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Key Workplace Documents
January 1994
The Wagner Act and the Question of Workplace
Representation
David Brody
University of California, Berkeley
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The Wagner Act and the Question of Workplace Representation
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Property 01
HEW YORK STMt SCHOOL
1HNISTR1AL AND LABOR R E U T »
1/10/94
Com«»H -UnM*****
The Wagner Act and the Q u e s t i o n of Workplace R e p r e s e n t a t i o n
David Brody
Nearly sixty y e a r s have p a s s e d since the p a s s a g e of t h e National
Labor Relations Act in 1935. So far removed a r e we from t h a t time,
remarked the legal scholar Paul Weiler a t t h e law's f i f t i e t h
anniversary
nine y e a r s ago, t h a t the s i d e s a r e t o t a l l y r e v e r s e d : management i s
c o n t e n t with i t , while organized l a b o r thinks t h a t maybe the b e s t thing
would be to s c r a p the law and r e t u r n to "the law of the jungle." 1 Is any
purpose to be s e r v e d by r e v i s i t i n g t h o s e d i s t a n t days when the Wagner
Act was hailed as Labor's Magna C h a r t a ? In a r e c e n t e s s a y , 2 I made t h e
labor h i s t o r i a n ' s c a s e for why knowledge of i t s p a s t is important to a
union movement b e s e t by t r o u b l e s . My argument took n o t e of the a p p a r e n t
anomaly of the r e c e n t E l e c t r o m a t i o n decision: t h a t labor-management
shop committees, which many In I n d u s t r y and government c o n s i d e r to be
e s s e n t i a l for f o s t e r i n g employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a r e a c t u a l l y i l l e g a l under
Section Sa(2) of the law. I c i t e d 8a(2) only "to remind us t h a t the
principles and r u l e s [the law] a s s e r t s came out of a p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r y
and were premised on a s p e c i f i c s e t of i n d u s t r i a l conditions."
But what I
had intended as a passing o b s e r v a t i o n t u r n s out to have p e c u l i a r
r e l e v a n c e to a growing d e b a t e in American today over labor law reform.
At the h e a r t of t h a t d e b a t e is t h e q u e s t i o n of workplace r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
And on exploring f u r t h e r , I have d i s c o v e r e d t h a t , far from being marginal
to the main p u r p o s e s of the law, t h a t q u e s t i o n , and how It was r e s o l v e d ,
stood at the h e a r t of the original d e b a t e over the Wagner Act.
Even today 8a(2) remains p r i s t i n e , without the u s u a l e n c r u s t a t i o n of
c a s e law of a s i x t y - y e a r o l d - p r o v i s i o n . The National Labor R e l a t i o n s
Board recognized t h i s in i t s finding in t h e E l e c t r o m a t l o n c a s e , which i s
based primarily on an examination of l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . S e n a t o r Wagner is
q u o t e d extensively, and there Is c l o s e a t t e n t i o n to the s u c c e s s i v e
wording of Section 8a(2)£9which in the end prohibits not only employer
domination in, but I n t e r f e r e n c e with, the formation or administration of
labor o r g a n i z a t i o n s , as well as any support financial or o t h e r w i s e . The
r e a c h of 8a(2) is determined by how the law defines "labor organization,"
and h e r e too t h e r e is no mistaking t h e l e g i s l a t i v e intent: in i t s final
wording, Section 2(5) l e a v e s no s h e l t e r from t h e p r o h i b i t i o n s of .8a(2) for
workplace forms of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n s o f a r as concerns the t e r m s and
c o n d i t i o n s of employment.
To t h e amici in the c a s e who a r g u e d t h a t changed i n d u s t r i a l c o n d i t i o n s
call for a more flexible approach, t h e Board r e s p o n d s r a t h e r p l a i n t i v e l y
t h a t i t cannot do so "when c o n g r e s s i o n a l i n t e n t to the c o n t r a r y i s
a b s o l u t e l y clear...."I/One can u n d e r s t a n d why, in a law committed to
f o s t e r i n g c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s between employers and employees,
Congress would be anxious to p r e v e n t t h e suborning of a c o l l e c t i v e
bargaining agent by i t s o p p o s i t e number. But what can S e n a t o r Wagner and
his c o l l e a g u e s have had in mind by t h e r a d i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s w r i t t e n into
Sa(2) and 2(5), c o n s t r a i n t s so sweeping t h a t they apply to employee
o r g a n i z a t i o n s not aspiring to c o l l e c t i v e bargaining (NLRB v.Cabot Carbon
Co [1959]) and to employer a c t i o n s not t a i n t e d by a n t i - u n i o n animus (NLRB
v. Newport News Shipbuilding Co. T1939])?
1
That 8a(2) was not i n a d v e r t e n t
In the original Wagner Act, t h e d e s i g n a t i o n is 8(2), but for
c o n s i s t e n c y ' s sake, and to avoid confusion, Sa(2) will be used t h r o u g h o u t .
2
became a l t o g e t h e r c e r t a i n when Congress u n d e r t o o k t h e
Taft-Hartley
overhaul of 1947. The House adopted a p r o v i s i o n p e r m i t t i n g employers in
the a b s e n c e of a c e r t i f i e d bargaining agent- t o form or maintain employee
committees for the p u r p o s e of discussing m a t t e r s of mutual i n t e r e s t ,
including the terms and conditions of work. The provision was r e j e c t e d in
c o n f e r e n c e , s p e c i f i c a l l y (so S e n a t o r Taft reported) b e c a u s e the
c o n f e r e e s wanted the p r o h i b i t i o n s In 8a(2) l e f t "unchanged,"-i/and s o they
have remained ever s i n c e .
What has changed is an i n d u s t r i a l environment t h a t now p l a c e s a
premium on employee involvement. This t a k e s v a r i o u s forms, from q u a l i t y
c i r c l e s to production teams and up t o , a t i t s most advanced, shop
committees like the ones d i s e s t a b l i s h e d by E l e c t r o m a t l o n . At s t a k e ,
argued some amici in t h a t c a s e , was nothing l e s s than American
c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s in the global economy. And when the Clinton
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n came into office a fev; weeks l a t e r , lo and behold t h a t was
exactly the p o s i t i o n it took. The key c o m p e t i t i v e a r e n a , s a y s S e c r e t a r y
of Labor Robert B. Reich, is the workplace, and the g o a l , "high
performance work p r a c t i c e . " Workplace reform is what in the Clinton
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s mind c a l l s for labor law reform. The link i s e x p l i c i t in
the charge it gave to the Commission on t h e F u t u r e of Worker-Management
R e l a t i o n s , the s o - c a l l e d Dunlop Commission a f t e r i t s c h a i r , John T.
Dunlop.V Although nothing is yet s e t t l e d , c l e a r l y what members of the
Commission have in mind, and what t h e s e c r e t a r i e s of l a b o r and commerce
had in mind when they called i t i n t o being, i s a s y s t e m of workplace
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n much more varied and c o l l a b o r a t i v e than Is p e r m i s s i b l e
under existing law>i/
3
The d r i f t of the adminis tra-tion's thinking is u n d e r w r i t t e n by t h e most
a u t h o r i t a t i v e of academic v o i c e s . In his r e c e n t book Governing t h e
Workplace: The F u t u r e of Labor and Employment Law, Paul Weiler In f a c t
commits himself to a s p e c i f i c reform: Employee Participation Committees
mandated by law for every workplace with 25 or more workers, taking as
his model the German w o r k s - c o u n c i l s y s t e m . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o t h e s e
EPCs would be e l e c t e d from within the p l a n t s , and their d u t i e s would be
"to a d d r e s s and respond to the b r o a d s p e c t r u m of r e s o u r c e p o l i c i e s of
the firm." And y e t , powerfully argued and wide-ranging as i t i s , P r o f e s s o r
Weller's book c o n t a i n s but a single s e n t e n c e d / s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h i s is a
choice t h a t the c o u n t r y c o n s i d e r e d once b e f o r e and r e j e c t e d when i t
chose t h e Wagner Act.
In v/hat follows, I p r o p o s e to r e t r a c e t h a t h i s t o r y , taking as my
c e n t r a l argument t h a t what was at i s s u e - - a n d what a c c o u n t e d for
the
sweeping language of Sa(2) and 2(5)--was a s y s t e m i c choice being made
between r i v a l forms of workplace r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ^ a n d f u r t h e r , t h a t i t
was a choice not so d i f f e r e n t from t h e one P r o f e s s o r Weiler o f f e r s u s .
My method will be, in the fashion of t h e h i s t o r i a n , to follow a b a s i c a l l y
chronological c o u r s e , stopping along t h e v/ay at major j u n c t u r e s - - f i v e by
my c o u n t - - t h a t seem to me b e a r on our d e b a t e s over l a b o r lav/. If o t h e r s
find in my account implications I have missed, so much the b e t t e r .
The h i s t o r y of the Wagner Act b e g i n s two y e a r s e a r l i e r in June 1333
with t h e National I n d u s t r i a l Recovery Act, the e a r l y New Deal's
m i s b e g o t t e n e f f o r t to fight the G r e a t D e p r e s s i o n t h r o u g h t h e
c a r t e l i z a t i o n of American i n d u s t r y , t h a t i s , through codes of f a i r
competition. Included in the Recovery Act was Section 7a, which s a i d t h a t
4
employees had the right to organize and b a r g a i n c o l l e c t i v e l y t h r o u g h
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e i r own choosing and in e x c e r c l s i n g that r i g h t to be
free from the i n t e r f e r e n c e , r e s t r a i n t or c o e r c i o n by employers or their
a g e n t s . Only the historian perhaps g e t s e x c i t e d about the q u e s t i o n of
how 7a got into the Recovery bill, and why, once in, i t stuck. For our
p u r p o s e s the main thing Is to understand t h a t , while 7a might i t s e l f have
been more or l e s s an h i s t o r i c a l accident, something like 7a was c e r t a i n
to have been e n a c t e d , b e c a u s e the p r i n c i p l e s i t embodied had a l r e a d y
p r e v a i l e d in an ideological s t r u g g l e going back a t l e a s t s e v e r a l d e c a d e s .
Since e a r l y in America's i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n , l i b e r t y of c o n t r a c t had
been t h e ruling employment p r i n c i p l e in law, applying even to a g r e e m e n t s
for which a condition of the Job was not joining a union or going on
s t r i k e . More p a l a t a b l e in l a t e r y e a r s than t h e yellow-dog c o n t r a c t ,
however, was the open-shop argument, which called on employers
t h e m s e l v e s to s a f e g u a r d the c o n t r a c t u a l freedom of t h e i r workers by
having no dealings, with t r a d e unions. But in a 2 0 t h - c e n t u r y world of
g r e a t i n d u s t r i a l c o r p o r a t i o n s and armies of w o r k e r s , individual r i g h t s
s t e a d i l y l o s t ground to the more u r g e n t claims of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . As
an answer to the epidemic of s t r i k e s and i n d u s t r i a l violence
the U.S.
Commission on I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s recommended in 1915 a c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g law. During World War I, when wartime policy did b r i e f l y
protect
organizing r i g h t s , a t h r e s h o l d v/as c r o s s e d , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the ugly
p o s t w a r r e a c t i o n . After the c o l l a p s e of a n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e Woodrov
Wilson had called in 1919 to find a common ground between l a b o r and
c a p i t a l , Bernard Baruch a s s u r e d the P r e s i d e n t t h a t , d e s p i t e
I r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s , the p a r t i c i p a n t s "did not at any time, r e j e c t
5
the p r i n c i p l e of the r i g h t o f w o r k e r s t o o r g a n i z e and b a r g a i n c o l l e c t i v e l y
with t h e i r employers.'^And when the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932
a s s e r t e d that right as public policy, t h e r e ' w a s no audible d i s s e n t .
Indeed, part of the language of Section 7a(l) i s l i f t e d bodily from N o r r l s LaGuardia, and the r e s t Is a paraphrase. There in Norris-LaGuardia,
moreover, are the key doctrinal words of the Wagner Act—"full freedom
of a s s o c i a t i o n " and "actua.1 liberty of contract." That l a t t e r phrase
d i s p o s e s of an expiring l e g a l t h e o r y - a c t u a l l i b e r t y of c o n t r a c t is what
public policy demands, not t h e fiction of f r e e l y c o n t r a c t i n g i n d l v l d u a l s -and t h e d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t the yellow-dog c o n t r a c t is u n e n f o r c e a b l e in
the f e d e r a l c o u r t s d r i v e s the conclusion n e a t l y home.
S e c t i o n 7a advances beyond N o r r i s - L a G u a r d i a only i n s o f a r as
inclusion in t h e NRA codes of fair c o m p e t i t i o n makes i t more than a mere
s t a t e m e n t of public policy. In f a c t , i n c l u s i o n in the codes was not much
of an a d v a n c e , and inef f e c t u a l i ty is t h e s t a n d a r d theme of 7a h i s t o r y - of the hopes of I n d u s t r i a l workers r a i s e d and then c r u s h e d by the
r e s i s t a n c e of powerful c o r p o r a t e i n t e r e s t s and the f e c k l e s s n e s s of the
Nev; Deal. All too t r u e . Yet, from the p e r s p e c t i v e of our own failed labor
law, 7a can be seen in a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t l i g h t , for what it a l s o
d e m o n s t r a t e d was the power of ideas whose time had come. Today, the
underlying p r i n c i p l e s a r e masked by a l l the encumbering amendments,
c o u r t and NLRB d o c t r i n e , and I n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s engulfing the labor
law. S e c t i o n 7a s t o o d q u i t e alone, l i t t l e more than an a s s s e r t i o n of
p r i n c i p l e s , but for t h a t v e r y r e a s o n c a p a b l e of summoning up t h e force
t h a t b r o u g h t the Wagner Act into being. Remarkably, the v a l i d i t y of the
p r i n c i p l e s were t h e m s e l v e s never d e b a t e d , only what they r e q u i r e d , and
6
from t h i s came a s e r i e s of r u l i n g s , c o n c e i v e d of a t the time a s an
emerging common law of l a b o r , t h a t finally was codified in t h e Wagner Act:
t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n e l e c t i o n , majority r u l e -and exclusive r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,
and a l i s t of enjoined unfair labor p r a c t i c e s by employers.
Once on t h e books, the Wagner Act developed enormous moral f o r c e . The
American Civil L i b e r t i e s Union c o n s i d e r e d i t "in e f f e c t a c i v i l l i b e r t i e s
s t a t u t e " and placed i t a t the top of t h e l i s t of F i r s t Amendment
a c h i e v e m e n t s for 1937. This was the a t m o s p h e r e in which t h e Supreme
Court s u r p r i s e d i t s c r i t i c s and handed down the c r u c i a l J o n e s and
Laughlin (1937) decision upholding t h e Wagner Act. The law m a n i f e s t e d , in
f a c t , a new u n d e r s t a n d i n g of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s beginning t o emerge
during the New Deal. "Perhaps i t is time to think of civil l i b e r t y a s
p r o t e c t i o n b_v the s t a t e r a t h e r than agains t the s t a t e , " w r o t e John
Dewey in 1936. The r e c o r d of the ACLU--it i n i t i a l l y opposed t h e Wagner
Act on t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r t a r i a n g r o u n d s - - i s a p e r f e c t I n d i c a t o r of t h i s
remarkable s h i f t , which was a p r e c o n d i t i o n for the civil r i g h t s r e v o l u t i o n
of the 1960s. In the 1930s, however, i t was l a b o r ' s r i g h t s t h a t occupied
c e n t e r s t a g e . L i s t e n to Roger Baldwin of the ACLU speaking In 1938:
However important or significant may be the s t r u g g l e for t h e p o l i t i c a l
r i g h t s of f i f t e e n million Negroes; however important or s i g n i f i c a n t the
d e f e n s e of r e l i g i o u s l i b e r t i e s ; of academic freedom; of freedom of the
p r e s s , radio or motion p i c t u r e s , t h e s e a r e on the whole t r i f l i n g in
n a t i o n a l e f f e c t compared with the fight for the r i g h t s of l a b o r to
organized
The d e b a t e over labor law reform could do worse than to s t a r t
from
Baldwin's s t a t e m e n t or, more r e a l i s t i c a l l y p e r h a p s , from t h e p r o p o s i t i o n
t h a t "full freedom of a s s o c i a t i o n " and " a c t u a l l i b e r t y of c o n t r a c t " a r e
r i g h t s of workers worthy of being g u a r a n t e e d by the s t a t e . If t h a t
p r o p o s i t i o n no longer holds the a l l e g i a n c e of the c o u n t r y , b e t t e r to know
i t and p r o c e e d accordingly tkan to remain a s we a r e today where t h e
p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t of the law Is to deny to w o r k e r s the r i g h t s the law s a y s
they h a v e . If, as I b e l i e v e , such a clarifyin-g d e b a t e would s e r v e to
r e v i t a l i z e t h e e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e s of t h e Wagner Act, the b a t t l e for
reform would be t h r e e - q u a r t e r s won: we know q u i t e well what i t would
take to c u r b employer intimidation of union w o r k e r s , make t h e
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n e l e c t i o n t r u l y the f r e e choice of employees, and eliminate
the b a r r i e r s to the f i r s t c o n t r a c t . More t o t h e point for t h i s i n q u i r y ,
and where the pathway to reform is l e s s c l e a r , we would a l s o have some
principled c r i t e r i a for a s s e s s i n g c h a n g e s in the law intended to f o s t e r
a l t e r n a t i v e forms of workplace r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
That was what Section 7a provided in t h e t r i a l period leading up to the
Wagner Act, which l e a d s me to my second h i s t o r i c a l j u n c t u r e : how o p e n shop employers proposed to meet the t e s t of 7a. The damning term
commonly used by h i s t o r i a n s , and by c r i t i c s a t t h e time, was the company
union, but we will do b e t t e r to a c c e p t t h e term advanced by employers
*
and one more functionally d e s c r i p t i v e - - t h e employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n plan
(ERP), or, in some companies, the works council. This was a workplace
s y s t e m of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , normally limited to single p l a n t s , and not
contemplating c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s . That the works council would be the
f i r s t line of employer defense was obvious f r o m ' t h e jockeying over
Section 7a b e f o r e the Recovery Act was e n a c t e d , and while i n d u s t r v
l o b b y i s t s had not g o t t e n what they w a n t e d - - a p r o v i s o p r o t e c t i n g
"existing s a t i s f a c t o r y r e l a t i o n s " - - t h e y went away s a t i s f i e d t h a t 7a v/as
l o o s e enough to encompass employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ^ Immediately the lav/
was signed, t h e r e was a tremendous r u s h to put ERPs into
S
effect,
s o m e t i m e s w i t h a c h a r a d e of -employee c o n s u l t a t i o n , m o s t l y n o t . The
cynical motives were all too plain.
Yet e m p l o y e e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l s o h a d q u i t e r e s p e c t a b l e ,
well-founded
r o o t s In the a d v a n c e d management thinking of t h e time. The m o s t d i r e c t
l i n e i n t o New Deal h i s t o r y runs back t o John D. R o c k e f e l l e r , Jr., t h e v e r y
e a r n e s t h e i r t o t h e S t a n d a r d Oil f o r t u n e . One of h i s p r o p e r t i e s ,
C o l o r a d o F u e l and I r o n Company, had f o u g h t a b i t t e r s t r i k e
the
for
r e c o g n i t i o n by t h e United Mine W o r k e r s t h a t e n d e d in t h e Ludlow M a s s a c r e
of 1914. R o c k e f e l l e r claimed I g n o r a n c e of t h e f i r m ' s a f f a i r s , o n l y t o be
p u b l i c l y e x p o s e d by e v i d e n c e d e v e l o p e d by t h e Commission on I n d u s t r i a l
R e l a t i o n s . E m b a r r a s s e d and c h a s t e n e d , he c a l l e d in t h e C a n a d i a n
i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s e x p e r t (and l a t e r p r i m e m i n i s t e r ) W.L. M a c k e n z i e King,
and b e t w e e n them t h e y d e v i s e d a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p l a n f o r t h e
mines. T h e n c e f o r t h , Rockefeller became a f e r v e n t
and v o c a l
Colorado
advocate,
e s t a b l i s h i n g a s i m i l a r p l a n a t S t a n d a r d Oil (NJ) in 1918, and t a k i n g what he
c o n s i d e r e d t o be an a d v a n c e d p o s i t i o n in f a v o r of i n d u s t r i a l d e m o c r a c y in
t h e p o s t w a r p e r i o d . S u b s e q u e n t l y he f i n a n c e d t h e m o s t
important
r e s e a r c h and c o n s u l t i n g o p e r a t i o n of i t s kind in t h e 1 9 2 0 s - - I n d u s t r i a l
R e l a t i o n s C o u n s e l o r s , Inc^v^
In e a r l y 1934, a t t h e h e i g h t of t h e b a t t l e s o v e r 7 a , t h e h e a d of
g r o u p , A r t h u r H. Young, became v i c e p r e s i d e n t in c h a r g e of
relations at
that
industrial
t h e United S t a t e s S t e e l C o r p o r a t i o n . From t h a t p e r c h , Young
did t h e s t r a t e g i c thinking f o r t h e n a t i o n a l ERP m o v e m e n t . And in t h e
Steel
C o r p o r a t i o n , with i t s 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 e m p l o y e e s and p r e - e m i n e n t p l a c e in
American i n d u s t r y , he had a big s t a g e f o r t e s t i n g h i s p r o g r a m . We c a n g e t
a t a s t e of w h a t Young t h o u g h t he was up t o from a s t a t e m e n t of
9
principle
he was fond of quoting:
The human element in I n d u s t r y is t h e f a c t o r of g r e a t e s t I m p o r t a n c e .
Capital cannot e x i s t w i t h o u t labor and l a b o r w i t h o u t c a p i t a l is h e l p l e s s .
The development of each i s dependent on th-e c o o p e r a t i o n of the o t h e r .
Confidence and good will a r e the f o u n d a t i o n s of e v e r y s u c c e s s f u l
e n t e r p r i s e , and t h e s e can be c r e a t e d only by s e c u r i n g a point of c o n t a c t
between employer and employee. They roust s e e k t o u n d e r s t a n d each
o t h e r ' s problems, u n d e r s t a n d each o t h e r ' s opinions, and maintain t h a t
u n i t y of p u r p o s e and e f f o r t upon which t h e v e r y e x i s t e n c e of t h e
community which they c o n s t i t u t e and t h e whole f u t u r e of d e m o c r a t i c
civilization d e p e n d ^
So how did employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f a r e in p r a c t i c e ?
The p l a n s
commonly called for Joint c o u n c i l s , with management and l a b o r a c c o r d e d
equal v o t e s , and a m a j o r i t y r e q u i r e d for any a c t i o n - - a
transparent
management v e t o , of c o u r s e . The d e t a i l s v a r i e d , but t h e small p r i n t
i n v a r i a b l y l e f t the final word to management. At I n t e r n a t i o n a l H a r v e s t e r ,
where Arthur Young r a n things in t h e e a r l y 1920s, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s who
s t e p p e d out of line got a hard l e s s o n ; they were laid off or
transferred.HyWhen l a b o r c o s t s had to be c u t , as in t h e s h a r p r e c e s s i o n
of 1920-21, the ERPs found t h e m s e l v e s b y p a s s e d and t h e r e b y
deflated,
and, in g e n e r a l , on wages and the b a s i c terms of employment they got
nov/here. Yet i t was a l s o t r u e t h a t , a f t e r t h e s h a k e o u t of plans i n i t i a t e d
only to s a t i s f y a wartime d i r e c t i v e or to c o u n t e r a unionizing t h r e a t in
the p o s t w a r s t r i k e period, employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n developed a good
deal of s t a y i n g power. The n e c e s s a r y i n g r e d i e n t s seem to have been,
f i r s t , a p e r s o n n e l d e p a r t m e n t capable of curbing line s u p e r v i s o r s ,
second, an e s t a b l i s h e d and p r o g r e s s i v e b e n e f i t s program, and, t h i r d ,
company willingness to expend the e n e r g y needed to keep the p l a n s from
winding down into I n a c t i v i t y - ^ W i t h 7a, of c o u r s e , t h e r e was a new influx
of firms not truly committed to the ERP c o n c e p t , and t h i s was, as A r t h u r
Young l a t e r ackowledged, a problem he had t o overcome when he joined
10
U n i t e d S t a t e s S t e e L ^ O n t h e ' o t h e r h a n d , t h e i n c e n t i v e s t o make t h e ERPs
work w e r e now v a s t l y higher than b e f o r e , and, in f a c t , o v e r t h e n e x t
two
y e a r s t h e y w e r e much r e w r i t t e n and g e n e r a l l y made m o r e a u t o n o m o u s of
management.
F o r t h o s e in t h e l a b o r movement who h a v e b e e n wondering w h e t h e r s h o p
c o m m i t t e e s might not be a halfway h o u s e toward u n i o n i z a t i o n , t h e a n s w e r
from t h e h i s t o r y I h a v e b e e n d e s c r i b i n g i s a q u a l i f i e d y e s . The e v i d e n c e
s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e ERPs did f o s t e r l o c a l l e a d e r s h i p a n d , i n s o f a r a s
f a i l e d t o p r o d u c e r e s u l t s , did e d u c a t e w o r k e r s and s t r e n g t h e n t h e
they
case
f o r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g by o u t s i d e u n i o n s . An e x t r e m e i n s t a n c e i s t o be
f o u n d in t h e Akron r u b b e r I n d u s t r y w h e r e , a f t e r
Assembly for f i f t e e n
fostering its
Industrial
y e a r s , G o o d y e a r u n i l a t e r a l l y r e - I m p o s e d an
h o u r d a y in 1935 and o p e n e d t h e f l o o d g a t e s
of u n i o n i z a t i o n . At A r t h u r
Young's s h o w c a s e in U.S. S t e e l , t h e ERPs in t h e s h e e t and
s u b s i d i a r y moved in 1935 o v e r h i s o b j e c t i o n s
eight-
tinplate
toward federation
and t h e
n e x t y e a r t h e ERP^s a t t h e b a s i c s t e e l s u b s i d i a r y w e r e s e i z e d by u n i o n
a d h e r e n t s who, a t a c r i t i c a l moment, w e n t in a b o d y o v e r t o t h e CIO.
F o r t h o s e w o n d e r i n g w h e t h e r t h e ERP e x p e r i e n c e of s i x t y y e a r s
suggests
t h a t shop committees can i n c u l c a t e
t h e company l o y a l t y
ago
and
commitment v;e now p r i z e , t h e a n s w e r i s a l s o a q u a l i f i e d y e s . A p r e t t y
fair
t e s t would be how t h e ERPs f a r e d a f t e r 1935 when t h e y came up a g a i n s t
CIO c h a l l e n g e and NLRB d i s e s t a b l i s h m e n t . At c o m p a n i e s t h a t had made a
l o n g - t e r m i n v e s t m e n t In p r o g r e s s i v e l a b o r r e l a t l o n s - - D u p o n t ,
for
e x a m p l e , o r AT <!< T - - i n d e p e n d e n t u n i o n s did t a k e r o o t . When Leo T r o y
s u r v e y e d t h i s l i t t l e - n o t i c e d s e c t o r in 1961, he e s t i m a t e d a m e m b e r s h i p of
1.5 million In 2,000 o r g a n i z a t i o n s , a l t h o u g h he c o u l d n o t s p e c i f y
11 .
what
p e r c e n t a g e of t h e s e a c t u a l l y " s temmed from t h e pre-Wagner Act E R P s ^ /
And, in l i g h t of c u r r e n t u n i o n - a v o i d a n c e s t r a t e g i e s , Sanford Jacoby has
more r e c e n t l y given r e s p e c t f u l a t t e n t i o n to firms whose w e l f a r i s t
p o l i c i e s in f a c t worked and who r e t a i n e d t h e l o y a l t y of t h e i r w o r k e r s ^ / '
As t o t h e big q u e s t i o n of whether employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n had ever
o f f e r e d a viable policy choice: the answer i s , again, a highly q u a l i f i e d
y e s . The r e a l i t y was t h a t b e c a u s e employers had moved so s w i f t l y , the
works c o u n c i l s a l r e a d y occupied the ground. At t h e i r peak in 1934, they
c o v e r e d probably 3 million workers, more than did t h e unions and, in the
m a s s - p r o d u c t i o n s e c t o r where they were roost h e a v i l y c o n c e n t r a t e d , very
much more. That f a c t - - t h a t the ERPs e x i s t e d , t h a t t h e y were functioning,
t h a t enormous b u s i n e s s I n t e r e s t s s t o o d behind t h e m - - h a d to be taken
into a c c o u n t , and, i n i t i a l l y , it more than any o t h e r s e t t h e terms of the
d e b a t e . But t h e r e was a n o t h e r fact t h a t a l s o had to be taken i n t o
a c c o u n t . With 7a, employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was no l o n g e r a p r i v a t e
affair,
but, on t h e c o n t r a r y , one deeply e n t a n g l e d in a m a s s i v e program of
i n d u s t r i a l r e g u l a t i o n , which brings me to my t h i r d h i s t o r i c a l j u n c t u r e .
In deciding about how to s q u a r e employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n with 7a, the
c o u n t r y was a l s o deciding what kind of a u t h o r i t y t h e s t a t e should a s s e r t
over labor-management r e l a t i o n s . The c o n t e x t in which t h i s happened
n e a r l y d e f i e s r e c a p t u r i n g , for the NRA r e p r e s e n t s America's one s e r i o u s
romance with a c o r p o r a t i s t economy. Each of some 400 codes of fair
c o m p e t i t i o n contained in addition to comprehensive t r a d e r e g u l a t i o n s not
only S e c t i o n 7a, but more or l e s s d e t a i l e d p r o v i s i o n s on wages, h o u r s
child l a b o r and a v a r i e t y of working c o n d i t i o n s . A p r o f u s i o n of agencies
s p r a n g up to i n t e r p r e t and enforce all t h l s - - t h e N a t i o n a l Labor Board of
12
1933-34, t h e s u c c e s s o r N a t i o n a l Labor R e l a t i o n s Board of 1934-1935,
r e g i o n a l l a b o r b o a r d s and a few i n d u s t r y l a b o r b o a r d s , o t h e r l a b o r
b o a r d s under code a u t h o r i t y , and, f i n a l l y , a whole h o s t of NRA compliance
and code committees. The question of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining r i g h t s was
enmeshed in this bureaucratic Jungle and intermingled with o t h e r ,
sometimes more pressing, NRA concerns with maintaining code labor
standards and s e t t l i n g Industrial d i s p u t e s . In this s t a t e of confusion or,
if you will, open p o s s i b i l i t i e s , what was a t i s s u e was not only t h e
d e f i n i t i o n of bargaining r i g h t s , b u t t h e scope of s t a t e
responsibility.
The Wagner Act embodied one r e s o l u t i o n — of c o u r s e , the one t h a t
p r e v a i l e d . But consider a n o t h e r . The powerful men a t the head of t h e
N a t i o n a l Recovery Administration, G e n e r a l Hugh Johnson and his g e n e r a l
c o u n s e l Donald Richberg, took the view t h a t S e c t i o n 7a called for a
" p e r f e c t n e u t r a l i t y " between forms of l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n . The company
union was j u s t as l e g i t i m a t e as the t r a d e union. I t was t h e employer's
duty t o deal with both of them, i n s o f a r as each was f r e e l y chosen by
employees, but by v i r t u e of t h e i r claim to be r e p r e s e n t e d , not t o g r a n t
e x c l u s i v e r e c o g n i t i o n to e i t h e r . The J o h n s o n - R i c h b e r g plan c o n t e m p l a t e d
multiple r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , p r o t e c t i o n of the r i g h t s of m i n o r i t i e s and
i n d i v i d u a l s , no bar a g a i n s t company unions, and a kind of l o c a l option
over the a c t u a l forms of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g - - l e t the p a r t i e s decide
what they wanted, so to s p e a k ^ ^
Where t h i s might have led is b e s t s e e n in the P r e s i d e n t ' s a u t o
s e t t l e m e n t of March 25, 1934. The i n i t i a t i n g c r i s i s was e n t i r e l y
emblematic of the time: the AFL unions were demanding r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
e l e c t i o n s leading to exclusive r e c o g n i t i o n , the companies answered t h a t
13
t h e i r w o r k e r s a l r e a d y had r e p r e s e n t a t i o n through the ERPs, but t h a t
they were willing to deal with (but not r e c o g n i z e or c o n t r a c t with) t h e
unions for t h e i r own members (providing membership l i s t s were t u r n e d
over). F e a r f u l t h a t a n a t i o n a l a u t o s t r i k e might s e t back economic
r e c o v e r y , P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t himself i n t e r v e n e d and c r a f t e d a
s e t t l e m e n t embodying the J o h n s o n - R l c h b e r g p r i n c i p l e s I have j u s t
d e s c r i b e d , b u t implemented on t h e s p e c i f i c b a s i s of p r o p o r t i o n a l
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Employers a g r e e d t o b a r g a i n with "the f r e e l y c h o s e n
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of g r o u p s , " with the b a r g a i n i n g committee, if t h e r e was
more t h a n one group in a p l a n t , to have " t o t a l membership p r o r a t a to the
number of men each member r e p r e s e n t s . " To e n f o r c e t h e s e t t l e m e n t t h e
P r e s i d e n t appointed a s p e c i a l Automobile Labor Board with final and
binding a u t h o r i t y . The Board f i r s t d e a l t with the backlog of
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c a s e s , then in e a r l y 1935 a d m i n i s t e r e d e l e c t i o n s for v/hat
it c a l l e d "bargaining a g e n c i e s " for e v e r y a u t o p l a n t in the c o u n t r y
(except Ford), the^ members of which were i d e n t i f i e d by a f f i l i a t i o n and
s e l e c t e d by a complex p r o c e s s to r e f l e c t t h e p l a n t - w i d e v o t e . Each
member a c t e d as g r i e v a n c e p e r s o n for h i s / h e r own d i s t r i c t , and on
b r o a d e r i s s u e s s a t on the bargaining agencyXJ^The a g e n c i e s r e p l a c e d t h e
ERPs, g e n e r a l l y adopting t h e i r d i s t r i c t l i n e s , and became in e f f e c t
the
s t a t e - m a n d a t e d works councils Paul Weiler has in mind.
We might t h e r e f o r e p a u s e to ask what light t h a t experience throws on
the c u r r e n t enthusiasm for a l t e r n a t i v e forms of workplace
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I n s o f a r as the works councils in the P r o f e s s o r Weiler's
plan a r e intended to be supplementary to e x i s t i n g c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g
p r o t e c t i o n s , not in lieu of them as was t h e c a s e with the 1934 a u t o
14
s e t t l e m e n t , to t h a t d e g r e e ol c o u r s e the two s i t u a t i o n s a r e not
comparable. And, in f a c t , the a u t o works councils d i s p l a y e d v e r y much the
same w e a k n e s s e s as the ERPs they r e p l a c e d , with members of the
bargaining a g e n c i e s complaining t h a t in dealing with management t h e y had
no Independent b a s e of power and no claims on t h e l a t t e r beyond t h e
right to be heardr^/^Yet in the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t h e y imposed on t h e
s t a t e , t h e a u t o works councils do have a c e r t a i n r e l e v a n c e for l a b o r law
reform.
The Automobile Labor Board, employing a s t a f f of over a hundred,
o r d e r e d and a d m i n i s t e r e d the plant e l e c t i o n s a c r o s s the i n d u s t r y , and, on
u n r e s o l v e d g r i e v a n c e s , began to function as a kind of l a b o r c o u r t . Who
would be charged with t h e s e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s if t h e law m a n d a t e s , or even
only a u t h o r i z e s , works councils? If full freedom of
association'remains
b a s i c d o c t r i n e in the law, as I assume i t will, will i t fall to the NLRE to
police t h e works councils and shop committees a g a i n s t the t h r e a t of
company domination and manipulation? If so, by what c r i t e r i a ? At the
time, a u t o u n i o n i s t s c a s t i g a t e d the works c o u n c i l s for being p o w e r l e s s ,
but the h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d also r e v e a l s them calling t h e councils
"government unions." Most c e r t a i n l y , labor lav; r e f o r m e r s will want to
think c a r e f u l l y about what functions the s t a t e will be u n d e r t a k i n g if it
becomes the a u t h o r of a l t e r n a t i v e forms of workplace r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
The a u t o s e t t l e m e n t was a r e a l a l t e r n a t i v e a t t h e time. P r e s i d e n t
R o o s e v e l t put it f o r t h as the b a s i s on which "a more c o m p r e h e n s i v e , a
more a d e q u a t e and a more equitable s y s t e m of I n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s may be
built than e v e r b e f o r e . It is my hope t h a t t h i s s y s t e m may develop into a
kind of works council in i n d u s t r y in which all g r o u p s of employees,
15
w h a t e v e r may be t h e i r c h o i c e - o f o r g a n i z a t i o n o r form of
representation,
may p a r t i c i p a t e in J o i n t c o n f e r e n c e s w i t h t h e i r e m p l o y e r s . ^ ' Think a b o u t
what o u r l a b o r r e l a t i o n s might h a v e l o o k e d l i k e h a d FDR's " h o p e " come t o
pass.
We come now t o my f o u r t h h i s t o r i c a l J u n c t u r e — t h e moment of t r u t h ,
so
t o s p e a k - - w h e n C o n g r e s s c h o s e t h e p a t h l e a d i n g t o t h e Wagner A c t . From
t h e d a y S e n a t o r Wagner s e t in m o t i o n t h e d r a f t i n g p r o c e s s in e a r l y 1 9 3 4 ,
t h e b a s i c s t r a t e g y p r o c e e d e d on two t r a c k s , one l e a d i n g t o a v i a b l e
framework f o r f r e e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , t h e o t h e r t o t h e e x p u r g a t i o n of
the r i v a l workplace r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s y s t e m . For t h e l a t t e r p u r p o s e , a
s e r v i c e a b l e weapon was a t hand in a p r i n c i p l e a l r e a d y w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d in
r a i l w a y l a b o r lav/: t h a t e m p l o y e r d o m i n a t i o n of l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s v/as an
e x c l u d e d a c t i v i t y c o r o l l a r y t o t h e r i g h t of
self-organizationi^-Specifying
s u c h e x c l u d e d a c t i v i t y was t h e v e r y f i r s t p r o b l e m t o which
Senator
Wagner's team g a v e d e t a i l e d a t t e n t i o n when t h e y p r o d u c e d t h e
sketchy
i n i t i a l d r a f t d a t e d J a n u a r y 31, 1934X*>/How f a r t o e x t e n d t h e c u r b s on
e m p l o y e r d o m i n a t i o n , h o w e v e r , was n o t i n i t i a l l y c l e a r . The f i n i s h e d
draft
of t h e l a b o r d i s p u t e s b i l l (S. 292G) t h a t Wagner s u b m i t t e d t o t h e
Senate
on March 1 d e f i n e d a s l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h o s e e x i s t i n g f o r t h e
purpose
"of d e a l i n g with e m p l o y e r s c o n c e r n i n g g r i e v a n c e s , l a b o r d i s p u t e s , w a g e s
or h o u r s of employment." A more c o m p r e h e n s i v e p h r a s e c o v e r i n g
"other
t e r m s of employment" o u g h t t o be a d d e d , a key a c a d e m i c a d v i s e r William E.
L e i s e r s o n w r o t e Wagner. O t h e r w i s e , " t h e c o n t e n t i o n may b e made
that
company u n i o n s may be k e p t in e x i s t e n c e to d e a l w i t h t h o s e t e r m s of
employment t h a t a r e n o t c o v e r e d in t h i s s u b - s e c t i o n d e f i n i n g " l a b o r
o r g a n i z a t i o n ' . " Similar r e a s o n i n g p r o m p t e d L e i s e r s o n ' s c o l l e a g u e Edwin H.
16
Witte to urge the addition o-f "employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n committee" t o t h e
d e f i n i t i o n of labor o r g a n i z a t i o n : ^ / L o g i c went in one d i r e c t i o n , b u t
p o l i t i c s in a n o t h e r . In e a r l y May S e n a t o r Wagner l o s t the i n i t i a t i v e In
t h e S e n a t e Education and Labor Committee, and t h e powerful c h a i r , David
I. Walsh, pushed for a more accommodating bill.
Walsh's s u b s t i t u t e p e r m i t t e d employers t o i n i t i a t e and i n f l u e n c e , b u t
not i n t e r f e r e with or dominate, employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n c o m m i t t e e s (and
o t h e r forms of labor o r g a n i z a t i o n ) , t o pay employee r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
for
t h e i r time (but not c o n t r i b u t e f i n a n c i a l l y to l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s ) , and
e n t i r e l y dropped the handling of g r i e v a n c e s a s a defining f u n c t i o n of
p r o t e c t e d labor o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Had t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of employee
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n been t h e i r primary c o n c e r n , employers should have
welcomed the Walsh s u b s t i t u t e , b u t of c o u r s e t h e i r r e a l i n t e r e s t was not
p r o t e c t i n g the ERPs, but fending off genuine c o l l e c t i v e bargaining, and
h e r e , while the Walsh s u b s t i t u t e made the key c o n c e s s i o n of dropping t h e
explicit duty to recognize and b a r g a i n with r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of employees,
«
employers could not be s u r e t h a t t h e y would not be faced with e x c l u s i v e
bargaining a g e n t s s e l e c t e d by s e c r e t b a l l o t through majority r u l e , all of
which was permissible at the d i s c r e t i o n of the " i n d u s t r i a l
adjustment
board" c r e a t e d by Walsh's b i l l X ^
After it was too l a t e Arthur Young remarked t h a t he thought
that
employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e bargaining were not incompatible
and could fruitfully function side by side'^/ll
t h a t was Young's belief, he
had blown his chance. Employers, Young included, fought the Walsh bill, and
helped get it killed in June 1934. In a r e v e a l i n g l e t t e r , Young figured
t h a t time was on his side: the e f f o r t s to e n f o r c e 7a could be stonev/alled
17
u n t i l it expired, and t h e r e would never "be given as good a chance for
the p a s s a g e of the the Wagner Act as now [June 16, 1934]."^^fcut time
proved to be on Wagner's s i d e , not Young's. The steam went out of the
p r o - b u s i n e s s NRA experiment; the 1934 C o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s swept out
the Republican right wing and c r e a t e d t h e most l i b e r a l C o n g r e s s in
memory; and the f u t i l e s t r u g g l e to e n f o r c e 7a exposed e v e r more s h a r p l y
the cynicism behind all t h e fine talk a b o u t t h e r i g h t s of w o r k e r s (not
l e a s t by t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of Young's damaging l e t t e r ) . There is no way of
u n d e r s t a n d i n g what d r o v e the campaign for a l a b o r law w i t h o u t taking
account of the n a t u r e of management's o p p o s i t i o n - - a b o v e a l l , to the
p r o s p e c t of genuine c o l l e c t i v e bargaining with independent
unions--and,
of c o u r s e , the m i s c a l c u l a t i o n s t h a t come so e a s i l y to people bent on
p r e s e r v i n g t h e i r power.
When S e n a t o r Wagner resumed the b a t t l e in the 1935 C o n g r e s s , the
gloves were off. The d e f i n i t i o n of employer domination of a l a b o r
o r g a n i z a t i o n becomes a i r t i g h t , and likewise the meaning of labor
o r g a n i z a t i o n in 2(5). On reading the d r a f t , S e c r e t a r y of Labor F r a n c e s
Perkins noted t h a t l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s were defined as o r g a n i z a t i o n s
c r e a t e d for the p u r p o s e of "dealing with employers." Would not bargaining
c o l l e c t i v e l y be the p r e f e r r e d term? No, came the vehement r e j o i n d e r . If
S e n a t o r Wagner a c c e p t e d Perkins' amendment, "then most of the a c t i v i t y
of employers in connection with the company unions we a r e seeking to
outlaw would fall o u t s i d e the scope of the Act. If, as employers i n s i s t ,
such "plans," e t c . , a r e lawful r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of employees, then
employers' a c t i v i t y r e l a t i v e to them should be c l e a r l y included, whether
they merely "adjust' or e x i s t as a "method of c o n t a c t , ' or engage in
IS
genuine c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. It i s for t h i s r e a s o n t h a t the bill u s e s t h e
broad term 'dealing w i t h ' . " ^ /
The a r c h i t e c t s of the bill a r e e n t i r e l y ' c l e a r about the f a c t t h a t they
a r e forcing a s y s t e m i c c h o i c e . Hence, for example, t h e i n s i s t e n c e on
r e t a i n i n g g r i e v a n c e handling as a defining function of l a b o r
o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Because employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n plans a r e mostly "nothing
but a g e n c i e s for p r e s e n t i n g and d i s c u s s i n g g r i e v a n c e s and o t h e r minor
m a t t e r s . . . t o exclude the term ' g r i e v a n c e s ' p a r t i c u l a r l y would exclude from
the p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s a c t the v a s t field of employer I n t e r f e r e n c e with
s e l f - o r g a n i z a t i o n by way of such plans or c o m m i t t e e s . *^/This s t a t ement,
in i t s remarkable n e g a t i v i t y , defines t h e d r a f t i n g s t r a t e g y : workplace
o r g a n i z a t i o n is encompassed by 2(5) so t h a t It can be excluded in 8a(2).
So did the Congress not c o n t e m p l a t e a need for workplace
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n or recognize g r i e v a n c e s as a l e g i t i m a t e e x p r e s s i o n of
employee d i s c o n t e n t ? Of c o u r s e i t did, only not through companydominated labor o r g a n i z a t i o n o r - - j u s t as i m p o r t a n t - - n o t by l e g i s l a t i v e
enactment. The shaping of 8a(2) has to be placed in i t s t r u e h i s t o r i c a l
c o n t e x t , which was the massive NRA experiment t h a t was in place during
this e n t i r e period. (The Supreme Court killed it only on May 27, 1935.) By
introducing s e p a r a t e labor l e g i s l a t i o n , Wagner was i n t e n t on an a c t of
disengagement from t h a t c o r p o r a t i s t m o r a s s , and t h e e v o l u t i o n of the lav/
was driven by t h i s i n t e n t i o n . Thus the NLRB ends up a public board, not
t r i p a r t i t e ; f r e e - s t a n d i n g , not a s s o c i a t e d with t h e Labor Department;
concerned s t r i c t l y with c o l l e c t i v e bargaining r i g h t s , not with mediating
and a r b i t r a t i n g labor d i s p u t e s ; and endowed with independent, a d e q u a t e
powers of enforcement, which, under the NRA, had been u t t e r l y lacking.
19
To define the NLRB as q u a s i - J u d i c i a l was empowering, but a l s o , in the
freewheeling NRA c o n t e x t , delimiting. It was t h i s q u i t e p r e c i s e
combination—of s t a t e a u t h o r i t y powerfully mobilized, y e t narrowly
a p p l i e d - - t h a t gave the Wagner Act i t s d i s t i n c t i v e c a s t and, indeed, i t s
p a r t i c u l a r programmatic t h r u s t : t h e lav; p r o t e c t e d t h e r i g h t to organize
and b a r g a i n i n g c o l l e c t i v e l y ; c o l l e c t i v e bargaining i t s e l f remained f r e e .
S e c t i o n Sa(2) is p a r t of t h a t g r e a t s e t t l e m e n t , disengaging workplace
r e l a t i o n s from the meddling NRA s t r u c t u r e and leaving It in t h e realm of
f r e e c o l l e c t i v e bargaining.
And t h i s brings me to my final h i s t o r i c a l j u n c t u r e . When c o l l e c t i v e
bargaining began in 1936 and 1937, t h e r e was l i t t l e argument a b o u t what
would go into the f i r s t c o n t r a c t s : p r o v i s i o n for shop s t e w a r d s or
committeemen, a formal g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e , and the p r i n c i p l e s of
s e n i o r i t y in layoff and r e h i r e , pay e q u i t y a c r o s s j o b s , and a t l e a s t
Implicitly j u s t c a u s e in d i s c h a r g e and d i s c i p l i n a r y actions-XJ^The
hallmarks of the .unionized workplace a r e p r e s e n t a t i t s b i r t h . Where had
they sprung from? From a h i s t o r y of shopfloor s t r u g g l e accompanying, and
in my view driving, the l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y I have been d e s c r i b i n g . The
s t a r t i n g point went back much b e f o r e the New Deal to the emergence of
m a s s - p r o d u c t i o n technology and the p a r a l l e l development of i n t e r n a l
labor m a r k e t s and h i e r a r c h i c a l command s t r u c t u r e s . In the 1920s and even
e a r l i e r , one can already s p o t the key elements in v a r i o u s
firms--pay
equity as job c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s y s t e m s a p p e a r e d , r u l e s for r e g u l a t i n g job
o p p o r t u n i t y among permanent employees, due p r o c e s s in d i s c i p l i n a r y
m a t t e r s , a f e l t need for some formal mechanism for e l i c i t i n g the views of
w o r k e r s and for p r o c e s s i n g t h e i r g r i e v a n c e s , which was of c o u r s e the
20
b e s t argument for the employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p l a n s . The problem was
t h a t c o r p o r a t e employers were only i m p e r f e c t l y committed to what they
t h e m s e l v e s had c r e a t e d . And when the Grea't D e p r e s s i o n s t r u c k , t h e s e
f a i l u r e s became magnified in \he minds of w o r k e r s , who facing
unemployment and s p e e d - u p had an enormous s t a k e in p r e d i c t a b l e , r u l e bound t r e a t m e n t . This was the s o u r c e of t h e explosive r e s p o n s e to 7a —
not from w o r k e r s on t h e s t r e e t s , but from t h o s e a t work e m b i t t e r e d by
c a p r i c i o u s and a r b i t r a r y t r e a t m e n t t h a t v i o l a t e d t h e v e r y p r e c e p t s of
b u r e a u c r a t i c o r d e r of the c o r p o r a t e e n t e r p r i s e I t s e l f .
The workplace e v e n t s of the pre-Wagner Act e r a all moved in a common
d i r e c t i o n . Even a t t h e i r most p l i a n t , t h e employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n plans
mark a kind of beginning for the g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e . The AFL unions
t h e m s e l v e s s t r e n u o u s l y r e s i s t e d t h e ERP s y s t e m b u t , given t h e i r
Impotence on the bargaining f r o n t , t h e y had l i t t l e choice but to channel
t h e i r e n e r g i e s into workplace o r g a n i z a t i o n . At General M o t o r s , shop
committeemen had, won the right to p r o c e s s the g r i e v a n c e s of union
members well b e f o r e t h e r e was any c o n t r a c t . The s e n s e of formal p r o c e s s
i n h e r e n t in t h e s e emerging v/orkplace s t r u c t u r e s v/as f o s t e r e d a s v/ell by
the NRA's h a l t i n g e f f o r t s at a d j u d i c a t i n g v i o l a t i o n s of S e c t i o n 7a. Among
the p r i n c i p l e s springing from t h e s e p r o c e e d i n g s , most i n t e r e s t i n g p e r h a p s
was s e n i o r i t y . One of the charges to the Automobile Labor Board had been
to handle discrimination c a s e s by t e s t i n g d i s c h a r g e and r e h i r e a g a i n s t
fixed c r i t e r i a , which included m a r i t a l s t a t u s , efficiency, and s e n i o r i t y .
Invoked for t h i s s p e c i f i c p n r p n e P j s e n i o r i t y almost a t once became a
g e n e r a l e n t i t l e m e n t , a c c e p t e d as such by the Auto Board and by the
i n d u s t r y . When It signed with the UAW a month a f t e r s e t t l i n g the g r e a t
21
Flint sitdown s t r i k e , General Motors took the p o s i t i o n t h a t i t was
embodying in the c o n t r a c t p r a c t i c e s a l r e a d y in p l a c e . What remained
implicit, but was p e r f e c t l y evident in i t s f u t u r e a c t i o n s , was t h a t
General Motors was s a t i s f i e d t h a t it was a c c e p t i n g a workplace system
t h a t met the r e q u i r e m e n t s of a g r e a t m a n u f a c t u r e r of m a s s - p r o d u c e d
automobiles.
Now t h a t we have a r r i v e d a t the moment when t h a t no l o n g e r seems to
be the c a s e , i t might be well to bear in mind t h a t , h i s t o r i c a l l y
c o n s i d e r e d , the workplace c o n t r a c t u a l i s m now so much in d i s f a v o r
a c t u a l l y r e p r e s e n t s a triumph of accommodation to the i n d u s t r i a l world
as i t then was. And s o , p e r h a p s more t o the p o i n t , does t h e l a b o r law. It
l e f t workplace r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to c o l l e c t i v e bargaining b e c a u s e i t was
confident of the r e s u l t , and swept out a l t e r n a t i v e forms of workplace
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b e c a u s e no compelling c a s e was made for c o n s e r v i n g them.
The ban a g a i n s t company domination, a f t e r all, is linked to t h e r i g h t to
s e l f - o r g a n i z a t i o n . No one argued a t the time t h a t a n y t h i n g e l s e was at
i s s u e , or r a t h e r , no one on management's s i d e , b e c a u s e t h e r e were indeed
union people like Walter R e u t h e r and Clinton Golden who b e l i e v e d t h a t
workers had a c o n t r i b u t i o n to make to production p r a c t i c e . A c a s e ,
indeed, has been r e c e n t l y made t h a t , by empowering w o r k e r s , S e n a t o r
Wagner and his a d v i s e r s thought they were laying the b a s i s for hight r u s t c o o p e r a t i v e workplace relationsX^Management h a r b o r e d no such
vision; running the p l a n t was t h e i r job. The management r i g h t s c l a u s e in
union c o n t r a c t s , as Barry and Irving Bluestone have been a t p a i n s to
point o u t J V s t a n d s as a monument to their d e t e r m i n a t i o n . In i t s heyday
b e f o r e the Wagner Act, the works council was never c o n c e i v e d to be of
22
any s e r i o u s r e l e v a n c e t o b e t t e r p l a n t o p e r a t i o n s . Now t h a t i t i s , we
ought not to r e a d t h e p a s t a s a c a u t i o n a r y t a l e , b u t r a t h e r for what i t
t e l l s u s a b o u t t h e ways we h a v e e a r l i e r f a s h i o n e d
the right r e s p o n s e s
o u r e c o n o m i c e n v i r o n m e n t and, in p a r t i c u l a r , a b o u t J u s t w h a t i t w a s
o u r l a b o r law c o n t r i b u t e d o n c e b e f o r e — and might o n c e a g a i n - - t o
to
that
high-
performance workplace r e l a t i o n s .
L e t me c o n c l u d e by m e n t i o n i n g t h e f a t e of A r t h u r H. Young. In
F e b r u a r y 1 9 3 7 , t h e Supreme C o u r t had n o t y e t v a l i d a t e d t h e Wagner Act,
and Young was s t i l l t r y i n g t o k e e p t h e ERPs a t U.S. S t e e l g o i n g . Young w a s
v i c e p r e s i d e n t in c h a r g e of l a b o r r e l a t i o n s , b u t he did n o t know t h a t
his
b o s s Myron C. T a y l o r had b e e n s e c r e t l y n e g o t i a t i n g with John L. Lewis
s i n c e e a r l y J a n u a r y . Soon a f t e r
t h e news of t h e union
recognition
a g r e e m e n t b r o k e on March 1, 1937, Young r e s i g n e d . He had t h o u g h t
himself
a h e a d of t h e c u r v e a s a p r o g r e s s i v e l a b o r m a n a g e r , b u t in f a c t he had
f a l l e n f a r b e h i n d . He was n o t e v e n in on t h e d e c i s i o n t h a t
c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g in t h e s t e e l
launched
industry.
1. P a u l C. W e i l e r , " M i l e s t o n e or M i l l s t o n e : The Wagner Act a t F i f t y , " in
A r b i t r a t i o n 19S5: Law and P r a c t i c e , ed. W a l t e r J. G e r s h e n f e l d
(Washington,
D.C., 19S5), 37.
2. "The F u t u r e of t h e L a b o r Movement in H i s t o r i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e , " D i s s e n t
(Winter 1994), 1-10.
3. The d e c i s i o n i s r e p r i n t e d in Daily L a b o r R e p o r t (December 18, 1992), E 1-23. The q u o t a t i o n i s in f o o t n o t e 9. In i t s b r i e f s u r v e y of
relevant
d e c i s i o n s , t h e Board t a k e s n o t e ( E - 6 , 7 ) of t h e one s e r i o u s d e p a r t u r e
23
from
t h e s t r i c t c o n s t r u c t i o n of 8a(2) by t h e Sixth C i r c u i t Court ( S c o t t k F e t z e r
Co. [ 1 9 8 2 ] , A l r s t r e a m . Inc. [19S9]), and finds i t wholly u n c o n v i n c i n g . F o r a
f u l l e r s u r v e y of the j u d i c i a l h i s t o r y of 8a(2) w r i t t e n under t h e shadow of
t h e S i x t h C i r c u i t i n i t i a t i v e , s e e Thomas C. Kohler, "Models of Worker
P a r t i c i p a t i o n : The U n c e r t a i n S i g n i f i c a n c e of S e c t i o n 8(a)(2)," B o s t o n C o l l e g e
Law Review 27 (1986), 5 3 4 - 4 5 . For a u s e f u l l i s t i n g of t h e s c h o l a r l y
commentary on 8a(2), s e e the B i b l i o g r a p h i c a l N o t e in Raymond L. Hogler and
G u l l l e r m o J. G r e n i e r , Employee P a r t i c i p a t i o n and L a b o r Law In t h e American
W o r k p l a c e ( W e s t p o r t , CT, 1992), 1 7 4 - 7 5 .
4. D a i l y L a b o r R e p o r t ( J u n e 8, 1959), D - 3 (in t h e t e x t of NLRB v. C a b o t
C a r b o n Co. [1959]).
5. The Commission's m i s s i o n s t a t e m e n t i s r e p r i n t e d in Dailv L a b o r R e p o r t
5.
(March 2 5 , 1993), F - l .
6. S e e t h e s t a t e m e n t s by Ron Brown and R o b e r t R e i c h in New York T i m e s . J u l y
5, J u l y 2 7 , A u g u s t 8, 1 9 9 3 , and by Commission m e m b e r s Thomas Kochan and
P a u l a Voos in Dailv L a b o r R e p o r t (April 30, 1993), A-17, and (May 4, 1993), C-
7. (Cambridge, M a s s . , 1990), 213; t h e q u o t a t i o n i s on p. 2 S 5 .
S. T h i s i s n o t an a r g u m e n t t h a t s t r a i n s t h e h i s t o r i c a l i m a g i n a t i o n ; i t i s
e n t i r e l y o b v i o u s t o any r e a d e r of t h e l e g i s l a t i v e r e c o r d l e a d i n g up t o
S e c t i o n 8a(2), a s , f o r example, K o h l e r , ""Models of Worker
Participation,"
531-3G.
9. Q u o t e d In David B r o d y , L a b o r in C r i s i s : The S t e e l S t r i k e of 1919
( P h i l a d e l p h i a , 1965), 127. The Commission on I n d u s t r i a l
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n i s in F i n a l R e p o r t (1915), 3 3 - 9 1 .
24
Relations'
'
10. C l e t u s E. Daniel, The ACLU and the Wagner ACt ( I t h a c a , N.Y., 1980), 18;
J e r o l d S. Auerbach, Labor and L i b e r t y : The L a F o I l e t t e Committee and t h e
New Deal (Indianapolis, 1966), 26, 210.
11. See, e.g., Memorandum t o Members of the Employment R e l a t i o n s Committee,
National A s s o c i a t i o n of M a n u f a c t u r e r s , May 26, 1933, In U.S S e n a t e ,
Subcommittee of t h e Committee on Education and Labor, V i o l a t i o n s of F r e e
Speech and Rights of Labor, 75th Cong., 1st sess.
(1937), P t . 17, 7561; Address
of the Chairman, American Iron and S t e e l I n s t i t u t e , Yearbook (1933).
12. The a u t h o r i t a t i v e a c c o u n t i s Howard M. Gitelman, Legacy of t h e Ludlov;
M a s s a c r e : A Chapter in American Labor R e l a t i o n s (Philadelphia, 1988).
13. This was p a r t of t h e founding s t a t e m e n t of t h e S p e c i a l Conference
Committee, which began in 1919 for p u r p o s e s of c o o r d i n a t i n g and i n f o r m a t i o n s h a r i n g on labor m a t t e r s by ten of the l a r g e s t and most p r o g r e s s i v e
employers in the c o u n t r y . Young s a t on it f i r s t as the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of
I n t e r n a t i o n a l H a r v e s t e r and then, by s p e c i a l d i s p e n s a t i o n , on behalf of IRC.
The s t a t e m e n t a p p e a r s in a t l e a s t t h r e e s p e e c h e s , September 2 4 , 1 9 3 5 , May
25, 1S39, March 11, 1941. A.H. Young P a p e r s , California I n s t i t u t e of Technology
Archives (copies in p o s s e s s i o n of author).
14. Toni Gilpin, "Left By Themselves: A History of t h e United Farm Equipment
and Metal Workers Union," Ph. D. d i s s . (Yale, 1992), 6 6 - 6 7 , which a l s o includes
a c a r e f u l a n a l y s i s of t h e e a r l y h i s t o r y of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l H a r v e s t e r
works council plan in ch. 1.
15. I am following h e r e t h e a s s e s s m e n t in Daniel Nelson, "The Company Union
Movement: A Reexamination," B u s i n e s s History Review 56(Autumn 1982), 3 3 5 -
25
16. T a l k by A.H. Young, Town H a l l - S e c t i o n on I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s , May I S ,
1 9 3 8 , Young P a p e r s .
17. F o r a l e g i s l a t i v e p r o p o s a l b a s e d d i r e c t l y on t h e ERP s t e e l
experience,
s e e Raymond L. H o g l e r , "Worker P a r t i c i p a t i o n , Employer A n t i - U n i o n i s m ,
and L a b o r Law: The C a s e of t h e S t e e l I n d u s t r y , 1 9 1 8 - 1 9 3 7 , " H o f s t r a
Labor
J p o u r n a l 7 ( F a l l 1989), 1-69.
I S . Leo T r o y , " L o c a l I n d e p e n d e n t U n i o n s and t h e A m e r i c a n L a b o r M o v e m e n t , "
I n d u s t r i a l and L a b o r R e l a t i o n s R e v i e w 14 (April 1961), 3 3 1 - 4 9 .
19. E.g.: "Reckoning w i t h Company U n i o n s : The C a s e of Thompson P r o d u c t s ,
1 9 3 4 - 6 4 , " I n d u s t r i a l and L a b o r R e l a t i o n s Review 4 3 ( O c t o b e r 1989), 1 9 - 4 0 .
20. T h e r e i s a c o n v e n i e n t summary of t h e J o h n s o n - R i c h b e r g p l a n in L e v e r e t t
S. L y o n , The N a t i o n a l R e c o v e r y A d m i n i s t r a t i o n : An A n a l y s i s and
Appraisal
( W a s h i n g t o n , 1935), 4 6 1 - 6 6 .
21. S i d n e y F i n e , The A u t o m o b i l e U n d e r t h e Blue E a g l e (Ann A r b o r , 1963),
2 2 2 - 2 4 , and p a s s i m f o r a h i g h l y d e t a i l e d
account.
2 2 . E.g.: M e e t i n g of t h e A u t o m o b i l e L a b o r B o a r d w i t h t h e B a r g a i n i n g Agency
E l e c t e d By E m p l o y e e s of C a d i l l a c M o t o r Company, J a n u a r y 3, 1 9 3 5 ; w i t h
B a r g a i n i n g A g e n c y . . . a t Buick M o t o r Company, NRA P a p e r s , R.G. 9, N a t i o n a l
A r c h i v e s , Box 2. In t h e view of t h e ALB, t h e a u t o s e t t l e m e n t r e q u i r e d
e m p l o y e r to m e e t with t h e b a r g a i n i n g a g e n c y , b u t t h a t e v e r y t h i n g
t h a t w a s s t r i c t l y v o l u n t a r y , and t h a t t h e a c t u a l d e v e l o p m e n t of
b a r g a i n g would be a l o n g - t e r m v o l u n t a r y
the
beyond
collective
process.
2 3 . Q u o t e d in F i n e , A u t o u n d e r t h e B l u e E a g l e 2 2 4 - 2 5 . On FDR's commitment
t o t h e a u t o s e t t l e m e n t a s t h e b a s i c d e f i n i t i o n of 7a r i g h t s , s e e
the
q u o t a t i o n in I r v i n g B e r n s t e i n , The T u r b u l e n t Y e a r s : A H i s t o r y of
the_
A m e r i c a n Worker, 1 9 3 3 - 4 1 ( B o s t o n . 1970), 191.
26
•
24. On t h e l e g a l h i s t o r y , Irving B e r n s t e i n , The New Deal C o l l e c t i v e
Bargaining Policy (Berkeley, CA, 1950), 18-22. On t h e p o t e n c y of the companydomination p r i n c i p l e , s e e e s p e c i a l l y t h e grudging t e s t i m o n y of James A.
Emery, g e n e r a l c o u n s e l of t h e National A s s o c i a t i o n of M a n u f a c t u r e r s ,
L e g i s l a t i v e H i s t o r y of t h e National Labor R e l a t i o n s Act. 1935 (Washington,
D. C , 1959, r e p r . 1985), 2 v o l s . , I, 379-81.
25. The e a r l y d r a f t s , beginning with t h e f i r s t of J a n u a r y 31, 1934, a r e
r e p r i n t e d , with commentary, in Kenneth C a s e b e e r , "Drafting Wagner's
Act: Leon K e y s e r l i n g and the Precommittee D r a f t s of t h e Labor Disputes
Act and the N a t i o n a l Labor R e l a t i o n s Act," I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s Law
J o u r n a l 11 (1989), 73-131.
2G. William L. L e i s e r s o n to Wagner, March 8, 1934, Folder 14, Box 1, Leon
K e y s e r l i n g P a p e r s , Georgetown U n i v e r s i t y ; EdwinE. Witte, Hearings on S.
2926. . L e g i s l a t i v e H i s t o r y . I, 271-73; James A. G r o s s , The Making of
the
National L a b o r R e l a t l o n s Board (Albany. NY, 1974), 68. The s u c c e s s i v e d r a f t s
of the l a b o r d i s p u t e s bill i n c o r p o r a t e L e i s e r s o n ' s and Witte's s u g g e s t i o n s ,
but a r e d e n o t e d "Confidential Committee P r i n t " and seem not to have been
formally
added to
the March 1 v e r s i o n . They a r e
not
reported
in
the
L e g i s l a t i v e H i s t o r y but can be found in Folder 20, Box 1, Keyserling P a p e r s .
27. The Walsh bill is r e p r i n t e d in L e g i s l a t i v e H i s t o r y . I, 10S4 ff., with
Walsh's e x p l a n a t i o n on 1101 ff. One change, not e s p e c i a l l y noted a t the time
but of p e c u l i a r r e l e v a n c e today, was the d e l e t i o n from the definition of
"employee" (Sec.3 [3] of t h e labor d i s p u t e s bill) of a p r o v i s o s t a t i n g t h a t
s t r i k e r e p l a c e m e n t s were not employees; the d e l e t i o n s u r v i v e d in the
d r a f t i n g of the final Wagner Act.
2S. Town Hall Speech, May 28, 193S, Young P a p e r s .
27
J
I
4
29. I t i s t o be f o u n d , A.H. Young t o L.H. C o r n d o r f , J u n e 16, 1 9 3 4 ,
in L e g i s l a t i v e H i s t o r y , II, 2 2 2 5 .
30. Leon K e y s e r l i n g , u n d a t e d Memo [ 1 9 3 5 ] , F o l d e r 9, Box 1, K e y s e r l i n g P a p e r s
31. " C o m p a r i s o n of S. 2 9 2 6 and S. 1 9 5 8 . " L e g i s l a t i v e H i s t o r y . I, 1 3 2 0 , 1 3 4 7 .
32. In t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n I am d r a w i n g on my "Workplace C o n t r a c t u a l i s m
in C o m p a r a t i v e P e r s p e c t i v e , " in N e l s o n L i c h t e n s t e i n and Howell J o h n H a r r i s ,
e d s . , I n d u s t r i a l D e m o c r a c y In America: The Ambiguous P r o m i s e (New York,
1993), 1 7 6 - 2 0 5 .
33. Mark B a r e n b e r g . "The P o l i t i c a l Economy of t h e Wagner A c t :
P o w e r , Symbol, and W o r k p l a c e C o o p e r a t i o n , " H a r v a r d Law Review
106 (1993), 1 3 7 9 - 1 4 9 6 .
34. N e g o t i a t i n g t h e F u t u r e : A L a b o r P e r s p e c t i v e on A m e r i c a n B u s i n e s s (New
York, 1992).
28
\