AUSTRALIAN PRESS COUNCIL NEWS, MAY, 1989 5 Contem pt of court an d the m edia Peter Gillies writes about the suppression o f public com m ent in light o f the H ind i case. he decision o f the High Court in Hinch v A-G (Vic) and Macquarie Broadcasting Holdings (Ltd) v AG(Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 15 deals with the commission o f contempt at com m on law in one o f its several cate gories, viz. the publication o f material in a situation where such publication tends to prejudice the fairness o f par ticular legal proceedings. It can be committed in relation to criminal and c ivil proceedings. As the High Court confirmed in this case, the m atters w hich must be proven are the same whether prejudice t<o criminal or civil litigation is alleged. C o n te m p t is o f course a crim inal offence, although it is tried summarily, ite. by a court sitting without a jury, in which the judge decides both the ques tions o f law and those o f fact, including tlhe ultimate one o f guilt. In Hinch's case the conduct com plained o f was several broadcasts by H inch and his employer, the second dlefendant, in which prejudice was ailleged to have been caused in relation no the prospective trial o f a person charged with certain criminal offences. W hat the case confirms is that discus sion by the media or for that matter piublic comment by other persons, in terms potentially influential in relation tio the outcome o f litigation involving t;hem, needs to be conducted with gp~eat caution. TTHE FACTS Broadly, the facts in the case were tlhat one Father Michael Glennon, who hiad been ordained as a Catholic priest, was charged on 12 November, 1985 w ith certain sexual offences against y/oung male persons. He was remanded tco appear on bail at a later date. At the tiime, Glennon was in charge o f the Peaceful Hand Youth Foundation Pty L td , an organisation which conducted children's camps and other activities fcor children. The next day following the charging o )f Glennon, the broadcaster Derryn PHOTO COURTESY SYDNEY M O RNING HERALD T Derryn Hinch Hinch made a broadcast on Radio Station 3AW, Melbourne, which was owned and operated by Macquarie Broadcasting Holdings Ltd, in which he referred to the fact that Glennon had been ch arged with o ffe n c e s against teenage boys. H e referred to Glennon's position as director o f the Foundation, and among other things noted that the offences charged had allegedly been com m itted between 1975 and 1982 at the Foundation's camp at Lancefield. Hinch stated that G len non had been "forced to resign from practising within the Catholic Church after he was charged with sexual assault and ja ile d in 1978". H e also said that Glennon had been charged with rape in 1978 and that when he pleaded guity to indecent assault o f a 16 year old girl, the police had not proceeded with the rape charge. Hinch observed that Glennon had been sentenced to two years imprisonment on the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and that he was later acquitted on two counts o f rape involving a 12 year old boy. At the end o f his comments Hinch raised the question o f how it was that G lennon had continued to run the F ou n dation having rega rd to his responsibility to take children into his care, when he had a sexual criminal record involving juveniles. Hinch made a second broadcast on the case the following day, repeating the gist o f the previous day's comments and observing that the Foundation's secretary had confirmed that Glennon would be remaining in his position. "That is, despite a ja il sentence for indecent assault, the man will stay in that position", Hinch said. H e again queried this as being anomalous. On 17 February, 1986 the Victorian Attorney-General filed a motion alleg in g that H in ch and M acqu arie B roadcasting had com m itted co n tempt. The motion was adjourned. Th en on 7 March, G lennon was charged with two counts o f indecent assault o f a female and one o f rape and was bailed to appear at a later date. T h e offen ces were alleged to have b een co m m itted in 1982. O n 11 March, Hinch made a third broadcast in which he again referred to the mat ters previously raised by him and to the latest charges and repeated the ques 6 AUSTRALIAN PRESS COUNCIL NEWS, r, 1989 tion previously asked by him. The Attorney-General filed a second motion against the defendants, alleg ing a contem pt in the form o f this broadcast. The motions were heard by Murphy J in the Supreme Court o f V ictoria. H e found the defendants guilty o f the contempts charged and im posed fines totalling $55,000 on Macquarie and $25,000 on Hinch. As well, Hinch was sentenced to 42 days imprisonment. On appeal to the Full Court, the verdicts were confirm ed, but the sentence o f imprisonment was reduced to 28 days, and the fines were reduced in each case by $10,000. Each party then appealed to the H igh Court. Th e core issue in each appeal was the elem ent o f criminal contempt. The comments on this mat ter in the leading case o f Ex part e Bread Manufacturers Ltd; Re Truth & Sportsman Ltd (1937) 37 SR(NSW) 242 per Jordan CJ were put directly in issue. SCOPE OF THE OFFENCE T h e five H ig h C ou rt Justices involved in the appeal held that the comments by Jordan CJ in the New South Wales case o f Re Truth and Sportsman Ltd in describing the ele ments o f the offence in the context o f publication concerning a prospective or current civil trial, applied equally to the publication o f comments concern ing a criminal trial. The central passage in Re Truth is at pp249-50. In it, C hief Justice Jordan noted that it is o f extreme public inter est that no conduct should be permit ted which is likely to prevent a litigant in a court from having his case tried free o f prejudice (such as could arise from the publication o f certain com ment on the case). But, he noted, the due administration o f justice is not the only matter in which the public is vital ly interested; and if in the course o f ventilation o f a question o f public con cern, matter is published which may prejudice a party in the conduct o f a lawsuit, it does not follow that a con tempt has been committed. It is well settled that a person cannot be prevented by a process o f contempt from continuing to discuss publicly a matter which may fairly be regarded as being o f public interest merely because the matter in question has become the subject o f litigation or that a person whose conduct is being publicly criti cised has become a party to litigation. What Jordan CJ envisaged would have to be done in such a case where con tempt was alleged, was to balance the public interest in the due administra tion o f justice with the public interest in free speech and in particular the dis cussion o f issues o f public interest. Where the first interest was the more weighty in the particular case and the elements o f contempt had otherwise been established, then the publisher (including the person responsible for the comment) would prima facie be guilty o f contempt. In the Hinch-Macquarie case, the trial ju d g e and the two appellate courts were o f the view that the contempt had been proven, viz. that the elements o f “What was objectionable in the broadcasts? A primary complaint according to the courts was that Hinch had disclosed that Glennon had a prior conviction o f a serious nature (for factors as the nature and extent o f tie publication, the mode o f trial (whether by judge or jury), and the time which will elapse between publication and trial (where the comment is prior to and not during the trial). Judges are properly viewed as having a relati/e immunity from being unduly influ enced by intrusive commentary bear ing upon litigation, while lay jurors may be more readily given to conse quential prejudice. The accused need not have a literal intention to interfere im properly in the administration o f justice, although certainly the act complained o f (tke pu blication) must be intentionally committed. It follows that absence of an intention improperly to deflect the course o f justice will not in itself save the accused from conviction where the other elements o f contempt are pre sent. Th e time for assessing whether a contempt has been committed is the time o f publication, not some later time, ie. a publication which is not con temptuous does not becom e a con tempt merely because o f later develop ments. sexual assault) ” contempt were established beyond rea sonable doubt (the criminal standard o f p ro o f must be satisfied, contempt being a crime), and that in particular, this balan cin g process was unfavourable to the appellants (the original defendants). What are the elements o f contempt in this context then, and why was the balancing process unfavourable to the defendants? T h e pu blish ed m atter must, as Mason CJ suggested in the High Court be such as to create a "real risk" o f interference with the due course o f jus tice in the particular case which the com m ent relates to: the com m ent must "as a matter o f practical reality", have "a tendency to interfere with the due course o f justice in a particular case". Not just any trifling interference, then, with no real potential for mis chief, will suffice for proving contempt beyond reasonable doubt. Further, the ba la n cin g process referred to must be decisively against the accused person (remembering that the onus o f p roo f is on the prosecu tion, and it must prove all, not just some o f the elements o f the offence beyond reasonable doubt). In deter mining whether in a case like Hinch the balancing process favoured the comments in question, or was hostile to them, regard is to be had to such APPLYING THE LAW TO THE FACTS IN HINCH In the Hinch case, as mentioned, the trial judge and the two appellate courts found against the defendants. What was decisive was the perceived out come o f the balancing process referred to. W hat was ob jection able in the broadcasts? A p rim ary com p lain t according to the courts was that Hinch had disclosed that G lennon had a prior conviction o f a serious nature (for sexual assault). It is a basic rule o f ev id e n ce that in a crim in al (and indeed a civil) trial, that evidence o f the past commission o f crimes by a per son accused at trial o f another crime (o r a civil w ro n g ), cannot be put before the court. So, to illustrate, i f a person is charged with committing a robbery in 1989, it is improper to prove that he committed robbery in 1987, 1985 or 1983. Clearly, this evidence is relevant - if a person has a history, say, o f com mitting robbery, it is more likely that he com m itted the robbery charged than it would be if he had no such his tory. T h e evidence shows crim inal propensity, and o f even m ore rele vance, propensity to commit a crime o f the very type charged. However, except in the most unusu al cases, the law will not allow this type o f evidence to be led. The reason is AUSTRALIAN PRESS COUNCIL NEWS, MAY, 1989 7 that the prejudice which it would cre ate in the minds o f a jury (or even a judge or magistrate trying the charge summarily) is so great that it would make the trial o f the charge unfair. There would be a real risk that a jury might convict the accused not because o f the strength o f the evidence relating solely to the charge presently before the court, but because o f the past crimes of the accused. The revelation by Hinch, therefore, was potentially prejudicial - the broad cast was to many thousands o f people in the city from which a jury would be drawn, assuming the charges against Glennon went to trial. The likelihood is that one at least o f the jurors would remember the broadcast and commu nicate the fact o f Glennon's past con viction for sexual assault to the others. Another factor adverse to the defen dants, was, as certain justices saw it, Hinch's insinuation that the priest was indeed guilty o f the fresh (and yet to be tried) charges. TooheyJ saw this as the factor principally adverse to the defendants. It is self-evidently a matter prejudicial to a person facin g the prospect o f trial, that observations as to his guilt are being published to poten tial jurors or for that matter, jurors cur rently trying his case. On the other side o f the ledger, the factor favourable to the defendants in balancing the competing public inter ests referred to, was what the defen dants identified as the public interest in disclosing the fact that the director o f a youth community organisation had not only been recently charged with sexual assaults against juveniles but that he had been convicted o f a sexual assault on a young girl. In the view o f the court, however, the public interest in preventing preju dice to the priest's prospects o f a fair trial on the outstanding charges, out weighed the public interest in broad casting the matters o f his personal histo ry id e n tifie d by H in ch . It was undoubtedly a matter o f influence with the several courts that dealt with the matter, that Hinch could have con fined his comments to observing that G len n on was d ire c to r o f the Foundation and that he had recently been charged with sexual offences against ju ven iles — observations which could not have amounted to contempt. The appellants' contention that this might not have been enough to alert the public (in particular the parents o f children involved in the Foundation) to the inappropriateness o f Glennon continuing in the position w hile the charges were outstanding, was rejected by the court (see in partic ular TooheyJ's comments at p.75). It is relevant then to look at the means available to a person contemplating a publication o f potentially prejudicial matter: is there something short o f the publication o f what is prima facie con tem ptuous m aterial, which can be done to serve the public interest they are concerned to promote? reasons mentioned earlier: that is, the presumed superior ability o f an experi enced judicial officer to put out o f mind prejudicial matter generated out o f court. • CONCLUSION An in tern ation al con feren ce on press councils and press regulatory bodies is to be held in Kuala Lumpur between 18-20 November, 1989. Organised by the World Federation o f UNESCO Clubs and Associations, the c o n fe re n c e has as its them e 'Freedom o f the Press and the Role o f Press Councils'. Representatives o f the Australian media are invited to attend the conference as observers, and the Federation will provide meals and con ference materials to observers without charge during the conference. No conference fees are charged to observers. The tenor o f the High Court's judg ment in this case (or more strictly, the five unanimous judgm ents) is over- “Hinch could have confined his comments to observing that Glennon was director of the Foundation and that he had recendy been charged with sexual offences against juveniles” w helm ingly favourable to what was seen as the fundamental right o f the citizen to a fair trial o f an allegation against him or her by the suppression o f public comment creating a real risk o f prejudice to this right. Where trials o f serious criminal charges are con cerned, it is apparent that the compet ing public interest in free speech and the free ventilation o f public-interest issues will uncommonly justify publica tions which prima facie are contemptu ous. Illustrations o f publications which would (or might) not amount to con tempt through application o f this bal ancing process, given in Hinch, con firm this conclusion. It is worth noting that the H inch case dealt with a publication bearing upon a prospective criminal trial or tri als. The courts have always been excep tionally meticulous in safeguarding the right o f the accused to a fair trial o f the criminal charge against him or her; in comparison, the conduct o f civil pro ceedings is relatively more relaxed for the very good reason that the liberty o f the citizen and his or her reputation are not at stake (or in so far as reputa tion is concern ed, not as much at stake). A further relevant factor (one apply ing particularly to civil proceedings, where jury trial is less common than in criminal cases) is, as noted in Hinch, the form o f the trial itself. Comment relating to a matter which is to be tried summarily will more readily "balance" in favour o f the commentator for the INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PRESS COUNCIL I f you have a complaint against a n e w s p a p e r o r p e r io d ic a l, you should first take it up with the edi tor or other representative o f the publication. I f the complaint is not resolved to your satisfaction, you may refer it to the Australian Press Council. A com plaint must be specific, in writing, and accompanied by a cut ting or clear photostat o f the matter complained of, with supporting doc uments or evid en ce i f any. Complaints must be lodged within three months o f publication. Th e Council will not hear a com plaint subject to legal action or, in the Council's view, possible legal action, unless the complainant is willing to sign a waiver o f the right to such action. Address complaints or inquiries to: The Secretary The Australian Press Council Suite 302, 149 Castlereagh Street Sydney NSW 2000 For in fo rm a tio n or advice te le phone: (02) 261 1930. A booklet setting out the aims, prac tices and procedures o f the Council is available free from the above address.
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