SOCIO-ECONOMIC ROOTS OF RADICALISM?
TOWARDS
TOWARDS EXPLAINING
EXPLAINING THE
THE APPEAL
OF ISLAMIC RADICALS
Alan Richards
July 2003
ACLURM001194
*****
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to Edmund
Edmund Burke,
Burke, Graham
Graham Fuller,
Fuller, Isebill Gruhn, Paul
The author is indebted
Lubeck, and
and Steven Simon
Simon for
forhelpful
helpfuldiscussions;
discussions;and
and two
two anonymous
anonymous reviewers
from the Army War College for
for useful comments and suggestions. None of these
people are responsible for
for the
the arguments
arguments advanced here.
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ii
ACLURM001195
FOREWORD
The September
September 11
The
11 attacks
attacks against
against U.S.
U.S. targets
targets came
came as
as a
frightening shock
Americans who
never previously
previously
frightening
shock to
to most Americans
who had never
heard of Osama Bin Laden
heard
Laden or
or the
the virulent
virulent radicalism
radicalism associated with
tumultuous aftermath
aftermath of
of the
the attacks,
attacks,
his al Qaeda network. In the tumultuous
Americans grasped
explanations as
many Americans
grasped for
for explanations
as to
to why these events
occurred and
was to
to be
bedone
doneabout
aboutthem.
them.Closely-related
Closely-related
occurred
and what was
queries were why
why Islamic
Islamic radicals
radicals enjoy
enjoy a significant
significant amount of
of
queries
Muslim World,
popular sympathy within the Muslim
World, and
and how this trend
can be reversed.
This
This monograph,
monograph, by Dr.
Dr. Alan
Alan Richards,
Richards, addresses the
the critical
critical
questions
involved in understanding and coping with the roots
questions involved
roots of
of
Islamic
radicalism. His
His work closely
examines the
the links between
Islamic radicalism.
closely examines
radicalism
radicalism and a series
series of crises
crises associated
associated with modernization in
the Islamic
World. The
The result
result isis aa thoughtful
and probing study
Islamic World.
thoughtful and
including
for U.S.
including policy
policy recommendations
recommendations for
U.S. military
military and civilian
civilian
decisionmakers
decisionmakers that
thatmakes
makesintelligible
intelligiblethe
the complex
complex subject
subject of Islamic
radicalism.
The Strategic
Strategic Studies
Studies Institute
Institute is
is pleased
pleased to offer
offer this
this monograph
monograph
contribution to the national security debate on this important
as a contribution
valuable to
to U.S. military
subject. This analysis
analysis should
should be particularly
particularly valuable
strategic leaders
seek to better
better understand
understand the
the security
security
strategic
leaders as
as they
they seek
Islamic World. Additionally,
concerns of friendly
friendly states within the Islamic
information provided should be very useful to all
the background information
within the Islamic
those involved in military-to-military interactions within
World.
DOUGLAS C.
C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
iii
ACLURM001196
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE
THE AUTHOR
AUTHOR
RICHARDS isis Professor
ALAN RICHARDS
Professor of
of Economics
Economics and
and Environmental
Studies at the University
Studies
University of California, Santa Cruz, where he has been
1976. He
University
on the faculty since 1976.
He was
was educated
educated at Harvard University
the University
University of
of Wisconsin,
Wisconsin, Madison,
Madison, where
studied
and the
where he studied
political science,
economics. He
political
science, Middle
Middle Eastern
Eastern studies,
studies, and economics.
He was
Director of the University of California System's Education Abroad
Programin
inCairo
Cairo from
from 1989-91
1989-91 (during
the Gulf
Gulf War).
War). In
In 1991 he
Program
(during the
he was
was
a member of aa three-person team tasked with drafting proposals for
U.S. development
assistance to
to the
the West
West Bank
Bank and
andGaza.
Gaza. In
In1992-94,
1992-94,
U.S.
development assistance
worked in
in Washington
Washingtonfor
forUSAID
USAID as a Senior Political Economist,
he worked
and/ordirected
directedpolitical
politicaleconomy
economy analyses
analyses of
where he conducted and/or
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia,
Tunisia, Yemen,
Yemen, and
and Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan.
has also
also taught
taught economics
economics at
at the
theUniversity
University of
ofWisconsin-Wisconsin-He has
Madison, Harvard
University, and
American University
University in
Madison,
Harvard University,
and the American
Cairo. With John Waterbury
Waterbury (formerly of Princeton University, now
American University in Beirut),
Beirut), he co-authored A
President of the American
A
Political
East (1990;
(1990; second
1996), a
Political Economy
Economy of
of the
the Middle
Middle East
second edition, 1996),
effort in the field.
field. In
work widely recognized as a groundbreaking effort
MacArthur Fellow
Fellow in International Environmental
1995/96 he was MacArthur
Policy for
University of
California system.
advisory
Policy
for the University
of California
system. He
He is
is an advisory
editor for the journal Middle East Policy, and is a frequent consultant
U.S. Government
to the U.S.
Government on Middle Eastern affairs.
iv
ACLURM001197
SUMMARY
Why do "Islamic
"Islamic radicals"
radicals" enjoy
much sympathy
sympathy in
the
Why
enjoy so
so much
in the
Middle East
Muslim world?
world? The
The author
author argues
argues that
that
Middle
East and
and wider Muslim
political response to the
the deepening
deepening economic,
economic,
such radicalism is a political
social, political,
crisis in the
the Muslim
Muslim World.
World. Rapid
Rapid
social,
political, and
and cultural
cultural crisis
demographic growth,
growth, educational
educational changes,
changes, government
government policy
policy
demographic
rapid urbanization
urbanization are
among the
the causes
causes of high
high
failure, and
failure,
and rapid
are among
unemployment, and increasing poverty, which, together with other
other forces,
forces, have
alienated large
large sectors
sectors of Muslim
Muslim youth. The
The
other
have alienated
regional crisis
crisis has
has deep historical
historical roots,
roots, and
and simple
simple "solutions"
"solutions" do
exist. A
Elements of
not exist.
A long-term strategy is needed. Elements
of that strategy
the face
face of
of
include recognition of the limits of American power in the
crisis, concrete steps to resolve the Palestinian
this multidimensional
multidimensional crisis,
improved intelligence
intelligence cooperation and covert actions.
problem, and improved
Muslims: we
The future of the region belongs to young Muslims:
we should ask
our actions?
of any proposed policy: how will they interpret our
v
ACLURM001198
ACLURM001199
SOCIO-ECONOMIC ROOTS OF RADICALISM?
TOWARDS EXPLAINING
EXPLAINING THE
THE APPEAL
TOWARDS
OF ISLAMIC RADICALS
"Roots."l
Introduction: The Debate Over "Roots."'
Why do
do "Islamic
"Islamic radicals"—including
radicals" -including the
alWhy
the partisans
partisans of
of alother followers
followers of
of Osama
Osama bin
binLaden—enjoy
Laden-enjoy so
Qaeda and other
so much
Middle East and wider
wider Muslim
Muslim world? Obviously,
sympathy in the Middle
understandingsuch
suchaa phenomenon
phenomenonisisaa necessary
necessary (but
(but not
not sufficient)
sufficient)
understanding
condition for crafting a strategy
condition
strategy to cope
cope with
with the
the murderous
murderous violence
September 11,
11, 2001.
2001. Some
Some analysts—including
analysts-including this
this one—believe
one-believe
of September
explaining this—or
this-or any
any other—large-scale
other-large-scale social
social movement
movement
that explaining
nuanced, complex
complex historical
historical analysis
analysis of
of social,
social, economic,
requires a nuanced,
political, and cultural factors.
factors. Space and professional
professional competence
competence
political,
analysis offered here, which will focus more
sharply constrain the analysis
economic, social,
cultural and
on economic,
social, and
and political
political factors
factors than
than on
on cultural
ideological aspects.
Any reader
reader of
of journals
journals and
and op-ed
op-ed pages
pages of
ofnewspapers
newspapers
Any
knows,
perspectives such
gone
knows, however,
however, that
that perspectives
such as
as this
this have hardly gone
immediate aftermath
aftermath of
of September
September 11,
unchallenged. Indeed, in the immediate
attempts at analysis of any kind were often denigrated
denigrated as symptoms
cowardice or treason.
policymakers suggested that
of cowardice
treason. Pundits and policymakers
phenomenon such
such as
as al-Qaeda
al-Qaeda had
had social
social roots was to
to argue that phenomenon
excuse, or even condone, their apocalyptic actions. As the political
political
excuse,
scientist Thomas
arguments are
scientist
Thomas Homer-Dixon
Homer-Dixonpointed
pointed out,
out, such
such arguments
sequiturs."2 After
After all,
all, historians
historians who
who study
study
"grade-school non
"grade-school
non sequiturs."2
of Stalinism do not
Nazism do not justify Auschwitz,
Auschwitz, and students of
exonerate the
exonerate
the perpetrators
perpetrators of the Gulag. Understanding is simply
the alternative,
alternative, which
which is
is incomprehension.
incomprehension. If we fail to
better than the
the attacks
attacks of
of September
September 11,
11, we will fail to
grasp the forces behind the
respond wisely.
A charitable interpretation of such breathless
breathless anathemas would
the authors
authors were
were simply
simply traumatized
traumatized by the shock
shock of the
be that the
events of that terrible day. While this
this may well be
be true, I think that
something else
else is
is also
also involved.
involved. The
The title
title to
to this
this monograph has a
question mark, not because I think that there are not such roots, but
1
1
ACLURM001200
because there exists an influential school of
ofwriters
writers and
and thinkers
thinkers who
exist. One can distinguish
continue to argue that such roots do not exist.
types of
of arguments
arguments here:
here: 1)
1) arguments
arguments about
about specific
specific
two broad types
roots (i.e.,
(Le., the
any, of
of poverty
poverty in
in fostering
fostering
roots
the debate
debate on the role, if any,
Islamic radicalism-discussed
of
Islamic
radicalism—discussedbelow),
below),and
and2)2)aa broader
broader denial of
that terrorism
terrorism (or
(or crime,
crime, or any
any social
social pathology) has any
the idea that
interesting social origins. The first perspective is certainly welcome:
interesting
it is always useful, indeed necessary, to challenge
challenge and
and question any
particular historical analysis. Such analysts are, at least, engaging in
analysis, however one may assess the validity
reasoned debate and analysis,
of their arguments.
The second
second perspective
perspective is,
course, one
beloved by
The
is, of
of course,
one much beloved
3
(grossly misnamed3)
misnamed ) neo-conservatives.
neo-conservatives. In
their jihad
jihad against
against
(grossly
In their
and"
permissiveness," they
theyfear
fear that
thatany
any sociological
sociological or
"liberalism" and
"permissiveness,"
economic explanation
economic
explanation for
for behavior
behavior will
will lead
lead to
to "softness,"
"softness," or
or to an
insufficiently muscular (in this case,
case, military)
military) response.
response. At aa deeper
level, they
seem either to argue
argue that
thatevil—such
evil-such as
attacks of
of
level,
they seem
as the attacks
11-is itself
September 11—is
itselfuncaused,
uncaused,or,
or,following
followingaavenerable
venerable tradition
tradition
that extends back at least to St.
St. Augustine,
Augustine, the product of pride. This
perspective is
particularly prominent
prominent in discussions
discussions of the
latter perspective
is particularly
question, "Why do 'they' hate us?" Allegedly, "Muslims"
"Muslims" "hate"
"hate" the
United States because we have been successful, and they have failed.
Such explanations, of course, imply that we in the United States need
not change any significant aspect of our
our behavior,
behavior, most particularly
and foreign
foreign policies.
policies. We simply have to keep
including our energy and
bashing the miscreants militarily
militarily often
often enough,
enough, and
and then they will
come to
they are wrong. It is, in
come
to understand that we are right and they
essence, an
Wall" strategy
strategy which
which
essence,
an American
American version
version of
of the
the "Iron Wall"
Palestine.4
Vladimir Jabotinsky advocated for the Yishuv in Palestine.4
Of course,
course, the wrong diagnosis will typically
typically lead
lead to
to the
the wrong
prescription. The American version of the Iron Wall is likely to be
been in
in Israel,
Israel, where, 50 years after
no more successful than it has been
the proclamation of the Jewish state, Israeli citizens feel
feel at least as
insecure as
their history.
history. While
While military action,
action, and, even
insecure
as ever in their
elements of a longmore, covert operations may well be appropriate
appropriate elements
are hardly
hardly likely
likely to
to be
be sufficient.
sufficient. The
The reason, of
of
term strategy, they are
course, is
the phenomenon
phenomenon of
of Islamic
Islamic radicalism
radicalism indeed
course,
is that the
indeed has
2
ACLURM001201
deep, tangled, historical
historical roots,
roots, and
and that
that our behavior has,
has, and can
again, exacerbate rather
rather than ameliorate the problem.
the difficulty,
difficulty, of course,
course, is
very complexity
complexity of the
Part of the
is the very
phenomena) which
of
phenomenon (or phenomena)
which confront
confront us.
us. As
As a number of
excellent recently
excellent
recently published
published articles
articles and
and books
books have
have reminded
reminded us
reminding), Muslims
(it is a damning commentary that we needed reminding),
dislike various aspects of the international order, their
who deeply dislike
u.s. foreign policy
policy are a highly
domestic political
domestic
political system,
system, and/or
and/or U.S.
lot.s Since
diverse lot.5
Since at
at least
least one
one of
ofseven
sevenhuman
human beings is Muslim,
Muslim, how
how
could it be otherwise? This very complexity makes it hugely difficult
generalize, yet
identify courses
to generalize,
yet generalize
generalize we
we must if we are to identify
of action that are likely to increase, or decrease, our security. It may
also be that the very complexity (and fluidity) of the phenomenon
phenomenon of
"Islamic radicalism"
radicalism" contributes to disagreement about the relative
various social
social factors,
factors, simply because different analysts
weight of various
are-perhaps unknowingly-discussing
are—perhaps
unknowingly—discussing different
different groups
groups of people.
For example,
example, itit may
may be
be useful
useful to
to distinguish
distinguish between
between the
the
For
thought of
of (perhaps)
(perhaps) as
as concentric
concentric circles:
circles:
following groups, thought
1. "Jihadist
"Jihadist Salafis"—such
Salafis"-such as
1.
as the
the followers
followers of
of al-Qaeda
al-Qaeda and likeminded local groups;
2. "Salafis"—those
"Salafis"-those who
2.
who believe
believe that
that the
the imitation
imitation of the behavior
closest companions
companions should be the basis
basis of
of
of the Prophet's closest
the social order;
3. "Islamists"—a
"Islamists"-a still
3.
still broader
broader category,
category, which
which includes anyone
thinks that
thatthe
theprecepts
preceptsof
ofIslam—however
Islam-however interpreted—
interpretedwho thinks
fundamental to
to the
the political
political and social order; and,
should be fundamental
4. "Discontented Muslims"—people
Muslims" -people who
themselves
4.
who identify themselves
with their
their life
life prospects,
Muslims, and
as Muslims,
and who are unhappy with
or with the state of the
with the justice of
of their
their societies,
societies,and/
and/or
wider world.
goal of American policy should be to isolate the first
Presumably, the goal
group from all the others. This alone
alone would
would suggest
suggest that
thatunderstanding
understanding
3
ACLURM001202
the social
social ongms
other groups,
groups, and
and the
the origins
ongms of
of their
their
the
origins of
of the
the other
discontents, should
high priority
priority for
for Americans.
Americans. Doing
Doing so
discontents,
should be
be a high
requires us to have
requires
have some
someunderstanding
understanding of the
the vast,
vast,multidimensional
multidimensional
crisis which is
is unfolding
unfolding in the Muslim world.
A Region in Crisis.
Arab-and the
Muslim-world confronts
The Arab—and
The
the wider Muslim—world
confronts today
today a
multidimensional crisis. Like
multidimensional
Like any
any important
important historical phenomenon,
phenomenon,
the roots of the
the current
current crisis in
in the
the Middle
Middle East
East and
and the
the Muslim
Muslim world
world
complex and intertwined.
intertwined. The
The crisis
crisis has
has economic,
economic,
are profoundly complex
social, political,
cultural dimensions.
dimensions. Although
author
social,
political, and
and cultural
Although the
the author
focuses on the socio-economic and political aspects of the crisis, the
cultural difficulties are equally, perhaps uniquely, difficult.
dimensions are conceptually
conceptually distinct,
Although these dimensions
distinct, they
they are
interact in
in complex
complex ways. For example,
intimately linked, and they interact
legitimacy and fosters an ideological
economic failure erodes regimes' legitimacy
ideological
vacuum, as old ideas
ideas (e.g.,
(e.g., Arab nationalism)
nationalism) are understandably
vacuum,
perceived as failures. The often-noted fact that essentially all serious
political discourse
in Islamic
Islamic terms
political
discourse in
in the
the region
region is
is now phrased in
dimension to all of the others.
links the cultural dimension
The crisis
crisis is
is simultaneously
simultaneously internal and external. It is internal,
because, as
we shall
shall see,
see, population
population growth,
growth, failed
failed economic
economic
because,
as we
policies, and
local authoritarianisms
authoritarianisms (as
cultural issues
issues
policies,
and local
(as well
well as
as cultural
which fall outside of the purview of this monograph) all contribute
to the problem. It is also external: wider forces of globalization play
critical role
spread of
of radicalism.
radicalism.
a critical
role in stimulating
stimulating the
the growth and spread
Much of the
the region's
region's economic stagnation
stagnation derives from a weak and a
integration into
into the
the global
global economy. At the same time, the
distorted integration
kinds of integration
integration which
which have
have occurred—specifically,
occurred-specifically, international
international
migrationand
and the
the spread
spread of global communications-have
migration
communications—have themselves
themselves
the spread
spread of
of radicalism.
radicalism. The
The failure
failure of
of local regimes
contributed to the
is, in large part, aa failure
failure to
to manage
manage and
and engage
engage successfully
successfully the
is,
wider process of globalization.
globalization.66 Nor can the problems of governance
without reference to outside actors, and
in the region be understood without
international conflicts.
conflicts.
to ongoing international
Today's Middle East finds
finds itself
itself enmired
enmired in the "modernization
4
ACLURM001203
process." For all the well-known weaknesses of this particular optic
history, it remains
remains true that
that changing
changing from
from aa society
society
on modern history,
inhabited by
illiterate farmers,
literate, urban
inhabited
by illiterate
farmers, who
who are
are ruled
ruled by a literate,
elite, into an urban, mass-educated society with an economy based
elite,
industry and
and services
services has always
always and everywhere
everywhere been deeply
deeply
on industry
traumatic. Worse, this transition has always and everywhere spawned
grotesque violence.
Europe and East
East
grotesque
violence. The
The modern
modern history
history of
of both
both Europe
Asia, the
places in
transition has been
Asia,
the only
only places
in the
the world where this transition
less successfully
successfully accomplished,
more or less
accomplished, often
often reads
reads like
like aa horror
novel: World
II; Stalin's
novel:
World Wars
Wars I and II;
Stalin's Gulag,
Gulag, and
and Hitler's Holocaust,
Japanese fascism,
fascism, the
Chinese revolution,
revolution, the
"Great Leap
Leap
or Japanese
the Chinese
the "Great
its attendant
attendant famine,
famine, and
and the
the Cultural
Cultural Revolution.
Revolution.
Forward" and its
Forward"
bloody: the extermination
extermination of
of
American experience
American
experience has
has also
also been bloody:
Native Americans, the racial violence of slavery and Jim Crow, and
than half-million
half-million casualties
casualties of
Civil War. Why
the more than
of our own Civil
expect Middle Easterners
Easterners to
Europeans,
should we expect
to do better than Europeans,
Americans, Japanese, or Chinese?
Much of
violence of
transition has been
been perpetrated
perpetrated
Much
of the violence
of this transition
utopian fanatics,
fanatics, aa category
category which
which includes
includes fascists,
fascists, Nazis,
Nazis,
by utopian
Maoists-and the
al-Qaeda. Like
Like their
Leninists, and Maoists—and
Leninists,
the followers
followers of
of al-Qaeda.
earlier cousins,
cousins, today's Islamist fanatics
fanatics have
have "imagined
"imagined aa future,"
future,"
of the
the (imagined)
(imagined) conditions
conditions of life in
in this case the "restoration" of
7th century Arabia. Like all fanatics,
fanatics, they believe
believe that they enjoy a
them""are
are not
monopoly on truth, and that those who disagree with them
merely mistaken, but wicked or mad."7 Like all
all fanatics,
fanatics, they
they believe
that there is only one goal
goal for
for humanity,
humanity, and
and they are ready
ready to wade
wade
"throughan
anocean
oceanof
of blood
blood to
to the
the Kingdom
Kingdom of
of Love."8
Love."B Fanatics have
"through
always built towers of skulls as monuments to their fantasies.
These particularly
larger social
social
These
particularly virulent
virulent fanatics
fanatics are
are part
part of a larger
transnational "Salafi
"Salafi movement." This movement
phenomenon, the transnational
return to
to the
the practice
practice of (what they believe to have
advocates a strict return
Muslims. Their political ideology
been) the practices of the earliest Muslims.
asserts that
such a return
return will
will constitute
constitute a solution
solution to the many
many
asserts
that such
difficult problems facing Middle Eastern and other Muslim societies.
aI-hal" -"Islam (that is, the Salafi
As their slogan goes, "Islam huwwa al-hal"—"Islam
interpretationof
of Islam)
Islam) is the solution." Salafis include the followers
interpretation
al-Qaeda-and the muwahhiduun (or "Unitarians"—as
"Unitarians"-as they call
of al-Qaeda—and
5
ACLURM001204
themselves) or the Wahhabis (as others call them),
themselves)
them), partisans of the
official ideology
official
ideology of
of the
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Several analysts
have recently called our
our attention to the spectrum of opinions
opinions within
within
this movement.
movement.99
Radical movements
when the
the
Radical
movementshave
have their
their greatest
greatest appeal
appeal when
dislocations of
modernity are most
most acute.
acute. Only
Only
dislocations
of the
the transitions
transitions to
to modernity
slaughter of World
World War II and
and its
its chaotic
chaotic aftermath
aftermath allowed
allowed
the slaughter
power in
in Russia;
Russia; Hitler
Hitler isis inconceivable
inconceivable
Bolsheviks to
seize power
the Bolsheviks
to seize
the Treaty
Treaty of
of Versailles
Versailles and the
the Great
Great Depression;
Depression; famine,
without the
of the Japanese invasion set
governmental collapse, and the horrors of
stage for Mao. The Siren
the stage
Siren Song
Song of
offanatics
fanaticsbecomes
becomes most
most seductive
seductive
economic, political,
political, social,
combine, and
when economic,
social, and
and cultural crises combine,
feel that they have
have been
been repeatedly
repeatedly humiliated.
humiliated. Any
when people feel
policy which increases the feelings
of humiliation
ofthe
the people
people of
of the region
feelings of
humiliation of
simply throwing
throwinggasoline
gasoline on
on the
the fire.
fire.
is simply
The Rage of the Young.
The utopian
utopian fanaticism of al-Qaeda
al-Qaeda and
and other
other groups
groups is
is nourished
nourished
despair of
of huge
huge numbers
numbers of
of young
young Middle
Middle Easterners,
Easterners,
by the deep despair
two-thirds of
below the
age of 30,
30, half
half of whom are
are
two-thirds
of whom
whom are
are below
the age
20, and 40 percent of whom have yet to reach
reach their
younger than 20,
birthday. The
The first
first major social element in the noxious cocktail
15th birthday.
of religious radicalism in the
the region
region is
is the
the phenomenon
phenomenon of the
the "youth
"youth
bulge."
The key demographic facts
facts of
of the
the region
region are
are that
that the
the population
is still growing
growing rapidly,
rapidly, but fertility rates have declined considerably
during the past decade.
According to the World Bank, the population
population of the Middle East
North Africa
Africa is now growing
growing at about
about 2.1
2.1 percent per year. At
and North
population will double in
in about
about 34
34 years. On the other
this rate, the population
fallen sharply
past 10
10
hand, population growth rates have fallen
sharply in the past
(from 3.2
3.2 percent
percent in
in the
the mid-1980s
mid-1980s to
to 2.7
2.7 percent
percent in
in1990-95
1990-95 to
years (from
2.1 percent in 2001).
2.1
2001).Sharp
Sharpfertility
fertility declines
declines caused
caused this
this change; there
are reasons to expect further falls.
generalization hides substantial variation across countries
This generalization
regions. (See
(See Table
and regions.
Table 1.)
1.) Although
Although population
population growth
growth rates
rates and
total fertility rates have fallen markedly in Egypt, Iran, and Tunisia,
6
ACLURM001205
in Gaza
Gaza and
and Yemen.
Yemen. Indeed
they have remained stubbornly high in
in Gaza
Gaza (7.6)
(7.6) and Yemen
Yemen (7.1)
(7.1) are
the total fertility rates in
are among
among the
highest in the world. The Gazan rate is also very high in relation to
income, a phenomenon which is also observable
observable in the
per capita income,
Arab Gulf countries.
Country
Population1O
Populationl°
TFR12
Afghanistan
Algeria
Bahrain
26.8
31.8
.64
Population Growth
(percent)l1
Rate (Percent)"
2.5
2.2
1.9
Egypt
Gaza
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Pakistan
68.5
1.2
71.9
24.7
4.7
2.1
3.6
6.1
30.2
2.5
41.2
1.9
4.5
2.5
3.6
3.1
1.9
1.6
3.7
2.0
3.3
2.4
3.4
7.6
4.3
6.1
4.8
3.4
2.3
6.2
3.4
6.1
4.9
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
.75
22.2
1.3
3.3
3.5
6.4
Somalia
Sudan
Syria
Tunisia
7.0
33.5
17.8
9.6
2.8
2.9
3.2
1.5
7.0
5.7
5.6
2.4
Turkey
66.6
1.6
2.5
2.4
1.6
3.6
1.7
17.5
3.2
3.3
4.9
7.1
UAE
West Bank
Yemen
6.0
3.4
3.0
ofthe
http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/wp98/wp98.pdJ
Source: U.S. Bureau of
the Census: http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/wp98/wp98.pdf
Table 1. Population Data for Selected Middle Eastern
and Other Muslim Countries.
7
ACLURM001206
despite falling
falling fertility rates
Populations will continue
continue to grow despite
because fertility remains well above replacement levels and because
many women
women will
will soon enter
past population growth ensures that many
child-bearing years (so-called
(so-called "demographic
"demographic momentum").
momentum").
their child-bearing
Many countries of the region will experience
experience considerable
considerable additions
additions
duringthe
thecoming
coming15
15years.
years.(See
(See Figure
Figure 1.)
1.) The
populations during
to their populations
region may
may reach
reach roughly
roughly 600
600 million
million by
by 2025,
2025,
population of the region
in the
the 1950s.
1950s. Such growth poses
some six times more people than in
economic challenges,
numerous economic
challenges, from
from areas
areas ranging
ranging from
from food
food and
water to jobs to housing.
Several implications
implications follow
this demographic
demographic pattern.
pattern.
Several
follow from
from this
First, and for
First,
for our purposes, the most important, is that most Middle
Easterners
Iranians and
Easterners are
are young:
young: half
half of
of all
all Arabs,
Arabs, 54
54 percent of all Iranians
52
Pakistanis are
years old.
old. (See
(See Table 2.)
2.)
52 percent of Pakistanis
are younger
younger than 20 years
Two-thirds of Saudis are younger than 25, and two-thirds of all the
thirty. (By
(By contrast, only slightly more
people of the region are under
under thirty.
one-quarter of
of the
the populations
populationsofofdeveloped
developedcountries—the
countries-the
than one-quarter
States, Canada, European Union (EU),
(EU), Australia
United States,
Australia and
and New
Zealand (A/NZ),
(AjNZ), and
and Japan—are
Japan-are under 20.)
20.) As
As Kepel
Kepel stresses,13
stresses,13
Zealand
structure first
first emerged
emerged in
inthe
the1970s—perhaps
1970s-perhaps not entirely
this age structure
coincidentally, the
political Islam
Islam surged. Note,
Note,
coincidentally,
the same
same decade
decade as
as political
however, that
picture will
will not change
change markedly
next
however,
that this picture
markedly in
in the next
people aged 0-14
0-14 years
years will
will
generation: By
generation:
By 2025
2025the
the number
number of
of people
roughly double; in
in that
that year, roughly
roughly two
two out
out of
of five Near Easterners
roughly
20.14 When we think of questions
are projected to be younger than 20.14
"what are
are the
the impacts
impacts of
ofour policies
policies on Arabs?" we are in fact
such as "what
"whatare
are the
the impacts
impacts of
ofour
our policies
policies on young people?"
asking, "what
Yousef have
Second, as Williamson
Williamson and Yousef
have argued,15 the rapid fall
fertility may
the""dependency
dependency ratio"
in fertility
may lead
lead to
to a rapid decrease in the
(the number of people under 15
15 and over
over 65
65 to
to the
the working-age
working-age
(the
population). When
elsewhere, as in East
East Asia
Asia
population).
When this
this has
has happened elsewhere,
the 1970s
1970s and
and 1980s,
1980s, dramatic
dramatic increases
increases in national
national savings
savings
in the
Yousef, the demographic change
rates ensued. For Williamson and Yousef,
the savings
savings change
change (this
(this is the natural
natural result
resultof
of their
their life-cycle
life-cycle
caused the
savings model). They are quick to
to note,
note, however,
however, that
that whether
whether or not
8
ACLURM001207
E
a
a
0
~o
a
0
C
L
Growth Popula l1ion From 2000
2015
9
ACLURM001208
Algeria
26%
\.0
,
;so 11::1:2 ••
rDfTlI:n" . . • . . . . . . . . . .. I, ~I . IIOO
,",21('.wo
Lf4!o«KI
~,' n'btIO
~.mIiI1J .. • . • •.• • .••••
I&lt ~ I' ..
't i7.4n,JlIII!lI
tJll:4 OM.m
Figure 1.
3,.M~ , DOO
H~ . 0001
3.30',001)
22'.~';1 .QQi)
I U14.1))lI
] 21';1.lIlIO
U2e.OCO
79',]{Ia;,DOO
4tIO.~.tIOO
gR ii
",~.ooo
H.e~2"3~
x2
222
2
2 2 r2
.(I,m,ol;l(l
:rb.'ml
Sea
67, 74 ,2
»,.31' (0 bIiiD
nc771.W:4
.piw.,„..
•FF
4§1M0§§ §
`41-fr. r=
:.:n.ooo
202il
~CI;I ..
11
,W01
11111111;
~
l<',U1,UiO
1§§§§m§§ §
N
10
I~--
-"' ...
... 1::.....,
Percentage
of the
the population
population which is:
Percentage of
<15 years old
Country
Afghanistan
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
<20 years old
43
%
43%
38
31
36
52
43
47
43
32
53 %
50
38
47
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Pakistan
30
48
41
58
47
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Somalia
Sudan
Syria
27
43
44
45
46
Tunisia
Turkey
UAE
West Bank
Yemen
32
31
32
45
48
41
56
60
Developed Countries **
Less Developed Countries
19
34
26
43
Gaza
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
36
41
34
62
54
58
54
42
51
52
35
52
54
56
57
42
41
** EU, Japan, U.S., Canada, A/NZ.
http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/wp98/wp98.pdJ
Source: U.S. Bureau ofthe
of the Census: http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/wp98/wp98.pdf
Table 2. Youth
Youth as
as Percentage of Total Populations.
1100
ACLURM001209
such savings
savings find
find their
their way
way into
intoproductive
productive and
andjob-creating
job-creating
such
depends on
on many
many other
other factors.
factors. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, in the sea
investment depends
about the
the region's
region's political
political economy,
economy, it is well to be
of "bad news" about
that not
not all
all is bleak.
reminded that
For the first time in history, many of these youths have received
some education. Although the region lags behind other parts of the
developing world
world such
such as
as Southeast
Southeast Asia, China, and Latin America,
developing
nevertheless, school enrollments and literacy have risen
risen dramatically
dramatically
during the
the past
past generation.
generation. For
For the
the first time in history, most Arabs,
during
most Iranians,
Iranians, can read and write (this
(this is still not the case
case in
and most
Pakistan, however,
two-fifths of
Pakistan,
however, where
where only
only just
just over two-fifths
of adults
adults are
literate). As
considerable variation exists among countries:
countries:
literate).
As usual, considerable
Kuwait,
more than three-quarters of adults are literate in Iran and Kuwait,
literacy stands at between
between one-half
one-half and two-thirds in
while adult literacy
Algeria, Iraq,
Libya, Tunisia,
Syria. Only about
Algeria,
Iraq, Libya,
Tunisia, Saudi
Saudi Arabia,
Arabia, and Syria.
half, or fewer, of all
all adults
adults are literate in Egypt, Morocco,
Morocco, Sudan,
Sudan, and
Yemen.
laggard like
like Egypt,
Egypt, virtually
virtually all
all children
children are
are
But even
even in aa laggard
But
school. School
School enrollments
enrolled in school.
enrollments have
have exploded
exploded throughout
region. The pattern
pattern has
has been
been uneven,
uneven, particularly
particularly between
between
the region.
genders. In most countries,
countries, boys were in school
school long before
before their
genders.
sisters were enrolled. Today, however,
however, not only all boys, but all or
nearly all girls are
are enrolled
enrolled in
in primary
primary school
school in
in Algeria,
Algeria, Egypt,
Egypt,
nearly
Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia. Roughly
Roughly 60 percent
Jordan, Lebanon,
percent of all
adolescents are enrolled in secondary school in the region. In Saudi
school, but only 75
75 percent
Arabia, all boys are enrolled in primary school,
of girls are in school.
school. In
In the
the most
most backward
backward countries, such as Sudan
Sudan
and Yemen,
Yemen, most girls are still not
not in
in school.
school. In Yemen, for example,
and
nearly all boys are enrolled
enrolled in
in primary
primary school,
school, only
only 40
40
although nearly
primary school.
school. In
In Morocco
Morocco over one-third,
percent of girls attend primary
in Oman
Oman roughly
roughly one-fourth,
one-fourth, of
of girls are not in primary school.
and in
Despite the appallingly vast waste of human resources which such
under-enrollment of
of girls represents, the past generation has seen an
under-enrollment
educational revolution throughout the region.
Several consequences follow. First, some analysts believe that the
education contributes
contributes to the appeal of
of
gap between girls' and boys' education
16
Islamists and Salafists.16 In this rather
rather hopeful
hopeful view, part
part of the origins
origins
11
ACLURM001210
of political Islamic
Islamic radicalism,
radicalism, including
including its relentless focus
focus on rigid
differential educational levels which
gender segregation, lie in the differential
current generation
generation will
will experience.
experience. For earlier generations,
only the current
both men and women were largely entirely uneducated. And, in the
is now
now in
in Iran)
Iran) everyone
everyone will be
immediate future
future (and the future is
at least minimally educated.
educated. Fargues
Fargues posits
posits this
this gap
gap as
as part of the
explanation for the appeal
appeal of
of the
the Salafi Islamists today.17
explanation
rapidly spreading
of the
the social
social
Second, rapidly
spreading education
educationisis part
part of
background to
the historian
historian Richard
Richard Bulliet
Bulliet has
called the
background
to what the
has called
Islam.18 How is it, after all,
"crisis of authority" in Islam.18
all, that any engineer
own fatwa? In previous centuries, such
can issue his ownfatwa?
such pronouncements
pronouncements
were the
the exclusive prerogative
prerogativeof
of a small, relatively privileged
privileged elite
elite of
were
educated Islamic
Islamic scholars (the ulama). Today, however,
traditionally educated
widespread diffusion
diffusion of education
education joins
joins with the
the absence
absence of
of
the widespread
hierarchical controls
contrast to,
hierarchical
controls on
on religious
religious edicts
edicts in
in Islam
Islam (in contrast
in Roman
Roman Catholicism)
Catholicism) to
say, the situation in
to produce the "religious
that provides
provides the
the cultural
cultural space
space for radicals to promulgate
anarchy" that
and advocate their messages.
Gilles Kepel
(e.g., Richard Bulliet)
Bulliet) have
As Gilles
Kepel and others (e.g.,
have argued,
of the
the 1950s
1950s and 1960s
1960s contributed
centralizing nationalist states of
contributed to
this problem. Earlier, the semi-independence of the ulema allowed
them to playa
play a mediating role between arbitrary
arbitrary state power and the
populace. Once the ulema were formally incorporated into the state
itself, they
itself,
they lost
lost their
their mediating role
role along
along with their independence.
Consequently, the
"social space"
criticism of
Consequently,
the "social
space" of religious criticism
of tyranny
was vacated, to be occupied by political Islamists.
Third, the quality of the education received during this explosion
has left much
much to
to be
bedesired.
desired.Throughout
Throughout the region,
region, education
education stresses
rote memorization, with little if any emphasis on analytical thinking
thinking
problem solving.
solving. In some countries,
countries, much
and problem
much time
time is
is devoted to
religious instruction: in Saudi Arabia, 30 to 40 percent of all course
hours are devoted to the study of scripture.
scripture.1919 Expectations have been
raised, but the skills to meet those hopes have not been imparted.
education to
Millions of
Millions
of young
young men
men now
now have
have enough education
to make the
difficult, dirty
old, difficult,
dirty jobs
jobs unsatisfying,
unsatisfying, but
but haven't
haven't acquired the skills
modern hyper-competitive
hyper-competitive global
global economy.
needed for the modern
Fourth, thanks to past population
population growth,
growth, the Middle
Middle East has
12
ACLURM001211
growing labor
labor force
force in the world (3.4
(3.4 percent per
the most rapidly growing
1990-98). In
year, 1990-98).
Insome
somecountries,
countries,the
the situation
situation isis even
even more serious:
(4.9 percent), Syria (4.8
(4.8 percent), Yemen
Yemen (5.6
(5.6 percent). By
By
Algeria (4.9
comparison, the
EU has
some
way of comparison,
the labor
labor force
force in
in the EU
has grown at some
0.4 percent
past decade,
decade, while
while the
the American
American
0.4
percent per
per year
year during the past
at about
about 0.8
0.8 percent.
percent. In
other words,
words, the
the
labor force
force has
labor
has grown at
In other
labor force
growing four
times as rapidly
rapidly as the
the
labor
forceinin the
the Middle
Middle East
East is
is growing
four times
labor force,
rapidly as
as the
the European
European labor
labor
American
American labor
force, and
and eight
eight times as rapidly
supply. Although the rate of growth attributable to past population
(e.g., Tunisia)
growth will decelerate in some countries (e.g.,
Tunisia) during the
10-15 years,
next 10-15
years, the
the decline
decline in fertility
fertility is,
is, as always, accompanied
by) rising
rising female
female education—which
education-which also
(plausibly, largely caused by)
simultaneouslyleads
leads women
womento
to seek
seek to enter
enter the labor market. It
and simultaneously
is highly unlikely that the growth of the labor supply will decelerate
within the medium term.
for labor
labor has
has grown
grown sluggishly.
sluggishly.
At the same time, the demand for
Simple economics
given such a mismatch
mismatch between
between
Simple
economicstells
tells us
us that,
that, given
growth of demand
demand and
and supply,
supply, either
either the
the wage
wage will
will fall,
fall,
the growth
the
unemployment will
will rise,
rise, or (most
(most likely)
likely) some combination of both
unemployment
precise mix varying with specific
specific labor market
will occur, with the precise
of
structures. Government policies
policies have
have not
not only
only reduced the rate of
demand for
for labor,
labor, but
but have
havealso
alsofostered
fostered inflexible
inflexible
growth of the demand
labor markets. (See below for
for more on government
government economic policy
failure). Decades
failure).
Decades of
of government
government job
job guarantees
guarantees for
for graduates have
to seek
seek any
any degree,
degree, regardless
regardless of
of its
its utility,
utility, since
since
induced students to
itself has long been a guarantee
guarantee of
of aa government
government job.
a degree by itself
necessary jobs,
jobs, but statist
statist
Governments cannot
Governments
cannot now
now provide the necessary
policies impede private sector job creation.
Several generalizations
generalizations about
about unemployment in the region may
high (see
(see Table
be made. First, current levels of unemployment are high
3), and the problem will probably get worse in the near-to-medium
run. In some countries, levels of unemployment
unemployment are similar to those
United States only during the
the worst
worst days
days of
of the
the 1930s.
1930s.
seen in the United
Unemployment primarily
affects young,
young, semi-educated,
semi-educated, urban
Unemployment
primarily affects
people, whose
anger fuels
fuels political
political unrest.
unrest. Second,
Second, real wages
wages
people,
whose anger
generation, and poverty
poverty levels
levels have,
have stagnated for roughly a generation,
depending on the country,
country, either remained
remained roughly
roughly the same or
depending
13
ACLURM001212
increased during the past decade.
decade. Third, stagnant real wages
wages and
increased
difficulties finding
difficulties
finding employment
employment greatly
greatly stimulate
stimulate the
the desire of the
young to leave their country.
Country
Algeria
Egypt
Unemployment Rate
30%
12%
Remarks
1999
2000. Some estimates show
20%
2001
Official Rate. CIA gives 25
- 30%. (1999)
1998
2000
2000
Iran
Jordan
20-25%
15%
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
18%
29%
15 --22%
22%
Saudi Arabia
14 --18%
18%
Syria
Tunisia
12 --15%
15%
16%
Higher among
graduates
1999
1999
Yemen
35%
1999
Sources: Saudi
Sources:
Saudi Arabia,
Arabia, United
United States
States Embassy,
Embassy, Riyadh,
Riyadh, and
and NYT,
NYT,8/26/01:
8/26/01: Iran,
Eric Rouleau, Le
Le Monde
Monde Diplomatique,
Diplomatique,www.en.mondediplomatique.fr/200l/06/05iran;
www.en.mondediplomatiquefr/2001/06/05iran;
MEDEA Institute
Research on Mediterranean
all others: MEDEA
Institute (European
(European Institute for
for Research
and Euro-Arab
Euro-Arab Co-operation), and CIA World
Fact Book.
Book.
and
World Fact
Middle East:
East:
Table 3. Unemployment in the Middle
of Estimates.
A Compendium of
provided aa safety-valve
For decades, international migration has provided
on domestic
domestic labor
labor markets.
markets. Migrants,
Migrants, particularly
pressure on
for the pressure
Africans, moved to the
the EU,
ED, while
while Egyptians,
Egyptians, Yemenis,
Yemenis, and
North Africans,
during the
the oil
oil boom
boom years. Three
Masraqis sought work in the Gulf during
political consequences have
have ensued.
may have
have intended
intended to
be
The migrants
migrants to
Europe, who
1. The
to Europe,
who may
to be
migrants" have
have tended to
to stay.
stay. Their
Their children,
children, often
often
"temporary migrants"
called "second-generation
"second-generation migrants"
particularly challenging
challenging
called
migrants" face particularly
problems of education,
education, employment,
employment, housing—and
housing-and identity.
problems
identity. It
It is
14
ACLURM001213
perhaps unsurprising
unsurprising that quite
quite aa number
numberofofsecond-generation
second-generation
perhaps
immigrant Muslims
attracted to Salafi
Salafi and
immigrant
Muslims in
in Europe
Europe have
have been attracted
other radical doctrines.
2. Migrants to the Gulf often
2.
often did
did return to their home countries,
only richer,
richer, but
but also
alsomore
moresocially
sociallyconservative,
conservative, associating
associating
not only
the Wahhabi
Wahhabi customs and outlook
outlook where
their good fortune with the
Egypt: "althey prospered. The phenomenon
phenomenon even
even had a name in Egypt:
gulfeyya."
3. The expulsion of migrants from Jordan, Palestine, and Yemen
3.
during the
the Gulf
Gulf Crisis of 1990
during
1990embittered
embitteredmany,
many,and
and imposed
imposed serious
serious
costs on their respective national economies.
What is the state of poverty in the region, and what, if any, are its
political consequences?
consequences? Only
Only sketchy
sketchy data
data are available
available on poverty
News Agency
Agency (MENA).2°
(MENA).20 Existing
Middle East
East News
from the Middle
Existing information
information
surprising. After
After all,
all,
quite contradictory,
contradictory, which
is also quite
which is hardly surprising.
"poverty" is
is the
the modern
modemequivalent
equivalentof
ofclassical
classical political
political economy's
"poverty"
"subsistence," defined
defined as some set of commodities
commodities without which
"subsistence,"
household is
is thought
thought to
to be
be sufficiently
sufficiently deprived as to
a person or household
defined as "poor."
"poor." Reasonable
Reasonable people
people differ
differ sharply
be defined
sharply over the
definition of the "necessary basket of commodities."
Serious issues also
also bedevil the selection
selection of
of an
an appropriate price
in calculating
calculating the cost of the basket (e.g.,
(e.g., do the
vector to be used in
poor actually
actually pay the
the "national
"national average"
average" price?).
price?). Given
Given these
these
poor
disagreements, it is not
not surprising
surprising that different studies use different
lines. And
difficulties are
poverty lines.
And these
these difficulties
are limited
limited to
to an estimate for
single time
time period.
period. In
In the
theMENA
MENA region,
region, considerable
considerable rainfall
rainfall
a single
variability and occasional
occasional political
economic turmoil
variability
political and
and economic
turmoil make it
difficult to
conclusions about long-term
difficult
to draw conclusions
long-term trends from data for
a few years.
Since the World Development Report of 1990,
1990, the
the World Bank has
used the "$1 PPP" or "$2 PPP"
PPP" measures of poverty. Data from two
21 suggest that, at the international poverty line
World Bank sources
sources21
$1 in expenditure per person per day
day at
at 1985
1985 PPP, the poverty
of $1
low except
except for Yemen,
Yemen, aa country
lowest
rates are low
country with one of the lowest
15
ACLURM001214
per-capita income levels in the region. For the six countries covered
van Eeghen—Algeria,
Eeghen-Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan,
and Tunisia—
Tunisiaby van
Jordan, Morocco, and
1990 aggregate
percent. Using this
the 1990
aggregate poverty
poverty rate
rate was
was around 6 percent.
measure, poverty
povertyin
in MENA appears
measure,
appears to be relatively
relatively limited
limited compared
compared
developing world. With
With aa poverty
poverty line
line of
of $2
$2
to other regions in the developing
the rates jump, an indication that a substantial
substantial population
population share lives
on expenditures between $1
$1 and $2
$2 per person per day. Using the
$2 poverty line, van Eeghen estimates an aggregate poverty rate of
25 percent. National poverty lines vary widely; on average
around 25
tend to
to be
be closer
closer to the
the $2 line.
they tend
fact, the Bank's $1
In fact,
$1 PPP
PPP poverty
poverty line,
line, which
which was
was designed to
reflect the
reflect
the standards
standards of what it means to be poor in a poor country,
$1 line
most MENA
MENA countries. The $1
seems too low for most
line is far below
average $PPP per capita incomes for most countries: the ratio of per
PPP dollars,
dollars, is
capita GNP
GNP to
to the poverty line, both measured in PPP
unreasonably high
high when
when compared
compared with
withaa similar
similar calculation
calculation for the
unreasonably
United States. In the United States, GNI per capita is about 6.5 times
than the poverty
poverty line, whereas corresponding
corresponding MENA
MENA figures
greater than
Egypt (9.9),
(9.9), Jordan
Jordan (11.4),
(11.4), Morocco (8.8),
(8.8), and Tunisia
Tunisia (13.8).22
(13.8).22 In
are Egypt
with the
the World Bank's estimates,
addition, there are other problems with
importantly related
related to
to the lack of data that are needed
perhaps most importantly
to construct price indices for
for the consumption baskets of the poor.
23
Pogge find
find that
that simulations
simulations using
using alternative
alternative PPP
PPP
Reddy and Pogge23
Reddy
poverty by
by 25
25 percent to 100 percent.
indices can raise estimates of poverty
political perspective,
perspective, what counts is the
the relative,
relative, social
social
From a political
definition of
poverty. Poverty
always and
and inevitably
inevitably partly
partly
definition
of poverty.
Poverty is
is always
Algeria (and
relative: poor
relative:
poor people
people in Egypt, Jordan,
Jordan, or Algeria
(and those who
compare themselves with the
sympathize with their plight) do not compare
poor" relative to their
poor in Bangladesh or Madagascar; they feel"
feel "poor"
fellow Egyptians,
Egyptians, Jordanians,
fellow
Jordanians, or
or Algerians.
Algerians. It
It follows
follows that higher
estimates of poverty are more politically relevant.
poverty headcount
headcount levels,
levels,
While there
disagreements on poverty
While
there are disagreements
consensus is
is emerging
emerging on
onpoverty
povertytrends—which
trends-which
something of aa consensus
political perspective. Most analysts24
analysts24 agree
is more relevant from a political
aggregate poverty
poverty rates
rates in
in MENA
MENA fell during
the years
years of the oil
that aggregate
during the
1970s to the early-to-mid 1980s)
1980s) but
boom (from the mid 1970s
but started
started to
rise after that. At the
the level
level of
ofindividual
individual MENA
MENA countries,
countries, Adams
Adams and
and
16
ACLURM001215
Page25 (2001)
(2001) note
Page25
note that
that Jordanian
Jordanian poverty, which rose precipitously
than in
in 1988.
1988. Other
1988 to 1992,
1992,has
has fallen
fallen but
but still
still remains
remains higher than
in Jordanian
Jordanian poverty
poverty
analysts also
despite the
the decline
decline in
analysts
also find
find that, despite
1992 to
from 1992
to 1997,
1997,poverty
povertyin
in the
the latter
latter year
year "remained far higher
was in
in 1988."26
1988."26 Similarly,
Similarly, aa Ford Foundation review of the
than it was
lively debate over poverty trends in Egypt concludes that there was
in the
the poverty
povertyheadcount
headcountfrom
from1981-82
1981-82to
to1990-91
1990-91 (from
a large rise in
29.7 percent
29.7
percent to
to 42.4
42.4percent)
percent)and
and that,
that, although
although the
the rate of poverty
slowed down
downduring
duringthe
the1990s,
1990s,by
by1995-96
1995-96 (the last year for
increase slowed
poverty headcount
headcount stood
stood at
at 48
48 percent
percent of
which there are data) the poverty
householdsP A study of
of poverty
poverty in Yemen found
households?'
found that the number
rosefrom
from 99 percent
percentin
in1992
1992 to
of families suffering from malnutrition
malnutrition rose
28
in 1999.28
1999. An International Development Research Centre
27 percent
percent in
(IDRC) report
living in
(IDRC)
report concludes
concludesthat
that "the
"the proportion
proportion of
of people living
poverty appears
appears to
to be rising in most of the
poverty
the region's
region's middle
middle and lower
income countries."29 Finally, some
some of
of the
the countries
countries for
for which
which data
data are
missing-most importantly
missing—most
importantly Iraq
Iraq and Sudan-have
Sudan—have large
large populations
populations
and relatively high poverty rates (although the exact magnitudes
magnitudes are
not known).
despite the
the difficulties
difficulties of
There are other reasons to believe that, despite
definitions and
definitions
and data, the problem of poverty may be worsening in
30
cite
the region. Ali and
and Elbadawi
Elbadawi3°
cite three
three factors
factors that seem likely to be
the key drivers of the rise in poverty. First, unemployment, despite
difficulties isis not
measurement difficulties
not only
only high,
high, but
but also
also rising
rising in many
countries. Second,
countries.
Second, most
most job
job creation
creation has
has occurred
occurred in the low-wage
informal sector,
higher paying
paying formal
formal sector
sector employment.
employment.
informal
sector, not
not in higher
finally, there is much evidence of falling real wages in formal
And finally,
sector urban employment.
employment. One
in some
some countries,
countries,
sector
One might
might add that in
including Egypt,
agriculture have
have been falling
falling as
including
Egypt, real
real wages
wages in agriculture
31
well.
wel1.31
What are the political consequences
consequences of
of poverty?
poverty? Poverty
Poverty provides
provides
of regimes (and therefore
a fertile recruiting ground for opponents of
governance) in at least two ways.
ways. First,
First, some
poses a challenge to governance)
some (often
(often limited)
limited)
poor people, particularly younger ones with some
opposition movements.
movements. The
The basic profile for
education, join violent opposition
the rank-and-file of many of today's violent radical Islamic groups
is a young person with some education, who may also have recently
17
ACLURM001216
moved to the city. Such
Such young
young people
people are
are often
often unemployed
unemployed or have
jobs
expectations. In North Africa,
Africa, they are
are colorfully
colorfully
jobs below
below their expectations.
known
known as the "hetistes."32 Some
Some evidence from Egyptian arrest records
records
that many
many of
of those arrested
arrested for violent activities against the
suggests that
surroundinglarge
largecities—that
cities-that is,
regime come from the shanty towns surrounding
from some of the poorest urban areas of the country. Ahmed Rashid
recently argued that the
the rise
rise of
of Islamist
Islamist radicalism
radicalism in Central
Central
has recently
33
Asia is also
also related
related to
to the
the problems
problems of
of youth
youth unemployment
unemployment there.
there.33
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
Majlis-e-Amal (MMA,
(MMA, the alliance
alliance of
of
Most recently, the Muttahida
Islamist parties
Pakistan) attracted
because, as one
Islamist
parties in Pakistan)
attracted poor voters because,
"Nawaz and
and (Bhutto)
(Bhutto) just
poor Pakistani who voted for them said, "Nawaz
stole from
religious parties
stole
from us, the religious
parties come
come from
from the
the poor,
poor, and they
will help US."34
us."34 Even if the leadership of these parties do not, in fact,
"come from the poor," in politics, perceptions are what counts.
The tenacity
The
tenacity of
of violent
violent opposition
opposition in
in Upper
Upper Egypt
Egypt during the
Sa'id (Middle
past 2 decades is also
also plausibly
plausibly related to poverty. The Sdid
Egypt) is the
the poorest
poorest region
region in
in the
the country.
country. Moreover,
Moreover,
and Upper Egypt)
there, as elsewhere
there,
elsewhere in the country,
country, poverty
poverty has
has been rising
rising during
the past 10 years.
years. The
Thepoverty
povertysituation
situation deteriorated
deteriorated during
during the past
collapse of unskilled wages. These
decade, thanks to the collapse
These had risen
350 percent
percent in real
real terms
terms from
from 1973
1973 to
to 1985,
1985, largely
largely thanks
over 350
in the
the Gulf
Gulf States
States (public
(public job
job creation
creation also
to emigration for work in
role). With the collapse
played a role).
collapse of
of the
the regional
regional oil
oil industry
industry in the
in the
the ability
ability of
of the public sector
war-related migration to Iraq, and in
to create jobs,
jobs, wages
wages for
for unskilled workers fell by over 50 percent.
problem of
As Sai'idis increasingly move to cities,
cities, they
they "export"
"export" the problem
Islamism to more visible locations, such as the major cities of Egypt.
The lack
lack of new jobs
jobs is
is particularly
particularly acute
acute since
since the long-run
long-run
The
problem has and in many cases will continue to worsen in the short
for labor
labor has
has grown
grown sluggishly
sluggishly because
because output
run. The demand for
growth has
has lagged,
lagged, and
and also
also because
because of
of specific
specific policy biases against
growth
labor-intensive, job-creating growth.
growth. Not only do
do the
the statist,
statist, inwardinwardlooking policies
also raise the
looking
policies sketched
sketched above
above retard
retard growth;
growth; they
they also
capital-intensity-and reduce
job-creating impact—of
impact-of whatever
capital-intensity—and
reduce the job-creating
does occur.
occur. But
But changing these
these policies
policies requires laying
laying off
off
growth does
workers in state-owned
state-owned enterprises
enterprises and the bureaucracy,
bureaucracy, a move
move
workers
which frightens many leaders.
18
ACLURM001217
Not by Bread Alone.
problemis
is the most politically volatile economic
The employment
employment problem
encourages
issue facing
facing the
the region
region during the medium term, as itit encourages
many of the relatively
relatively educated,
educated, young,
young, urban
urban residents
residents to
to support
radical Islamist
Islamist political
radical
political movements.
movements. One
One must
must be cautious here,
however. The
however.
The problems
problems of
of the
the "youth
"youth bulge"
bulge" and
and rampant youth
are at
at least
least as
as severe
severe in
in sub-Saharan
sub-Saharan Africa.
Africa. Yet we
unemployment are
example. 35 Many
hear little of Congolese international terrorism, for example.35
complex political
complex
political and
and cultural
cultural forces
forces are
are behind
behind the
the various kinds
"economic determinism"
determinism" is
Islamist political
political movements;
movements; no "economic
of Islamist
implied here.
here. To
To understand
understand how and why the discontent spawned
takesaa specific
specific political and ideological form, one
by unemployment
unemployment takes
and economics
economics alone: we must
cannot have recourse to demography
demography and
also look at political
political structures
structures and ideological environments.
The Ayatollah
Ayatollah Khomeini
that, "the
The
Khomeiniisisreported
reportedtoto have
have said
said that,
revolution is
Islam, not the price
price of
of melons."
melons." Much deeper
revolution
is about Islam,
legitimacy are
stake. For
For example,
example, we
issues of
identity and legitimacy
issues
of identity
are at stake.
should remember
remember that although
although unemployed,
unemployed, frustrated
frustrated young
young
should
throughout the
the region
region can turn
tum to
to Islamism,
Islamism, they can also
men throughout
also tum
turn
drugs and
and crime,
crime, to
to apathy,
apathy, indifference,
indifference, muddling
muddling through,
through,
to drugs
dogged hard
work, or any
any number
number of
of other,
other, personal
personal "coping"
"coping"
dogged
hard work,
strategies. The decision to join
join aarevolutionary
revolutionary movement is a deeply
Socio-economic contexts
personal, idiosyncratic one. Socio-economic
contexts are
are important
for understanding these movements, but they hardly provide a full
Nevertheless, huge numbers of discontented
explanation for
for them. Nevertheless,
young men (and
(and women)
women) are aa major
major threat
threat to
to internal
internal stability
stability
young
throughout the region.
We might
might view
view the importance
importance of youth unemployment
unemployment in a
We
different way. Youth politics
politics have
have always
always and everywhere focused
merely on material
material goods,
goods, but also
also on
on questions
questions of
of identity,
identity,
not merely
justice, and
and morality. (Consider the politics of American "Boomers"
the1960s.)
1960s.)Impatience—and
Impatience-and Manichean
Manichean thinking—are
thinking-are
during the
among the burdens of
of youth
youth politics,
politics, whether in Berkeley
Berkeley or
among
or in
Cairo. And,
criminologists tell
violence is also
also
Cairo.
And, as criminologists
tell us,
us, resort
resort to violence
overwhelmingly aa youth phenomenon.
phenomenon. The presence
presence of
of millions
millions
overwhelmingly
underemployed young
young men,
men, in
in the
the specific
specific political
political and
of un- or underemployed
19
ACLURM001218
cultural milieux of the region, constitutes one of the tangled roots of
radicalism.
The Jungle of Cities.
The discontent of these young people is exacerbated by the fact
most of
of them
them now
nowlive
liveinincities—cities
cities---cities which are crumbling.
crumbling.
that most
urban Middle
Middle Easterners
Easterners has increased
increased by about
about 100
100
The number of urban
million in
years. Roughly
Roughly half
million
in the past 35 years.
half of
of the
the population of the
cities. The
region now lives in cities.
The number
number of urban dwellers is expected
current level
level of
of over
over 135
135 million
million to over
over 350
350 million
to rise from its current
2025. From
by 2025.
From 1985
1985toto1990,
1990,the
themost
mostrapid
rapidgrowth
growth was
was in secondary
cities--6 percent—compared
percent---compared with a growth rate of
of 3.8 percent for the
cities-6
in 1990. This
populationsover
over11 million
million in
19 largest cities with populations
This trend
trend has
continued during
duringthe
the1990s.
1990s. (See
(See Table 4.)
continued
4.) Public
Public services
services and
and utilities
in Jordan
Jordan and
and Morocco,
Morocco, for example, oneare already overwhelmed; in
sewerage services. Urban
third of the urban population
population lacks adequate
adequate sewerage
often erratic.
erratic. Governments
Governments attempt
provide
water supplies are often
attempt to provide
services through heavy
heavy subsidies.
subsidies. These
These strain
strain government
government
urban services
thwart the
the necessary investments to extend and
budgets, and thwart
and improve
services.
The rapid urbanization
urbanization of the
the region
region erodes
erodes governments'
governments'
The
ways. First,
First, the
growth of
of cities
cities
legitimacy in
legitimacy
in at
at least
least three ways.
the rapid growth
strains infrastructure—and
infrastructure-and government
budgets. Governments'
Governments'
strains
government budgets.
perceived inability
problems like housing,
perceived
inability to
to cope
cope with mundane problems
sewerage, potable
and garbage
garbage collection
collection further
further
sewerage,
potable water
water supply, and
already strained
strained regime
regime legitimacy.
legitimacy. Second,
Second, the process
process of
weakens already
migration from
from rural to urban areas has always been a disorienting
Whetherin
inAyachuco
Ayachucoor
or Asyut,
Asyut, the
the mix
mix of
process for many migrants.
migrants. Whether
rural-urban migration
migration with
with discontented
discontented provincial
provincial intellectuals has
rural-urban
toxic (but, so far, not fatal)
fatal) to existing governments.
proved highly toxic
migrants to cities
cities provide
The disoriented,
disoriented, recently
The
recently arrived
arrived rural
rural migrants
fertile fishing
Islamic militants,
militants, particularly
fertile
fishing ground for Islamic
particularly when the
(allegedly) decadent
cities shock
shock the
the sensibilities
sensibilities of
of
(allegedly)
decadent mores
mores of the cities
recently arrived migrants. The problems are also made more acute
recently
the difficulties
difficulties which
which migrants
migrants sometimes
sometimes find
obtaining
by the
find in obtaining
work (e.g., in the Maghreb).
Maghreb). Third,
Third, urban discontent is clearly more
20
ACLURM001219
Country
Percent
59.5
45.0
61.1
73.6
89.3
55.3
36.5
85.1
35.1
54.0
64.8
74.1
24.5
Algeria
Egypt
Iran
Jordan
Lebanon
Morocco
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Syria
Tunisia
Turkey
Yemen
Source: UNDP,
UNDP, Human
Development Report,
Report, 2001.
2001. NY:
NY: Oxford
Oxford University
University Press,
Press,
Source:
Human Development
pp. 154-157.
of Total Population, 1999,
Table 4. Urban Population as Percent of
in Selected Middle Eastern and North African Countries.
politically volatile
volatile and
and dangerous to regimes than is rural
rural discontent
region. Rapid
Rapid urbanization
urbanization strains
strains budgets,
budgets, legitimacy,
legitimacy, and
in the region.
governance, while swelling the ranks of regime
regime opponents.
Consider the
example of Karachi.
Karachi. This
one million
million
Consider
the example
This city
city had
had one
inhabitants at
independence, but
holds at least
least
inhabitants
at the
the time of independence,
but now
now holds
million people,
people, and will
will grow
grow to
to perhaps
perhaps 20
20 million
million by
by 2015.
2015.
11 million
The managers
managers of such
such cities
cities are
are completely
completely overwhelmed.
overwhelmed. The
The
The
providing water,
water, electricity, transportation, health care, and
systems providing
education are all swamped. Meanwhile, the one place in the slums
which is cool while the outside is hot, the one place which is clean
outside is filthy, the one place which
while the outside
which is
is calm
calm where
where outside
outside
only chaos—is
chaos-is the
is only
the mosque.
mosque. Government
Government policy
policy has
has played
played an
abandonment
important role here: government incapacity,
incapacity, and
and the"
the "abandonment
private, Islamist
Islamist schools,
schools, clinics,
clinics, hospitals,
of public space" to private,
hospitals, and
welfare agencies,
fanatics' cause
cause
welfare
agencies, have
have done
done much
much to advance the fanatics'
21
ACLURM001220
Some analysts, such as Gilles Kepel,
Kepel, see
see reasons
reasons to be hopeful.3
hopeful.366
the social
social disorientation
disorientation of
of the first
first generation
generation of
of
He contends that the
to the
the cities
cities fueled much of the appeal of radical and
rural migrants to
process is decelerating,
other Islamist movements. Stating that this process
this particular
particular root
root of
of radicalism
radicalism is
is likely to
he therefore argues that this
recommend it, but
time. This
shrivel over time.
This contention
contention has
has much
much to recommend
unless the above
above arguments
arguments on
on how
how dysfunctional
dysfunctional urbanization
urbanization
unless
helps radicals is wrong, the deceleration of
of rural
rural to
to urban
urban migration
(see Table
(which itself is not a foregone conclusion in all countries (see
4), is
4),
is unlikely
unlikely to
to be
be sufficient
sufficient to
to undermine
undermine their appeal in the cities.
"But the September 11 Terrorists
Terrorists Were
Were All
All Privilegedl"
Privileged!"
37
have objected that, so far as we can tell,
A number of observers
observers37
most of the criminals of
of September
September 11
11were
wereprivileged
privilegedand
and educated.
educated.
Krueger and Maleckova
Maleckova conduct
analysis of arrested
Krueger
conduct a regression analysis
Palestinians using
conclude that
Palestinians
using income
income and
and education
education data,
data, and conclude
"poverty
cause terrorism"—that
terrorism" -that is,
"
poverty does not cause
is, the
the arrested
arrested youth are
neither relatively
relatively poor
uneducated. There
There are two
two problems
problems
neither
poor nor uneducated.
inferences from
with inferences
from such
such findings.
findings. First,
First, itit is
is far
far from clear that
would obtain
obtain in,
in, say,
say, Algeria,
Algeria, Egypt,
Egypt, Pakistan,
Pakistan, or
a similar result would
Uzbekistan. Second,
question ("Are
("Are
Uzbekistan.
Second, the
the research
research asks
asks the
the wrong question
orpoor?"),
poor?"), and, therefore, unsurprisingly
terrorists uneducated and/
and/or
unsurprisingly
yields uninteresting answers. The real question,
question, "How
"How does poverty
contribute to Islamic radicalism,"
contribute
radicalism," requires a more
more nuanced
nuanced analytical
approach.
The social
social problems
problems sketched
sketched above,
above, including
including poverty,
poverty,
The
contribute to the
the existence
existence of Islamic
Islamic radicalism
radicalism in several ways.
contribute
In the first place,
place, we should remember the famous quip of
of George
George
pronounce their
their aitches."
aitches."
Orwell: "Revolutionaries
"Revolutionaries can
Orwell:
can always
always pronounce
Revolutionaries are often, even typically, from relatively privileged
backgrounds. Lenin
Mao tse-tung
son of
of
backgrounds.
Lenin was
was no muzhik. Mao
tse-tung was
was the son
rich peasant.
peasant. Yet
Yet the conditions
conditions of
Russia and
China in their
their
a rich
of Russia
and China
respective youths
profoundly shaped their
their perspectives.
perspectives. People
People
respective
youths profoundly
Mohammed Atta
AUa in Germany heard
heard him
him speak
speak of the"
fat
who knew Mohammed
the "fat
cats" running Egypt.
Egypt. Most people find the presence of widespread
cats"
poverty and
and human
human degradation
degradation offensive.
offensive. We
We are
are thinking,
thinking,
poverty
22
ACLURM001221
reasoning beings:
own
reasoning
beings:we
welook
lookaround
aroundus,
us, and
and then
then draw
draw our own
conclusions. The presence of widespread
widespread socio-economic dislocation
delegitimizes regimes in the eyes of
of those
those who
who spend much of their
what they
they see,
see, such
such as
as intellectuals,
intellectuals, journalists,
time thinking about what
the "shock troops" of a
and students. It is entirely unsurprising that the
privileged. It would be
revolutionary movement
movement are
are educated
educated and privileged.
to argue
argue that
thattheir
theirexistence—and
existence-and their
their appeal—is
appeal-is
quite a-historical to
independent of
of the
the social
social conditions
conditions of
of their societies.
independent
It is also worth remembering
remembering that the
the phenomenon
phenomenon of
of Islamist
Islamist
wider than
than al-Qaeda.
al-Qaeda. Movements
Movements in
in Algeria,
Algeria,
radicalism is
far wider
radicalism
is far
Southeast
Egypt, Palestine,
Palestine, Pakistan,
Pakistan, Yemen,
Egypt,
Yemen, Central
Central Asia,
Asia, and Southeast
diverse actors.
actors. Indeed,
Indeed, Gilles
Gilles Kepel's optimistic
Asia include many diverse
account:38isisfundamentally
fundamentallya astory
storyofofthe
thealliances—and
alliances-andcleavages—
cleavagesaccount
between two large social
social groups,
groups, the disenfranchised
disenfranchised urban poor
between
"devout middle
middle classes."
classes." He argues that, although the poor
and the "devout
drawn to
to Islamist
Islamist politicians,
politicians, the latter have been able to seize
are drawn
alliance (as
power only when they could forge such an alliance
(as during the
revolution). II would argue that, beyond
beyond such
such alliances,
alliances, the
Iranian revolution).
continued presence
presence of
continued
of societal
societal distress
distress on
on the
the scale
scale evident
evident in the
cause") the
region, contributes
contributes to (note that the verb is
is not"
not "cause")
the continued
continued
appeal of Islamist radicals,
radicals, not
not only among
among the poor but also among
unemployed middle-class
middle-class high school
the "lumpen
"lumpen intelligentsia" of unemployed
university graduates.
graduates. Monocausal
Monocausal explanations
explanations of
of complex
complex
and university
historical phenomenon are always foolish.
foolish. This
historical
This hardly
hardly means that
socio-economic conditions
socio-economic
conditions are
are irrelevant to their genesis.
A Historical Analogy.
illuminating here.
here. The
The fanatics
fanatics of
of
An historical analogy may be illuminating
family resemblance to the so-called
so-called "Nihilists"
al-Qaeda display a family
other terror-prone
terror-prone would-be
would-be revolutionaries
revolutionaries of 19th
19th century
century
and other
writer Tibor Szamuely:
Russia, as
as described by the Hungarian writer
The Russian
Russian intelligentsia
intelligentsia was
social stratum
stratum composed
composed of
of
The
was a social
members of
of
those politically
politically aroused,
vociferous, and
those
aroused, vociferous,
and radical members
classes who felt
the educated classes
felt totally
totally estranged
estranged from
from society
society...
...
The alienation
alienation of
intelligentsia from
The
of the intelligentsia
from society
society was
was to
to a great
social structure ....
extent inherent in the country's rudimentary social
..
23
ACLURM001222
unlike the West, Russia
Russia had
had no interest groups capable of giving
strength, support and substance
...
substance to the intellectuals'
intellectuals' protest ...
The Russian
Russian intelligentsia
intelligentsia had
had neither
neither aa place
place nor
nor aa stake
stake in the
39
existing order of thingS.
things.39
The author
goes on
the educated
educated young
The
author goes
on to argue that, just as the
men who piloted planes into
into the
the World
World Trade
Trade Center
Center could
could easily
easily
have found well-paying jobs, there were considerable
considerable opportunities
opportunities
Tsarist burearucracy
burearucracy for
talent in the
the Russian
Russian
within the Tsarist
for men
men of
of talent
Empire. But, like the al-Qaeda
al-Qaeda mujahidiin, many Russian intellectuals
chose to
to spurn this path: "The intelligent . .... himself rejected the idea
injustice, oppression
of serving a system founded on injustice,
oppression and misery."4o
misery.',40
matter-and ideas are not formed in
in aa socio-economic
sodo-economic
That is, ideas matter—and
vacuum.
Further similarities emerge.
emerge. For
For example,
example, in
in Russia
Russia during
during this
generation in the Middle East and wider
period, as during the past generation
Muslim
Muslim world, there was a dramatic
dramatic expansion
expansion of the universities,
universities,
the first
first time
time to
to relatively
relatively less
less privileged
privileged
whose doors opened for the
young men, often from
from rural backgrounds.
(After the
social
(After
the Crimean
Crimean War)
War) there
there was
was a marked shift in the social
body in
in the
the universities
universities ....
composition of the student
student body
. . it came to
more and
and more
more of
of so-called
so-called raznochintsy, "people of
of
be made up more
petty officials,
officials, army
sons of
of clergymen, peasants, petty
diverse rank": sons
officers, artisans,
officers,
artisans, tradesmen
tradesmen who
who had become divorced by virtue
of their education or inclination from their fathers' social station
41
and could
could no
no longer
longer fit
fit into
into the
the official
official estate system.
and
system.41
In aa manner
manner which
which Szamuely
Szamuely finds
finds "very
"very understandable,"
understandable,"
mobility,
instead of being grateful
grateful for
for this
this opportunity for
for upward mobility,
"student-raznochinets brought
the "student-raznochinets
broughtwith
withhim
himaa deep
deep sense
sense of
of the
injustices of Russian
Russian life
life ...
. . .[which]
[which]rapidly
rapidlyturned
turned into
into hatred
hatred of the
also notes
notes that
that the
the intolerant
intolerant utopianism
utopianism
existing order."42 Szamuely also
student revolutionaries
revolutionaries was aa mirror-image
mirror-image of
of the
the violence
violence
of the student
of the Tsarist state.
state. Here,
Here, too,
too, there
there are
are important
important parallels with the
situation in many Muslim countries.
current situation
The Failure of Governments.
The incompetence
incompetence and
Muslim and
and
The
and authoritarianism
authoritarianismofof many
many Muslim
24
ACLURM001223
Middle
strongly fosters
fosters Islamist
Islamist radicalism.
radicalism. These
These
Middle Eastern governments strongly
are overwhelmingly unelected,
unelected, unaccountable,
unaccountable, and corrupt;
corrupt;
governments are
provide no legitimate
legitimate outlet for
discontent. Unsurprisingly,
they provide
for youth discontent.
people. The
these governments are widely despised by their young people.
old ideologies of these governments, largely varieties of nationalism,
nationalism,
are also perceived as failures. The old ideology has failed to deliver
material goods or a sense of dignity either at home or abroad. The
half-century failure of Arab states to resolve
resolve the
the Palestinian
Palestinian situation
situation
the inability
inability of
of Pakistan
Pakistan to
to ease
ease the
the lot
lot of
of Kashmiri
Kashmiri Muslims
Muslims
and the
the evident
evident corrosion
corrosion of
of regimes'
regimes' legitimacy
legitimacy
have contributed to the
in the eyes of youth. Nationalism has
has not disappeared; it has been
assimilated into
into the Islamists'
Islamists' discourse.
discourse. And,
And, as
as George Orwell once
assimilated
nationalism of
of defeated peoples
peoples is
is necessarily revengeful
said, "the nationalism
and short-sighted."
dismal economic
economic
Governments are rightly faulted for countries' dismal
past 20
20 years,
years, Organization
Organization for
for Economic
Economic
performance. During the past
Cooperation and
and Development
Development(OECD)
(OECD) countries have seen their per
Cooperation
capita incomes rise at some 1.4 percent
percent per year. East Asia
Asia (excluding
Japan) has, of course,
course, grown much faster, at 5.8 percent per year, a
incomes in 12
years. Even
Even
rate which doubled per capita incomes
12 and
and 1/2
1/2 years.
Latin America,
America, with
with its
its notorious
notorious "lost
"lost decade"
decade" of
of the
the debt-ridden
1980s, saw
1980s,
saw per
per capita
capita incomes
incomes rise
rise at
at just
just under
under 1 percent per year
past 22 decades.
decades. By
By contrast,
contrast, per capita incomes
incomes in the
during the past
are little
little different
different from what they
they were
were in
in1980;
1980;
Arab states today are
some analysts would argue that per capita growth has actually been
negative,43 which is clearly the case for some countries, notably the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Arabia. Real
Realwages
wages and
and labor
labor productivity
productivity today
the same
same as
as in
in 1970.
1970. This
are about the
This performance
performance isis worse
worse than
than that
of any other major region of the world except for the countries of the
sub-Saharan Africa.
former Soviet Union and sub-Saharan
The reasons for this
this woeful
woeful record
record are
are well-understood.
well-understood. A baleful
combination of
of vast economic
economic rents,
rents, authoritarian
authoritarian and centralizing
import-substitution of
states, and the fashion for import-substitution
of the
the third quarter
20th century
century generated
generated inward-looking
inward-looking political
political economies
economies
of the 20th
dominated by the state. Oil wealth
dominated
wealth has
has rendered the public purse
independent of
taxation of the
the populace:
populace: no
no representation
representation has
independent
of taxation
taxation. Because
Because oil money flows
been fostered by no taxation.
flows directly into
corruption. The
the public purse, it fosters corruption.
The role
role of
of the
the state
state in the
25
ACLURM001224
economy was-and
was—and remains-unusually
remains—unusuallylarge,
large,whether
whether measured
measured by
percentage of output or
or employment.
employment. (See
(See Figure
Figure 2.)
2.) Dismantling
Dismantling
percentage
the process
process of
of
proved difficult,
difficult, and the
such inherited structures has proved
economic reform has often been
been tentative,
tentative, dilatory, and slow.
regional conflict and
Sluggish reform combined with continued regional
undermined private
private investment,
investment, whether
whether of
of locals
locals
uncertainty have undermined
of foreigners.
foreigners. Consequently,
Consequently, the
or of
the demand
demand for
for labor
labor has grown
slowly, while, as
as we have seen,
seen, the
the supply
supply has soared. Government
economic policy failure
failure isis the
the other
other "blade
"blade of
of the
thescissors"
scissors"producing
producing
unemployment, falling real wages, stagnant per capita incomes.
What Is To Be Done?
appeal of
of utopian
utopian fanatics?
fanatics? We should
How can we reduce the appeal
Size of
MENA Region
Size
of Government
Government in the MENA
25~----------------------------------------------,
25
~20+---------------------------~
r
) 20
~
0
Q.
0_
Lu
15
~15+-----------­
IT3
Q
f;2.
'0
0
0>10
X
10
Ol
.g
a
c
0>
0
!:1
a:.2
5
o
East Asia
Europe
and
Europe and
CentralAsia°
Asiaa
and Pacific
Pacific Central
Latin America
and the
Caribbean
1
—
Middle East
South
Sub-Saharan
Africa
and
Asia
Africa b
North Africab
a. Data for
for Europe
a.
Europe and
and Central
Central Asia
Asianot
notavailable
available before
before 1989.
b. Most recent year
year for
for MENA
MENA is
is 1996.
1996.
b.
Source: World Bank.
Figure 2.
26
ACLURM001225
D
1974-84
•
1985-97
approachthis
this problem
problemwith
with considerable
considerablehumility.
humility.Take
Take the economic
approach
crisis. A
A strong
strong case
case can
canbe
bemade
made that
that Middle
Middle Eastern
Eastern economies
economies have
have
thanks to
to institutional—and
institutional-and political—deficiencies.
political-deficiencies. Outsiders
failed, thanks
Outsiders
can do very little to
to promote
promote institutional
institutional change, as the United States
its dismay,
dismay, in
in Russia
Russia and
and elsewhere.
elsewhere. Similarly,
Similarly, resolving
learned to its
cultural crisis
crisis of contemporary Islam's confrontation with
the deep cultural
be done
done by
by Muslims.
Muslims. Non-Muslim
Non-Muslim Americans
Americans
modernity can only be
in this process, as well.
are largely by-standers in
Take the problems of the economy. The region has been slow to
embrace the international consensus (the "Washington Consensus")
on what
what economic policies ought
ought to be
be adopted
adopted to improve economic
management, and
restore growth of
of incomes
incomes and job
job
management,
and thereby
thereby to
to restore
creation. This
only aa private-sector
private-sector led,
led, exportexportcreation.
This view
view holds
holds that only
oriented economic
economic development
chance of coping
coping
oriented
development strategy
strategy has
has a chance
the development
development challenges
challenges facing
facing the region. This consensus
with the
is best articulated
articulated by the World
World Bank
Bank and
and the
the International
International Monetary
(IMF),44 but
adherents, particularly in the
Fund (IMF),"
but it has many other adherents,
U.S. Government
U.S.
Government and
and in American academia
academia and
and think-tanks.
The usual policy recommendation
recommendation is
is to
to push harder for Middle
Eastern regimes
to "reform
"reform their
their economies."
economies." However,
However, there
there
Eastern
regimes to
fear that,
that, although
although the
the Washington
Washington consensus
consensus has
are reasons to fear
virtues, it,
it, too, is likely to fail. This is
virtues,
is especially
especially so
so for
for two
two groups of
the relatively
relatively rich states of the
countries, the very poor nations and the
Cooperation Council
Council (GCC).
(GCC).
Gulf Cooperation
For the poorest countries, exports are highly unlikely to provide
either adequate
adequate food
food security
security (which
(which is
is an
an increasingly
increasingly serious
serious
either
population growth
growth and
and water
water constraints)45
constraints)45 or
or
problem, given
problem,
given population
sufficient numbers
same time,
time, while
while domestic
domestic
sufficient
numbers of
of jobs.
jobs. At
At the same
capacity has
productive capacity
has been
been and
and is being damaged by population
property rights
rights issues
issues (e.g.,
(e.g., for groundwater); natural
growth and property
resource degradation may have gone so far as to
to be
be very
very difficult
difficult
resource
to reverse. Note that the enthusiasm for private market solutions is
when severe
severe negative externalities
externalities exist.
unlikely to be very helpful when
population growth,
growth, the
the labor
labor force is growing
Further, thanks to past population
growing
rapidly that
that provision
provisionof
of sufficient
sufficient jobs via the"
private sector-led
so rapidly
the "private
export model" is simply not credible: infrastructure is far too poor,
the labor
labor force
force is
is overwhelmingly
overwhelmingly illiterate.
illiterate. The grim facts are
and the
27
ACLURM001226
best, economic
economic development
that, at best,
development in such countries is mainly a
"holding action," designed to prevent further deterioration and the
consequent complete breakdown of order.
order. In
In addition
addition to
to the
the human
human
suffering such breakdowns always bring, the danger, of course, is
the anarchy
anarchy of
of aaSomalia
Somalia or
orAfghanistan
Afghanistan provides
provides excellent
excellent
that the
havens for terrorists and other organized criminals.
does the
the Washington
Washington consensus
consensus easily fit the GCC
GCC states.
Nor does
are, in
in the
the first
first instance,
instance, largely
largelyfiscal.
fiscal. The
The relief
relief
The problems here are,
several years have afforded
afforded seems unlikely to last:
which the last several
ceiling," given by alternative energy production costs,
costs, is
the "rent ceiling,"
about $25
$25 per barrel. Even at this maximum (and relatively
perhaps about
unlikely) price,
short. The
The imperatives
imperatives of
of
unlikely)
price, revenue
revenue would
would be
be short.
spending have
have (at
(at least)
least) three proximate causes: the perceived need
spending
heavily on
on 1) defense, 2)
2) consumer
to spend heavily
consumer subsidies, and 3) public
creation. The
local populations which
sector job creation.
The GCC
GCC states
states have
have local
completely depend
expect to
to receive,
receive, a wide variety of
of
completely
depend upon, and expect
subsidies. Governments'
consumer subsidies.
Governments' ability
ability to
to meet their side of the
importantly, the
the large
large
social contract
increasingly in
social
contract is
is increasingly
in doubt. Most importantly,
majority (e.g.,
(e.g., in Kuwait,
Kuwait, —
- 80
80 percent)
percent) of
of nationals
nationals are
are employed
employed by
majority
Consequently, shortfalls
the state. Consequently,
shortfalls in
in government
government revenue translate
creation. The need for job
quickly into difficulties with employment
employment creation.
creation is particularly acute, given the weakness of aa "demographic
"demographic
in the
the GCC states: mortality rates have fallen sharply,
transition" in
sharply, but
fertility rates have fallen only
only very
very moderately
moderately and
and remain very high
(See Table 1.)
by international standards. (See
1.) High
High rates
rates of population
15-20 years
growing labor
labor
growth 15-20
years ago
ago translate
translate into
into very rapidly growing
supplies today.
today. The
The private
private sector
sector cannot
supplies
cannot currently
currently take
take up
up the
slack in employment
employment creation.
dependent on
slack
creation. The
The sector
sector isis too
too dependent
state largesse, and relatively too small to do so. Most importantly,
of the Gulf
Gulfhave
have limited
limited comparative
comparative advantages
advantages
however, the countries of
non-oil goods
goods or services. Wage rates, seriously inflated by past oil
in non-oil
current consumer
consumer subsidies, are far too high to compete
compete
rents and current
activities, but
skills are
compete in more
more
in low wage activities,
but skills
are too low to compete
sophisticated activities.
economic growth strategy also
also faces
faces formidable
formidable
The orthodox economic
obstacles in
obstacles
in other countries
countries of
of the
the region where the strategy might
more plausibly
plausibly work,
work, in
in the
theso-called
so-called Newly
Newly Industrializing
Industrializing
more
28
ACLURM001227
Countries (NICs),
(NICs), like
African countries,
countries, Egypt,
Egypt, Iran,
Iran,
Countries
like the
the North African
and, possibly, Jordan. Here the needed policy shifts may themselves
destabilizing, not only because
because the
the necessary
necessary changes
changes involve
involve
be destabilizing,
special interests
major props
austerity, but also because special
interests which
which are major
of regime support-and
support—and who
who occupy
occupy important
important subsidized
subsidized positions
within the
the bureaucracy—face
bureaucracy-face important
within
important challenges. Examples of the
latter range from East Bank Jordanians
Jordanians to
to Egyptian
Egyptian workers in stateowned enterprises.
Over the
the longer
longer haul,
haul, the
the needed
needed changes
changes are also
also likely
likely to
Over
destabilizing in another way:
way: attracting
attracting the
the necessary
necessary volume
volume
be destabilizing
investment in the
the region
region will
will almost
almost certainly
certainly require
require greater
greater
of investment
governmental accountability
governmental
accountabilityand
andmore
more transparent
transparent rules
rules of
of the
economic game.
democracy is needed for
economic
game.This
Thisisis not
not to
to say
say that democracy
growth; it is merely to suggest that it is very unlikely that regimes
citizens or
will attract the necessary private capital from their own citizens
from foreigners
foreigners if
arbitrary, authoritarian
from
if regimes
regimes persist
persist in their arbitrary,
practices. Since
continued
practices.
Sincethere
there are
are good
good reasons
reasons to
to suppose
suppose that continued
46
initself,
itself, one
one of the roots of Islamic radicalism
, and
authoritarianismis,
is,in
authoritarianism
radicalism46,
unaccountable governance
governance undermines
undermines economic
economic
since continued unaccountable
growth, institutional change in the direction of greater participation
enhanced governmental
governmental accountability
accountability is
almost certainly
certainly
and enhanced
is almost
necessary if the countries of the region are to achieve stability in the
longer term.
The problem, of course,
course, isis that
that managing
managing the transition from the
authoritarian unaccountability
unaccountability is
likely to be
current situation of authoritarian
is likely
rocky-and destabilizing.
rocky—and
destabilizing.what
what are
are you
you up
up to? Inevitably there will
failures as well as successes.
successes. Given
be failures
Given recent
recent history,
history, itit should be
even relatively
relatively successful regimes may well be hostile
obvious that even
u.S. foreign
to many U.S.
foreign policies.
policies. Much
Much hypocrisy
hypocrisy has
has poisoned public
United States:
States: we are simultaneously
debate on these issues in the United
1) the
the "Arab
"Arab street"
street" doesn't
doesn't matter,
matter, and
and 2)
2) regimes
regimes are
told that 1)
told
actually in favor
actually
favor of our overthrowing the government of Iraq, but
say so
so publicly.
publicly. The
The inconsistency
inconsistency here seems to bother
they can't say
darling of
of the neo-conservatives,
neo-conservatives,
few observers. To
To paraphrase
paraphrase that darling
Winston Churchill, more democratic regimes in the region are likely
worst of
of all possible
possible outcomes—except
outcomes---except for
to be the worst
for all
all the
the others.
Humility, of
Humility,
of course,
course, would
would help.
help. The
The truth
truth is
is that outsiders are
largely irrelevant
process of
institutional and cultural
largely
irrelevant to
to the process
of deep institutional
29
ACLURM001228
change which, alone, can ultimately overcome
overcome the
the profound, multitiered crisis
crisis facing
Muslim world.
attempts to promote
promote
tiered
facing the
the Muslim
world. Our
Our attempts
former Soviet
Soviet Union
squarely against
against the
democracy in
democracy
in the
the former
Union ran squarely
burden of
of Russian, Caucasian, and Central Asian history.
burden
Of course,
course, itit is
is within our power to refrain from making things
worse. We can,
can, indeed
indeed must,
must, avoid
avoid actions
actionswhich
whichprovide
provide arguments
arguments
fanatics, and which discourage those Middle Easterners who
to the fanatics,
would respond
responddifferently
differentlytotothe
thecrises
crisesfacing
facing their
theirsocieties.
societies. Here,
Here, of
would
course, our foreign policy plays a vital role. We must press on with
seeking a settlement
settlement to the conflict between
between Israelis
Israelis and
and Palestinians.
The sorry legacy of the past 2 years
years (not
(not to
to say
say the
the last
lastcentury)
century) means
means
any resolution
resolution will
will be,
be, to
to say
say the
the least,
least, enormously
enormously difficult.
difficult.
that any
for the
the only
only viable
viable solution,
solution, a two-state
two-state
Time may
Time
may be running out for
Whatever the
the difficulties,
difficulties, we have no choice but to try. Any
solution. Whatever
seasoned observer of the region knows that itit is entirely impossible
for the United
United States
States to have peace
peace with young Arabs
Arabs and other
other
for
Muslims until this situation is resolved. We also
also have
have opportunities
opportunities
policies toward the
to contribute to change through modifying our policies
perhaps especially,
especially, toward Iran.
Iran. Our
Our energy
energy policies
policies also
Gulf and, perhaps
remain stunningly myopic, as we continue to
to "pay
"pay at the pump" for
many a Salafi madrasa.
many
Unfortunately, current
policies will
will
Unfortunately,
current indications
indicationsare
are that
that our policies
little to
to ameliorate
ameliorate these
these problems.
problems. A dismaying
dismaying tendency
tendency in
do little
American discourse
entirety of the
the current American
discourse isis to
to attribute
attribute the entirety
problem to cultural failings
failings in the
the Muslim
Muslim world,
world, and
and to argue that
largely military
military solution.
solution. The
The above
above analysis
analysis
the problems have aa largely
47
suggests that
that this
this is most unlikely to be true.
suggests
true.47 Instead of formulating
formulating
nuanced policy,
policy, combining
combining short-term covert operations against
a nuanced
al-Qaeda with
medium- to
long-run strategies
strategies to
undermine the
al-Qaeda
with mediumto long-run
to undermine
appeal of
of violent
violent Islamist
Islamist radicals,
radicals, the Bush
Bush administration
administration has
appeal
policy which
which myopically
myopically focuses
focuses on unilateral
unilateral military
military
adopted aa policy
the Ba'athist
Ba' athist regime in Iraq, we
action. Now that we have destroyed the
face a dilemma:
dilemma: if
quickly, we
face
if we
we withdraw too quickly,
we risk plunging the
country into chaos, but if we stay too long, we risk being perceived
colonialists. Falling
as colonialists.
Fallinginto
intoeither
eithertrap
trapwould
would further
further undermine
undermine our
the Muslim
Muslim world. Perhaps we will be both lucky and
standing in the
very skillful (we will need both). Unfortunately, there is a grave risk
30
ACLURM001229
of our actions stoking the already intense rage against the United
States felt
felt by
by the political
political actors
actors to
to whom
whom the
the future
future belongs:
belongs: young
young
Muslims. Sadly,
writing, it seems
seems probable
probable that both
both
Muslims.
Sadly,as
as of
of this
this writing,
American behavior and regional trends will continue to nourish the
roots of Islamist radicalism.
Summary of Policy Recommendations.
Recognize that
policies have
•• Recognize
that our
our past policies
have contributed
contributed to the origins
of this problem. Understand that denial of history does not serve
our interests.
Recognize that
necessary institutional
institutional changes
changes must come
come
•• Recognize
that the necessary
from within Arab and
and other
other Muslim
Muslim societies.
societies. Learn from
from
from the
in the
the former Soviet Union.
failure of "shock-therapy" in
Subject all
"youth test"—ask:
test"-ask: "Could
policy
•• Subject
all policies
policies to
to the "youth
"Could this policy
further enrage young Muslims against us?"
Move-now and
viable, independent,
independent,
•• Move—now
and forcefully-to
forcefully—tocreate
createaa viable,
democratic Palestinian state.
that genuinely
genuinely democratic
democratic Arab
Arab and
and Islamic
Islamic polities
•• Understand that
will include
include strong
strong representation
representation of
of Islamists.
Islamists. Accept
Accept that
that
will
differences with many of these, we
although we will have our differences
all except the jihadist salafis (see list on
can often still work with all
page 3).
policies designed
•• Adopt domestic energy policies
designed to
to speed the transition
to the "post-oil era."
Work closely
closely with
all Middle
Middle Eastern
Eastern issues.
issues. (What
(What
•• Work
with the EU on all
we think
think if
if the EU
EU pursued
pursued policies
policies in
in Latin America that
would we
ignored our interests?)
•• Do
strengthen intelligence
intelligence and police
police
Do everything
everything possible
possible to strengthen
with Arab, EU,
cooperation with
cooperation
EU, and
and other
other governments
governments in the struggle
struggle
31
ACLURM001230
against al-Qaeda and like-minded jihadi salafist terrorists.
ENDNOTES
1. "I am more fearful than
than ever that
that II will hopelessly repeat myself, over and
1.
Vavclav Havel, "A Farewell
Farewell to Politics,"
Politics," New York
York Review
Review of
ofBooks,
Books,
over again," Vavclav
October 24,
24, 2002, p.
October
p. 4.
4. Unlike
Unlike Mr. Havel, I know that I am repeating
repeating myself: I draw
draw
on several
several previous
previouspieces:
pieces: "Socio-economic
"Socio-economic Roots
Roots of Radicalism,"
Radicalism,"
heavily here on
College Review, Vol.
Vol. LV,
2002; "The Political Economy
Naval War College
LV, No.4,
No. 4, Autumn,
Autumn, 2002;
Santa Monica: RAND, October
October 2001;
2001; and
of Economic Reform in the Middle
Middle East," Santa
and
War With
With Utopian
Utopian Fanatics,"
Fanatics," Middle East Policy, Vol.
Vol. VIII,
"At War
VIII, No.4,
No. 4, December
appearsas
asaa Global
Global Policy
Policy Brief, Center
2001. An
2001.
An earlier
earlier version
version of this
this monograph
monograph appears
Regional Studies of the University
University of
of California,
California,
Global, International,
International, and Regional
for Global,
am repeating
repeating myself,
myself, but events
events in
in Washington
Washington and
and elsewhere
elsewhere
Santa Cruz.
Cruz. I am
Santa
suggest that the material bears repeating.
2. Thomas Homer-Dixon,
Homer-Dixon, "Why
Globe
2.
"Why Root
Root Causes
Causes Are
Are Important," Toronto Globe
September26,
26, 2001.
and Mail, September
3. There
There is nothing
nothing "conservative"
"conservative" about
about these
these people,
people, particularly
particularly in
3.
the context
context of American
American policy
Middle East.
East. They
They are,
are, in fact,
fact,
the
policy toward
toward the
the Middle
revolutionaries.
4. Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall, NY and London: Penguin
PenguinBooks,
Books, 2001.
2001.
4.
5. See especially Guilain
5.
Guilain Denoux,
Denoux, "The
"The Forgotten
Forgotten Swamp: Navigating
Navigating Political
Islam," Middle East Policy, Vol. IX,
IX, No.2,
No. 2, June
June 2002,
2002,pp.
pp. 56-81;
56-81;Michael
MichaelScott
ScottDoran,
Doran,
January/February2002,
2002, pp.
pp. 22-42;
22-42;
"Somebody Else's Civil War," Foreign
Foreign Affairs, January/February
Quintan Wiktorowicz,
Wiktorowicz, "The New
New Global Threat: Transnational
Quintan
Transnational Salafis and Jihad,"
Middle East Policy, Vol. VIII,
VIII, No.4,
No. 4, December
December 2001,
2001,pp.
pp. 18-38;
18-38;Graham
Graham Fuller,
Fuller, "The
March/April 2002,
2002, pp.
pp. 48-56;
48-56; Gilles
Gilles
of Political
Political Islam,"
Islam," Foreign
Future of
Foreign Affairs, March/April
MA: Harvard
Kepel, Jihad:
Jihad: The
The Trail
Trail of Political
Political Islam. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press,
ofSacred
Sacred Terror.
Terror. NY:
NY: Random
2002; Daniel
2002;
Daniel Benjamin
Benjamin and
and Steven Simon, The Age of
House, 2002.
2002.
House,
6. As
As argued
argued extensively
extensively by Clement
Clement Henry
Henry and
and Robert
Robert Springborg,
Springborg,
6.
Development inin the
the Middle
Middle East.
East. Cambridge:
Globalization and
Globalization
andthe
the Politics
Politics of
of Development
Cambridge University
University Press,
Press, 2001.
2001.
Cambridge
7. Isaiah Berlin,
Berlin, "Notes on Prejudice." New York
York Review
Review of
ofBooks,
Books, October 18,
7.
2001, p. 12.
8. Ibid.
8.
32
ACLURM001231
9.
for example,
example, Mahmoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics
9. See,
See, for
Politics of Dissent,
1999; and
New York: St.
St. Martin's
Martin's Press, 1999;
and the references cited above in note 5.
10. In millions,
millions, 2000.
10.
2000.
11. Rate of nahlral
increase, 2000.
11.
natural increase,
12.
2000.The
TheTFR
TFRmeasures
measuresthe
thenumber
number of
ofchildren
children which
which
12. Total Fertility Rate, 2000.
a "statistically average" woman will have during
during her lifetime.
13.
13. Op.cit, p. 66.
14.
Census Bureau.
14. U.S.
U.S. Census
15.
G. Williamson
Williamson and
and Tareq Yousef,
Yousef, "Demographic
"Demographic Transitions
Transitions and
15. Jeffrey
Jeffrey G.
Economic
Performancein
in MENA,"
MENA," unpublished
unpublished paper,
paper, Harvard
Economic Performance
Harvard University,
University,
1999.
16.
or Social
16. Philippe
Philippe Fargues,
Fargues, "Demographic
"Demographic Explosion
Explosion or
Social Upheaval?"
Upheaval?" in
Ghassan Salame, ed., Democracy
Democracy Without
Without Democrats?
The Renewal
Renewal of Politics
Politics in the
Democrats? The
Tauris, 1994.
Muslim World, London: I.B.
I.B. Tauris,
17.
between the percentage
percentage of
of males and the percentage of
of
17. Although the gap between
females in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, and
and Lebanon
Lebanondeclined
declinedfrom
from1980
1980 to
to 2000,
2000,
the gap stayed
stayed essentially
essentially the same
same in
in Morocco,
Morocco, and increased
increased in Tunisia
Tunisia and
Yemen. Calculated from World Bank data.
18.
"Twenty Years of Islamic Politics," The Middle East Journal,
18. Richard Bulliet, "Twenty
Vol. 53, No.2,
No. 2, Spring
Spring 1999.
19.
Rouleau, "Trouble
"Trouble in
in the
the Kingdom,"
Kingdom," Foreign
Foreign Affairs,
Affairs, July/August
July/August2002,
2002,
19. Eric Rouleau,
pp.
75-89.
pp.75-89.
20.
paragraphs draw
draw on Hans
20. The
The following
following paragraphs
Hans Lofgren
Lofgren and
and Alan
Alan Richards,
Richards,
"Food Security,
Poverty, and
and Economic
Policyinin the
the Middle
Middle East
East and
and North
Economic Policy
Security, Poverty,
Africa," International
International Food
Food Policy
Policy Research Institute
Institute (IFPRI),
(IFPRI), forthcoming.
21.
van Eeghen,
Eeghen, "Poverty
"Poverty in
21. World Development
Development Indicators,
Indicators, 2001;
2001; and Willem van
Middle East
East and
and North
NorthAfrica,"
Africa," World
WorldBank,
Bank, 1995.
1995.
the Middle
22. Sheldon
Sheldon H. Danziger
Danziger and
andDaniel
DanielH.
H. Weinberg,
Weinberg,1994;
1994; "The
22.
"The Historical
Historical Record:
Trends in Family Income,
Income, Inequality, and Poverty," in Sheldon H. Danziger, Gary
D. Sandefur, and Daniel
Daniel H. Weinberg,
Weinberg, eds., Confronting Poverty: Prescriptions for
Change, Cambridge,
Cambridge, MA:
MA: Harvard
HarvardUniversity
UniversityPress,
Press,pp.
pp.18-50.
18-50. World
WorldBank,
Bank, 2001b;
2001b;
World Development Indicators, Washington, DC.
33
ACLURM001232
23.
23. "How Not To Count the Poor," Sanjay G.
G. Reddy and Thomas
Thomas W. Pogge,
May
May 1, 2002. www.socialanalysis.org.
24. See, for
North Africa: A
24.
for example, "Social
"Social Protection
Protection in the
the Middle
Middle East and North
Review,"
Tzannatos, Zafiris,
Zafiris,paper
paper presented
presented at the Mediterranean Development
Review," Tzannatos,
Kouassi Soman,
2000, p.
Forum, March 2000,
p. 5;
5; Willem
Willem van
van Eeghen
Eeghen and
and Kouassi
Soman, "Poverty in
North Africa,"
Africa," in
in Ishac
Ishac Diwan and
and Karen
Karen Sirker, eds., Voices
the Middle East and North
from Marrakech:
Marrakech: Towards
Towards Competitive
Competitive and
and Caring
Caring Societies
Societies in
in the
the Middle
Middle East
East and
and North
North
from
from the
the Mediterranean Development Forum:
Forum: Knowledge
Knowledge and
Africa, Selections
Selections from
Skills
for Development in the
Skills for
the Information
Information Age,
Age, Marrakech,
Marrakech, Morocco,
Morocco, May
May 121217, 1997;
"Poverty in the
http://www.worldbank.orglmdflmdfl!; George F.
F. Kossaifi,
Kossaifi, "Poverty
1997; http.Wwww.worldbank.org/mdf/mdflA
Arab World:
Toward aa Critical
CriticalApproach,"
Approach," paper
paper presented
presented at the Mediterranean
World: Toward
Development
DevelopmentForum,
Forum,September
September3-6,
3-6, 1998,
1998, Marrakech, Morocco, p. 5.
25.
H. Adams,
Jr., and John
25. Richard
Richard H.
Adams, Jr.,
John Page,
Page, "Holding
"Holding the
the Line:
Line: Poverty
Poverty
Reduction in the Middle East
paper presented
presented at
East and
and North
NorthAfrica,
Africa, 1970-2000,"
1970-2000," paper
AnnualERF
ERF Conference,
Conference, October
October25-27,
25-27, 2001.
Annual
26. Radwan
Radwan Shaban, Dina Abu-Ghaida, and Abdel-Salam AI-Naimat,
26.
Al-Naimat, "Poverty
"Poverty
Alleviation
in Jordan
Jordanin
inthe
the1990s:
1990s: Lessons for the Future,"
Future," ERF
ERF Forum,
Forum, Vol.
Vol. 8, No.
Alleviation in
2, October
October 2001, p. 2.
27.
27. Ford Foundation,
Foundation, "Poverty
"PovertyReport,"
Report," Cairo,
Cairo, 1998,
1998, www.fordfound.org/global/
wwwfordfound.orglglobal/
cairolfeatures.cfm
cairo/features. cfm
28. Mohamed El-Maitamy,
El-Maitamy, "Poverty and the
the Labor
Labor Market
Market in
inYemen,"
Yemen," ERF
ERF
28.
Forum, Vol.
Vol. 8, No.
No.2,
October 2001, www.erforg.eg/nletter/oct01_11.asp.
www.erforg.eglnletter/octOl_11.asp.
Forum,
2, October
29.
Rodenbeck, "An
"An Emerging
Emerging Agenda
Agenda for
for Development
Development in the Middle
29. Max Rodenbeck,
East and
and North
NorthAfrica,"
Africa," IDRC,
IDRC, 2000,
2000, www.idrc.ca/books/focus/930/12rodenb.html.
30. A. G.
30.
G. Ali
Ali and
and Ibrahim A.
A. Elbadawi,
Elbadawi, "The
"The Labor
Labor Market
Market and
and Poverty in the
Arab World: Some
Some Preliminary
Preliminary Results,"
Results," paper
paper presented
presented at the Seventh Annual
Conference of
Economic Research
Conference
of the
the Economic
ResearchForum
Forumfor
for the
the Arab
Arab Countries,
Countries, Iran
Iran and
Turkey, October
October26-29,
26-29, 2000.
2000.
Turkey,
31.
31. Alan Richards,
Richards, "The Egyptian
Egyptian Farm
Farm Labor
Labor Market
Market Revisited,"
Revisited," Journal
of
1994, pp.
pp. 239-261;
Gaurav Datt
Datt and Jennifer
of Development
Development Economics,
Economics, Vol.
Vol. 43,
43, 1994,
239-261; Gaurav
Jennifer
Olmsted,
in Egypt,"
Egypt," Washington:
Washington:
"InducedWage
WageEffects
Effects of Changes in Food Prices in
Olmsted, "Induced
IFPRI,1998.
IFPRI,
1998.
32.
with the French
32. A Maghrebi word which blends the Arabic heta, wall, with
French suffix
-iste: "one who leans against the wall."
34
ACLURM001233
33.
Jihad: The
TheRise
Riseof
ofMilitant
Militant Islam
Islam in
in Central Asia, New Haven:
33. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad:
Yale University
University Press,
2002.
Press, 2002.
34. Gretchen Peters, "Pakistan Tilts
Tilts Toward
Toward Extremism?"
Extremism?" Christian Science
Science
34.
Monitor, October
October 15,
15, 2002.
35.
35. However,
However, some
some observers
observers argue that
that violent
violent conflicts
conflicts in
in sub-Saharan
sub-Saharan
Africa are also closely linked to the problems of rootless youth. See,
See, for example,
AfricaResource
Resource Conflicts?
Conflicts? The
The Case of Sierra
"Are 'Forest
'ForestWars'
Wars'ininAfrica
Paul Richards, "Are
Leone," in Nancy Peluso and Michael Watts, eds., Violent Environments, Ithaca and
London: Cornell
Cornell University
UniversityPress,
Press,2001,
2001, pp.
pp. 65-82.
65-82.
36.
Jihad: The
The Trail
Trail of
of Political Islam, Anthony F. Roberts, trans.,
36. Gilles Kepel, Jihad:
Cambridge,
Harvard University
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard
UniversityPress,
Press, 2002.
2002.
Cambridge, MA:
37. See,
See, for
example, Michael
Michael Mandelbaum,
Shaken: The
The
37.
for example,
Mandelbaum, "Stirred
"Stirred but not Shaken:
Economic Repercussions,"
Economic
Repercussions,"in
in Strobe
Strobe Talbott
Talbottand
and Nayan
Nayan Chanda, eds., How
How Did
This Happen?
and the
the New
New War, NY:
Books, 2001;
2001; Alan
Alan B.
B. Krueger
Krueger
Happen? Terrorism
Terrorism and
NY: Basic
Basic Books,
and
and Jitka Maleckova, "Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?" The New Republic, June 24,
2002.
38.Op.
38.
Gp. cit.
39.
39. Tibor Szamuely, The
The Russian Tradition,
Tradition, London: Fontana, 1974,
1974, pp. 192192194.
40.Ibid., p. 194.
40.
41.Ibid., p. 197.
41.
42.Ibid., p. 198.
42.
43. Gary Hufbauer, "China, the United
United States,
States, and
and the
the Global
Global Economy,"
Economy,"
43.
Washington: Institute
Institute for
for International
InternationalEconomics,
Economics, 1999.
1999.
44.
44. See, for example, World Bank, Claiming the Future: Choosing Prosperity in the
Reform and
and Growth
Middle East and North Africa, 1995; and IMF,
IMP, Building on Progress:
Progress: Reform
in the Middle East and North Africa, 1996.
45.
and Richards.
45. See Lofgren and
46. See,
See, for
46.
for example,
example, Graham
Graham Fuller,
Fuller, "The Future of Political Islam," Foreign
Affairs, March/
MarchiApril
April 2002.
2002.
47.
statement should
should not
not be
be taken
47. This
This statement
taken to imply
imply that
that military
military action
action is
35
ACLURM001234
necessarily
unwarranted. Rather,
Rather, such
such action
action is
is unlikely
necessarily unwarranted.
unlikely to be
be sufficient,
sufficient, and,
unless very carefully designed and
and executed,
executed, may
may easily
easily exacerbate
exacerbate the complex
crisis which spawns Islamic radicalism.
36
ACLURM001235