Sacrificing the Self - the Absolute Gift?
Emma L Jeanes,
University of Exeter, School of Business and Economics, [email protected]
Sara Louise Muhr,
Copenhagen Business School, Dept. of Management, Politics and Philosophy, [email protected]
Introduction
What does it mean to „give oneself‟ or to „give time‟ to an organisation? At what point
does this „giving‟ go beyond a mere exchange, towards being a gift – a generous present
in excess of the rewards due? This paper considers the nature of sacrifice made in the
workplace, and in particular the sacrifice of one‟s time. New forms of control in the
workplace have shifted from more structured forms of control, such as through rules and
regulations found in bureaucracy, to commitment based approaches in which employees
are motivated and directed through their identification with the organisation, often
leading to the intensification and extension of working practice into the life of the
employee (Alvesson & Willmott 2002, Barley & Kunda 1992, Grey & Garsten 2001,
Kunda 1992). The shift from a form of control based on specific demands and
expectations external to the employee to an open-ended internalised commitment creates
a commitment without bounds. One of the most common manifestations of this
unbounded commitment is the giving of ones time, working beyond the contractual
obligation. This „gift‟ may be demanded in a culture where presenteeism and excess
within organisations is the norm – and yet a gift perhaps given unthinkingly.
Increasingly concerns are being voiced about the nature of our devotion to work, ahead of
other commitments – the balance between work and life – and the expectations and
potential misappropriation of time, time given in excess of ones duty and at the expense
of other duties. In extremis such an excess can lead to what in Japan is called karōshi –
death by excess work – a death given to the organisation by responding to its demands.
This giving of ones time (time beyond the contractual hours, and perhaps beyond that
which is rewarded) could be seen as a gift to the organisation. Yet the idea of giving
implies a very particular act – an event without recognition or return, an event outside of
an economy of reciprocation or recompense. Is this what lies behind the „giving‟ of ones
time (if time can be giveni)? In this paper we explore whether this sacrifice is really a
„gift‟ or part of an economy – an offering in anticipation of a return; whether such a
sacrifice creates a debt – an anticipation of reciprocity or recompense as part of an
1
exchange, or whether this is given without expectation of return, indeed given almost
without even being seen as given, without being recognised. What is at stake is the
ethical relation and responsibility. Are employees responding to the call, the demands
within the workplace, at the expense of all others – their family and friends? Is this
sacrifice to be rewarded or is it a gift, a sacrifice - or death, of the self? What ethical
responsibility does the employee have – to give, and what concerns may we have with
what is taken? In doing so we will explore the very limits of thinking of the gift – the
very possibility and impossibility of the gift (and ethics) through the work of Jacques
Derrida. The paper will consider how Derrida‟s consideration of the gift and sacrifice
can help us think through the problem of ethics and responsibility in the workplace.
The gift & sacrifice
To understand the nature of this sacrifice we need to understand what it means to give, of
what a gift consists. As we will see through Derrida‟s consideration of this question, this
is far from unproblematic. For Derrida (1992, 1995), a gift is that which is marked by a
lack of return, a lack of recompense, a lack even of acknowledgment that a gift has been
made (for such an acknowledgement by either donor or donee would provide a reward for
the giver, a recognition or appreciation). Indeed such a lack of acknowledgment of a gift
requires that the gift not be recognised as a gift – a gift, which is unseen as a gift by both
giver and receiver. A gift, therefore, stands in contrast to the idea of an economy – and
its principle of exchange and circulation, of calculation and return. The gift must remain
aneconomic, it must interrupt the economy, it must keep a relation of foreignness to the
economic circle (Derrida 1992: 7). Yet this raises the impossibility of the gift – it must be
intended as a gift, to be a gift – we have the idea or language of a „gift‟ or we would not
be speaking otherwise – yet to be a gift it must be as if it is not there. To be a gift it must
be seen as such, and yet not seen at all. The condition of possibility of the gift – that
someone gives something to some one other – simultaneously indicates the impossibility
of the gift – or its destruction: “If the Other gives me back or owes me or has to give me
back what I give him or her, there will not have been a gift” (Derrida 1992: 12). The
recognition of the gift as a gift, therefore, provides the condition for its annulment – the
gift must be a secret, inaccessible. Derrida takes our thinking to the limits of possibility
and its impossibility. There must be an event of the gift, an event that occurs in an
instant, that interrupts the economy of exchange, but that is forgotten immediately – if
such a thing is possible (Derrida 1992: 16), for there must be an event – a gift – for
something to be forgotten – the gift would be the condition of forgetting. The gift is not
nothing (Derrida 1992: 17).
What calls us to make this gift, a giving without acknowledgment or receiving in return?
We are called to this noble act by the gaze, by a calling into question – a demand from
the other to which we must respond. It is this ethical relation – to respond to the other –
that demands us to give, and to give without expectation or consideration of return, to
give without perceiving or counting the cost of giving.ii Yet in responding to the call of
the other, we neglect the call of other others – there must be economy in what we give, in
the limited time we have to „give‟. Furthermore, our gift to the other may do violence not
2
only to oneself but also to others, such as in Abraham‟s sacrifice.iii The sacrifice
Abraham prepared to make to God of his son Isaac on Mount Moriah demonstrates how
he was prepared to respond to the call of God at the expense of the call of his family. To
Isaac‟s mother, Abraham was prepared to murder their child, indeed did murder his child
in their preparedness to do so – in his betrayal. Abraham‟s decision demonstrates how he
put his absolute and immediate duty to God ahead of his duty „in general‟, ahead of what
might be seen as responsible behaviour – behaviour for which one can account and
explain (for he cannot explain his actions – given in faith, beyond duty), which takes into
account the demands of all others (Derrida 1995: 61). His sacrifice to God was both
ethical, in responding to the call of the Other, to God, and yet also lacking in recognised
ethics, lacking in morality from the perspective of others who may demand that he
account for his actions. To the sceptical, Abraham is a murderer responding to a demand
that signifies unpalatable authoritarianism; to the faithful Abraham is the father of faith
(Attridge 2008: 15). For Derrida, the story of Abraham exemplifies the terrifying
paradox entailed in the responsibility to the other – the absolute responsibility – in which
the realm of ethics (where we have laws of conduct and relationship, and where murder is
forbidden) is overridden by this absolute obligation to the other – a singular command
(ibid).
Abraham‟s absolute duty is a duty of faith, that is, a calling that is beyond reason and
explanation – a mystery. To subordinate responsibility to knowledge is to discount
responsibility – to deny its possibility when reasons are unknown. If decisions are made
on knowledge then there is no longer a responsible decision, but a mechanistic
deployment of a theorem (Derrida 1995: 24). Undecidability is therefore the condition of
responsibility and of the decision (Derrida 1993: 16). The absolute duty commands us to
respond to this mystery, but to do so in secret. To share our decision is to avoid our
responsibility, it is to try and substitute ourselves. Abraham could have shared his
dilemma with his wife, but that would have been to negate his responsibility for making
the decision, to substitute himself for another, to open the decision to others and ignore
his absolute duty by opening it to others, giving up his responsibility – denying his
singularity (Derrida 1995: 60). The absolute duty is a calling to question of the singular
other, secretly (such that it remains your responsibility), and mysteriously – this
command is always beyond our comprehension (Peperzak 1993: 135) and beyond limit
(Derrida 1996: 3).
[T]he activating of responsibility (decision, act, praxis) will always take place before and beyond
any theoretical or thematic determination. It will have to decide without it, independently from
knowledge; that will be the condition of a practical idea of freedom. We should therefore
conclude that not only is the thematization of the concept of responsibility always inadequate but
that it is always so because it must be so. (Derrida 1995: 26)
For it to be our sacrifice, we must make this sacrifice – offer our gift – in our singularity.
The ultimate gift is the gift of death – death as a mark of our singularity, which cannot be
substituted: “By its very essence, death is in every case mine, insofar as it ‘is’ at all”
(Heidegger 1962: 284). You cannot take another‟s dying from them even if you can die
for them in some particular affair (Derrida 1995: 42). Death is important as a condition of
our responsibility: “only death, or rather the apprehension of death can give this
3
irreplaceability, and it is only on the basis of it that one can speak of a responsible
subject, of the soul of a conscience of self, of myself, etc.” (Derrida 1995: 51).
Abraham‟s death, for he was also putting himself to death as he killed the son he loved, is
non-substitutable – only Abraham can die Abraham‟s death – that is his responsibility.
“Mortifying (himself) in order to make a gift of this death as a sacrificial offering to God”
(Derrida 1995: 69) is Abraham‟s responsibility; a responsibility that becomes a sacrifice
because of the love for his son. He must love his son for this to be a sacrifice (Derrida
1995: 64-65). It is this death which is the ultimate gift, for there can be no return. But
what responsibility do we have to give this gift? Levinas, unlike Heidegger, reminds us
that our first responsibility is before the other. Because the other is mortal I have a
singular responsibility for their death, a death which is foremost, and in which I am
included inasmuch as I am responsible for the other (Derrida 1995: 46, 1996: 5). I am
responsible for the other and yet at the same time all others. It is here that Derrida opens
us to the im/possibility of ethics – between our absolute duty and our responsibilities to
others in general – a „universal‟ ethics.
As soon as I enter into a relation with the other, with the gaze, look, request, love, command, or
call of the other, I know that I can respond only by sacrificing ethics, that is, by sacrificing
whatever obliges me to also respond, in the same way, in the same instant, to all the others. I offer
a gift of death, I betray, I don‟t need to raise a knife over my son on Mount Moriah for that. Day
and night, at every instant, on all the Mount Moriahs of this world, I am doing that, raising my
knife over what I love and must love, over those to whom I owe absolute fidelity,
incommensurably. (Derrida 1995: 68)
At all times we remain called into question by the gaze of the other, but in turn by all
others. The ethical employee, therefore, must respond to this call – to their absolute duty
and yet also (impossibly) to their universal responsibilities. In responding to this demand
they are called to give time, to give themselves to their colleagues and thus to the
organisation. The calling into question by the other is a singular other, rather than an
organisation. However Derrida also uses this concept to understand the calling or
demands of the family and thus the idea of a collection of individuals is employed here to
signify a work team or organisation. But the foundation of this calling exists with the
calling of a singular other within this organisation and will be implicitly assumed
throughout this essay. The gift – the act of giving – is thus based on the ethical relation
founded by the calling into question by the Other, the absolute duty – yet this gift may be
given to a singular other such that it benefits many others. To act is to assume, in theory,
the concept of responsibility, to take responsibility (Derrida 1988: 590). The look in the
eye of the colleague, who demands you stay to help, may be a singular demand, but such
an expectation may be founded in a culture where such a demand can be expected, and
may benefit many. And it is this giving of time, an excess of time, that might concern us
for fear that it exploits (takes advantage of) the employee. Does the organisation have a
responsibility to limit this giving of time, to limit the generosity of the gift? We will
return to this later. First we need to consider this demand.
4
Sacrificing the self
Increasingly the management of organisations are shifting their efforts of controlling
employees from more overt forms of external control, such as bureaucratic forms of
control, to management of staff through commitment (see Roberts 2005). These less
visible forms of control encourage employees to develop a connection with the
organisation that moves beyond a transactional psychological contract to one in which the
employee identifies with and gives to the organisation in a manner beyond the
employment contract – an involvement beyond mere labour. Such an approach often
normalises the good employee as one who demonstrates emotional commitment (Kunda
1992), engagement (Loehr & Tony 2003), and devotion to the organization (Barley &
Kunda 1992, Casey 1999), through being part of a clan (Ouchi 1980). Employees must
take responsibility for their own work and for the organization as a whole (Manz & Sims
1984, 1989) with discipline being achieved through an extreme form of belief that
individual interests are best served by immersing oneself in the interests of the whole
(Kanter 1972: 41). Employees are not merely parts of the organization; they actively take
part and have responsibility for its success. In fact, to be a good employee, employees are
expected to love the organization and love their work (Amabile 1997); a process in which
“the company‟s interests and those of its employees are equated” (Legge 2005: 128).
Such a relationship goes beyond the transaction of effort and ideas for recompense, but
opens the employee to a demand without limit. The employee has to give something of
themselves to the organisation and be open to its demands. As Casey argues, the modern
employee is one “who enthusiastically manifests the values of dedication, loyalty, selfsacrifice and passion for the product and customer” (Casey 1999: 161). In this sense “the
willing service of long hours of work and declaration of commitment” (Casey 1999: 161)
is what defines the „correct‟ attitude of the „good‟ employee.
This „empowered‟ way of working calls for a commitment and responsibility to the
organisation from the employee that is both their choice (they are free to take up this
responsibility), yet demanded. In a culture where presenteeism, and going beyond
contractual obligations is assumed, employees often give themselves to the organisation
dutifully. Yet, this duty not only leads to a significant increase in working hours (Belkic
et al. 2000), but also of work-life conflicts (Mauno et al. 2006, Hughes & Parkes 2007).
Although empowerment gives the employee an increased sense of freedom, it in turn
exposes the employee‟s self to the organisation, opens it to new forms of control
(Fleming & Sturdy 2007). The demand for commitment and devotion has lead to a
significant increase in employee stress (Casey 1999, Harkness et al. 2005) and „burnouts‟
(Van der Linden et al. 2005, Barley & Kunda 1992). Schnall et al. (2000) and Belkic et
al. (2004) show how the current way of working long hours and with high stress levels
raises blood pressures and dramatically increases the risk of deadly cardio diseases. The
Japanese even have a word for death by overwork – karōshi (Belkic et al. 2000). Since
the 1980s karōshi has been legally recognised as a cause of death, and is defined as
occupational death resulting from heart attacks and strokes due to stress. It is often the
giving of one‟s time – the unlimited demands of work that opens the employee to
demands for more of their time – that most commonly demonstrates the sacrifices made.
5
Given time
We sense we cannot make men work well unless they are sure of being fairly paid throughout their
life for work they have fairly carried out, both for others and for themselves. The exchangist
producer feels once more – he has always felt it, but this time he does so more acutely- that he is
exchanging more than a product or his labor-time, but that he is giving something of himself – his
time, his life. Thus he wishes to be rewarded, even if only moderately, for this gift. (Derrida 1992:
141)
What is it that is given in the „giving of one‟s time‟? Can we make a gift of time? Time
is perhaps not „ours‟ to give, but in giving our time, or what we can give in that time, we
are sacrificing other possibilities:
By preferring my work, simply by giving it my time and attention, by preferring my activity as a
citizen or as a professorial and professional philosopher, writing and speaking here in a public
language, French in my case, I am perhaps fulfilling my duty. But I am sacrificing and betraying
at every moment all my other obligations: my obligations to the other others whom I know and
don‟t know. (Derrida 1995: 69)iv
How does Derrida help us understand the „giving‟ of one‟s time, of sacrificing one‟s life
to the organisation? Is it an exchange or gift as Derrida suggests? As in Baudelaire‟s
story of the counterfeit coin,v ultimately our narration of the intentions of those who give
an excess of their time to the organisation cannot be known – it is only our supposition.
However, we can, through Derrida‟s explication of the notion of a gift, consider the
possibility of this gift. The apparently boundless nature of this giving of time – the gift in
a context of internally driven commitment where employees identify themselves with the
organisation and feel compelled to give more time – suggests a generosity towards the
organisation. But to others such an act may be seen as exploitative on the part of the
organisation – that such a giving requires a taking, a taking in excess of what is owed.
This „given time‟ is given in excess – for a moderated gift would not be a gift but a
calculation (Derrida 1992: 38) – and may also be given unthinkingly. Even if this
sacrifice is acknowledged, such as when the demands of others, family perhaps, makes
one realise the sacrifice, it is possible that this sacrifice – or at least the extent of the
sacrifice – is then forgotten when the call of absolute duty forces us to decide between
our responsibility and responsibilities in general. Furthermore the gift of time may
remain unacknowledged, even unnoticed – or forgotten as soon as it has been given. So
is this „giving of one‟s time‟ a pure gift? Or is it part of an economy? Just as Abraham
may have done the will of God for some return, if not in earth then in heaven, is it not the
case that this freedom of giving of ones time to the organisation is given with an
expectation of reciprocity or recompense? Is it not the case that the giving of time is
giving the other time to respond to this gift as in Mauss‟s gift economy – gift/countergift
(Derrida 1992: 38)? (for discussion of anthropological approaches to the gift, see also
Laidlaw 2000). And if employees are taking part in the organisation is this not
demonstrating that employees are taking as well as giving – taking a part? Yet this
economy may not be a circular economy in which a „gift‟ is fully repaid, but an exchange
6
of dissymmetry in which the gift may not be repaid to the same value – thus the sacrifice
made may be in excess of the return (if such a calculation can be made). The idea of
calculation reintroduces the notion of reason and account – that one „gives‟ in order to
„receive‟ – a debt is created and obligated on the receiver of the gift. Does this describe
the giving of ones‟ time to the organisation; does it explain karōshi? Is this time given
with the intention or desire of receiving something in return? Is this an economy of
calculation or a gift given that may then become annulled? Is this given as an absolute
duty or as part of a calculatedvi sacrifice for an expected return – recognition,
remuneration, promotion? We cannot say, we cannot know the intentions of the „gift
giver‟ and whether it is forgotten. We cannot know, therefore, if a gift is possible even in
the aneconomic instant.
Yet if the gift is all but impossible does that mean that every sacrifice is already
rewarded, if only in its recognition? Should we then care, if sacrifices are rewarded –
even if the calculation is a stupid one, a foolish generosity perhaps – but a sacrifice made
nonetheless in hope of a return? Or does the receiver of this given time have a
responsibility to annul its gift-ness – to repay the debt, perhaps even refuse it? If the
employee gives their time to the organisation freely should the organisation accept (and
forget) this gift, or should it witness this sacrifice and remember the debt? God witnessed
Abraham‟s sacrifice – he saw what Abraham did, he did not forget (Derrida 1995: 81).
But what is the repayment for this debt? It is impossible to make this calculation. How
much return or recognition is required to annul the gift, we cannot say (Derrida 1992:
157). But as organisations garner the commitment of their employees, they may consider
what they demand of their employees – if not the sacrifice of their sons on Mount
Moriah, then what other demand is made upon the employee. For whilst the ethical
relation is asymmetrical, that one cannot demand or wait for reciprocity (Levinas 1985:
98), it does not mean that one is without responsibility for oneself, and others without
responsibility for that one: “Is not the Infinite which enigmatically commands me… also
the turning of the I into “like the others,” for which it is important to concern oneself and
take care? My lot is important” (Levinas 1981: 161). Does the organisation then have a
responsibility to annul the generosity of excess when it sacrifices all others for you?
Indeed, it may be that this giving of ones time is not a gift, which requires chance,
surprise, as well as mystery (Derrida 1992: 122) but forms part of an institutional ritual
(137) – a symbolic process, an expectation by which employees are bound to this demand
– their response is obligated not received in surprise. A culture of presenteeism suggests
that the dissymmetry in the economy is demanded – the excess of time is expected and
anticipated. It may even be rewarded beyond its recognition, but not necessarily to its
full value, if such a calculation were possible. The sacrifice made by the employee will
be in excess of its return – and the demands of others will go unanswered as the time has
been „taken‟ just as in the Time of the King, when Madame de Maintenon lamented that
“the King takes all my time” (Derrida 1992: 2). Is this then given time or time taken,
taken by the cultural expectation that one gives time? An anticipated gift that then cannot
be a gift at all, but a sacrifice – the gift is transformed into an exchange, which demands
to be acknowledged and that should be remembered. Derrida refers to the sacrifice as
distinguished from the pure gift (if such a thing exists) by the fact that it proposes in
7
offering in the form of a destruction against which it exchanges, hopes for – such as
surplus value or security (Derrida 1992: 137). However in the case of given time it may
perhaps be argued that this loss or destruction of time is more productive than this
implies – it is a gift of time, even if not a true „gift.‟ The idea of sacrifice here is very
different from the one described by Mauss quoted in Derrida (see Derrida 1992: 138)
even if the experience of the donor is that of destruction and loss.
The ethics of sacrifice
For Derrida, following Levinas, the ethical or responsible subject is the one who responds
to the call of the other – and ethical relation in which one is placed, always and already
(Levinas 1969). Being responsible is possible of the condition of the ethical relation:
On the condition that the Good no longer be a transcendental objective, a relation between
objective things, but the relation to the other, a response to the other; an experience of personal
goodness and a movement of intention. (Derrida 1995)
Responsibility is therefore an opening up to the other of welcome and giving to the other,
of hospitality (Derrida 2007). Is the ethical employee, therefore, the employee who
works him or herself to death, sacrifices their life for the organisation? Is this sacrifice,
this gift of ones life (ones death) the condition of an ethical employee?
This ethical response to ones absolute duty is at one and the same time also the condition
of ones irresponsibility to one‟s self, and to all others. How can the employee be ethical,
how can they balance the demands of the absoluteness of individual obligation with the
universality of ethics – an ethics that requires calculation and interpretation? Is the ethical
employee then compelled to give time such that they feel to meet the demands of other
others? How can we make the „decision‟, find the balance between absolute duty and
duty to all others? Derrida doesn‟t offer us a solution, as a solution cannot be offered – it
is the very nature of ethics that there is an impossibility of ethics. There remains a
conflict between the universality of ethics and the absoluteness of the singular obligation
– a responsibility that cannot be met, for one can never do enough. Indeed the hospitality
– the openness that one must show others – conditions its own impossibility and its
autodestruction. To remain the hospitable host, one must retain one‟s position as the
master of the household, one must define the conditions of this hospitality to retain the
position of host (Derrida 2007: 245, 1997a: 17). Derrida (1997b) also discusses the
universality of friendship and the necessarily contradictory (impossible) nature of this
universality. Yet, at the same time, and in doing so, one must be held hostage to the other
in our singular responsibility to the other – a relation in which the other is master
(Derrida 1996: 6). Responding to absolute duty always leaves the call of others
unanswered – we are forced to renounce ethics in failing to meet the universality of
demands (Attridge 2008: 17). Is ethics possible? For Derrida, writing at the limits of
thinking – of the im/possibility of concepts – an impossibility doesn‟t mean that it can‟t
happen, even if only fleetingly, precariously and imperceptibly – yet ethics may be of a
different order – truly beyond possibility (ibid).
8
What does Abraham teach us, in his approach to sacrifice? That far from ensuring responsibility,
the generality of ethics incites to irresponsibility. It impels me to speak, to reply, to account for
something, and thus to dissolve my singularity in the medium of the concept. Such is the aporia of
responsibility: one always risks not managing to accede to the concept of responsibility in the
process of forming it. For responsibility (we would no longer dare speak of the “universal concept
of responsibility”) demands on the one hand an accounting, a general answering-for-oneself with
respect to the general and before that generality, hence the idea of substitution, and, on the other
hand, uniqueness and absolute singularity, hence nonsubstitution, non repetition, silence, and
secrecy. … this is ethics as “irresponsibilization”, as an insoluble and paradoxical contradiction
between responsibility in general and absolute responsibility. (Derrida 1995: 61)
A lack of possibility of ethics, however, is not a call for irresponsibility but of pushing
our responsibility to the limit. As Levinas would say, we are already in this ethical
relation. It is therefore a question of our decisions, of taking a risk, of deciding in a
context of undecidability. The question, therefore, is perhaps not whether a gift is
possible, or if the economy of sacrifice is circular and reciprocal, but, of how we respond
to the call. And such a calling, as with the gaze of God, demands that we respond
without limit and in faith, not reason and calculation. The im/possibility of the gift,
therefore, does not negate the „giving‟ or sacrificing of oneself. It does not negate the
sacrifice of one‟s family or one‟s own life as in karōshi, and thus doesn‟t negate the
responsibility of the organisation (or others within the organisation) to respond to this
calling into question. In demonstrating the impossibility of ethics, Derrida signifies the
important of both the singular and general, the nonsubstitutable and the substitutable – it
opens us to the possibility of the Levinasian Other and all others.vii Furthermore the
economy of gift/countergift (the non-gift/or sacrifice) enables us to think of given time as
that which is both ethical – responding to the call, but nonetheless demanding of an
exchange – it demands to be noticed. We cannot say whether the ethical employee can
show irreducible responsibility to the organisation without being irresponsible to one‟s
self, family and so on; or we can, in that it is inevitable – impossible otherwise. We, like
Abraham, may have to renounce our family loyalties – sacrifice our time with them to
respond to the call of absolute duty. The ethical employee, therefore, is the one who
sacrifices – who gives up life, who betrays others, as any other must do. The ethical is
always “perhaps” – the possible as impossible, the impossibility of the possible, a
decision without knowledge, the incalculable economy that demands calculation. This
impossibility (undecidability) conditions the possibility – it is affirmative of our duty
towards our unspeakable responsibility. It binds us to an impossible promise, but it
doesn‟t negate the act of promising, of its possibilities.
9
References
Alvesson, M. & Willmott, H. 2002. 'Identity regulation as organizational control:
Producing the appropriate individual.' Journal of Management Studies, 7, 619-44.
Amabile, T. M. 1997. 'Motivating creativity in organizations: on doing what you love and
loving what you do.' California Management Review, 40:1, 39-58.
Attridge, D. 2008. 'Derrida's singularity: Literature and ethics.' In S. Glendining & R.
Eaglestone (Eds.) Derrida's legacies: 12-25. London: Routledge.
Barley, S. R. & Kunda, G. 1992. 'Design and devotion: surges of rational and normative
ideologies of control in managerial discourse.' Administratively Science
Quarterly, 37, 363-99.
Belkic, K., Landsbergis, P., Schnall, P. & Baker, D. 2004. 'Is job strain a major source of
cardiovascular disease risk?' Scandinavian Journal of Work Environment Health,
30:2, 85-128.
Belkic, K., Schnall, P., Landsbergis, P. & Baker, D. 2000. 'The workplace and
cardiovascular health: conclusions and thoughts fr a future agenda.' Occupational
Medicine, 15:1, 307-21.
Casey, C. 1999. 'Come join our family: discipline and integration in corporate
organizational culture.' Human Relations, 22:2, 155-78.
Derrida, J. 1988. 'Like the sound of the sea deep within a shell: Paul de Man's war.'
Critical Inquiry, 14:3, 590-652.
Derrida, J. 1992. Given time. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Derrida, J. 1993. Aporias. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Derrida, J. 1995. The gift of death. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Derrida, J. 1996. 'Adieu.' Critical Inquiry, 23:1, 1-10.
Derrida, J. 1997a. On cosmopolitanism and forgiveness. London: Routledge.
Derrida, J. 1997b. The Politics of Fiendship. London/New York: Verso.
Derrida, J. 2007. 'Hospitality.' In B. Stocker (Ed.) Jacques Derrida: Basic writings.
London: Routledge.
Fleming, P. & Sturdy, A. 2007. 'Just be yourself - towards neonormative contol in
organizations?' Working Paper. Cambridge: University of Cambridge.
Grey, C. & Garsten, C. 2001. 'Trust, control and post-bureaucracy.' Organization Studies,
22:2, 229-50.
Harkness, A. M. B., Long, B. C., Bermbach, N., Patterson, K., Jordan, S. & Kahn, H.
2005. 'Talking about work stress: discourse analysis and implications for stress
interventions.' Work & Stress, 19:2, 121-36.
Heidegger, M. 1962. Being and time. Ocford: Blackwells.
Hughes, E. L. & Parkes, K. R. 2007. 'Work hours and well-being: the roles of work-time
control and work-family interference.' Work & Stress, 21:3, 264-78.
Kanter, R. M. 1972. Commitment and community. Cambridge: Harvard.
Kunda, G. 1992. Engineering culture: control and commitment in a high-tech
corporation. Temple University Press.
10
Laidlaw, J. 2000. 'A free gift makes no friends.' The Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute, 6:2, 617-34.
Legge, K. 2005. Human resource management: rhetorics and realities. Basingstoke:
Pelgrave Macmillan.
Levinas, E. 1969. Totality and infinity - an essay on exteriority. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania:
Duquesne University Press.
Levinas, E. 1981. Otherwise than being or beyond essence. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania:
Duquesne University Press.
Levinas, E. 1985. Ethics and infinity: conversations with Philippe Nemo. Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press.
Loehr, J. & Tony, S. 2003. The power of full engagement: making energy, not time, is the
key to high performance and personal renewal. New York: Free Press.
Manz, C. C. & Sims, H. 1984. 'Searching for the un-leader: organizational member views
on leading self-managed groups.' Human Relations, 37, 409-24.
Manz, C. C. & Sims, H. 1989. SuperLeadership: leading others to lead themselves. New
York: Prentice Hall.
Mauno, S., Kinnunen, U. & Ruokolainen, M. 2006. 'Exploring work- and organizationbased resources as moderators between work-family conflict, well-being, and job
attitudes.' Work & Stress, 20:3, 210-33.
Ouchi, W. G. 1980. 'Markets, bureaucracies, and clans.' Administrative Science
Quarterly, 25:1, 129-41.
Peperzak, A. 1993. To the other. An introduction to the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas.
West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.
Roberts, J. 2005. 'The power of the imaginary in disciplinary processes.' Organization,
12:5, 619-42.
Schnall, P., Belkic, K., Landsbergis & Baker, D. 2000. 'Why the workplace and
cardiovascular disease?' Occupational Medicine, 15:1, 97-122.
Van der Linden, D., Keijsers, P. E. & Van Schaijk, R. 2005. 'Work stress and attentional
difficulties: an initial study on burnout ad cognitive failures.' Work & Stress, 19:1,
23-36.
i
Time, as such, cannot be given for it doesn‟t belong to the giver. But the acts done
within that time – how one fills that time - may constitute a giving, a giving of what is in
that time (Derrida, 1992:3)
ii
The calling into question and ethical relation develops ideas from Levinas (Attridge,
2008:19). See also Derrida, 1996.
iii
Genesis 22.
iv
The “perhaps” found in Derrida is “that of the possible and the impossible at the same
time, of the possible as impossible (Derrida, 2002: 344)
v
Counterfeit Money, by Charles Baudelaire, forms a central part of Derrida‟s discussion
of the gift and of economy in Given Time. He notes in this discussion that the narrator
has to assume the intentions of his friend in giving the counterfeit money to the beggar –
the „real‟ intentions cannot be known. (Derrida, 1992:152)
vi
Baudelaire‟s narrator may say „stupidly so‟ – in its failure to employ reason (Derrida,
1992:167).
11
vii
Levinas (1969, 1981) also explores the importance of other others, but it is argued here
that Derrida lays more emphasis on the generality of ethics as well as the absolute duty.
12