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Conflict Versus Consensus Strategic
Orientations Among Environmental NGOs:
An Empirical Evaluation
ShiraLeonZchout 1
AlonTal 2,*[email protected]
1Ecopeace Middle EastTel AvivIsrael
2Ben Gurion University of the NegevBeershebaIsrael
Abstract
Israeli environmental non-government organizations (ENGOs) are assessed in light
of Resource Mobilization Theory, introducing a new method for dividing ENGOs
according to strategic orientation. Based on a national survey, 85 groups are
categorized as consensus ENGOs that seek understanding aim at finding common
grounds, or as conflict ENGOs working “outside the system.” Results show that
conflict ENGOs are more grassroots in orientation and consensus ENGOs are more
professionalized. ConflictENGOs
operate
primarily
in
local
arenas. Consensus ENGOs appear more stable, with larger annual budgets and paid
staff, but with fewer registered members. Consensus ENGOs enjoy a wider variety
of income sources; receive more funding from government, foreign, and private
donations;
and
have
a
broader
range
of
self-generated
income
sources. Conflict ENGOs depend more on membership fees. Both groups are highly
dependent on foundation grants. In general, greater resources are associated
with consensusactivity than among organizations utilizing conflict tactics.
AQ1
AQ2
Résumé
Des organisations non gouvernementales environnementales (ONGE) israéliennes
sont évaluées à la lumière de la théorie de mobilisation des ressources, qui introduit
une nouvelle méthode de division des ONGE selon leur orientation stratégique.
Selon un sondage national, 85 groupes sont catégorisés comme ONGE consensuelles
cherchant à être comprises et à trouver des terrains d’entente ou comme ONGE
conflictuelles œuvrant « en dehors du système » . Les résultats démontrent que les
ONGE conflictuelles ont une orientation plutôt populaire et que les ONGE
consensuelles sont plus professionnalisées. Les ONGE conflictuelles œuvrent
principalement dans des milieux locaux. Les ONGE consensuelles semblent plus
stables et leur budget annuel et leur effectif payé sont plus importants, mais leur
adhésion est plus faible. Les ONGE consensuelles profitent d’une vaste gamme de
sources de revenus. Elles reçoivent plus de financements du gouvernement et de
dons étrangers et privés, et leurs sources de revenus autonomes sont plus
diversifiées. Les ONGE conflictuelles ont une plus grande dépendance aux frais
d’adhésion. Les deux groupes dépendent fortement des subventions de fondation. En
général, plus de ressources sont associées aux activités consensuelles qu’aux
organisations faisant appel à des tactiques conflictuelles.
Zusammenfassung
Israelische nicht-staatliche Umweltorganisationen werden im Rahmen der
Ressourcenmobilisierungstheorie bewertet, wobei eine neue Methode zur Einteilung
dieser Organisationen nach ihrer strategischen Orientierung eingeführt wird.
Beruhend auf einer landesweiten Umfrage werden 85 Organisationen in Konsensus Organisationen, die ein Einvernehmen und gemeinsame Prinzipien anstreben, und
Konflikt-Organisationen, die „außerhalb des Systems“arbeiten, eingeteilt. Die
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Konflikt-Organisationen im Hinblick auf ihre Orientierung
eher auf der Basisebene operieren, während Konsensus-Organisationen
professionalisierter sind. Konflikt-Organisationen sind hauptsächlich auf der lokalen
Ebene tätig. Konsensus-Organisationen erscheinen beständiger zu sein und verfügen
über größere jährliche Budgets und bezahlte Mitarbeiter, haben jedoch weniger
registrierte Mitglieder. Konsensus-Organisationen verfügen über vielfältigere
Einnahmequellen, erhalten mehr finanzielle Unterstützung von der Regierung sowie
durch ausländische und private Spenden und verfügen über eine weite Reihe von
selbstgenerierten Einnahmequellen. Konflikt-Organisationen sind mehr von
Migliedsgebühren abhängig. Beide Gruppen sind in hohem Maß von Zuschüssen
seitens Stiftungen abhängig. Im Allgmeinen werden größere Ressourcen mit
Aktivitäten in Verbindung gebracht, die vom Konsensus geleitet werden, als mit
Organisationen, die Konflikttaktiken anwenden.
Resumen
Las organizaciones no gubernamentales medio ambientales israelíes (ENGO, por sus
siglas en inglés) son evaluadas a la luz de la Teoría de Movilización de Recursos,
introduciendo un nuevo método para dividir las ENGO según la orientación
estratégica. Basándonos en una encuesta nacional, se clasifican 85 grupos como
ENGO de consenso que buscan comprender con el objetivo de encontrar bases
comunes; o como ENGO de conflicto que trabajan “fuera del sistema.” Los
resultados muestran que las ENGO de conflicto están más orientadas a la base
(comunidad) y las ENGO de consenso están más profesionalizadas. Las ENGO de
conflicto operan fundamentalmente en ámbitos locales. Las ENGO de consenso
parecen más estables, con presupuestos anuales más grandes y con personal pagado,
pero con un menor número de miembros inscritos. Las ENGO de consenso disfrutan
de una variedad más amplia de fuentes de ingresos; reciben más financiación del
gobierno, de donaciones extranjeras y privadas, y tienen una gama más amplia de
ingresos autogenerados. Las ENGO de conflicto dependen más de las cuotas de sus
miembros. Ambos grupos dependen en gran medida de las subvenciones de
fundaciones. En general, se asocia un mayor número de recursos a la actividad de
consenso que entre las organizaciones que utilizan tácticas de conflicto.
摘要
本文根据资源调动理论(Resource Mobilization Theory),对以色列非政府环保组织
(ENGOs)进行了评估,并介绍了一种根据策略导向对ENGOs进行分类的新方法。
在一项全国性调查中,85个小组被分为共识ENGOs(Consensus
ENGOs)与冲突
ENGOs(Conflict ENGOs),前者寻求理解,并以达成共识为目标,而后者则在“体制之
外”努力。结果显示,冲突ENGOs的导向更具草根性,而共识ENGOs则更专业化。
冲突ENGOs主要活跃于地方。共识ENGOs表现的更加稳定,年度预算更大,受薪职
员更多,但是注册会员则较少。共识ENGOs的收入来源更多样化;更多地得到政府
、国外与私人捐助;其自主创造的收入来源更多样化。而冲突ENGOs更多地依赖
于会员会费。两个小组的ENGOs都高度的依赖于基金资助。一般地,与共识活动
(consensus activity)相关联的资源比与使用冲突策略的组织相关的资源要多。
要約
イスラエルの環境非政府組織 (ENGO) は、戦略的方向性に基づいてENGOを分
割する新しい方法を導入して、資源の動員理論に焦点を当てて評価する。全国
調査に基づいて、一般的な理由を見つけることで理解の目的を求めるコンセン
サスのENGOとして、85グループもしくは「外部システム」の競合として
ENGOを分類する。結果から、競合するENGOは方向性があり草の根的であり
、より専門化されたコンセンサスのENGOである。競合するENGOはローカル
な活動領域で主に実施される。コンセンサスのENGOは増加する年次予算と有
給スタッフが固定されているが、登録されたメンバーは少ない。コンセンサス
のENGOは、幅広い収入源、政府の資金受領、外国人や民間からの寄付を受け
取って、自己生成の収入源に広い範囲を持っている。競合するENGOは会費に
よって異なる。両方のグループは、財団の補助金に大きく依存する。一般的に
より多くの資金は、競合の戦術を活用した組織よりもコンセンサス活動に関連
付けられている。
‫ملخص‬
‫(تم تقييم منظمات غير حكومية بيئية‬ENGOS) ‫ إدخال طريقة جديدة‬،‫إسرائيلية في ضوء نظرية تعبئة الموارد‬
‫( لتقسيم المنظمات الغير حكومية البيئية‬ENGOS) ‫ إستنادا” على إستطالع رأي‬.‫وفقا” لتوجي ه إستراتيجي‬
‫ من مجموعات منظمات غير حكومية بيئية‬85 ‫ تم تصنيف‬،‫( وطني‬ENGOS) ‫على نحو إتفاق على الرأي‬
‫ أو كصراع مجموعات منظمات غير حكومية‬.‫الذي يسعى إلى فهم الهدف في إيجاد أرضية مشتركة‬
‫(بيئية‬ENGOS) ‫ تشير النتائج إلى أن صراع مجموعات منظمات غير حكومية‬.”‫تعمل “ خارج النظام‬
‫(بيئية‬ENGOS) ‫(هو أكثر شعبية في التوجيه وإجماع منظمات غير حكومية بيئية‬ENGOS) ‫على الرأي‬
‫ صراع المنظمات الغير حكومية البيئية‬.‫( بصورة مهنية أكثر‬ENGOS) .‫يعمل أساسا” في الساحات المحلية‬
‫( إتفاق المنظمات الغير حكومية البيئية‬ENGOS) ‫ مع الميزانيات السنوية‬، ”‫ع لى الرأي يبدو أكثر استقرارا‬
‫ إتفاق المنظمات الغير حكومية البيئية‬.‫ لكن مع عدد أقل من أعضاء مسجلين‬،‫الكبيرة والموظفين المأجورين‬
(ENGOS) ‫على الرأي يستمتع بتنوع واسع من مصادر الدخل؛ يحصل على المزيد من التمويل من الحكومة‬
‫ صراع المنظمات‬.”‫ وله مجموعة واسعة من مصادر الدخل الذي تم إنتاجها ذاتيا‬، ‫ تبرعات أجنبية و خاصة‬،
‫( الغير حكومية البيئية‬ENGOS) ‫ كل من المجموعتين يعتمد‬.‫يعتمد أكثر على رسوم تسجيل العضوية‬
‫ بشكل عام ترتبط أكبر الموارد مع نشاط إجماع الرأي أكثر من بين‬.‫إعتمادا” كبيرا” على منح المؤسسات‬
‫المنظمات التي تستخدم تكتيكات الصراع‬.
Keywords
Environmental movement
Green NGOs Israel
Strategies
Introduction: The Strategic Orientation of
Environmental Organizations
Environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) were formed in response
to environmental degradation and damage to natural resources. Many have emerged
as influential domestic political players, taking an active role in internal policy
debates, while others are engaged in the international arena (Dalton et al. 2003;
Wapner 1995). Typically, ENGOs seek to affect public policy, industrial activities,
development and social behavior regarding environmental, ecological, and health related issues (Schreurs 2002).
AQ3
Over the years ENGOs developed a variety of tactics, leading experts to categorize
them according to their preferred strategies. For instance, Rucht (1996) divided
social movements into three categories of structure and strategy: the grassroots
model, interest group model, and political party-oriented movement model. After
analyzing the results of a broad international survey of ENGOs, Dalton et al. (2003)
recognized four types of activity: conventional, networking, mobilizing, and protest.
Conventional activities promote policy and legislative change, through lobbying
activities; networks activities include and forging connections with other groups and
allies. Mobilizing activities recruit people for collective action; and unconventional
actions include protests and disruptions. Koopmans (1993) also divided social
movements according to four action types: demonstrative actions, confrontational,
light violence, and heavy violence. Tarrow (1994) defined three types of collective
action: violent, disruptive, and conventional.
Most theorists divide NGOs into two recurrent categories which serve as the salient
divisions for the present study. Michaelson (1994) divided social movements into
conflict and consensus groups. Conflict groups act against or in contrast to groups
with opposite opinions, challenging the government and the political
system. Consensus groups work on a basis of shared understanding, finding common
denominators in the belief that compromise produces progress more readily than
controversy. Winston (2003) made the same fundamental distinction, between
radical and moderate groups. Similarly, Dryzek et al. (2003) divided NGO activities
in response to levels of state openness between consensus and conflict strategies.
The present study adopts this nomenclature as germane in the Israeli context, based
on the professed orientation of different ENGOs (Tal et al. 2013). According to this
dichotomy, consensus ENGOs work within conventional channels, accepting the
political structure and the contemporary power holders, while seeking integration
into the political process. In contrast, conflict ENGOs serve in the role of opposition
and take little interest in blending into a consensus or participating directly in
governmental discourse. They challenge and confront the state and decision makers,
trying to influence the government externally (Dryzek et al. 2003;
Michaelson 1994).
Differences can be seen in the self-definitions of groups and opinions held by their
members and representatives. Conflict ENGOs generally characterize themselves as
activist or radical groups that challenge the status quo, while consensus groups
define themselves as cooperative, acknowledging, implicitly, or explicitly the
legitimacy of the establishment. Moreover, conflict ENGOs tend to have more
radical worldviews. This can be found in their substantive opinions and in the types
of activity pursued. Distinctions betweenconsensus and conflict ENGOs are
primarily manifested in their modes of action. Consensus ENGOs often
acknowledge the greater scientific complexity and richer nuances posed by
environmental issues today (Callon et al. 2001). They are characterized by engaging
mainly in conventional modes of action (Richards and Heard 2005),
while conflict ENGOs prefer confrontational, unconventional, or radical modes of
action.
Conventional modes of action have been defined as all forms of action that support
and are accepted within the political system. They are aimed at convincing. These
include lobbying and raising awareness (Handy 2001), testifying before government
commissions, participating in government panels (Dalton et al. 2003), campaigns for
public participation, petitioning (Kitschelt 1986), and drafting new legislation (Kim
et al. 2010). Additional conventional activities create forums for communicating
with industry and governmental representatives. Also educational activities and
information dissemination in sundry forms to the public, designed to influence
environmental awareness and behavior are considered conventional activities
(Handy 2001). Environmental conventional activities that exert political pressure
can include public ranking of companies according to environmental behavior, and
influencing voters to choose candidates according to environmental commitments
(Handy 2001; Kitschelt 1986). Surveys among ENGOs in Europe suggest that while
“direct action” is still considered an important part of the “NGO armory,” the most
effective tactics involved these conventional activities such as activating the media,
scientific research, and political lobbying, with legal challenges being one of the
least effective (Richards and Heard 2005).
Conflict ENGOs tend to use confrontational and unconventional strategies aimed at
pressuring decision makers. These include public events that range from street
theater and bearing witness to civil disobedience, demonstrations and disruption
(Tarrow 1994; Kitschelt1986). Direct action is also a form of unconventional action.
As was the case in other countries, direct action has been adopted by ENGOs in
Israel. Among the most prominent early examples were sabotage of bulldozers
diverting the River Jordan to create a hydro-electric plant and protests to stop the
paving of the Trans-Israel Highway when activists physically blocked bulldozers
and managed to delay work of construction crews (Meizlish 2005; Rabinowitz and
Vardi 2010). These disruptive activities are typically designed to engage the police,
attracting media attention and public exposure. The anti-nuclear movement in West
Germany used such tactics during the 1970s enjoined establishment of local power
plants and nuclear facilities inspiring similar activities in the United States
(Gottlieb1993). Other unconventional modes of action include “monkey wrenching,”
a form of sabotage and property destruction for the sake of environmental
preservation (Gottschalk 1999; Bron 1991). In the era of social networks, a whole
new suite of opportunities exist to amplify the impact of such tactics.
Political Opportunity Structure suggests that the nature of social movements is
determined by the dynamics of state structure. Tarrow (1994) claims that movements
act in response to the opening of opportunities in the political structure. Aligned
with this approach, Dalton (2005) argued that industrialized democracies allow the
existence of radical and confrontational movements, while less democratic states
lack the institutional basis, such as freedom of information and the right to protest,
to allow such uncompromising, oppositional social movement activity. Michaelson
(1994) claims that in countries where the level of democracy is very low,
oppositional movements are most likely oppressed.
A central paradigm for understanding civil society efforts involves Resource
Mobilization Theory. The theory maintains that operational decisions NGOs in
general, and ENGOs in particular, are based on rational considerations rather than
ideology. It assumes that organizations choose operational strategies in order to
produce optimal results (Michaelson 1994). McCarthy and Zald (1977) developed
the theory identifying an association between organizational characteristics and
strategy. They argue that activities of a social movement and its success are
determined by the potential to attract resources. Resources can be in the form of
funding, general public supporters, political connections, and ability to recruit public
figures for support. A membership base constitutes an additional resource of
leverage (Dalton et al. 2003; Oser 2009). Other resources include public adherents,
allies, and external influences such as relationships with the state. Resource
Mobilization Theory for the first time focused analysis on the organization or
“meso” level of civil society. Prior to its introduction, analysis for the most part was
conducted at the micro level, examining personal motivations and participation,
along with the national conditions and processes of social movements.
Relying on this paradigm, McCarthy and Zald (1977) predict that well-funded
organizations choose conventional modes of action. They argue that resources are
allocated to maintain existing organizational structures. Organizational actions,
therefore, tend to be cautious, protecting existing institutions and maintaining
government and foundation support. Dalton et al. (2003) supported this theory, and
found that high budgeted ENGOs engage in more conventional and moderate
activities that entail ‘lower risk.’ Organizations with higher budgets typically have
higher rates of activity, while when resources are limited, choices of action are made
according to costs and benefits. For example, when faced with a choice between
lobbying, demonstrations and public awareness campaigns, decisions will often be
driven by associated costs.
Disputes between the supporters of Resource Mobilization Theory and other, more
traditional perspectives regarding social movements often center around the ultimate
objectives of social movements. Resource Mobilization Theory assumes that
movements’ primary aim involves institutional change. Accordingly, other factors
frequently are not taken into consideration, with large aspects of social movements
such as social and spiritual transformation, personal relationships and inspirations
that draw people to movements society transformation, ideology and identity are
often neglected (Jenkins 1983).
AQ4
Indeed, Resource Mobilization Theory may not be designed to explain personal
motivation of NGO members and activists systematically. It has therefore been
criticized for focusing excessively on economic cost and benefit analyses, assuming
that it is for the benefit of all to take action for change. Critiques claim
that Resource Mobilization Theory cannot solve the dilemma of the free riders who
are motivated solely by economic considerations. Accordingly, an individual may
prefer to have the other activists “do the work” and enjoy the results rather than join
a movement (Beuchler 1993). Jenkins (1983) proposes two main changes that might
be made inResource Mobilization Theory for it to be more accurate: the first
involves extending the approach to include psychological theories of collective
action; the second, change involves taking advantage of political opportunity.
Understanding the relationship between political opportunity and access to power
provides for a more complete picture.
Accordingly, Beuchler (1993) critiqued Resource Mobilization Theory in the context
of an assessment of the woman’s rights movements. The most prominent deficiency
highlighted was that the theory does not explain motivation of individual activists to
join the movement, attributing insufficient weight to the influence of ideology and
the broader grievances of social movements. Buechler also argued that the theory
ignores social and cultural processes, assuming that only formally organized social
structures can make an impact, whereas the history of the women’s movement
suggests that an unofficial, social movement community has been the dominant
force of mobilization for woman’s rights.
Another critique of Resource Mobilization Theory is that it does not provide
compelling explanations for the key question of “why” social movements “emerge,”
but rather limits its analysis to “how” (Flynn S. Theories of Social movements,
Sociology Reference Guide). A related criticism by Jenkins (1983) claims
that Resource Mobilization Theory provides an excessively narrow approach that
examines only hierarchical movements, leaving out decentralized groups. According
to this view, decentralized groups have greater ability to mobilize grassroots and
promote personal transformation. But this emphasis on the individual in turn might
compromise broader, societal effectiveness.
A long debated, associated area of research involves the optimal level of
engagement by civil society. Dalton et al. (2003) posit that there is an unresolved
theoretical conflict as to whether ENGOs should work within conventional channels
or challenge the state from the outside. According to Dryzek et al.
(2003), consensus behavior usually demands fewer resources. As long as ENGO
goals are consistent with the imperatives of the state and the organization can find
channels for influence, lower resource ENGOs will engage inconsensus activities.
Curtis and Gronberg (2007) found a correlation between the size of ENGOs and
collective action. But this view is not uniform. In contrast, Piven and Cloward
(1977, cited by Dalton et al. 2003) claimed that ‘poorly funded movements often rely
on the time and energy of volunteer activists, thereby leading to spontaneous,
protest-based tactics. Thus ENGOs with small budgets and staffs may be more likely
to perform more confrontational activities, as they need to get noticed and cannot
appeal to a broad-based membership.’ (p. 14).
Tarrow claims that organizations are flexible and can ‘combine a variety of forms (of
action), either alone or in combination.’ (Tarrow1994, p.115). Each organization
develops a repertoire of tactics, in which the extent of use of each type of action
determines the behavioral character of the ENGO.
According to Dalton et al. (2003), even ENGOs that are recognized as
unconventional use both consensus and radical tactics: “The unconventional
activities that often define public images of the movement are actually a small part
of their political efforts. Thus in pursuit of their goals, the movement relies on a set
of methods that span the entire repertoire of available activities.” It is the frequency
and intensity of use of these its actions that define the ENGO’s strategic orientation.
The use of both oppositional and peaceful modes of action is described by Dryzek et
al. (2003) as a dual strategy. In many cases, organizations make allies with other
groups to create the most beneficial strategy, in which each one uses its advantages
and legitimacy stemming from its actions. This research seeks to understand the way
the two strategies play out among Israel’s ENGOs in their work to influence public
policy and protect the local environment. A central question involves the perceived
benefits and resources that a given strategy provides an environmental organization.
Some scholars claim that movement strategies are not static (McAdam 1983). For
example, Michaelson (1994) found that movements can change, responding to
political opportunities. Tarrow (1994) argues that even innovative confrontational
modes of action become conventional after repetition. Eventually, they can be
adopted by elites or by counter movements.
“In summary, in contrast to their popular image as challenging groups that function
outside the political process, ENGOs typically use a variety of tactics in pursuit of
their political goals. As citizen groups, these groups devote a large part of their
efforts to activities that might generate public attention and support for their cause.
In addition, environmental groups commit considerable effort to conventional
political methods: meetings with government officials, participation in government
commissions, and contact with parliament. The unconventional activities that often
define public images of environmental movements are actually a small part of their
political efforts. Thus in pursuit of their goals, the movement relies on a set of
methods that span the entire repertoire of available activities” (Dalton et al. 2003).
They also found a correlation between organizational age and conventional activities
and attributed the link to political connections and legitimacy that can be gained
over time by social movements. This in turn offers advantages for working within
conventional channels. They reason that older ENGOs over time manage to attain a
certain status that makes them less inclined to risk their status by engaging in radical
actions. There are some studies suggesting that contentious organizations tend to
become moderate over time, or alternatively, drift to unsustainable, violent paths
(Koopmans 1993; Tarrow 1994). Ultimately, it is hard to sustain radical opposition
in thought and action (Dryzek et al. 2003). In this study, we sought to better
characterize the two types of Israeli ENGOs according to a range of measures. We
find that notwithstanding its imperfections, Resource Mobilization Theory still
provides a strong basis for understanding the characteristics of environmental
organizations along with their operational orientation and the related outcomes. By
assessing strategic orientation and practices according to the types of organizational
resources, a compelling picture of the relationship between ENGO strategies and
available resources emerges.
Methods
The study constitutes the first research with which we are familiar where the two
opposing strategic approaches of organizations were given replicable, operational
definitions, allowing for assignment to different categories and quantitative
evaluations. By classifying organizations based on strategic orientation and
comparing their experience, a clearer understanding of the structure of Israel’s
environmental movement emerges, providing a sense of the operational approach
utilized by the players.
Our study relied primarily on a national survey distributed among Israeli ENGOs in
2011. Preparation of the survey involved several initial steps, which yielded a basic
profile of the country’s ENGOs, their priorities, and substantive orientation (Tal et
al. 2013). During preparation and implementation of the survey, the research team
consulted an advisory panel consisting of ENGO leaders, academic experts, and
representatives from the philanthropic community. Creation of an updated list of
Israeli ENGOs was needed to set the groundwork for the survey. Two levels of NGO
definition were required and decided upon: targeted environmental goals as the
major objective of the ENGOs, and the type of NGO legal registration as a non -
governmental not for-profit organization. Then, a 68 question questionnaire was
drafted and completed. Initial contact was made with 120 ENGOs, although eight
were eventually excluded due to inadequate activity levels. This left approximately
112 ENGOs currently identified as active in the overall sample, 97 of whom
completed the questionnaire after ongoing reminders, producing an initial 85 %
response rate. Respondents included all major ENGOs in the country and a high
percentage of smaller organizations currently active. Four hearings were conducted
in different regions throughout the country between January and February 2011
where interim findings were presented to participating organizations to receive
feedback. To supplement the quantitative data and better understand implications of
the results, semi-structured interviews were conducted with ENGO leaders,
academic experts, former senior environmental officials, and representatives from
industry.
Due to disqualifications resulting from incomplete responses, a total of 85
participating ENGOs were included in the present research, an assessed response
rate of 76 %. Of the cohort, 69 are legally registered in the national registrar of non profit organizations, while 16 are not registered but are functionally active In the
interest of simplicity, non-registered groups are also referred to as ENGOs.
Conflict Versus Consensus The strategic orientation of each the ENGOs between
conflict and consensus strategic orientation was characterized according to a
combination of the survey results that together formed an index. The index was
designed to comprehend many characteristics of the ENGOs retrieved from the
questioner that can imply of their strategic orientation. The index was calibrated
according to some known prototype ENGOs.
The index was designed to define the ‘consensus ENGO that engages in cooperative
modes of action, as opposed to the conflict ENGO,’ that engages in more
confrontational modes of action. So that later statistical analyses will compare
between the two types of groups to define the characteristics of the two strategic
groups.
The division into two categories was made cognizant of associated limitations and
that a dichotomous division reduces the scope of observations, eliminating some of
the subtleties existing between the groups. Social science research frequently
requires generalization which dilutes sacrifices nuances for the ability to contrast
between cohorts for evaluations. Extensive review of group assignment by experts
confirmed the legitimacy of this division. In light of the relatively small number of
ENGOs included as research units, a dichotomous division offered the most
efficacious route to producing a reliable dataset that can be assessed using statistical
analyses.
Three different criteria for categorizing ENGOS were chosen from the survey results
to form the index. These include the following: 1. modes of action, 2. selfidentification of the ENGO, and 3. their expressed opinions about relevant issues.
The opinion criterion was based on an independent sub-index which combined
organization responses according to three relevant statement questions. For each
group of characteristics, a decision rule was specified as to whether to categorize the
group as consensus or conflict.
An index grade was calculated for each of the three criterion based on the survey
results in a given category. Rating of the grades was between 0 and 100 %. A grade
of “100 %” was assigned for results that reflected a maximum conflict strategic
orientation in all areas as opposed to “0” for organizations with an
extreme consensus strategic orientation. Summing the three scores in an average
typically revealed a clear strategic orientation of an ENGO. The average score for
each ENGO was then presented as a percentage. ENGOs were defined consensus if
their cumulative score was equal to 50 % or less (consensus ≤ 50 %); conflict groups
had scores over 50 % (conflict > 50 %).
The first criterion included in the Index was based on ENGOs’ modes of action.
ENGOs were requested to choose from a given list of actions and fill out their
organizational activities in percentages that consumed up to 100 % of their
resources. For example, an ENGO could report 55 % lobbying, 40 % education, and
5 % scientific monitoring. During the coding stage, it became clear that few if any
organizations maintained a one hundred percent conflict approach in all activities.
For instance, media campaigns and education are used in various strategy
combinations and can be used to complement both consensus and conflict activities.
If the aggregate sum pointed to a conflict orientation, the organization was scored
“1” for this area. If the combined percentage of both activism and legal
actions reported by ENGOs was lower than 20 %, it was scored 0 (consensus
strategic orientation). Conversely, if the combined percentage of both categories
scored 20 % or higher, it was scored 1 (conflict strategic orientation).
It would have been thought that groups would have used higher percentages of
belligerent modes of action to be identified conflict. Through the calibration of the
index, it was evident that only up to a considerably small percentage of the resources
converted to confrontational methods to take on conflict orientation. This fact also
aligns with the finding of Dalton et al. (2003) as described in the introduction that
only a slight difference in choice of modes of action define the strategic orientation
on the NGOs. The difference between consensus and conflict ENGOs is the
frequency and amount of confrontational actions along with the conventional
actions.
The second criterion included in the Index was based on self-definitions given by
ENGOs themselves characterizing their relations with the state and whether they
sought cooperation or confrontation with authorities. ENGOs selected definitions
from a list. If an ENGO defined itself as an activist group, among other definitions,
or marked it singularly, it was scored 1 (conflict strategy). If it defined itself using
more conciliatory descriptions, the default was scored 0 (consensus strategy).
The third criterion included in the Index assessed responding organizations’
identification with three statements. A statement supporting or identifying with
conflict strategies was considered a positive statement and scored 1 for positive
answers and 0 for negative answers. Alternatively, a statement that supported
consensus strategies was scored 0 for positive answer and 1 for negative answer. A
statement for example: “When an important environmental value is in danger, it is
legitimate to move to radical activism and civil resistance.” Support of this
statement helps strengthening the odds to score on the conflict strategic orientation.
The supplement of two more. Average percentages of all results supplied the index
for the subgroup result. Equal or less than 50 % was defined as consensus, while
scores over 50 % were conflict. For example, if the average of all questions was
30 %, the organization was considered to be consensus(Table 1).
Table 1
Example for the index calculations
Criteria
Measures (calculation formula)
1. Modes of action
Activism + legal actions ≥ 20 = 1; all other results = 0
2. Self-definition
Activist = 1, all other results = 0
3. Average result of three statementsa
positive toward conflict strategies = 1, negative or indifferent = 0
Final scoreb
Average of all results in percentage
Definition of strategic orientation
Consensus ≤ 50 %
Conflict > 50 %
The index is based on three criteria: modes of action, self-definition, and statements
The average result of the three statements is not presented as a percentage, since determination was made based o
Otherwise, Statementswould have more weight on the index result than the other criteria
a
Final score based on the average results for the three criteria determines strategic orientation assignment
b
AQ5
AQ6
The index score calculation was calibrated according to six chosen ENGOs that were
identified as prototypes for the two categories. ENGOs that were recognized as
consensus prototypes all work closely with government agencies, often receiving
contracts to conduct research and openly express their intention of educating and
convincing policy makers. All of them were defined by the index as consensus.
ENGOs that were recognized conflict each have a rich history of confrontational
campaigns that challenge government policies, aggressively criticizing and seeking
major transformation in present priorities. All of the three ENGOs were confirmed
by the index as conflict ENGOs as their scores reached a higher percentage than
50 % confirming the coherence of the measure and its consistency with the
preliminary evaluation’s definition for “conflict.” By way of contrast, ENGOs
considered consensus scored between 0 and 50 % on the index also showing the
soundness of the preliminary evaluation and its classification as a consensus ENGO.
After initial classification, a multi-step quality control process was instituted that
examined organizations’ final classification according to the Index, and modified the
assignment if categorization was deemed inappropriate. This included conferring
with Life and Environment, Israel’s umbrella organization for ENGOs which is
familiar with the full range of local environmental groups. Follow-up phone
interviews were conducted with ENGO representatives when classification was
equivocal to receive updated information about current campaigns, general
strategies, reasons for specific actions, relationship with the local authorities, and
Israel’s government agencies.
After the assignment was made for each ENGO, statistical analyses were conducted
comparing the strategic groups, yielding a profile for each type of organization.
Specific statistical tests applied include Mann–Whitney non-parametric test, Pearson
Chi-square test for goodness-of-fit, two-tailed T test to string data, Pearson
correlation, and Spearmen non-parametric correlations.
Results
Division by Strategic Orientation
Strategic Orientation and Organizational Characteristics
As part of the evaluation of resource management by ENGOs, organizational
characteristics of the two strategic groups were assessed. Among the characteristics
examined were year of establishment, to see how organizational age affects
strategic orientation. Four measures of organization size were examined: annual
budget, paid staff, number of members, and number of active affiliates. Correlations
between age and size were explored. Income sources were then compared between
the two strategic groups. The final characteristic analyzed involved geographical
focus of the groups and scope of activities to see whether location in the country,
specifically proximity to the center versus the periphery, affects strategic
orientation. Additional analysis assessed similarities and differences between the
strategic groups in their worldview, values, statements, and paradigms. In all of
these analyses, strategic orientation definition resulted from the index is the
dependent variable, while the several measurements serve as independent variable.
A collective profile emerges that includes the salient characteristics of the two
strategic groups, showing conspicuous similarities and differences between them.
Age An independent sample T test for the age distribution between the two strategic
groups revealed no significant difference in the time the two groups that have been
operating. Both age averages for strategic-oriented ENGOs range between 12 and
13 years, with a standard deviation of 11.41 years.
Size The size of ENGOs was measured in the survey according to three criteria:
annual budget, size of the staff, and number of registered members. For a composite
picture, it is well to present the annual budgets of all surveyed ENGOs as presented
in Fig. 1. The fact that 43 % of Israeli ENGOs have either a very modest annual
budget or no budget all implies the grassroots nature of the movement as a whole. A
quarter of ENGOs (27 %) have annual budgets between 100,001 and 500,000 NIS
that could be enough for office rent and at least a salary for a part -time employee.
Fig. 1
Distribution of ENGOs in percent according to annual budget levels (N = 82)
Mann–Whitney non-parametric test was used to determine differences in budget
distribution between the two independent samples of strategic groups drawn from
the index. Results show a significant difference between the two strategy groups in
budget distribution withP < 0.05 (P = 0.039). Figure 2 presents these findings. The
cross-section shows that consensus ENGOs tend to have higher budgets
thanconflict ENGOs. This is reflected in the relative percentages in all categories of
annual budgets over 100,000 NIS. For instance, 31 % ofconsensus ENGOs were
found to have an annual budget between 100,001 and 500,000 compared to only
18 % of conflict ENGOs; in the higher category of annul budgets, we find that while
22 % of the consensus ENGOs have an annual budget that ranges between 500,001
and 3,000,000 NIS only 14 % of the conflict ENGOs enjoy that level of economic
resources. Moreover, in the category of annual budgets that exceed 3 million NIS,
13 % are consensus ENGOs and only 7 % are conflict ENGOs.
Fig. 2
Strategic orientation groups in percentage divided according to budget distribution
(N = 82, N consensus = 54, N conflict = 28)
The figure shows a higher percent of conflict ENGOs than consensus ENGOs in the
lower budget categories up to 100,000 NIS with total of 61 % of the conflict ENGOs
and only 33 % of the consensus ENGOs. In the category of “no formal budget,” the
contrast is also profound: 39 % for conflict ENGOs and only 22 %
for consensus ones for budget under 25,000. It can be concluded
that conflict ENGOs in Israel tend to have a lower budgets than consensus ENGOs.
Nonetheless, over 20 % of conflict ENGOs’ annual budgets exceed 500,000 NIS.
Higher budgets are not necessarily tantamount to greater organizational
effectiveness. Indeed some of the most successful environmental campaigns in Israel
were conducted with minimal resources. For example, a surprisingly victorious
effort to prevent construction of a coastal resort south of Tel Aviv on the Palmachim
beach was initiated by a high school girl, Adi Lustig, who simply began to sleep on
the beach, printing up her own fliers and using social media to draw attention to the
imminent loss of open coastal space (Cheslow2010). Nonetheless, resources allow
organizations to employ more staff, attorneys, and scientists as well as pay for
special events, advertising and a range of other services which can increase the
efficacy of their endeavors.
Staff statistical analyses did not show this disparity to be significant. Mann–Whitney
non-parametric test revealed insignificant differences between the two strategically
oriented groups: Mann–Whitney U = 656.500, P > 0.05 (P = 0.383, N = 82). The
kinds of staffers hired by the two kinds of groups, however, are markedly different:
72 % of consensus ENGOs reported professionals as organizational employees
compared to only 54 % of conflict groups. Similarly, 64 % of consensus ENGOs
have academics on their staff, while only 42 % of conflict ENGOs report staff
members with advanced training.
Membership
There is also a statistically significant difference between the number of registered
members found in the two kinds of groups. It can be assumed that larger budgets
would be reflected in larger memberships. In fact, the opposite dynamic was
detected. Conflict ENGOs tend to have smaller budgets, but many more members
than consensus ENGOs. Figure 3 shows that 71 % of consensus ENGOs have up to
50 members and only 29 % of consensus ENGOs have over 50 members. Results of
Chi-Square Tests on the combined categories (recoded into two categories: up to 50,
and over 50 registered members) show a significant difference between consensus
and conflictstrategic groups regarding the size of registered
membership χ2 (1) = 4.022, P < 0.05 (P = 0.045). It might be inferred that more
people are drawn to activities that are “in conflict with the state” as they provide
greater stimulation and sense of combative purpose.
Fig. 3
Strategic orientation ENGO groups in percentages divided according to number of
registered members
This phenomenon is consistent with international experience during the 1980s and
1990s and is well documented in the original direct actions to protect habitat across
the U.S. (Foreman 1991) to the violent anti-globalization demonstrations in Seattle
(Sonit 2003). The literature is full of testimonials describing the attraction of radical
environmental activities, where the battle lines in environmental conflicts are clearly
marked: a highly ideological and often dogmatic public squares off against the
governments where the conflict becomes one between “the forces of light and the
forces of darkness” with state authority directly challenged (Taylor 1995). In her
best seller, This Changes Everything, Capitalism versus the Climate and the
associated 2015 documentary, Naomi Klein (2014) documents numerous recent
examples of such contentious encounters from Greece, Canada, India, the U.S. and
Nigeria: grassroots campaigns successfully attracted thousands of individuals who
willingly broke the law and often faced considerable consequences in protest of
environmentally destructive development by state governments. Klein calls this as
recent, climate-driven manifestations of spontaneous, radical civil disobedience
“Blockadia.” The grass roots and national protests against new coal fire power
plants and natural gas refineries in Israel are also part of this phenomenon.
Grassroots groups may also be successfully in attracting more members because
they are perceived as accessible by the public. Conversely, it can also be assum ed
that consensus ENGOs gain their legitimacy through the professional acumen of
their expert staff rather than a broad membership base per se.
A similar pattern can be found in the dependence of the organizations on volunteers
in their operational activities. Figure 4 presents the distribution of the two kinds of
groups according to volunteer dependency. Conflict ENGOs are nearly 20 % more
dependent on volunteers in all activities (64 %), while only 46 %
of consensus ENGOs are dependent on volunteers in all activities. At the other
extreme, relative to consensus ENGOs, 25 % more conflict ENGOs do not depend
on volunteers at all. Chi-square testing, however, shows no significant difference in
the volunteer dependency between the two strategic groups χ2(4) = 3.544, P > 0.05
(P = 0.471).
Fig. 4
Strategic orientation ENGO groups divided according to level of volunteer dependency
(N = 71, N consensus = 46, N conflict = 25)
Use of Professional Volunteers Since consensus ENGOs typically enjoy greater
resources, it would seem intuitively that they would not need to rely as heavily
as conflict ENGOs on professional volunteers. Results are presented in Fig. 5. In
fact, a higher percent ofconsensus ENGOs in Israel use volunteers for professional
work (37 %) than conflict groups do (20 %). Overall, consensus ENGOs seem to
utilize volunteers for professional work and advice, while conflict ENGOs utilize the
work of volunteers for management, organizational tasks, and coordination of
activities.
Fig. 5
Percent of ENGOs that use volunteers for professional activities (N = 71, N
consensus = 46, N conflict = 25)
Income Sources
There are some objective differences between the fund-raising reality faced by
Israeli NGOs relative to their international counterparts.
Higher tax rates which limit resources and motivation for giving (Hercowitz and
Lifschitz 2015);
More modest possibilities under the Israeli tax code for tax exempt donations to
non-profits (Haris 2012); and
The availability of international Jewish philanthropy (Katz-Gerro et al. 2014; Tal et
al. 2013).
It can be argued that international funding for environmental activism in Israel has
the potential to strengthen the independence of Israel ENGOs who seek to i nfluence
government policies. But these sources of funding have dropped dramatically in
recent years and available support is more than counteracted by the aforementioned
barriers to donations by the Israeli public for public interest groups. The result is
that not unlike other countries (Zhan and Tang 2011), the strategic decision to
assume the status of a “conflict” NGO and forego potential sources of support by
Israeli government agencies carries with it financial consequences.
To characterize the strength, stability, and freedom of action available to Israeli
ENGOs, it is important to consider their sources of income. This also provides
insights about the basis for ENGO decision making and the relevance of resource
mobilization theory. In the survey, ENGOs were requested to report the percent of
their income received from various sources. Figure 6 presents the results of income
sources for all Israeli ENGOs. The major source of income for both groups is
donations, accepted by 73 % of ENGOs. After that 49 % of the ENGOs report selfgenerated incomes; 25 % of ENGOs receive funding from local and national
governments.
Fig. 6
Percent of ENGOs that receive funding from the sources of income (N = 75)
A comparison of the sources of income between the two strategic groups as shown
in Fig. 7 primarily reveals similarities.
Fig. 7
Percent of strategic orientation groups receiving funding from different income sources
(N = 75, N consensus = 49, N conflict = 26)
Both strategic groups report a financial need for investing in economic enterprises
for future income: 53 % of consensus and 42 % ofconflict ENGOs strongly agreed
that this constituted an important organizational challenge for them. The
questionnaire responses were confirmed by interviews with ENGO leaders who
almost without exception express a desire to reduce dependence on supporting
foundations and raise the need for new sources of income.
A higher level of resolution examining specific income sources reveals different
portfolios among the two strategic groups. Figure 8presents the distribution with
regard to sources of income, based on a more refined delineation of donations. Large
disparities were found with regard to donations from individuals living outside
Israel. While 29 % of consensus ENGOs obtain such individual donations, only 8 %
of conflict ENGOs receive this kind of grant. Even more striking is the breakdown
regarding support from international governments or embassy grants. While 12 % of
consensus ENGOs utilize these sources of income, none of the conflict ENGOs do.
Similarly, corporate donations seem to be utilized more by consensus ENGOs than
by conflict ENGOs: 16 % consensus compared to only 8 % of conflict ENGOs
receive funding from corporations. Both consensus and conflict ENGOs are heavily
dependent on foundations. 58 % of conflict ENGOs and 53 % of consensus ENGOS
depend on foundations to fund sundry projects. Some 37 % of consensus ENGOs
and 31 % of conflict ENGOs depend on foundation grants for general support. Such
high rates, specifically for project-based donations, belie many organizations’
economic vulnerability.
Fig. 8
Donations: percent of strategic orientation groups that receive funding from different
sources in the form of donations list (N = 75, N consensus = 49, N conflict = 26)
A breakdown of different governmental sources also reveals an important difference
between the two strategic groups. Results presented in Fig. 9 show that while 16 %
of consensus ENGOs receive financial support from local governments, none of the
conflict ENGOs utilize this source of funding. Regarding national government
funding, 16 % of consensus ENGOs and 12 % of conflict ENGOS receive grants
from Israel’s central government. One plausible explanation for the relatively low
level of government funding received byconflict ENGOs is the restriction (more
implicit than explicit) imposed on ENGOs receiving government funding to refrain
from criticizing the government. This was given as part of the reason why two of
Israel’s example leading advocacy groups, the Israel Union for Environmental
Defense and Zalul refuse to receive government support.
Fig. 9
Government grants—percent of strategic orientation groups that receive from local and
national government grants (N = 75, N consensus = 49, N conflict = 26)
Income Generation How do Israeli ENGOs generate funding based on their own
initiatives? The breakdown of self-reliant income sources in Fig. 10 reflects two
completely different emphases among the different kinds of organizations.
While consensus ENGOs invest actively to develop a diverse portfolio of self-reliant
funding sources, conflict ENGOs rely almost entirely on membership fees, with only
modest development of other self-reliant sources. Accordingly, 22 %
of consensus groups receive funding through business ventures, while only 12 %
of conflict ENGOs report a for-profit business as an income source. The gap
between the groups appears higher in provision of services: 27 %
of consensus ENGOs charge fees for services, while only 4 % of conflict ENGOs
do. The opposite trend exists for membership: 35 % of conflict ENGOs receive
funding from dues paid by members as opposed to 24 % of consensus ENGOs.
Fig. 10
Self-reliant income—percent of strategic orientation groups that receive income from
self-reliant sources (N = 75, N consensus = 49 N conflict = 26)
A summary regarding the sources of ENGO funding suggests that consensus ENGOs
have a larger variety of funding sources and are less limited
than conflict organizations. As presented conflict ENGOs do not receive budgets
from local governments, and have not yet developed a significant capacity for
charging fees for services.
Geographic Distribution Comparisons between strategic groups according to
geographic location are presented in Fig. 11. A third ofconsensus ENGOS, 33 % are
not confined to a given region and try to operate throughout Israel.
Among consensus group, 23 % are based in the south, 19 % are focused in the
center, 10 % in the northern regions of the Galilee and Golan, and only 4 %
of consensusENGOS are focused in Jerusalem region. Mann–Whitney nonparametric test for distribution between the two strategic groups in geographical
distribution was made. No significant difference was found between their
geographical orientation and those of conflictENGOs. Mann–
Whitney U = 511.500, P > 0.05 (P = 0.518).
Fig. 11
Strategic orientation groups according to geographic region of operation, where the
activity in mostly invest in (N = 72, N consensus = 48, N conflict = 24)
Although the geographic distributions of consensus and conflict ENGOs are not
significantly different, some distinctions can still be seen. For example, both
peripheral regions of the south and north, including the Galilee and Golan, show a
larger ratio of conflict ENGOs relative to those in the center of Israel. This is
consistent with the assumption that conflict ENGOS tend to operate in the periphery,
while consensus ENGOs are located in the center of the country, closer to centers of
political power. The periphery in Israel is characterized by a weaker ability to access
decision makers as well as a diminished capacity for entering political controversies
as conventional players or lobbyists (Teschner et al. 2010). The periphery has a
higher percentage of ethnic minorities who feel subjectively disenfranchised and
objectively do not find debates over zoning or permitting to be taking place on a
proverbial “even playing field” (Tal 2016; Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005). It is
not surprising, therefore, that peripheral ENGOs have a greater tendency to
adopt conflict strategic orientations.
Also, most of the major industrial sources of pollution are located in the periphery,
some nearby populated areas. Most prominent among them are Neot Hovav a
chemical industrial zone and the disposing site for toxic chemical waste in Israel.
And the second, the chemical and oil refining industry located in the Haifa bay.
These led over the years to high-profile confrontational campaigns to mitigate
pollution and increase transparency in decision making.
Motivations of ENGOs The survey contrasted the ideological perspectives of
responding organizations and their members revealing several differences. To begin
with, the ideological perspectives appear to be driven by the specific circumstances
of the group’s staff, activists, and members. Less than half of consensus ENGOs,
45 % described their active affiliates as “neighborhood activists.” A far higher
percent (77 %) of conflict ENGOs characterized their membership this way. An even
greater difference was found in defining active affiliates as “a community threatened
by or suffering from environmental hazards.” Only 15 % of consensus ENGOs
responded positively to this definition, while more than half (54 %)
of conflict ENGOs found it appropriate.
These data suggest that conflict ENGOs are not only more peripheral and locally
oriented, but they also tend to define themselves as neighborhood activists. Many of
these groups are based on communities suffering from acute environmental hazards
(Fig. 12). This supports the hypothesis explaining the rationale for
choosing conflict strategies: citizens see themselves as defending their homes. At the
same time, a higher percentage of consensus ENGOs reported professionals and
academics among their active affiliates. Presumably, professionals and academics
feel more comfortable in organizations with a more reserved approach, allowing
them to be involved without compromising professional reputations. Also, being
part of consensus ENGOs enables many members to utilize their professional skills,
which empowers them and offers a sense of personal satisfaction.
Fig. 12
Definitions of the active affiliates of ENGOs, as reported by ENGOs (N = 79, N
consensus = 53, N conflict = 26)
Discussion
Results of the characterization of ENGOs between consensus and conflict strategies
reveal that two-thirds (67.1 %) of Israel’s environmental groups
adopt consensus strategies, and a third (32.9 %), base their campaigns
on conflict strategies. The characterization of ENGOs according
to consensus or conflict strategies offers a methodology for developing a profile that
distinguishes between conflictand consensus ENGOs, in regards to their use and
availability of several types of resources. In general, the profile suggests the two
different approaches to managing resources, found among the strategic-oriented
groups.
There was reason to expect a correlation between strategic orientation and age.
Dalton et al. (2003) found that older ENGOs tend to engage in consensus strategies
more than young ENGOs do. The explanation proposed by Dalton et al. for this
divergence is that over time ENGOs accumulate more connections and develop a
more respectable reputation. This gives them greater capacity to enter the political
discourse and participate in decision making. The picture emerging in Israel,
however, is somewhat different. Although correlations between organizational age
and different measures of ENGO size were found to be significant, associations
between age and ENGO strategic orientation were not.
Moreover, contrary to expectations, conflict ENGOs in Israel seem to be older
than consensus ones. Part of the reason may be chronological: a higher percentage
of conflict ENGOS were established during the 1990’s, while
more consensus ENGOs were established after 2000 when many hitherto
unaddressed pollution problems had already begun to be confronted. Another
explanation is that Israel’s pollution levels have improved considerably over the past
twenty years and many of the most egregious polluters have improved their
environmental performance due to regulatory efforts by the Ministry of
Environmental Protection (Tal 2006). Indeed, Israel’s Ministry of Environment,
while still generally considered a poorly funded and politically weak ministry, has
had a cumulative effect for the better on the environment. Organizational orientation
might reflect a change in the nature of local environmental problems which now
reflect considerably greater scientific uncertainties (Callon et al. 2001) and possible
risk tradeoffs (Graham and Wiener1997) along with an increased capacity by
government agencies. In interviews, some Israeli environmental leaders also speak
of a maturation process in their organizations where the scope of their work expands
making working relationships with officials increasingly important in order to
remain effective. This view is consistent with a central hypothesis of Resource
Mobilization Theory which assumes that more resources bring more conventional
modes of action.
In retrospect, the chronological dynamics can be seen as follows: Faced with a weak
ministry and a recalcitrant industrial sector, during the 1990s, many
environmentalists preferred a confrontational approach. Even though many of these
campaigns were poorly funded, the acute nature of the problem and the existence of
massive undeniable violations of new environmental standards and statutes
contributed to many successful civil society interventions. The new dynamics and
improved ability to engage industries and developers might makeconsensus efforts
more promising today than in the past. A third explanation could be that Israeli
ENGOs have changed their strategic orientation in response to the opening of
opportunity structures. This is not an uncommon phenomenon internationally, such
as the Kenyan Green Belt Movement which transitioned from a consensus to
a conflict oriented organization (Michaelson 1994).
Analyses of budgets also reveal significant differences between the strategic orientated groups. Consensus ENGOs have a higher annual budget
than conflict ENGOs. This is consistent with the findings of both Dalton et al.
(2003) and Piven and Cloward (1977 in Dalton et al. 2003) where an association
between conflict strategies and lower budgets was observed. Consensus groups had
higher budgets, presumably leading to more moderate and conventional actions. In
Israel, both consensus and conflict ENGOs are highly dependent on foundation
grants. This can be attributed to the large number of international Jewish
philanthropic bodies who became supportive of environmental causes in Israel over
the years. This dependence on foundation funding can be seen as a source of
vulnerability for Israeli ENGOs. Years ago, McCarthy and Zald (1977) emphasized
the instability of ENGOs that are funded by distant supporters.
The two strategic groups also exhibited differences in their ideological orientations.
The most prominent gap involved environmental justice. Conflict ENGOs see the
environmental problems of minorities and other disenfranchised communities as
constituting a more pressing challenge than consensus groups do. This phenomenon
is linked to the breadth of a given organization’s social perspective and
identification with a reformist agenda. Working in tandem with the Ministry of
Environmental Protection, consensus ENGOs tend to express appreciation for its
policy and actions, while few if any conflict ENGOs share this appreciation.
The greater familiarity with government operations among consensus ENGOs leads
to a more sophisticated and nuanced approach to government relations. For example,
a higher percentage of consensus ENGOs believe that the environmental movement
should approach a broader array of governmental ministries in its advocacy work.
This might be expected from organizations which focus on engaging the
government. Conflict ENGOs might see such overtures as unnecessary, or simply do
not have time or resources to familiarize themselves with the potential of engaging
myriad government sectors, aside from the environmental ministry.
Analyses of ENGO priorities largely show consensus between the two strategic
groups. There are many common values supported by both groups, even
as conflict ENGOs tend to express identification more strongly. There are a few
issues, however, where agreement between the types of organizations in Israel’s
environmental movement is less apparent. One involves antipathy to globalization
by several conflict ENGOs which are largely absent among consensus groups.
Another involves the great support among consensus ENGOS for integration of
economic tools and promotion of environmental technologies through environmental
policies. This contrast is consistent with other research (Dryzek et al. 2003) that
identified consensus ENGOs as comfortable with economic paradigms, relative
to conflict ENGOs that question the legitimacy of state actions in these areas.
Conclusions
A methodology designed to divide ENGOs according to strategic orientation proved
to be an effective research tool for evaluating their activities. Differences that
emerged point to two distinct ENGO profiles for the two strategic groups of ENGOs
in Israel with contrasting ideology and modes of action. In other areas, similarities
exist with a strong consensus existing across Israel’s environmental movement. Such
is a commitment to search for non-foundation funding, since a majority of ENGOs
are suffering from the recent reduction in support from international foundations
who have redefined their philanthropic priorities. Also, a surprising consens us exists
among ENGOs regarding the country’s environmental priorities was where
differences often appear to be largely tactical.
The study suggests that resources are an influential factor in organizational strategy.
With a few conspicuous exceptions, well-financed ENGOs appear to prefer
moderate actions. Presumably, it took considerable effort to develop connections
with decision makers andconsensus ENGOs do not wish to compromise them. These
groups prefer actions aimed at influencing through conventional channels, like
joining meetings and commissions, publishing position papers, monitoring, or
research.
Some of these actions require high levels of funding. ENGOs with more modest
budgets cannot afford to hire professional employees. In some cases, the mos t staff
that a grassroots group can hire is a part-time manager to coordinate activities and
manage basic paperwork.Consensus strategies require a better trained professional
staff. The nature of their work will tend to draw smaller audiences and create fe wer
events in which activists can participate, unless they are volunteer professionals or
academics. This explains the lower numbers of members and active affiliates.
But the opposite assumption must not be ruled out: moderate actions might lead to
better funding because they are more effective; aconsensus organizational
orientation might not be driven by opportunistic considerations but by a sober
assessment of the political dynamics and the potential to maximize influence.
According to this explanation, it is because of their success that consensus groups
successfully raise funds.
There are of course exceptions to the above trends and generalizations. Although
most conflict ENGOs have grassroots characteristics (smaller budgets and local
orientations), there are large national groups that show a conflict profile. They too
have significant financial and human resources, with highly professional staffs. It is
likely that these groups apply conflict strategies for reasons other than lack of
resources. To better understand the reasons why high-budget ENGOs use
confrontational, aggressive modes of action, it is important to consider the full range
of requirements for successful campaigns. They are often advantages to
using conflict strategies. Conflictapproaches are more invigorating, bringing
excitement to activists, especially if radical actions are involved. Conflict strategies
such as demonstrations, direct actions, disruption, and confrontations attract the
attention of the media and the public, raising their messages to the public discourse
and giving participants a sense of purpose and motivation. In some campaigns, even
well-connected ENGOs might choose these kinds of actions to increase public
pressure and visibility. Ultimately, the existence of a rich array of organizations can
ensure an optimal civil society presence. Formal or tacit divisions between “good
cop” and “bad cop” roles allow consensus and conflictENGOs, working in tandem,
to enjoy the best of both worlds as they seek to upgrade environmental performance
and public policies.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by the JMG foundation.
Funding
This study was funded by a 25,000 Pound Sterling grant from the JMG Foundation
of London to pursue independent research. The grant has no number associated with
it that is known to the authors.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of Interest
The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest and have not received
funding that would influence their conclusions or data presentation for this research.
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