particular attention to Syria, which was in the
throes of its ongoing civil war, and with spillover violence in neighboring countries like Lebanon.
The civil war raging in neighboring Syria has increasingly included the involvement of Hezbollah,
exacerbating the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian conflict plaguing the Middle East, with Syria and -increasingly -- neighboring Lebanon at the center of that conflict. To that latter end, thanks to the
active involvement of Lebanon-based Hezbollah in the Syrian crisis, there has been a
countervailing plague of sectarian violence in the streets of Lebanon. Sunnis aligned with the
opposition in Syria have railed against Hezbollah's alignment with the Assad regime in Syria.
In the Syrian civil war, the rebel groups have not been united. Some groups have been aimed at
overthrowing the Assad regime from office for political reasons, while other Sunni extremist groups
have also sought to oust the Assad regime but for more ideological (read: sectarian) reasons as they
oppose the Shi'a elite that has long ruled Syria. In Lebanon, those dynamics were playing out in
similar form. Some Sunni enclaves were simply sympathetic to the rebel movement in Syria and
opposed to Hezbollah. Meanwhile, some Sunni factions were being motivated by religious
extremist ideology to use tactics of terrorism. Of particular note was the November 2015
bombings in a southern suburb of Beirut for which the notorious terror enclave, Islamic State,
claimed responsibility.
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Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, www.countrywatch.com .
Bibliography for list of general research sources.
See
National Security
External Threats
Both Syria and Israel became heavily involved in Lebanon's internal affairs during its lengthy civil
war. In 1976, Syrian forces intervened on behalf of the Maronite Christian faction. Largely
motivated by concerns over the increasingly chaotic conditions there, Israel invaded Lebanonin
1982. Soon after, Syrian and Israeli forces began to clash in eastern Lebanon. In 1984, the bulk of
Israeli troops departed. Syriaremained active in the region. Initially, the Syrian government
attempted to reconcile differences amongst warring factions in Lebanon. During a March September 1989 outbreak of hostilities between Christian and Muslim elements in Lebanon,
however, Syriaactively supported the latter. The 1989 Taif Accord effectively brought an end to
factional fighting in Lebanonand its civil war officially ended two years later.
Relations between Lebanon and Israelremain strained. Likewise, by virtue of its ongoing presence
in Lebanon, Syriahas incurred the enmity of certain elements there. As of September 2003,
Lebanon and Israelwere still officially at war, though open engagements between their respective
forces have seldom occurred over the course of the last two decades.
In April 1996, Israel initiated a 16-day military operation in Lebanon in response to rocket strikes
in Northern Israel launched by the Lebanese extremist organization Hezbollah. Hundreds of
thousands of Lebanese fled their homes during the conflict. Israeli troops withdrew from South
Lebanon and the Bekka Valleyin May 2000. The Lebanese government continues to take issue
with the Israeli occupation of a section of the Golan Heights known as Sheba Farms. Lebanese ties
to anti-Israeli extremist organizations also continue to exacerbate tension between the two countries
(see below section on terrorism).
In 2006, the leader of Lebanon-based Hizbollah (also known as Hezbollah) announced that his
militant Islamic group had captured two Israeli soldiers. Refusing to negotiate with Hizbollah,
which it has regarded as a terrorist enclave, the Israeli government decided to respond with a
strong military offensive in Lebanon -- both in response to Hizbollah's actions, and also for the
purpose of finding the two captured soldiers. Israel also warned that it would hold Lebanon
responsible for the fates of the two captured soldiers and it characterized the actions of LebanonLebanon Review 2017
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based Hizbollah as an "act of war." Israel's promise of "painful" and "far-reaching" consequences
was issued just as its forces launched an assault on Lebanon, which left several Israeli troops and
Lebanese civilians dead, even as infrastructure and Hezbollah interests were attacked within
Lebanon. Meanwhile, Hizbollah launched systematic attacks on Israel, reaching towns inside the
border and leading to the deaths of several Israelis. The situation intensified into a kind of
undeclared war. Please see "Political Conditions" for details about this crisis.
Contrary to one of the Taif Accord's principle objectives, Syria maintained a substantial armed
presence in Lebanon. In 2004, Syria began the withdrawal of some of its 16,000 troops that were
in Lebanondue to the Al-Ta'if agreement. Subsequently, a full withdrawal of the Syrian troops
ensued.
Crime
Lebanonhas a moderate crime rate, including incidents of theft and burglary. Also, small quantities
of South American narcotics transit the country en route to destinations in Europe and the Middle
East. Opium and cannabis are cultivated there on a limited scale.
Insurgencies
Lebanon's devastating 16-year civil war officially ended in 1991. Generally stable conditions have
prevailed and much of the country's shattered infrastructure has been rebuilt since the cessation of
hostilities. Two issues in particular threaten Lebanon's fragile state of harmony, however. The
sectarian hostilities that sparked and perpetuated its lengthy internal conflict still linger. Second and
related to the first reason, Druze and Christian elements in Lebanon have begun to demand the
withdrawal of Syrian troops, who have been in Lebanonfor nearly three decades. During an
outbreak of factional violence there in the late 1980s, the Syrians supported Lebanese Muslims.
Since the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri -- a noted politician
with an anti-Syrian orientation -- Lebanon has slowly retrenched into a state of dissonance. The
period saw short-term transformation when the Cedar Revolution swept pro-Western and antiSyrian factions to power at the polls later that year, along with the withdrawal of Syrian troops
from Lebanon. However, since that time, political stability has devolved, as exemplified by a
spate of political assassinations blamed on pro-Syrian elements. As well, Lebanon was the main
venue of violent conflict during the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel. In recent times, the
country has been caught in a political deadlock and intransigence over presidential succession,
largely due to prevailing acrimony between pro-Syrian/pro-Hezbollah factions and proreform/Western-backed members in the Lebanese parliament. The establishment of the May 2008
Doha Agreement was intended to end the political impasse and move the country forward.
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Terrorism
Several extremist organizations that have historically used terrorism to further their political
agendas continued to maintain a presence in Lebanon. Hezbollah emerged there in 1982 with the
objective of driving Israeli forces out of the country. Throughout its existence, it has continued to
perpetrate terrorist attacks against Israeli and U.S. targets in Lebanonand elsewhere. Amongst its
more significant acts of violence were the bombings of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in
1983 and the U.S.embassy annex there in 1984. The U.S. Department of State reports that group
members may have arrived in Iraqin 2003. Outside of Hezbollah, several pro-Palestinian
organizations also maintain a presence in Lebanon, including HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PLFP-GC), and the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP).
Lebanonis party to eleven of the twelve of the international conventions and protocols pertaining to
terrorism.
Editor's Note:
Since the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri -- a noted politician with an
anti-Syrian orientation -- Lebanon has slowly retrenched into a state of dissonance. The period saw
short-term transformation when the Cedar Revolution swept pro-Western and anti-Syrian factions
to power at the polls later that year, along with the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon for a
three-decade long presence in that country. While the Cedar Revolution was viewed as the
dawning of a new day in Lebanon, the aftermath was not so pleasant. Political stability devolved,
as exemplified by a spate of political assassinations, which were blamed on pro-Syrian elements.
As well, Lebanon was the main venue of violent conflict during the 2006 war between Hezbollah
and Israel. In recent times, the country has been caught in a political deadlock and intransigence
over presidential succession, largely due to prevailing acrimony between pro-Syrian/pro-Hezbollah
factions and pro-reform/Western-backed members in the Lebanese parliament. The establishment
of the May 2008 Doha Agreement was intended to end the political impasse and move the country
forward. The opening of corresponding embassies in Beirut and Damascus in 2009 was viewed as
a step not only towards positive bilateral engagement, but also towards greater stability in Lebanon.
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Defense Forces
Military Data
Military Branches:
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF): Army, Navy, and Air Force
Eligible age to enter service:
17-30 years of age for voluntary; 18-24 years of age for officer candidates
Mandatory Service Terms:
No conscription
Manpower in general population-fit for military service:
males age 16-49: 920,825
females age 16-49: 941,806
Manpower reaching eligible age annually:
male: 36,856
femaie: 35,121
Military Expenditures-Percent of GDP:
4.04%
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Chapter 3
Economic Overview
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Economic Overview
Overview
Unlike many of its Middle Eastern neighbors, Lebanon does not have petroleum reserves and has
few natural resources. However, with its high literacy rate and traditional mercantile culture,
Lebanon has been an important commercial hub for the region. The country has an experienced,
financially sound banking system and resilient small-to medium-scale manufacturers.
Lebanon suffered a bloody civil war from 1975 to 1991 that seriously damaged its economy. The
country embarked on a massive reconstruction program in 1992 to rebuild the physical and social
infrastructure. The government borrowed heavily to rebuild the economy and as a result, has
accumulated large public debt. Moreover, the country lies at the crossroads of regional political
tensions that often affect its economic developments, such as the conflict with Israel in the summer
of 2006.
In the aftermath of the 2006 conflict with Israel, the Lebanese government developed a
comprehensive economic reform program supported by the international community, including the
Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) under the IMF. In the context of an improved
political and security situation, Lebanon has started to reap the benefits of prudent macroeconomic
policies, having met the two key objectives of EPCA – reducing the government debt and
strengthening international reserves. These achievements have enhanced confidence and economic
activity. The Lebanese economy has been remarkably resilient to shocks, with the global economic
crisis having only a limited impact on it. But the country still faces a serious vulnerability of high
government debt (among the highest in the world), and risks from the possible confluence of
domestic political uncertainty and regional instability. The formation of the government of national
unity in late 2009 opened a new window of opportunity for reinvigorating economic reforms,
including addressing the main vulnerabilities of the economy. In general, political stability following
the Doha Accord of 2008 helped boost tourism and, combined with a solid banking sector, led to
the country posting strong GDP growth in 2009 and 2010 despite a regional slowdown. However,
Lebanon was not immune to regional and domestic political unrest in 2010 and early 2011. Still,
the country was expected to perform better than Syria and Jordan although the entire region was
expected to grow below trend. The collapse of the government in early 2011 over its backing of the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon and unrest in neighboring Syria slowed economic growth after four
years of strong average growth By mid-2011, Lebanon’s new prime minister, Najib Mikati, had
announced a long-delayed cabinet that was dominated by Hezbollah. The new government was
formed after five months of political stalemate that had impacted both the country's 2010 and 2011
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budgets and held up $2 billion in infrastructure projects. In September 2011, the Cabinet endorsed
a bill that would provide $1.2 billion in funding to improve Lebanon's battered electricity sector,
but fiscal limitations would test the government's ability to invest in other areas, such as water.
Overall, Lebanon's economy is believed to have slowed sharply in 2011, partly because of the
Syrian crisis. Foreign direct investment declined to $4 billion in 2011 from $4.8 billion a year
earlier, according to Nabil Itani, head of the government's Investment Development Authority of
Lebanon (IDAL). But in another example of the government's disorganized state, obtaining
reliable data on the slowdown has been difficult.
In January 2012, pressure from labor unions led to the government’s decision to boost the
minimum wage by 35 percent, the first increase since 2008. The IMF questioned the decision,
saying a big wage hike would eat up a lot of resources that might have been used to create new
jobs. By July 2012, it was clear that the turmoil related to the uprising in neighboring Syria and the
continuous conflict among Lebanese politicians were taking its toll on Lebanon. Investors – many
from wealthy Arab Gulf States – were putting their investment plans for Lebanon on hold or
reevaluating their strategies in the country. Credit rating agency Moody's Investors Service said
decreasing confidence in Lebanon's ruling coalition could prevent the government from pushing
through much-needed budget reforms. “The spread of popular unrest in Syria threatens the existing
economic and political frameworks in Lebanon,” Moody's said in an email to Reuters.
In 2013, Lebanon's economy was still seeing negative impact from the civil war in neighboring
Syria. But on the positive side, the total size of the country's foreign reserves had held up. As of
September 2013, the central bank reported that it was running more than $36 billion of liquid
foreign assets. Bank officials predicted the country would see 2 to 2.5 percent growth for the year
with inflation below 4 percent.
Also in September 2013, Lebanon’s central bank revealed it had shed about $5 billion worth of the
government’s international bonds portfolio over the course of the year in an effort to boost its
foreign currency liquidity. Overall, growth decelerated in 2013 as traditional drivers of growth —
real estate-related activity, construction and tourism—were impacted by increasing uncertainty and
worsening security. Inflation appeared contained, though there were reportedly pressures on
housing prices. The external current account deficit remained large.
By mid-2014, it was clear that the crisis in Syria was continuing to have a dramatic impact on
Lebanon. The refugee influx, according to United Nations figures, had reached one quarter of the
population, fueling already high unemployment and poverty, and straining local communities and
public services. The crisis has further exacerbated domestic political uncertainties. The term of the
president ended in May 2014, and the presidential vacuum was disrupting efforts to pass
legislation, including a salary increase for the public sector. Parliamentary elections in November
(already postponed from June 2013) added to uncertainty.
Meanwhile, fiscal imbalances had widened. The primary fiscal position deteriorated 2013,
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reflecting cyclical factors. Hosting the large refugee population was adding to fiscal strains. As a
result, public debt—already one of the highest in the world as a share of GDP—has been on an
upward trajectory since 2012, reaching 141 percent of GDP in 2013.
Without a resolution in Syria, economic performance was expected to remain weak, with high
downside risks from a further weakening of public finances and delays in structural reforms.
Growth is likely to be subdued in 2014, reflecting domestic and regional uncertainties, and return
only gradually to potential.
In mid-June 2014, Lebanon was considering increasing an $800 million economic stimulus package
allocated for the year because most of the funds had already been used up, according to Reuters.
The central bank had already introduced a $1.4 billion stimulus package in 2013 and the additional
aid for 2014. The stimulus packages comprised low borrowing rates for housing and new projects,
including for renewable energy, and extended loan terms for small and medium-sized businesses.
Tourism and construction in the country had suffered, with the violence and unrest deterring
visitors and investors.
Economic activity in Lebanon picked up in the second half of 2014. Stronger economic
performance and lower oil prices pushed real GDP growth upwards in 2014, led by private
demand. Renewed improvement in security conditions in the first quarter of 2015 as well as the
launch of dialogue between opposing political parties were likely to positively impact consumer and
investor confidence, noted the World Bank in its Spring report. In addition, continuously low oil
prices were expected to have a positive net impact on the economy. As a result, real GDP growth
was projected to further accelerate in 2015.
In June 2015, Fitch Ratings affirmed Lebanon's Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDR) at 'B' with a negative outlook. Fitch said the ratings continued to capture
political risks exacerbated by the Syrian conflict, as well as very weak public finances, an
increasingly costly funding structure and weak economic performance relative to peers. On the
positive side, Lebanon did have strong external liquidity, continued non-resident deposit inflows
and other structural strengths. Still, political risks remained. The country had been operating
without a president since May 2014 as a result of multiple failed attempts to reach a necessary
quorum in parliament. General government debt was the third highest among Fitch-rated
sovereigns.
In July 2016, Fitch Ratings downgraded Lebanon's long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs to
'B-' from 'B' with stable outlooks. Persistent political risks exacerbated by the ongoing Syrian war,
very weak public finances and an anemic economic performance were behind the downgrade,
Reuters reported. Also, negative spillover effects from the Syrian war had gradually taken more of
a toll on Lebanon's economy and political scene, placing an increasing strain on the sovereign's
creditworthiness. As such, public finances were very weak. General government debt was the third
highest among Fitch-rated sovereigns at an estimated 136.7 percent of GDP in 2015. On the
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positive side the banking system was still attracting sufficient deposits to fund government
borrowing while ensuring moderate growth of credit to the resident private sector.
Meanwhile, political risks remained persistently high. Lebanon had been without a president since
May 2014. Looking ahead, Fitch expected real GDP growth to remain below 2 percent in 2016,
with no major improvement in growth prospects before the end of the Syrian conflict. The number
of Syrian refugees in Lebanon remained very substantial at well over 1 million, relative to a
previous total population of around 4.5 million.
Still, by September 2016, Lebanon’s central bank Governor Riad Salameh said that the country’s
economy remained resilient. He told Bloomberg that measures taken during the year to boost
liquidity had put the economy in a better position. Foreign reserves were at a record high over $40
billion, the currency was stable and liquidity was adequate, he said.
Updated in 2016
Supplementary Sources: Roubini Global Economics, Bloomberg, World Bank and Reuters
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2008
36067.950000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2009
39133.720000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2010
41873.078228
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Name
Unit
Year
Value
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2011
44678.695555
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2012
44993.804790
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
9.272508
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
8.499999
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
7.000000
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
0.908354
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
0.705278
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
38018.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
41659.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
44672.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
53596.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
51590.210692
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
6686.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
7384.000000
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Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
7999.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
7555.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
7789.486093
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
13810.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
18063.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
18986.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
16157.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
19149.935530
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2008
11077.000000
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2009
10728.000000
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2010
8.232172
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2011
14.517675
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 225 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Lebanon Review 2017
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2012
24.911608
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2008
24244.000000
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2009
25183.000000
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2010
18.641459
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2011
25.720170
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2012
33.983224
Page 226 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Nominal GDP and Components
Nominal GDP and Components
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2008
45345.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2009
52649.010000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2010
55965.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2011
60419.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2012
65131.682000
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
20.046064
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
16.107619
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
7.138754
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
5.443280
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
7.800000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2008
4.170000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2009
4.200000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2010
4.341092
Population, total (million)
Millions
2011
4.383000
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 227 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Population, total (million)
Millions
2012
4.425000
Population growth (%)
%
2008
0.771958
Population growth (%)
%
2009
0.719164
Population growth (%)
%
2010
2.217322
Population growth (%)
%
2011
0.967519
Population growth (%)
%
2012
0.958247
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2008
10882.160000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2009
12544.470000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2010
8.551852
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2011
13784850.558977
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2012
14719024.180791
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2008
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2009
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2010
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2011
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2012
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 228 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Government Spending and Taxation
Government Spending and Taxation
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
6686.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
7384.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
7999.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
7555.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
7789.486093
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
13.489120
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
14.549671
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
6.399999
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
2.680333
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
15.630321
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2008
20.926823
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2009
22.243608
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 229 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2010
6.523417
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2011
22.788981
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2012
22.204038
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2008
9489.270000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2009
11711.040000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2010
3650.830664
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2011
13768.875000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2012
14461.864000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
-4413.020000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
-4335.570000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
4348.169335
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
-3578.267000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
-5596.692000
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 230 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2008
8.445000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2009
7.335000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2010
-7.769444
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2011
-5.922420
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2012
-8.592887
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 231 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2008
103424.000000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2009
123718.560000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2010
138694.683000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2011
146282.664000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2012
156478.806000
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
14.775575
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
19.622676
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
12.104999
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
5.470996
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
6.970164
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2008
0.022113
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2009
0.010634
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2010
0.129677
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2011
4.494104
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 232 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2012
7.045034
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2008
9.964166
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2009
9.568333
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2010
8.336666
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2011
7.527500
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2012
7.249166
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2008
50.700000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2009
50.700000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2010
8.899999
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2011
6.154076
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2012
6.591581
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 233 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2008
1507.500000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2009
1507.500000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2010
1507.500000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2011
1507.610539
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2012
1476.908888
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2008
-13167.000000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2009
-14455.000000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2010
-10.409286
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2011
-11.202495
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2012
-9.071616
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 234 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The Balance of Payments
The Balance of Payments
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Current Account
$US Billions
2008
-4.110000
Current Account
$US Billions
2009
-6.750000
Current Account
$US Billions
2010
-7.470000
Current Account
$US Billions
2011
-4.170000
Current Account
$US Billions
2012
-6.160000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2008
11.440000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2009
15.600000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2010
9.880000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2011
6.390000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2012
1.700000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2008
7.340000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2009
8.860000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2010
2.420000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2011
2.230000
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 235 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2012
-4.460000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2008
20.250000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2009
29.110000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2010
44.475630
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2011
47.859469
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2012
52.530986
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2008
-0.000006
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2009
-0.000008
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2010
-0.000008
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2011
-0.000004
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2012
-0.008799
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 236 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2008
36067.950000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2009
39133.720000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2010
41873.078228
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2011
44678.695555
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2012
44993.804790
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
9.272508
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
8.499999
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
7.000000
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
0.908354
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
0.705278
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
38018.000000
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 237 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
41659.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
44672.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
53596.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
51590.210692
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
6686.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
7384.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
7999.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
7555.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
7789.486093
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
13810.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
18063.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
18986.000000
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 238 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
16157.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
19149.935530
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2008
11077.000000
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2009
10728.000000
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2010
8.232172
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2011
14.517675
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2012
24.911608
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2008
24244.000000
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2009
25183.000000
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2010
18.641459
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2011
25.720170
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2012
33.983224
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 239 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Nominal GDP and Components
Nominal GDP and Components
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2008
45345.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2009
52649.010000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2010
55965.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2011
60419.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2012
65131.682000
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
20.046064
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
16.107619
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
7.138754
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
5.443280
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
7.800000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2008
4.170000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2009
4.200000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2010
4.341092
Population, total (million)
Millions
2011
4.383000
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 240 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Population, total (million)
Millions
2012
4.425000
Population growth (%)
%
2008
0.771958
Population growth (%)
%
2009
0.719164
Population growth (%)
%
2010
2.217322
Population growth (%)
%
2011
0.967519
Population growth (%)
%
2012
0.958247
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2008
10882.160000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2009
12544.470000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2010
8.551852
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2011
13784850.558977
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2012
14719024.180791
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2008
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2009
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2010
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2011
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2012
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 241 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Government Spending and Taxation
Government Spending and Taxation
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
6686.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
7384.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
7999.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
7555.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
7789.486093
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
13.489120
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
14.549671
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
6.399999
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
2.680333
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
15.630321
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2008
20.926823
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2009
22.243608
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 242 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2010
6.523417
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2011
22.788981
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2012
22.204038
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2008
9489.270000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2009
11711.040000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2010
3650.830664
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2011
13768.875000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2012
14461.864000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
-4413.020000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
-4335.570000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
4348.169335
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
-3578.267000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
-5596.692000
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 243 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2008
8.445000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2009
7.335000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2010
-7.769444
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2011
-5.922420
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2012
-8.592887
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 244 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2008
103424.000000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2009
123718.560000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2010
138694.683000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2011
146282.664000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2012
156478.806000
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
14.775575
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
19.622676
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
12.104999
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
5.470996
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
6.970164
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2008
0.022113
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2009
0.010634
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2010
0.129677
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2011
4.494104
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 245 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2012
7.045034
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2008
9.964166
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2009
9.568333
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2010
8.336666
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2011
7.527500
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2012
7.249166
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2008
50.700000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2009
50.700000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2010
8.899999
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2011
6.154076
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2012
6.591581
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 246 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2008
1507.500000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2009
1507.500000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2010
1507.500000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2011
1507.610539
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2012
1476.908888
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2008
-13167.000000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2009
-14455.000000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2010
-10.409286
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2011
-11.202495
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2012
-9.071616
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 247 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The Balance of Payments
The Balance of Payments
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Current Account
$US Billions
2008
-4.110000
Current Account
$US Billions
2009
-6.750000
Current Account
$US Billions
2010
-7.470000
Current Account
$US Billions
2011
-4.170000
Current Account
$US Billions
2012
-6.160000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2008
11.440000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2009
15.600000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2010
9.880000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2011
6.390000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2012
1.700000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2008
7.340000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2009
8.860000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2010
2.420000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2011
2.230000
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 248 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2012
-4.460000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2008
20.250000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2009
29.110000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2010
44.475630
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2011
47.859469
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2012
52.530986
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2008
-0.000006
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2009
-0.000008
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2010
-0.000008
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2011
-0.000004
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2012
-0.008799
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 249 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2008
36067.950000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2009
39133.720000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2010
41873.078228
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2011
44678.695555
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2012
44993.804790
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
9.272508
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
8.499999
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
7.000000
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
0.908354
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
0.705278
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
38018.000000
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 250 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
41659.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
44672.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
53596.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
51590.210692
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
6686.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
7384.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
7999.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
7555.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
7789.486093
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
13810.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
18063.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
18986.000000
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 251 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
16157.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
19149.935530
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2008
11077.000000
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2009
10728.000000
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2010
8.232172
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2011
14.517675
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2012
24.911608
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2008
24244.000000
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2009
25183.000000
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2010
18.641459
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2011
25.720170
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2012
33.983224
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 252 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Nominal GDP and Components
Nominal GDP and Components
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2008
45345.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2009
52649.010000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2010
55965.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2011
60419.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2012
65131.682000
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
20.046064
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
16.107619
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
7.138754
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
5.443280
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
7.800000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2008
4.170000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2009
4.200000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2010
4.341092
Population, total (million)
Millions
2011
4.383000
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 253 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Population, total (million)
Millions
2012
4.425000
Population growth (%)
%
2008
0.771958
Population growth (%)
%
2009
0.719164
Population growth (%)
%
2010
2.217322
Population growth (%)
%
2011
0.967519
Population growth (%)
%
2012
0.958247
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2008
10882.160000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2009
12544.470000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2010
8.551852
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2011
13784850.558977
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2012
14719024.180791
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2008
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2009
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2010
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2011
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2012
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 254 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Government Spending and Taxation
Government Spending and Taxation
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
6686.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
7384.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
7999.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
7555.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
7789.486093
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
13.489120
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
14.549671
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
6.399999
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
2.680333
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
15.630321
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2008
20.926823
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2009
22.243608
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 255 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2010
6.523417
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2011
22.788981
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2012
22.204038
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2008
9489.270000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2009
11711.040000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2010
3650.830664
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2011
13768.875000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2012
14461.864000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
-4413.020000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
-4335.570000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
4348.169335
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
-3578.267000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
-5596.692000
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 256 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2008
8.445000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2009
7.335000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2010
-7.769444
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2011
-5.922420
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2012
-8.592887
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 257 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2008
103424.000000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2009
123718.560000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2010
138694.683000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2011
146282.664000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2012
156478.806000
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
14.775575
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
19.622676
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
12.104999
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
5.470996
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
6.970164
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2008
0.022113
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2009
0.010634
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2010
0.129677
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2011
4.494104
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 258 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2012
7.045034
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2008
9.964166
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2009
9.568333
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2010
8.336666
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2011
7.527500
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2012
7.249166
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2008
50.700000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2009
50.700000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2010
8.899999
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2011
6.154076
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2012
6.591581
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 259 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2008
1507.500000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2009
1507.500000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2010
1507.500000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2011
1507.610539
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2012
1476.908888
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2008
-13167.000000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2009
-14455.000000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2010
-10.409286
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2011
-11.202495
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2012
-9.071616
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 260 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The Balance of Payments
The Balance of Payments
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Current Account
$US Billions
2008
-4.110000
Current Account
$US Billions
2009
-6.750000
Current Account
$US Billions
2010
-7.470000
Current Account
$US Billions
2011
-4.170000
Current Account
$US Billions
2012
-6.160000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2008
11.440000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2009
15.600000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2010
9.880000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2011
6.390000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2012
1.700000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2008
7.340000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2009
8.860000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2010
2.420000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2011
2.230000
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 261 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2012
-4.460000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2008
20.250000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2009
29.110000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2010
44.475630
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2011
47.859469
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2012
52.530986
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2008
-0.000006
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2009
-0.000008
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2010
-0.000008
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2011
-0.000004
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2012
-0.008799
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 262 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2008
36067.950000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2009
39133.720000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2010
41873.078228
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2011
44678.695555
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
£L
billions
2012
44993.804790
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
9.272508
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
8.499999
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
7.000000
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
0.908354
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
0.705278
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
38018.000000
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 263 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
41659.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
44672.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
53596.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
51590.210692
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
6686.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
7384.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
7999.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
7555.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
7789.486093
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
13810.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
18063.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
18986.000000
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 264 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
16157.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
19149.935530
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2008
11077.000000
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2009
10728.000000
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2010
8.232172
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2011
14.517675
Exports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2012
24.911608
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2008
24244.000000
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2009
25183.000000
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2010
18.641459
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2011
25.720170
Imports ($US billions)
£L
billions
2012
33.983224
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 265 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Nominal GDP and Components
Nominal GDP and Components
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2008
45345.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2009
52649.010000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2010
55965.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2011
60419.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
£L billions
2012
65131.682000
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
20.046064
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
16.107619
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
7.138754
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
5.443280
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
7.800000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2008
4.170000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2009
4.200000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2010
4.341092
Population, total (million)
Millions
2011
4.383000
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 266 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Population, total (million)
Millions
2012
4.425000
Population growth (%)
%
2008
0.771958
Population growth (%)
%
2009
0.719164
Population growth (%)
%
2010
2.217322
Population growth (%)
%
2011
0.967519
Population growth (%)
%
2012
0.958247
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2008
10882.160000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2009
12544.470000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2010
8.551852
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2011
13784850.558977
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
£L thousands
2012
14719024.180791
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2008
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2009
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2010
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2011
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2012
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 267 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Government Spending and Taxation
Government Spending and Taxation
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
6686.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
7384.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
7999.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
7555.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
7789.486093
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
13.489120
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
14.549671
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
6.399999
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
2.680333
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
15.630321
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2008
20.926823
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2009
22.243608
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 268 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2010
6.523417
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2011
22.788981
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2012
22.204038
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2008
9489.270000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2009
11711.040000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2010
3650.830664
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2011
13768.875000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2012
14461.864000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2008
-4413.020000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2009
-4335.570000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2010
4348.169335
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2011
-3578.267000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
£L
billions
2012
-5596.692000
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 269 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2008
8.445000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2009
7.335000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2010
-7.769444
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2011
-5.922420
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2012
-8.592887
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 270 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2008
103424.000000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2009
123718.560000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2010
138694.683000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2011
146282.664000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
£L billions
2012
156478.806000
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
14.775575
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
19.622676
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
12.104999
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
5.470996
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
6.970164
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2008
0.022113
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2009
0.010634
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2010
0.129677
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2011
4.494104
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 271 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2012
7.045034
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2008
9.964166
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2009
9.568333
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2010
8.336666
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2011
7.527500
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2012
7.249166
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2008
50.700000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2009
50.700000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2010
8.899999
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2011
6.154076
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2012
6.591581
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 272 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2008
1507.500000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2009
1507.500000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2010
1507.500000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2011
1507.610539
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
£L/$
2012
1476.908888
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2008
-13167.000000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2009
-14455.000000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2010
-10.409286
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2011
-11.202495
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2012
-9.071616
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 273 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The Balance of Payments
The Balance of Payments
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Current Account
$US Billions
2008
-4.110000
Current Account
$US Billions
2009
-6.750000
Current Account
$US Billions
2010
-7.470000
Current Account
$US Billions
2011
-4.170000
Current Account
$US Billions
2012
-6.160000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2008
11.440000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2009
15.600000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2010
9.880000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2011
6.390000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2012
1.700000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2008
7.340000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2009
8.860000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2010
2.420000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2011
2.230000
Lebanon Review 2017
Page 274 of 463 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2012
-4.460000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2008
20.250000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2009
29.110000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2010
44.475630
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2011
47.859469
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2012
52.530986
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2008
-0.000006
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2009
-0.000008
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2010
-0.000008
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2011
-0.000004
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2012
-0.008799
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Economic Performance Index
Economic Performance Index
The Economic Performance rankings are calculated by CountryWatch's editorial team, and are
based on criteria including sustained economic growth, monetary stability, current account deficits,
budget surplus, unemployment and structural imbalances. Scores are assessed from 0 to 100 using
this aforementioned criteria as well as CountryWatch's proprietary economic research data and
models.
Bank
stability
risk
Monetary/
Currency
stability
Government
Finances
Empl./
Unempl.
Econ.GNP
growth or
decline/
forecast
0 - 100
0 - 100
0 - 100
0 - 100
%
North Americas
Canada
92
69
35
38
3.14%
United States
94
76
4
29
3.01%
Austria
90
27
30
63
1.33%
Belgium
88
27
19
23
1.15%
Cyprus
81
91
16
80
-0.69%
Denmark
97
70
45
78
1.20%
Finland
89
27
41
33
1.25%
Western Europe
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France
87
27
18
27
1.52%
Germany
86
27
22
21
1.25%
Greece
79
27
5
24
-2.00%
Iceland
90
17
2
34
-3.04%
Italy
85
27
37
24
0.84%
Ireland
92
27
11
10
-1.55%
Luxembourg
99
27
28
66
2.08%
Malta
77
27
41
51
0.54%
Netherlands
91
27
26
74
1.30%
Norway
98
44
10
76
1.08%
Portugal
77
27
13
20
0.29%
Spain
83
27
9
3
-0.41%
Sweden
94
72
54
32
1.23%
Switzerland
97
86
55
77
1.53%
United Kingdom
85
12
9
37
1.34%
Albania
44
60
33
6
2.30%
Armenia
45
59
49
30
1.80%
Central and
Eastern Europe
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Azerbaijan
56
4
84
99
2.68%
Belarus
59
21
83
98
2.41%
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
34
68
69
N/A
0.50%
Bulgaria
58
75
88
49
0.20%
Croatia
69
68
94
9
0.18%
Czech Republic
80
89
29
70
1.67%
Estonia
72
90
66
92
0.80%
Georgia
36
60
53
56
2.00%
Hungary
70
66
26
54
-0.16%
Latvia
67
100
65
44
-3.97%
Lithuania
65
91
87
79
-1.65%
Macedonia (FYR)
53
69
56
2
2.03%
Moldova
23
36
81
67
2.50%
Poland
74
74
38
12
2.72%
Romania
62
56
70
62
0.75%
Russia
73
18
90
8
4.00%
Serbia
48
49
52
5
1.97%
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Montenegro
39
27
73
1
-1.70%
Slovak Republic
80
62
30
14
4.06%
Slovenia
81
27
36
65
1.12%
Ukraine
41
11
57
N/A
3.68%
Algeria
57
18
96
7
4.55%
Angola
49
1
97
N/A
7.05%
Benin
19
91
20
N/A
3.22%
Botswana
68
58
76
N/A
6.33%
Burkina Faso
16
91
13
N/A
4.41%
Burundi
2
91
6
N/A
3.85%
Cameroon
26
91
91
N/A
2.58%
Cape Verde
52
87
4
N/A
4.96%
Central African
Republic
9
91
32
N/A
3.18%
Chad
22
91
89
N/A
4.42%
Congo
52
87
87
N/A
12.13%
Côte d’Ivoire
25
91
82
28
2.98%
Africa
Dem. Republic
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Congo
4
91
47
N/A
5.44%
Djibouti
31
76
50
N/A
4.47%
Egypt
37
20
24
69
5.01%
Equatorial Guinea
82
91
85
N/A
0.94%
Eritrea
1
3
1
18
1.81%
Ethiopia
6
45
8
N/A
6.96%
Gabon
64
91
96
N/A
5.36%
Gambia
8
48
86
N/A
4.82%
Ghana
9
11
69
N/A
4.50%
Guinea
10
7
91
N/A
3.03%
Guinea-Bissau
5
91
46
N/A
3.47%
Kenya
20
41
59
N/A
4.11%
Lesotho
13
40
12
N/A
2.98%
Liberia
12
73
74
N/A
5.92%
Libya
73
2
94
N/A
5.22%
Madagascar
4
22
24
N/A
-1.02%
Malawi
7
25
55
N/A
5.96%
Mali
20
91
82
N/A
5.12%
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Mauritania
15
13
93
N/A
4.58%
Mauritius
65
52
56
55
4.10%
Morocco
37
72
48
26
3.23%
Mozambique
12
23
71
N/A
6.45%
Namibia
40
39
62
N/A
1.70%
Niger
10
91
21
N/A
4.41%
Nigeria
30
6
61
N/A
6.98%
Rwanda
21
40
68
N/A
5.39%
Sao Tome &
Principe
1
61
100
N/A
3.40%
Senegal
24
91
63
N/A
3.44%
Seychelles
60
67
97
N/A
4.01%
Sierra Leone
5
10
39
N/A
4.77%
Somalia
2
38
59
N/A
3.19%
South Africa
61
37
70
N/A
2.59%
Sudan
16
5
73
N/A
5.52%
Swaziland
32
44
79
N/A
1.09%
Tanzania
15
45
32
N/A
6.17%
Togo
8
91
92
N/A
2.56%
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Tunisia
50
61
44
39
4.00%
Uganda
11
17
54
N/A
5.59%
Zambia
29
20
49
N/A
5.84%
Zimbabwe
0
8
16
N/A
2.24%
Argentina
66
3
80
36
3.50%
Belize
47
76
80
N/A
1.00%
Bolivia
32
51
61
81
3.99%
Brazil
71
47
78
11
5.50%
Chile
78
25
92
73
4.72%
Columbia
47
52
34
47
2.25%
Costa Rica
60
42
39
57
3.45%
Ecuador
43
76
75
64
2.51%
El Salvador
35
76
67
N/A
1.04%
Guatemala
46
59
58
N/A
2.52%
Honduras
27
47
58
N/A
2.00%
Mexico
69
42
52
61
4.07%
Nicaragua
23
49
42
N/A
1.75%
South and
Central America
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Panama
66
76
72
45
5.00%
Paraguay
35
46
66
16
5.27%
Peru
59
66
75
22
6.33%
Suriname
58
26
81
59
4.02%
Uruguay
70
26
27
N/A
5.71%
Venezuela
55
1
28
13
-2.63%
Antigua & Barbuda
72
76
15
N/A
-2.01%
Bahamas
74
76
45
87
-0.50%
Barbados
67
76
33
15
-0.50%
Caribbean
Bermuda
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Cuba
45
76
18
95
0.25%
Dominica
53
76
65
N/A
1.40%
Dominican Republic
54
39
43
4
3.50%
Grenada
63
76
48
N/A
0.80%
Guyana
28
56
17
N/A
4.36%
Haiti
11
27
89
N/A
-8.50%
Jamaica
42
9
85
19
-0.28%
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St Lucia
55
76
67
N/A
1.14%
St Vincent &
Grenadines
49
76
95
N/A
0.50%
Trinidad & Tobago
82
37
77
72
2.13%
Bahrain
84
76
62
91
3.48%
Iran
51
19
40
58
3.01%
Iraq
48
9
8
N/A
7.27%
Israel
87
62
12
48
3.20%
Jordan
41
51
3
N/A
4.10%
Kuwait
96
4
99
N/A
3.10%
Lebanon
63
54
2
N/A
6.00%
Oman
76
16
88
N/A
4.71%
Qatar
99
16
83
N/A
18.54%
Saudi Arabia
76
8
98
N/A
3.70%
Syria
61
24
40
N/A
5.00%
Turkey
75
23
27
60
5.20%
United Arab
Emirates
96
24
98
94
1.29%
Middle East
Lebanon Review 2017
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Yemen
Pending
28
2
78
N/A
7.78%
Afghanistan
17
70
74
N/A
8.64%
Bangladesh
13
43
25
N/A
5.38%
Bhutan
24
55
5
N/A
6.85%
Brunei
78
19
99
75
0.48%
Cambodia
18
67
42
N/A
4.77%
China
54
90
19
68
11.03%
Hong Kong
89
76
14
82
5.02%
India
31
38
34
35
8.78%
Indonesia
42
46
37
31
6.00%
Japan
88
89
6
71
1.90%
Kazakhstan
62
13
76
42
2.40%
Korea North
18
65
23
N/A
1.50%
Korea South
83
63
22
85
4.44%
Kyrgyz Republic
24
15
84
88
4.61%
Laos
17
54
7
N/A
7.22%
Macao
91
76
14
82
3.00%
Asia
Lebanon Review 2017
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Malaysia
68
65
44
90
4.72%
Maldives
44
55
17
N/A
3.45%
Mongolia
33
5
77
93
7.22%
Myanmar
3
41
72
N/A
5.26%
Nepal
3
14
25
N/A
2.97%
Pakistan
19
15
31
41
3.00%
Papua New Guinea
75
50
11
N/A
7.96%
Philippines
30
48
53
43
3.63%
Singapore
93
75
63
40
5.68%
Sri Lanka
38
22
10
N/A
5.50%
Taiwan
84
88
35
89
6.50%
Tajikistan
6
6
60
97
4.00%
Thailand
56
64
90
96
5.46%
Turkmenistan
51
53
68
N/A
12.00%
Uzbekistan
40
10
60
100
8.00%
Vietnam
25
12
20
N/A
6.04%
96
63
31
46
2.96%
Pacific
Australia
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Fiji
46
53
3
N/A
2.06%
Marshall Islands
27
76
46
N/A
1.08%
Micronesia (Fed.
States)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
New Caledonia
96
73
51
52
2.00%
New Zealand
98
73
51
52
2.00%
Samoa
34
88
64
N/A
-2.77%
Solomon Islands
14
71
1
N/A
3.36%
Tonga
26
57
38
N/A
0.60%
Vanuatu
33
58
47
N/A
3.80%
Source:
CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com
Updated:
This material was produced in 2010; it is subject to updating in 2012.
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div style='margin-top:40%;padding-top:40%'>
Chapter 4
Investment Overview
Lebanon Review 2017
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Foreign Investment Climate
Background
Lebanon has a free-market economy and a strong laissez-faire commercial tradition. The
government does not restrict foreign investment; however, the investment climate suffers from red
tape, corruption, arbitrary licensing decisions, high taxes, tariffs, and fees, archaic legislation, and
weak intellectual property rights. The Lebanese economy is service-oriented; main growth sectors
include banking and tourism. The 1975-90 civil war seriously damaged Lebanon's economic
infrastructure, cut national output by half, and all but ended Lebanon's position as a Middle
Eastern entrepot and banking hub. In the years since, Lebanon has rebuilt much of its war-torn
physical and financial infrastructure by borrowing heavily - mostly from domestic banks. In an
attempt to reduce the ballooning national debt, the Rafiq HARIRI government in 2000 began an
austerity program, reining in government expenditures, increasing revenue collection, and passing
legislation to privatize state enterprises, but economic and financial reform initiatives stalled and
public debt continued to grow despite receipt of more than $2 billion in bilateral assistance at the
2002 Paris II Donors Conference. The Israeli-Hizballah conflict in July-August 2006 caused an
estimated $3.6 billion in infrastructure damage, and prompted international donors to pledge nearly
$1 billion in recovery and reconstruction assistance. Donors met again in January 2007 at the Paris
III Donor Conference and pledged more than $7.5 billion to Lebanon for development projects and
budget support, conditioned on progress on Beirut's fiscal reform and privatization program. An
18-month political stalemate and sporadic sectarian and political violence hampered economic
activity, particularly tourism, retail sales, and investment, until the new government was formed in
July 2008. Political stability following the Doha Accord of May 2008 helped boost tourism and,
together with a strong banking sector, enabled real GDP growth of 7% per year in 2009-10 despite
a slowdown in the region.
Foreign Investment Assessment
Openness to Foreign Investment
Lebanon is keen to attract foreign investment and offers a generally liberal investment climate. A
framework privatization law was passed in May 2000, paving the way for sectoral laws in
telecommunications, electricity, and water. Initially, the government will be looking for "strategic
partners," foreign or domestic, to participate in the corporatization of public utilities.
Lebanon Review 2017
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A foreigner can establish a business under the same conditions that apply to a Lebanese national,
provided the business is registered in the commercial registry. Registration depends on the foreigner
having obtained residence and work permits. Lebanese law does not differentiate between local
and foreign investors; however, in some cases there are certain restrictions placed on foreigners
acquiring properties and establishing companies in Lebanon. Foreign investors can generally
establish a Lebanese company, participate in a joint venture, or establish a local branch or
subsidiary of their company without difficulty. All companies established in Lebanon must abide by
the Lebanese commercial code and regulations. Generally, a company is established either as a
joint-stock corporation or as a limited liability partnership, modeled after the French Societe
Anonyme (SA) or Societe á Responsabilite Limitee (SARL).
Foreign investment in industrial projects has been limited due to red tape and restrictions. In the
service sectors, however, Lebanon generally provides equal treatment to foreigners' investment.
Foreigners are treated less favorably than domestic suppliers in the insurance sector (Article 26 of
Decree 9812 of May 4, 1968 requires foreign companies to provide double the guarantees of
Lebanese firms). However, domestic insurance companies are subject to capital requirements not
applied to foreign firms. Broadcast Media licenses are restricted to Lebanese joint stock
companies, according to Article 16 of Law No. 382/94. All shares should be nominally owned by
Lebanese and not transferable to foreign legal or natural persons. The banking sector is subject to
screening by the CBL (per the Money and Credit Code, which was issued as Decree 13513 of
Aug. 1, 1963).
Transparency of Regulatory System
The government of Lebanon encourages competition among companies bidding on government
contracts and does not discriminate among foreign suppliers. However, there is no one specific law
regulating all aspects of government procurement in Lebanon. Serious impediments to investments
include administrative bureaucracy, red tape, heavy social security requirements, delay in issuance
of construction and work permits, and the absence of independent regulatory bodies. Sectoral
privatization laws address this need in key sectors such as telecommunications, but the government
has not moved forward quickly on privatization and parliament has questioned the importance of
independent regulators.
Labor Force
Total: 2.6 million (in addition, there are as many as 1 million foreign workers)
By occupation: N/A
Agriculture and Industry
Agriculture products: citrus, grapes, tomatoes, apples, vegetables, potatoes, olives, tobacco; sheep,
Lebanon Review 2017
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goats
Industries: banking, food processing, jewelry, cement, textiles, mineral and chemical products,
wood and furniture products, oil refining, metal fabricating
Import Commodities and Partners
Commodities: petroleum products, cars, medicinal products, clothing, meat and live animals,
consumer goods, paper, textile fabrics, tobacco
Partners: France 13.5%, Germany 11.8%, Italy 10.8%, Syria 5.4%, China 5.3%, UK 5%, US
4.5%
Export Commodities and Partners
Commodities: authentic jewelry, inorganic chemicals, miscellaneous consumer goods, fruit,
tobacco, construction minerals, electric power machinery and switchgear, textile fibers, paper
Partners: Switzerland 11%, UAE 10.1%, Saudi Arabia 7.6%, US 7.4%, Turkey 5.5%
Telephone System
Telephones- main lines in use: 678,800
Telephones- mobile cellular: 775,100
General Assessment: telecommunications system severely damaged by civil war; rebuilding well
underway
Domestic: primarily microwave radio relay and cable
International: country code - 961; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1 Indian Ocean and 1
Atlantic Ocean) (erratic operations); coaxial cable to Syria; microwave radio relay to Syria but
inoperable beyond Syria to Jordan; 3 submarine coaxial cables
Internet
Internet Hosts: 6,998
Internet users: 400,000
Roads, Airports, Ports and Harbors
Railways: 401 km
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Highways: 7,300 km
Ports and harbors: Antilyas, Batroun, Beirut, Chekka, El Mina, Ez Zahrani, Jbail, Jounie, Naqoura,
Sidon, Tripoli, Tyre
Airports: 8; w/paved runways: 5
Legal System and Considerations
Lebanon’s legal system is a mixture of Ottoman law, canon law, Napoleonic code, and civil law.
There is no judicial review of legislative acts, nor has the government accepted compulsory ICJ
jurisdiction
Dispute Settlement
In 1996, the government faced problems with the three European companies involved in a
telephone rehabilitation contract, and with the two private GSM operators—Cellis and Libancell—
providing cellular telephone service. In both cases, the issues were settled quickly and amicably.
However, in spring 2000, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT) accused the two
GSM operators of violating their Build/Operate/Transfer (BOT) contracts. The government
claimed $300 million for alleged violations and threatening to seize the assets of both firms in case
of failure to pay these penalties. Ultimately, the parties to this dispute agreed to international
arbitration.
Cases in Lebanese courts are not settled rapidly because of a shortage of judges and inadequate
support structures. There is occasional government interference in the court system. Local courts
accept investment agreements drafted subject to foreign jurisdiction, if the latter does not
contradict Lebanese law. Judgments of foreign courts are enforced subject to the exequatur
obtained. Bankruptcy is governed by the commercial and penal codes rather than a separate
bankruptcy law. By law, a secured creditor has a right to share in the assets of a bankrupt party.
Verdicts involving monetary values in contract cases are made according to the currency of the
contract or its equivalent in Lebanese pounds at the official conversion rate on the day of the
payment.
The "Lebanese Center for Arbitration" became operational on May 8, 1995. Created by economic
organizations, including the four Lebanese Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, the
Center acts as an arbitrator in solving Lebanese and international conflicts related to trade and
investment. Its statutes are close to those of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris.
Lebanon has an administrative judicial system that handles all kinds of disputes with the State.
However, the government has recently decided not to accept binding international arbitration of
investment disputes between foreign investors and the State. Lebanon is not a member of the
Lebanon Review 2017
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International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID - Washington Convention).
Lebanon has ratified the New York Convention of 1958, on the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards.
Corruption Perception Ranking
See full listing elsewhere in this Country Review, as reported by Transparency International, for
Lebanon's current rank. Typically, Lebanon is ranked as one of the less corrupt nations in the
world.
Cultural Considerations
When in Lebanon it is important to know that handshakes are customary greeting. However, men
will wait for a woman to extend her hand first before shaking it. During a conversation it is best to
stick to formal forms of address, complete with titles, unless invited to do otherwise.
Note that although Lebanon is not a strictly Muslim country, it is important to be sensitive to
cultural and religious diversity. For example, women should take special care not to wear revealing
clothing so as to avoid hostility from, or offending, the Muslim population.
For more information see:
United States’ State Department Commercial Guide
Foreign Investment Index
Foreign Investment Index
The Foreign Investment Index is a proprietary index measuring attractiveness to international
investment flows. The Foreign Investment Index is calculated using an established methodology by
CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on a given country's economic stability (sustained
economic growth, monetary stability, current account deficits, budget surplus), economic risk (risk
of non-servicing of payments for goods or services, loans and trade-related finance, risk of
sovereign default), business and investment climate (property rights, labor force and laws,
regulatory transparency, openness to foreign investment, market conditions, and stability of
government). Scores are assigned from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks
the lowest level of foreign investment viability, while a score of 10 marks the highest level of
foreign investment viability, according to this proprietary index.
Lebanon Review 2017
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Lebanon Review 2017
Pending
Country
Assessment
Afghanistan
2
Albania
4.5
Algeria
6
Andorra
9
Angola
4.5-5
Antigua
8.5
Argentina
5
Armenia
5
Australia
9.5
Austria
9-9.5
Azerbaijan
5
Bahamas
9
Bahrain
7.5
Bangladesh
4.5
Barbados
9
Belarus
4
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Lebanon Review 2017
Pending
Belgium
9
Belize
7.5
Benin
5.5
Bhutan
4.5
Bolivia
4.5
Bosnia-Herzegovina
5
Botswana
7.5-8
Brazil
8
Brunei
7
Bulgaria
5.5
Burkina Faso
4
Burma (Myanmar)
4.5
Burundi
4
Cambodia
4.5
Cameroon
5
Canada
9.5
Cape Verde
6
Central African Republic
3
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Chad
4
Chile
9
China
7.5
China: Hong Kong
8.5
China: Taiwan
8.5
Colombia
7
Comoros
4
Congo DRC
4
Congo RC
5
Costa Rica
8
Cote d'Ivoire
4.5
Croatia
7
Cuba
4.5
Cyprus
7
Czech Republic
8.5
Denmark
9.5
Djibouti
4.5
Dominica
6
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Dominican Republic
6.5
East Timor
4.5
Ecuador
5.5
Egypt
4.5-5
El Salvador
6
Equatorial Guinea
4.5
Eritrea
3.5
Estonia
8
Ethiopia
4.5
Fiji
5
Finland
9
Former Yugoslav Rep. of Macedonia
5
France
9-9.5
Gabon
5.5
Gambia
5
Georgia
5
Germany
9-9.5
Ghana
5.5
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Greece
5
Grenada
7.5
Guatemala
5.5
Guinea
3.5
Guinea-Bissau
3.5
Guyana
4.5
Haiti
4
Holy See (Vatican)
n/a
Hong Kong (China)
8.5
Honduras
5.5
Hungary
8
Iceland
8-8.5
India
8
Indonesia
5.5
Iran
4
Iraq
3
Ireland
8
Israel
8.5
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Italy
8
Jamaica
5.5
Japan
9.5
Jordan
6
Kazakhstan
6
Kenya
5
Kiribati
5.5
Korea, North
1
Korea, South
9
Kosovo
4.5
Kuwait
8.5
Kyrgyzstan
4.5
Laos
4
Latvia
7
Lebanon
5
Lesotho
5.5
Liberia
3.5
Libya
3
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Liechtenstein
9
Lithuania
7.5
Luxembourg
9-9.5
Madagascar
4.5
Malawi
4.5
Malaysia
8.5
Maldives
6.5
Mali
5
Malta
9
Marshall Islands
5
Mauritania
4.5
Mauritius
7.5-8
Mexico
6.5-7
Micronesia
5
Moldova
4.5-5
Monaco
9
Mongolia
5
Montenegro
5.5
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Morocco
7.5
Mozambique
5
Namibia
7.5
Nauru
4.5
Nepal
4
Netherlands
9-9.5
New Zealand
9.5
Nicaragua
5
Niger
4.5
Nigeria
4.5
Norway
9-9.5
Oman
8
Pakistan
4
Palau
4.5-5
Panama
7
Papua New Guinea
5
Paraguay
6
Peru
6
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Philippines
6
Poland
8
Portugal
7.5-8
Qatar
9
Romania
6-6.5
Russia
6
Rwanda
4
Saint Kitts and Nevis
8
Saint Lucia
8
Saint Vincent and Grenadines
7
Samoa
7
San Marino
8.5
Sao Tome and Principe
4.5-5
Saudi Arabia
7
Senegal
6
Serbia
6
Seychelles
5
Sierra Leone
4
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Singapore
9.5
Slovak Republic (Slovakia)
8.5
Slovenia
8.5-9
Solomon Islands
5
Somalia
2
South Africa
8
Spain
7.5-8
Sri Lanka
5.5
Sudan
4
Suriname
5
Swaziland
4.5
Sweden
9.5
Switzerland
9.5
Syria
2.5
Tajikistan
4
Taiwan (China)
8.5
Tanzania
5
Thailand
7.5-8
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Togo
4.5-5
Tonga
5.5-6
Trinidad and Tobago
8-8.5
Tunisia
6
Turkey
6.5-7
Turkmenistan
4
Tuvalu
7
Uganda
5
Ukraine
4.5-5
United Arab Emirates
8.5
United Kingdom
9
United States
9
Uruguay
6.5-7
Uzbekistan
4
Vanuatu
6
Venezuela
5
Vietnam
5.5
Yemen
3
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Zambia
4.5-5
Zimbabwe
3.5
Editor's Note:
As of 2015, the global economic crisis (emerging in 2008) had affected many countries across the
world, resulting in changes to their rankings. Among those countries affected were top tier
economies, such as the United Kingdom, Iceland, Switzerland and Austria. However, in all these
cases, their rankings have moved back upward in the last couple of years as anxieties have
eased. Other top tier countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy, suffered some
effects due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone
nation, was also downgraded due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, Greece's position on the
precipice of default incurred a sharper downgrade than the other four euro zone countries
mentioned above. Cyprus' exposure to Greek bank yielded a downgrade in its case. Slovenia and
Latvia have been slightly downgraded due to a mix of economic and political concerns but could
easily be upgraded in a future assessment, should these concerns abate. Meanwhile, the crisis in
eastern Ukraine fueled downgrades in that country and neighboring Russia.
Despite the "trifecta of tragedy" in Japan in 2011 -- the earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and the
resulting nuclear crisis -- and the appreciable destabilization of the economic and political terrain
therein, this country has only slightly been downgraded. Japan's challenges have been assessed to
be transient, the government remains accountable, and there is little risk of default. Both India
and China retain their rankings; India holds a slightly higher ranking than China due to its record of
democratic representation and accountability.
There were shifts in opposite directions for Mali and Nigeria versus the Central African Republic,
Burkina Faso, and Burundi. Mali was slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to constitutional
order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and Islamists. Likewise, a
new government in Nigeria generated a slight upgrade as the country attempts to confront
corruption, crime, and terrorism. But the Central African Republic was downgraded due to the
takeover of the government by Seleka rebels and the continued decline into lawlessness in that
country. Likewise, the attempts by the leaders of Burundi and Burkina Faso to hold onto power
by by-passing the constitution raised eybrows and resulted in downgrades.
Political unrest in Libya and Algeria have contributed to a decision to marginally downgrade these
countries as well. Syria incurred a sharper downgrade due to the devolution into de facto civil war
and the dire security threat posed by Islamist terrorists. Iraq saw a similar downgrade as a result of
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the takeover of wide swaths of territory and the threat of genocide at the hands of Islamist
terrorists. Yemen, likewise, has been downgraded due to political instability at the hands of
secessionists, terrorists, Houthi rebels, and the intervention of external parties. Conversely, Egypt
and Tunisia saw slight upgrades as their political environments stabilize.
At the low end of the spectrum, devolving security conditions and/or economic crisis have resulted
in countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Zimbabwe maintaining their low ratings.
The United States continues to retain its previous slight downgrade due to the enduring threat of
default surrounding the debt ceiling in that country, matched by a conflict-ridden political climate.
In the case of Mexico, there is limited concern about default, but increasing alarm over the security
situation in that country and the government’s ability to contain it. In Argentina, a default to bond
holders resulted in a downgrade to that country. Finally, a small but significant upgrade was
attributed to Cuba due to its recent pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the
Unitd States.
Source:
CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com
Updated:
2015
Corruption Perceptions Index
Corruption Perceptions Index
Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index
Editor's Note:
Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index is a composite index which ranks
countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials.
This index indicates the views of national and international business people and analysts about the
levels of corruption in each country. The highest (and best) level of transparency is indicated by
the number, 10. The lower (and worse) levels of transparency are indicated by lower numbers.
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Rank
Country/Territory
CPI 2009
Score
Surveys
Used
Confidence
Range
1
New Zealand
9.4
6
9.1 - 9.5
2
Denmark
9.3
6
9.1 - 9.5
3
Singapore
9.2
9
9.0 - 9.4
3
Sweden
9.2
6
9.0 - 9.3
5
Switzerland
9.0
6
8.9 - 9.1
6
Finland
8.9
6
8.4 - 9.4
6
Netherlands
8.9
6
8.7 - 9.0
8
Australia
8.7
8
8.3 - 9.0
8
Canada
8.7
6
8.5 - 9.0
8
Iceland
8.7
4
7.5 - 9.4
11
Norway
8.6
6
8.2 - 9.1
12
Hong Kong
8.2
8
7.9 - 8.5
12
Luxembourg
8.2
6
7.6 - 8.8
14
Germany
8.0
6
7.7 - 8.3
14
Ireland
8.0
6
7.8 - 8.4
16
Austria
7.9
6
7.4 - 8.3
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17
Japan
7.7
8
7.4 - 8.0
17
United Kingdom
7.7
6
7.3 - 8.2
19
United States
7.5
8
6.9 - 8.0
20
Barbados
7.4
4
6.6 - 8.2
21
Belgium
7.1
6
6.9 - 7.3
22
Qatar
7.0
6
5.8 - 8.1
22
Saint Lucia
7.0
3
6.7 - 7.5
24
France
6.9
6
6.5 - 7.3
25
Chile
6.7
7
6.5 - 6.9
25
Uruguay
6.7
5
6.4 - 7.1
27
Cyprus
6.6
4
6.1 - 7.1
27
Estonia
6.6
8
6.1 - 6.9
27
Slovenia
6.6
8
6.3 - 6.9
30
United Arab Emirates
6.5
5
5.5 - 7.5
31
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
6.4
3
4.9 - 7.5
32
Israel
6.1
6
5.4 - 6.7
32
Spain
6.1
6
5.5 - 6.6
34
Dominica
5.9
3
4.9 - 6.7
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35
Portugal
5.8
6
5.5 - 6.2
35
Puerto Rico
5.8
4
5.2 - 6.3
37
Botswana
5.6
6
5.1 - 6.3
37
Taiwan
5.6
9
5.4 - 5.9
39
Brunei Darussalam
5.5
4
4.7 - 6.4
39
Oman
5.5
5
4.4 - 6.5
39
Korea (South)
5.5
9
5.3 - 5.7
42
Mauritius
5.4
6
5.0 - 5.9
43
Costa Rica
5.3
5
4.7 - 5.9
43
Macau
5.3
3
3.3 - 6.9
45
Malta
5.2
4
4.0 - 6.2
46
Bahrain
5.1
5
4.2 - 5.8
46
Cape Verde
5.1
3
3.3 - 7.0
46
Hungary
5.1
8
4.6 - 5.7
49
Bhutan
5.0
4
4.3 - 5.6
49
Jordan
5.0
7
3.9 - 6.1
49
Poland
5.0
8
4.5 - 5.5
52
Czech Republic
4.9
8
4.3 - 5.6
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52
Lithuania
4.9
8
4.4 - 5.4
54
Seychelles
4.8
3
3.0 - 6.7
55
South Africa
4.7
8
4.3 - 4.9
56
Latvia
4.5
6
4.1 - 4.9
56
Malaysia
4.5
9
4.0 - 5.1
56
Namibia
4.5
6
3.9 - 5.1
56
Samoa
4.5
3
3.3 - 5.3
56
Slovakia
4.5
8
4.1 - 4.9
61
Cuba
4.4
3
3.5 - 5.1
61
Turkey
4.4
7
3.9 - 4.9
63
Italy
4.3
6
3.8 - 4.9
63
Saudi Arabia
4.3
5
3.1 - 5.3
65
Tunisia
4.2
6
3.0 - 5.5
66
Croatia
4.1
8
3.7 - 4.5
66
Georgia
4.1
7
3.4 - 4.7
66
Kuwait
4.1
5
3.2 - 5.1
69
Ghana
3.9
7
3.2 - 4.6
69
Montenegro
3.9
5
3.5 - 4.4
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71
Bulgaria
3.8
8
3.2 - 4.5
71
FYR Macedonia
3.8
6
3.4 - 4.2
71
Greece
3.8
6
3.2 - 4.3
71
Romania
3.8
8
3.2 - 4.3
75
Brazil
3.7
7
3.3 - 4.3
75
Colombia
3.7
7
3.1 - 4.3
75
Peru
3.7
7
3.4 - 4.1
75
Suriname
3.7
3
3.0 - 4.7
79
Burkina Faso
3.6
7
2.8 - 4.4
79
China
3.6
9
3.0 - 4.2
79
Swaziland
3.6
3
3.0 - 4.7
79
Trinidad and Tobago
3.6
4
3.0 - 4.3
83
Serbia
3.5
6
3.3 - 3.9
84
El Salvador
3.4
5
3.0 - 3.8
84
Guatemala
3.4
5
3.0 - 3.9
84
India
3.4
10
3.2 - 3.6
84
Panama
3.4
5
3.1 - 3.7
84
Thailand
3.4
9
3.0 - 3.8
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89
Lesotho
3.3
6
2.8 - 3.8
89
Malawi
3.3
7
2.7 - 3.9
89
Mexico
3.3
7
3.2 - 3.5
89
Moldova
3.3
6
2.7 - 4.0
89
Morocco
3.3
6
2.8 - 3.9
89
Rwanda
3.3
4
2.9 - 3.7
95
Albania
3.2
6
3.0 - 3.3
95
Vanuatu
3.2
3
2.3 - 4.7
97
Liberia
3.1
3
1.9 - 3.8
97
Sri Lanka
3.1
7
2.8 - 3.4
99
Bosnia and Herzegovina
3.0
7
2.6 - 3.4
99
Dominican Republic
3.0
5
2.9 - 3.2
99
Jamaica
3.0
5
2.8 - 3.3
99
Madagascar
3.0
7
2.8 - 3.2
99
Senegal
3.0
7
2.5 - 3.6
99
Tonga
3.0
3
2.6 - 3.3
99
Zambia
3.0
7
2.8 - 3.2
106
Argentina
2.9
7
2.6 - 3.1
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106
Benin
2.9
6
2.3 - 3.4
106
Gabon
2.9
3
2.6 - 3.1
106
Gambia
2.9
5
1.6 - 4.0
106
Niger
2.9
5
2.7 - 3.0
111
Algeria
2.8
6
2.5 - 3.1
111
Djibouti
2.8
4
2.3 - 3.2
111
Egypt
2.8
6
2.6 - 3.1
111
Indonesia
2.8
9
2.4 - 3.2
111
Kiribati
2.8
3
2.3 - 3.3
111
Mali
2.8
6
2.4 - 3.2
111
Sao Tome and Principe
2.8
3
2.4 - 3.3
111
Solomon Islands
2.8
3
2.3 - 3.3
111
Togo
2.8
5
1.9 - 3.9
120
Armenia
2.7
7
2.6 - 2.8
120
Bolivia
2.7
6
2.4 - 3.1
120
Ethiopia
2.7
7
2.4 - 2.9
120
Kazakhstan
2.7
7
2.1 - 3.3
120
Mongolia
2.7
7
2.4 - 3.0
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120
Vietnam
2.7
9
2.4 - 3.1
126
Eritrea
2.6
4
1.6 - 3.8
126
Guyana
2.6
4
2.5 - 2.7
126
Syria
2.6
5
2.2 - 2.9
126
Tanzania
2.6
7
2.4 - 2.9
130
Honduras
2.5
6
2.2 - 2.8
130
Lebanon
2.5
3
1.9 - 3.1
130
Libya
2.5
6
2.2 - 2.8
130
Maldives
2.5
4
1.8 - 3.2
130
Mauritania
2.5
7
2.0 - 3.3
130
Mozambique
2.5
7
2.3 - 2.8
130
Nicaragua
2.5
6
2.3 - 2.7
130
Nigeria
2.5
7
2.2 - 2.7
130
Uganda
2.5
7
2.1 - 2.8
139
Bangladesh
2.4
7
2.0 - 2.8
139
Belarus
2.4
4
2.0 - 2.8
139
Pakistan
2.4
7
2.1 - 2.7
139
Philippines
2.4
9
2.1 - 2.7
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143
Azerbaijan
2.3
7
2.0 - 2.6
143
Comoros
2.3
3
1.6 - 3.3
143
Nepal
2.3
6
2.0 - 2.6
146
Cameroon
2.2
7
1.9 - 2.6
146
Ecuador
2.2
5
2.0 - 2.5
146
Kenya
2.2
7
1.9 - 2.5
146
Russia
2.2
8
1.9 - 2.4
146
Sierra Leone
2.2
5
1.9 - 2.4
146
Timor-Leste
2.2
5
1.8 - 2.6
146
Ukraine
2.2
8
2.0 - 2.6
146
Zimbabwe
2.2
7
1.7 - 2.8
154
Côte d´Ivoire
2.1
7
1.8 - 2.4
154
Papua New Guinea
2.1
5
1.7 - 2.5
154
Paraguay
2.1
5
1.7 - 2.5
154
Yemen
2.1
4
1.6 - 2.5
158
Cambodia
2.0
8
1.8 - 2.2
158
Central African Republic
2.0
4
1.9 - 2.2
158
Laos
2.0
4
1.6 - 2.6
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158
Tajikistan
2.0
8
1.6 - 2.5
162
Angola
1.9
5
1.8 - 1.9
162
Congo Brazzaville
1.9
5
1.6 - 2.1
162
Democratic Republic of
Congo
1.9
5
1.7 - 2.1
162
Guinea-Bissau
1.9
3
1.8 - 2.0
162
Kyrgyzstan
1.9
7
1.8 - 2.1
162
Venezuela
1.9
7
1.8 - 2.0
168
Burundi
1.8
6
1.6 - 2.0
168
Equatorial Guinea
1.8
3
1.6 - 1.9
168
Guinea
1.8
5
1.7 - 1.8
168
Haiti
1.8
3
1.4 - 2.3
168
Iran
1.8
3
1.7 - 1.9
168
Turkmenistan
1.8
4
1.7 - 1.9
174
Uzbekistan
1.7
6
1.5 - 1.8
175
Chad
1.6
6
1.5 - 1.7
176
Iraq
1.5
3
1.2 - 1.8
176
Sudan
1.5
5
1.4 - 1.7
178
Myanmar
1.4
3
0.9 - 1.8
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Afghanistan
1.3
4
1.0 - 1.5
180
Somalia
1.1
3
0.9 - 1.4
Methodology:
As noted above, the highest (and best) level of transparency with the least perceived corruption is
indicated by the number, 10. The lower (and worse) levels of transparency are indicated by lower
numbers.
According to Transparency International, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) table shows a
country's ranking and score, the number of surveys used to determine the score, and the
confidence range of the scoring.
The rank shows how one country compares to others included in the index. The CPI score
indicates the perceived level of public-sector corruption in a country/territory.
The CPI is based on 13 independent surveys. However, not all surveys include all countries. The
surveys used column indicates how many surveys were relied upon to determine the score for that
country.
The confidence range indicates the reliability of the CPI scores and tells us that allowing for a
margin of error, we can be 90% confident that the true score for this country lies within this range.
Note:
Kosovo, which separated from the Yugoslav successor state of Serbia, is not listed above. No
calculation is available for Kosovo at this time, however, a future corruption index by
Transparency International may include the world's newest country in its tally. Taiwan has been
listed above despite its contested status; while Taiwan claims sovereign status, China claims
ultimate jurisdiction over Taiwan. Hong Kong, which is also under the rubric of Chinese
sovereignty, is listed above. Note as well that Puerto Rico, which is a United States domain, is also
included in the list above. These inclusions likely have to do with the size and fairly autonomous
status of their economies.
Source:
Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index; available at URL:
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http://www.transparency.org
Updated:
Uploaded in 2011 using most recent ranking available; reviewed in 2015.
Competitiveness Ranking
Competitiveness Ranking
Editor's Note:
The Global Competitiveness Report’s competitiveness ranking is based on the Global
Competitiveness Index (GCI), which was developed for the World Economic Forum. The GCI is
based on a number of competitiveness considerations, and provides a comprehensive picture of the
competitiveness landscape in countries around the world. The competitiveness considerations are:
institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary education, higher
education and training, goods market efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial market
development, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication, and innovation. The
rankings are calculated from both publicly available data and the Executive Opinion Survey.
Country/Economy
GCI 2010
Rank
GCI 2010
Score
GCI 2009
Rank
Change
2009-2010
Switzerland
1
5.63
1
0
Sweden
2
5.56
4
2
Singapore
3
5.48
3
0
United States
4
5.43
2
-2
Germany
5
5.39
7
2
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Japan
6
5.37
8
2
Finland
7
5.37
6
-1
Netherlands
8
5.33
10
2
Denmark
9
5.32
5
-4
Canada
10
5.30
9
-1
Hong Kong SAR
11
5.30
11
0
United Kingdom
12
5.25
13
1
Taiwan, China
13
5.21
12
-1
Norway
14
5.14
14
0
France
15
5.13
16
1
Australia
16
5.11
15
-1
Qatar
17
5.10
22
5
Austria
18
5.09
17
-1
Belgium
19
5.07
18
-1
Luxembourg
20
5.05
21
1
Saudi Arabia
21
4.95
28
7
Korea, Rep.
22
4.93
19
-3
New Zealand
23
4.92
20
-3
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Israel
24
4.91
27
3
United Arab Emirates
25
4.89
23
-2
Malaysia
26
4.88
24
-2
China
27
4.84
29
2
Brunei Darussalam
28
4.75
32
4
Ireland
29
4.74
25
-4
Chile
30
4.69
30
0
Iceland
31
4.68
26
-5
Tunisia
32
4.65
40
8
Estonia
33
4.61
35
2
Oman
34
4.61
41
7
Kuwait
35
4.59
39
4
Czech Republic
36
4.57
31
-5
Bahrain
37
4.54
38
1
Thailand
38
4.51
36
-2
Poland
39
4.51
46
7
Cyprus
40
4.50
34
-6
Puerto Rico
41
4.49
42
1
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Spain
42
4.49
33
-9
Barbados
43
4.45
44
1
Indonesia
44
4.43
54
10
Slovenia
45
4.42
37
-8
Portugal
46
4.38
43
-3
Lithuania
47
4.38
53
6
Italy
48
4.37
48
0
Montenegro
49
4.36
62
13
Malta
50
4.34
52
2
India
51
4.33
49
-2
Hungary
52
4.33
58
6
Panama
53
4.33
59
6
South Africa
54
4.32
45
-9
Mauritius
55
4.32
57
2
Costa Rica
56
4.31
55
-1
Azerbaijan
57
4.29
51
-6
Brazil
58
4.28
56
-2
Vietnam
59
4.27
75
16
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Slovak Republic
60
4.25
47
-13
Turkey
61
4.25
61
0
Sri Lanka
62
4.25
79
17
Russian Federation
63
4.24
63
0
Uruguay
64
4.23
65
1
Jordan
65
4.21
50
-15
Mexico
66
4.19
60
-6
Romania
67
4.16
64
-3
Colombia
68
4.14
69
1
Iran
69
4.14
n/a
n/a
Latvia
70
4.14
68
-2
Bulgaria
71
4.13
76
5
Kazakhstan
72
4.12
67
-5
Peru
73
4.11
78
5
Namibia
74
4.09
74
0
Morocco
75
4.08
73
-2
Botswana
76
4.05
66
-10
Croatia
77
4.04
72
-5
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Guatemala
78
4.04
80
2
Macedonia, FYR
79
4.02
84
5
Rwanda
80
4.00
n/a
n/a
Egypt
81
4.00
70
-11
El Salvador
82
3.99
77
-5
Greece
83
3.99
71
-12
Trinidad and Tobago
84
3.97
86
2
Philippines
85
3.96
87
2
Algeria
86
3.96
83
-3
Argentina
87
3.95
85
-2
Albania
88
3.94
96
8
Ukraine
89
3.90
82
-7
Gambia, The
90
3.90
81
-9
Honduras
91
3.89
89
-2
Lebanon
92
3.89
n/a
n/a
Georgia
93
3.86
90
-3
Moldova
94
3.86
n/a
n/a
Jamaica
95
3.85
91
-4
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Serbia
96
3.84
93
-3
Syria
97
3.79
94
-3
Armenia
98
3.76
97
-1
Mongolia
99
3.75
117
18
Libya
100
3.74
88
-12
Dominican Republic
101
3.72
95
-6
Bosnia and Herzegovina
102
3.70
109
7
Benin
103
3.69
103
0
Senegal
104
3.67
92
-12
Ecuador
105
3.65
105
0
Kenya
106
3.65
98
-8
Bangladesh
107
3.64
106
-1
Bolivia
108
3.64
120
12
Cambodia
109
3.63
110
1
Guyana
110
3.62
104
-6
Cameroon
111
3.58
111
0
Nicaragua
112
3.57
115
3
Tanzania
113
3.56
100
-13
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Ghana
114
3.56
114
0
Zambia
115
3.55
112
-3
Tajikistan
116
3.53
122
6
Cape Verde
117
3.51
n/a
n/a
Uganda
118
3.51
108
-10
Ethiopia
119
3.51
118
-1
Paraguay
120
3.49
124
4
Kyrgyz Republic
121
3.49
123
2
Venezuela
122
3.48
113
-9
Pakistan
123
3.48
101
-22
Madagascar
124
3.46
121
-3
Malawi
125
3.45
119
-6
Swaziland
126
3.40
n/a
n/a
Nigeria
127
3.38
99
-28
Lesotho
128
3.36
107
-21
Côte d'Ivoire
129
3.35
116
-13
Nepal
130
3.34
125
-5
Mozambique
131
3.32
129
-2
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Mali
132
3.28
130
-2
Timor-Leste
133
3.23
126
-7
Burkina Faso
134
3.20
128
-6
Mauritania
135
3.14
127
-8
Zimbabwe
136
3.03
132
-4
Burundi
137
2.96
133
-4
Angola
138
2.93
n/a
n/a
Chad
139
2.73
131
-8
Methodology:
The competitiveness rankings are calculated from both publicly available data and the Executive
Opinion Survey, a comprehensive annual survey conducted by the World Economic Forum
together with its network of Partner Institutes (leading research institutes and business
organizations) in the countries covered by the Report.
Highlights according to WEF -- The United States falls two places to fourth position, overtaken by Sweden and Singapore in the
rankings of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011
- The People’s Republic of China continues to move up the rankings, with marked improvements
in several other Asian countries
- Germany moves up two places to fifth place, leading the Eurozone countries
- Switzerland tops the rankings
Source:
World Economic Forum; available at URL: http://www.weforum.org
Updated:
Lebanon Review 2017
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2011 using most recent ranking available; reviewed in 2015.
Taxation
Corporate tax
Corporate income tax is applied at a statutory rate of 15 percent on taxable income.
Capital gains
Capital gains result in a capital gains tax of 10 percent from property sales.
Indirect tax
A value added tax (VAT) is applied at 10 percent on some transactions involving goods and
services.
Social security
Social security contributions are applied at 21.5 percent on gross salaries.
Stock Market
The Beirut Stock Exchange, established in 1920, reopened for business in September of 1995 after
12 years of suspended activity due to war. Cross-listing arrangements have been negotiated with
both the Kuwaiti and Egyptian Stock Exchanges. At the end of the 1990's, the Beirut Stock
Exchange had 13 companies listed.
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For more information on the Beirut Stock Exchange, see URL: http://www.bse.com.lb/.
Partner Links
Partner Links
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Chapter 5
Social Overview
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People
Cultural Diversity
Lebanon is the only Middle Eastern country where Christians constitute a large portion of the
population. However, no official census has been taken since the 1932 census (when Christians
constituted a slight majority)-reflecting the political sensitivity in Lebanon over religious balance.
Recent estimates suggest that around 60 to 70 percent of the resident population is Muslim (Shia,
Sunni and Druze), while the rest belongs to various Christian communions (the Maronite sect of
the Roman Catholic Church, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic, Armenian Catholic and
Orthodox, as well as other Christian minorities.) Shia Muslims make up the single largest sect.
The official language is Arabic, although French is widely spoken as well and considered official -a testament to the colonial legacy. The Armenian minority speaks Armenian.
The Lebanese people are mostly of Arab origin, although a substantial Armenian population is also
present. Also, some people in Lebanon claim Phoenecian origins -- a reference to the cultural and
ethnic group that lived in Lebanon prior to the influx of Arabs. As well, there are some 300,000
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestinians in the Near East (UNRWA), and about 180,000 stateless people resident in the country
(mostly Kurds and Syrians). Palestinians and stateless people are not accorded the legal rights
enjoyed by the rest of the population.
Note: With no official figures available, it is estimated that 600,000-900,000 persons fled the
country during the initial years of civil strife (1975-1976). Although some returned, the continuing
instability until 1990, sparked further waves of emigration, casts even more doubt on population
figures. Higher emigration rates among Christians have, in addition to higher birth rates in the
Muslim population, reduced the percentage of Christians residing in the country. Faced with
worrisome economic, social and political pr ospects, educated young people continues to emigrate,
making "brain-drain" (the leaving of one country to work in another) one of Lebanon's most
imminent problems.
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Human Development
In terms of health and welfare, the infant mortality rate in Lebanon is 22.59 deaths per 1,000 live
births. The total fertility rate os 1.88 children born per woman. Life expectancy at birth for the
total population is 73.41 years of age (70.91 for males and 76.04 for females), according
to recent estimates. In terms of population trends, the population growth rate is 1.2 percent, while
the birth rate is 18.08 births per 1,000 people and the death rate is 6.1 deaths per 1,000 people.
The literacy rate for the total population is 87.4 percent, with males registering at 93.1 percent, and
females at 82.2 percent.
About 8.2 percent of GDP in this country is spent on health expenditures; about 1.8 percent of
GDP in this country is spent on education. Access to water and sanitation in this country is
regarded to be good, although there may be notable obstacles in certain rural areas.
A notable measure of human development is the Human Development Index (HDI), which is
formulated by the United Nations Development Program. The HDI is a composite of several
indicators, which measure a country's achievements in three main arenas of human development:
longevity, knowledge and education, as well as economic standard of living. In a ranking of 177
countries, the HDI placed Lebanon in the medium human development category, at 88th place.
The country, however, was omitted from the United Nation's latest HDI ranking.
Note: Although the concept of human development is complicated and cannot be properly captured
by values and indices, the HDI, which is calculated and updated annually, offers a wide-ranging
assessment of human development in certain countries, not based solely upon traditional economic
and financial indicators.
Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, www.countrywatch.com.
Bibliography for list of general research sources.
See
Human Development Index
Human Development Index
Human Development Index (Ranked Numerically)
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The Human Development Index (HDI) is used to measure quality of life in countries across the
world. The HDI has been compiled since 1990 by the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) on a regular basis. The HDI is a composite of several indicators, which measure a
country's achievements in three main arenas of human development: longevity, education, and
economic standard of living. Although the concept of human development is complicated and
cannot be properly captured by values and indices, the HDI offers a wide-ranging assessment of
human development in certain countries, not based solely upon traditional economic and financial
indicators. For more information about the methodology used to calculate the HDI, please see the
"Source Materials" in the appendices of this review.
Very High
Human
Development
High Human
Development
Medium Human
Development
Low Human
Development
1. Norway
43. Bahamas
86. Fiji
128. Kenya
2. Australia
44. Lithuania
87. Turkmenistan
129. Bangladesh
3. New Zealand
45. Chile
88. Dominican
Republic
130. Ghana
4. United States
46. Argentina
89. China
131. Cameroon
5. Ireland
47. Kuwait
90. El Salvador
132. Myanmar
(Burma)
6. Liechtenstein
48. Latvia
91. Sri Lanka
133. Yemen
7. Netherlands
49. Montenegro
92. Thailand
134. Benin
8. Canada
50. Romania
93. Gabon
135.
Madagascar
9. Sweden
51. Croatia
94. Surname
136. Mauritania
10. Germany
52. Uruguay
95. Bolivia
137. Papua
New Guinea
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11. Japan
53. Libya
96. Paraguay
138. Nepal
12. South Korea
54. Panama
97. Philippines
139. Togo
13. Switzerland
55. Saudi Arabia
98. Botswana
140. Comoros
14. France
56. Mexico
99. Moldova
141. Lesotho
15. Israel
57. Malaysia
100. Mongolia
142. Nigeria
16. Finland
58. Bulgaria
101. Egypt
143. Uganda
17. Iceland
59. Trinidad and Tobago
102. Uzbekistan
144. Senegal
18. Belgium
60. Serbia
103. Micronesia
145. Haiti
19. Denmark
61. Belarus
104. Guyana
146. Angola
20. Spain
62. Costa Rica
105. Namibia
147. Djibouti
21. Hong King
63. Peru
106. Honduras
148. Tanzania
22. Greece
64. Albania
107. Maldives
149. Cote
d'Ivoire
23. Italy
65. Russian Federation
108. Indonesia
150. Zambia
24. Luxembourg
66. Kazakhstan
109. Kyrgyzstan
151. Gambia
25. Austria
67. Azerbaijan
110. South Africa
152. Rwanda
26. United
Kingdom
68. Bosnia and
Herzegovina
111. Syria
153. Malawi
27. Singapore
69. Ukraine
112. Tajikistan
154. Sudan
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28. Czech
Republic
70. Iran
113. Vietnam
155.
Afghanistan
29. Slovenia
71. The former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia
114. Morocco
156. Guinea
30. Andorra
72. Mauritius
115. Nicaragua
157. Ethiopia
31. Slovakia
73. Brazil
116. Guatemala
158. Sierra
Leone
159. Central
African
Republic
32. United Arab
Emirates
74. Georgia
117. Equatorial
Guinea
33. Malta
75. Venezuela
118. Cape Verde
160. Mali
34. Estonia
76. Armenia
119. India
161. Burkina
Faso
35. Cyprus
77. Ecuador
120. East Timor
162. Liberia
36. Hungary
78. Belize
121. Swaziland
163. Chad
37. Brunei
79. Colombia
122. Laos
164. GuineaBissau
38. Qatar
80. Jamaica
123. Solomon
Islands
165.
Mozambique
39. Bahrain
81. Tunisia
124. Cambodia
166. Burundi
40. Portugal
82. Jordan
125. Pakistan
167. Niger
41. Poland
83. Turkey
126. Congo RC
168. Congo
DRC
127. Sao Tome
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42. Barbados
Pending
84. Algeria
and Principe
169. Zimbabwe
85. Tonga
Methodology:
For more information about the methodology used to calculate the HDI, please see the "Source
Materials" in the appendices of this Country Review.
Reference:
As published in United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report 2010.
Source:
United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index available at URL:
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/
Updated:
Uploaded in 2011 using ranking available; reviewed in 2015
Life Satisfaction Index
Life Satisfaction Index
Life Satisfaction Index
Created by Adrian G. White, an Analytic Social Psychologist at the University of Leicester, the
"Satisfaction with Life Index" measures subjective life satisfaction across various countries. The
data was taken from a metastudy (see below for source) and associates the notion of subjective
happiness or life satisfaction with qualitative parameters such as health, wealth, and access to
basic education. This assessment serves as an alternative to other measures of happiness that tend
to rely on traditional and quantitative measures of policy on quality of life, such as GNP and GDP.
The methodology involved the responses of 80,000 people across the globe.
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Rank
Country
Score
1
Denmark
273.4
2
Switzerland
273.33
3
Austria
260
4
Iceland
260
5
The Bahamas
256.67
6
Finland
256.67
7
Sweden
256.67
8
Iran
253.33
9
Brunei
253.33
10
Canada
253.33
11
Ireland
253.33
12
Luxembourg
253.33
13
Costa Rica
250
14
Malta
250
15
Netherlands
250
16
Antiguaand Barbuda
246.67
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17
Malaysia
246.67
18
New Zealand
246.67
19
Norway
246.67
20
Seychelles
246.67
21
Saint Kitts and Nevis
246.67
22
United Arab Emirates
246.67
23
United States
246.67
24
Vanuatu
246.67
25
Venezuela
246.67
26
Australia
243.33
27
Barbados
243.33
28
Belgium
243.33
29
Dominica
243.33
30
Oman
243.33
31
Saudi Arabia
243.33
32
Suriname
243.33
33
Bahrain
240
34
Colombia
240
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35
Germany
240
36
Guyana
240
37
Honduras
240
38
Kuwait
240
39
Panama
240
40
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
240
41
United Kingdom
236.67
42
Dominican Republic
233.33
43
Guatemala
233.33
44
Jamaica
233.33
45
Qatar
233.33
46
Spain
233.33
47
Saint Lucia
233.33
48
Belize
230
49
Cyprus
230
50
Italy
230
51
Mexico
230
52
Samoa
230
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53
Singapore
230
54
Solomon Islands
230
55
Trinidad and Tobago
230
56
Argentina
226.67
57
Fiji
223.33
58
Israel
223.33
59
Mongolia
223.33
60
São Tomé and Príncipe
223.33
61
El Salvador
220
62
France
220
63
Hong Kong
220
64
Indonesia
220
65
Kyrgyzstan
220
66
Maldives
220
67
Slovenia
220
68
Taiwan
220
69
East Timor
220
70
Tonga
220
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71
Chile
216.67
72
Grenada
216.67
73
Mauritius
216.67
74
Namibia
216.67
75
Paraguay
216.67
76
Thailand
216.67
77
Czech Republic
213.33
78
Philippines
213.33
79
Tunisia
213.33
80
Uzbekistan
213.33
81
Brazil
210
82
China
210
83
Cuba
210
84
Greece
210
85
Nicaragua
210
86
Papua New Guinea
210
87
Uruguay
210
88
Gabon
206.67
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89
Ghana
206.67
90
Japan
206.67
91
Yemen
206.67
92
Portugal
203.33
93
Sri Lanka
203.33
94
Tajikistan
203.33
95
Vietnam
203.33
96
Bhutan
200
97
Comoros
196.67
98
Croatia
196.67
99
Poland
196.67
100
Cape Verde
193.33
101
Kazakhstan
193.33
102
South Korea
193.33
103
Madagascar
193.33
104
Bangladesh
190
105
Republic of the Congo
190
106
The Gambia
190
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107
Hungary
190
108
Libya
190
109
South Africa
190
110
Cambodia
186.67
111
Ecuador
186.67
112
Kenya
186.67
113
Lebanon
186.67
114
Morocco
186.67
115
Peru
186.67
116
Senegal
186.67
117
Bolivia
183.33
118
Haiti
183.33
119
Nepal
183.33
120
Nigeria
183.33
121
Tanzania
183.33
122
Benin
180
123
Botswana
180
124
Guinea-Bissau
180
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125
India
180
126
Laos
180
127
Mozambique
180
128
Palestinian Authority
180
129
Slovakia
180
130
Myanmar
176.67
131
Mali
176.67
132
Mauritania
176.67
133
Turkey
176.67
134
Algeria
173.33
135
Equatorial Guinea
173.33
136
Romania
173.33
137
Bosnia and Herzegovina
170
138
Cameroon
170
139
Estonia
170
140
Guinea
170
141
Jordan
170
142
Syria
170
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143
Sierra Leone
166.67
144
Azerbaijan
163.33
145
Central African Republic
163.33
146
Republic of Macedonia
163.33
147
Togo
163.33
148
Zambia
163.33
149
Angola
160
150
Djibouti
160
151
Egypt
160
152
Burkina Faso
156.67
153
Ethiopia
156.67
154
Latvia
156.67
155
Lithuania
156.67
156
Uganda
156.67
157
Albania
153.33
158
Malawi
153.33
159
Chad
150
160
Côte d'Ivoire
150
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161
Niger
150
162
Eritrea
146.67
163
Rwanda
146.67
164
Bulgaria
143.33
165
Lesotho
143.33
166
Pakistan
143.33
167
Russia
143.33
168
Swaziland
140
169
Georgia
136.67
170
Belarus
133.33
171
Turkmenistan
133.33
172
Armenia
123.33
173
Sudan
120
174
Ukraine
120
175
Moldova
116.67
176
Democratic Republic of the Congo
110
177
Zimbabwe
110
178
Burundi
100
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Commentary:
European countries, such as Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria resided at
the top of the ranking with highest levels of self-reported life satisfaction. Conversely, European
countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine ranked low on the index.
African countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe a n d Burundi found
themselves at the very bottom of the ranking, and indeed, very few African countries could be
found in the top 100. Japan was at the mid-way point in the ranking, however, other Asian
countries such as Brunei and Malaysia were in the top tier, while Pakistan was close to the bottom
with a low level of self-identified life satisfaction. As a region, the Middle East presented a mixed
bad with Saudi Arabians reporing healthy levels of life satisfaction and Egyptians near the bottom
of the ranking. As a region, Caribbean countries were ranked highly, consistently demonstrating
high levels of life satisfaction. The findings showed that health was the most crucial determining
factor in life satisfaction, followed by prosperity and education.
Source:
White, A. (2007). A Global Projection of Subjective Well-being: A Challenge To Positive
Psychology? Psychtalk 56, 17-20. The data was extracted from a meta-analysis by Marks,
Abdallah, Simms & Thompson (2006).
Uploaded:
Based on study noted above in "Source" ; reviewed in 2015
Happy Planet Index
Happy Planet Index
The Happy Planet Index (HPI) is used to measure human well-being in conjunction with
environmental impact. The HPI has been compiled since 2006 by the New Economics
Foundation. The index is a composite of several indicators including subjective life satisfaction, life
expectancy at birth, and ecological footprint per capita.
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As noted by NEFA, the HPI "reveals the ecological efficiency with which human well-being is
delivered." Indeed, the index combines environmental impact with human well-being to measure
the environmental efficiency with which, country by country, people live long and happy lives.
The countries ranked highest by the HPI are not necessarily the ones with the happiest people
overall, but the ones that allow their citizens to live long and fulfilling lives, without negatively
impacting this opportunity for either future generations or citizens of other countries. Accordingly,
a country like the United States will rank low on this list due to its large per capital ecological
footprint, which uses more than its fair share of resources, and will likely cause planetary damage.
It should be noted that the HPI was designed to be a counterpoint to other well-established indices
of countries' development, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which measures overall
national wealth and economic development, but often obfuscates the realities of countries with
stark variances between the rich and the poor. Moreover, the objective of most of the world's
people is not to be wealthy but to be happy. The HPI also differs from the Human Development
Index (HDI), which measures quality of life but not ecology, since it [HPI] also includes
sustainability as a key indicator.
Rank
Country
HPI
1
Costa Rica
76.1
2
Dominican Republic
71.8
3
Jamaica
70.1
4
Guatemala
68.4
5
Vietnam
66.5
6
Colombia
66.1
7
Cuba
65.7
8
El Salvador
61.5
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9
Brazil
61.0
10
Honduras
61.0
11
Nicaragua
60.5
12
Egypt
60.3
13
Saudi Arabia
59.7
14
Philippines
59.0
15
Argentina
59.0
16
Indonesia
58.9
17
Bhutan
58.5
18
Panama
57.4
19
Laos
57.3
20
China
57.1
21
Morocco
56.8
22
Sri Lanka
56.5
23
Mexico
55.6
24
Pakistan
55.6
25
Ecuador
55.5
26
Jordan
54.6
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27
Belize
54.5
28
Peru
54.4
29
Tunisia
54.3
30
Trinidad and Tobago
54.2
31
Bangladesh
54.1
32
Moldova
54.1
33
Malaysia
54.0
34
Tajikistan
53.5
35
India
53.0
36
Venezuela
52.5
37
Nepal
51.9
38
Syria
51.3
39
Burma
51.2
40
Algeria
51.2
41
Thailand
50.9
42
Haiti
50.8
43
Netherlands
50.6
44
Malta
50.4
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45
Uzbekistan
50.1
46
Chile
49.7
47
Bolivia
49.3
48
Armenia
48.3
49
Singapore
48.2
50
Yemen
48.1
51
Germany
48.1
52
Switzerland
48.1
53
Sweden
48.0
54
Albania
47.9
55
Paraguay
47.8
56
Palestinian Authority
47.7
57
Austria
47.7
58
Serbia
47.6
59
Finland
47.2
60
Croatia
47.2
61
Kyrgyzstan
47.1
62
Cyprus
46.2
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63
Guyana
45.6
64
Belgium
45.4
65
Bosnia and Herzegovina
45.0
66
Slovenia
44.5
67
Israel
44.5
68
South Korea
44.4
69
Italy
44.0
70
Romania
43.9
71
France
43.9
72
Georgia
43.6
73
Slovakia
43.5
74
United Kingdom
43.3
75
Japan
43.3
76
Spain
43.2
77
Poland
42.8
78
Ireland
42.6
79
Iraq
42.6
80
Cambodia
42.3
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81
Iran
42.1
82
Bulgaria
42.0
83
Turkey
41.7
84
Hong Kong
41.6
85
Azerbaijan
41.2
86
Lithuania
40.9
87
Djibouti
40.4
88
Norway
40.4
89
Canada
39.4
90
Hungary
38.9
91
Kazakhstan
38.5
92
Czech Republic
38.3
93
Mauritania
38.2
94
Iceland
38.1
95
Ukraine
38.1
96
Senegal
38.0
97
Greece
37.6
98
Portugal
37.5
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99
Uruguay
37.2
100
Ghana
37.1
101
Latvia
36.7
102
Australia
36.6
103
New Zealand
36.2
104
Belarus
35.7
105
Denmark
35.5
106
Mongolia
35.0
107
Malawi
34.5
108
Russia
34.5
109
Chad
34.3
110
Lebanon
33.6
111
Macedonia
32.7
112
Republic of the Congo
32.4
113
Madagascar
31.5
114
United States
30.7
115
Nigeria
30.3
116
Guinea
30.3
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117
Uganda
30.2
118
South Africa
29.7
119
Rwanda
29.6
120
Democratic Republic of the Congo
29.0
121
Sudan
28.5
122
Luxembourg
28.5
123
United Arab Emirates
28.2
124
Ethiopia
28.1
125
Kenya
27.8
126
Cameroon
27.2
127
Zambia
27.2
128
Kuwait
27.0
129
Niger
26.9
130
Angola
26.8
131
Estonia
26.4
132
Mali
25.8
133
Mozambique
24.6
134
Benin
24.6
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135
Togo
23.3
136
Sierra Leone
23.1
137
Central African Republic
22.9
138
Burkina Faso
22.4
139
Burundi
21.8
140
Namibia
21.1
141
Botswana
20.9
142
Tanzania
17.8
143
Zimbabwe
16.6
Source: This material is derived from the Happy Planet Index issued by the New Economics
Foundation (NEF).
Methodology: T h e m e t h o d o l o g y f o r t h e c a l c u l a t i o n s c a n b e f o u n d a t U R L :
http://www.happyplanetindex.org/
Status of Women
Gender Related Development Index (GDI) Rank:
68th out of 140
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Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) Rank:
Not Ranked
Female Population:
1.9 million
Female Life Expectancy at birth:
76 years
Total Fertility Rate:
3.2
Maternal Mortality Ratio (2000):
150
Total Number of Women Living with HIV/AIDS:
270-2,100
Ever Married Women, Ages 15-19 (%):
N/A
Mean Age at Time of Marriage:
N/A
Contraceptive Use Among Married Women, Any Method (%):
63%
Female Adult Literacy Rate:
82%
Combined Female Gross enrollment ratio for Primary, Secondary and Tertiary schools:
80%
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Female-Headed Households (%):
N/A
Economically Active Females (%):
30.7%
Female Contributing Family Workers (%):
N/A
Female Estimated Earned Income:
$2,430
Seats in Parliament held by women (%):
Lower or Single House: 2.3%
Upper House or Senate: N/A
Year Women Received the Right to Vote:
1952
Year Women Received the Right to Stand for Election:
1952
*The Gender Development Index (GDI) is a composite index which measures the average
achievement in a country. While very similar to the Human Development Index in its use of the
same variables, the GDI adjusts the average achievement of each country in terms of life
expectancy, enrollment in schools, income, and literacy in accordance to the disparities between
males and females.
*The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) is a composite index measuring gender inequality in
three of the basic dimensions of empowerment; economic participation and decision-making,
political participation and decision-making, and power over economic resources.
*Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is defined as the average number of babies born to women during their
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reproductive years. A TFR of 2.1 is considered the replacement rate; once a TFR of a population
reaches 2.1 the population will remain stable assuming no immigration or emigration takes place.
When the TFR is greater than 2.1 a population will increase and when it is less than 2.1 a
population will eventually decrease, although due to the age structure of a population it will take
years before a low TFR is translated into lower population.
*Maternal Mortality Rate is the number of deaths to women per 100,000 live births that resulted
from conditions related to pregnancy and or delivery related complications.
*Economically Active Females are the share of the female population, ages 15 and above, whom
supply, or are able to supply, labor for the production of goods and services.
*Female Contributing Family Workers are those females who work without pay in an economic
enterprise operated by a relative living in the same household.
*Estimated Earned Income is measured according to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in US
dollars.
Global Gender Gap Index
Global Gender Gap Index
Editor's Note:
The Global Gender Gap Index by the World Economic Forum ranks most of the world’s countries
in terms of the division of resources and opportunities among males and females. Specifically, the
ranking assesses the gender inequality gap in these four arenas:
1. Economic participation and opportunity (salaries and high skilled employment participation
levels)
2. Educational attainment (access to basic and higher level education)
3. Political empowerment (representation in decision-making structures)
4. Health and survival (life expectancy and sex ratio)
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2010
rank
2010
score
2010
rank
among
2009
countries
Iceland
1
0.8496
1
1
0.8276
4
0.7999
4
Norway
2
0.8404
2
3
0.8227
1
0.8239
2
Finland
3
0.8260
3
2
0.8252
2
0.8195
3
Sweden
4
0.8024
4
4
0.8139
3
0.8139
1
New
Zealand
5
0.7808
5
5
0.7880
5
0.7859
5
Ireland
6
0.7773
6
8
0.7597
8
0.7518
9
Denmark
7
0.7719
7
7
0.7628
7
0.7538
8
Lesotho
8
0.7678
8
10
0.7495
16
0.7320
26
Philippines
9
0.7654
9
9
0.7579
6
0.7568
6
Switzerland
10
0.7562
10
13
0.7426
14
0.7360
40
Spain
11
0.7554
11
17
0.7345
17
0.7281
10
South Africa
12
0.7535
12
6
0.7709
22
0.7232
20
Germany
13
0.7530
13
12
0.7449
11
0.7394
7
Belgium
14
0.7509
14
33
0.7165
28
0.7163
19
2009
rank
2009
score
2008
rank
2008
score
2007
rank
Country
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United
Kingdom
15
0.7460
15
15
0.7402
13
0.7366
11
Sri Lanka
16
0.7458
16
16
0.7402
12
0.7371
15
Netherlands
17
0.7444
17
11
0.7490
9
0.7399
12
Latvia
18
0.7429
18
14
0.7416
10
0.7397
13
United
States
19
0.7411
19
31
0.7173
27
0.7179
31
Canada
20
0.7372
20
25
0.7196
31
0.7136
18
Trinidad and
Tobago
21
0.7353
21
19
0.7298
19
0.7245
46
Mozambique
22
0.7329
22
26
0.7195
18
0.7266
43
Australia
23
0.7271
23
20
0.7282
21
0.7241
17
Cuba
24
0.7253
24
29
0.7176
25
0.7195
22
Namibia
25
0.7238
25
32
0.7167
30
0.7141
29
Luxembourg
26
0.7231
26
63
0.6889
66
0.6802
58
Mongolia
27
0.7194
27
22
0.7221
40
0.7049
62
Costa Rica
28
0.7194
28
27
0.7180
32
0.7111
28
Argentina
29
0.7187
29
24
0.7211
24
0.7209
33
Nicaragua
30
0.7176
30
49
0.7002
71
0.6747
90
Barbados
31
0.7176
31
21
0.7236
26
0.7188
n/a
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Portugal
32
0.7171
32
46
0.7013
39
0.7051
37
Uganda
33
0.7169
33
40
0.7067
43
0.6981
50
Moldova
34
0.7160
34
36
0.7104
20
0.7244
21
Lithuania
35
0.7132
35
30
0.7175
23
0.7222
14
Bahamas
36
0.7128
36
28
0.7179
n/a
n/a
n/a
Austria
37
0.7091
37
42
0.7031
29
0.7153
27
Guyana
38
0.7090
38
35
0.7108
n/a
n/a
n/a
Panama
39
0.7072
39
43
0.7024
34
0.7095
38
Ecuador
40
0.7072
40
23
0.7220
35
0.7091
44
Kazakhstan
41
0.7055
41
47
0.7013
45
0.6976
32
Slovenia
42
0.7047
42
52
0.6982
51
0.6937
49
Poland
43
0.7037
43
50
0.6998
49
0.6951
60
Jamaica
44
0.7037
44
48
0.7013
44
0.6980
39
Russian
Federation
45
0.7036
45
51
0.6987
42
0.6994
45
France
46
0.7025
46
18
0.7331
15
0.7341
51
Estonia
47
0.7018
47
37
0.7094
37
0.7076
30
Chile
48
0.7013
48
64
0.6884
65
0.6818
86
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Macedonia,
FYR
49
0.6996
49
53
0.6950
53
0.6914
35
Bulgaria
50
0.6983
50
38
0.7072
36
0.7077
25
Kyrgyz
Republic
51
0.6973
51
41
0.7058
41
0.7045
70
Israel
52
0.6957
52
45
0.7019
56
0.6900
36
Croatia
53
0.6939
53
54
0.6944
46
0.6967
16
Honduras
54
0.6927
54
62
0.6893
47
0.6960
68
Colombia
55
0.6927
55
56
0.6939
50
0.6944
24
Singapore
56
0.6914
56
84
0.6664
84
0.6625
77
Thailand
57
0.6910
57
59
0.6907
52
0.6917
52
Greece
58
0.6908
58
85
0.6662
75
0.6727
72
Uruguay
59
0.6897
59
57
0.6936
54
0.6907
78
Peru
60
0.6895
60
44
0.7024
48
0.6959
75
China
61
0.6881
61
60
0.6907
57
0.6878
73
Botswana
62
0.6876
62
39
0.7071
63
0.6839
53
Ukraine
63
0.6869
63
61
0.6896
62
0.6856
57
Venezuela
64
0.6863
64
69
0.6839
59
0.6875
55
Czech
Republic
65
0.6850
65
74
0.6789
69
0.6770
64
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Tanzania
66
0.6829
66
73
0.6797
38
0.7068
34
Romania
67
0.6826
67
70
0.6805
70
0.6763
47
Malawi
68
0.6824
68
76
0.6738
81
0.6664
87
Paraguay
69
0.6804
69
66
0.6868
100
0.6379
69
Ghana
70
0.6782
70
80
0.6704
77
0.6679
63
Slovak
Republic
71
0.6778
71
68
0.6845
64
0.6824
54
Vietnam
72
0.6776
72
71
0.6802
68
0.6778
42
Dominican
Republic
73
0.6774
73
67
0.6859
72
0.6744
65
Italy
74
0.6765
74
72
0.6798
67
0.6788
84
Gambia,
The
75
0.6762
75
75
0.6752
85
0.6622
95
Bolivia
76
0.6751
76
82
0.6693
80
0.6667
80
Brueni
Darussalem
77
0.6748
77
94
0.6524
99
0.6392
n/a
Albania
78
0.6726
78
91
0.6601
87
0.6591
66
Hungary
79
0.6720
79
65
0.6879
60
0.6867
61
Madagascar
80
0.6713
80
77
0.6732
74
0.6736
89
Angola
81
0.6712
81
106
0.6353
114
0.6032
110
Bangladesh
82
0.6702
82
93
0.6526
90
0.6531
100
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Malta
83
0.6695
83
88
0.6635
83
0.6634
76
Armenia
84
0.6669
84
90
0.6619
78
0.6677
71
Brazil
85
0.6655
85
81
0.6695
73
0.6737
74
Cyprus
86
0.6642
86
79
0.6706
76
0.6694
82
Indonesia
87
0.6615
87
92
0.6580
93
0.6473
81
Georgia
88
0.6598
88
83
0.6680
82
0.6654
67
Tajikistan
89
0.6598
89
86
0.6661
89
0.6541
79
El Salvador
90
0.6596
90
55
0.6939
58
0.6875
48
Mexico
91
0.6577
91
98
0.6503
97
0.6441
93
Zimbabwe
92
0.6574
92
95
0.6518
92
0.6485
88
Belize
93
0.6536
93
87
0.6636
86
0.6610
94
Japan
94
0.6524
94
101
0.6447
98
0.6434
91
Mauritius
95
0.6520
95
96
0.6513
95
0.6466
85
Kenya
96
0.6499
96
97
0.6512
88
0.6547
83
Cambodia
97
0.6482
97
104
0.6410
94
0.6469
98
Malaysia
98
0.6479
98
100
0.6467
96
0.6442
92
Maldives
99
0.6452
99
99
0.6482
91
0.6501
99
Azerbaijan
100
0.6446
100
89
0.6626
61
0.6856
59
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Senegal
101
0.6414
101
102
0.6427
n/a
n/a
n/a
Suriname
102
0.6407
102
78
0.6726
79
0.6674
56
United Arab
Emirates
103
0.6397
103
112
0.6198
105
0.6220
105
Korea, Rep.
104
0.6342
104
115
0.6146
108
0.6154
97
Kuwait
105
0.6318
105
105
0.6356
101
0.6358
96
Zambia
106
0.6293
106
107
0.6310
106
0.6205
101
Tunisia
107
0.6266
107
109
0.6233
103
0.6295
102
Fiji
108
0.6256
108
103
0.6414
n/a
n/a
n/a
Guatemala
109
0.6238
109
111
0.6209
112
0.6072
106
Bahrain
110
0.6217
110
116
0.6136
121
0.5927
115
Burkina
Faso
111
0.6162
111
120
0.6081
115
0.6029
117
India
112
0.6155
112
114
0.6151
113
0.6060
114
Mauritania
113
0.6152
113
119
0.6103
110
0.6117
111
Cameroon
114
0.6110
114
118
0.6108
117
0.6017
116
Nepal
115
0.6084
115
110
0.6213
120
0.5942
125
Lebanon*
116
0.6084
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Qatar
117
0.6059
116
125
0.5907
119
0.5948
109
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Nigeria
118
0.6055
117
108
0.6280
102
0.6339
107
Algeria
119
0.6052
118
117
0.6119
111
0.6111
108
Jordan
120
0.6048
119
113
0.6182
104
0.6275
104
Ethiopia
121
0.6019
120
122
0.5948
122
0.5867
113
Oman
122
0.5950
121
123
0.5938
118
0.5960
119
Iran
123
0.5933
122
128
0.5839
116
0.6021
118
Syria
124
0.5926
123
121
0.6072
107
0.6181
103
Egypt
125
0.5899
124
126
0.5862
124
0.5832
120
Turkey
126
0.5876
125
129
0.5828
123
0.5853
121
Morocco
127
0.5767
126
124
0.5926
125
0.5757
122
Benin
128
0.5719
127
131
0.5643
126
0.5582
123
Saudi Arabia
129
0.5713
128
130
0.5651
128
0.5537
124
Côte
d'Ivoire*
130
0.5691
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Mali
131
0.5680
129
127
0.5860
109
0.6117
112
Pakistan
132
0.5465
130
132
0.5458
127
0.5549
126
Chad
133
0.5330
131
133
0.5417
129
0.5290
127
Yemen
134
0.4603
132
134
0.4609
130
0.4664
128
Belarus
n/a
n/a
n/a
34
0.7141
33
0.7099
23
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n/a
n/a
n/a
58
0.6913
55
0.6906
41
*new country 2010
Commentary:
According to the report’s index, Nordic countries, such as Iceland, Norway, Finland, and Sweden
have continued to dominate at the top of the ranking for gender equality. Meanwhile, France has
seen a notable decline in the ranking, largely as a result of decreased number of women holding
ministerial portfolios in that country. In the Americas, the United States has risen in the ranking to
top the region, predominantly as a result of a decreasing wage gap, as well as higher number of
women holding key positions in the current Obama administration. Canada has continued to
remain as one of the top ranking countries of the Americas, followed by the small Caribbean island
nation of Trinidad and Tobago, which has the distinction of being among the top three countries of
the Americans in the realm of gender equality. Lesotho and South African ranked highly in the
index, leading not only among African countries but also in global context. Despite Lesotho still
lagging in the area of life expectancy, its high ranking was attributed to high levels of female
participation in the labor force and female literacy. The Philippines and Sri Lanka were the top
ranking countries for gender equality for Asia, ranking highly also in global context. The
Philippines has continued to show strong performance in all strong performance on all four
dimensions (detailed above) of the index. Finally, in the Arab world, the United Arab Emirates
held the highest-rank within that region of the world; however, its placement near the bottom of
the global list highlights the fact that Arab countries are generally poor performers when it comes
to the matter of gender equality in global scope.
Source:
This data is derived from the latest edition of The Global Gender Gap Report by the World
Economic Forum.
Available at URL:
http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNetw
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Updated:
Based on latest available data as set forth in chart; reviewed in 2014
Culture and Arts
Cultural Summary
Lebanon is considered to be one of the most liberal cultures in the Middle East. Although the
religion of Islam plays a key role in the country’s culture, Lebanon has a relatively large Christian
population when compared to other Middle Eastern nations with Christians making up about 40
percent of the country’s residents.
Arabic and French are the official language of Lebanon although Arabic is by far the most widely
spoken. These days, English is becoming more prevalent in business circles
The country has one of the highest literacy rates in the Middle East. Major universities include the
American University of Beirut, the Universite Saint-Joseph (subsidized by the French government
and administered by the Jesuit order), the Lebanese University (Universite Libanaise) and the
Beirut Arab University (an affiliate of the University of Alexandria).
Some famous Lebanese writers included Khalil Gibran, Georges Shehade and Michel Chiha.
Nineteenth-century artist Khalil Gibran is among the most well-known poets and writers around the
world. Contemporary writers include Amin Maalouf, Emily Nasrallah and Hanan Al-Shaykh.
Lebanon has hosted the Baalbeck International Festival, an annual music fest, since 1955. The
event is the oldest and most known cultural event in the Middle East and the eastern
Mediterranean. At one time, international opera, ballet, symphony and drama companies
worldwide performed in Beirut. Some Lebanese artists are active in European opera and theater
companies, while others are trying to create a wider audience for classical Arabic music and
theater.
The national dance is the dabkah, an energetic folk dance. Classical belly dancing is still common
at weddings and popular at wedding as well. Traditional Arabic music is created using
unharmonized melodies and complex rhythms, often accompanied by sophisticated, many-layered
singing. Instruments used include the oud, a pear-shaped string instrument; the tabla, a clay, wood
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or metal and skin percussion instrument; the nay, a single reed, open-ended pipe with a lovely
mellow tone; and the qanun, a flat trapezoid instrument with at least 81 pluckable strings.
Zajal, or folk poetry, has seen a revival as of late.
Research sources include:
http://www.ghazi.de/culturet.html
http://www.eslsite.com/country_guide/Lebanon/Lebanon_Culture.html
http://marounabi.com/Lebanon_culture.htm
***
Etiquette
Cultural Dos and Taboos
1. Handshakes are customary. Men will wait for a woman to extend her hand first before shaking
it.
2. Stick to formal forms of address, complete with titles, unless invited to do otherwise.
3. If a Muslim man does not introduce you to his wife, though she may be standing next to him, do
not assume the responsibility of introducing yourself to her.
4. Business meetings will not start until people have gotten a chance to know each other. This is a
good time to establish a trust and rapport between both parties involved.
5. Visitors should expect to bargain in the market place. Bargaining in the market place is the
traditional way of business. In fact, merchants may become offended if visitors do not attempt to
bargain and may refuse the sale of their product.
6. Traditional Muslims will not touch any sort of pork product (such as football make from pig
skin) or alcohol products (even perfumes which contain alcohol).
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7. Alcohol, however, is legal in bars and restaurants. Nevertheless, public drunkenness is not
tolerated. A woman should be careful not to drink alone in bars or she might be thought of as a
prostitute.
8. Men and women should avoid making prolonged eye contact with the opposite sex.
9. No flirting and no public affection, even between married couples.
10. The visitor should respect the five times of daily prayer.
11. Observe Muslim customs when invited to a Muslim house. This means remove shoes before
entering the house, do not sit or stand so that anyone can see the bottom of your foot, and do no
eat with you left hand.
12. One should always remove his or her shoes before entering houses or mosques.
13. Never expose the bottom of the foot to anyone.
14. Note that Lebanon is not a strictly Muslim country. Be sensitive to cultural and religious
diversity.
15. Dress should always be modest. Women should take special care not to wear revealing clothing
so as to avoid harassment and hostility from the Muslim population.
Travel Information
Please Note:
This is a generalized travel guide and it is intended to coalesce several resources, which a
traveler might find useful, regardless of a particular destination. As such, it does not
include travel warnings for specific "hot spot" destinations.
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For travel alerts and warnings, please see the United States Department of State's listings
available at URL:
http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/alertswarnings.html
Please note that travel to the following countries, based on these warnings, is ill-advised, or
should be undertaken with the utmost precaution:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea,
Honduras, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, Niger,
Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories of West Bank and Gaza,
Philippines areas of Sulu Archipelago, Mindanao, and southern Sulu Sea, Saudi Arabia,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Yemen.
***
Please Note:
The Department of State urges U.S. citizens to avoid all travel to Lebanon because of
ongoing safety and security concerns. U.S. citizens living and working in Lebanon should
understand that they accept the risks of remaining in the country and should carefully
consider those risks. In the past two years, two U.S. citizens have died in bombings, and
two have been kidnapped, according to information available to the U.S. government.
Terrorist groups from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and al-Nusrah Front
(ANF) have been active in Lebanon, specifically along the border with Syria. As well,
there have been episodic clashes between the Lebanese army and Syrian-based extremists
along the border with Syria. There have also been incidents of cross-border shelling and air
strikes of Lebanese villages from Syria, which resulted in deaths and injuries. There have
been reports of armed groups from Syria who kidnapped or attacked Lebanese citizens
living in the border area. With the potential for violence and abductions, the U.S. Embassy
strongly urges U.S. citizens to avoid the Lebanese-Syrian border region.
There are border tensions to the south with Israel as well. Hostilities between Israel and
Hezballah have in the past flared in the Golan Heights and Shebaa Farms area, and the
potential for wider conflict remains to date. South of the Litani River, Hizballah has
stockpiled large amounts of munitions in anticipation of a future conflict with Israel.
There have been sporadic rocket attacks from southern Lebanon into Israel in connection
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with the violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. These attacks, normally consisting of
a few unsophisticated rockets fired at northern Israel, often provoke a prompt Israeli
military response in the form of artillery fire.
Landmines and unexploded ordnance pose significant dangers throughout southern
Lebanon, particularly south of the Litani River, as well as in areas of the country where
fighting was intense during the civil war.
Sudden outbreaks of violence can occur at any time in Lebanon, and armed clashes have
occurred in major cities. The Lebanese government cannot guarantee protection for U.S.
citizens or visitors to the country in the event violence occurs suddenly. P
***
International Travel Guide
Checklist for Travelers
1. Take out travel insurance to cover hospital treatment or medical evacuation. Overseas medical
costs are expensive to most international travelers, where one's domestic, nationalized or even
private health insurance plans will not provide coverage outside one's home country. Learn about
"reciprocal insurance plans" that some international health care companies might offer.
2. Make sure that one's travel insurance is appropriate. If one intends to indulge in adventurous
activities, such as parasailing, one should be sure that one is fully insured in such cases. Many
traditional insurance policies do not provide coverage in cases of extreme circumstances.
3. Take time to learn about one's destination country and culture. Read and learn about the place
one is traveling. Also check political, economic and socio-cultural developments at the destination
by reading country-specific travel reports and fact sheets noted below.
4. Get the necessary visas for the country (or countries) one intends to visit - but be aware that a
visa does not guarantee entry. A number of useful sites regarding visa and other entry requirements
are noted below.
5. Keep in regular contact with friends and relatives back at home by phone or email, and be sure
to leave a travel itinerary.
6. Protect one's personal information by making copies of one's passport details, insurance policy,
travelers checks and credit card numbers. Taking copies of such documents with you, while
leaving another collection copies with someone at home is also good practice for travelers. Taking
copies of one's passport photograph is also recommended.
7. Stay healthy by taking all possible precautions against illness. Also, be sure to take extra supplies
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of prescription drugs along for the trip, while also taking time to pack general pharmaceutical
supplies, such as aspirin and other such painkillers, bandages, stomach ailment medication, antiinflammatory medication and anti-bacterial medication.
8. Do not carry illicit drugs. Understand that the punishment for possession or use of illegal drugs
in some countries may be capital punishment. Make sure your prescription drugs are legal in the
countries you plan to visit.
9. Know the laws of one's destination country and culture; be sure to understand the repercussions
of breaking those laws and regulations. Often the transparency and freedoms of the juridical
system at home is not consistent with that of one's destination country. Become aware of these
complexities and subtleties before you travel.
10. For longer stays in a country, or where the security situation is volatile, one should register
one's self and traveling companions at the local embassy or consulate of one's country of
citizenship.
11. Women should take care to be prepared both culturally and practically for traveling in a
different country and culture. One should be sure to take sufficient supplies of personal feminine
products and prescription drugs. One should also learn about local cultural standards for women,
including norms of dressing. Be aware that it is simply inappropriate and unsafe for women to
travel alone in some countries, and take the necessary precautions to avoid risk-filled situations.
12. If one is traveling with small children, one should pack extra supplies, make arrangements with
the travel carrier for proper seating that would adequately accommodate children, infants or
toddlers. Note also that whether one is male of female, traveling with children means that one's
hands are thus not free to carry luggage and bags. Be especially aware that this makes one
vulnerable to pickpockets, thieves and other sorts of crime.
13. Make proper arrangements for accommodations, well in advance of one's arrival at a
destination. Some countries have limited accommodation, while others may have culturally
distinctive facilities. Learning about these practicalities before one travels will greatly aid the
enjoyment of one's trip.
14. Travel with different forms of currency and money (cash, traveler's checks and credit cards) in
anticipation that venues may not accept one or another form of money. Also, ensuring that one's
financial resources are not contained in one location, or by one person (if one is traveling with
others) can be a useful measure, in the event that one loses a wallet or purse.
15. Find out about transportation in the destination country. In some places, it might be advisable
to hire a local driver or taxi guide for safety reasons, while in other countries, enjoying one's travel
experience may well be enhanced by renting a vehicle and seeing the local sights and culture
independently. Costs may also be prohibitive for either of these choices, so again, prior planning is
suggested.
Tips for Travelers
• Follow the local and regional news. Visits are usually trouble free but you may need to change
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your plans at short notice in the event of heightened tension.
• Check with your embassy, consulate, or appropriate government institution related to travel
before traveling.
• Bring enough funds for your stay and return journey, and ensure that if necessary you can
arrange for extra funds to be sent to you.
• Carry your passport or Lebanese identity document with you at all times.
• Keep your passport, money and valuables in a safe place at all times. Do not leave passports or
valuables unattended on the beach.
• Enter next of kin details into the back of your passport.
• Keep a separate record of your passport number, date and place of issue or a photocopy. This
will help speed up replacement if the original is lost or stolen.
• Respect Lebanese immigration and work permit rules. Tourist visas are valid for a stay of three
months maximum. Applications for an extension of stay should be made at the Passport and
Immigration Office, Surete Generale. Failure to do this could result in detention and deportation.
• Register with your embassy on arrival and consult them if any problems arise.
• Medical Insurance. Make sure you are fully covered for medical treatment. Hospitalization and or
medical evacuation to your home country can be very expensive.
• Travel Insurance. Make sure you are fully covered for unexpected losses or expenses (e.g.
cancelled flights, lost luggage, lost passport, stolen cash or credit cards).
• Don't go anywhere that isn't a recognized tourist site unless you are on an organized tour or have
a local guide. There are landmines and unexploded ordnance in many parts of Lebanon,
particularly areas around the border with Israel. Stay away from the border itself; people have been
shot. Visits to Palestinian camps are not advised.
• Don't hitchhike. It is not safe to accept lifts.
• Don't get involved with drugs. Penalties for drug trafficking, smuggling and possession are severe.
• Don't take photographs of or near military or other official installations.
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• Don't attempt to enter Lebanon with an Israeli stamp on your passport.
Note: This information is directly quoted from the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth
Office.
Sources: United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Business Culture: Information for Business Travelers
For general information on etiquette in Lebanon, see our Cultural Etiquette page.
Online Resources Regarding Entry Requirements and Visas
Foreign Entry Requirements for Americans from the United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1765.html
Visa Services for Non-Americans from the United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/visa/visa_1750.html
Visa Bulletins from the United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_1360.html
Visa Waivers from the United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/without_1990.html - new
Passport and Visa Information from the Government of the United Kingdom
http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/
Visa Information from the Government of Australia
http://www.dfat.gov.au/visas/index.html
Passport Information from the Government of Australia
https://www.passports.gov.au/Web/index.aspx
Passport Information from the Government of Canada
http://www.voyage.gc.ca/preparation_information/passport_passeport-eng.asp
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Visa Information from the Government of Canada
http://www.voyage.gc.ca/preparation_information/visas-eng.asp
Online Visa Processing by Immigration Experts by VisaPro
http://www.visapro.com
Sources: United States Department of State, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Government of Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of Canada
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Useful Online Resources for Travelers
Country-Specific Travel Information from United States
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1765.html
Travel Advice by Country from Government of United Kingdom
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/
General Travel Advice from Government of Australia
http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/General
Travel Bulletins from the Government of Australia
http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/TravelBulletins/
Travel Tips from Government of Australia
http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/tips/index.html
Travel Checklist by Government of Canada
http://www.voyage.gc.ca/preparation_information/checklist_sommaire-eng.asp
Travel Checklist from Government of United Kingdom
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/staying-safe/checklist
Your trip abroad from United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/brochures/brochures_1225.html
A safe trip abroad from United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/safety/safety_1747.html
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Tips for expatriates abroad from United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/travel/living/residing/residing_1235.html
Tips for students from United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/travel/living/studying/studying_1238.html http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/brochures/broc
Medical information for travelers from United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/health/health_1185.html
US Customs Travel information
http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/travel/
Sources: United States Department of State; United States Customs Department, United Kingdom
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government of Australia;
Government of Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Other Practical Online Resources for Travelers
Foreign Language Phrases for Travelers
http://www.travlang.com/languages/
http://www.omniglot.com/language/phrases/index.htm
World Weather Forecasts
http://www.intellicast.com/
http://www.wunderground.com/
http://www.worldweather.org/
Worldwide Time Zones, Map, World Clock
http://www.timeanddate.com/
http://www.worldtimezone.com/
International Airport Codes
http://www.world-airport-codes.com/
International Dialing Codes
http://www.kropla.com/dialcode.htm
http://www.countrycallingcodes.com/
International Phone Guide
http://www.kropla.com/phones.htm
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International Mobile Phone Guide
http://www.kropla.com/mobilephones.htm
International Internet Café Search Engine
http://cybercaptive.com/
Global Internet Roaming
http://www.kropla.com/roaming.htm
World Electric Power Guide
http://www.kropla.com/electric.htm
http://www.kropla.com/electric2.htm
World Television Standards and Codes
http://www.kropla.com/tv.htm
International Currency Exchange Rates
http://www.xe.com/ucc/
Banking and Financial Institutions Across the World
http://www.123world.com/banks/index.html
International Credit Card or Automated Teller Machine (ATM) Locator
http://visa.via.infonow.net/locator/global/
http://www.mastercard.com/us/personal/en/cardholderservices/atmlocations/index.html
International Chambers of Commerce
http://www.123world.com/chambers/index.html
World Tourism Websites
http://123world.com/tourism/
Diplomatic and Consular Information
United States Diplomatic Posts Around the World
http://www.usembassy.gov/
United Kingdom Diplomatic Posts Around the World
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/embassies-and-posts/find-an-embassy-overseas/
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Australia's Diplomatic Posts Around the World
http://www.dfat.gov.au/missions/
http://www.dfat.gov.au/embassies.html
Canada's Embassies and High Commissions
http://www.international.gc.ca/ciw-cdm/embassies-ambassades.aspx
Resources for Finding Embassies and other Diplomatic Posts Across the World
http://www.escapeartist.com/embassy1/embassy1.htm
Safety and Security
Travel Warnings by Country from Government of Australia
http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/
Travel Warnings and Alerts from United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_1764.html
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/pa/pa_1766.html
Travel Reports and Warnings by Government of Canada
http://www.voyage.gc.ca/countries_pays/menu-eng.asp
http://www.voyage.gc.ca/countries_pays/updates_mise-a-jour-eng.asp
Travel Warnings from Government of United Kingdom
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/?
action=noTravelAll#noTravelAll
Sources: United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the United States Department of
State, the Government of Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
Government of Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Other Safety and Security Online Resources for Travelers
United States Department of State Information on Terrorism
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/
Government of the United Kingdom Resource on the Risk of Terrorism
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?
pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1044011304926
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Government of Canada Terrorism Guide
http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/terrorism-terrorisme.aspx?lang=eng
Information on Terrorism by Government of Australia
http://www.dfat.gov.au/icat/index.html
FAA Resource on Aviation Safety
http://www.faasafety.gov/
In-Flight Safety Information for Air Travel (by British Airways crew trainer Anna Warman)
http://www.warman.demon.co.uk/anna/inflight.html
Hot Spots: Travel Safety and Risk Information
http://www.airsecurity.com/hotspots/HotSpots.asp
Information on Human Rights
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/
Sources: The United States Department of State, the United States Customs Department, the
Government of Canada, the Government of United Kingdom, the Government of Australia, the
Federal Aviation Authority, Anna Warman's In-flight Website, Hot Spots Travel and Risk
Information
Diseases/Health Data
Please Note: Most of the entry below constitutes a generalized health advisory, which a
traveler might find useful, regardless of a particular destination.
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As a supplement, however, reader will also find below a list of countries flagged with current
health notices and alerts issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
Please note that travel to the following countries, based on these 3 levels of warnings, is
ill-advised, or should be undertaken with the utmost precaution:
Level 3 (highest level of concern; avoid non-essential travel) -Guinea - Ebola
Liberia - Ebola
Nepal - Eathquake zone
Sierra Leone - Ebola
Level 2 (intermediate level of concern; use utmost caution during travel) -Cameroon - Polio
Somalia - Polio
Vanuatu - Tropical Cyclone zone
Throughout Middle East and Arabia Peninsula - MERS ((Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome)
Level 1 (standard level of concern; use practical caution during travel) Australia - Ross River disease
Bosnia-Herzegovina - Measles
Brazil - Dengue Fever
Brazil - Malaria
Brazil - Zika
China - H7N9 Avian flu
Cuba - Cholera
Egypt - H5N1 Bird flu
Ethiopia - Measles
Germany - Measles
Japan - Hand, foot, and mouth disease (HFMD)
Kyrgyzstan - Measles
Malaysia -Dengue Fever
Mexico - Chikungunya
Mexico - Hepatitis A
Nigeria - Meningitis
Philippines - Measles
Scotland - Mumps
Singapore - Hand, foot, and mouth disease (HFMD)
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South Korea - MERS ((Middle East Respiratory Syndrome)
Throughout Caribbean - Chikungunya
Throughout Central America - Chikungunya
Throughout South America - Chikungunya
Throughout Pacific Islands - Chikungunya
For specific information related to these health notices and alerts please see the CDC's
listing available at URL:
http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/notices
Health Information for Travelers to Lebanon
Check the Outbreaks section for important updates on this region
(http://www.cdc.gov/travel/outbreaks.htm).
The preventive measures you need to take while traveling in the Middle East depend on the areas
you visit and the length of time you stay. You should observe the precautions listed in this
document in most areas of this region. However, in highly developed areas of Israel, you should
observe health precautions similar to those that would apply while traveling in the United States.
Travelers' diarrhea, the number one illness in travelers, can be caused by viruses, bacteria, or
parasites, which can contaminate food or water. Infections may cause diarrhea and vomiting (E.
coli, Salmonella, cholera, and parasites), fever (typhoid fever and toxoplasmosis), or liver damage
(hepatitis). Make sure your food and drinking water are safe. (See below.)
Malaria is a preventable infection that can be fatal if left untreated. Prevent infection by taking
prescription antimalarial drugs and protecting yourself against mosquito bites (see below). A low
risk for malaria exists in parts of Iran, Iraq, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey,
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Travelers to risk areas of Oman, Iran, Saudi Arabia, United
Arab Emirates, and Yemen should take mefloquine for malaria prevention. Travelers to risk areas
of Iraq, Syria, and Turkey should take chloroquine. For specific locations, see Malaria Information
for Travelers to the Middle East (http://www.cdc.gov/travel/regionalmalaria/mideast.htm).
A certificate of yellow fever vaccination may be required for entry into certain of these countries,
but only if you are coming from a country in tropical South America or sub-Saharan Africa. (There
is no risk for yellow fever in the Middle East.) For detailed information, see Comprehensive Yellow
Fever Vaccination Requirements (http://www.cdc.gov/travel/yelfever.htm).
Dengue, filariasis, leishmaniasis, onchocerciasis, and plague are diseases carried by insects that also
occur in this region. Protecting yourself against insect bites (see below) will help to prevent these
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diseases.
CDC Recommends the Following Vaccines (as Appropriate for Age):
See your doctor at least 4-6 weeks before your trip to allow time for shots to take effect.
• Hepatitis A or immune globulin (IG).
• Hepatitis B, if you might be exposed to blood (for example, health-care workers), have sexual
contact with the local population, stay longer than 6 months, or be exposed through medical
treatment.
• Meningococcal vaccine is required for pilgrims to Mecca for the annual Hajj. However, CDC
currently recommends the vaccine for all travelers to Mecca, including those traveling for the
Umra. (For more information, please see Meningococcal Disease Among Travelers to Saudi Arabia
at URL http://www.cdc.gov/travel/saudimenin.htm.)
• Rabies, if you might be exposed to wild or domestic animals through your work or recreation.
• Typhoid, particularly if you are visiting developing countries in this region.
• As needed, booster doses for tetanus-diphtheria and measles, and a one-time dose of polio for
adults. Hepatitis B vaccine is now recommended for all infants and for children ages 11-12 years
who have not completed the series.
All travelers should take the following precautions, no matter the destination:
• Wash hands often with soap and water.
• Because motor vehicle crashes are a leading cause of injury among travelers, walk and drive
defensively. Avoid travel at night if possible and always use seat belts.
• Always use latex condoms to reduce the risk of HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases.
• Don't eat or drink dairy products unless you know they have been pasteurized.
• Don't share needles with anyone.
• Eat only thoroughly cooked food or fruits and vegetables you have peeled yourself. Remember:
boil it, cook it, peel it, or forget it.
• Never eat undercooked ground beef and poultry, raw eggs, and unpasteurized dairy products.
Raw shellfish is particularly dangerous to persons who have liver disease or compromised immune
systems.
Travelers visiting undeveloped areas should take the following precautions:
To Stay Healthy, Do:
• Drink only bottled or boiled water, or carbonated (bubbly) drinks in cans or bottles. Avoid tap
water, fountain drinks, and ice cubes. If this is not possible, make water safer by BOTH filtering
through an "absolute 1-micron or less" filter AND adding iodine tablets to the filtered water.
"Absolute 1-micron filters" are found in camping/outdoor supply stores.
• If you visit an area where there is risk for malaria, take your malaria prevention medication
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before, during, and after travel, as directed. (See your doctor for a prescription.)
• Protect yourself from insects by remaining in well-screened areas, using repellents (applied
sparingly at 4-hour intervals), and wearing long-sleeved shirts and long pants from dusk through
dawn.
• To prevent fungal and parasitic infections, keep feet clean and dry, and do not go barefoot.
To Avoid Getting Sick:
• Don't eat food purchased from street vendors.
• Don't drink beverages with ice.
• Don't handle animals (especially monkeys, dogs, and cats), to avoid bites and serious diseases
(including rabies and plague). (For more information, please see the Animal-Associated Hazards on
the Making Travel Safe page at URL http://www.cdc.gov/travel/safety.htm.)
• Don't swim in fresh water. Salt water is usually safer. (For more information, please see the
Swimming Precautions on the Making Travel Safe page.)
What You Need To Bring with You:
• Long-sleeved shirt and long pants to wear while outside whenever possible, to prevent illnesses
carried by insects (e.g., malaria, dengue, filariasis, leishmaniasis, and onchocerciasis).
• Insect repellent containing DEET (diethylmethyltoluamide), in 30%-35% strength for adults and
6%-10% for children.
• Over-the-counter antidiarrheal medicine to take if you have diarrhea.
• Iodine tablets and water filters to purify water if bottled water is not available. See Do's above for
more details about water filters.
• Sunblock, sunglasses, hat.
• Prescription medications: make sure you have enough to last during your trip, as well as a copy
of the prescription(s).
After You Return Home:
If you have visited an area where there is risk for malaria, continue taking your malaria medication
weekly for 4 weeks after you leave the area.
If you become ill-even as long as a year after your trip-tell your doctor the areas you have visited.
For More Information:
Ask your doctor or check the CDC web sites for more information about protecting yourself
against diseases that occur in the Middle East.
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Carried by Insects
Dengue, Malaria, Plague
Carried in Food or Water
Cholera, Escherichia coli, diarrhea, Hepatitis A, Schistosomiasis, Typhoid Fever
Person-to-Person Contact
Hepatitis B, HIV/AIDS
For more information about these and other diseases, please check the Diseases
(http://www.cdc.gov/travel/diseases.htm) s e c t i o n a n d t h e H e a l t h T o p i c s A - Z
(http://www.cdc.gov/health/diseases.htm).
Note:
Lebanon is located in the Middle East health region.
Sources:
The Center for Disease Control Destinations Website:
http://www.cdc.gov/travel/destinat.htm
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Chapter 6
Environmental Overview
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Environmental Issues
General Overview:
Located along a narrow coastal plain; Lebanon 's terrain is mainly rugged, and characterized most
strongly by the Anti-Lebanon Mountains and Al Biqa' (the Bekaa Valley ) . M o s t o f i t s
environmental problems are concentrated in its capital city of Beirut. Air pollution – typical urban
environmental challenges – have not escaped the area surrounding Beirut. Likewise, oil spills and
residues – both common occurrences in the oil-producing Middle East have also contributed to
water pollution. Finally, widespread exploitation of Lebanon 's famous cedars have contributed to
increasing deforestation, as well as the associated problems, such as soil erosion.
Current Issues:
-deforestation
-soil erosion
-desertification
-air pollution in Beirut, due to vehicular traffic, in conjunction with industrial waste incineration
-no viable form of waste management, including the disposal of raw sewage
-high incidence of oil spills, due to unregulated mineral transport
-pollution of coastal waters by oil spills and raw sewage
Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Mtc):
4.9
Country Rank (GHG output):
107th
Natural Hazards:
-dust storms
-sandstorms
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Environmental Policy
Regulation and Jurisdiction:
The regulation and protection of the environment in Lebanon is under the jurisdiction of the
following:
Ministry of the Environment
Ministry of Agriculture
Major Non-Governmental Organizations:
N/A
International Environmental Accords:
Party to:
Biodiversity
Climate Change
Desertification
Hazardous Wastes
Law of the Sea
Nuclear Test Ban
Ozone Layer Protection
Ship Pollution
Wetlands
Signed but not ratified:
Environmental Modification, Marine Life Conservation
Kyoto Protocol Status (year ratified):
Lebanon is not a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol
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Greenhouse Gas Ranking
Greenhouse Gas Ranking
GHG Emissions Rankings
Country
Rank
Country
1
United States
2
China
4
Russia
5
Japan
6
India
7
Germany
8
United Kingdom
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9
Canada
10
Korea, South
11
Italy
12
Mexico
13
France
14
South Africa
15
Iran
16
Indonesia
17
Australia
18
Spain
19
Brazil
20
Saudi Arabia
21
Ukraine
22
Poland
23
Taiwan
24
Turkey
25
Thailand
26
Netherlands
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27
Kazakhstan
28
Malaysia
29
Egypt
30
Venezuela
31
Argentina
32
Uzbekistan
33
Czech Republic
34
Belgium
35
Pakistan
36
Romania
37
Greece
38
United Arab Emirates
39
Algeria
40
Nigeria
41
Austria
42
Iraq
43
Finland
44
Philippines
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45
Vietnam
46
Korea, North
47
Israel
48
Portugal
49
Colombia
50
Belarus
51
Kuwait
52
Hungary
53
Chile
54
Denmark
55
Serbia & Montenegro
56
Sweden
57
Syria
58
Libya
59
Bulgaria
60
Singapore
61
Switzerland
62
Ireland
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63
Turkmenistan
64
Slovakia
65
Bangladesh
66
Morocco
67
New Zealand
68
Oman
69
Qatar
70
Azerbaijan
71
Norway
72
Peru
73
Cuba
74
Ecuador
75
Trinidad & Tobago
76
Croatia
77
Tunisia
78
Dominican Republic
79
Lebanon
80
Estonia
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81
Yemen
82
Jordan
83
Slovenia
84
Bahrain
85
Angola
86
Bosnia & Herzegovina
87
Lithuania
88
Sri Lanka
89
Zimbabwe
90
Bolivia
91
Jamaica
92
Guatemala
93
Luxembourg
94
Myanmar
95
Sudan
96
Kenya
97
Macedonia
98
Mongolia
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99
Ghana
100
Cyprus
101
Moldova
102
Latvia
103
El Salvador
104
Brunei
105
Honduras
106
Cameroon
107
Panama
108
Costa Rica
109
Cote d'Ivoire
110
Kyrgyzstan
111
Tajikistan
112
Ethiopia
113
Senegal
114
Uruguay
115
Gabon
116
Albania
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117
Nicaragua
118
Botswana
119
Paraguay
120
Tanzania
121
Georgia
122
Armenia
123
Congo, RC
124
Mauritius
125
Nepal
126
Mauritius
127
Nepal
128
Mauritania
129
Malta
130
Papua New Guinea
131
Zambia
132
Suriname
133
Iceland
134
Togo
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135
Benin
136
Uganda
137
Bahamas
138
Haiti
139
Congo, DRC
140
Guyana
141
Mozambique
142
Guinea
143
Equatorial Guinea
144
Laos
145
Barbados
146
Niger
147
Fiji
148
Burkina Faso
149
Malawi
150
Swaziland
151
Belize
152
Afghanistan
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153
Sierra Leone
154
Eritrea
155
Rwanda
156
Mali
157
Seychelles
158
Cambodia
159
Liberia
160
Bhutan
161
Maldives
162
Antigua & Barbuda
163
Djibouti
164
Saint Lucia
165
Gambia
166
Guinea-Bissau
167
Central African Republic
168
Palau
169
Burundi
170
Grenada
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171
Lesotho
172
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines
173
Solomon Islands
174
Samoa
175
Cape Verde
176
Nauru
177
Dominica
178
Saint Kitts & Nevis
179
Chad
180
Tonga
181
Sao Tome & Principe
182
Comoros
183
Vanuatu
185
Kiribati
Not Ranked
Andorra
Not Ranked
East Timor
Not Ranked
Holy See
Not Ranked
Hong Kong
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Not Ranked
Liechtenstein
Not Ranked
Marshall Islands
Not Ranked
Micronesia
Not Ranked
Monaco
Not Ranked
San Marino
Not Ranked
Somalia
Not Ranked
Tuvalu
* European Union is ranked 3rd
Cook Islands are ranked 184th
Niue is ranked 186th
Global Environmental Snapshot
Introduction
The countries of the world face many environmental challenges in common. Nevertheless, the
nature and intensity of problem vary from region to region, as do various countries' respective
capacities, in terms of affluence and infrastructure, to remediate threats to environmental quality.
Consciousness of perils affecting the global environment came to the fore in the last third or so of
the 20th century has continued to intensify well into the new millennium. According to the United
Nations Environment Programme, considerable environmental progress has been made at the level
of institutional developments, international cooperation accords, and public participation.
Approximately two-dozen international environmental protection accords with global implications
have been promulgated since the late 1970s under auspices of the United Nations and other
international organizations, together with many additional regional agreements. Attempts to address
and rectify environmental problems take the form of legal frameworks, economic instruments,
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environmentally sound technologies and cleaner production processes as well as conservation
efforts. Environmental impact assessments have increasingly been applied across the globe.
Environmental degradation affects the quality, or aesthetics, of human life, but it also displays
potential to undermine conditions necessary for the sustainability of human life. Attitudes toward
the importance of environmental protection measures reflect ambivalence derived from this
bifurcation. On one hand, steps such as cleaning up pollution, dedicating parkland, and suchlike,
are seen as embellishments undertaken by wealthy societies already assured they can successfully
perform those functions deemed, ostensibly, more essential-for instance, public health and
education, employment and economic development. On the other hand, in poorer countries,
activities causing environmental damage-for instance the land degradation effects of unregulated
logging, slash-and-burn agriculture, overgrazing, and mining-can seem justified insofar as such
activities provide incomes and livelihoods.
Rapid rates of resource depletion are associated with poverty and high population growth,
themselves correlated, whereas consumption per capita is much higher in the most developed
countries, despite these nations' recent progress in energy efficiency and conservation. It is
impossible to sequester the global environmental challenge from related economic, social and
political challenges.
First-tier industrialized countries have recently achieved measurable decreases in environmental
pollution and the rate of resource depletion, a success not matched in middle income and
developing countries. It is believed that the discrepancy is due to the fact that industrialized
countries have more developed infrastructures to accommodate changes in environmental policy, to
apply environmental technologies, and to invest in public education. The advanced industrialized
countries incur relatively lower costs in alleviating environmental problems, in comparison to
developing countries, since in the former even extensive environmental programs represent a rather
minuscule percentage of total expenditures. Conversely, budget constraints, lagged provision of
basic services to the population, and other factors such as debt service and militarization may
preclude institution of minimal environmental protection measures in the poorest countries.
A synopsis for the current situation facing each region of the world follows:
Regional Synopsis: Africa
The African continent, the world's second-largest landmass, encompasses many of the world's
least developed countries. By global standards, urbanization is comparatively low but rising at a
rapid rate. More heavily industrialized areas at the northern and southern ends of the continent
experience the major share of industrial pollution. In other regions the most serious environmental
problems typically stem from inefficient subsistence farming methods and other forms of land
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degradation, which have affected an increasingly extensive area under pressure of a widely
impoverished, fast-growing population. Africa's distribution of natural resources is very uneven. It
is the continent at greatest risk of desertification, especially in the Sahel region at the edge of the
Sahara but also in other dry-range areas. Yet at the same time, Africa also harbors some of the
earth's richest and most diverse biological zones.
Key Points:
Up to half a billion hectares of African land are moderately to severely degraded, an occurrence
reflecting short-fallow shifting cultivation and overgrazing as well as a climatic pattern of recurrent
droughts.
Soil degradation is severe along the expanse directly south of the Sahara, from the west to the east
coasts. Parts of southern Africa, central-eastern Africa, and the neighboring island of Madagascar
suffer from serious soil degradation as well.
Africa contains about 17 percent of the world's forest cover, concentrated in the tropical belt of the
continent. Many of the forests, however, are severely depleted, with an estimated 70 percent
showing some degree of degradation.
Population growth has resulted in continuing loss of arable land, as inefficient subsistence farming
techniques affect increasingly extensive areas. Efforts to implement settled, sustainable agriculture
have met with some recent success, but much further progress in this direction is needed.
Especially in previously uninhabited forestlands, concern over deforestation is intensifying.
By contrast, the African savanna remains the richest grassland in the world, supporting a
substantial concentration of animal and plant life. Wildlife parks are sub-Saharan Africa's greatest
tourist attraction, and with proper management-giving local people a stake in conservation and
controlling the pace of development-could greatly enhance African economies.
Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of northern, southern and eastern Africa are
currently threatened, while the biological diversity in Mauritania and Madagascar is even further
compromised with over 20 percent of the mammal species in these two countries currently under
threat.
With marine catch trends increasing from 500,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 3,000,000
metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life,
should this trend continue unabated.
Water resource vulnerability is a major concern in northeastern Africa, and a moderate concern
across the rest of the continent. An exception is central Africa, which has plentiful water supplies.
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Many Africans lack adequate access to resources, not just (if at all) because the resources are
unevenly distributed geographically, but also through institutional failures such as faulty land tenure
systems or political upheaval. The quality of Africa's natural resources, despite their spotty
distribution, is in fact extraordinarily rich. The infrastructure needed to protect and benefit from
this natural legacy, however, is largely lacking.
Regional Synopsis: Asia and the Pacific
Asia-earth's largest landmass-and the many large and nearly innumerable small islands lying off its
Pacific shore display extraordinarily contrasting landscapes, levels of development, and degrees of
environmental stress. In the classification used here, the world's smallest continent, Australia, is
also included in the Asia-Pacific region.
The Asia-Pacific region is home to 9 of the world's 14 largest urban areas, and as energy use for
utilities, industry and transport increases in developing economies, urban centers are subject to
worsening air quality. Intense population density in places such as Bangladesh or Hong Kong is the
quintessential image many people have of Asia, yet vast desert areas such as the Gobi and the
world's highest mountain range, the Himalayas, span the continent as well. Forested areas in
Southeast Asia and the islands of Indonesia and the Philippines were historically prized for their
tropical hardwood, but in many places this resource is now severely depleted. Low-lying small
island states are extremely vulnerable to the effects of global warming, both rising sea levels and an
anticipated increase in cyclones.
Key Points:
Asian timber reserves are forecast to be depleted in the next 40 years. Loss of natural forest is
irreversible in some areas, but plantation programs to restore tree cover may ameliorate a portion
of the resulting land degradation.
Increased usage of fossil fuels in China and other parts of southern Asia is projected to result in a
marked increase in emissions, especially in regard to carbon dioxide. The increased usage of energy
has led to a marked upsurge in air pollution across the region.
Acidification is an emerging problem regionally, with sulfur dioxide emissions expected to triple by
2010 if the current growth rate is sustained. China, Thailand, India, and Korea seem to be
suffering from particularly high rates of acid deposition. By contrast, Asia's most highly developed
economy, Japan, has effected substantial improvements in its environmental indicators.
Water pollution in the Pacific is an urgent concern since up to 70 percent of the water discharged
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into the region's waters receives no treatment. Additionally, the disposal of solid wastes, in like
manner, poses a major threat in a region with many areas of high population density.
The Asia-Pacific region is the largest expanse of the world's land that is adversely affected by soil
degradation.
The region around Australia reportedly suffers the largest degree of ozone depletion.
The microstates of the Pacific suffer land loss due to global warming, and the consequent rise in
the levels of ocean waters. A high-emissions scenario and anthropogenic climate impact at the
upper end of the currently predicted range would probably force complete evacuation of the
lowest-elevation islands sometime in this century.
The species-rich reefs surrounding Southeast Asia are highly vulnerable to the deleterious effects of
coastal development, land-based pollution, over-fishing and exploitative fishing methods, as well as
marine pollution from oil spills and other activities.
With marine catch trends increasing from 5,000,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 20,000,000
metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life,
should this trend continue unabated.
Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of China and south-east Asia are currently
threatened, while the biological diversity in India, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia and
parts of Malaysia is even further compromised with over 20 percent of the mammal species in
these countries currently under threat.
Water resource vulnerability is a serious concern in areas surrounding the Indian subcontinent.
Regional Synopsis: Central Asia
The Central Asian republics, formerly in the Soviet Union, experience a range of environmental
problems as the result of poorly executed agricultural, industrial, and nuclear programs during the
Soviet era. Relatively low population densities are the norm, especially since upon the breakup of
the U.S.S.R. many ethnic Russians migrated back to European Russia. In this largely semi-arid
region, drought, water shortages, and soil salinization pose major challenges.
Key Points:
The use of agricultural pesticides, such as DDT and other chemicals, has contributed to the
contamination of soil and groundwater throughout the region.
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Land and soil degradation, and in particular, increased salinization, is mostly attributable to faulty
irrigation practices.
Significant desertification is also a problem in the region.
Air pollution is prevalent, mostly due to use of low octane automobile fuel.
Industrial pollution of the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea, as a result of industrial effluents as well as
mining and metal production, presents a challenge to the countries bordering these bodies of water.
One of the most severe environmental problems in the region is attributable to the several billion
tons of hazardous materials stored in landfills across Central Asia.
Uzbekistan's particular problem involves the contraction of the Aral Sea, which has decreased in
size by a third, as a consequence of river diversions and poor irrigation practices. The effect has
been the near-total biological destruction of that body of water.
Kazakhstan, as a consequence of being the heartland of the former Soviet Union's nuclear
program, has incurred a high of cancerous malignancies, biogenetic abnormalities and radioactive
contamination.
While part of the Soviet Union, the republics in the region experienced very high levels of
greenhouse gas emissions, as a consequence of rapid industrialization using cheap but dirty energy
sources, especially coal.
By contrast, however, there have recently been substantial reductions in the level of greenhouse
gas emissions, especially those attributable to coal burning, with further decreases anticipated over
the next decade. These changes are partially due to the use of cleaner energy technologies, such as
natural gas, augmented by governmental commitment to improving environmental standards.
Regional Synopsis: Europe
Western Europe underwent dramatic transformation of its landscape, virtually eliminating largescale natural areas, during an era of rapid industrialization, which intensified upon its recovery from
World War II. In Eastern Europe and European Russia, intensive land development has been less
prevalent, so that some native forests and other natural areas remain. Air and water pollution from
use of dirty fuels and industrial effluents, however, are more serious environmental problems in
Eastern than in Western Europe, though recent trends show improvement in many indicators. Acid
rain has inflicted heavy environmental damage across much of Europe, particularly on forests.
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Europe and North America are the only regions in which water usage for industry exceeds that for
agriculture, although in Mediterranean nations agriculture is the largest water consumer.
Key Points:
Europe contributes 36 percent of the world's chlorofluorocarbon emissions, 30 percent of carbon
dioxide emissions, and 25 percent of sulfur dioxide emissions.
Sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions are the cause of 30 to 50 percent of Central and Eastern
Europe's deforestation.
Acid rain has been an environmental concern for decades and continues to be a challenge in parts
of Western Europe.
Overexploitation of up to 60 percent of Europe's groundwater presents a problem in industrial and
urban areas.
With marine catch trends increasing from 5,000,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 20,000,000
metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life,
should this trend continue unabated.
Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of western Europe, Eastern Europe and Russia are
currently threatened, while the biological diversity on the Iberian Peninsula is even further
compromised with over 40 percent of the mammal species in this region currently under threat. As
a result, there has been a 10 percent increase in protected areas of Europe.
A major environmental issue for Europe involves the depletion of various already endangered or
threatened species, and most significantly, the decline of fish stocks. Some estimates suggest that
up to 50 percent of the continent's fish species may be considered endangered species. Coastal
fisheries have been over-harvested, resulting in catch limits or moratoriums on many commercially
important fish species.
Fortunately, in the last few years, these policies have started to yield measurable results with
decreasing trends in marine fish catch.
Recently, most European countries have adopted cleaner production technologies, and alternative
methods of waste disposal, including recycling.
The countries of Eastern Europe have made air quality a major environmental priority. This is
exemplified by the Russian Federation's addition to the 1995 "Berlin Mandate" (transnational
legislation based on resolutions of the Rio Earth Summit) compelling nations to promote "carbon
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sinks" to absorb greenhouse gases.
On a relative basis, when compared with the degree of industrial emissions emitted by many
Eastern European countries until the late 1980s, there has been some marked increase in air quality
in the region, as obsolete plants are closed and a transition to cleaner fuels and more efficient
energy use takes place.
Regional Synopsis: The Middle and Near East
Quite possibly, the Middle East will exemplify the adage that, as the 20th century was a century
fixated on oil, the 21st century will be devoted to critical decisions about water. Many (though far
from all) nations in the Middle East rank among those countries with the largest oil and gas
reserves, but water resources are relatively scarce throughout this predominantly dry region.
Effects of global warming may cause moderately high elevation areas that now typically receive
winter "snowpack" to experience mainly rain instead, which would further constrain dry-season
water availability. The antiquities and religious shrines of the region render it a great magnet for
tourism, which entails considerable economic growth potential but also intensifies stresses on the
environment.
Key Points:
Water resource vulnerability is a serious concern across the entire region. The increased usage of,
and further demand for water, has exacerbated long-standing water scarcity in the region. For
instance, river diversions and industrial salt works have caused the Dead Sea to shrink by one-third
from its original surface area, with further declines expected.
The oil industry in the region contributes to water pollution in the Persian Gulf, as a result of oil
spills, which have averaged 1.2 million barrels of oil spilt per year (some sources suggest that this
figure is understated). The consequences are severe because even after oil spills have been cleaned
up, environmental damage to the food webs and ecosystems of marine life will persist for a
prolonged period.
The region's coastal zone is considered one of the most fragile and endangered ecosystems of the
world. Land reclamation, shoreline construction, discharge of industrial effluents, and tourism
(such as diving in the Red Sea) contribute to widespread coastal damage.
Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of the Middle East are currently threatened.
Since the 1980s, 11 percent of the region's natural forest has been depleted.
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Regional Synopsis: Latin America and the Caribbean
The Latin American and Caribbean region is characterized by exceedingly diverse landforms that
have generally seen high rates of population growth and economic development in recent decades.
The percentage of inhabitants residing in urban areas is quite high at 73.4 percent; the region
includes the megacities of Mexico City, Sao Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. The region also includes the
world's second-highest mountain range, the Andes; significant expanses of desert and grassland; the
coral reefs of the Caribbean Sea; and the world's largest contiguous tropical forest in the Amazon
basin. Threats to the latter from subsistence and commercial farming, mineral exploitation and
timbering are well publicized. Nevertheless, of eight countries worldwide that still retain at least 70
percent of their original forest cover, six are in Latin America. The region accounts for nearly half
(48.3 percent) of the world's greenhouse gas emissions derived from land clearing, but as yet a
comparatively minuscule share (4.3 percent) of such gases from industrial sources.
Key Points:
Although Latin America is one of the most biologically diverse regions of the world, this
biodiversity is highly threatened, as exemplified by the projected extinction of up to 100,000
species in the next few decades. Much of this loss will be concentrated in the Amazon area,
although the western coastline of South America will also suffer significant depletion of biological
diversity. The inventory of rainforest species with potentially useful commercial or medical
applications is incomplete, but presumed to include significant numbers of such species that may
become extinct before they are discovered and identified.
Up to 50 percent of the region's grazing land has lost its soil fertility as a result of soil erosion,
salinization, alkalinization and overgrazing.
The Caribbean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean have all been contaminated by
agricultural wastes, which are discharged into streams that flow into these major waters. Water
pollution derived from phosphorous, nitrates and pesticides adversely affects fish stocks,
contributes to oxygen depletion and fosters overgrowth of aquatic vegetation. Marine life will
continue to be severely compromised as a result of these conditions.
Due to industrial development in the region, many beaches of eastern Latin America and the
Caribbean suffer from tar deposits.
Most cities in the region lack adequate sewage treatment facilities, and rapid migration of the rural
poor into the cities is widening the gap between current infrastructure capacity and the much
greater level needed to provide satisfactory basic services.
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The rainforest region of the Amazon Basin suffers from dangerously high levels of deforestation,
which may be a significant contributory factor to global warming or "the greenhouse effect." In the
late 1990s and into the new millennium, the rate of deforestation was around 20 million acres of
rainforest being destroyed annually.
Deforestation on the steep rainforest slopes of Caribbean islands contributes to soil erosion and
landslides, both of which then result in heavy sedimentation of nearby river systems. When these
sedimented rivers drain into the sea and coral reefs, they poison the coral tissues, which are vital to
the maintenance of the reef ecosystem. The result is marine degradation and nutrient depletion.
Jamaica's coral reefs have never quite recovered from the effects of marine degradation.
The Southern Cone of Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) suffers the
effects of greatly increased ultraviolet-B radiation, as a consequence of more intense ozone
depletion in the southern hemisphere.
Water resource vulnerability is an increasingly major concern in the northwestern portion of South
America.
Regional Synopsis: North America
North American nations, in particular the United States and Canada, rank among the world's most
highly developed industrial economies-a fact which has generated significant pollution problems,
but also financial resources and skills that have enabled many problems to be corrected. Although
efforts to promote energy efficiency, recycling, and suchlike have helped ease strains on the
environment in a part of the world where per capita consumption levels are high, sprawling land
development patterns and recent preferences many households have demonstrated for larger
vehicles have offset these advances.
Meanwhile, a large portion of North America's original forest cover has been lost, though in many
cases replaced by productive second-growth woodland. In recent years, attitudes toward best use
of the region's remaining natural or scenic areas seem to be shifting toward recreation and
preservation and away from resource extraction. With increasing attention on the energy scarcity in
the United States, however, there is speculation that this shift may be short-lived. Indeed, the
energy shortage on the west coast of the United States and associated calls for energy exploration,
indicate a possible retrenchment toward resource extraction. At the same time, however, it has also
served to highlight the need for energy conservation as well as alternative energy sources.
Despite generally successful anti-pollution efforts, various parts of the region continue to suffer
significant air, water and land degradation from industrial, vehicular, and agricultural emissions and
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runoff. Mexico, as a middle-income country, displays environmental problems characteristic of a
developing economy, including forest depletion, pollution from inefficient industrial processes and
dirty fuels, and lack of sufficient waste-treatment infrastructure.
Key Points:
Because of significantly greater motor vehicle usage in the United States (U.S.) than in the rest of
the world, the U.S. contribution of urban air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, especially
carbon dioxide, is disproportionately high in relation to its population.
Acid rain is an enduring issue of contention in the northeastern part of the United States, on the
border with Canada.
Mexico's urban areas suffer extreme air pollution from carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur
dioxide, and other toxic air pollutants. Emissions controls on vehicles are in their infancy, compared
to analogous regulations in the U.S.
The cities of Mexico, including those on the U.S. border, also discharge large quantities of
untreated or poorly treated sewage, though officials are currently planning infrastructure upgrades.
Deforestation is noteworthy in various regions of the U.S., especially along the northwest coastline.
Old growth forests have been largely removed, but in the northeastern and upper midwestern
sections of the United States, evidence suggests that the current extent of tree cover probably
surpasses the figure for the beginning of the 20th century.
Extreme weather conditions in the last few years have resulted in a high level of soil erosion along
the north coast of California; in addition, the coastline itself has shifted substantially due to soil
erosion and concomitant landslides.
Agricultural pollution-including nitrate contamination of well water, nutrient runoff to waterways,
and pesticide exposure-is significant in various areas. Noteworthy among affected places are
California's Central Valley, extensive stretches of the Midwest, and land in the Chesapeake Bay
watershed.
Inland waterways, especially around the Great Lakes, have substantially improved their water
quality, due to concentrated efforts at reducing water pollution by governmental, commercial and
community representatives. Strict curbs on industrial effluents and near-universal implementation
of sewage treatment are the chief factors responsible for this improvement.
A major environmental issue for Canada and the United States involves the depletion of various
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already endangered or threatened species, and most significantly, the decline of fish stocks. Coastal
fisheries have been over-harvested, resulting in catch limits or moratoriums on many commercially
important fish species. In the last few years, these policies have started to yield measurable results
with decreasing trends in marine fish catch.
Due to the decay of neighboring ecosystems in Central America and the Caribbean, the sea
surrounding Florida has become increasingly sedimented, contributing to marine degradation,
nutrient depletion of the ecosystem, depletion of fish stocks, and diseases to coral species in
particular.
Polar Regions
Key Points:
The significant rise in sea level, amounting 10 to 25 centimeters in the last 100 years, is due to the
melting of the Arctic ice sheets, and is attributed to global warming.
The Antarctic suffers from a significant ozone hole, first detected in 1976. By 1985, a British
scientific team reported a 40 percent decrease in usual regeneration rates of the ozone. Because a
sustained increase in the amount of ultraviolet-B radiation would have adverse consequences upon
all planetary life, recent environmental measures have been put into effect, aimed at reversing
ozone depletion. These measures are projected to garner significant results by 2050.
Due to air and ocean currents, the Arctic is a sink for toxic releases originally discharged thousands
of miles away. Arctic wildlife and Canada's Inuit population have higher bodily levels of
contaminants such as PCB and dioxin than those found in people and animals in much of the rest
of the world.
Global Environmental Concepts
1. Global Warming and Greenhouse Gases
The Greenhouse Effect:
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In the early 19th century, the French physicist, Jean Fourier, contended that the earth's atmosphere
functions in much the same way as the glass of a greenhouse, thus describing what is now
understood as the "greenhouse effect." Put simply, the "greenhouse effect" confines some of the
sun's energy to the earth, preserving some of the planet's warmth, rather than allowing it to flow
back into space. In so doing, all kinds of life forms can flourish on earth. Thus, the "greenhouse
effect" is necessary to sustain and preserve life forms and ecosystems on earth.
In the late 19th century, a Swedish chemist, Svante Arrhenius, noticed that human activities, such
as the burning of coal and other fossil fuels for heat, and the removal of forested lands for urban
development, led to higher concentrations of greenhouse gases, like carbon dioxide and methane, in
the atmosphere. This increase in the levels of greenhouse gases was believed to advance the
"greenhouse effect" exponentially, and might be related to the trend in global warming.
In the wake of the Industrial Revolution, after industrial development took place on a large scale
and the total human population burgeoned simultaneously with industrialization, the resulting
increase in greenhouse gas emissions could, many scientists believe, be significant enough to have
some bearing on climate. Indeed, many studies in recent years support the idea that there is a
linkage between human activities and global warming, although there is less consensus on the
extent to which this linkage may be relevant to environmental concerns.
That said, some scientists have argued that temperature fluctuations have existed throughout the
evolution of the planet. Indeed, Dr. S. Fred Singer, the president of the Science and Environment
Policy Project has noted that 3,000-year-old geological records of ocean sediment reveal changes
in the surface temperature of the ocean. Hence, it is possible that climate variability is merely a
normal fact of the planet's evolution. Yet even skeptics as to anthropogenic factors concur that any
substantial changes in global temperatures would likely have an effect upon the earth's ecosystems,
as well as the life forms that inhabit them.
The Relationship Between Global Warming and Greenhouse Gases:
A large number of climatologists believe that the increase in atmospheric concentrations of
"greenhouse gas emissions," mostly a consequence of human activities such as the burning of fossil
fuels, are contributing to global warming. The cause notwithstanding, the planet has reportedly
warmed 0.3°C to 0.6°C over the last century. Indeed, each year during the 1990s was one of the
very warmest in the 20th century, with the mean surface temperature for 1999 being the fifth
warmest on record since 1880.
In early 2000, a panel of atmospheric scientists for the National Research Council concluded in a
report that global warming was, indeed, a reality. While the panel, headed by Chairman John
Wallace, a professor of atmospheric sciences at the University of Washington, stated that it
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remained unclear whether human activities have contributed to the earth's increasing temperatures,
it was apparent that global warming exists.
In 2001, following a request for further study by the incoming Bush administration in the United
States, the National Academy of Sciences again confirmed that global warming had been in
existence for the last 20 years. The study also projected an increase in temperature between 2.5
degrees and 10.4 degrees Fahrenheit by the year 2100. Furthermore, the study found the leading
cause of global warming to be emissions of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels, and it
noted that greenhouse gas accumulations in the earth's atmosphere was a result of human activities.
Within the scientific community, the controversy regarding has centered on the difference between
surface air and upper air temperatures. Information collected since 1979 suggests that while the
earth's surface temperature has increased by about a degree in the past century, the atmospheric
temperature five miles above the earth's surface has indicated very little increase. Nevertheless, the
panel stated that this discrepancy in temperature between surface and upper air does not invalidate
the conclusion that global warming is taking place. Further, the panel noted that natural events,
such as volcanic eruptions, can decrease the temperature in the upper atmosphere.
The major consequences of global warming potentially include the melting of the polar ice caps,
which, in turn, contribute to the rise in sea levels. Many islands across the globe have already
experienced a measurable loss of land as a result. Because global warming may increase the rate of
evaporation, increased precipitation, in the form of stronger and more frequent storm systems, is
another potential outcome. Other consequences of global warming may include the introduction
and proliferation of new infectious diseases, loss of arable land (referred to as "desertification"),
destructive changes to existing ecosystems, loss of biodiversity and the isolation of species, and
concomitant adverse changes in the quality of human life.
International Policy Development in Regard to Global Warming:
Regardless of what the precise nature of the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and
global warming may be, it seems that there is some degree of a connection between the
phenomena. Any substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and global warming trends will
likely involve systematic changes in industrial operations, the use of advanced energy sources and
technologies, as well as global cooperation in implementing and regulating these transformations.
In this regard, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
stipulated the following objectives:
1. To stabilize "greenhouse gas" concentrations within the atmosphere, in such a manner that
would preclude hazardous anthropogenic intervention into the existing biosphere and ecosystems of
the world. This stabilization process would facilitate the natural adaptation of ecosystems to
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changes in climate.
2. To ensure and enable sustainable development and food production on a global scale.
*** See section on "International Environmental Agreements and Associations" for information
related to international policies related to limiting greenhouse gases and controlling climate change
emanating from historic summits at Kyoto, Copenhagen, Doha, and Paris. ***
2. Air Pollution
Long before global warming reared its head as a significant issue, those concerned about the
environment and public health noted the deleterious effects of human-initiated combustion upon
the atmosphere. Killer smogs from coal burning triggered acute health emergencies in London and
other places. At a lower level of intensity motor vehicle, power plant, and industrial emissions
impaired long-range visibility and probably had some chronic adverse consequences on the
respiratory systems of persons breathing such air.
In time, scientists began associating the sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides released from coal
burning with significant acid deposition in the atmosphere, eventually falling as "acid rain." This
phenomenon has severely degraded forestlands, especially in Europe and a few parts of the United
States. It has also impaired some aquatic ecosystems and eaten away the surface of some human
artifacts, such as marble monuments. Scrubber technology and conversion to cleaner fuels have
enabled the level of industrial production to remain at least constant while significantly reducing
acid deposition. Technologies aimed at cleaning the air and curtailing acid rain, soot, and smog
may, nonetheless, boomerang as the perils of global warming become increasingly serious. In brief,
these particulates act as sort of a sun shade -- comparable to the effect of volcanic eruptions on the
upper atmosphere whereby periods of active volcanism correlate with temporarily cooler weather
conditions. Thus, while the carbon dioxide releases that are an inevitable byproduct of combustion
continue, by scrubbing the atmosphere of pollutants, an industrial society opens itself to greater
insolation (penetration of the sun's rays and consequent heating), and consequently, it is likely to
experience a correspondingly greater rise in ambient temperatures.
The health benefits of removing the sources of acid rain and smog are indisputable, and no one
would recommend a return to previous conditions. Nevertheless, the problematic climatic effects of
continually increasing emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases pose a major global
environmental challenge, not as yet addressed adequately.
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3. Ozone Depletion
The stratospheric ozone layer functions to prevent ultraviolet radiation from reaching the earth.
Normally, stratospheric ozone is systematically disintegrated and regenerated through natural
photochemical processes. The stratospheric ozone layer, however, has been depleted unnaturally as
a result of anthropogenic (man-made) chemicals, most especially chlorine and bromide compounds
such as chloroflorocarbons (CFCs), halons, and various industrial chemicals in the form of
solvents, refrigerants, foaming agents, aerosol propellants, fire retardants, and fumigants. Ozone
depletion is of concern because it permits a greater degree of ultraviolet-B radiation to reach the
earth, which then increases the incidences of cancerous malignancies, cataracts, and human
immune deficiencies. In addition, even in small doses, ozone depletion affects the ecosystem by
disturbing food chains, agriculture, fisheries and other forms of biological diversity.
Transnational policies enacted to respond to the dangers of ozone depletion include the 1985
Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The Montreal Protocol was subsequently amended in
London in 1990, Copenhagen in 1992 and Vienna in 1995. By 1996, 155 countries had ratified the
Montreal Protocol, which sets out a time schedule for the reduction (and eventual elimination) of
ozone depleting substances (OPS), and bans exports and imports of ODS from and to nonparticipant countries.
In general, the Protocol stipulates that developed countries must eliminate halon consumption by
1994 and CFC consumption by 1996, while developing countries must eliminate these substances
by 2010. Consumption of methyl bromide, which is used as a fumigant, was to be frozen at the
1995 in developed countries, and fully eliminated in 2010, while developing countries are to freeze
consumption by 2002, based on average 1995-1998 consumption levels. Methyl chloroform is to
be phased out by 2005. Under the Montreal Protocol, most ODS will be completely eliminated
from use by 2010.
4. Land Degradation
In recent decades, land degradation in more arid regions of the world has become a serious
concern. The problem, manifest as both "desertification" and "devegetation," is caused primarily by
climate variability and human activities, such as "deforestation," excessive cultivation, overgrazing,
and other forms of land resource exploitation. It is also exacerbated by inadequate irrigation
practices. Although the effects of droughts on drylands have been temporary in the past, today, the
productivity and sustainability of these lands have been severely compromised for the long term.
Indeed, in every region of the world, land degradation has become an acute issue.
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Desertification and Devegetation:
"Desertification" is a process of land degradation causing the soil to deteriorate, thus losing its
nutrients and fertility, and eventually resulting in the loss of vegetation, known as "devegetation."
As aforementioned, "desertification" and "devegetation" are caused by human activities, yet human
beings are also the greatest casualties. Because these forms of land degradation affect the ability of
the soil to produce crops, they concomitantly contribute to poverty. As population increases and
demographic concentrations shift, the extent of land subject to stresses by those seeking to wrest
subsistence from it has inexorably risen.
In response, the United Nations has formed the Convention to Combat Desertification-aimed at
implementing programs to address the underlying causes of desertification, as well as measures to
prevent and minimize its effects. Of particular significance is the formulation of policies on
transboundary resources, such as areas around lakes and rivers. At a broader level, the Convention
has established a Conference of Parties (COP), which includes all ratifying governments, for
directing and advancing international action.
To ensure more efficacious use of funding, the Convention intends to reconfigure international aid
to utilize a consultative and coordinated approach in the disbursement and expenditure of donor
funds. In this way, local communities that are affected by desertification will be active participants
in the solution-generation process. In-depth community education projects are envisioned as part of
this new international aid program, and private donor financing is encouraged. Meanwhile, as new
technologies are developed to deal with the problem of desertification, they need to be distributed
for application across the world. Hence, the Convention calls for international cooperation in
scientific research in this regard.
Desertification is a problem of sustainable development. It is directly connected to human
challenges such as poverty, social and economic well-being and environmental protection as well.
Broader environmental issues, such as climate change, biological diversity, and freshwater supplies,
are indirectly related, so any effort to resolve this environmental challenge must entail coordinated
research efforts and joint action.
Deforestation:
Deforestation is not a recent phenomenon. For centuries, human beings have cut down trees to
clear space for land cultivation, or in order to use the wood for fuel. Over the last 200 years, and
most especially after World War II, deforestation increased because the logging industry became a
globally profitable endeavor, and so the clearing of forested areas was accelerated for the purposes
of industrial development. In the long term, this intensified level of deforestation is considered
problematic because the forest is unable to regenerate itself quickly. The deforestation that has
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occurred in tropical rainforests is seen as an especially serious concern, due to the perceived
adverse effects of this process upon the entire global ecosystem.
The most immediate consequence of deforestation is soil degradation. Soil, which is necessary for
the growth of vegetation, can be a fragile and vital property. Organically, an extensive evolution
process must take place before soil can produce vegetation, yet at the same time, the effects of
natural elements, such as wind and rain, can easily and quickly degrade this resource. This
phenomenon is known as soil erosion. In addition, natural elements like wind and rain reduce the
amount of fertile soil on the ground, making soil scarcity a genuine problem. When fertile topsoil
that already exists is removed from the landscape in the process of deforestation, soil scarcity is
further exacerbated. Equally significant is the fact that once land has been cleared so that the
topsoil can be cultivated for crop production, not only are the nutrient reserves in the soil depleted,
thus producing crops of inferior quality, but the soil structure itself becomes stressed and
deteriorates further.
Another direct result of deforestation is flooding. When forests are cleared, removing the cover of
vegetation, and rainfall occurs, the flow of water increases across the surface of land. When
extensive water runoff takes place, the frequency and intensity of flooding increases. Other adverse
effects of deforestation include the loss of wildlife and biodiversity within the ecosystem that
supports such life forms.
At a broader level, tropical rainforests play a vital role in maintaining the global environmental
system. Specifically, destruction of tropical rainforests affects the carbon dioxide cycle. When
forests are destroyed by burning (or rotting), carbon dioxide is released into the air, thus
contributing to an intensified "greenhouse effect." The increase in greenhouse gas emissions like
carbon dioxide is a major contributor to global warming, according to many environmental
scientists. Indeed, trees themselves absorb carbon dioxide in the process of photosynthesis, so their
loss also reduces the absorption of greenhouse gases.
Tropical rainforest destruction also adversely affects the nitrogen cycle. Nitrogen is a key nutrient
for both plants and animals. Plants derive nitrogen from soil, while animals obtain it via nitrogenenriched vegetation. This element is essential for the formation of amino acids, and thereby for
proteins and biochemicals that all living things need for metabolism and growth. In the nitrogen
cycle, vegetation acquires these essential proteins and biochemicals, and then cyclically returns
them to the atmosphere and global ecosystem. Accordingly, when tropical rainforest ecosystems
are compromised, not only is vegetation removed; the atmosphere is also affected and climates are
altered. At a more immediate level, the biodiversity within tropical rainforests, including wildlife
and insect species and a wealth of plant varieties, is depleted. Loss of rare plants is of particular
concern because certain species as yet unknown and unused could likely yield many practical
benefits, for instance as medicines.
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As a result of the many challenges associated with deforestation, many environmental groups and
agencies have argued for government policies on the sustainable development of forests by
governments across the globe. While many countries have instituted national policies and programs
aimed at reducing deforestation, and substantial research has been advanced in regard to
sustainable and regenerative forestry development, there has been very little progress on an
international level. Generally speaking, most tropical rainforests are located in developing and less
developed countries, where economic growth is often dependent upon the exploitation of tropical
rainforests. Timber resources as well as wildlife hunting tend to be particularly lucrative arenas.
In places such as the Amazon, where deforestation takes place for the construction of energy
plants aimed at industrialization and economic development, there is an exacerbated effect on the
environment. After forests are cleared in order to construct such projects, massive flooding usually
ensues. The remaining trees then rot and decay in the wake of the flooding. As the trees
deteriorate, their biochemical makeup becomes more acidic, producing poisonous substances such
as hydrogen sulphide and methane gases. Acidified water subsequently corrodes the mechanical
equipment and operations of the plants, which are already clogged by rotting wood after the
floodwaters rise.
Deforestation generally arises from an economically plausible short-term motivation, but
nonetheless poses a serious global concern because the effects go beyond national boundaries. The
United Nations has established the World Commission on Forest and Sustainable Development.
This body's task is to determine the optimal means of dealing with the issue of deforestation,
without unduly affecting normal economic development, while emphasizing the global significance
of protecting tropical forest ecosystems.
5. Water Resources
For all terrestrial fauna, including humans, water is the most immediate necessity to sustain life. As
the population has increased and altered an ever-greater portion of the landscape from its natural
condition, demand on water resources has intensified, especially with the development of
industrialization and large-scale irrigation. The supply of freshwater is inherently limited, and
moreover distributed unevenly across the earth's landmasses. Moreover, not just demand for
freshwater but activities certain to degrade it are becoming more pervasive. By contrast, the oceans
form a sort of "last wilderness," still little explored and in large part not seriously affected by
human activity. However, coastal environments - the biologically richest part of the marine
ecosystem-are experiencing major depletion due to human encroachment and over-exploitation.
Freshwater:
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In various regions, for instance the Colorado River in the western United States, current
withdrawals of river water for irrigation, domestic, and industrial use consume the entire
streamflow so that almost no water flows into the sea at the river's mouth. Yet development is
ongoing in many such places, implying continually rising demand for water. In some areas reliant
on groundwater, aquifers are being depleted at a markedly faster rate than they are being
replenished. An example is the San Joaquin Valley in California, where decades of high water
withdrawals for agriculture have caused land subsidence of ten meters or more in some spots.
Naturally, the uncertainty of future water supplies is particularly acute in arid and semi-arid regions.
Speculation that the phenomenon of global warming will alter geographic and seasonal rainfall
patterns adds further uncertainty.
Water conservation measures have great potential to alleviate supply shortages. Some city water
systems are so old and beset with leaking pipes that they lose as much water as they meter. Broadscale irrigation could be replaced by drip-type irrigation, actually enhancing the sustainability of
agriculture. In many areas where heavy irrigation has been used for decades, the result is
deposition of salts and other chemicals in the soil such that the land becomes unproductive for
farming and must be abandoned.
Farming is a major source of water pollution. Whereas restrictions on industrial effluents and other
"point sources" are relatively easy to implement, comparable measures to reform hydraulic
practices at farms and other "nonpoint sources" pose a significantly knottier challenge. Farmcaused water pollution takes the following main forms:
- Nitrate pollution found in wells in intensive farming areas as a consequence of heavy fertilizer use
is a threat to human health. The most serious danger is to infants, who by ingesting high-nitrate
water can contract methemoglobinemia, sometimes called "blue baby syndrome," a potentially fatal
condition.
- Fertilizer runoff into rivers and lakes imparts unwanted nutrients that cause algae growth and
eventual loss of oxygen in the body of water, degrading its ability to support fish and other
desirable aquatic life.
- Toxic agricultural chemicals - insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides - are detectable in some
aquifers and waterways.
In general, it is much easier to get a pollutant into water than to retrieve it out. Gasoline additives,
dry cleaning chemicals, other industrial toxins, and in a few areas radionucleides have all been
found in water sources intended for human use. The complexity and long time scale of
subterranean hydrological movements essentially assures that pollutants already deposited in
aquifers will continue to turn up for decades to come. Sophisticated water treatment processes are
available, albeit expensive, to reclaim degraded water and render it fit for human consumption. Yet
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source protection is unquestionably a more desirable alternative.
In much of the developing world, and even some low-income rural enclaves of the developed
world, the population lacks ready access to safe water. Surface water and shallow groundwater
supplies are susceptible to contamination from untreated wastewater and failing septic tanks, as
well as chemical hazards. The occurrence of waterborne disease is almost certainly greatly
underreported.
Marine Resources:
Coastal areas have always been desirable places for human habitation, and population pressure on
them continues to increase. Many types of water degradation that affect lakes and rivers also affect
coastal zones: industrial effluents, untreated or partially treated sewage, nutrient load from
agriculture figure prominently in both cases. Prospects for more extreme storms as a result of
global warming, as well as the pervasiveness of poorly planned development in many coastal areas,
forebode that catastrophic hurricanes and landslides may increase in frequency in the future.
Ongoing rise in sea levels will force remedial measures and in some cases abandonment of
currently valuable coastal property.
Fisheries over much of the globe have been overharvested, and immediate conservation measures
are required to preserve stocks of many species. Many governments subsidized factory-scale
fishing fleets in the 1970s and 1980s, and the resultant catch increase evidently surpassed a
sustainable level. It is uncertain how much of the current decline in fish stocks stems from
overharvesting and how much from environmental pollution. The deep ocean remains relatively
unaffected by human activity, but continental shelves near coastlines are frequently seriously
polluted, and these close-to-shore areas are the major biological nurseries for food fish and the
smaller organisms they feed on.
6. Environmental Toxins
Toxic chemical pollution exploded on the public consciousness with disclosure of spectacularly
polluted industrial areas such as Love Canal near Buffalo, New York. There is no question that
pollutants such as organophosphates or radionucleides can be highly deleterious to health, but
evidence to date suggests that seriously affected areas are a localized rather than universal problem.
While some explore the possibilities for a lifestyle that fully eschews use of modern industrial
chemicals, the most prevalent remediative approach is to focus on more judicious use. The most
efficient chemical plants are now able to contain nearly all toxic byproducts of their production
processes within the premises, minimizing the release of such substances into the environment.
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Techniques such as Integrated Pest Management (IPM) dictate limited rather than broadcast use of
pesticides: application only when needed using the safest available chemical, supplemented as
much as possible with nontoxic controls.
While heightened public awareness and growing technical sophistication suggest a hopeful outlook
on limiting the damage from manmade environmental toxins, one must grant that previous incidents
of their misuse and mishandling have already caused environmental damage that will have to be
dealt with for many years to come. In the case of the most hazardous radioactive substances, the
time scale for successful remediation actually extends beyond that of the recorded history of
civilization. Moreover, in this era of high population density and rapid economic growth, quotidian
activities such as the transport of chemicals will occasionally, seemingly inevitably result in
accidents with adverse environmental consequences.
7. "Islandization" and Biodiversity
With increased awareness regarding the adverse effects of unregulated hunting and habitat
depletion upon wildlife species and other aspects of biodiversity, large-scale efforts across the globe
have been initiated to reduce and even reverse this trend.
In every region of the world, many species of wildlife and areas of biodiversity have been saved
from extinction. Nationally, many countries have adopted policies aimed at preservation and
conservation of species, and one of the most tangible measures has been the proliferation of
protected habitats. Such habitats exist in the form of wildlife reserves, marine life reserves, and
other such areas where biodiversity can be protected from external encroachment and exploitation.
Despite these advances in wildlife and biodiversity protection, further and perhaps more intractable
challenges linger. Designated reserves, while intended to prevent further species decline, exist as
closed territories, fragmented from other such enclaves and disconnected from the larger
ecosystem. This environmental scenario is referred to as "islandization." Habitat reserves often
serve as oversized zoos or game farms, with landscapes and wildlife that have effectively been
"tamed" to suit. Meanwhile, the larger surrounding ecosystem continues to be seriously degraded
and transformed, while within the islandized habitat, species that are the focus of conservation
efforts may not have sufficient range and may not be able to maintain healthy genetic variability.
As a consequence, many conservationists and preservationists have demanded that substantially
larger portions of land be withheld as habitat reserves, and a network of biological corridors to
connect continental reserves be established. While such efforts to combat islandization have
considerable support in the United States, how precisely such a program would be instituted,
especially across national boundaries, remains a matter of debate. International conservationists
and preservationists say without a network of reserves a massive loss of biodiversity will result.
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The concept of islandization illustrates why conservation and preservation of wildlife and
biodiversity must consider and adopt new, broader strategies. In the past, conservation and
preservation efforts have been aimed at specific species, such as the spotted owl and grizzly bear in
North America, the Bengal tiger in Southeast Asia, the panda in China, elephants in Africa. Instead,
the new approach is to simultaneously protect many and varied species that inhabit the same
ecosystem. This method, referred to as "bio-regional conservation," may more efficaciously
generate longer-term and more far-reaching results precisely because it is aimed at preserving entire
ecosystems, and all the living things within.
More About Biodiversity Issues:
This section is directly taken from the United Nations Environmental Program: "Biodiversity
Assessment"
The Global Biodiversity Assessment, completed by 1500 scientists under the auspices of United
Nations Environmental Program in 1995, updated what is known (or unknown) about global
biological diversity at the ecosystem, species and genetic levels. The assessment was uncertain of
the total number of species on Earth within an order of magnitude. Of its working figure of 13
million species, only 13 percent are scientifically described. Ecological community diversity is also
poorly known, as is its relationship to biological diversity, and genetic diversity has been studied for
only a small number of species. The effects of human activities on biodiversity have increased so
greatly that the rate of species extinctions is rising to hundreds or thousands of times the
background level. These losses are driven by increasing demands on species and their habitats, and
by the failure of current market systems to value biodiversity adequately. The Assessment calls for
urgent action to reverse these trends.
There has been a new recognition of the importance of protecting marine and aquatic biodiversity.
The first quantitative estimates of species losses due to growing coral reef destruction predict that
almost 200,000 species, or one in five presently contributing to coral reef biodiversity, could die
out in the next 40 years if human pressures on reefs continue to increase.
Since Rio, many countries have improved their understanding of the status and importance of their
biodiversity, particularly through biodiversity country studies such as those prepared under the
auspices of UNEP/GEF. The United Kingdom identified 1250 species needing monitoring, of
which 400 require action plans to ensure their survival. Protective measures for biodiversity, such
as legislation to protect species, can prove effective. In the USA, almost 40 percent of the plants
and animals protected under the Endangered Species Act are now stable or improving as a direct
result of recovery efforts. Some African countries have joined efforts to protect threatened species
through the 1994 Lusaka Agreement, and more highly migratory species are being protected by
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specialized cooperative agreements among range states under the Bonn Agreement.
There is an emerging realization that a major part of conservation of biological diversity must take
place outside of protected areas and involve local communities. The extensive agricultural areas
occupied by small farmers contain much biodiversity that is important for sustainable food
production. Indigenous agricultural practices have been and continue to be important elements in
the maintenance of biodiversity, but these are being displaced and lost. There is a new focus on the
interrelationship between agrodiversity conservation and sustainable use and development practices
in smallholder agriculture, with emphasis on use of farmers' knowledge and skills as a source of
information for sustainable farming.
Perhaps even more important than the loss of biodiversity is the transformation of global
biogeochemical cycles, the reduction in the total world biomass, and the decrease in the biological
productivity of the planet. While quantitative measurements are not available, the eventual
economic and social consequences may be so significant that the issue requires further attention.
******
Specific sources used for this section:
Bendall, Roger. 1996. "Biodiversity: the follow up to Rio". The Globe 30:4-5, April 1996.
Global Environmental Change: Human and Policy Implications. 1995. Special issue on "People,
Land Management and Environmental Change", Vol. 3, No. 4, September 1995.
Golubev, Genady N. (Moscow University) In litt. 29 June 1996.
Heywood, V.H. (ed.). 1995. Global Biodiversity Assessment. United Nations Environment
Programme. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Heywood, V.H. 1996. "The Global Biodiversity Assessment". The Globe, 30:2-4, April 1996.
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Reaka-Kudla, Marjorie. 1996. Paper presented at American Association for Advancement of
Science, February 1996. Quoted in Pain, Stephanie. "Treasures lost in reef madness". New
Scientist, 17 February 1996.
Uitto, Juha I., and Akiko Ono (eds). 1996. Population, Land Management and Environmental
Change. The United Nations University, Tokyo.
USFWS. 1994. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service report to Congress, cited in news release 21 July
1994.
Online resources used generally in the Environmental Overview:
Environmental Protection Agency Global Warming Site. URL: http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming
Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations: Forestry. URL:
http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/sofo/en/
Global Warming Information Page. URL: http://globalwarming.org
U n i t e d N a t i o n s E n v i r o n m e n t a l
http://www.unep.org/GEO/GEO_Products/Assessment_Reports/
P r o g r a m .
U R L :
United Nations Global Environmental Outlook. URL: http://www.unep.org/geo/geo4/media/
Note on Edition Dates:
The edition dates for textual resources are noted above because they were used to formulate the
original content. We also have used online resources (cited above) to update coverage as needed.
Information Resources
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For more information about environmental concepts, CountryWatch recommends the following
resources:
The United Nations Environmental Program Network (with country profiles)
<http://www.unep.net/>
The United Nations Environment Program on Climate Change
<http://climatechange.unep.net/>
The United Nations Environmental Program on Waters and Oceans
<http://www.unep.ch/earthw/Pdepwat.htm>
The United Nations Environmental Program on Forestry: "Forests in Flux"
<http://www.unep-wcmc.org/forest/flux/homepage.htm>
FAO "State of the World's Forests"
<http://www.fao.org/forestry/FO/SOFO/SOFO99/sofo99-e.stm>
World Resources Institute.
<http://www.wri.org/>
Harvard University Center for Health and the Global Environment
<http://www.med.harvard.edu/chge/the-review.html>
The University of Wisconsin Center for Sustainability and the Global Environment
http://sage.aos.wisc.edu/
International Environmental Agreements and Associations
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International Policy Development in Regard to Global Warming:
Introduction
Regardless of what the precise nature of the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and
global warming may be, it seems that there is some degree of a connection between the
phenomena. Any substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and global warming trends will
likely involve systematic changes in industrial operations, the use of advanced energy sources and
technologies, as well as global cooperation in implementing and regulating these transformations.
In this regard, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
stipulated the following objectives:
1. To stabilize "greenhouse gas" concentrations within the atmosphere, in such a manner that
would preclude hazardous anthropogenic intervention into the existing biosphere and ecosystems of
the world. This stabilization process would facilitate the natural adaptation of ecosystems to
changes in climate.
2. To ensure and enable sustainable development and food production on a global scale.
Following are two discusssions regarding international policies on the environment, followed by
listings of international accords.
Special Entry: The Kyoto Protocol
The UNFCCC was adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, and entered into force in 1994. Over
175 parties were official participants.
Meanwhile, however, many of the larger, more industrialized nations failed to reach the emissions'
reduction targets, and many UNFCCC members agreed that the voluntary approach to reducing
emissions had not been successful. As such, UNFCCC members reached a consensus that legally
binding limits were necessitated, and agreed to discuss such a legal paradigm at a meeting in Kyoto,
Japan in 1997. At that meeting, the UNFCCC forged the Kyoto Protocol. This concord is the first
legally binding international agreement that places limits on emissions from industrialized countries.
The major greenhouse gas emissions addressed in the Kyoto Protocol include carbon dioxide,
nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride, and methane.
The provisions of the Kyoto Protocol stipulate that economically advanced nations must reduce
their combined emissions of greenhouse gases, by approximately five percent from their 1990
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levels, before the 2008-2010 deadline. Countries with the highest carbon dioxide emissions, such as
the United States (U.S.), many of the European Union (EU) countries, and Japan, are to reduce
emissions by a scale of 6 to 8 percent. All economically advanced nations must show
"demonstrable progress" by 2005. In contrast, no binding limits or timetable have been set on
developing countries. Presumably, this distinction is due to the fact that most developing countries - with the obvious exceptions of India and China -- simply do not emit as many greenhouse gases
as do more industrially advanced countries. Meanwhile, these countries are entrenched in the
process of economic development.
Regardless of the aforementioned reasoning, there has been strong opposition against the
asymmetrical treatment assigned to emissions limits among developed and developing countries.
Although this distinction might be regarded as unfair in principle, associations such as the Alliance
of Small Island States have been vocal in expressing how global warming -- a result of greenhouse
gas emissions - has contributed to the rise in sea level, and thus deleteriously affected their very
existence as island nation states. For this reason, some parties have suggested that economically
advanced nations, upon returning to their 1990 levels, should be required to further reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions by a deadline of 2005. In response, interested parties have observed that
even if such reductions were undertaken by economically advanced nations, they would not be
enough to completely control global warming. Indeed, a reduction in the rate of fossil fuel usage by
developing nations would also be necessary to have substantial ameliorative effect on global
warming. Indeed, a reduction in the rate of fossil fuel usage by developing nations would also be
necessary to have substantial ameliorative effect on global warming.
As such, the Protocol established a "Clean Development Mechanism" which permits developed
countries to invest in projects aimed at reducing emissions within developing countries in return for
credit for the reductions. Ostensibly, the objective of this mechanism is to curtail emissions in
developing countries without unduly penalizing them for their economic development. Under this
model, the countries with more potential emissions credits could sell them to other signatories of
the Kyoto Protocol, whose emissions are forecast to significantly rise in the next few years. Should
this trading of emissions credits take place, it is estimated that the Kyoto Protocol's emissions
targets could still be met.
In 1999, the International Energy Outlook projected that Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union
and Newly Independent States, as well as parts of Asia, are all expected to show a marked
decrease in their level of energy-related carbon emissions in 2010. Nations with the highest
emissions, specifically, the U.S., the EU and Japan, are anticipated to reduce their emissions by up
to 8 percent by 2012. By 2000, however, the emissions targets were not on schedule for
achievement. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Energy estimates forecast that by 2010, there will be
a 34 percent increase in carbon emissions from the 1990 levels, in the absence of major shifts in
policy, economic growth, energy prices, and consumer trends. Despite this assessment in the U.S.,
international support for the Kyoto Protocol remained strong, especially among European countries
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and island states, who view the pact as one step in the direction away from reliance on fossil fuels
and other sources of greenhouse gases.
In 2001, U.S. President, George W. Bush, rejected his country's participation in the Kyoto
Protocol, saying that the costs imposed on the global economic system, and especially, on the US,
overshadowed the benefits of the Protocol. He also cited the unfair burden on developed nations to
reduce emissions, as another primary reasons for withdrawal from the international pact, as well as
insufficient evidence regarding the science of global warming. Faced with impassioned international
disapproval for his position, the U.S. president stated that his administration remained interested in
dealing with the matter of global warming, but would endorse alternative measures to combat the
problem, such as voluntary initiatives limiting emissions. Critics of Bush's position, however, have
noted that it was the failure of voluntary initiatives to reduce emissions following the Rio Summit
that led to the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol in the first place.
In the wake of the Bush administration's decision, many participant countries resigned themselves
to the reality that the goals of the Kyoto Protocol might not be achieved without U.S. involvement.
Nevertheless, in Bonn, Germany, in July 2001, the remaining participant countries struck a political
compromise on some of the key issues and sticking points, and planned to move forward with the
Protocol, irrespective of the absence of the U.S. The key compromise points included the
provision for countries to offset their targets with carbon sinks (these are areas of forest and
farmland which can absorb carbon through the process of photosynthesis). Another compromise
point within the broader Bonn Agreement was the reduction of emissions cuts of six gases from
over 5 percent to a more achievable 2 percent. A third key change was the provision of funding for
less wealthy countries to adopt more progressive technologies.
In late October and early November 2001, the UNFCC's 7th Conference of the Parties met in
Marrakesh, Morocco, to finalize the measures needed to make the Kyoto Protocol operational.
Although the UNFCC projected that ratification of the Protocol would make it legally binding
within a year, many critics noted that the process had fallen short of implementing significant
changes in policy that would be necessary to actually stop or even slow climate change. They also
maintained that the absence of U.S. participation effectively rendered the Protocol into being a
political exercise without any substance, either in terms of transnational policy or in terms of
environmental concerns.
The adoption of the compromises ensconced within the Bonn Agreement had been intended to
make the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol more palatable to the U.S. In this regard, it failed to
achieve its objective as the Bush administration continued to eschew participation in the
international accord. Still, however, the Bonn Agreement did manage to render a number of other
positive outcomes. Specifically, in 2002, key countries, such as Russia, Japan and Canada agreed
to ratify the protocol, bringing the number of signatories to 178. The decision by key countries to
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ratify the protocol was regarded as "the kiss of life" by observers.
By 2005, on the eve of a climate change conference in London, British Prime Minister Tony Blair
was hoping to deal with the problems of climate change beyond the provisions set forth in the
Kyoto Protocol. Acknowledging that the Kyoto Protocol could not work in its current form, Blair
wanted to open the discussion for a new climate change plan.
Blair said that although most of the world had signed on to Kyoto, the protocol could not meet any
of its practical goals of cutting greenhouse gas emissions without the participation of the United
States, the world's largest polluter. He also noted that any new agreement would have to include
India and China -- significant producers of greenhouse gas emissions, but exempt from Kyoto
because they have been classified as developing countries. Still, he said that progress on dealing
with climate change had been stymied by "a reluctance to face up to reality and the practical action
needed to tackle problem."
Blair also touted the "huge opportunities" in technology and pointed toward the possibilities offered
by wind, solar and nuclear power, along with fuel cell technology, eco-friendly biofuels, and
carbon capture and storage which could generate low carbon power. Blair also asserted that his
government was committed to achieving its domestic goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by
20 percent by 2010.
In the United States, President George W. Bush has said that global warming remained a debatable
issue and despite conclusions reached by his own Environmental Protection Agency, he has not
agreed with the conclusion that global warming and climate change are linked with human
activities. Bush has also refused to ratify Kyoto on the basis of its economic costs.
Australia, an ally of the United States, has taken a similarly dim view of the Kyoto Protocol.
Ahead of the November 2005 climate change meeting in Canada in which new goals for the
protocol were to be discussed, Australia 's Environment Minister, Ian Campbell, said that
negotiating new greenhouse gas emission levels for the Kyoto Protocol would be a waste of time.
Campbell said, "There is a consensus that the caps, targets and timetables approach is flawed. If
we spend the next five years arguing about that, we'll be fiddling and negotiating while Rome
burns." Campbell, like the Bush administration, has also advocated a system of voluntary action
in which industry takes up new technologies rather than as a result of compelling the reduction of
emissions. But the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) has called on its government to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol, to establish a system of emissions trading, and to set binding limits on
emissions. Interestingly, although it did not sign on to Kyoto , Australia was expected to meet its
emissions target by 2012 (an 8 percent increase in 1990 levels in keeping with the country's
reliance on coal). But this success has nothing to do with new technologies and is due to statebased regulations on land clearing.
Note: The Kyoto Protocol calls for developed nations to cut greenhouse emissions by 5.2 percent
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of 1990 levels by 2012.
Special Entry: Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen (2009) -In December 2009, the United Nations Climate Change Summit opened in the Danish capital of
Copenhagen. The summit was scheduled to last from Dec. 7-18, 2009. Delegates from more than
190 countries were in attendance, and approximately 100 world leaders, including British Prime
Minister Gordon Brown and United States President Barack Obama, were expected to participate.
At issue was the matter of new reductions targets on greenhouse gas emissions by 2020.
Despite earlier fears that little concurrence would come from the conference, effectively pushing
significant actions forward to a 2010 conference in Mexico City, negotiators were now reporting
that the talks were productive and several key countries, such as South Africa, had pledged to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The two main issues that could still lead to cleavages were
questions of agreement between the industrialized countries and the developing countries of the
world, as well as the overall effectiveness of proposals in seriously addressing the perils of climate
change.
On Dec. 9, 2009, four countries -- the United Kingdom, Australia, Mexico and Norway - presented a document outlining ideas for raising and managing billions of dollars, which would be
intended to help vulnerable countries dealing with the perils of climate change. Described as a
"green fund," the concept could potentially help small island states at risk because of the rise in sea
level. Bangladesh identified itself as a potential recipient of an assistance fund, noting that as a
country plagued by devastating floods, it was particularly hard-hit by climate change. The "green
fund" would fall under the rubric of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, for which developed countries have been committed to quantifying their emission
reduction targets, and also to providing financial and technical support to developing countries.
The United Kingdom, Australia, Mexico and Norway also called for the creation of a new legal
treaty that would replace the Kyoto Protocol. This new treaty, which could go into force in 2012,
would focus largely on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. But Australia went
even further in saying that the successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol, should be one with
provisions covering all countries. Such a move would be a departure from the structure of the
Kyoto Protocol, which contained emissions targets for industrialized countries due to the prevailing
view that developed countries had a particular historic responsibility to be accountable for climate
change. More recently, it has become apparent that substantial reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions demanded by scientists would only come to pass with the participation also of significant
developing nation states, such as China and India. Indeed, one of the most pressing critiques of the
Kyoto Protocol was that it was a "paper tiger" that failed to address the impact of the actions of
emerging economies like China and India, with its focus on the developed economies.
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Now, in 2009, China -- as the world's biggest greenhouse gas emitter -- was responding this
dubious distinction by vocalizing its criticism of the current scenario and foregrounding its new
commitments. Ahead of the Copenhagen summit, China had announced it would reduce the
intensity of its carbon emissions per unit of its GDP in 2020 by 40 to 45 percent against 2005
levels. With that new commitment at hand, China was now accusing the United States and the
European Union of shirking their own responsibilities by setting weak targets for greenhouse gas
emissions cuts. Senior Chinese negotiator, Su Wei, characterized the goals of the world's second
largest greenhouse gas emitter -- the United States -- as "not notable," and the European Union's
target as "not enough." Su Wei also took issue with Japan for setting implausible preconditions.
On Dec. 11, 2009, China demanded that developed and wealthy countries in Copenhagen should
help deliver a real agreement on climate change by delivering on their promises to reduce carbon
emissions and provide financial support for developing countries to adapt to global warming. In so
doing, China's Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei said his country was hoping that a "balanced
outcome" would emerge from the discussions at the summit. Echoing the position of the Australian
government, He Yafei spoke of a draft agreement as follows: "The final document we're going to
adopt needs to be taking into account the needs and aspirations of all countries, particularly the
most vulnerable ones."
China's Vice Foreign Minister emphasized the fact that climate change was "a matter of survival"
for developing countries, and accordingly, such countries need wealthier and more developed
countries to accentuate not only their pledges of emissions reduction targets, but also their financial
commitments under the aforementioned United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change. To that end, scientists and leaders of small island states in the Indian Ocean, the Pacific
Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, have highlighted the existential threat posed by global warming and
the concomitant rise in sea level.
China aside, attention was also on India -- another major player in the developing world and a
country with an industrializing economy that was impacting the environment. At issue was the
Indian government's decision to set a carbon intensity target, which would slow emissions growth
by up to 25 percent by the 2020 deadline. This strong position was resisted by some elements in
India, who argued that their country should not be taking such a strong position when developed
wealthy countries were yet to show accountability for their previous commitments to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. The matter grew so heated that the members of the opposition stormed
out of the parliament in protest as Indian Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh defended the
policy. But the political pressure at home in India was leaving the Indian delegation in Copenhagen
in a state of chaos as well. In fact, India's top environmental negotiator refused to travel to
Copenhagen in protest of the government's newly-announced stance.
China and India were joined by Brazil and South Africa in the crafting of a draft document calling
for a new global climate treaty to be completed by June 2010. Of concern has been the realization
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that there was insufficient time to find concurrence on a full legal treaty, which would leave
countries only with a politically-binding text by the time the summit at Copenhagen closed. But
Guyana's leader, President Bharrat Jagdeo, warned that the summit in Denmark would be
classified as a failure unless a binding document was agreed upon instead of just political
consensus. He urged his cohorts to act with purpose saying, "Never before have science,
economics, geo-strategic self-interest and politics intersected in such a way on an issue that impacts
everyone on the planet."
Likewise, Tuvalu demanded that legally binding agreements emerge from Copenhagen. Its
proposal was supported by many of the vulnerable countries, from small island states and subSaharan Africa, all of whom warned of the catastrophic impact of climate change on their
citizens. Tuvalu also called for more aggressive action, such as an amendment to the 1992
agreement, which would focus on sharp greenhouse gas emissions and the accepted rise in
temperatures, due to the impact the rise in seas. The delegation from Kiribati joined the call by
drawing attention to the fact that one village had to be abandoned due to waist-high water, and
more such effects were likely to follow. Kiribati's Foreign Secretary, Tessie Lambourne, warned
that the people of Kiribati could well be faced with no homeland in the future saying, "Nobody in
this room would want to leave their homeland." But despite such impassioned pleas and
irrespective of warnings from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that the rise in sea
level from melting polar ice caps would deleteriously affect low-lying atolls such as such as Tuvalu
and Kiribati in the Pacific, and the Maldives in the Indian Ocean, the oil-giant Saudi Arabia was
able to block this move.
Meanwhile, within the developed countries, yet another power struggle was brewing. The
European Union warned it would only agree to raise its target of 20 percent greenhouse gas
emissions reductions to 30 percent if the United States demonstrated that it would do more to
reduce its own emissions. It was unknown if such pressure would yield results. United States
President Barack Obama offered a "provisional" 2020 target of 17 percent reductions, noting that
he could not offer greater concessions at Copenhagen due to resistance within the United States
Congress, which was already trying to pass a highly controversial "cap and trade" emissions
legislation. However, should that emissions trading bill fail in the Senate, the United States
Environment Protection Agency's declaration that greenhouse gases pose a danger to human health
and the environment was expected to facilitate further regulations and limits on power plants and
factories at the national level. These moves could potentially strengthen the Obama
administration's offering at Copenhagen. As well, President Obama also signaled that he would be
willing to consider the inclusion of international forestry credits.
Such moves indicated willingness by the Obama administration to play a more constructive role on
the international environmental scene than its predecessor, the Bush administration. Indeed, ahead
of his arrival at the Copenhagen summit, President Barack Obama's top environmental advisors
promised to work on a substantial climate change agreement. To that end, United States
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Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Lisa Jackson said at a press conference, "We are
seeking robust engagement with all of our partners around the world." But would this proengagement assertion yield actual results?
By Dec. 12, 2009, details related to a draft document prepared by Michael Zammit Cutajar, the
head of the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action, were released at the
Copenhagen climate conference. Included in the document were calls for countries to make major
reductions in carbon emissions over the course of the next decade. According to the Washington
Post, industrialized countries were called on to make cuts of between 25 percent and 40 percent
below 1990 levels -- reductions that were far more draconian than the United States was likely to
accept. As discussed above, President Obama had offered a provisional reduction target of 17
percent. The wide gap between the released draft and the United States' actual stated position
suggested there was much more negotiating in the offing if a binding agreement could be forged,
despite the Obama administration's claims that it was seeking greater engagement on this issue.
In other developments, the aforementioned call for financial support of developing countries to deal
with the perils of climate change was partly answered by the European Union on Dec. 11, 2009.
The European bloc pledged an amount of 2.4 billion euros (US$3.5 billion) annually from 2010 to
2012. Environment Minister Andreas Carlgren of Sweden -- the country that holds the rotating
presidency of the European Union at the time of the summit -- put his weight behind the notion of
a "legally binding deal." Meanwhile, Yvo de Boer, a top United Nations climate change official,
focused less on the essence of the agreement and more on tangible action and effects saying,
"Copenhagen will only be a success if it delivers significant and immediate action that begins the
day the conference ends."
The division between developed and developing countries in Copenhagen reached new heights on
Dec. 14, 2009, when some of the poor and less developed countries launched a boycott at the
summit. The move, which was spurred by African countries but backed by China and India,
appeared to be geared toward redirecting attention and primary responsibility to the wealthier and
more industrialized countries. The impasse was resolved after the wealthier and more
industrialized countries offered assurances that they did not intend on shirking from their
commitments to reducing greenhouse gases. As a result, the participating countries ceased the
boycott.
Outside the actual summit, thousands of protestors had gathered to demand crucial global
warming, leading to clashes between police and demonstrators elsewhere in the Danish capital city.
There were reports of scattered violence across Copenhagen and more than 1,000 people were
arrested.
Nevertheless, by the second week of the climate change summit, hopes of forging a strong deal
were eroding as developed and developing nations remained deadlocked on sharing cuts in
greenhouse gases, and particularly on the matters of financing and temperature goals. In a bid to
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shore up support for a new climate change, United States President Barack Obama joined other
world leaders in Copenhagen. On Dec. 14, 2009, there was a standoff brewing between the
United States and China. At issue was China's refusal to accept international monitoring of its
expressed targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The United States argued that China's
opposition to verification could be a deal-breaker.
By the close of the summit, the difficult process eventually resulted in some consensus being
cultivated. A draft text called for $100 billion a year by 2020 to assist poor nations cope with
climate change, while aiming to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius compared with preindustrial levels. The deal also included specific targets for developed countries to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, and called for reductions by developing countries as a share of their
economies. Also included in the agreement was a mechanism to verify compliance. The details of
the agreement were supported by President Barack Obama, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.
This draft would stand as an interim agreement, with a legally-binding international pact unlikely to
materialize until 2010. In this way, the summit in Copenhagen failed to achieve its central
objective, which was to negotiate a successor to the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions.
Editor's Note
In the background of these developments was the growing global consciousness related to global
warming and climate change. Indeed, as the Copenhagen summit was ongoing, it was clear there
was enormous concurrence on the significance of the stakes with an editorial on the matter of
climate change being published in 56 newspapers in 45 countries. That editorial warned that
without global action, climate change would "ravage our planet." Meanwhile, a global survey taken
by Globescan showed that concern over global warming had exponentially increased from 1998 -when only 20 percent of respondents believed it to be a serious problem -- to 64 percent in 2009.
Such survey data, however, was generated ahead of the accusations by climate change skeptics
that some climate scientists may have overstated the case for global warming, based on emails
derived in an illicit manner from a British University.
Special Entry: Climate change talks in Doha in Qatar extend life of Kyoto Protocol (2012)
December 2012 saw climate talks ensue in the Qatari city of Doha as representatives from
countries across the world gathered to discuss the fate of the Kyoto Protocol, which seeks to
minimize greenhouse gas emissions. The summit yielded results with decisions made (1) to extend
the Kyoto Protocol until 2020, and (2) for wealthier countries to compensate poorer countries for
the losses and damage incurred as a result of climate change.
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In regards to the second matter, Malia Talakai of Nauru, a leading negotiator for the Alliance of
Small Island States, explained the necessity of the compensation package as follows: “We are trying
to say that if you pollute you must help us.”
This measure was being dubbed the "Loss and Damage" mechanism, and was being linked with
United States President Barack Obama's request for $60 billion from Congress to deal with the
devastation caused by Hurricane Sandy months before. The sight of a hurricane bearing down on
the northern Atlantic seaboard, along with the reality of the scope of reconstruction, appeared to
have illustrated the economic costs of climate change -- not so much as a distant environmental
issue -- but as a danger to the quotidian lives of people. Still, there was blame to be placed on the
United States and European countries -- some of world's largest emitters -- for failing to do more
to reduce emissions.
To that latter end, there was in fact little progress made on the central issue of reducing greenhouse
gas emissions. Had those emissions been reduced, there would have been less of a need to
financially deal with the devastation caused by climate change. One interpretation was that the
global community was accepting the fact that industrialization was contributing to global warming,
which had deleterious effects on the polar ice caps and concomitantly on the rise of sea level, with
devastating effects for small island nations. Thus, wealthier countries were willing to pay around
$10 billion a year through 2020, effectively in "damages," to the poor countries that could be
viewed as the "collateral damage" of industrial progress. But damages today could potentially be
destruction tomorrow, leaving in place the existential challenges and burdens to be born by some of
the world's smallest and least wealthy island countries.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the representative for the small island nation states at the Doha summit
responded with ire, characterizing the lack of progress on reducing emissions as follows: "We see
the package before us as deeply deficient in mitigation (carbon cuts) and finance. It's likely to lock
us on the trajectory to a 3,4,5C rise in global temperatures, even though we agreed to keep the
global average temperature rise of 1.5C to ensure survival of all islands. There is no new finance
(for adapting to climate change and getting clean energy) -- only promises that something might
materialize in the future. Those who are obstructive need to talk not about how their people will
live, but whether our people will live."
Indeed, in most small island countries not just in the Pacific, but also the Caribbean and Indian
Ocean, ecological concerns and the climate crisis have been dominant themes with dire life and
death consequences looming in the background for their people. Small island nations in these
region are already at risk from the rise of sea-level, tropical cyclones, floods. But their very
livelihoods of fishing and subsistence farming were also at risk as a result of ecological and
environmental changes. Increasingly high storm surges can wipe out entire villages and contaminate
water supplies. Accordingly, the very existence of island nations, such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, are
at severe risk of being obliterated from the map. Yet even with the existential threat of being wiped
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off the map in the offing, the international community has been either slow or restrictive in its
efforts to deal with global warming, climate change, economic and ecological damage, as well as
the emerging global challenge of environmental refugees.
A 2012 report from the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the Pacific Regional
Environment Program underlined the concerns of small island nations and their people as it
concluded that the livelihoods of approximately 10 million people in Pacific island communities
were increasingly vulnerable to climate change. In fact, low-lying islands in that region would
likely confront losses of up to 18 percent of gross domestic product due to climate change,
according to the report. The report covers 21 countries and territories, including Fiji, Kiribati,
Samoa and Tonga, and recommended environmental legislation intended to deal with the climate
crisis facing the small island countries particularly. As noted by David Sheppard, the director
general of the Pacific Regional Environment Program that co-sponsored this study: “The findings...
emphasize the need more than ever to raise the bar through collective actions that address the
region's environmental needs at all levels."
Regardless of the failures of the summit in Qatar (discussed above), the meeting did facilitate a
process starting in 2015, which would bind both wealthy and poor countries together in the
mission of forging a new binding treaty that would replace the Kyoto Protocol and tackle the
central causes of climate change.
For more information on the threats faced in small island nations by climate change and the
measures being undertaken to lobby for international action, please see the Alliance for Small
Island States available online at the URL: http://aosis.org/
Special Report
COP 21 summit in Paris ends with historic agreement to tackle climate change; rare
international consensus formed on environmental crisis facing the planet (2015) -In mid-December 2015, the highly-anticipated United Nations climate conference of parties (COP)
in Paris, France, ended with a historic agreement. In fact, it would very likely be understood as
the most significant international agreement signed by all the recognized countries of the world
since the Cold War. Accordingly, the Paris Agreement was being distinguished as the first
multilateral pact that would compel all countries across the world to cut its carbon emissions -- one
of the major causes of increasing greenhouse gas emissions, which contribute to global warming,
and its deleterious effects ranging from the dangerous rise in sea level to catastrophic climate
change.
The accord, which was dubbed to be the "Paris Agreement," was the work of rigorous diplomacy
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and fervent environmental advocacy, and it aimed to address the climate change crisis facing the
planet. As many as 195 countries were represented in the negotiations that led to the landmark
climate deal. Indeed, it was only after weeks of passionate debate that international concurrence
was reached in addressing the environmental challenges confronting the world, with particular
attention to moving beyond fossil fuels and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
The success of the COP 21 summit in Paris and the emergence of the landmark Paris Agreement
was, to some extent, attributed to the efforts of France's Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius who
presided over the negotiations. The French foreign minister's experience and credentials as a
seasoned diplomat and respected statesman paid dividends. He skillfully guided the delegates from
almost 200 countries and interest groups along the negotiations process, with ostensibly productive
results and a reasonably robust deal to show for it.
On Dec. 12, 2015, French Foreign Minister Fabius officially adopted the agreement, declaring: "I
now invite the COP to adopt the decision entitled Paris Agreement outlined in the document.
Looking out to the room I see that the reaction is positive, I see no objections. The Paris
agreement is adopted." Once Foreign Minister Fabius' gavel was struck, symbolically inaugurating
the Paris Agreement into force, the COP delegate rushed to their feet with loud and bouyant cheers
as well as thunderous applause.
In general, the Paris Agreement was being hailed as a victory for enviromental activists and a
triumph for international diplomats, while at the same time being understood as simply an initial -and imperfect -- move in the direction of a sustainable future. China's chief negotiator, Xie
Zhenhua, issued this message, saying that while the accord was not ideal, it should "not prevent
us from marching historical steps forward."
United States President Barack Obama lauded the deal as both "ambitious" and "historic," and the
work of strenuous multilateral negotiations as he declared, "Together, we've shown what's possible
when the world stands as one." The United States leader acknowledged that the accord was not
"perfect," but he reminded the critics that it was "the best chance to save the one planet we have. "
Former United States Vice President Al Gore, one of the world's most well known environmental
advocates, issued a lengthy statement on the accompishments ensconced in the Paris Agreement.
He highlighted the fact that the Paris Agreement was a first step towards a future with a reduced
carbon footprint on Planet Earth as he said, "The components of this agreement -- including a
strong review mechanism to enhance existing commitments and a long-term goal to eliminate
global-warming pollution this century -- are essential to unlocking the necessary investments in our
future. No agreement is perfect, and this one must be strengthened over time, but groups across
every sector of society will now begin to reduce dangerous carbon pollution through the framework
of this agreement."
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The central provisions of the Paris Agreement included the following items:
- Greenhouse gas emissions should peak as quickly as possible, with a move towards balancing
energy sources, and ultimately the decrease of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century
- Global temperature increase would be limited to 1.5 degrees Centigrade above pre-industrial
levels and would be held "well below" the two degrees Centigrade threshold
- Progress on these goals would be reviewed every five years beginning in 2020 with new
greenhouse gas reduction targets issued every five years
- $100 billion would be expended each year in climate finance for developing countries to move
forward with green technologies, with further climate financing to be advanced in the years beyond
It should be noted that there both legally binding and voluntary elements contained within the
Paris Agreement. Specifically, the submission of an emissions reduction target and the regular
review of that goal would be legally mandatory for all countries. Stated differently, there would be
a system in place by which experts would be able to track the carbon-cutting progress of each
country. At the same time, the specific targets to be set by countries would be determined at the
discretion of the countries, and would not be binding. While there was some criticism over this
non-binding element, the fact of the matter was that the imposition of emissions targets was
believed to be a major factor in the failure of climate change talks in Copenhagen, Denmark, in
2009.
In 2015, the talks faced challenges as several countries, such as China and India, objected to
conditions that would stymie economic and development. In order to avoid that kind of landmine,
a system Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) was developed and formed the
basis of the accord. As such, the Paris Agreement would, in fact, facilitate economic growth and
development, as well as technological progress, but with the goal of long-term ecological
sustainability based on low carbon sources. In fact, the agreement heralded as "the beginning of
the end of the fossil fuel era." As noted by Nick Mabey, the head of the climate diplomacy
organization E3G, said, "Paris means governments will go further and faster to tackle climate
change than ever before. The transition to a low carbon economy is now unstoppable, ensuring
the end of the fossil fuel age."
A particular sticking point in the agreement was the $100 billion earmarked for climate financing
for developing countries to transition from traditional fossil fuels to green energy technologies and a
low carbon future. In 2014, a report by the International Energy Agency indicated that the cost of
that transition would actually be around $44 trillion by the mid-century -- an amount that would
render the $100 billion being promised to be a drop in the proverbial bucket. However, the general
expectation was that the Republican-controlled Senate in the United States, which would have to
ratify the deal in that country, was not interested in contributing significant funds for the cause of
climate change.
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A key strength of the Paris Agreement was the ubiquitous application of measures to all countries.
Of note was the frequently utilized concept of "flexibility" with regard to the Paris Agreement.
Specifically, the varying capacities of the various countries in meeting their obligations would be
anticipated and accorded flexibility. This aspect presented something of a departure from the 1997
Kyoto Protocol, which drew a sharp distinction between developed and developing countries, and
mandated a different set of obligations for those categories of countries. Thus, under Kyoto,
China and India were not held to the same standards as the United States and European
countries. In the Paris Agreement, there would be commitments from all countries across the
globe.
Another notable strength of the Paris Agreement was the fact that the countries of the world were
finally able to reach consensus on the vital necessity to limit global temperature increases to 1.5
degrees Centrigrade. Ahead of the global consensus on the deal, and as controversy continued to
surface over the targeted global temperature limits, the leaders of island countries were sounding
the alarm about the melting of the Polar ice caps and the associated rise in seal level. Prime
Minister Enele Sopoaga of Tuvalu issued this dismal reminder: “Tuvalu’s future … is already
bleak and any further temperature increase will spell the total demise of Tuvalu. No leader in this
room carries such a level of worry and responsibility. Just imagine you are in my shoes, what
would you do?” It was thus something of a victory for environmental advocates that the countries
of the world could find cnsensus on the lower number -- 1.5 degrees rather than 2 degrees.
A significant weak point with regard to the Paris deal was a "loss and damage" provision, which
anticipates that even with all the new undertakings intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
and move to a low carbon future, there would nonetheless be unavoidable climate change
consequences. Those consequences ranged from the loss of arable land for farmers as well as soil
erosion and contamination of potable water by sea water, to the decimation of territory in coastal
zones and on small islands, due to the rise in sea level, with entire small island countries being
rendered entirely uninhabitable. The reality was that peoples' homes across the world would be
destroyed along with their way of life.
With that latter catastrophic effect being a clear and present danger for small island countries, the
Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) demanded that the developed world acknowledge its
responsibility for this irreversible damage.. Despite the fact that greenhouse gas emissions and the
ensuing plague of global warming was, indeed, the consequence of development in the West (the
United States and Europe) and the large power house countries, such as Russia, China and India,
there was no appetite by those countries to sign on to unlimited liability. Under the Paris
Agreement, there was a call for research on insurance mechanisms that would address loss and
damage issues, with recommendations to come in the future.
The call for research was being regarded as an evasion of sorts and constituted the weakest aspect
of the Paris Agreement. Not surprisingly, a coalition of small island nations demanded a "Marshall
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Plan" for the Pacific. Borrowing the term "Marshall Plan" from the post-World War II
reconstruction effort, the coalition of Pacific island nation, which included Kiribati, Tuvalu, Fiji,
and the Marshall Islands, called for an initiative that would include investment in renewable energy
and shoreline protection, cultural preservation, economic assistance for economies in transition,
and a plan for migration and resettlement for these countries as they confront the catastrophic
effects of the melting of the Polar ice caps and the concomitant rise in sea level. The precise
contours of the initiative remained unknown, unspecified, and a mere exercise in theory at the time
of writing. Yet such an initiative would, at some point, have to be addressed, given the realities of
climate change and the slow motion calamity unfolding each day for low-lying island nations across
the world.
As noted by Vice President Greg Stone of Conservation International, who also functions as an
adviser to the government of Kiribati, “Imagine living in a place where you know it’s going to go
away someday, but you don’t know what day that wave’s going to come over and wash your
home away." He added, “It’s a disaster we know is going to happen.” Meanwhile, the
intervening years promised to be filled with hardship for small island nations, such as Kiribati.
Stone explained, “For every inch of sea-level rise, these islands lose 10 feet of their freshwater
table to saltwater intrusion,” Stone explained. “So it’s not just about the day the water finally goes
over the island; it’s also about the day that there’s just not enough water left and everyone has to
move off the island.” Presaging the future for island nations that could face submersion, Stone
said, “If you look ahead 50 years, a country like Kiribati could become the first aqueous nation.
possibility of migration. That is, they own this big patch of ocean, and they administer it from
elsewhere.”
Foreign Minister Minister Tony Debrum of the Marshall Islands emerged as the champion
advocating on behalf of small island nation states and a loose coalition of concerned countries from
the Pacific to the Caribbean, but with support from the United States. He addressed the
comprehensive concerns of small island nations regarding the weaknesses of the deal, while
simultaneously making clear that the Paris Agreement signified hope for the countries most at risk.
In a formal statement, Debrum declared: "We have made history today. Emissions targets are still
way off track, but this agreement has the tools to ramp up ambition, and brings a spirit of hope that
we can rise to this challenge. I can go back home to my people and say we now have a pathway to
survival.” Debrum highlighted the imperatives of Pacific island nations, saying, “Our High
Ambition Coalition was the lightning rod we needed to lift our sights and expectations for a strong
agreement here in Paris. We were joined by countries representing more than half the world. We
said loud and clear that a bare-bones, minimalist agreement would not fly. We instead demanded an
agreement to mark a turning point in history, and the beginning of our journey to the post-carbon
era.”
Debrum of the Marshall Islands espoused the quintessential synopsis of the accord and its effects
for those most likely to be affected by climate change as he noted, “Climate change won’t stop
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overnight, and my country is not out of the firing line just yet, but today we all feel a little safer.”
Editor's Entry on Environmental Policy:
The low-lying Pacific island nations of the world, including Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands,
Fiji, among others, are vulnerable to the threats posed by global warming and cimate change,
derived from carbon emissions, and resulting in the rise in sea level. Other island nations in the
Caribbean, as well as poor countries with coastal zones, were also at particular risk of suffering the
deleterious effects of climate change.
Political policy in these countries are often connected to ecological issues, which have over time
morphed into an existential crisis of sorts. Indeed, ecological concerns and the climate crisis have
also been dominant themes with life and death consequences for the people of island nations in the
Pacific. Indeed, the very livelihoods of fishing and subsistence farming remain at risk as a result of
ecological and environmental changes. Yet even so, these countries are threatened by increasingly
high storm surges, which could wipe out entire villages and contaminate water supplies. Moreover,
because these are low lying island nations, the sustained rise in sea level can potentially lead to the
terrain of these countries being unihabitable at best, and submerged at worst. Stated in plain terms,
these countries are at severe risk of being obliterated from the map and their plight illuminates the
emerging global challenge of environmental refugees. In these manifold senses, climate change is
the existential crisis of the contemporary era.
Since the time of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, there have been efforts aimed at extending the life of
that agreement, with an eye on minimizing greenhouse gas emissions, and thus minimizing the
effects of climate change. Those endeavors have largely ended in failure, as exemplified by the
unsuccessful Copenhagen talks in 2009 and the fruitless Doha talks in 2012 respectively. The
success of the COP 21 talks in France, with the adoption of the landmark Paris Agreement in
2015, was regarded as the first glimmer of hope. Not only did the Paris Agreement signify the
triumph of international diplomacy and global consensus, but it also marked the start of the end of
the fossil fuel era, with the path forward toward a low carbon future reliant on greener
technologies. Most crucially, the Paris Agreement stood as the first significant response in recent
times to the central challenge of climate change and its quotidian effects on the lives of real human
beings across the world.
1. Major International Environmental Accords:
General Environmental Concerns
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 1991.
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Accords Regarding Atmosphere
Annex 16, vol. II (Environmental Protection: Aircraft Engine Emissions) to the 1044 Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Montreal, 1981
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), Geneva, 1079
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), New York, 1002
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 1985 including the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Depleted the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 1987
Accords Regarding Hazardous Substances
Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movements
and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, Bamako, 1991
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused during Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road,
Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), Geneva, 1989
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
(Basel Convention), Basel, 1989
Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Helsinki, 1992
Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive
Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes
within the South Pacific Region (Waigani Convention), Waigani, 1995
European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR),
Geneva 1957
FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides, Rome, 1985
2. Major International Marine Accords:
Global Conventions
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Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter
(London Convention 1972), London, 1972
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by
Protocol of 1978 relation thereto (MARPOL 73/78), London, 1973 and 1978
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 (1969 CLC), Brussels,
1969, 1976, and 1984
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage 1971 (1971 Fund Convention), Brussels, 1971
Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS), London 1996
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Co-operation (OPRC),
London, 1990
International Convention Relation to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution
Casualties (Intervention Convention), Brussels, 1969
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Montego Bay, 1982
Regional Conventions
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (Oslo
Convention), Oslo, 1972
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based Sources (Paris Convention),
Paris, 1974
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic (OSPAR
Convention), Paris, 1992
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (1974 Helsinki
Convention), Helsinki 1974
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (1992 Helsinki
Convention), Helsinki 1992
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Conventions within the UNEP Regional Seas Programme
Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution, Bucharest, 1992
Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider
Caribbean Region, Cartagena de Indias, 1983
Convention for the Protection, Management, and Development of the Marine and Coastal
Environment of the Eastern African Region, Nairobi, 1985
Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from
Pollution, Kuwait, 1978
Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment and Coastal Region of
the Mediterranean Sea (Barcelona Convention), Barcelona, 1976
Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, Jeddah,
1982
Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific
Region, Noumea, 1986
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South-East
Pacific, Lima, 1981
Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal
Environment of the West and Central African Region, Abidjan, 1981
3. Major Conventions Regarding Living Resources:
Marine Living Resources
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), Canberra,
1980
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), Rio de Janeiro, 1966
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), Washington, 1946
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Nature Conservation and Terrestrial Living Resources
Antarctic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 1959
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage
Convention), Paris, 1972
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Nairobi, 1992
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), Bonn, 1979
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),
Washington, D.C., 1973
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar
Convention), Ramsar, 1971
Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD), Paris 1994
FAO International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Rome, 1983
International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1994 (ITTA, 1994), Geneva, 1994
Freshwater Resources
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes,
Helsinki, 1992
4. Major Conventions Regarding Nuclear Safety:
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
(Assistance Convention), Vienna, 1986
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Notification Convention), Vienna, 1986
Convention on Nuclear Safety, Vienna, 1994
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, 1963
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5. Major Intergovernmental Organizations
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)
European Union (EU): Environment
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
Global Environment Facility (GEF)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
International Labour Organization (ILO)
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds)
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Environment Policy
Committee (EPOC)
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
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World Bank
World Food Programme (WFP)
World Health Organization (WHO)
World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
World Trade Organization (WTO)
6. Major Non-Governmental Organizations
Atmosphere Action Network East Asia (AANEA)
Climate Action Network (CAN)
Consumers International (CI)
Earth Council
Earthwatch Institute
Environmental Liaison Centre International (ELCI)
European Environmental Bureau (EEB)
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)
Friends of the Earth International (FoEI)
Greenpeace International
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)
International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)
International Solar Energy Society (ISES)
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IUCN-The World Conservation Union
Pesticide Action Network (PAN)
Sierra Club
Society for International Development (SID)
Third World Network (TWN)
Water Environment Federation (WEF)
Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO)
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)
World Federalist Movement (WFM)
World Resources Institute (WRI)
World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF)
7. Other Networking Instruments
Arab Network for Environment and Development (RAED)
Global Legislators for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE)
Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC)
United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service (UN-NGLS)
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Appendices
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Bibliography
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sources: Key Data
Altapedia. URL: http://www.atlapedia.com/online/country_index.htm
Ethnologue. URL: http://www.ethnologue.com
Geobase Global Statistics. URL: http://www.geoba.se
Infoplease: URL: http://www.infoplease.com
The Statesman's Year Book 2006. Barry Turner, ed. London: St. Martin's Press.
United States D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , B a c k g r o u n d N o t e s . U R L :
http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.htm
United States Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook. Washington, D.C.: Printing and
Photography Group. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html
World Bank. URL: http://www.worldbank.org/
World Climate Data Online. URL: http://www.worldclimate.com
Methodology Note for Demographic Data:
The demographic numbers for cities and national populations listed in CountryWatch content are
derived from the Geoba.se website, which analyzes data from the World Bank. The current
demographic numbers displayed on the Countrywatch website are reflective of the latest available
estimates.
The demographic information for language, ethnicity and religion listed in CountryWatch content is
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derived from a mix of sources including the Altapedia, Central Intelligence Agency Factbook,
Infoplease, and State Department Background Notes.
Sources: Political Overview
Agence France Presse. URL: http://www.afp.com/en/
BBC International News. URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ (Various editions and dates as
cited in particular reviews)
Britannica Book of the Year. 1998-present. David Calhoun, ed. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica,
Inc.
Britannica Online URL :http://www.eb.com
Britannica Year in Review. URL: http://www.britannica.com/browse/year
Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments. URL:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/chiefs/index.html
Christian Science Monitor. URL: http://www.csmonitor.com/ (Various editions and dates as cited
in particular reviews)
CNN International News. URL:http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/ (Various editions and dates as cited
in particular reviews)
Current Leaders of Nations. 1997. Jennifer Mossman, ed. Detroit: Gale Research
The Economist Magazine. (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews)
The Economist Country Briefings. URL: http://www.economist.com/countries/
Eldis Country Profiles. URL: http://www.eldis.org/country/index.htm
Elections Around the World. URL: http://www.electionworld.org/
Election Resources. URL: http://electionresources.org/
Europa World Yearbook 1999. Vols. I & II. 1999. London: Europa Publications Ltd.
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Europe World Online. URL: http://www.europaworld.com/pub/
Financial Times. URL: http://www.financialtimes.com
Foreign Government Resources. URL: http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/foreign.html
Human Rights Watch. URL: http://www.hrw.org
IFES Election Guide. URL: http://www.electionguide.org
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. URL: http://www.idea.int/
International Who's Who 1997-1998, 61st Edition. 1997. London: Europa Publications Ltd.
L e a d e r s h i p V i e w s , C h i e f s o f
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/chiefs/index.html
S t a t e
O n l i n e .
U R L
:
Library of Congress Country Studies. URL: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html
New Encyclopedia Britannica. 1998. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc.
New York Times. URL: http://www.nytimes.com (Various editions and dates as cited in
particular reviews)
Patterns of Global Terrorism. n.d. United States Department of State. Washington D.C.: United
States Department of State Publications.
Political Handbook of the World. n.d. Arthur S. Banks, Thomas C. Muller, ed. Binghamton, New
York: CSA Publications.
Political Reference Almanac Online. URL: http://www.polisci.com/almanac/nations.htm
Reuters News. URL: http://www.reuters.com/
Rulers. URL: http://rulers.org/
The Guardian Online. URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/
particular reviews)
(Various editions and dates as cited in
The Statesman's Year-Book 2006. Barry Turner, ed. London: St. Martin's Press.
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United Nations Development Programme. URL: http://hdr.undp.org
United Nations Refugee Agency. URL: http://www.unhcr.org
United States Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook.Washington, D.C.: Printing and
Photography Group. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html
United States Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT)
URL : http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_ac/reports_ac.html
United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. URL:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18245.htm
United States D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , B a c k g r o u n d N o t e s . U R L :
http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html
Virtual Library: International Relations Resources. URL: http://www.etown.edu/vl/countgen.html
World Bank: Governance Indicators. URL: http://info.worldbank.org/governance
-- See also list of News Wires services below, which are also used for research purposes. -Note on Edition Dates:
The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original Country
Reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been
used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above)
contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.
Sources: Economic Overview
BP Statistical Review of World Energy. URL: http://www.bp.com/genericsection.do?
categoryId=92&contentId=7005893
BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 1998. 1998 to present. Page 1.C. London: The
British Petroleum Company.
International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook. Washington, D.C.:
International Monetary Fund Publication Services.
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International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 1998 to present. Washington,
D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services.
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 1999 to present.
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services.
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, May 1999. 1999 to present. Washington,
D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services.
International Labour Office, World Employment Report, 1998-99. 1998 to present. Geneva:
International Labour Office.
United Nations Statistical Division Online. URL: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm
United Nations Statistics Division, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (MBS On Line), November 1999
Edition. 1999 to present. New York: United Nations.
United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 43rd Issue. 1999. 1999 to present New York: United Nations.
United Nations, Food & Agricultural Organization, FAOSTAT Database. URL : http://apps.fao.org/
United Nations, Comtrade Data Base, http://comtrade.un.org/
United States Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs.
URL:http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html
United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Database
United States Geological Service, Mineral Information
United States Department of State, Country Commercial Guides. Washington, D.C. United States
of America. URL:http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/com_guides/index.html
The World Bank, Global Development Finance, Country Tables. 1999 to present. Washington,
D.C.: The World Bank.
The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators. 1999 to present. Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank.
Yearbook of Tourism Statistics, World Tourism Organization. 1998 to present. Madrid: The World
Tourism Organization.
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Note on Edition Dates:
The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original country
reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been
used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above)
contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.
Methodology Notes for Economic Data:
Estimates by CountryWatch.com of GDP in dollars in most countries are made by converting local
currency GDP data from the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook to US dollars
by market exchange rates estimated from the International Monetary Fund International Financial
Statistics and projected out by the CountryWatch Macroeconomic Forecast. Real GDP was
estimated by deflating current dollar values by the US GDP Implicit Price Deflator.
Exceptions to this method were used for:
• Bosnia-Herzegovina
• Nauru
• Cuba
• Palau
• Holy See
• San Marino
• Korea, North
• Serbia & Montenegro
• Liberia
• Somalia
• Liechtenstein
• Tonga
• Monaco
• Tuvalu
In these cases, other data and/or estimates by CountryWatch.com were utilized.
Investment Overview
C o r r u p t i o n a n d T r a n s p a r e n c y
http://www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/2001/cpi2001.html#cpi
<http://www.transparency.org/documents/
I n d e x .
U R L :
Deloitte Tax Guides. URL: http://www.deloittetaxguides.com
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Trade Policy Reviews by the World Trade Organization .
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm#bycountry
URL:
United States Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs. URL:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html
United States D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , B a c k g r o u n d N o t e s . U R L :
http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html
United States Department of State, Country Commercial Guides. 1996-2006. Washington, D.C.
U n i t e d S t a t e s
o f
A m e r i c a .
U R L :
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/com_guides/index.html
World Bank: Doing Business. URL: http://www.doingbusiness.org
World Bank: Governance Indicators. URL: http://info.worldbank.org/governance
Social Overview
Borden, G.A., Conaway, W.A., Morrison, T. 1994. Kiss, Bow, or Shake Hands: How to do
Business in Sixty Countries. Holbrook, Massachusetts, 1994.
Center for Disease Control. URL: http://www.cdc.gov
Eldis Country Profiles. URL: http://www.eldis.org/country/index.htm
Ethnologue. URL: http://www.ethnologue.com/
Government of Australia D e p a r t m e n t o f F o r e i g n A f f i a r s a n d T r a d e . U R L :
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo
Government of
Canada F o r e i g n A f f a i r s a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a d e . U R L :
http://www.voyage.gc.ca/consular_home-e.htm
Library of Congress Country Studies. URL: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html
Lonely Planet. URL: http://www.lonelyplanet.com/worldguide/
Steve Kropla's Online Help For World Travelers. URL: http://www.kropla.com/
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United Kingdom Ministry of Foreign and Commonwealth Office. URL: http://www.fco.gov.uk/
United Nations Human Development Report. URL: http://www.undp.org/hdro
UNICEF Statistical Database Online. URL: http://www.unicef.org/statis/atoz.html
United States Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook. 2001. Washington, D.C.: Printing and
Photography Group. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html
United States Department of State, Background Notes. URL:
http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html
United States Department of State, Commercial and Business Affairs: Travel Tips. URL:
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/cba_travel.html
United States Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs. URL: http://travel.state.gov/
World Health Organization. URL: http://www.who.int/home-page/
World News Connection, National Technical Information Service. Springfield, Virginia, USA.
Internet News Service, Xinhua News Agency (U.S.) Inc. Woodside, New York. URL:
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/
Note on Edition Dates:
The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original country
reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been
used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above)
contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.
Methodology Notes for the HDI:
Since 1990, the United Nations Development Programme, in concert with organizations across the
globe, has produced the Human Development Index (or HDI). According to the UNDP, the index
measures average achievement in basic human development in one simple composite index, and
produces from this index a ranking of countries. The HDI is a composite of three basic
components of human development: longevity, knowledge and standard of living. Longevity is
measured by life expectancy. Knowledge is measured by combination of adult literacy and mean
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years of schooling. Standard of living is measured by purchasing power, based on real GDP per
capita (in constant US$) adjusted for differences in international living costs (or, purchasing power
parity, PPP). While the index uses these social indicators to measure national performance with
regard to human welfare and development, not all countries provide the same level of information
for each component needed to compute the index; therefore, as in any composite indicator, the
final index is predicated on projections, predictions and weighting schemes. The index is a static
measure, and thus, an incomplete measure of human welfare. In fact, the UNDP says itself the
concept of human development focuses on the ends rather than the means of development and
progress, examining in this manner, the average condition of all people in a given country.
Specifically, the index is calculated by determining the maximum and minimum for each of the
three components (as listed above) and then measuring where each country stands in relation to
these scales-expressed as a value between 0 and 1. For example, the minimum adult literary rate is
zero percent, the maximum is 100 percent, and the reading skills component of knowledge in the
HDI for a country where the literacy rate is 75 percent would be 0.75. The scores of all indicators
are then averaged into the overall index.
For a more extensive examination of human development, as well as the ranking tables for each
participating country, please visit: http://www.undp.org
Note on History sections
In some CountryWatch Country Reviews, open source content from the State Department
Background Notes and Country Guides have been used.
Environmental Overview
Environmental Profiles: A Global Guide to Projects and People. 1993. Linda Sobel Katz, Sarah
Orrick, and Robert Honig. New York: Garland Publishing.
The Environment Encyclopedia and Directory, 2nd Edition. 1998. London: Europa.
Environmental Protection Agency Global Warming Site. URL: http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming
Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations: Forestry. URL:
http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/sofo/en/
Global Warming Information Page. URL: http://globalwarming.org
Introduction to Global Environmental Issues, 2nd Edition. 1997. Kevin Pickering and Lewis Owen.
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London: Routledge.
Trends: Compendium of Data on Global Change.
http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/trends/emis/em_cont.htm
U n i t e d N a t i o n s E n v i r o n m e n t a l
http://www.unep.org/GEO/GEO_Products/Assessment_Reports/
P r o g r a m .
URL:
U R L :
United Nations Global Environmental Outlook. URL: http://www.unep.org/geo/geo4/media/
United States Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs. URL:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html
World Climate Data Online. URL: http://www.worldclimate.com
World Directory of Country Environmental Studies. 1996. The World Resource Institute.
World Factbook. US Central Intelligence Agency. Washington, D.C.: Printing and Photography
Group.
1998-1999 World Resources Guide to the Global Environment by the World Resources Institute.
May, 1998.
1998/1999 Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development. 1998.
London: Earthscan Publications.
Note on Edition Dates:
The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original country
reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been
used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above)
contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.
Other Sources:
General information has also been used in the compilation of this review, with the courtesy of
governmental agencies from this country.
News Services:
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CANA Daily Bulletin. Caribbean Media Agency Ltd., St. Michael, Barbados.
Central and Eastern Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa.
Daily News, Panafrican News Agency. Dakar, Senegal.
PACNEWS, Pacific Islands Broadcasting Association. Suva, Fiji.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Washington D.C. USA.
Reuters News. Thomson Reuters. New York, New York. USA.
Southern Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa.
Voice of America, English Service. Washington D.C.
West Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network for West Africa. 1998-1999
Note: Some or all these news services have been used to research various sections of this Country
Review.
USING COUNTRYWATCH.COM AS AN ELECTRONIC SOURCE:
MLA STYLE OF CITATION
Commentary
For items in a "Works Cited" list, CountryWatch.com suggests that users follow recommended
patterns forindentation given in the MLA Handbook, 4th edition.
Individual Works
Basic form, using an Internet protocol:
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Author/editor. Title of Print Version of Work. Edition statement (if given). Publication information
(Place of publication: publisher, date), if given. Title of Electronic Work. Medium. Available
Protocol (if applicable):Site/Path/File. Access date.
Examples:
Youngblood-Coleman, Denise. Country Review: France. 2003. Houston, Texas: CountryWatch
Publications, 2003.
C o u n t r y R e v i e w : F r a n c e. O n l i n e . A v a i l a b l e U R L :
http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_country.asp?vCOUNTRY=61 October, 12, 2003.
Note:
This is the citation format used when the print version is not used in the reference.
Parts of Works
Basic form, using an Internet protocol:
Author/editor. "Part title." Title of Print Version of Work. Edition statement (if given). Publication
information (Place of publication: publisher, date), if given. Title of Electronic Work. Medium.
AvailableProtocol (if applicable): Site/Path/File. Access date.
Examples:
Youngblood-Coleman, Denise. "People." CountryWatch.com: France. 2003. Houston, Texas:
CountryWatch Publications, 2003. CountryWatch.com: France. Online. Available URL :
http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.asp?
vCOUNTRY=61&SECTION=SOCIAL&TOPIC=CLPEO&TYPE=TEXT. October 12, 2003.
Note:
This is the citation format used when the print version is not used in the reference.
For further source citation information, please email: [email protected] or
[email protected].
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CountryWatch
CountryWatch is an information provider for public and private sector organizations that operate globally.
The management of CountryWatch has extensive international experience and has utilized this experience to
provide a concise and useful set of political, economic, and business information for its clients in the form
of Country Reviews, the Country Wire, CountryWatch Data, Elections Central, CountryWatch Videos and
CountryWatch Forecast.
This Country Review is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information on the subject matter
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CountryWatch believes that the information and opinions contained here in are reliable, but does not make
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ISSN: 1- 60523- 893-5
Printed in the United States of America
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