The Past and Present Society
Early Greek Land Warfare as Symbolic Expression
Author(s): W. R. Connor
Source: Past & Present, No. 119 (May, 1988), pp. 3-29
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/651018
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EARLYGREEKLAND WARFAREAS
SYMBOLICEXPRESSION*
The Greekshad little love for wild Ares. His
templesand statueswere sparse.Athenaalwayscameout
the victorin battlesbetweenthe two of them. His hair
filledwith dirt
as he fell to coversevenacreswith his body. The artisans
acceptedhim only in nakedform;they deniedhim his
helmet;
his spearoff to one side, abandonedon a chair,diagonally
placed,
no longera symbol morea bit of decoration.
1
These lines fromYannisRitsos'"Expiation"standin sharpcontrast
to the assessmentof the role of war in ancientGreeksocietyoffered
by leadingancienthistoriansover the past few decades.2Beginning
in the l950s, and increasinglyin the 1960sand 1970s,manyclassical
scholarsconcludedthatancientGreecewas a warculture:it derived
its values from war, it acceptedwar as somethinginevitableand
natural,its citizens went out to fight every spring with the same
regularitythat blood-redcyclamensbrightenthe Greekhillsides.3
ArnaldoMomigliano,speakingin 1954 at the second International
Congressof ClassicalStudies,was one of the firstto arguethis view:
Warwas an ever presentrealityin Greeklife; it was a focusfor emotions,ethical
values,socialrules. . . Warwasthecentreof Greeklife. Yettheamountof attention
thatGreekpoliticalthinkersgaveto causesof waris negligiblein comparisonto the
attentionthey paidto constitutional
changes. . . The reason,I suspect,is thatthe
Greekscameto acceptwaras a naturalfactlikebirthanddeathaboutwhichnothing
could be done.4
* This essaywas originallypresentedin lectureformin the SpenserTraskseriesat
PrincetonUniversity.I amespeciallygratefulto BruceFrier,JackKrollandLawrence
Stonefor help and encouragement.
1 YannisRitsos,ExileandReturn:Selected
Poems,1967-1974,trans.EdmundKeeley
(New York, 1985),pp. 85 f.
2 Ritsos'view aboutthe cultsof Ares, however,matches
thatof the leadingscholar
of ancientGreekreligion,WalterBurkert.See Burkert'sGreekReligion,trans. J.
Raffan(Cambridge,Mass., 1985),pp. 169 f.
3 Behind the movementsof the last generation,to be sure, is a long tradition
includingMaxWeber'sdefinitionof the Greekpolis as "a communityof warriors":
Wirtschaft
undGesellschaft
(Tubingen,1921),p. 558.
4 A. Momigliano,
"SomeObservationson Causesof Warin AncientHistoriography",ActaCongressus
Madvigiani:Proceedings
of theSecondInternational
Congress
of
ClassicalStudies,1954, i (Copenhagen,1958),pp. 199-211;reprintedin his Secondo
(cont.
on p.
4)
PAST AND PRESENT
4
NUMBER 1 19
The ideaof controllingwars)like the idea of the emancipation
of womenand the
idea of birthcontrolnis parto?the intellectualrevolutionof the XIX centuryand
meanta breakwith the classicaltraditionof historiography
aboutwars.5
In his Vanierlectures,publishedin 1972, Eric Havelockhelped
supportthis view by providinga more secureconceptualbasis He
drewon the workof psychologistsand socialbiologistsand his own
studiesdevotedto literacy.The title of the lecturesrevealsmuchof
the approach-"War as a Way of Life in ClassicalCulture'.6
Havelockowed much to studies of aggressionand territorialityby
KonradLorenzand others;the ideaof"culturalprogramming'was
especiallyimportantin his thinking.He appliedthatideato Homer)
Herodotusand Thucydides,whose texts he believed"yieldup the
secretof a jointpartnershipin a literaryenterprise)one whichproved
decisive in placingorganisedwarEare
at the heartof the European
Yalue
system1.7
In Havelocks view these authorsnot only exalted
war)they legitimizedit and encouragedits persistentprominencein
HuropeanClVlwilZatlOn.
LaterJacquelinede Romilly,SirKennethDoverandothersjoined
in emphasizingthe universalityof waramongthe Greeks.8The late
Sir Moses Finley also lent his supportto this view i'Warwas a
normalpart of life . . . hardlya year went by withoutrequiringa
formaldecision to fight) followed by a muster and the necessary
preparations,and finallycombatat some level'9
and in recent
.
.
.
,
fn. 4 cont.)
conlnbuto(Rome, 1960), pp. 21 ff., and Studiesin Historiogruphy
(London,1966),
ch. 7.
5 Ibid., in Secondoconlribato,
p. 25. Cf. Y. GarlanWarin theAncientUYorld)
trans.
J. Lloyd(London,1975),pp. 16f. Theanalogyto contraception
is misleading.Genevan
for example, had alreadyentered ';the age of contraception"by the end of the
seventeenthcentury:see P. Laslett,TheWorldWeHaveLost(New York, 1965),pp
101, 132;and the Greeksof antiquitydid rsotregardbirthas somethingaboutwhich
nothingcould be done: see E. EybenSssurvey, "FamilyPlanningin Antiquity'
AnvientSoc., xi-xii (1980-1))pp. 5-82*
6 The lectureswere publishedin E. Gareau(ed.3,ClassicalValuesand theModern
WorS(Ottawa,19723,pp. 19-78.
7 Ibid.3p.37.
8 J de Romilly,C'Guerre
et paixentrecites", in 3 P. Vernant(ed.)3Proklemes
de
la guerreen Greceancienne(Civilisationset societes,xi, Paris, 1968),pp. 207 ff. Note
the criticismsof P. Ducrey,Le traitement
despnsonniers
de guerre(Ecolesfranaises
d'Athenes,xvii, Paris, 1968),p. 3.
Dover commentedin GreekPopulurMorality(Oxford, 1974), p. 315, "It being
takenfor grantedthat there must be wars (Xen. Hell. vi 3.15)) just as therem7ast
alwaysbe badweather)the practicalproblemwas alwaysa problemof when, where
andhow". Fromsuch a commentone mightforgetthatthe passageunderdiscussion
("warsare foreverbreakingout and being concluded")is partof an argumentfor
settlinga warand arrangingpeaceas quicklyas possible.
9 M. I. Finley, Politicsin theAncierzt
WorZd
(Cambridge,1983),p. 67, cf. p. 60:
'stherewere . . . few years in the historyof most Greekcity-states(of Spartaand
Athens in particular)and hardlyany years in succession,without some military
(cont.
on p.
SJ
EARLY GREEKLAND WARFAREAS SYMBOLICEXPRESSION
5
yearsshoweda dispositionto carrythe argumentone stagefurther.
Not only was war "normal",it was unopposed:"No one in the citystate world, and certainlyno social class, was opposed to war,
conquestand empire".10 Behindthese commentsa radicalre-evaluation of Greek civilizationwas under way, and enteringa wider
intellectualdiscourse. In HannahArendt'sOn Revolution,for example, we find a similarview of the Greeks:"Sincefor the Greeks
politicallife by definitiondid not extendbeyondthepolis,the use of
violenceseemedto thembeyondthe needforjustification
in the realm
of what we todaycall foreignaffairs''.1l
These scholarsand criticsare the best of theirgeneration;yet, as
we shallsee, they arewrongor seriouslymisleadingin severalmajor
respects.They have, moreover,slippedinto the old habitof treating
the variousperiodsof Greekcivilizationand the variousforms of
warfareas a unity. They have therebyencouragedthe view thatthe
Greekswere as monolithicin their acceptanceof the inevitabilityof
war as they were ferociousin its conduct. As a result diversities,
tensionsand perplexitiesthat were extremelyimportantto ancient
Greekcivilizationare reducedto a clichewhich has the Greekstell:
. . . with such high zest
To childrenardentfor somedesperateglory
The old Lie: Dulce et decorumest
Pro patriamori.12
This approachobscuresmuch of the diversityof view to be found
amongvariousGreeksaboutwar theirdisagreementsand dissensions, the diversity of practiceand the inner division between a
(n. 9 cont.)
engagements".A similarargumentis presentedby Garlan,War in theAncient World,
p. 18. He arguesthat the allegedfailureof the ancientsto think deeplyaboutthe
causesof warmaybe "becauseit was so widespreadandperennialthatit appearedto
be outsidehumaninitiativeandto fallwithinthe domainof natureor the realmof the
gods".A passagethatis oftenadducedas supportof thisview(Plato,Laws, 625 e ff.)
is in fact a statementthat one individual,Plato'sCretanlawgiver,"condemnedthe
stupidityof the massof men in failingto perceivethatall areinvolvedceaselesslyin
a lifelongwaragainstall states. . . for . . . 'Peace'. . . ie nothingmorethana name".
It does not establishthatmostGreeksthoughtwarwas the normalor naturalstateof
affairs.
10Finley,Politics in the Ancient World, p. 113, citingR. Meiggs,Athenian Empire
(Oxford,1972),ch. 21, and W. V. Harris,War and Impenalismin RepublicanRome
(Oxford, 1979), ch. 1. To show unanimityon questionsof war amongthe Greeks
Finley adducesonly the Atheniandecisionto invadeSicily, by no meansa typical
event.
11H. Arendt,On Revolution (New York, 1963),p. 2.
12 WilfredOwen, "Dulce et DecorumEst", in Poems, ed. E. Blunden(London,
1933), p. 66.
PAST AND PRESENT
6
NUMBER 1 19
recognitionof the inevitabilityof warif independenceis to be maintainedand horrorat some of its consequences.
To explorethe full complexityof the role of war in Greeksociety
wouldbe a lengthytask. Withinthe confinesof this essay, however,
it is possible to ask what was the role of land warfareamong the
Greeksin the sixth and earlyfifth centuriesB.C. Whatwas it like?
How commonwas it? Above all, how did it functionand relateto
other aspects of their society?This is but a small part of a larger
story, but it may help clarifysome importantquestionsabout the
Greeks.
First, was warreallyas endemicas we havebeentold?It certainly
seemsso as we readthroughthe pagesof Greekliterature:the battles
of the Iliad, the marchingsongs of Tyrtaeus,Aeschylus'tragedies
"fullof Ares'',13andaboveall the historians-Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon,Polybius for whomwardefinedthe opportunity
for historicalwriting.Surelywarwas an extremelyimportantfactfor
thatcultureandits writers.But to gaugeits frequencyby its prominence in literaturewouldbe to committhe historiographical
fallacy
mistakingliteraryrepresentationfor historicalfact. That fallacyobscurestwo importantdifferencesin warfareamongthe Greeks:first,
a differenceover time; and secondly,a differenceby type of state.
This is well illustratedby FrankFrost'srecentstudyof Athenian
warfarefrom the late seventh until the late sixth century s.c.14
Volunteerexpeditions,freebooting,civil strife,the use of mercenary
troopsareall well attestedin this period,but an officialcall-upof the
citizens for a real war is hard to find. Frost concludesthat his
"catalogueof Athenianmilitaryventures. . . is surprisinglymodest
for a people who are supposedto be so fond of fighting"and that
"no regularmobilizationseemsto havetakenplace".15 The average
Athenianmale of militaryage was not marchingout to war every
springin the sixth centuryB.C. If he chose, he could probablyhave
lived out his modestlife expectancywithoutever havingjoinedin a
battle.
His descendantsin thenextcentury,theeraof Athenianhegemony,
could not lead such a quiet life. The shift was a dramaticone,
13
14
Aristophanes,Frogs,1021.
F. Frost, 'sTheAthenianMilitarybeforeCleisthenes",Historia,xxxiii (1984),
pp.283-94.
15Ibid.,pp.292f. Cf. H. vanEffenterre,"Clistheneet les mesuresde mobilisation",
Revuedesetudesgresques,lxix (1976),
p. 4. The Solonianlaw citedby Gaiusapud
Justinian'sDigest,47.22.4, hints at the roleof societiesformedfor profitfrombooty
in earlywarfare.
EARLY GREEK LAND WARFAREAS SYMBOLICEXPRESSION 7
coincidingwiththefallof the Pisistratidtyranny,theincreasingthreat
of civicinstitutions,many
fromPersiaandCleisthenes'restructuring
of which, recentscholarshiphas pointedout, weredesignedto make
of Athensinto
the city moreeffectivemilitarily.16 The reorganization
ten tribes, for example,provideda moreeffectivebasisfor Athens's
militarypower.That new systemenabledAthensto takethe leadership againstthe Persiansand eventuallyto dominatemany Greek
states.At this time Athenswas developinga new sense of itself and
of its place in the Greekworld. Soon it took on a hegemonicrole
amongthe Greeks.As it did so, it naturallyfounditself drawnwith
increasingfrequencyintowarfare.17 Thus Athensillustratesboththe
distinctionsalludedto earlierin this discussion:the extentof warfare
changesovertime and by type of state-hegemonic ambitionswere
farfromuniversalamongthe Greeks,but theiroccurrenceregularly
led to an increasedfrequencyof war. The case of Athensprovides,
therefore,a warningagainstthe generalizationthat the Greekswere
constantlyat war throughouttheir history. Even Athens was not
alwaysat war. Nor was Sparta,as Finley himselfpointedout some
Oftencommercial
yearsago, especiallyeagerto engagein warfare.18
states (for example, Corinth),festival centres (for example, Elis)
or states with few hegemonicambitionsand relativelyrestrained
neighbours(for example,Megara,Sicyon, Phlius and manyof the
islands)could enjoy protractedtranquillity.19
Someof whathasnow becomeorthodoxdoctrineaboutwaramong
of Cleisthenes'reforms,see P. Siewert,Die Trittyen
16 On the militarysignificance
(Vestigia,xxxiii, Munich, 1982). For a
desKleisthenes
Attikasunddie Heeresreform
criticismof Siewert,see G. R. Stanton,"TheTribalReformsof Kleisthenes",Chiron,
xiv (1984), pp. 1-41.
one would expecta shift in the way the protecting
17 Under these circumstances
goddessof the city was represented an increasingemphasison herwarlikeaspects
wouldbe a likelyreflectionof the newconcernsof the polis. It is not surprising,then,
to findthatwhilethevenerationof the old olive-wood,probablyseated,AthenaPolias
continued,the goddess'siconographyin the fifth centurypresentedher in warlike
Parthenos.Cf.
aspect, both in the bronzePromachosand in the chryselephantine
andPclrthenon,
andCult",Parthenos
C. J. Herington,"Athenain AthenianLiterature
supplementto GreeceandRome,x (1963), pp. 61-73.
de la guerre,p. 154:"After
in Vernant(ed.), Problemes
18 M. I. Finley, "Sparta",
revolution,Spartawas, if anything,
the SecondMessenianWarandthe sixth-century
less willingto join battlethanmanyotherGreekstates".
19On Elis, see DiodorusSiculus, 8.1.3. There is evidencefor frequentwarfare
betweenThebesand opponentssuch as Tanagra,CoroneandThespiae(Herodotus,
5.79.2) and betweenSpartaand Arcadiancities such as Tegea (Herodotus,1.67).
Note, however,that it is by no meansclearthat these conflictswere alwaysofficial
stateaction.The exampleof Atticaremindsus of the activitiesof groupsof private
citizensjoined togetherfor the acquisitionsof war. See Frost, "AthenianMilitary
beforeCleisthenes",pp. 286-9.
8
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 1 19
the Greeksneeds) therefore)to be modified.Yetnalthoughwe need
to be morecautiousin assessingthe frequencyof war)its importance
in ancientGreekcivilizationis not in dispute.A properassessment
of its role, however,dependson therecognitionthathistorianscannot
rely on what the ancientGreekssaid aboutwar, but must examine
closelyhow war was conductedand how it relatedto otherpartsof
civiclife.20At the sametime scholarlydevelopmentsin otherhistorical periodswherestimulatingworkhas been doneon the connection
betweenwarandeconomicrsocialandculturalsettingprovideuseful
analogiesand methods.A close examinationof landwarfareamong
the Greekcity-statesof the archaicarldearlyclassicalperiodsshows
that for the Greekswar was more than tactics,strategyand gore;it
was linkedto almosteveryaspectof theirsocialorganizationand to
their rich imaginativelife. The significanceof war in early Greek
civilization,it can be seen, is not to be measuredby its frequency
but by its symbolicpower.
But when we ask what a land war was like for the city-statesof
continentalGreeceduringthis period, it is surprising,afterall the
attentionclassicistshave paid to militaryhistory,how hardit is to
find a comprehensivedescriptionof a typicallandcampaign.2lThe
next sectionof this essay pieces togetheras vivid a pictureas possible in effect, as "thick"a descriptionas possible in orderto
clarifythe symbolicand culturalroleof warfareamongthe Greeks.22
A prorrocation
has taken place that a city regardsas a casusbelli.
Whateverthe ultimaterootsof the dispute,eachpartyoftenpresents
its actionas justifiedself-defenceor as a legitimateresponseto an act
of hubris,thatis, someourerreaching
thatthe otherstatethinksit can
20 Greek literature constantly deplores war, as has often been pointed out, most
recently by Peter Karavites, "Greek Interstate Relations in the Fifth Century B.C.",
Paroladelpassato,ccxvi (1984), pp. 163-5. See also P. Ducrey, Warfarein Ancient
Greece,trans. J. Lloyd (New York, 1985).
21 Classical scholarship has clarified many individual points in Greek military
procedure in recent years. Especially valuable are the volumes by W. K. Pritchett,
TheGreekState at War,four of which have now been issued by the University of
California Press. The first of these originally appeared as Ancierzt
GreekMilitary
Pructice(Univ. of California Publications in Classical Studies, vii, Berkeley, 1971).
22 The description in the text is a composite drawn from sources that apply to several
Greek cities, especially Athens, during the archaic and early classical periods. Since
Spartan military and social practices differed in important respects, evidence relating
to Spartahas been used very sparingly. On Spartanmilitary matters, see most recently
J. F. Lazenby, TheSpartanAnny (Warminster, 1985).
EARLY GREEKLAND WARFAREAS SYMBOLICEXPRESSION 9
get away with. The ancient sources, althoughthey are often from
later periods, probablyreplicatethe widespreadGreekpracticeof
playingdownquestionsof politicalideology,economicsorlong-range
shifts in the balanceof poweramongstates. These issues are often
masked as a dispute over some borderland, as a responseto an
offence arisingout of some ritualmatteror as the obligationto be
loyalto some friendlystate.23Wheneverpossiblewaris presentedas
a matterof honourrat'Fler
than of economicor strategicinterest.24
Beforewar is undertakenan oraclewill probablybe consulted,
most likely at a major pan-Helleniccentre such as Delphi. The
responseof the oraclewill be discussedin the city'sassemblybefore
a finalvote on waris taken.Af er thata heraldshouldbe sentforward
to the enemyto declarewar. All subsequentintercoursebetweenthe
stateswill requirethe presenceof a herald.25
Beforeanexpeditioncantakeplace,however,twofurthermeasures
areneeded.First,sacrificesmustbe made,to the protectingdivinities
of the town of course, but also in some statesto Eros or to virgins,
suchas the Hyakinthidaiin Athens,famedin mythfortheirdevotion
to the city.26Secondly,a decisionmustbe madeaboutwhichcitizens
are to take part in the expedition.27In fifth-centuryAthens ten
23 Borderdisputes:the CynourianlandbetweenArgosand Sparta,the hieraorgas
disputebetweenAthensand Megaraor the OropusquestionbetweenAthensand
Boeotia.
Ritualmatters:the obligationsowed to the Atheniansby the Aeginetansbasedon
their possessionof the figures of Damia and Auxesia (Herodotus,5.82 f.); the
in matters
Corcyreans'
failureto allowthe properrolefor a Corinthianrepresentative
of sacrifice(Thucydides,1.25.4).
24 The hieraorgas,for example,so prominentin the commonancientview of the
outbreakof the PeloponnesianWar) was almostsurelynot prime farmlandbut a
woody, mountainoustract,significantmorefor its links to the Eleusiniancult than
forits economicvalue. SeeW. K. Pritchett,"TheAtticStelai",Hesperia,xxv (1956),
p. 256.
25 On declarations
of warSsee Thucydides,1.29.1, and the discussionin Ducrey,
Traitement
desprisonniers
deguerre,p. 3. In timesof especiallyintensewarfarea state
mightrefuseto send heraldsto or acceptthemfromits opponent.This wouldresult
polemos,andmightalsoprecludetheusualtruces
in an "undeclared
war",anakeruktos
for pan-Hellenicfestivalssuch as the Olympicgames(cf. Philostratus,Peri Gymn.,
7), rule out most formsof negotiatedsettlementand even preventthe trucefor the
taking-upof the deadaftera battle.SeeJ. L. Myers,"AKERUKTOSPOLEMOS",Classical
Re., lvii (1943), pp. 66 f.; Garlan,Warin theAncientWorld,p. 48.
ones: see Onasander,5. On sacrifices
26 Someof these sacrificeswerepurificatory
et
to Erosin Sparta,CreteandThebes,see Athenaeus,13.561e.On the Hyakinthidai
al., see Burkert,GreekReligion,p. 267;WalterBurkert,HomoNecans,trans.P. Bing
(Berkeley,1983), pp. 64 f., who notes the parallelto the sacrificeof Makariain
Euripides,Heraclidae.
27 Was there also a norm of sexual abstinencebeforewar? See Burkert,Homo
Necans,p. 61 n. 12.
10
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 1 19
commanders,elected annually,one from each tribe, saw that a list
of names was posted by the EponymousHeroes, that is, by the
monumentwiththe statuesof thetenmythologicalfiguresafterwhom
the Atheniantribes were named.28Those whose names are listed
know that they are to appearon a certainday, with equipmentand
their own provisionsfor food supply.29
For the main body of troops the equipmentis heavy armour,
hopla shield,breastplate,helmet,greaves,an eight-footthrustingspear,swordor dagger.Theseheavy-armedtroops the hoplites
take their name from that armour;the investmentis considerable:
these men are not necessarilyaristocrats,but they are certainlynot
poor. Their weaponswould requirean expenditureequivalentto
severalmonths'wagesat the ratesformoderatelyskilledcraftsmen.30
28 See A. Andrewes,"The Hoplite Katalogos",
in G. S. Shrimptonand D. J.
McCargar(eds.), ClassicalStudiesPresentedto M. McGregor
(LocustValley, 1981).
The systemin theoryprovidedthatall hopliteswouldservein turn, but it is likely
that in practiceprovisionwas made for volunteersand for the generalsto select
individualsthey knew would be especiallyvaluable.Aristophanesshows us the
reactionsof a citizenwho foundhis nameon the list whenhe hadnot expectedit. In
the Athensof Aristotle'sday this was done by callingup certainage groups,eachof
whichwasassociatedwith a hero;for example,the callmightbe forall hoplitesfrom
twentyto fortyyearsold. Eachannualgrouphad a herowhosenamecouldalso be
usedto call up the troops.Thus the marshalledarmywasnot simplyan arrayof men
of variousages but a networkof protectingheroes.The systemis describedin the
Aristotelian
Athenaion
Politeia,53: see P. Rhodes'scommentary
ad loc.; C. Habicht,
"Neue Inschriften",Athenische
Mitteilungen,
lxxvi (1961), pp. 143-6;Vernant(ed.),
Problemes
de la guerre,p. 163.
Exemptionsfrom militaryservicewere extendedto membersof the boule, the
annualmagistrates,choreutaiand a few others.
29 On problems
of foodsupplycausedby the absenceof an adequatecommissariat,
see J. K. Anderson,MilitaryTheoryandPracticein theAge of Xenophon(Berkeley,
1970), pp. 43-66.
30 The priceof armour
is hardto determinebut maybe estimatedin twoways.U.
Kahrstedt,Staatsgebiet
u. Staatsangehorige
(Studienzum offentlichenRechtAthens,
i, Gottingen,1934),pp. 359 f., arguedthatat the end of the archaicperiodAthens
sometimessubsidizedthe cost of purchasingarmourby makinga grantof approximately30 drachmaeto qualifiedindividuals.This figuremay not have coveredthe
full cost of armour,to judgefromestimatesof the cost of bronzeandworkmanship.
The priceof bronzein fifth-centuryAthensmaybe derivedfromthe materialin M.
Price, "EarlyGreekBronzeCoinage",in C. M. Kraayand G. K. Jenkins(eds.),
Essaysin GreekCoinagePresentedto StanleyRobinson(Oxford,1968),p. 103. This
suggeststhatat the levelof 85 percentcopperand 15 percenttin, bronzewouldcost
approximately
65 drachmaeper talentor about2 6 drachmaeper kilo. Sucharmour
wouldsurelyweighat least10kilos,perhapsa gooddealmoreif a shieldaloneweighed
7 5 kilos, as estimatedby P. Connolly,GreeceandRomeat lWar(EnglewoodCliffs,
1981),pp. 47 f.; cf. P. Krentz,i'TheNatureof HopliteBattle",ClassicalAntiquity,
iv (1985), p. 52 n. 14. 10 kilos of bronzewould cost about26 drachmae,and the
workmanship
mightwelldoublethe cost. In additiononewouldneeda swordof highqualityiron, probablya daggeras well, anda strongwoodenshaftfor the thrusting(cont.
on p.
1l)
EARLY GREEK LAND WARFARE AS SYMBOLIC EXPRESSION
11
iSincerationsare not suppliedby a quartermaster
corps, some food
wouldbe broughtalongand the restpurchasedat specialmarketsen
route. A slave, and perhapsa mule, to help carrytent, bedrolland
miscellaneousequipmentwould be very welcome.
The appointedtime for departureis normallyan early summer
morningafterthe quartermoon, for the Greeks the enlightened
rationalGreeks-waited until the moon and the omenswere auspicious.31Afterindividualvows and farewells,the armymovesout,
and with it a large percentageof the population.Athens sent nine
thousandhoplitesagainstthe Persiansat Plataea,probablyalmostall
its availableland troops. Fifty years later, at the beginningof the
PeloponnesianWar, the city coulddisposethirteenthousandcitizen
hoplitesof militaryageplussixteenthousandoldercitizensandmetics
who couldguardthe wallsanddo garrisonduty.32Evensmallercities
wouldfind thatwith allies, cavalryandlight-armedtroopsa fighting
forceof well overten thousandcouldoftenbe mustered.In addition,
heralds, traderswho aim to buy the booty and perhapsjugglers,
dancers, singers, whores-anyone who thinks a profit could be
turned by going along-each with gear and noise form a great
audiencefor the coming spectacle.33Sacrificialanimals,especially
goats, accompanythem, with shepherdsof course to keep them
together.But the armyitselfneed not be herdedin veryclose order.
Therewas a tacitunderstandingamongGreekpoleisthatyou did not
(n.
30
cont.)
spear. These very crude calculations suggest 75-100 drachmae as a conservative
estimate.
The second method of calculation is to work from the prices given to actual pieces
of armour. This method is no less hazardous than the other, for the examples are so
few and problematic. The most explicit evidence comes from mid-fourth-century
Thasos: J. Pouilloux, Recherches
surl'histoireet les cultesde Th(lsos,i (Etudes Thasiennes, iii, Paris, 1954), no. 141, pp. 371-80. This implies a full suit of armour would
cost not less than 3 mnai,or 300 drachmae a high figure by comparison to those
derived above and the (admittedly rather poor) evidence for classical Athens: see
Pritchett, "Attic Stelai", pp. 306-8. If we estimate a spear at between 2 and 3 drachmae
and a shield at 20 drachmae, the range of 75-100 drachmae per outfit seems plausible.
For an army of five thousand, the total cost of such armour would be between 60 and
80 talents; if the Thasian figures are correct, the armour for such an army would cost
not less than 250 talents.
31 Pritchett, Ancient
GreekMilitaryPractice,p. 119. H. Popp, Die Einwirkung
von
Vorzeichen,Opfernund Festen anf die Kriegfahrung
der Grzechen
(Erlangen diss.,
Wurzburg, [1957]), showed that omens, etc., were taken very seriously. See also
M. G. Goodman and A. J. Holladay, "Religious Scruples in Ancient Warfare",
ClassicalQuart.,xxxvi (1986), pp. 151-71.
32 Herodotus, 9.28 (Plataea); Thucydides, 2.13 (Peloponnesian War). The Spartans
at Plataea brought seven helots with every hoplite plus heavy-armed Perioikoi, a total
of forty-five thousand men.
33 On the presenceof prostitutes,see Alexis of Samos, quoted in Athenaeus)13.572 f.
12
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 1 19
ambushor otherwisetry to surprisea hopliteforce.34Non-Greeks,
Greekswhowerenotorganizedin truepoleis,poleisthatwerefighting
withlight-armedtroopsmighttryto gainan advantagein thatway
but the heavy-armedtroops of a self-respectingcity would regard
sucha surpriseattackas apate, deception,legitimatein somemilitary
situationsbut not in hoplitebattles.35
Indeedwhen they finallydrawclose to the othercity some agreement, tacit or explicit, determineswhen and where the two forces
will engage.36The relianceon heavyarmourdictatesa plain good
agriculturalland, usuallyon the peripheryof the invadedterritory.37
The attackers,aftermakingsuitablesacrificesat the border,might
ravagethe enemy'sterritoryfor somewhile if he hesitatedto engage
them, mockingandtauntingat anyopportunity.38
But at lastthe two
armies, ritually purified, armourpolished, are grouped in tribal
regiments,readyto fight. Eachhoplitestrapsa circularshieldon the
left arm, and carriesa thrusting-spear
in his righthand.39
The bestfightersarestationedin the frontandto therear.40Behind
the frontrank,anotherand then another,regularlyeightof them, in
latertimes sometimessixteen,even fifty. If we allow6 feet per man
and eight men deep, a phalanxof ten thousandmen would reach
approximately7,500 feet in length the full width of many small
34 Stratagems
cameto havea veryimportantrolein ancientwarfare,even if many
of them seem naive or clumsyto us. But in this periodhoplitearmieswould not
normallytry to surpriseotherhoplitearmies.See Pritchett,GreekStateat War,ii, p.
160. Such measureswere for light-a;-med
troops,barbarians
and the semi-civilized.
Therewere,however,exceptionsto the norm:forexample,DiodorusSiculus,12.6.2
(447 B C )35 Pritchett,GreekState at
War,ii, pp. 156 ff., discussessurpriseattacks.These
mightbe expectedin sieges, in attacksby light-armedtroopsor as a resultof naval
operations(cf. Herodotus,6.88), butamonghoplitearmiesareunusualin thisperiod.
36 Pritchett,GreekState at War,ii, pp. 147 ff.
37 Did they invoke the enemy's gods as they crossed the borderthroughan
epitheiasmos?
The evidenceis gatheredibid.,iii, pp. 322f. Thucydides,2.74 f., applies
to the undertakingof a siege, not to an army'scrossingof the border.Thucydides,
4.87, is only slightlybetterevidence,and Onasander,Strat., 4.1-3, is late.
38 On thesesacrifices,the diabuteria,
see Burkert,HomoNecans,p. 40 n. 22; Popp,
Einwirkung
von Vorzeichen,
pp. 42-6. On taunts,see Pritchett,GreekStateat War,ii,
p. 153.
39 On ritualpurification,see Onasander's
treatise,TheGeneral,5. The extentof
hoplitetrainingwas probablyquite low in most Greekcities. See most recentlyE.
Wheeler,"Hoplomachia
and GreekDancesin Arms",Greek,RomanandByzantine
Studies,xxiii (1982), pp. 223-33;Pritchett,GreekStateat War,iv.
40 This was Nestor's advice in Iliad, 4.297-300. Cf. Hesychius,s.v. Iaurostatai
(Lambda25, Latte);cf. Pollux, 4.106. Xenophon,Memorabilia,3.1.8, speaksof
puttingthe best troopsin the frontandthe rearandthe weakerin the middle,but he
seemsto be thinkingof the orderof troopsduringa march.
EARLY GREEK LAND WARFAREAS SYMBOLICEXPRESSION 13
Greekplains.41On the flanks, light-armedtroops and cavalryare
stationedto preventencirclementand to move in for the kill when
one of the two armiesgivesway. Justbefore,the engagementomens
are taken;42sacrificialanimalsare slaughteredin the sight of all.43
Underothercircumstancesthe sequelto suchkillingwouldnormally
be a sacrificialmealwithits correlativethestrengthening
of communal
ties amongthose bound togetherby the ritualand the fellowshipof
the meal.44But in warthe immediatesequelis the sheddingof more
blood.45
Eachcommandernow gives a shortspeechof encouragement,and
then most likelytakeshis placein the frontranks.Sincethereis now
little room for manceuvringor brilliantstrategy,the commanders
have no reasonto stand aside from the fray. A trumpetsounds or
someonefromone armymovesforwardcarryinga lightedtorchand
castsit intothe ranksof the enemy.46The two armiesarenowmoving
forward,sometimeson the double.47This is the momentfor the
41 On the distancebetweenhoplitefighters,see especially
GeorgeCawkwell,Philip
of Macedon(London,1978),pp. 150-3;A. J. Holladay,"HoplitesandIIeresies",ffl.
IIellenicStudies,cii (1982), pp. 94 ff.; J. K. Anderson,"Hoplitesand Heresies:A
Note", Zl.HellenicStudies,civ (1984),p. 152;andmostrecentlyKrentz,"Natureof
HopliteBattle",pp. 50 ff.; Pritchett,GreekStateat War)iv. The tacticalmanualof
Asclepiodotus,althoughwrittenlater than our period, providesa llseful hint that
practicevaried:if an armychargedit mightdrawitselfinto "compactspacing",that
is, abouta yard from right shoulderto right shoulder;an armythatwas aboutto
receivesuch an attackmight draw in even closerto "lockedshields" half that
distance.But the most commonpatternseems to have been "an intervalof four
cubits" thatis, aboutsix feet fromrightshoulderto rightshoulder.
42 Burkert,GreekReligion,p. 60. On the role of omens,etc., see Pritchett,Greek
State at War,iii, chs. 1-4; Finley, Politicsin theAncientWorld,pp. 94 f.; and the
workscitedin n. 31 above.The Persiansand the Greeksdelayedten daysbeforethe
battleof Plataea,eachwaitingfor favourableomens.
43 Porphyry.
deabstinentia,
2.56, citesPhylarchusto showthathumansacrificewas
regularlyperformedbeforebattle. See the discussionin M. P. Nilsson, Griechische
Feste(Leipzig, 1906),p. 406 n. 1.
44 Burkert,GreekReligion,p. 58.
45 Ibid., p. 267, citingHomoNecans,pp. 46-8, 64-6.
46 On the Pyrphoroi,
see Euripides,Phoenissae,1377f., andthe scholiaad loc. The
principalmoderndiscussionis F. Schwenn,"Der Kriegin griechischenReligion",
ArchisfurReligionswissenschaft,
xxi (1922),pp. 58 ff. Schwennalsodiscussesthesacral
role of the trumpet.
47 The DorianGreeks,especiallythe Spartans,had somewhatdifferentpractices:
they used music extensivelyat this point, with auloi, instrumentslike a recorder,
playingloud and the troopssinging:Thucydides,5.69-70,describesa battlebetween
Argivesand Spartansand suggeststhatthe use of auloiwasdistinctiveof the Spartan
army.The Spartans,we aretold, sangversesfromTyrtaeus.The use of the paeanas
a battlehymnwas also primarilyDorian:Thucydides,7.44.6. On the paceat which
the two armiesdrewneartogether,see J. A. S. Evans,"HerodotusandMarathon",
Flonlegium,vi (1984), p. 5 n. 16.
14
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 1 19
battle-cry,whosename,alalaior alalalai,givesan onomatopoeichint
of its chillingsound.48
The patternof the fightingitselfhas beenmuchdisputedin recent
years,perhapsbecausethe actualpatternvariedfrombattleto battle
or even from hour to hour.49Sometimesthere seem to have been
individualengagements,perhapsfor an extendedperiod of time.
In these each soldier's dexterityand agility were crucial. But a
characteristic
featureof the hoplitebattleis the othismos,the thrust,
compellingthe enemyto give ground,oftenby lockingshieldagainst
shield and drivingthe opposingforce backward.50Eventuallyone
side gives way, turning,running,everymanfor himself.The break
is calledthe trope, "the turning"--a physicalturning,but also the
transformationof collectiveanonymouscombatinto hand-to-hand
fightswith swordor dagger,scenesof supplication,armourthrown
away,headlongflightto the hills or to some local shrinefor safety,
the closing-inof the light-armedtroopsandpursuitby the cavalry
deaths,moredeaths.51Anonymous,narrativeless
combatis suddenly
turnedinto a replicaof the Homericbattlescenes.52
Pursuitwouldnot go veryfar,norwouldthe victoriousarmymove
rapidlyto follow up on its advantage.53
The battlefieldremainsthe
focus of attention,for much work is still to be done. The enemy
dead must be strippedof their armour;the victor'sdead gathered,
identifiedand readiedfor burial.54The victoriouscommandersnow
48 The words for "battle-cry", however, are not restricted to war contexts. It was
also a shout of joy or ecstatic release: see Liddell, Scott and Jones, GreekLexicon,
s.w. They were probably also used in a komoswhen the victorious army returned
home: see Aristophanes, Birds, 1763. As Burkert, [IomoNecans,p. 48 n. 49, points
out, Pindar, fr. 78, makes explicit the link between the war-cry and sacrificialaspects
of warfare.
49 See the bibliography in n. 41 above.
50 Note especially Thucydides, 4.96.2.
51 The trope
was not inevitable: Thucydides, 1.105. The flight that followed could
be terrible, and one must assume that despite supplication many were killed in the
heat of the moment. But if a person were taken prisoner he was not to be put to death:
Euripides, Heraclidae,
961-74, 1017-55. Nor was the body of an enemy to be mutilated.
52 This phase of the battle is often neglected by those who wish to emphasize the
anonymous, collective nature of hoplite warfare. See, for example, M. Detienne, "La
phalange", in Vernant (ed.), Problemes
dela guerre,p. 125. The trope,however, is not
merely a break in the ranks, it is a transformationof the type of fighting and the role
of the individual warrior.
53 On the limitation of pursuit, see P. Krentz, "Casualties in Hoplite Battles",
Greek,RomanandByzantineStudies,xxvi (1985), p. 20.
54 According to Diodorus Siculus, 8.27.2, Spartan soldiers wrote their names on a
small stick which served as a bracelet, so that if they died they could be readily
identified. Athens in the classical period and some other Greek states normally brought
the ashes of the fallen warriorsback to the home city for burial, individual or collective.
fcont.on p. 15)
EARLY GREEK LAND WARFAREAS SYMBOLICEXPRESSION 15
garlandthemselvesand theirtroopsin celebrationof the victoryand
in honourof the gods.55The troopsconstructa victorymarker,called
a trophaion,a wordrelatedto the termfor the "turning"(trope).The
trophaion
shouldbe located"at the spot wherethe battlehad turned
about:weaponslootedfromthe enemy,armour,helmets,shieldsand
spearsare hung aboutan oa!kpost . . . the trophaion
is an imageof
Zeus, the lord of victory".56
Whenthe defeatedhadregroupedtheywouldsenda heraldasking
for a truce to take up their dead. Under Greekcustom the victor
could not honourablyrefusesuch a truce calledthe spondai,the
pouringof libations.57But the requestcombinedwith the controlof
the battlefieldis the definitionof victory and the requestfor the
bodies a sure mark of defeat.58This is true no matterwhat the
strateglcimplicationsof the battlemight be.
Beforelongthe captiveswouldbe ransomedby friendsor relatives;
fixedamountsgovernthe ransomand a strongculturalnorm,sometimesviolatedby the Greeksand sometimesmisunderstoodby modern scholars, discouragesthe enslavementof Greekscapturedin
a hoplite battle.59Enslavementcould be expected in some other
situations,but not in land battleswagedby hoplites.60
(n. 54 cont.)
SeetheexchangebetweenNoel Robertson,"TheCollectiveBurialof FallenSoldiers",
Echosdu mondeclassique,new ser., ii (1983),pp. 78-92,andPritchett,GreekStateat
War,iv, pp. 94-259.
55 Xenophon,Agesilaus,
2.15; the evidenceappliesto Sparta,but the practicewas
probablypan-Hellenic.
56 Burkert,GreekReligion,p. 267. See also Pritchett,GreekStateat War,ii, pp.
246 f.; Garlan,Warin theAncientWorld,p. 62; W. C. West III, "The Trophiesof
the PersianWars",ClassicalPhilology,lxiv (1969), pp. 7-19.
57 For a mythological
precedentfor the practice:DiodorusSiculus,3.71.6.
58 In Herodotus,1.82.5, it is holdingthe field and strippingthe armourfromthe
dead thatdefinesvictory.Cf. Thucydides,4.44.
59 On the treatment
of captives,see above,n. 51; Ducrey,Traitement
despnsonniers
de guerre;Pritchett,AncientGreekMilitaryPractice,p. 81; Pritchett,GreekState at
War,ii, p. 173;P. Karavites,Capitulations
andGreekInterstate
Relations(Hypomnemata,lxxi, Gottingen 1982).The evidenceseemsat firstglanceto conflict.Certainly
on manyoccasionsGreekskilledotherGreekstakenin war.But partof the difficulty
is createdby a conflictbetweentwo norms one enjoiningransomingratherthan
killing or enslavingof Greekstaken in battle (for example, Euripides,Herakles
Mainomenos,
961, 1019), the otherallowingthe victoriousbesiegerof a city to treat
thecaptivesas he sawfit (forexample,Xenophon,Hellenica,1.6.14).Thiscouldresult
in the deathof military-age
malesandthe enslavementof womenandchildren.Much
of the evidenceused to suggestthatthe GreeksenslavedotherGreeksafterbattlesin
fact applies to sieges. Siege warfaretoo was governedby a code, but a radically
differentone fromthatwhichappliedto hoplitebattles.
60 Amongthe Peloponnesians
therewas an fixedsum, 2 mnas(200 drachmae)for
each soldiercaptured:Herodotus,6.79.1. This is approximately
twice the amount
calculatedas the valueof a set of bronzearmour.1 mnuper personis mentionedas
theransomcollectedby Dionysiusof Syracusein 384 B.C.: DiodorusSiculus,14.111.4.
16
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 1 19
Next the spoilsof battlemustbe divided.These
maybe substantial,
given the vast wealththat moveswith such an
army.The takingof
booty was perhapsthe largestmovementof
capitalin Greekcivic
life.61Figureseasilyreachinto the hundredsof
talents,and in later
periodsthousandsarenot uncommon.62The
allocation
of this booty
is understandably
a majormatterof concern.First, "the top
of the
pile", the akrothinia
is set asideas a tithe,a realtenth,forthe
godsusually through a dedicationat Delphi or
another pan-Hellenic
sanctuarywhere all could see it.63 Here war and
poetryintersect:
some Simonidesshouldbe foundto writea
suitableepigramfor the
victory.The remainingbronzearmourand the
proceedsfrom the
ransomingnormallygo to the city, perhapswith a
specifiedsharefor
thecommanders.
64 In addition,of course,
therearepursesandsmall
piecesof booty takenby individualsoldiers.
As a result of a hoplite battle, in other
words, wealth moves
fromthe privateinto the public realm, often
through
projects- temples, parks or fortifications.65 public-work
throughthese projectsand throughdedicationsis Commemoration
extremelyimportant,perhapseven moreso thanfollowingup
on the strategicadvantage,if any, of the battle.Greekcommanders
sometimesseemmuch
moreconcernedwith the proper
commemorationof their victory
thanin anythingClausewitzwould tell them
to do Apartfromthe
anomalous
seizureof Messeniabythe Spartans,territorial
acquisition,
forexample, appearsprimarilyin the
change of sovereigntyover
marginal
border lands. Each state retains control over
its main
agricultural
land. Nor do we often find in this period a
victorious
61 It was not solely an
exchangebetweenstates. Since the invadingstate
often
pillaged
for a while beforethe hoplitebattle,
considerable
wealthcouldbe gathered.
If
the invaderwerethendefeated,muchof this
wealth
victorious
armyinto othersegmentsof the society. wouldthenbe recycledby the
62 See the figuresin
Pritchett,AncientGreekMilitaryPractice,pp. 75
ff. Even
allowing
forexaggeration
by thevictoriousparty,theamountsarehuge
whencompared
to
otheritemsin the state'sbudget.The totaleost
of the Parthenon,for example,is
estimated
at 469 talents:R. S. Stanier,"The Cost of
the Parthenon",Yl.Hellenic
Studies,
lxxiii (1953), pp. 68-76.
63 On tithesfrombooty,
see Pritchett,AncientGreek
The
Atheniansoften made a dedicationin their ownMilitaryPractice,pp. 93-100.
land,
commemorating
thevictoryoverthe BoeotiansandEuboeans as in the monument
discussedin Herodotus,
5.77,
or the templeto Eukleia,GoodFame,from
see
H. A. Shapiro,"Ponosand Aponia",Greek,the spoilsat Marathon.On Eukleia,
RomanandByzantineStudies,xxv
(1984),
pp. 108 f.
64 On prizes to generals,
see Pritchett,AncientGreekMilitatyPractice,
pp. 83 f.
The
amountscould be very substantial:Demosthenes'
mentioned
in Thucydides,3.114, mightwell havebeen three hundredpanoplies
worth3-5 talents.
65For example,Plutarch,
Cimon,13.
EARLY GREEK LAND WARFAREAS SYMBOLICEXPRESSION 17
hopliteforceattemptingto changethe formof governmentof a state
whose hoplitearmyhas been defeated-to substitutea democracy
for an oligarchy,for example.The ideologyof ancientGreekland
warfare,the representationof war as a matterof honour,affectsits
conductand results.Underlyingthe violenceanddestructionof war
is a logic basednot on the use of war as a meansto certainends but
on its effectivenessas a way of self and civic representation.
The dramaticchangeat the momentof the trope the shiftfrom
collectiveto individualfighting reappearsat the end of the battle
throughthe censureof those who left the expeditionat some point
(lipostratia)and throughawardsto those who distinguishedthemselvesin courage(arzsteia).66
Therefollowsthe returnhomewithdue
festivity;someevidenceindicatesthe existenceof victoryprocessions
in early Greece, althoughnothing like the Romantriumphor the
Byzantineceremonyof adventus.67
Surelymuchfestivityandrevelry
followa victory-happy celebrations,but alsoa way of re-establishing the unity of the community.68
That unity is demonstratedaboveall in the honouringof the war
dead. By the late fifth centurythe Athenianscrematedthe dead on
the battlefieldin tribalpyres;the ashesof thefallenwerethenbrought
back to Athens, kept in tribalcasketsfor civic burial.69And at the
end of the campaigningseason would be held a public funeral
ceremonyconsistingof an orationin honourof the fallen, funeral
games and a funeralfeast for the relativesof the dead.70The final
66 See Herodotus,9.81; Plutarch,defato, 569 e; Pritchett,Ancient
GreekMilitary
Practice,pp. 82 ff. Plato,Symposium,
220 d (cf. Plutarch,Alcibiades,
7), indicatesthat
in Athensthe generalsawardedthe ansteia. Some of the difficultyinvolvedin the
awardingof ansteiamightbe avoidedby usingathleticcompetitionsto determinethe
winnersof prizes:Xenophon,Hellenica,3.4.16, 4.2.5; Agesilaus,1.25. On lipostratia
and relatedcharges, see G. Busolt and H. Swoboda,Griechische
Staatskunde,ii
(Munich,1926),p. 1127n. 2.
67 On arrivalceremoniesin Greektimes, see S. MacCormack,
Art and Ceremony
(Berkeley,1981),pp. 19, 281 n. 14. On othermajorpointsof contrastbetweenthis
patternof warfareand that used by the Romans,see Finley, Politicsin theAncient
World,pp. 129f.
68 In the fourthcenturythere were banquetsin the agoracelebrating
victories:
Theopompus,FGrHist,115 F 213, apudAthenaeus,12.532d.
69 Thucydides,2.34, describesthe Athenian"ancestral
custom".On the practice,
see the discussionscited in n. 54 above;Nicole Loraux,L'invention
d'Athenes
(Paris,
1981).
70 The evidence for the funeralorationsis well set forth in Loraux,Invention
d'Athenes.On funeralgames, see Pritchett,GreekState at War,iv, pp. 106-24.On
the funeralfeast (the perideipnon),
see Demosthenes,de corona,288; and, more
generally,D. KurtzandJ. Boardman,GreekBunalCustoms
(London,1971),pp. 146
f.; Burkert,GreekReligion,p. 193 and n. 28.
18
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 1 19
commemoration,however,is a memorialconsistingof names,
just
names,name afternameaftername, arrangedby
tribe.
Once
again
we have a movementfrom the privateto the
publicrealm.STaming
for the Greeks,as for us, is a family matter;
but in war the polis
controlsthe names, not only in conscription,but in
the awardof
honoursat the end of the battle,in regulatingwhat
displaya commanderma makeof his successandaboveallin the
tribal
honouringthe dead.71These, unlike the battlefield monuments
trophaion,are
intendedto be permanent.As the impermanence
of the trophymarks
the transitorinessof humanrelationships,
especially
all sorts, the inscribednamesof the dead mark interstateties of
the
comesfrom the mergingof the individualinto the endurancethat
community.72
II
The peculiaritiesof this patternof warfareare
evident to us, as
theywere to some criticsin antiquity.Herodotus,
for example,has
Mardonius,the Persiancommander,say:
And yet, I am told, these very Greeks are wont
to wage wars against one another in
the most foolish way, through sheer
perversity and doltishness. For no sooner is
war proclaimed than they search out the
smoothest and fairest plain that is to be
found in all the land, and there they assemble
and fight; whence it comes to pass
that even the conquerors depart with great
loss: I say nothing of the conquered for
they are destroyed altogether.73
Herodotus
has Mardoniusgive expressionto a reactionthat
many
Greeksof the fifth centuryare likely to have
shared. Yet, as the
historical
Mardoniusfound out, the system was highly effective,
especiallyagainst the Persians. Yet its military
notpreventextensivecodificationand thorough effectivenessdid
ritualization.Both
features
demandcomment.
71 Athens, for example,
denied Cimon the right to put his name upon
the Herms
set
up to commemorate his victory: Aeschines, 3
(Against Ctesiphon), 183-6; Plutarch,
Cimon,
7.4. Detienne, "Phalange", p. 128, notes the
Spartanparallel in Thucydides,
1.132.Note also the apparenttaboo against
the naming of individuals or the recounting
of
individual exploits of heroism in the Attic funeral
orations prior to that given by
Hyperides.
72 The impermanence of the
trophy corresponds to the Greek habit of often
making
treaties
for a fixed period of time, rather than for
ever, as the Romans did. Cf. de
Romilly,
"Guerreet paix entre cites", p. 208. Greek
alliances,
however, are sometimes
made
"for ever": A Selectionof GreekHistoncal
Inssnptions,
ed. R. Meiggs and D. M.
Lewis
(Oxford, 1969), nos. 10, 63, 64.
73 Herodotus, 7.9 beta,
trans. Rawlinson. Walbank in his
13.3.4,
follows Jacoby in suggesting that this passage may commentaryon Polybius,
reflect a democraticcriticism
of
archaicbattle techniques. One can well imagine
it appealing to an intelligent lightarmed
soldier.
EARLY GREEK LAND WARFAREAS SYMBOLICEXPRESSION 19
First, codification.It is now widely recognizedthat systems of
warfareareoftenencoded,in twosensesof theword.Militaryconduct
in many cultures is governedby elaboratecodes or standardsof
behaviour;it can also be encodedin anotherand more interesting
sense-as an encapsulationof social roles and values. Such codes
may representrelationshipswithin the societyand sometimeshelp
resolve conflictsand tensions between social groups or values. In
earlyGreeklandwarfarethe tensionsbetweenthe possessorsof heavy
armourand othergroupswithinthe society,betweenindividualand
collectiveaction, betweengloryand advantage,mercyand severity,
guileandopenness,areallencededwithinthe systemof landwarfare.
The code was incorporatedin a series of unwritten"lawsof the
Greeks",widely recognized,althoughnot universallyfollowed, in
antiquity.74Polybiuscalls attentionto the code when he contrasts
the warfareof his own era with that of earliertimes. The Greeksof
those days?he wrote:
would not even consentto get the betterof theirenemiesby fraud,regardingno
successas brilliantor secureunlessthey crushedthe spiritof theiradversariesin
open battle. For this reasonthey enteredinto a conventionamongthemselvesto
use againsteachotherneithersecretmissilesnor thosedischargedfroma distance,
and consideredthat it was only a handto handbattleat close quarterswhichwas
trulydecisive.Hencethey precededwarby a declaration,andwhentheyintended
to do battlegavenoticeof the factandof the spotto whichtheywouldproceedand
arraytheirarmy.But at the presentthey say it is a sign of poorgeneralshipto do
anythingopenlyin war.'5
74 The normsgoverning
hoplitewarfarewerenot alwaysobservedevenin the good
old days. Herodotus,6.75-84, for example,tells a storyaboutCleomenesof Sparta
thatmakeshimanalmostparadigmatic
inversionof thewarriorcode.WhenCleomenes
receivedbadomensat the crossingof the RiverErasinus,he recognizedthatthe local
divinitieswereopposedto him. He withdrewbut vowedthatthe Argiveswouldnot
escapehim. He then by-passedthe local divinitiesby movinghis troopsby sea to
Nauplia,defeatedthe Argivesby a stratagem,andwhentheytookrefugein a sacred
grove,gatheredtheirnamesby interrogating
his captives,and then sent a heraldto
callthemout one by one, on pretenceof havingreceivedtheirransoms.He massacred
aboutfifty of them beforethe othersfoundout whatwas happening.He then had
brushwoodpiled up aroundthe groveand set it on fire. The hopliteclassof Argos
wasvirtuallywipedout by this atrocity:Herodotus,7.148, estimatedthe lossesat six
thousand.(For a lower estimate,see W. G. Forrest,'4Themistocles
and Argos",
ClassicalQuart.,x (1960),p. 221.) But Cleomeneswasnot through.He proceededto
attemptto offera thanksgivingsacrificeat the Argives'most-esteemedtemple,and
whenthe priestwouldnot allowhim to sacrificehadhim scourged.Herodotusmakes
of this storya warningtale aboutthe dangersof violatingthe warriorcode much
as the storyof Croesusin the firstbookbecomesa paradigmof how not to consultan
oracle.
75 Polybius,13.3.2-6,trans.Patton.See Walbank
ad loc.; Livy, 42.47.5. Polybius
is p.vbablyalludingto a documentthat Strabo(10.1.12) reported-an agreement
betweenChalcisand Eretriathatoutlawed"missiles",thatis, the use of the sling, in
the so-calledLelantineWar, perhapsin the eighthcenturyB.C.
20
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 1 19
Polybiusmay be mistakingthe existenceof a code for its
effective
operation.But even so, he pointsto a phenomenonof great
interest
in the study of early Greekhistory.76Three aspects
are especially
relevantto the presentenquiry.First, the practicaleffectsof
such a
code. Thereis someevidencethatthe code of warfareand
its related
practicesoccasionallydiminishedor eliminatedsomeof the
violence
in warfare.When an oracle was consulted, it
sometimeswarned
againstthewaror urgedpostponement evenfora full
generation.77
Omens taken beforebattlemight encouragedelay or even
cause a
temporary
withdrawalofthe enemy'sforce.Theresolutionof conflicts
by combatbetweenone or more championsfromeach
side was not
anespeciallyeffectivedevice, but its recurrentuse
pointsto another
possibleway of minimizingviolence. More common,and
perhaps
moreeffective,was the supplicationritualand the
conventionsgoverningthe ransomingof prisoners a counterbalanceto
some of
thefury and slaughterof the battle.We can beginto see
why, then,
theconcernwith supplicationwas so centralin the
literatureof the
archaicand classicalperiods of Greece. The destructive
effects of
ancientwarfarewere, as will shortlybe seen, intense, but
to some
smalldegree the code may have served to prevent
even greater
violence.
A second and more significantaspect of its operation,
however,
wasits validationof a social hierarchy.Excessive
concentrationon
thepracticaleffects of the code may obscurethis
importanteffect.
Theagreementto whichPolybiuscalledattentionin the
passagecited
aboveprohibitedthe use of certaintypes of projectilesin
an early
Greek
conflict, probablythe LelantineWar.78The agreementhas
oftenbeen seen as a proto-GenevaConventionaimed
at making
warfare
morehumane.This mayindeedhavebeenone of its
effects,
buta moreimmediatepurposemay have been to
minimizethe role
of
the slingersandotherlight-armedtroopsandto ensure
the central
role
of hoplites.Similarconsiderationsmayhavebeen
behindagreements
to resolveissues by singlecombator by a battleof
champions,
and
the reluctanceof hoplitearmiesto overthrowthe
governments
The code is often referredto as the nomimaton
"the conventional
practices
of the Hellenes".See R. von Scala,StudiendesHellenon,
Polybios,
i
(Stuttgart,1890),
pp.
299-324;F. Kiechele, "Zur Humanitatin der Kriegfuhrung
der griechischen
Staaten",
Historia,vii (1958),pp. 129-56;and the bibliographycited
in n. 59 above.
77 Herodotus,5.89.2; the
advice,however,was not taken.
78 See the documentcited in
Strabo,10.1.12. On the
of the LelantineWar,
see
S. D. A. Lambert,"A ThucydideanScholiumon scale
the 'LelantineWar'", Yl.
Hellenic
Studies,cii (1982), pp. 216-20.
76
EARLY GREEK LAND WARFAREAS SYMBOLICEXPRESSION 21
of enemycitiesin whichthe hopliteclassesdominated.79The code,in
otherwords, reflectsa degreeof interstatesolidarityamonghoplites.
Thirdly,the codeof warfareis closelyconnectedwithpan-Hellenic
valuesandwiththe majorpan-Hellenicsanctuaries.The logicbehind
this developmentcan readily be surmised. Such codes are most
effectivelypromulgatedwhen the warriorsshareacrosscountrylines
some sense of class identity. For the Greeks that contact came
primarilythroughvislts to the pan-Hellenicsanctuaries.Thus it is
not surprisingto find pan-Hellenicmotifsboth at the beginningand
at the end of a campaign firstthroughthe consultationof Delphi,
and laterthroughdedicationsat this or anotherpan-Hellenicsanctuary. Nor is it surprisingto find warspostponedor specialtrucesfor
the observanceof pan-Hellenicfestivities.These threeaspectsof the
code its practicaleffects, its validationof social rankingand its
connectionto pan-Hellenicidentity a11point to its centralityin
earlyGreekculture.
The second characteristicof such land warfareis its elaborate
The term "ritualization"may requireexplanation:it
ritualizatic)n.
does not imply that the violenceof war was unrealor perfunctory.
Xenophon'sdescriptionof a hoplitebattlefieldof the fourthcentury
B.C. shoulddispel that notioneven for an earlierperiod:"the earth
stainedwith blood, friend and foe lying dead side by side, shields
smashedto pieces, spears snappedin two, daggersbared of their
sheaths,some on the ground, some embeddedin the bodies, some
yet grippedby the hand".80Xenophon'spictureis confirmedby a
recentstudyof the figuresfor battlecasualtiesin such battlesduring
the period472-371 B.C. Peter Krentzestimatesthat on averagethe
victoriousside lost about5 per cent of its forcein a hoplitebattlein
this period;the losing side approximately14 per cent.8l Picturethe
aftertenyears
effectsof suchcasualtieson a cadreof twenty-year-olds
of fightingone hoplitebattlea year. By the time they reachedthirty,
fewerthanfortyof the originalhundredwouldbe alive.Thesefigures
Stateat War,iv, p. 16. The practicegoes
79 On singlecombat,see Pritchett,Greek
backto thearchaicperiod,forexamplePittacusof Mytilene:DiodorusSiculus,9.12.1;
cf. Frost, "AthenianMilitarybeforeCleisthenes",p. 287; see also Herodotus,1.82,
treatyof 420 citedin
in the Argive-Spartan
6.92.3; a furtherinstanceis contemplated
Thucydides,5.41. On the reluctanceto overthrowa hoplite-basedgovernment,note
the resultsof the Spartanproposalin Herodotus,5.91.
2.14-16, trans.Marchant.
80 Xenophon,Agesilaus,
in HopliteBattles",pp. 13-20.Civilwarwasoftenbloodier,
81 Krentz,"Casualties
but the statementthatthe Thirtykilledmorein eightmonthsthanwerekilledin ten
.
War(Xenophon,Hellenica,2.4.21) is probablyexaggerated
yearsof thePeloponnesian
On casualties,see also Pritchett,GreekStateat War,ii, p. 261.
22
AND PRESENT
PAST
1 19
NUMBER
cities
be takenseriouslyby thosewho thinkthatmost Greek
should
high
the
Given
annuallyengagedin one or morehoplitebattles.
were
under
class
hoplite
of mortalityin antiquityfromothercauses,the
rate
82 The
circumstancesalmostcertainlycouldnot reproduceitself.
such
land
Greek
early
are also a reminderthatthe code governing
figures
was far from eliminatingits destructiveness.
warfare
structure
Althoughthe violencein suchbattleswasrealenough its
to
corresponded
and
to and conveyed culturalnorms,
conformed
sense
that
In
culture.
ritual acts of great importanceto the
Other
useful key to
itwas "ritualized".WalterBurkerthas provideda
antiquity
Greek
in
that
this ritualizationby observing
understanding
This is
action'.83
sacrificial
"warmay almostappearlike one great
correlatives
are
warfare
such
notmeresimile.Manyof the elementsin
of proofthose in ritualsacrificeamongthe Greeks:the sequence and
flesh
of
burning
the
blood,
cession,violentblow, the spillingof
the sacrificial
thepouringof libationsthat stands at the centreof
marchinto
the
battle:
land
the
in
ritualis paralleledby the sequence
and the
pyres
funeral
the
battle,the blood spilled in the fighting,
of the
cry
the
Furthermore
truce(calledthe spondai,the "libations").
the
in
echo
its
has
ololugntos)
the
womenat the momentof sacrifice,
battle
the
after
garlanding
The
soldiersbattle-cry,the
adaptsto warfareanotherpracticefromsacrificialritual. ancient
of
The sacrificialpatternhelpsexplainsomeof thestructure
the
without
(sacrifice
battle
before
landwarfare:an abortivesacrifice
replaced
is
meal)
ceremonial
a
without
and
burningof the animalflesh
the battleis
by anotherform of sacrificein the battleitself. Once
libations
over,the sacrificialpatternis reassertedin the garlanding,
is
pattern
this
of
significance
The
feast.
andeventuallyin the funeral
hursting
not to be found in the persistenceof neolithicor earlier
outcomeof
rituals,as Burkertsometimessuggests)but in the usual
alalagwos.84
tO findtheirhoplite
Statesthatdid engagein frequentwarfaremightbe expected
theclassicalperiod
in
Sparta
in
case
the
been
have
may
classdecliningovertime.This
about Athens after the
and part of the explanationfor what Aristotleobserved
PeloponnesianWar:Politics,5.1303 a 8 ff.
83 See n. 45 above.
is personifiedin Pindar,fr. 78:
84 The battle-cry
Hearme, Alala,daughterof Polemos,
Pourforththe proemium,for with you
Men offerthe sacrificeof the mostupstandingdeath
For theircity.
(Burkert,HomoNecans,
Auloi,oboe-likeinstruments,werealsousedbothin sacrifice
Atheniansusedauloiin
the
that
clear
not
is
it
but
battle;
p. 4) and in the marchinto
war. See above, nn. 47, 48.
82
EARLY GREEK LAND WARFAREAS SYMBOLICEXPRESSION 23
community-buildingthrough a
sacrificein the ancient world
shared meal.85As often in ancient ritual the communitydivides,
projectsan imageof itselfthatilluminatesits innerrelationships,and
then convergesin festivityand unity.86Yet thereis a furtheraspect:
the ambiguityof emotionat animalsacrifice the divisionbetween
exultationin the offeringand delight in the meal on one side, and
the horrorof the deed on the other, so well broughtout in Burkert's
HomoNecans is the perfectexpressionof the ambiguityof Greek
reactionsto war.
These ritualelementshelped make the Greekpatternof hoplite
warfarea very powerfulsymbolicsystem. We can best understand
this by lookingmore closelyat the divisionand reunificationof the
communityin such warfare.The polis is divided at first into two
groups, each of which may becomeengagedin fightingbeforethe
campaignis over. The first group, largelymilitary-agemales and
their logisticalsupport, leaves the city in order to do battle. The
secondgroup,consistingof oldermen, womenandchildren,remains
at home but, if need be, will fight on the walls, fromthe roof-tops
and from streetto streetto defendthe city. The firstgroupreceives
the greatestattention,both in antiquityand in moderntimes, but
the second is strategicallyno less important.It has, moreover,the
prerogativeof judgingthe conductof the first group, praisingand
honouringvalour, and condemningindividualsor even whole expeditionsforcowardice,asthe Corinthiansdidwhentheirexpeditionary force returnedclaimingvictoryover the Atheniansbut without
havingset up a trophyin the Megrid.87
Warfare,then, representsdivisionwithin the communityand a
potentialfor inner as well as externalstrife. This is perhapshinted
at beforethe departureof the expeditionby sacrificesto Eros or to
legendarymaidenswho gave theirlives to ensurethe successof the
communityin war.88Suchsacrifices,forexampleto the Hyakinthidai
at Athens, mark, as Walter Burkertputs it, "the turning away
from love to war".89At the end of the campaignthe communityis
as
85 So Burkert,HomoNecans,pp. 48 ff., esp. p. 50: "theritualmealfunctioned
a bond withinthe community".
86 Cf. ibid., p. 102.
87 Thucydides,1.105.4.Thucydidesalludesto the tauntsof the eldersin this case.
Womenalso playedan importantrole in the assessmentof militaryconduct.Along
with the old men they servedas repositoriesof civicpraiseandblameandsometimes
of physicalattackson soldierswho seemedto haveactedas cowards.
88 On sacrifices
to Erosbeforebattle,see especiallyAthenaeus,13.561e. Cf. n. 26
above.
89 Burkert,GreekReligion,p. 267.
24
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 1 19
reintegratedthroughfestivitiesand celebrations,if victoryhas been
achieved,or in any event, by the commemoration
of the war dead.
The campaign,in otherwords, becomesa closed system.This is
evident in several furtherrespects:at an early stage there is the
consultationof Delphi, at the end the dedicationof spoilsat this or
someotherpan-Hellenicshrine.In thesededicationsthemessuchas
retaliationagainsthubris)theinvolvementof thegods,theimportance
of personaland civic honour that are prominentat the beginning
of a campaignreappear,often given expressionthroughverse on
dedicationsor othermonuments.They are prominent,for example,
in the Athenian epigram on the occasion of their defeat of the
Boeotiansand Euboeansaround506 B.C.:
WhenChalcisand Boeotiadaredher might,
Athenssubduedtheirpridein valorousfight;
Gavebondsfor insult;and, the ransompaid,
Fromthe full tenthsthesesteedsfor Pallasmade.90
The powerof such a symbolicsystemderivesin largepartfromits
abilityto providea coherentway of lookingat the world, of seeing
and interpretingexperience.In war, wheregrief and horrorcan so
readilyoverwhelmhur2lan
understanding,
fragmentcommunitiesand
shatterindividualpersonalityand the willingnessto contributeto
civicgoals,the coherenceof sucha ritualizedsystemis consolingand
compelling.
At the sametime it mayhavewiderimplications.Althoughit is ne
more effective than the elaboratecodificationin minimizingthe
destructivenessof war, it too has importanteffectson society. The
ritualelementsprovidea powerfulway of representingthe central
place of the hoplite class within the polis and of strengtheningthe
institutionswhereby it governed. It has long been recognized,of
course,thata Greekhoplitearmyis a stylized,selectiverepresentation
of the social and politicalsystem of the archaicand early classical
polis.91It shows the structureof the city - its social patterns,
90Herodotus,5.77, trans.Rawlinson.On the inscriptionandthe textualproblems,
see Epigrammata
graeca,ed. D. Page(Oxford,1975),p. 9. Note a similarthemein
the dedicationmentionedin Herodotus,5.102.
9' See, forexample,theoftenquotedcommentof G. Glotz,"thepeopleunderarms
alwayslived as a reflectionof the Cleistheniccity":Histoiregresque,4 vols. (Paris,
1925-38),ii. Cf. van Effenterre,"Clistheneet les mesuresde mobilisation",p. 3. See
also FrankAdcock, TheGreekandMacedonian
Art of War(Berkeley,1957),p. 67:
"No formof combatcouldso plainlyexhibitthe communitysolidaritythatwasof the
essenceof the Greekcity-state".Burkert,HomoNecans,p. 47: "Waris ritual,a selfportrayal
andself-affirmation
of malesociety.Malesocietyfindsstabilityin confronting
death, in definingit througha displayof readinessto die, and in the ecstasyof
survival".
EARLY GREEK LAND WARFAREAS SYMBOLICEXPRESSION 25
religion,age-ranking,etc. Butit is alsoa veryselectiverepresentation.
In classicalAthens,for example,specialemphasiswas placedon the
importanceof the Cleisthenictribal system. The call-up notice is
postedby the monumentof the ten tribalheroes;the armyfightsby
tribaldivisions;normallyten commanders,onefromeachtribe,serve
as its generalstaff; the bodies of the fallen are crematedin tribal
pyres, their ashes mixed in tribalcaskets,their namesinscribedon
triballists. Sometimesthe funeralorationspronouncedat the timeof
state burial use the exampleof the tribal heroes to commendthe
sacrificeof the soldierswho had fallenin the year'scampaignsand
therebyto hold up a model of the relationshipbetweenindividual
and state. For the tribal heroes were not mere names; they were
examplesof individualsacrificefor commongood, andhencemodels
for the new Atheniancivicorderthatflourishedthroughthe involvement and contributionsof a largeportionof its citizens.This is well
illustratedby passagesin various funeral orations, including the
encomiumof the war dead of the Erechteidtribe includedin the
funeralspeech ascribedto Demosthenes:
those from the Erechtheidtribe knew that their eponymErechtheushad let his
daughters,who are calledthe Hyacinthidae,go tO a conspicuousdeathin orderto
savehis country.They felt it wouldbe disgracefulif one who haddescendedfrom
the immortalsdid everythingpossiblefor tile freedomof the country,while they
placedgreatervalueon a mortalbody thanon undyingglory.92
The selectivity of the representationof civic order is evident
throughout.The emphasison bronzearmour,for example,through
its displayin mustersand parades,its use on trophiesand the later
practiceof presentingsuits of armourto the orphanedboys of those
who had died in war, etc., validatesthe pre-eminenceof the hoplite
class. The masseduse of such armour,moreover,definesthis type
of combatand the individual'srole in it. Its use is also presentedas
a markof the contrastbetweenGreekandbarbarian.93
Owningsuch
armouris requiredif one is to marchout of the city as a hoplite;
retainingthe armouris essentialif you are to returnfrom war in
honour."Withyourshieldor on it", saidthe Lacorlicmother and
if she did not mean it, the culturedid.94The use of this type of
armourdeterminedthe choice of the "smoothestand fairestplace"
for the battlefield;the strippingof this armourfromthe deadwas a
markof victory,sellingit was the principalwaywealthwas acquired
92
93
94
Demosthenes,60 (Epitaphios),27.
Aristagoras,in Herodotus,5.97.1.
The commentis reportedin Plutarch,Moralia,241 f et al.
26
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 1 19
in warfare,settingup the trophyinvolvedtransforming
sucharmour
into a sacredmemorial.And the culminationof the campaignwas
the dedicationof armour especiallyshields-in the sanctuaries
of the gods. Ancient Greek land warfarerevolves about bronze
armour,just as it revolvesabout the hoplite class.95By attaching
such significanceto the armourits possessorsarethemselvesgivena
central role in society and its survival. Light-armedtroops and
cavalry not to mentionthe fleetandits "navalrabble",the nautikos
ocklos howevergreat their militarypotential,are made to seem
quite peripheral.96
The Attic war memorialssometimesprovidea furtherindication
of the relativesocialstatusof hoplitesandof othergroupsof warriors.
Someof theseinscriptionslist the fallenand thenadd, as if an afterthought,the namesof the archerswho had also given theirlives in
the campaignsof the year.97The pattern,however,is not the result
of carelessness;it reflectsthe attitudethatdeniedfull civic statusto
the lowest economicclass, the thetes,and that, even in Aristotle's
day, viewedcitizenshipas a functionof servicein the hopliteranks.98
95 Bronze is often linked to the sacred realm it was bronze that was used for the
inscribing of sacral laws, bronze that was dedicated in temples and kept safe in a
special storage spot on the Acropolis in Athens, bronze that sheathed the temple of
Athena at Sparta. Note also its association with Zeus Polieus: E. Simon, Festivalsof
Attica(Madison, 1983), p. 9; and with Athena: M. Detienne and J. P. Vernant, Les
rusesde l'intelligence
(Paris, 1974), pp. 172 f.
96 The differentiation of roles is likely to have been a gradual one in Greek society;
early tombs, for example, sometimes contain both spears and arrows an indication
that the same individual might be both spearman and archer. By the late archaic
period, however, the spearmen had asserted a primacy for themselves in the civic
structures of many Greek city-states. This may also be reflected in the fact that
Athenian naval activity was not normally organized in tribal fashion. The evidence is
to be found in B. Jordan, TheAthenianNavy in theClassical
Period(Berkeley, 1975),
pp. 205 f., 225-30. Cf. also E. L. Wheeler, "The Prohibition of Missiles", inAbstracts
of the1986AnnualMeetingof theAmencanPhilological
Association
(Decatur, Georgia,
1986), p. 7.
97 LG, i2 79, 929. On these lists, see D. W. Bradeen, The AthenianAgora:
Inssnptions:
FuneraCMonuments
(Agora Publications, xvii, Princeton, 1974). On the
role of archers in the Athenian military, see A. Plassart, "Les archers d'Athenes",
Revuedesetudesgresques,
xxvi (1913), pp. 151-213; Jordan, AthenianNavy, pp. 20310.
98 On the social status of thetes, I.G., i3 138, is especially revealing: the most recent
discussion of the inscription is by David Whitehead, TheDemesofAttica(Princeton,
1986), p. 35 n. 130. There was, of course, a strong counter-current, pressing the
claims of light-armed troops and of the citizens who served in the navy. C. W.
Fornarahas provided a useful discussion of the fifth-century treatmentsof the relative
contribution of hoplites and the fleet at the time of the Persian invasion: "The Hoplite
Achievement at Psyttaleia", Zl. HellenicStudies,xcvi (1966), pp. 51-4. This article
cites many of the literary texts that reflect the devaluation of naval service; there are
also hints of this in the inscriptions: the order of groups in I.G., ii2 195 l, for example,
(cont.
on p. 27)
EARLY GREEK LAND WARFAREAS SYMBOLICEXPRESSION 27
Again, as was apparentin the discussionof the codificationof
warfire, the structureworksacrosscity lines, and tends to exclude
certainpatternsof warfarethatmightotherwisebe expected.It helps
explain,for example why manyGreekcitieswereslowto exploitthe
advantagesof peltastsand other comparativelylight-armedtroops)
and when at war with another Greek state avoided the obvious
strategyof holdingthemountainpassesandwagingwarsof attrition.99
Twentieth-century
historyamplyestablisheshoweffectivethesetechniques can be in a Greek setting. If we understandthat hoplite
warfarewas in largeparta way of representingandvalidatirlgsocial
relationshipswithinandbetweenpoleis, it becomeseasyto recognize
the problemsthis formof warfarewould pose. For it would tend to
devaluethe statusof the hopliteclass. As modernguerrillawarfare
shows, the successfulapplicationof such techniquesentailsthe use
of highly mobile troops, men the Greekswould call psiloi. And
these-slingers, archers)javelin-hurlers-were traditionally
drawn
fromthose classesin societythat could not affordthe investmentin
heavy armour.To put them at the centreof a campaign,however
effectiveit might prove tactically,would be to elevate their civic
statusat the expenseof the hopliteclasses,andriskeventualpolitical
repercussions.
100
A similarconsiderationmay help clarifywhy for a long time no
Greekstateencouragedslaverevoltsor defectionsor triedto exploit
thegrievancesof marginalgroupsdeniedfullcivicstatus,forexample
thosewho dweltin outlyingregionsof certainpoleis. Nor did Greek
statesin this perioduse the rhetoricof ideologyor socialrevolution.
All thesewould be heard,loud and strong,in laterdecades)but not
n our perloc.
For Athens a great changetook place duringthe Peloponnesian
N /arr when a desperatestrategicsituationrequiredevery possible
effortfor survival.The armourof Athenianhopliteswasmodifiedfor
lightnessand mantuvrability)and increasinguse was madeof light(n. 98cont.)
rnayreRe.tthe low politicalstatusof archersand sailors.Unlikethe land armythe
navyreliedonly minimallyon the tribalstructure)as the evidencegatheredin Jordan,
AthenianNavy, pp. 130-4)164 ff., 225-30,indicates.
99See A. W. Gomme,HistoricalCommentaC
on Thucydades,
i (Oxford,194S),pp.
12-15;Pritchett,GreekState at War,ii, pp. 173 f.; Anderson)MilitaryTheoryand
Practice,ch. 2; J. G. P. Best, ThracianPeltasts(Groningen)1969),esp. p. 95.
lQo On the connectionbetweenmilitaryandpoliticalpowerin the ancientpolis)see
Aristotle,Politics,4.1297 b 22: ;'asthe statesgrewand the wearersof heavyarmour
had becomestronger,morepersons[sc. thanmerelythe cavalry]cameto havea part
in thegovernment"(trans.H. Rackham).The sameprinciplewould,of course,apply
to the growingrole of light-armedtroopsin the fifthcenturyB.C.
28
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 1 19
armedtroops.101The generalDemosthenesseemsto havemadesome
especiallysignificantinnovationsin the use of light-armedtroops.102
Inevitablythese innovationswere controversialand thereby had
political as well as militaryimplications.They might be used to
validatethe claimsof non-hoplitegroupsfor even greaterpowerin a
societythatsome thoughthad alreadybecomean excessivelyradical
democracy.The emergenceof new patternsof politicalleadershipin
this period,oftenassociatedwithCleon,is likelyto be linkedto these
militarychanges.
The intensityof feelingassociatedwith these changesis reflected
in one of the most popularmediaof the day Attic tragedy.The
ritualsand codes of hoplitewarfarehad long had analoguesin the
recurrentthemesof Greektragedy supplication,oraclesand their
interpretation,the willingnessto risk war, the burialof the dead,
especiallywardead, devotionto the commoncodesof the Greeks.103
These themesare not purelymythicor literary;they reflectmatters
of lifeanddeathforeverymilitary-age
malein theaudience.Similarly,
the socialtensionsbehindthe politicaland militarychangescan also
be detectedin Atheniandrama.In Euripides'HeraclesDr>enMad,
for example, the heavy-handedtyrantLycus belittlesHeraclesby
calling him:
A manwho, cowardin everythingelse,
Madehis reputationfightingbeasts,
Who neverbuckledshieldupon his arm,
Never cameneara spear,but held a bow,
The coward'sweapon,handyto run away.
The bow is no proofof manlycourage;
No, yourrealman standofirmin the ranks
And daresto face the gashthe spearmay make.
These are the claims of the unregeneratehoplite fighter put in
the mouth of one of Euripides'most melodramaticvillains. Old
Amphitryongives him the lie:
Yourspearsmanis the slaveof his weapons;
Unlesshis comradesin the ranksfightwell,
. . . he dies, killedby theircowardice;
And once his spear,his sole defense,is smashed,
He has no meansof wardingdeathaway.
But the manwhosehandsknowhow to aim the bow,
Holds the one best weapon:a thousandarrowsshot,
See theworkscitedin n. 99 above,esp. Anderson,Militawy
Theory
andPractice.
See especiallyThucydides'accountof the Pyloscampaignand fhe explication
by W. R. Connor,Thucydides
(Princeton,1984),pp. 108-18.
103 See now J. Winkler,"The Ephebes'Song",Representations,
no. 11 (summer
1985),pp. 26-62.
102
EARLY GREEKLAND WARFAREAS SYMBOLICEXPRESSION 29
He still has moreto guardhimselffromdeath.
He standsfar off, shootingat foes who see
Only the woundthe unseenarrowplows,
While he himself,his body unexposed,
Lies screenedand safe. This is best in war:
To preserveyourselfand to hurtyourfoe
.
.
.
Such are my arguments,squarelyopposed
To yourson everypointat issue here.104
Passages
such
as
this
changes
that
political
life,
cultural
being
radically
were
all
the
codes
In
or
warfare
for
the
has
of
war
in
every
early
a code,
Greek
reality.
pattern
Its
true
major
in
war
intensity,
the
constituted
or
Greeks
of animal
feature
and
Princeton
University
the
and
plays
of
the
extraordinary
Athens.
The
economics,
with
them
literature,
Greek
and
by
was
an
as
its
forms
of
philosophy
land
be
culture,
its
and
found
alld
But,
is
warfare
and
measured
and
seen,
by
in
its
system;
it
echoes
of
as a representation
its
power
close
its
of social
links
to almost
religion,
and
its
Land
stylized
especially
in
of the
have
prominence.
including
symbolic
in much
as we
not
literary
elaborate
a ritual,
sacrifice,
in
role.105
culture
even
is to
ofthe
of Euripides
a central
functioned
significance
structure
again
religion,
transformed,
age
significance
frequency
once
in fifth-century
expression,
work,
the
us
place
it.
Thucydides'
of
remind
taki1zg
governing
literature
the
were
social
implications.
W.
R.
Connor
l04Euripides,Herakleshfainomenos,157-204,excerpted,trans.W. Arrowsmith.
The dateof the playcannotbe preciselyfixed,but the decade425-415seemssecure.
On the passage,see most recentlyRichardHamilton,"Slingsand Arrows",Trans.
Amer.Philol.Assoc.,cxv ( 1985),pp. 19-25.
105 Seethe discussion
of S. SaidandM. Trede,"Artde la guerreet experiencechez
Thucydide",Classicaet mediaevalia,
xxxvi(1985),pp. 65-85.Cf. Said'searlierarticle
on Herodotus:"Guerre,intelligenceet couragedans les Histoiresd'Herodote",
AncientSoc., xi-xii (1980-1),pp. 83-118.