Title
Author(s)
China's civil service reform and local government
performance: a principal-agent perspective
Wang, Xiaoqi; 王曉琦
Citation
Issue Date
URL
Rights
2006
http://hdl.handle.net/10722/52439
The author retains all proprietary rights, (such as patent
rights) and the right to use in future works.
Abstract of thesis entitled
“China’s Civil Service Reform and Local Government Performance:
A Principal-Agent Perspective”
Submitted by
Wang Xiaoqi
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at The University of Hong Kong
May 2006
This dissertation has examined the impacts of China’s Civil Service Reform on
the performance of government agencies in charge of environmental protection and
education in three cities (Haidian district of Beijing, Changchun, and Ningbo). I have
explored China’s Civil Service Reform and its impact on local government performance
within a principal-agent framework. Because of information asymmetry and conflict of
interest, bureaucratic superiors on three hierarchical levels within the old Cadre
Management System had trouble in obtaining full compliance from their bureaucratic
subordinates. But, being rational, the bureaucratic superiors (especially the central
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party) design rules and institutions to mitigate the
problems. The introduction of China’s Civil Service System in 1993 is one such effort to
i
manage cadres. The crucial outputs and outcomes of China’s Civil Service Reform are
the major focus of this study.
In particular, this dissertation aims to answer the following related questions.
How have the new sets of rules or initiatives shaped the incentives facing the civil
servants and thus influenced the way they exercise their discretion (this being the
managerial goal of the reforms)? How do the Reforms affect the ability of the Chinese
leadership to control the bureaucracy (the political goal of the reforms), and what are the
implications of the Reforms for the relationships among the political leadership, the
bureaucrats, and the citizens? How might we explain the variations in reform
implementations and performance across policy areas and regions after China’s adoption
of the Civil Service System?
I find that components of China’s Civil Service Reform provide superiors
solutions to alleviate the control problems, which were embedded in three hierarchical
levels of Chinese government, through incentive-alignment and information discovery.
The alleviations of control problems manifest themselves in the improvement of local
government performance, which is measured by objective indicators and citizen survey
data in this study. In general, I find the managerial and political objectives of China’s
Civil Service Reform have been met. As the outputs of the reforms, evidence suggests
civil service quality has improved and local governments have adopted and implemented
China’s Civil Service System to a large extent. Moreover, the implementation of China’s
ii
Civil Service System has motivated the civil servants to put more conscious effort into
their work and accordingly adjust the way they treat their clients. Referring to the
outcomes of the reforms, the implementation of the components of China’s Civil Service
System and other administrative monitoring mechanisms has helped the central
leadership in China to successfully strengthen control over the local governments and the
local bureaucrats. The strengthened control of the bureaucracy has manifested itself in
better provision and delivery of public services, which in turn leads to increased citizen
satisfaction with regard to government performance. All these illustrate that local
government performance improved after China’s implementation of Civil Service
Reform.
(467 words)
iii
China’s Civil Service Reform and Local Government Performance:
A Principal-Agent Perspective
By
Wang Xiaoqi
LL.B. B. Econ. LL.M., Peking University
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at The University of Hong Kong
May 2006
iv
Declaration
I declare that this thesis represents my own work, except where due acknowledgement is
made, and that it has not been previously included in a thesis, dissertation or report
submitted to this University or to any other institution for a degree, diploma or other
qualifications.
Signed
——————————
Wang Xiaoqi
v
Acknowledgements
This work has benefited greatly from a number of wonderful people.
Immeasurable degree of thanks goes to Prof. John P. Burns, my supervisor, who has
showed me how a great scholar should have passionate devotion to his field. His
insightful guidance, constant encouragement and kind support enabled the fulfillment of
this research. With his immense experience and knowledge of Chinese bureaucratic
politics, he taught me to argue concisely, with clarity and always supported by sound
evidence. His rigor and precision have set ever-higher standards for me, and he has been
unfailingly patient, kind and supportive.
I also owe a great debt to Dr. Danny Lam, who has inspired, challenged and
encouraged me throughout the entire process. With sharp critical mind, superb analytical
skills and good humor, Danny has showed me a combination of excellent scholarship and
marvelous mentorship. I have marveled at his pedagogy and hope to become half so
gifted at cultivating curiosity and inspiration in my future students.
I want to offer my sincere thanks to Prof. Ian Thynne, Dr. Hu Weixing and Dr.
Choi Jin Wook, who frequently discussed with and enlightened me with their wisdom
and expertise. Warm thanks also go to the members of the post-graduate office at the
Department of Politics and Public Administration for the friendship and a stimulating
intellectual environment. Their collective action has helped to make my Ph.D. study an
enjoyable experience.
vi
Special thanks are also due to The University of Hong Kong for providing me a
studentship for four years and a conference grant. For other financial support, I would
like to thank the Urban China Research Network of the State University of New York at
Albany for a Graduate Student Research Grant. I also thank the Hong Kong Association
of University Women for financially supporting my fieldwork with the HKAUW Thomas
H C Cheung Postgraduate Scholarship.
Finally, I would like to thank my family who has supported me in my endeavor to
gain an education. My parents and three lovely elder sisters provided me endless love and
caring.
Most importantly, I would like to thank Mr. Bai Yang, my fiancé. I am fortunate
that life brings him to me. Together we struggled and laughed, with joy and peace. His
intellectual and emotional support has been an enduring source of stimulation and insight
and has always given me the strength to go through challenging times. With his passion
and love, I was able to learn and accomplish so much. I want to dedicate this work to him
with all my love.
vii
Contents
Declaration
Acknowledgements
Table of Contents
List of Tables
List of Figures
A Map of China that Identified the Three Cities
i
ii
iv
vi
viii
ix
Chapter 1
1
Introduction
Research Questions
Framework: Principal-Agent Theory
Arguments, Hypotheses and Findings
Research Design
Implications
Overview of the Dissertation
Chapter 2
2
10
15
22
27
31
Principal-Agent Problems and Institutional Solutions:
A Review
34
Principal Agent Theory
Building Blocks from Behavioral Paradigm and Transaction Cost Approach
New Economics of Organization Applied to Public Bureaucracy
Government Performance Put into Principal-Agent Logic
Conclusion
34
44
48
57
62
Chapter 3 An Agency Model of Civil Service Performance in China 64
China’s Cadre Management System vs. China’s Civil Service System
Principal-Agent Relationship within an Agency (Level 1)
Multiple Principals Model (Level 2)
Control of the Bureaucracy (Level 3)
Conclusion
Chapter 4 Measuring Government Performance: Dimensions and
Indicators
65
83
89
96
105
107
Knowledge Gaps on Conceptualizing and Measuring Government Performance 108
Methodological Concerns
115
Case Illustration
119
The Governance Structure of Education Policy in China
141
Conclusion
144
viii
Chapter 5 Output of Reforms: Personnel Quality, Extent of Local
Implementation, and Effects on Officials’ Behavior
Efforts of Authorities to Raise Civil Service Quality
Local Implementation of China’s Civil Service Reform
Discussion
Conclusion
146
148
158
184
195
Chapter 6 Control of the Bureaucracy, Public Service Provision and
Citizen Satisfaction
196
Control of the Bureaucracy
Public Service Provision
Citizen Satisfaction Data
Conclusion
198
217
228
236
Chapter 7 Explaining Performance Variations
Policy Nature
Determining Factors of Government Performance Variations
Conclusion
Chapter 8 Conclusion
Appendix 2
239
246
266
269
Summary of Research Findings
Policy Implications
Methodological Implications
Limitations
Further Direction
Appendix 1
238
271
278
283
286
288
Detailed Information on The Database Used in This
Dissertation
292
Information on Socio-Demographic and Economic
Development in the Three Cities
299
Appendix 3 Protocol for The 90 In-depth Interviews
303
Appendix 4 Haidian Citizen Satisfaction Survey Questionnaire
308
Appendix 5 Fieldwork Survey Questionnaire
322
Bibliography
325
ix
List of Tables
Table 4.1 Question wording, definitions and descriptive statistics for the
model variables
125
Table 4.2 R-square values for the indicators of model 3
135
Table 4.3 Summary of model fit and comparisons of models
138
Table 5.1 Chinese leadership profile before and after the Mandatory
Retirement Program
150
Table 5.2 Number and distribution of civil servants by administrative level, 1998
155
Table 5.3 Number and distribution of civil servants by rank, 1998
156
Table 5.4 Transition program in Haidian
164
Table 5.5 Haidian district government civil servant selection situation, 1995-2002
165
Table 5.6 Total demobilized soldiers transferred into Haidian district, 1995-2001
167
Table 5.7 Avoidance in Haidian district government 1998
168
Table 5.8 Weights of different parties’ evaluation
169
Tables 5.9 Number of civil servants, their education level and age in
Haidian district government, 1991-2000
172
Table 5.10 Number of civil servants, their education level and age in Personnel
Bureau of Haidian district, 1991-2000
173
Table 5.11 Ningbo absorption of demobilized soldiers
177
Table 5.12 Number of civil servants, their education level and age in
Environmental Protection Bureau of Ningbo city, 1996-2000
179
Table 5.13 Number of civil servants in Ningbo Education Commission and their
education level, 1991-2001
180
Table 5.14 Changchun position classification 1996
181
Table 5.15 Changchun absorption of demobilized soldiers
182
Table 5.16 Are Pay and Performance Linked?
189
x
Table 6.1 Educational Performance in Terms of Promotion Rates, 1995-2000
218
Table 6.2 Education Expenditure Per Capita, 1997-2000
219
Table 6.3 Student-Teacher Ratio, 1995-2000
220
Table 6.4 Environmental Performance Scores, 1994 and 1999
221
Table 6.5 Perception that Bureau Performance Has Improved
230
Table 6.6 Public’s perception of the entity responsible for educational mission
231
Table 6.7 To what extent citizens are informed about government policy & activities 232
Table 6.8 Through what channels citizens know of the policies and activities
232
Table 6.9 General evaluation of educational performance compared with 5 years ago 233
Table 6.10 Evaluation of Haidian education performance by gender, age,
education and income
234
Table 6.11 Citizens' evaluation of Haidian educational performance
235
Table 6.12 Evaluation of government policy responsiveness
236
Table 7.1 Average Hours of Training
250
Table 7.2 Interviewees’ Preference on Organizational Harmony
259
Table 7.3 Horizontal Trust Level
259
Table 7.4 Insider Evaluation of Other Sub-divisions’ Performance in Education
262
Table 7.5 Insider Evaluation of Other Sub-divisions’ Performance in Environment
262
Table 7.6 Tendency to Help Other Sub-division Colleagues
263
xi
List of Figures
Figure 4.1 Path Diagram of Unidimension Model
129
Figure 4.2 Path Diagram of Three-dimension Model
132
Figure 4.3 Path Diagram of Refined Three-dimension Model
134
Figure 4.4 T-Value of Refined Three-dimension Model
136
Figure 4.5 Path Diagram of Second Order Measurement Model
140
Figure 5.1 Leading Cadres in China with University Education 1981-1998
154
Figure 8.1 Actors and Controls in 3 Levels of Principal-agent Relationships in
Chinese Government
273
xii
Changchun
Beijing
Ningbo
A Map of China that Identified the Three Cities
xiii
Chapter 1 Introduction
In the past two decades, the Chinese economy and society have undergone
tremendous changes. In general, a market economy has emerged and a more liberal
society has taken shape. These developments have brought great challenges to the
outdated governance structure and personnel management. To improve the quality of
government decision-making and tailor China’s management to its more complex
economy, Chinese post-Mao authorities have implemented a number of administrative
reforms, including reforms on selecting and promoting administrative officials from
among professionals and specialists based on their competence, expertise, education, and
age. In particular, in 1993 the government of China announced that it was establishing a
new Civil Service System1 to manage the 5.3 million or so white collar workers
employed as “civil servants” by the government. The purpose of the change, broadly
speaking, was to improve the efficiency, capacity, and integrity of the civil service. The
reforms have been implemented nationwide since 1993 and thousands of positions have
been filled under the new rules and procedures. It is time to investigate what impacts the
on-going Civil Service Reforms have had on the performance of the Chinese government.
This dissertation studies the efforts of Chinese authorities to modernize the government
1
Morgan and Perry define “civil service systems” as “mediating institutions that mobilize human resources
in the service of the affairs of the state in a given territory”. See Philip E. Morgan and James L. Perry, “Reorienting the Comparative Study of Civil Service Systems,” Review of Public Personnel Administration
Vol. 8, No. 3 (1988), p. 84. In this dissertation, however, I use the term “Civil Service System” in a more
restricted sense to mean a government personnel system of a particular kind that is characterized by open,
competitive selection and performance-based rewards. The term “China’s Civil Service System” is specific,
referring to the current government personnel system in China.
1
personnel system since the late 1970s, with a focus on the 1993 reform. The crucial
outputs and outcomes of these administrative reforms are the major focus of this study.2
Research Questions
In this dissertation, I will try to answer the following related questions. How have
the new sets of rules or initiatives shaped the incentives facing the civil servants and thus
influenced the way they exercise their discretion (the managerial goal of the reforms)?
How do the Reforms affect the ability of the Chinese leadership to control the
bureaucracy (the political goal of the reforms)3, and what are the implications of the
Reforms for the relationships among the political leadership, the bureaucrats, and the
citizens? How might we explain the variations in reform implementations and
performance across policy areas and regions after China’s adoption of the Civil Service
System?
Why This Topic Is Interesting and Important
2
Here “output” refers to the quality of government personnel. From the managerial perspective, Civil
Service Reform belongs to public personnel management reform. The output of personnel reform refers to
personnel quality. By “outcome”, I refer to the quality of public service provision and delivery. The logic:
the outcome of personnel reform means changes in government behavior have an impact on each citizen’s
life. Government is responsible for providing and delivering public services and one main part of a citizen’s
life is to consume public services. Then the question becomes what changes in government behavior have
what impact on the quality of public services. One proxy I find in this dissertation to measure the quality of
public service is customer/ citizen satisfaction.
3
We need to understand the political goal of the reforms in order to investigate the outcomes of China’s
Civil Service Reform. To achieve improvement in the quality of public service provision and delivery, the
political leadership wants to better control the bureaucracy since only a capable civil service can provide
better public services to the Chinese citizens. The political leadership will gain / regain public support
when the citizens feel satisfied with government performance in providing public service.
2
The Civil Service System is a basic constituent part of modern government, and a
key analytic unit of modern public administration.4
Modern government very much
depends on civil servants, who exercise considerable power and influence in the
discharge of executive functions. Given that an efficient civil service is crucial to the
implementation of socio-economic reforms, the demands for Civil Service Reform are
immense. Globally there is a trend toward increasing institutionalization of Civil Service
Reform.5 The transformation of Civil Service Systems has been seen in Eastern Europe,
Africa and many other areas in the world. China provides another picture of the
transformation of the Civil Service System, which should receive special academic
attention.6
The establishment of the Civil Service System in China has abolished the
inflexible over-centralized Cadre Management System by introducing a rational
management system based on categorization. The Civil Service Reform is of far-reaching
significance for the reform of China’s political system since the new system has also
introduced competitive and legal elements into personnel management. Moreover,
government rebuilding and changes in governance have had important impacts on the
welfare of Chinese citizens. Admittedly, reform is an ongoing process, and many events
4
Morgan and Perry address the importance of the Civil Service System as this: “just as power and politics
are the center of political science, and social organization the core of sociology, one could argue
persuasively that the Civil Service System is the core of public administration.” See Philip E. Morgan and
James L. Perry, “Re-orienting the Comparative Study of Civil Service Systems,” Review of Public
Personnel Administration Vol. 8, No. 3 (1988), p. 84.
5
The two basic goals of the Civil Service Reform are to improve government performance and to enhance
the legitimacy of the civil service. See Raadschelders, Joe C. N. and James L. Perry, “Protocol for
Comparative Studies of National Civil Service Systems,” (Bloomington: Comparative Civil Service
Research Consortium, 1994).
6
See Hans A. G. M. Bekke, James L. Perry and Theo A. J. Toonen (eds.), Civil Service Systems in
Comparative Perspective (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996).
3
are still gradually unfolding. Studies of this process will contribute to our understanding
of China’s political development in general.
Main Research Questions
To evaluate a reform, we first should be clear about what policy problems the
reform intended to address. In this dissertation, the main research questions are based on
my understanding of the managerial and political goals of the reforms and the evolving
process of how China’s leadership has decided to adopt the Civil Service System.
Personnel system reforms are a popular means of improving government performance. In
their performance management movement, most OECD countries adopted new
approaches to manage government staff, which stemmed from their belief that more
effective management of people in areas such as pay and employ practices, working
methods, organizational culture and job satisfaction will lead to more effective and
efficient government.7
One of the objectives of introducing a Civil Service System in China is to
improve government performance, as stated clearly in a series of official documents. For
example, the 1993 Provisional Regulations on State Civil Servants (referred as the 1993
Provisional Regulations thereafter) states that the objectives to promulgate these
regulations are to optimize the civil service work force, curb corruption and improve
7
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Integrating People Management
into Public Service Reform (Paris: OECD, 1996).
4
administrative performance (xiaoneng).8 The Notice for the Implementation Plan for the
Civil Service System says that the establishment of a Civil Service System is an
important step to promote the abilities and skills of the civil service work force, and
improve government efficiency.9
The above understanding is based on the 1993 Provisional Regulations, which
only indicate the managerial goals of China’s Civil Service Reform.10 China’s Civil
Service Reform also has political goals, which cannot be ignored otherwise we cannot
achieve comprehensive understanding of the reform. The analysis of the evolving process
of how China’s leadership has decided to adopt the Civil Service System will make the
political goals understandable. The leadership shifted the focus of China’s development
strategy to the economy in 1980. They saw political institutional reform as a means to
promote and implement their economic restructuring. 11 However, the Cadre Management
8
See Article 1 in the 1993 Provisional Regulations on State Civil Servants. A copy of the 1993 Provisional
Regulations can be found in the Ministry of Personnel (ed.), Guojia gongwuyuan zhidu quanshu [A
Collection of Documents on State Civil Service System] (Changchun: Jilin Literature and History Press,
1994), pp. 121-129. One of the objectives of China’s administrative reforms is to curb corruption. This is
because corruption has become an issue of major political and economic significance in recent years and
the necessity to take measures against it has become evident. However, the main aim of China’s Civil
Service Reform is to improve government efficiency on the one hand, and on the other hand, the Chinese
authorities have conducted resolute struggle against corruption through a lot of other political and legal
measures. So the focus of the analysis will not be put on corruption issue in this study. Moreover, the
challenges involved in undertaking empirical research on corruption issue in contemporary China should
not be underestimated. Due to the difficulties involved in collecting data, I did not explore corruption issue
in detail in this study.
9
A copy of the Notice for the Implementation Plan for the Civil Service System can be found in the
Ministry of Personnel (ed.), Guojia gongwuyuan zhidu quanshu [A Collection of Documents on State Civil
Service System] (Changchun: Jilin Literature and History Press, 1994), pp. 130-132.
10
In this dissertation, China’s Civil Service Reform is defined broadly, not only including the promulgation
of the 1993 Provisional Regulations but also a number of other reform initiatives that touch the issue of
public personnel management and the issue of control of the bureaucracy. This dissertation studies the
efforts of Chinese authorities to modernize the government personnel system since the late 1970s, with a
focus on the 1993 reform.
11
Chinese reformers saw political institutional reform not as an end itself, but rather as a means to promote
and implement their program of economic restructurings. See Harry Harding, “Comments”, in Susan Shirk,
5
System became incompatible with this new situation.12 To tailor China’s management to
its more complex economy, the post-Mao authorities were forced to select administrative
leaders from among professionals and specialists based in part on their work performance
and problem-solving ability rather than, as in the Mao era, on political credential alone.
In the mid-1980s, a reform of the cadre system was considered. At its 13th
National Party Congress in October 1987, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) endorsed
a program of political reform. The aim was to separate the functions of the Party and
government and to give the government more autonomy over the management of its own
staff.
13
Establishing a civil service system served as one of the tasks of the political
reform.14
However, the orthodox first generation of the communist revolutionaries in the
Party leadership prevented the inclusion of political reforms in the country’s political
agenda. They feared separation of the Party and government would take considerable
How China Opened Its Door: the Political Success of the PRC’s Foreign Trade and Investment Reforms
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994).
12
For a comprehensive discussion of the Cadre Management System, see Doak A. Barnett, Cadres,
Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967);
Harry Harding, Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy 1949-1976 (California: Stanford
University Press, 1981); Lee Hong Yung, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist
China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in
Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).
13
Deng Xiaoping called for the separation of the Party from the government (dang zheng fen kai) and put
reform of the cadre system on the Party’s agenda in his August 1980 address to the Politburo. See Deng
Xiaoping, “Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership,” in Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping
wenxuan, [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping] (Beijing: People’s Publishing, 1984), pp. 302-325.
14
The government announced plans to divide the cadres within the Government organs into “professional
civil servants” (ye wu gong wu yuan) and “political civil servants” (zheng wu gong wu yuan). The former
would consist of officials recruited through open examinations and promoted on the basis of job
performance and the latter, senior officials recommended by the Party to supervise the civil service. See
John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in Contemporary China,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs No.
18 (1987), pp. 47 – 83.
6
power regarding personnel allocation away from the Party.15 The orthodox Li Peng
announced the postponement of the introduction of the Civil Service System soon after
he took over the premiership in 1988. The Tiananmen Incident of 1989 further halted the
proposed political reform. After this incident, discussions on the separation of the Party
from the government were taboo. 16
At its 14th National Party Congress in October 1992 (after Deng’s famous South
China Inspection Tour), 17 the CCP reaffirmed its commitment to reform the civil service.
The Civil Service Reform was implemented from October 1993, after the promulgation
of the Provisional Regulations on State Civil Servants. This time the political goals of the
Civil Service Reform changed. Instead of separating the functions of the Party and
government, the central leadership put emphasis on strengthening the control over the
bureaucracy and improving the local implementation of central policies.18 By
strengthening control over the bureaucracy and building a capable civil service, the
15
Zhao Ziyang (the then General Secretary of the CCP) attempted to remove the management of viceministers and below from the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee to the Ministry of
Personnel. If they only controlled the “political civil servants”, the Party would lose direct control over
99% of cadres in the executive branch of government. See Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], 1 August 1988.
16
Details on the political environment of that time can be found in Lam, Tao-Chiu and Hon S. Chan,
“Reforming China’s Cadre Management System: Two Views of a Civil Service,” in Asian Survey Vol.36,
No.8 (1996), pp. 772-786.
17
In the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, the reformers in the top decision-making circle were on
the defensive, and a whole series of reform policies were put on hold. In order to counter the rise of leftist
ideology and generate the momentum for further reform, in the spring of 1992, Deng Xiaoping made his
famous trip to Shenzhen, the leading testing field of economic reform. This helped launch another round of
economic liberalization and administrative reform in China. See Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Governing China:
from Revolution through Reform 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 2004), pp.143-144.
18
In the new regulations, some radical components of the original plan have been deleted. One example is
that the divisions of the political affairs category of civil servants and professional work category have been
removed. The new Civil Service System will strengthen the control of the bureaucracy by institutionalizing
the new appointment and promotion rules, and the officials’ exchange and rotation system. See Huai Yan,
“Establishing a Public Service System,” in Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao (eds.), Decision-Making in
Deng’s China: Perspectives from Insiders (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp.169-175. He argues after the
Tiananmen Incident, China’s Civil Service Reform emphasized making sure of the Party’s overall control
of the government personnel system.
7
leadership hopes to gain/ regain legitimacy and public support (see detailed analysis in
chapter 3).
After studying the rationale behind China’s Civil Service Reform (both
managerial and political objectives), I raise the main questions of this study. Did the Civil
Service Reform improve the quality and efficiency of government employees? Did Civil
Service Reform result in some improvements in routine management? These questions
are to examine the outputs of the reforms. Further, did Civil Service Reform result in
some improvements in public service provision and delivery? In other words, what were
the consequences of bureaucratic maximization or sponsor control for the quality of
public services? These questions examine the outcomes of the reforms.
Moreover, it should be noted that the reform design and the implementation are
different things. It is possible that local governments’ implementations of the reforms
deviate from the formal rules and regulations. Thus it is understandable that local
government performance varies across policy areas and localities. How might we explain
these variations? In this dissertation, I compare bureau performance across various policy
areas and localities to single out the determining forces that cause great government
performance improvement.
Why Choose the Performance of Local Government Agency as the Target of This
Research?
8
First, given that local government is closely related to the everyday life of the
populace, decentralization is becoming the fashion of modern administrative reform.
Modern China also puts emphasis on decentralization.19 China’s Civil Service Reform
involves delegation of personnel management power to various levels of local
governments.20 When implementing the central policy, local governments have some
autonomy to adjust the national policy to their own local circumstances. As a
consequence of this autonomy, local leaders are able to direct the programs either
towards or away from the stated policy goals. Therefore, investigating the performance
changes of local government agencies is the direct way to test what really happened in
the local China and to what magnitude rather than the policy design of the central
government.
Second, given the size of the country and the uneven development among regions,
conditions for implementing policies in China often vary greatly. Balancing the
requirement for uniformity in the Civil Service System with this wide diversity in
regional circumstances and among the different levels of government is extremely
challenging. In China, different local governments’ abilities to bear the administrative
19
Lieberthal argues that decentralization is a common characteristic of many policy areas in China, see
Kenneth G. Lieberthal, “Introduction: the ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’ Model and Its Limitations”, in
Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds.), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision-making in PostMao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 1 – 32.
20
In China, the Party Centre is responsible for outlining the general reform framework through the CCP
Central Committee and its Organization Department, State Council, the Ministry of Personnel and other
concerned ministries. Provincial and sub-provincial governments are charged with adapting the framework
to local realities and designing and implementing the concrete programs. One striking example of
delegating personnel power to local governments is that of changing the “two levels down” management of
local cadres to “one level down” management. I will discuss this in detail in chapter 6.
9
costs of implementing the new system are different.21 Moreover, without the necessary
political support from local leaders, the implementation process can be slow and
arduous.22 All these indicate the importance of local government in investigating China’s
Civil Service Reform.
Third, why study the agency performance but not the individual performance? All
government agencies have their own missions. Scholars and the general public care more
about whether the agency accomplishes its mission and whether it uses their taxes wisely
than caring about the behaviors of individuals within the agency. Moreover, it is difficult
to measure exactly an individual’s performance and even more difficult to aggregate the
performance of many individuals. But by choosing agency performance as a dependent
variable, I can find some proxies for measurement, such as customer satisfaction, that is
the outcome of the collective actions of the agency staff.
Framework: Principal-Agent Theory
In government organizations, control problems occur when subordinates have
different interests from those of their superiors in the organization and when the behavior
of subordinates is imperfectly monitored. Control mechanisms are designed (and
sometimes take the form of reform initiatives) to minimize such problems by aligning
21
In poorer counties where personnel costs can amount to 70% or more of total expenditure (World Bank,
2002), paying bonuses and increments (which are required by the civil service reform pay policy) is
undoubtedly a real hardship. See John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in China,” in Governance in China
(OECD, 2005), pp. 51-74.
22
See Haiyan Caroline Tong, Jeffrey D. Straussman and Walter D.Broadnax, “Civil Service Reform in the
People’s Republic of China: Case Studies of Early Implementation,” Public Administration and
Development No. 19 (1999), pp. 193-206.
10
incentives or improving information. The dissertation aims to use this principal-agent
framework to examine the impacts of China’s Civil Service Reform on the performance
of local government. I choose principal-agent theory as the framework because it is
simple but can be extremely insightful in analyzing authority relationship. The chief
advantage of this approach is its parsimony. It shows that a range of seemingly unrelated
phenomena is in fact rooted in a common origin and that they serve similar functions of
aligning incentives of and generating information about lower-level officials in this large
organization--China. The strength of principal-agent theory also lies in its analytical
rather than metaphorical power, that is, its capacity to make transparent the process or the
mechanisms underlying complex relationships. Further, by providing a consistent
framework from which hypotheses may be drawn and tested, it may be capable of
ultimately sorting truth from error.
Principal-Agent Theory: Principal-Agent Problems and Control Mechanisms
Principal-agent theory helps us to understand the issues of hierarchical control in
the context of information asymmetry and conflict of interests. The typical principalagent relationship occurs when the agent performs certain actions on behalf of the
principal, who has to delegate some authority to the agent.23 The control problems
common in hierarchies arise on account of conflict of interest and information asymmetry
between the principal and the agents. Agents, in general, have information advantage
23
See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, No. 3 (1976), p. 308; Stephen A. Ross,
“The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 63,
No. 2 (1973), p. 134.
11
about the tasks assigned to them, either because of the attached technical details or
because of their proximity to the tasks, and about their own abilities and preferences. The
interests of the principal and the agent are inclined to diverge in a principal-agent
relationship, since it is assumed that the agent’s effort level will contribute positively to
the principal’s utility but reduce the agent’s welfare. The net effect from the presence of
these two factors (conflict of interest and information asymmetry) is that the agents may
shirk; they may work in the principal’s interests but put little effort into it or divert their
effort to their own interests.24
Here control is defined as the process whereby subordinates behave in ways that
are consistent with and/or beneficial to the interests of the principal or the organization as
a whole. The principal can control agents either by converging interests or by improving
information distribution—or by some combination of the two—through establishing a set
of practices, routines or organizational structures to serve such purposes. The practices,
routines, and organizational structures are referred to, collectively, as control mechanisms
in this dissertation. Overall, taken in its general form, the principal-agent theory suggests
that the principal can use incentive-alignment arrangement, monitoring, competition and
credible commitment to induce the desirable behaviors from the agents. 25
How the Principal-Agent Framework Helps Me to Understand the Research
Questions
24
Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Ibid, pp. 305- 360; Stephen A. Ross, Ibid, pp. 134- 139.
Terry Moe, “The New Economics of Organization,” American Journal of Political Science, No. 28
(1984), pp. 739-777.
25
12
First, the principal-agent theory provides logic to understand the relationship
between reform and organizational performance. In the principal-agent construction, the
main idea is that if the principal can effectively control the agents and get them to work
for the best interest of the principal—that is, reduce the agency cost—then the principal’s
interest will be promoted, which means that the organizational performance will be
improved. Reform implies transition from the old institutional arrangement to the new
one. In the old institutional arrangement, if the two conditions, i.e., conflict of interest
and information asymmetry, are present, agency problems must exist. Then the task
becomes an investigation into whether the new institutional arrangement provides
solutions to mitigate the agency problems. If the components of the new institutional
arrangement serve as solutions to the agency problems, then under this new institutional
arrangement, the principal can control the agents. This indicates organizational
performance will be improved.
Second, in this dissertation, the framework instructs me to start from identifying
actors of the game. Different actors possess different resource endowment. Principals
possess power while agents possess information. To test whether the agency problem is
present, I need to check whether the two conditions (conflict of interest and information
asymmetry) are present or not. The principal-agent theory specifies some control
mechanisms and institutional solutions to alleviate the agency problems. I will investigate
whether such mechanisms or solutions are present in the new institutional arrangement to
test the hypotheses regarding the performance changes of governmental organizations.
13
Third, it should be noted that new agency problems might emerge during the
reform implementation. Whether and how the principals in cases could design and
enforce countermeasures are the further targets to be investigated. I hope the design and
implementation of the countermeasures will account for the performance variations
among cases.
Fourth, like other studies in this tradition, my analysis of Chinese bureaucracy
also revolves around the incentives of individual players.26 This is because the
explanatory power of the principal-agent model lies in its adherence to methodological
individualism. The behavior of an individual is the point of departure for the analysis.
Collective phenomena, such as the growth of government bureaucracy or a deviating
implementation of political decisions, are explained as the intended and unintended
consequences of the individual actions and their interactions. This dissertation studies
what are the incentives, opportunities, and constraints embedded in China’s Civil Service
Reform, and how do they affect the behavior of the civil servants and hence agency
performance. Through tracing the causal mechanism all the way down to the individual
level, therefore, my arguments about macro-institutional choices and performance are
built on a solid micropolitical foundation.
Fifth, I identify three levels of analysis in this research. Given that the actors and
the problematics involved in the three levels are so different, the mechanisms in dealing
with the agency problems could be different across the three levels. Therefore in my
26
See Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967); William
Niskanen, Representative Bureaucracy (New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1971); Gordon Tullock, The Politics
of Bureaucracy (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1965).
14
adaptation of the principal-agent model, I depart from the conventional approach. Instead
of making universal and abstract assumptions, and arguing that the principal-agent theory
could provide a common theme for all three levels, I delve into the rich historical context
and the evolution of institutions to construct a more nuanced understanding of actors’
preferences and interests (see chapter 3). This adaptation of the principal-agent model is
advocated by scholars in “analytic narratives”. 27
Arguments, Hypotheses and Findings
Arguments
This dissertation first identifies the principal-agent problems involved in the
Cadre Management System. Second, I investigate whether and how the components of
the Civil Service Reform could serve as the institutional solutions to mitigate these
problems. In particular, I examine what kind of control mechanisms and monitoring
techniques have been adopted in China’s Civil Service System and the effects (including
human resource-based control mechanisms and the control of the bureaucracy) of them.
Third, to explain performance variations of government bureaus across various policy
areas and regions after China’s adoption of the Civil Service System, I investigate
whether certain new principal-agent problems emerge during the reform implementation.
Moreover, I investigate whether and how various local governments design
countermeasures to alleviate the newly-emerged problems.
27
See Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry Weingast, Analytic
Narratives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
15
My goal in this dissertation is not to give complete descriptions of all these
events, but to offer a logic that can organize these issues in one succinct and coherent
explanatory framework. This logic is built on principal-agent theory and its application to
human resource management and the control of the bureaucracy. Throughout the
dissertation, I explore China’s Civil Service Reform and its impact on local government
performance in a principal-agent framework. Because of information asymmetry and
conflict of interest, bureaucratic superiors on three hierarchical levels within the old
Cadre Management System had trouble in obtaining full compliance from their
bureaucratic subordinates. But, being rational, the bureaucratic superiors (especially the
central leadership of the CCP) design rules and institutions to mitigate the problems. The
introduction of China’s Civil Service System in 1993 to manage cadres is one such kind
of effort. Components of China’s Civil Service Reform provide superiors solutions to
mitigate these problems through incentive-alignment and information discovery. I argue
the control problems which were embedded in three hierarchical levels of Chinese
government have been alleviated to some extent through government’s adoption of the
Civil Service System. The problem alleviations manifest themselves in the improvement
of local government performance, which is measured by objective indicators and citizen
survey data in this study.
In general, the managerial and political objectives of China’s Civil Service
Reform have been met. As the outputs of the reforms, evidence suggests civil service
quality has improved and local governments have adopted and implemented China’s
16
Civil Service System to a large extent. Moreover, the implementation of China’s Civil
Service System has motivated the civil servants to put more conscious effort into their
work and accordingly adjust the way they treat their clients. Referring to the outcomes of
the reforms, the implementation of the components of China’s Civil Service System and
other administrative monitoring mechanisms has helped the central leadership in China to
successfully strengthen control over the local governments and the local bureaucrats. The
strengthened control of the bureaucracy has manifested itself in better provision and
delivery of public services, which in turn leads to increased citizen satisfaction with
regard to government performance. All these illustrate that local government
performance improved after China’s implementation of Civil Service Reform.
Hypotheses
In this dissertation, I identify three levels of principal-agent relationships in the
Chinese government. They are the superior - subordinate relationship within an agency;
the relationship between upper-level agency and lower-level agency; and relationships
among political leaders, bureaucrats (civil servants) and citizens. China’s Civil Service
Reform touched the control mechanisms available to the principal and the incentives of
the agents on all these three levels.
The first level of hypotheses concerns the superior-subordinate relationship within
a government agency. I apply principal-agent logic to understand how different Human
Resource Management practices shape officials’ incentives and thus influence
17
agency/organizational
performance.
The
principal/superior
wants
to
achieve
organizational performance by qualified personnel and scientific personnel management.
The Cadre Management System did not provide measures to deal with conflict of interest
and information asymmetry. Adverse selection, moral hazard, and shirking were involved
in almost all personnel procedures. The analysis of formal rules suggests that the
components of the Civil Service System could help the principal better control the agents
in a Chinese government agency. In general, I suppose under the Civil Service System,
there would be the following improvements: the principals in an agency could select
qualified and like-minded people; the principals could to some extent objectively
measure the agents’ performance and accordingly decide proper award or sanction; the
new pay scheme could motivate the agents to put conscious effort into their work and
voluntarily update their work related knowledge and skills; competition would thus be
instilled into selection, promotion and award practices. All these will have positive
influence on agency performance.
The second level of hypotheses explores the relationships among the local agency
and its regional leader and professional leader. One special organizing principle of
Chinese governance structure is that agencies in various local governments are formally
under two lines of leadership, one professional and the other regional.28 In China, because
the regional leaders tightly control their careers and budgets, local agents in various local
agencies share their interests more closely with the regional leaders. Under the Cadre
Management System, the unbalanced dual leadership led to the result that local agents did
28
This is the organizational principle of tiao-kuai (professional and regional) separation in Chinese
governance structure. See Kenneth G. Lieberthal, op. cit.
18
not faithfully fulfill the requirements from their professional leaders. Therefore, a control
problem between the professional leader and the local agency existed. During China’s
Civil Service Reform, the central leadership institutionalized evaluation of the
performance of leading cadres and formulated the Leading Cadre Responsibility System.
The measures for evaluating and promoting the leading cadres became more
comprehensive and not purely based on economic development.29 Under the Leading
Cadre Responsibility System, the regional (local government) leaders can not totally
disregard the implementation of non-economic policies.
If they do disregard other
policies completely, local governments will risk attracting the attention of the higher
levels of government, and punitive action may follow. Local leaders will now strongly
promote local economic development, and at the same time implement other policies (for
example, environment and education) sufficiently so as not to attract the attention of a
higher level of government. Therefore the local functional agencies, to some extent, will
implement and enforce the requirements from the professional leaders strictly. The
dissertation arrives at the following hypotheses. Under China’s Civil Service System, by
evaluating the regional leading cadre’s performance more comprehensively, the local
non-compliance of professional leaders’ directives decreased. This would put positive
influence on local functional agency performance. In other words, a local functional
agency would more faithfully fulfill their professional missions.
In level 3, I will investigate how the political leadership controls the bureaucracy.
In dealing with the issue of control of the bureaucracy, the central leadership, civil
servants, and citizens are collectively involved. Under the Cadre Management System,
29
I will discuss the Leading Cadre Responsibility System in detail in chapter 6.
19
the criteria for bureaucratic promotion were political loyalty and social class background.
Consequently, local bureaucrats aimed to please the central leadership but cared little
about the citizens. If we consider this from the citizen-principal’s perspective, there is a
moral hazard problem in the local agents’ behavior. The most important difference
between the Cadre Management System and the Civil Service System is the promotion
criteria. Under China’s Civil Service System, the promotion criteria focus on work
performance and problem-solving ability. For work performance, civil servants must find
in their performance some physical and material basis. The apparent material basis could
be economic growth, infrastructure construction, increased foreign investment, and so on.
Most of these material bases are public goods or public services, and of course will
influence the citizens’ interests. More important, these public goods and public services
can not be produced or provided without the cooperation of the citizens. Well realizing
this, the civil servants tend to care about the citizens and try to induce cooperative
behavior from them. In general, after the reform, civil servants aim to please both the
leadership and the citizens. Civil servants seek to please the citizens since they want to
induce their cooperation in co-production of the public goods. The production or
provision of public goods can in turn serve as proof or material basis when civil servants
show their work performance to the leadership. Thus, I suppose if citizen satisfaction is
used as a measure, the performance of local government agencies will likely be
improved.
Findings
20
The results of empirical study support the hypotheses. In particular, this
dissertation yields eight main findings. First, evidence indicates that the cadre corps have
been successfully modernized through China’s Civil Service Reform in the sense that
local officials are now better educated and younger. Second, case studies of local
implementations of the reform suggest that to a large extent, local governments faithfully
adopted and implemented China’s Civil Service System. Third, the implementation of
China’s Civil Service System has motivated the civil servants to put more conscious
effort into their work and accordingly adjust the way they treat their clients. Fourth,
reforms have caused the evaluation of leading cadres to be more comprehensive, and not
purely based on local economic development. This has led regional leaders to pay more
attention to non-economic policies, and local bureaus in non-economic fields more
faithfully fulfill their professional missions. The perception data of officials and clients
reveals that the actual behaviors of the local officials in providing public service largely
conform to the directives from upper level government. That is, there is a high degree of
local compliance with key central policies in providing public service. Fifth,
administrative reforms have caused the promotion rule of Chinese hierarchy to be based
on work performance and problem-solving ability. In order for their work performance to
impress their superiors, local bureaucrats are bound to please the citizens (so as to induce
cooperation behavior from the citizens). In my study, citizens agree that performance of
local governments improved after reforms and citizens feel satisfied with local
governments’ performance. Sixth, the implementation of China’s Civil Service System
components and other administrative monitoring mechanisms help the central leadership
in China to successfully strengthen control over the local governments and the local
21
bureaucrats. The strengthened control of the bureaucracy manifests itself in better
provision and delivery of public service, which in turn leads to increased citizen
satisfaction with government performance. Seventh, referring to performance variations
across policy areas, I find in environmental policy, the principals tend to face more
serious control problems than the principals in educational policy in China. Eighth,
referring to performance variations across bureaus, I find the following characteristics are
crucial in achieving great performance improvement: more financial resources and more
committed leaders to support the local implementation of the reform measures; and
effective leadership that can design and implement countermeasures to mitigate the
newly-emerged principal-agent problems during the implementation process.
Research Design
Case Selection
In this research, two policy areas—environmental protection and education—and
three cities-- Beijing, Changchun and Ningbo--are selected for empirical study. The three
cities are chosen because they are relatively accessible to us and because they are
characterized by some geographic and income spread. Changchun (in Jilin province) and
Beijing are located in the north while Ningbo (in Zhejiang province) is located in the
mid-south. All three places, however, are located in the eastern, more developed part of
the country. The three cities also vary according to incomes – in 2000 the per capita GDP
of Beijing and Ningbo (RMB 22,000 and RMB 21,786 respectively) was almost double
that of Changchun (RMB 12,381). Because authorities have ranked Changchun and
22
Ningbo at “deputy provincial-level,” we decide to focus on a district of Beijing (Haidian
district), rather than the entire city (which is ranked at provincial level). Admittedly there
is still some asymmetry within our comparison. The populations range from 1.2 million
for Ningbo to 2.9 million for Changchun (Haidian was about 1.5 million).
Some empirical studies find that the nature of public policy has acted as a
confounding factor to influence people’s evaluation of government performance.30 We
choose two policy areas for a modest comparison. As a result, my arguments on local
government performance are not policy-specific. We also think that bureaus in these two
different policy areas would provide an interesting contrast. Education bureaus have
existed for a very long time in China, have a relatively high bureaucratic rank, and have
been staffed by generalists with backgrounds in education. Indeed, education bureaus
have recruited their staff from school teachers. By contrast environmental protection
bureaus have been relatively recent creations (mostly set up in the 1980s), have until
recently had a relatively lower bureaucratic rank, and should have been staffed by
specialists.31 Generally city education bureaus (sometimes called commissions) are two
to three times larger than environmental protection bureaus. In our study environmental
protection bureaus ranged from 28 to 30 employees (in spite of variation in population –
30
Janet M. Kelly and David Swindell, “A Multiple-Indicator Approach to Municipal Service Evaluation:
Correlating Performance Measurement and Citizen Satisfaction across Jurisdictions,” Public
Administration Review, Vol. 62, No. 5 (2002), pp. 610-621; Karin Brown and Phillip B. Coulter,
“Subjective and Objective Measures of Police Service Delivery,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 43,
No. 1 (1983), pp. 50-58; Jeffrey L. Brudney and Robert E. England, “Urban Policy Making and Subjective
Service Evaluations: Are They Compatible?” Public Administration Review, Vol. 42, No. 2 (1982), pp.
127-135.
31
Abigail R. Jahiel, “The Organization of Environmental Protection in China,” The China Quarterly No.
156 (1998), pp. 757- 787; C W H Lo, K T Yip and K C Cheung, “The Regulatory Style of Environmental
Governance in China: the Case of EIA Regulation in Shanghai,” Public Administration and Development
No. 20 (2000), pp. 305- 318.
23
the environmental protection bureau in Changchun with twice as many people is the same
size as the bureau in Ningbo). Education bureaus/commissions, by contrast, varied in size
from 64 employees in Changchun to 90 or more in Ningbo and Beijing’s Haidian.32 That
is, the government of poorer and more populous Changchun appears to have been
comparatively under resourced in both environmental protection and education.
Moreover, the functions of the bureaus in the two policy areas differ somewhat. While
both environmental protection and education bureaus carry out inspections and provide
services to clients, education bureaus also allocate resources to schools under their
control.33
Method and Data
A variety of research methods have been employed in this study, including
comparative case studies and quantitative methods in analyzing data, and documentary
research, in-depth interviews and questionnaire surveys in collecting data.
To
empirically demonstrate whether and how administrative reform has an impact on
government performance is a challenging task.
34
The challenges are rooted in 1). the
difficulty of defining and measuring government performance meaningfully; 2). the
difficulty of investigating the reform implementation of various local governments; 3).
32
The administrative establishment of the three Environmental Protection Bureaus and the three Education
Bureaus are 30, 28, 28, 148, 90, and 64 respectively in Haidian, Ningbo, and Changchun. There is a
relatively larger education establishment in Haidian District. Indeed, 148 employees staffed two agencies
that dealt with “education work,” including both the Education Commission and the CCP Education Work
Committee.
33
Yu Qiang, HKU-PKU Changchun Education Case Study (in Chinese) (2001).
34
OECD, Performance Management in Government: Performance Measurement and Result-oriented
Management (Paris: OECD, 1994); OECD, Performance Management in Government: Contemporary
Illustrations (Paris: OECD, 1996).
24
more importantly, the difficulty of identifying the link between the reform and
performance changes.
In order to collect valid and reliable evidence, the following efforts have been
made for the purpose of this study. In defining government performance, scholars have
long recognized that government performance is multi-dimensional. In measuring
government performance, objective indicators and citizen satisfaction survey have been
frequently used to proximate government performance (see detailed discussion in chapter
4). In this study, important sources of objective data include press releases available from
the websites of the local governments, documents provided by the local government
bureaus, statistical data and press cuttings. We have conducted citizen satisfaction
surveys to collect subjective data on government performance. Referring to investigating
reform implementation, fieldwork research has been conducted. In particular, a
questionnaire survey and in-depth interviews have been used to gather information on
reform implementation of the three local governments concerned in this study. For
identifying the linkage between the reform and government performance changes, we
have mainly relied on in-depth interviews with officials and clients. Comparing officials’
perception data with that of their clients could help us to confirm or reject some
arguments regarding a reform-performance link from the interviews. Through uncovering
the extent and the structure of the information that the related interviewees revealed, I
have drawn some meaningful conclusions on reform –performance links.
25
As a result of these efforts, the empirical data set in this dissertation includes three
main parts.35 First, we carried out in-depth interviews with a total of 40 officials working
in environmental and education bureaus and 50 clients of the bureaus in the three cities.
The 90 interviews were carried out in 2000 and 2001. The 40 officials were selected
from a pool of 388 officials. To increase the variety of responses, we selected them from
various bureaucratic ranks.36
Second, we conducted a questionnaire survey to examine how citizens evaluate
government performance in Haidian district of Beijing city from January to March in
2003. The Probabilities Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling method was adopted to
generate a random sample of 728 adults in the Haidian district. This probability sample
was derived from a multi-stage sampling process. Step 1, 25 Urban Residential
Committees (Juweihui) were randomly chosen. Step 2, 29 households were randomly
chosen from each of the 25 Urban Residential Committees, producing a total of 728
households. Step 3, one individual of 18 or older but younger than 67 was randomly
chosen from each of the 728 households as the interviewee. During the survey, a field
worker brought the questionnaire to the randomly chosen individual respondent and then
conducted the interview. On average, the interview took 45 minutes. A total of 501
permanent urban residents aged between 18 and 66 were interviewed. The response rate
was approximately 69%. Demographic information of the interviewees can be found in
Appendix 1.
35
The data for this dissertation came in part from a CERG research project supported by the Hong Kong
Research Grants Council, entitled “The Impact of Reform of the Civil Service Entry Selection System in
China since 1993” RGC No. HKU7128/98H.
36
See Appendix 1 for a profile of the interviewees.
26
Third, I conducted fieldwork for this study. In particular, I conducted in-depth
interviews and questionnaire surveys in environmental protection bureaus and
educational bureaus of Haidian district and Changchun city during March and April of
2004 and of Ningbo city in February of 2005. During the fieldwork, I try to collect data
and information on the implementation of China’s Civil Service Reform, performance
measurement in local government bureaus, and officials’ perceptions of their clients and
the performance of their bureaus. I interviewed 52 civil servants (a profile can be found
in Appendix 1).
Implications
First, scholars of China studies have worked on bureaucracy extensively;37
however, they have mainly been interested in describing the norms and procedures of
bureaucracy, thinking the bureaucracy/bureaucratic structure as given. They did not crack
open the organization of the bureaucracy, nor investigate the intrinsic characteristics of
the bureaucracy/bureaucratic organization.38 That is to say few have analyzed the
rationale behind these rules, institutions, and institutional design. With the assistance of
37
See Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Michel C. Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and
Processes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M.
Lampton, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision-making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1992); Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Governing China: from Revolution through Reform 2nd ed.
(New York: Norton, 2004).
38
The “new economics of organization” (reviewed by Terry Moe in 1984) provides insights in studying the
intrinsic characteristics of bureaucratic organization. By investigating the individual incentive and the
institutional influence on individual incentive and behavior, this perspective highlights the rationale behind
the institutional design. See Terry Moe, “The New Economics of Organization,” op. cit.
27
principal-agent logic, this dissertation opens the organization of Chinese bureaucracy and
provides some thoughts to understand institutional design in China.
Second, among the scholarship of Chinese Civil Service Reform, some focus on
describing the changes on norms or procedures of appointment and promotion
decisions39; some describe the implementation situation with a general brush40; others
explain the socioeconomic factors behind the mobility of Chinese cadres.41 Although
these studies have significantly advanced our understanding of Chinese administrative
reforms, they have limitations. They are quite descriptive rather than exploratory and no
study has assessed the impacts of the reforms on government performance. This
dissertation aims to fill this gap. Given that assessment can tell others whether the policy
is good or enforceable, and whether the implementation is fluent, the assessment of
reforms can serve as the reference for the next round of policy design and decisionmaking.
39
See John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in Contemporary China,” Australian Journal of China Affairs
No. 18 (1987), pp. 47-84; John P. Burns, “Chinese Civil Service Reform: The 13th Party Congress
Proposal,” The China Quarterly No.120 (1989), 739 – 770; John P. Burns, “China’s Administrative
Reforms for a Market Economy,” Public Administration and Development Vol. 13, No. 4 (1993), 345 –
360; John P. Burns, “Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: the 1990
Nomenklatura,” The China Quarterly No. 138 (1994), pp. 458- 491; Melaine Manion, “The Cadre
Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of Party and State
Leaders,” The China Quarterly No. 102 (1985), pp. 203- 233.
40
For example, see John P. Burns, “The Civil Service System of China: The Impact of the Environment,”
in John P. Burns and Bidhya Bowornwathana (eds.) Civil Service Systems in Asia (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2001), pp. 79-116; Chou Kwok Ping, “Conflict and Ambiguity in the
Implementation of the Civil Service Reform in China, 1993-2000,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Hong
Kong: The University of Hong Kong, 2003).
41
See Lee Hong Yung, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991); Andrew G. Walder, “Career Mobility and the Communist Political
Order,” American Sociological Review Vol. 60, No. 3 (1995), pp. 309– 328; Zhou Xueguang, “Partial
Reform and the Chinese Bureaucracy in the Post-Mao Era,” Comparative Political Studies No. 28 (1995),
pp. 440– 468.
28
Third, the insights generated from the “new economics of organization” have had
a substantial impact on political science since 1984.42 Surprisingly, few have applied this
perspective to non-democratic regimes. Even more surprisingly, the studies of Chinese
politics have not been affected by the new economics of organization perspective.
Therefore our understanding of agency problems and institutional solutions has some
democratic bias.43 I believe the “new economics of organization” perspective can deal
with more generic topics and can speak to a bigger audience. I will apply this perspective
to China. This dissertation will show how this perspective helps to structure a coherent
argument of Chinese administrative reforms and government performance. Moreover,
China provides an ideal place outside of a democratic state for studying the agency
problem (informational problem) since its organization is complicated and the
informational demand is so acute.
Fourth, this dissertation establishes a model on investigating the outputs and
outcomes of the administrative reform, which is conducive to later empirical research. If
this study only benefits China, it will be of marginal interest. But the fact is it does not.
This research is intended to provide an analytical perspective that is conducive to
42 In 1984, Terry Moe first comprehensively introduced the school of “new economics of organization”.
For a detailed review of the development of this school, see four articles: Ronald Wintrobe, “Modern
Bureaucratic Theory,” in Dennic C. Mueller (ed.), Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 429-454; Terry Moe, “The Positive Theory of Public
Bureaucracy,” in Dennic C. Mueller (ed.) Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 455-480; William Niskanen, “Bureaucracy,” in William F.
Shughart and Laura Razzolini (eds.), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice (Edward Elgar Publishing,
2001), pp. 258-270; Chang et al. “Rational Choice Theories of Bureaucratic Control and Performance,” in
William F. Shughart and Laura Razzolini (eds.), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice (Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2001), pp. 271-292.
43 For example, the “fire alarm” as a control mechanism in China does not work as successfully as in
democratic countries. This is due to the absence of an independent court system and the authorities’
restriction on the formulation of interest groups and powerful non-government organizations. Another
example, in China civil servants tend to be politically in line with the leadership and hence ideological
persuasion can serve as a control mechanism.
29
understanding the logic between administrative reform and local government
performance. The principal-agent logic advanced here can construct coherent hypotheses
and arguments about both the managerial dimension and political dimension of
administrative performance.
Fifth, the rules and institutions on appointing and promoting personnel in
government serve as useful mechanisms for the leadership to induce local bureaucratic
compliance when implementing central policy. China’s Civil Service Reform touches
these rules and institutions. Therefore this dissertation will contribute to the long-standing
debate among China studies regarding the central government’s ability to control policy
implementation by a decentralized bureaucratic system. In some studies, the ability of the
central government to control the local governments has been repeatedly called into
question. These studies show that bureaucratic noncompliance has emerged as one of the
most challenging problems facing the CCP leadership in contemporary China.
Accordingly it has been claimed there is a governance crisis in China and collapse is
predicted.44 On the other hand, a great deal of literature has argued that the Chinese
Communist Party is capable of great institutional adaptability and that the central
leadership’s capacity to control and monitor lower level agents has increased in China.45
44
See Pei Minxin, From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New
York: Random House, 2001).
45
John P. Burns, “The People’s Republic of China at 50: National Political Reform,” The China Quarterly,
No. 159 (1999), pp. 580-594; Maria Edin, “State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre
Management from A Township Perspective,” The China Quarterly, No. 173 (2003), pp. 35-52; Yasheng
Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China: the Political Economy of Central-Local Relations
during the Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Dali L. Yang, Remaking the
Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and Politics of Governance in China (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 2004); Naughton and Yang, Holding China Together: Diversity and National Integration
in the Post-Deng Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
30
I agree with this. This dissertation argues through implementing China’s Civil Service
System and other administrative monitoring mechanisms, the central leadership improved
its capacity to shape, reward and control local governments and local bureaucrats.
Despite the tremendous pressures induced by the continual reforms and decentralization,
the central leadership has achieved a reasonably high degree of cohesion among cadres
by designing effective mechanisms of elite recruitment, promotion and rotation, etc.
Overview of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into two parts. Part one contains theoretical
discussion and the modeling process. Chapter 2 introduces some basic concepts and
analytical tools of the principal-agent theory. It serves as a review of principal-agent
problems and relevant institutional solutions. Chapter 3 specifies the components and
logic of the principal-agent model to China, and thus establishes an agency model of
Chinese Civil Service Reform and performance of local governments. Drawing on
historical and institutional backgrounds, I develop three sets of hypotheses that
incorporate both managerial and political dimensions of administrative performance. The
hypotheses lay down some theoretical expectations for empirical analysis.
In part two, I test the hypotheses and analyze the outputs and outcomes of China’s
Civil Service Reform. A measurement model for assessing the performance of local
Environmental Protection Bureaus is developed in chapter 4. Through conceptualizing
government performance and setting benchmarks on measurement, chapter 4 serves as
31
the foundation for further examining the impacts of the reform on Chinese local
governments.
Chapter 5 is the empirical test of the level 1 hypotheses. It examines the outputs
of the reforms, including personnel quality, extent of local implementation, and effects on
officials’ behavior.
Chapter 6 is the empirical test of the level 2 and 3 hypotheses. It examines the
outcomes of China’s Civil Service Reform (impacts of the reform on public service
provision and citizen satisfaction). It first reviews and analyzes how upper levels of the
Party-state have strengthened their political control over lower level bureaucrats through
appointment, promotion and rotation and so on. Second, the chapter shows that under
strong central control, local governments do improve their performance in providing and
delivering public service. The manifestations include statistical data and case studies of
public service provision and delivery. Third, the strengthened control of the bureaucracy
is also manifested in the increased level of citizen satisfaction with government
performance.
Chapter 7 explains why government performance varies across different policy
areas and various localities. In particular, I compare the performance of the six bureaus in
various sub-issues to single out the forces that cause great government performance
improvement.
32
This dissertation concludes in chapter 8. The chapter first summarizes the
empirical findings. Second, several policy and methodological implications resulting
from the analysis are identified. After noting some limitations, the chapter closes with
further directions for research.
33
Chapter 2 Principal-Agent Problems and Institutional Solutions:
A Review
In this chapter, I first introduce the basic concepts and analytical tools of
principal-agent theory. Then, I highlight some insights from behavioral paradigm and
transaction cost approach, since these insights will serve as building blocks when
applying economic perspective to political institutions. To supplement its relative absence
in the field of politics, I also place the principal-agent approach in the context of the
relevant economic and political science literatures (positive theories of bureaucracy).
Finally, I apply this principal-agent logic to the analysis of government performance,
focusing on various levels of principal-agent problems involved in government.
Principal Agent Theory
Principal agent theory helps us to understand the issues of hierarchical control in
the context of information asymmetry and conflict of interests. Hierarchy is a typical
organization form of business firms, not-for-profit organizations, and government
agencies. In a hierarchy, actors at different hierarchical levels are vertically related: the
superior has authority over his subordinates and the subordinates provide information to,
and follow instructions from, their superior. There might be many layers in a hierarchy.
As the number of layers increases, the complexity involved increases too.
Whether and how the superiors can control their subordinates are the essential
topics of hierarchy. The problem—control of subordinates—repeats itself at every layer
in the hierarchy. Many schools provide insights, for example, organizational theory, the
34
scientific management school, and etc. The way principal-agent theory addresses the
complexity involved in hierarchical control issues gains it the reputation of utility,
parsimony and concert, i.e., principal-agent theory helps to simplify different levels of
relationship between the superior and his subordinate to a typical principal and his agent
relationship (through a principal-agent chain). As Moe argued in 1984, a principal-agent
model cuts through the inherent complexity of organizational relationships by identifying
distinct aspects of individuals and their environments that are most worthy of
investigation, and it integrates these elements into a logically coherent whole.1
Actors and Motivations
Principal agent theory holds that many social relationships can be usefully
understood as involving two parties: a principal and an agent. The agent performs certain
actions on behalf of the principal, who has to delegate some authority to the agent.2
Principal-agent relationships are common in our daily lives. For example, a
professor hires a research assistant to collect research materials. Stockholders hire a
manager to run the corporation for them. In the political world, citizens routinely elect
representatives to make public policy for the community.
Principal-agent theory draws upon the rational economic model of the individual.
This is a model of persons pursuing their self-interest and maximizing their personal
1
See Terry Moe, “The New Economics of Organization,” American Journal of Political Science, No. 28
(1984), p. 757.
2
See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, No. 3 (1976), p. 308; Stephen A. Ross,
“The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 63,
No. 2 (1973), p. 134.
35
calculus. In such a model, an individual is assumed to face a set of possible actions and to
choose that action within the possible set that he most prefers. The larger environment
influences the behavior of an individual by constraining the set of possible actions, by
changing the relations between actions and outcomes and, to some extent, by influencing
his personal preferences.3 Typically, such a rational actor seeks personal wealth, status,
leisure, or the like.4
In principal-agent theory, both principals and agents will act in their self-interest
to maximize their own welfare. The principals have some motivation to rely on the agents
perhaps because they themselves lack certain specialized knowledge or legal certification
that the agents possess, or because sometimes the size or complexity of the task simply
requires coordinated action by persons other than themselves.
On the other hand, effort carries a negative utility in the agents’ utility function. It
assumes that the agents prefer to have more spare time and leisure. This assumption
implies some divergence of interests between principals and agents. That is, while agents
want to spare effort as far as possible, the principal values more of it, since the output and
thus the principal’s interest increase as agents devote more effort to their tasks.
This divergence of interests and /or preferences between the two parties will cause
problems. Given the agent’s concern for his own interest, there is no guarantee that he,
3
William Niskanen, “Bureaucracy,” in William F. Shughart and Laura Razzolini (eds.), The Elgar
Companion to Public Choice (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001), pp. 258-270.
4
See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure”; Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York:
The Free Press, 1985).
36
once hired, will in fact choose to pursue the principal’s best interests or to do so
efficiently.5 We term this problem a “principal-agent problem” or “agency problem”.
Agency Problems
Conflict of interest, information asymmetry, shirking, adverse selection, and
moral hazard are common themes among scholars of principal agent theory.6
In a standard principal-agent model, the conflict of interest has been directly built
in. It is assumed that the agent’s effort level will contribute positively to the principal’s
utility but reduce the agent’s welfare. By this construction, self-interested agents may
shirk on the job or divert their effort to their own interests when effort is not observed by
their principals. As Mitnick argued in 1992, a loss of control is inevitable. 7 So this
assumption implies agents’ incentive for shirking and the ensuing control problem for the
principal.
In order to understand shirking behavior, we should first understand under which
circumstances shirking could happen. One of the most important concepts is team
production. Organizations or firms are characterized by team production where: 1).
5
See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure,” p. 308.
6
See R. Rees, “The Theory of Principal and Agent,” Bulletin of Economic Research No. 37 (1985), pp. 428; Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Principal and Agent,” in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman (eds.),
Allocation, Information and Markets (London and Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1989), pp. 241-253; Stephen A.
Ross, “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem,” pp. 134-139.
7
See B. M. Mitnick, “The Theory of Agency and Organizational Analysis,” in N. E. Bowie and R. E.
Freeman (eds.), Ethics and Agency Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 76.
37
several types of resources are used, 2). the product is not a sum of separable outputs of
each team member, and 3). not all resources used in the team belong to one person.8
Team production suffers from a particular problem—shirking. The problem is a
reflection of underlying externalities: for each individual, the fact that others benefit from
his productive effort is external to his decision calculus, and he therefore chooses more
leisure than is socially (for the team) desirable. Each individual knows that his effort has
some impact on the team’s reward, but that this reward is split among all members; thus
while he bears the full cost of his effort, he receives only part of what his effort produces.
On the other hand, when he shirks by reducing his effort expenditure, the savings in effort
accrue only to him, and resulting losses in team rewards are borne largely by the others.
This fundamental asymmetry therefore characterizes the structure of incentives, and each
member will tend to find it in his own best interests to engage in some degree of
shirking.9
The typical condition of modern production is information asymmetry, that is, due
to division of labor, an individual’s effort cannot be easily observed and directly
measured. In a principal-agent relationship, the agent has information advantage over the
principal since he has certain exclusive knowledge about his own type and action. In
reality, some aspects of the agent’s actions are unobservable to the principal, either
because it is too costly to get that information or some information is inherently
unobservable. Asymmetry of information in the principal-agent relationship may lead to
two problems: adverse selection (hidden information) and moral hazard (hidden action),
8
See Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs and Economic
Organization,” American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5 (1972), pp. 777-795; B. Holmstrom, “Moral
Hazard in Teams,” Bell Journal of Economics, No. 13 (1982), pp. 324-340.
9
See Terry Moe, “The New Economics of Organization,” American Journal of Political Science, No. 28
(1984), pp. 739-777.
38
which are general problems whose potential is inherent in all contracting and hierarchical
relationships.
Adverse selection denotes the difficulty that the principal faces in discovering the
true nature of the agent before making the contract. It arises from unobservability of
information, beliefs, and values on which the decisions of others are based. It is
commonly found in the insurance industry and labor market. Moral hazard, on the other
hand, arises from the unobservability of actual behavior in ex post contracting situations.
It refers to the difficulty that the principal faces in observing the actual effort of the agent.
Shirking behavior is an instance of moral hazard.
In short, an agency problem means that in any actual or implied delegation of
choice by the principal to the agent, differences of interest and/or information between the
two parties lead to the result that the agent may not act in the interest of the principal.
And the costs and difficulties of selecting an appropriate agent and monitoring his
performance mean that the principal may not be able to enforce her will on the agent.
Control Mechanisms and Institutional Solutions
Given that the interests of the principal and agent are inclined to diverge, the
delegation of authority from the principal to the agent allows a degree of underfulfillment
of the wishes of the principal. Principal-agent theory specifies some mechanisms that will
be used to try to minimize the underfulfillment in order to maintain an efficient principal-
39
agent relationship. 10 These mechanisms can be roughly grouped into four general
categories.
1. Incentive Schemes
A thriving body of literature examines how to design optimal incentive contracts
and compensation arrangements in organizations to deal with the agency problem.11 The
incentive mechanism addresses the root problem of interest divergence and tries to align
two players’ interests through institutional innovations. First, principal agent models in
economics and allied fields have traditionally taken the form of the compensation contract
as the primary mechanism available to the principal to induce desirable actions from the
agent. Narrowing the interest gap between the principal and the agent can effectively
lower the agency costs. The interest gap can be narrowed through a risk sharing
contractual arrangement: this mechanism lies in the belief that the agent will share the
interests of the principal if his reward, like the principal’s, is directly linked to the
performance of their entity. He may receive a bonus or suffer a loss as the final output
fluctuates. In short, the risk sharing contractual arrangement can create more incentivecompatible institutions that entail lower agency costs. But this arrangement only works if
the agent has decision-making power that impacts the final output.
Second, some administrative procedures, such as appointment, budget, and
performance appraisal, also enable the principal to shape the agent’s incentives and
behaviors. Appointment, including selection, helps the principal find appropriate/ like-
10
See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure,” pp. 305-360.
11
See Stanley Baiman, “Agency Research in Managerial Accounting: A Survey,” Journal of Accounting
Literature No. 1 (1982), pp. 154-213; Stanley Baiman, “Agency Research in Managerial Accounting: A
Second Look,” Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1990), pp. 341-371.
40
minded agents. Usually, reward or punishment will follow a performance appraisal. These
ex post corrective mechanisms can deter the agents from deviant behaviors.
2. Monitoring
Monitoring is intended to partly address the information asymmetry problem and
allow the principal to observe more aspects of the agent’s behavior. Monitoring refers to
putting into place various monitoring devices, such as reporting routines, inspection
teams, rewards, and punishments. In general principal-agent theory, it is assumed that the
principal is risk-neutral and that the agent is risk-averse. This assumption has implications.
For instance, Baiman and Demski contend that monitoring is more efficiently used as a
punishment for more risk-averse agents, but as a reward for risk-tolerant agents.12 Thus,
the research on optimal design of monitoring systems is aimed at reducing the risk
imposed on the agent by basing the agent’s compensation on both outcome and some
indicator of effort.13 Constant monitoring may be effective in reducing the agency losses,
but it is too costly to implement in reality and carries the possibility of collusion between
the agent and the monitoring agent.
3. Competition
Usually, a hierarchical layer involves one principal and many agents. Launching
competition among the agents can be one effective control mechanism for the principal.
Competition can be instilled by evaluating and then compensating one agent’s
performance relative to that of other agents. Such schemes, which use ordinal measures of
12
Stanley Baiman and Joel Demski, “Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control
Systems,” Journal of Accounting Research, No. 18 (1980), pp. 184-220.
13
See Stanley Baiman, “Agency Research in Managerial Accounting: A Second Look,” Accounting,
Organizations and Society, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1990), pp. 341-371.
41
performance rather than cardinal measures, are called tournaments.14 The advantage of
tournaments is that they ensure that principals will honor contracts even when verification
of absolute performance is difficult.
Promotion-based incentives are a commonly
observed example of tournaments. Tournaments will fail when the agents collude with
one another against the principal. The retention rule can be one policy instrument for the
principal. By investigating the retention rule, we can understand the extent to which the
threat of dismissal may be used to alleviate each of these problems, to induce agents to
take more desirable actions, as well as to separate “better” agents from “worse” ones. 15
4. Leadership
The above three groups are standard solutions in the canonical principal-agent
models. Recently, scholars have extended the institutional solutions to the agency
problem. Miller argues a purely materialistic arrangement can hardly be sufficient for
control and some organizational cultures or norms are needed in hierarchies. He points
out for any given incentive scheme, the agent still has some room to pursue his own
interest or shirking. This justifies the need for organizational leadership and other
coordination devices. In his understanding, effective leadership can inspire the agents to
forgo narrow self-interest and align their own goals to that of the organization.16 Kreps
interprets leadership as corporate culture. He argues organizations which involve
effective leadership can have comparative advantage over others.17
14
See Dilip Mookherjee, “Competition and Motivation: An Organizational Perspective,” unpublished paper
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1988).
15
Applying the retention rule to the labor arrangement means a single promotion or retention decision by an
employer is of paramount importance. Heinkel and Stoughton study portfolio management contracts in a
two-period principal agent model with both moral hazard and adverse selection problems. They show that
the threat of dismissal at the end of one period can be a powerful motivation for the agent to take desirable
actions. See Robert Heinkel and N. M. Stoughton, “The Dynamics of Portfolio Management Contracts,”
The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1994), pp. 351-387.
16
Gary J. Miller, Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992).
17
David Kreps, A Course in Microeconomics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
42
One manifestation of leadership is the inculcation of trust among the agents /
subordinates, that is, instilling the belief that the commitment from the principal / superior
is credible. Breton and Wintrobe show the necessity of trust and credible commitment.18
They understand hierarchy as a trade between superior and subordinates. They argue that
within hierarchies, there are many ways in which a subordinate can be induced to perform
his task with efficiency, if he is sure that he will be rewarded for doing so. The superior
can offer more rapid promotion, bigger bonuses, a larger budget, travel privileges, and so
on. The subordinates can offer extra effort—more accurate information, more investment
to get the work done—in exchange for the superior’s offer. Such a trade may increase
organizational productivity. But both parties face the prospect that the other may cheat or
renege on his obligation. Hence, some form of guarantee is necessary-- trust and credible
commitment. If the subordinates believe that the commitments from the superior are
credible, they will accordingly build up their action strategies. For example, positive
commitments from the superior like reward and decentralization of power can motivate
the subordinates to put in more effort; negative commitments like punishment or
dismissal will deter the subordinates from bad conducts or deviating behaviors. So the
credible commitment from the principal can shape the agents’ incentive to perform well.
Breton and Wintrobe also assumed that superior-subordinate (vertical) trust links
tend to enhance productivity while subordinate-subordinate (horizontal) trust links tend to
diminish it. 19 This permits the development of a number of comparative static
implications: it is difficult to measure trust, but one can derive a theoretical link between
18
A. Breton and R. Wintrobe, The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct: an Economic Analysis of Competition,
Exchange and Efficiency in Private and Public Organizations (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University
Press, 1982); A. Breton and R. Wintrobe, “The Bureaucracy of Murder Revisited,” Journal of Political
Economy, No. 94 (1986), pp. 905-926.
19
See A. Breton and R. Wintrobe, “The Bureaucracy of Murder Revisited”.
43
various aspects of organizational structure (e.g., levels of turnover, monitoring, supply of
promotion, etc.) and productivity if these variables can be shown to affect the incentives
to accumulate vertical and horizontal trust in plausible ways. For example, an increase in
promotion possibilities increases vertical trust but decreases horizontal trust.
Overall, taken in its general form, principal-agent literature suggests that the
principal can control the agent by mechanisms and institutional innovations. In some
cases, the principal may shape agents’ incentives by a compensation contract or
administrative procedures. In some cases, the principal may closely monitor effort levels
of agents. In others, the principal can launch competition among agents to gain efficient
outputs. In still some other settings, the principal may work to instill a sense of trust
between the agent and herself. Here trust is interpreted as the shared beliefs of members
of a hierarchical organization that everyone is playing the same, Pareto-preferred
cooperative game. The notion of principal-agent can be employed to encompass all such
forms of superior /subordinate relationships.
Building Blocks from Behavioral Paradigm and Transaction Cost
Approach
Since some managerial considerations are secondary or omitted altogether from
principal-agent theory, in this section, I will introduce some reasonable building blocks
from behavioral paradigm and transaction cost approach. We start with criticisms made
by management literature. Agency theory has often been criticized for its narrow model
44
of human motivation.20 According to management literature, people are motivated to
pursue many goals in their lives in addition to material gain. The narrow motivation
model of agency theory is only equal to X Theory in management motivation.21 Students
of human behavior have identified a much larger range of human motives, including
needs for achievement, responsibility, and recognition, as well as altruism, belief, respect
for authority, and the intrinsic motivation of an inherently satisfying task.22 Traditionally,
human motivation has been viewed as neither wholly Theory X nor wholly Theory Y but
as some more complex and contingent admixture of the two.23
Psychologists and sociologists point out that human behavior is often produced
without conscious thought, that is, through habit, emotion, taken-for-granted custom,
conditioned reflex, unconditioned reflex, posthypnotic suggestion, and unconscious
desires. Recently many scholars have accepted these cognitive limitations of problemsolving individuals as the basis for a rational choice model.
Bounded Rationality
Herbert Simon and James March have been the main pioneers of models of
bounded rationality. Bounded rationality was first developed and applied to organization
in 1947 in Administrative Behavior, and means that people are limited both in the
20
See Lex Donaldson, “The Ethereal Hand: Organizational Economics and Management Theory,” Academy
of Management Review Vol. 15, No. 3 (1990), pp. 369-381. He identified the inherent problems of
organizational economics as a narrow model of human motivation and behavior, a negative moral
characterization of managers, and methodological individualist bias.
21
Typically, rational man seeks personal wealth, status, leisure, or the like. Accordingly, behavior as a
potentially shirking or opportunistic agent can be curbed by vigilant monitoring, together with incentive
schemes based around money, promotion, negative sanctions, and similar. This is a model of the Theory X
variety of man. See D. McGregor, The Human Side of the Enterprise (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).
22
See R. Wood and A. Bandura, “Social Cognitive Theory of Organizational Management,” Academy of
Management Review, No. 14 (1989), pp. 361-384.
23
See J. B. Miner, Theories of Organizational Behavior (Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press, 1980); E. Schein,
Organizational Psychology 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970).
45
information and knowledge they process and in the computational skills they bring to
bear in making choices. Rational choice models assume that decision makers are
relentlessly forward-looking. In contrast, behavioral theorists emphasize that decision
makers are often heavily influenced by experience, by what they have learned. So,
individuals behave in a routine, myopic, but reasonably adaptive manner.24
In this line, March and Simon sought to explain the structure of organizations as a
result of human cognitive limitations. In response to their inherent limitations, individuals
rationally choose certain organization structures that deal with their limitations. For
example, division of labor solves the problem of inability of individuals to multitask.
Transaction Cost Approach
In response to the critics, economists revise their basic assumption of individual
and base it on bounded rationality. Williamson’s 1975 Markets and Hierarchies perhaps
is an explicit attempt to integrate major components from both paradigms (contractual
and behavioral). 25 Williamson argues that the relative efficiency of an organization arises
from the joining of uncertainty and small numbers (environment factors) with
opportunism and bounded rationality (human factors). Opportunism can impede Paretoimproving exchange because players may find it in their interest to expropriate their
partners ex post because of bounded rationality, asset specificity or unbridled power. The
24
Simon puts forward the “satisficing model”. He argues since an individual’s rationality is bounded by
cognitive ability, he seeks to attain only a certain aspiration level instead of maximal utility. See Herbert A.
Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1947); James March and Herbert Simon,
Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958).
25
See Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications – A study in the
Economics of Internal Organization (London: The Free Press, 1975).
46
challenge is to design institutions that can credibly commit transacting partners ex ante
not to engage in ex post opportunism.
I review the transaction cost theory here because the principal-agent relationship
inevitably incurs transaction costs. The hidden information and hidden action by the agent
create agency losses in the principal-agent relationship. Due to the information
asymmetry as mentioned above, the principal has to pay a price to observe or monitor the
agent’s behaviors. Although the principal can employ various means such as screening
and overseeing the agent to minimize agency losses, these means all impose some costs
on the principal. Thus transaction costs are inevitably associated with the principal-agent
relationship.
Credible Commitment
Simon’s concept of authority can play an integral role in linking bounded
rationality and organizational behavior. Simon stressed that the authority relation is not
characterized by command or fiat, as classical organization theorists suggest, but rather is
two-way. The subordinate has a “zone of acceptance” within which he willingly allows
the employer to direct his behavior. Thus, the nature of authority relation and whether or
how well it works depend upon both parties to the agreement. 26
Miller and Whitford extended Miller’s 1992 book by reincorporating both older
and more recent strains of principal-agent literature. 27 Both of them focus on the
implications of trust and credible commitment on organizational productivity. The
26
See Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1947).
Gary J. Miller and Andrew B. Whitford, “Trust and Incentives in Principal-Agent Negotiations: The
Insurance / Incentive Trade-Off,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2002), pp. 231-267.
27
47
interpretations of trust differ though. In Miller’s 1992 book, trust is interpreted as shared
expectation among the game players that all of them will coordinate. Note that trust is not
a violation of rational choice, given repeated games being played. In their 2002 article,
Miller and Whitford reintroduce a range of managerial considerations, such as bounded
rationality. Under such circumstance, as no repeated games are being played and players
are bounded rational, trust cannot be interpreted as a shared expectation regarding a
coordinated equilibrium. The article focuses on an interpretation of trust that is based on
reciprocity. In a one-shot negotiation, trust is interpreted as the expectation that the
trusted player will reciprocate a one-shot kindness with an appropriate response. In short,
the contribution of Miller and Whitford’s 2002 article lies in their extending theoretical
environment of principal-agent by reincorporating some managerial considerations.
Based on bounded rationality, they argued the creation and communication of reciprocity
norms can be one important leadership manifestation.
New Economics of Organization Applied to Public Bureaucracy
This section reviews the academic efforts that try to extend the theoretical
environment of principal-agent to reincorporate both older and more recent strains of
literature with greater importance for the study of public bureaucracies. The perspective
of new economics of organization has been developed with reference to private
organizations, particularly business firms; it has been applied to public bureaucracy
frequently since Terry Moe showed its potential in 1984.28 In 1984, Moe argued some
modifications and adjustments were needed for the application to be meaningful and
28
Before 1984, there were some individual cases, for example, see B. Mitnick, “The Theory of Agency: the
Policing Paradox and Regulatory Behavior,” Public Choice No. 24 (1975), pp. 27-42.
48
instructive (in his own words: applying economics to politics is by no means
straightforward).
Before applying the economic perspective to political institutions, we should
notice the differences between public and private organizations. Government agencies do
not operate under the same objectives or constraints as private, commercial
organizations.29 Public bureaucrats do not want the same things as private bureaucrats,
and they tend to have far less flexibility and fewer resources for pursuing their objectives
through the compliance of subordinates. Government agencies also differ from private
organizations in terms of the measures used to evaluate performance. Beetham argues
government agencies are concerned with providing public needs in a manner that meets
both the political and legal criteria of performance. That is, what is being judged in public
administration is not merely the cost-effectiveness and timely provision of public needs,
but also whether the expenditure incurred is in conformity with the purpose and terms for
which it is authorized by the legislature. Another consideration is whether administration
is conducted within legally defined parameters and without abridging the rights of the
citizen.30
General understanding is that high-powered incentives that can motivate
subordinates and align interests (like in a private organization) are not the case for
government agencies. For the incentive theory of government, we should approach the
public choice school. When applying the new economics of organization to public
bureaucracy, public choice theorists collectively contribute to positive theories of
29
See James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York:
Basic Books, 1989); Oliver E. Williamson, “Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost
Economics Perspective,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1999), pp. 306-342.
30
David Beetham, Bureaucracy (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1987).
49
bureaucracy.31 There are three fundamental questions that the positive theories tried to
answer: what motivates bureaucrats; what the sources of bureaucratic power are; and how
the political leaders control bureaucrats.
What Motivates Bureaucrats?
Political theories regarding bureaucratic behavior have tended to focus on budgets,
slack, career opportunities, and influence on public policy, power, and security as central
motivators, and have recognized that the salience of specific motivators varies across
bureaucratic officials.
During the mid-1960s, public choice theorists showed that
bureaucracy can be well understood by assuming bureaucrats are rational actors largely
motivated by self-interest. They argued that rational bureaucratic behavior promotes
inefficiency, excessive growth, capture, weak accountability, and related problems that
undermine effective government. 32
The formal analysis of bureaucratic motivation started from Niskanen. He argues
that bureaucrats are budget maximizers. 33 Migue and Belanger argue bureaucrats
31
For a detailed review and an understanding of how the positive theories of public bureaucracy evolved,
see four articles: Ronald Wintrobe, “Modern Bureaucratic Theory,” in Dennic C. Mueller (ed.),
Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 429-454;
Terry Moe, “The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy,” in Dennic C. Mueller (ed.) Perspectives on
Public Choice: A Handbook (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 455-480; William
Niskanen, “Bureaucracy,” in William F. Shughart and Laura Razzolini (eds.), The Elgar Companion to
Public Choice (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001), pp. 258-270; Chang et al. “Rational Choice Theories of
Bureaucratic Control and Performance,” in William F. Shughart and Laura Razzolini (eds.), The Elgar
Companion to Public Choice (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001), pp. 271-292.
32
Tullock builds on the assumption that bureaucrats are motivated by career advancement. See Gordon
Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1965). Downs creates five
motivational types—conservers, climbers, zealots, advocates, and statesmen—and shows how the changing
mix of these types shapes the growth and operation of bureaucracy. See Anthony Downs, Inside
Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967).
33
See William Niskanen, Representative Bureaucracy (New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1971). His model has
just two actors, the bureau and its legislative sponsor. Their relationship is one of bilateral monopoly, with
the bureau holding two pivotal advantages. Its position as sole supplier gives it a monopoly over
50
maximize the “discretionary budget”, namely, the difference between the total budget and
the minimum cost of production. 34 This makes sense, for any such slack in agency
budgets is available to bureaucrats to spend as they wish—on more staff, travel, or
favored programs. Slack is the bureaucratic equivalent of personal income.
Similar to Tullock, Tirole in 1994 argued career concerns played an important role
in motivating public bureaucrats.35 By identifying the motivational differences between
public and private bureaucracy, Tirole pointed out that perhaps the main drive for civil
servants and politicians is career concerns. They are concerned about the effect of their
current performance not so much on their monetary reward, but rather on their reputation
or image in view of future promotions, job prospects in the private and public sectors and
reelections.
The Sources of Bureaucratic Power
From the view of the public choice school, there are three main strategies
bureaucrats use to get what they want, namely, information advantage, agenda control
and selective efficiency. Information advantage means that only the bureaucrats (policy
implementers) possess exclusive information on the cost of their actual activities and
some expertise that the political master/sponsor do not possess. Political decision makers
do not possess the specialist knowledge, or the time and money necessary to control
implementers.
information about the true costs of production. Besides this information advantage, the other advantage is
the agenda control.
34
Migue and Belanger, “Toward A General Theory of Managerial Discretion,” Public Choice, No. 17
(1974), pp. 27-43.
35
Jean Tirole, “The Internal Organization of Government,” Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1994),
pp. 1-29.
51
Bendor, Taylor and Van Gaalen describe agenda control as follows. The
superior’s problem arises from a classical division of labor: the subordinate, who has
expertise but no formal authority, designs the set of alternatives; the politician, who has
authority but little expertise, makes the final choice. The bureaucrat has programmatic
preferences and wants to rig the superior’s agenda to boost the odds that his preferred
program will be selected. He does so by allocating more design time to his preferred
program. It is the search for policy alternatives that constitutes agenda manipulation.36
Selective efficiency means bureaucrats control their master’s choices by being efficient at
the things they want to do, and inefficient at those they do not.
How Do Political Leaders Control Bureaucrats?37
The necessity of political control lies in the existence of the deviating
implementation of political decisions. During implementation, the aims of a policy
sometimes appear to change because implementation agencies receive the authority to
realize the political decision. Implementation agencies have their own views regarding the
policy to be pursued, their own perception of social problems, and their preferences
regarding the outcomes of political decisions. These ideas concerning the most desirable
decision outcome can lead to the selection and realization of another policy alternative
than the one intended originally by decision makers.
36
See Bendor, Taylor and Van Gaalen, “Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Asymmetric Information,” American
Journal of Political Science No. 31 (1987), pp. 796-828.
37
Or how central leaders control local governments. Scholars frequently talk about these two questions
together.
52
Given that bureaucracy has information advantage over their political leadership,
which institutional mechanisms allow political leadership to hold bureaucrats accountable
for their administrative decisions and behaviors? First, political leadership can try to
shape bureaucrats’ incentives. But the common understanding is that there are lowpowered incentives in government since designing such an incentive scheme is quite
difficult. Government agencies generally pursue multiple goals. Thus, the performance of
government agencies includes multiple dimensions. The multidimensionality of goals
often goes hand in hand with two difficulties which hinder the construction of powerful
incentive schemes. One difficulty lies in lack of comparison; many government agencies
have a monopoly position in their activities, which suggests that their performance is hard
to assess. The other difficulty lies in the lack of agreement on the weight that should be
put on every single dimension. Usually there are tensions between measurable and nonmeasurable objectives.
Concerning the above difficulties, political sponsors use “fuzzy missions” to
shape bureaucrats’ incentives. What effects do multifaceted, or composite, missions have,
given agencies are charged with multiple objectives? If the performance is only
measurable for a subset of the tasks, then agents will not pursue all the tasks at the desired
level. Instead all their effort will be focused on tasks in which measurement is possible. In
this circumstance, the political principal has an incentive not to reveal ex ante how
performance will be rewarded. Instead, she acts probabilistically, sometimes rewarding
performance on some tasks and at other times rewarding performance on the others. The
reason is that under these conditions, agents will hedge, splitting effort among multiple
tasks.
53
Another method used by the political leaders is appointment. Political leaders
control appointments to bureaucratic positions, and thus influence the “types” of the
individuals with which they deal. Scholars argue that political sponsors are not passive
actors. They can appoint bureaucrats whose careers are tied to theirs and who will
therefore make decisions in the sponsors’ interest.
These mechanisms operate
unobtrusively to enable congress to control the bureaucracy. 38
Second, the political leaders can monitor the behavior of bureaucrats, and
accordingly reward compliance, and punish noncompliance. But efforts to monitor,
reward and sanction the agencies are costly to employ. To lower the costs, the political
leadership can involve a third party to help to engineer bureaucratic compliance. A third
party (various interest groups that are affected by the agent’s decisions) usually has the
necessary information to monitor the agent. Instead of monitoring the agent constantly,
the political leadership can wait for the “fire alarms” raised by unhappy groups and
initiate sanctions and corrections.39 This mechanism has in fact shifted the monitoring
costs to the third parties and saved tremendous resources for the political leadership.
Scholars argue that constituents and interest groups play this role actively for their
legislators in the American political system. 40
38
See Gary Miller and Terry Moe, “Bureaucrats, Legislatures, and the Size of Government,” American
Political Science Review, No. 77 (1983), pp. 297-322; Bendor, Taylor and Van Gaalen, “Politicians,
Bureaucrats, and Asymmetric Information”.
39
The term “fire alarm” refers to the negative response political leaders receive from unhappy groups
whose welfare is influenced by the bureaucrats’ behaviors. See McCubbins and Schwarts, “Congressional
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28,
No. 1 (1984), pp.165-179.
40
See Barry Weingast and Mark Moran, “Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory
Policy-making at the Federal Trade Commission,” Journal of Political Economy, No. 91 (1983), pp. 765800. They use the term “decibel meters” to refer to the feedback politicians receive from constituency
groups affected by bureaucratic performance.
54
Police patrol is another monitoring tool as named by McCubbins and Schwarts.
The political leaders/ central leaders can dispatch working groups to certain localities to
inspect local work and report problems to the central leaders. 41 But there is no clear
evidence how effective the police patrol is. Because the central work groups are not
necessarily familiar with local situations, it is not easy for them to dig out information if
local officials intentionally hide it. After all local officials are in informational
advantageous positions. Moreover, the extensive social networks common among local
officials also increase the difficulty of investigation if multiple officials are involved.
Third, the political leaders can utilize competition among bureaus, or among
bureaucrats within particular bureau, or among other groupings of bureaucrats to keep
them in check.
Fourth, and importantly, the political leadership can use ideological persuasion to
instill trust and commitment among bureaucrats. I agree that a purely materialistic
arrangement can hardly be sufficient for control and some organizational cultures or
norms are needed in hierarchies. This is because, in addition to material gains, people are
motivated to pursue many other goals in their lives. This makes other means to maintain
control available for the principal and ideological persuasion can be such a powerful tool.
Ideology used in this context refers to any body of ideas that provides a coherent and
simplified understanding of the world around us. 42 It may include theories, cultures,
norms, and religions, etc. To be persuasive, ideologies should be able to help people rank
an order among multiple goals and point out the right way of living. If an ideology can
persuade agents to forgo narrow self-interest and pursue the principal’s interest instead, it
41
See McCubbins and Schwarts, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms”.
See Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
42
55
serves as a good control mechanism. From a purely instrumental perspective, it pays off
for the political leaders to invest in such ideologies and use them as a controlling tool.
Linking Institutional and Organizational Aspects of Government Performance
In addition to the above exploration, this dissertation needs to explain
performance variations among various agencies. Existing literatures argue that
performance of various government agencies varies drastically. In searching for the
determining factors to explain performance variations, scholars find almost everything
matters, including the nature of institutions, interests, policy tasks, technological change,
ideas and beliefs, and individuals in organizations. To make it simple, scholars frequently
locate their searching on two levels—an institutional (external aspects) level and an
organizational (internal) level. 43 For example, Chang and his colleagues argue for a
linking of models of institutional policy choice and internal organizational choice.44 First,
the variation in the institutional (external) factors causes vastly different agency behavior
and performance. These institutional factors may include the nature of tasks the agencies
perform, their interest-group environments, their political context, and their institutional
constraints. Second, a number of factors of the internal organization of agencies may vary:
organizational cultures, missions, incentives of agents at different levels of hierarchy,
reporting relationships and task assignments. All these can determine what kind of
outputs an agency will produce.45
43
See Chang et al. “Rational Choice Theories of Bureaucratic Control and Performance”; James Q. Wilson,
Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
44
In this article, by identifying the internal and external aspects of government performance, the authors
argue the institutional policy choice model and internal organizational choice model should be linked to
achieve a comprehensive understanding of government performance. That is, a model of administrative
performance incorporates both managerial dimension and political dimension.
45
See James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It.
56
Government Performance Put into Principal-Agent Logic
This section first identifies four levels of principal-agent relationships in the
government context. Second, it highlights the main characteristics of the civil service
system. Whether the components of the civil service system can serve as institutional
solutions to various levels of agency problems involved in the government is the focus of
the remaining part.
Because of information asymmetry and conflict of interest, an agency problem
exists almost inherently in all organizations. Thus adverse selection and moral hazard
problems exist in governmental agencies and exist in every stage of government. As Moe
addressed:
Generally speaking, democratic politics is easily viewed in principalagent terms. Citizens are principals, politicians are their agents.
Politicians are principals, bureaucrats are their agents. Bureaucratic
superiors are principals, bureaucratic subordinates are their agents. The
whole of politics is therefore structured by a chain of principal-agent
relationships, from citizen to politician to bureaucratic superior to
bureaucratic subordinate and on down the hierarchy of government to the
lowest-level bureaucrats who actually deliver services directly to citizens.
Aside from the ultimate principal and the ultimate agent, each actor in the
hierarchy occupies a dual role in which he serves both as principal and as
agent. The formal apparatus and deductive power of principal-agent
model are applicable to each of these hierarchical stages of government,
and might usefully be employed in investigating even the most basic
questions of democratic control and performance.46
46
See Terry Moe, “The New Economics of Organization,” American Journal of Political Science, No. 28
(1984), pp. 765-766.
57
Therefore, we can identify four levels of principal-agent relationships in the
government context. They are the superior - subordinate relationship within an agency;
the relationship between upper-level agency and lower-level agency; the relationship
between political leaders and bureaucrats; the relationship between the citizen (acting as
the principal) and the government as a whole (acting as the agent), that is, politicians and
bureaucrats in democracies; the Party-state in China. In the following part, I will
investigate level by level whether the components of the civil service system can serve as
solutions to various levels of agency problems in the government.
Civil service systems evolved under different political traditions and in different
ways in different countries, but they tended to converge on a similar institutional model—
a merit system. A civil service system is a personnel system rooted in merit and career
concepts. Some common ideas are deeply engrained in the institutional design, as noted
by Horn:
Selection based on openly competitive exams; protection of civil servants
from arbitrary removal, thus protection of their political neutrality;
positions are established centrally and classified according to rank;
bureaucrats are paid a salary and pension determined by their rank rather
than the work they do; and there often exists some impediments to lateral
entry from outside the service at senior grades. There tend to be few ports
of entry, most civil servants enter at low grade and pursue a career inside
the service, and virtually all senior positions are filled by promotion.47
Level 1 How Do Bureaucratic Superiors Control Bureaucratic Subordinates within
An Agency?
47
See Murray J. Horn, The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public
Sector (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 97.
58
Within an agency, the agency head can be considered as the principal and the
subordinates as the agents. In some large agencies, there are divisions and sections. Heads
of divisions and sections can be considered as principals too. An agency problem will be
present with two conditions, i.e., conflict of interest and information asymmetry. Interest
divergences appear since the superior wants the subordinates to put in more effort while
the subordinates want more spare time and leisure. Information asymmetry is present
because in the public sector, the relationship between effort and outcome is complicated.
It is difficult for the superiors to exactly measure the subordinates’ efforts.
The institutional design of a civil service system can provide some solutions to the
principal-agent problems within an agency. First, selecting appropriate people through
open competitive exams helps to improve competence in administration by ensuring that
the most able are selected. Second, a civil service system includes sophisticated
performance appraisal procedures. Performance appraisal gives the superior more
information on subordinates’ behavior and effort. Based on the results of a performance
appraisal, decisions of reward or punishment will be made. This helps to deter
subordinates from shirking. Fourth, given the monopoly position of a bureau, it is
competition among officials for promotion that provides the best opportunity to influence
their behavior. Civil service rules regulate this competition. Moreover, job security and
various training programs provide the opportunity and incentive for administrators to
develop skills and expertise in administration.
The logical limits of “formal contractual and incentive systems” and the
importance of mutual cooperation have been explored in depth in Miller’s 1992 book.
The characteristic elements of the merit system act to reduce agency loss but, as Miller
59
reminds us, agency loss can not be fully eliminated. Senior management can not design
an incentive system that will overcome agency problems and induce staff to do exactly
what they the superiors want. To be effective, senior management must gain the
cooperation of bureau staff. So the effectiveness of senior officials depends to a very
large degree on their ability to elicit the cooperation of their subordinates.
Level 2 Upper-level Agency and Lower-level Agency
When organizations decentralize, tasks and authority are delegated to lower-level
units in the expectation that they will use their specialized knowledge and productive
capacities to contribute toward organization ends; but the inevitable information
asymmetries create incentive problems. An upper-level unit soliciting policy inputs from
lower-level units will pay the price of adverse selection, since only the lower-level units
know what information their inputs are based upon, and they can use that to their own
advantage; similarly, a superior unit trying to increase a subordinate unit’s productive
efficiency will have to grapple with the problem of moral hazard, since the observability
of productive behavior is asymmetrically distributed in the latter’s favor.
Matrix management is involved in government. 48 Usually matrix management
takes the form of multitasks and multiple principals models. Due to the multiple goals the
government wants to accomplish, the multitasks agent is a common phenomenon in the
government agency arrangement. In addition to the moral hazard problem, multiple tasks
can lead to further problems for the principal. If the measurability of these tasks differs,
the principal should avoid adopting high-powered incentives for those tasks that can be
48
The matrix management arrangement has logic: it can check and balance power, and aid the principal
against the agent’s information advantage. But it also can be the main sources of administrative inefficiency.
60
measured relatively easily. This is because it will draw the agent’s attention
disproportionately to this particular task at the expense of others. For example, Tirole
argues incentives based on measurable goals must be limited to not completely jeopardize
the non-measurable dimensions of social welfare.49
Also common in government is the fact that one agent may face multiple
principals. In the multiple principals arrangement, the principals will have to compete for
the agent’s limited attention, and are tempting to adopt high-powered incentives for their
own task. This will greatly exacerbate the control problem for the principal in charge of
tasks with low measurability. In addition, the agent can also play principals against one
another. The problem will worsen further if principals have diametrically opposed goals.
The “common agency” theory of Bernheim and Whinston finds that conflicting interests/
commands from several principals for one agent undermine efficiency.50
Level 3 How Do Political Leaders Control Bureaucrats?
Horn argues the modern civil service system imposes restrictions on legislators,
creates incentives for bureaucrats, and improves legislators’ ability to gain support from
their constituents. 51 The features of a merit civil service influence the behavior of
legislators since it eliminates their control of the hiring, dismissal, pay and promotion of
officials.
49
Jean Tirole, “The Internal Organization of Government,” Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1994),
pp. 1-29.
50
See Bernheim and Whinston, “Common Agency,” Econometrica No. 19 (1986), pp. 269-281.
51
See Murray J. Horn, The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public
Sector (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
61
At first glance, the dominance of the merit system sits very uncomfortably with
any attempt to explain the organization of the public sector solely in terms of a legislative
“principal” attempting to control its administrative “agent”. Removing the power to hire
and fire eliminates the ability to select like-minded officials and weakens the incentives
for appointed officials to act in the interests of their elected “principal”. Actually the
selection and incentive mechanisms of a patronage system are not powerful at controlling
agency problems. Although it was relatively easy to identify supporters, appointees had
personal objectives that clashed with those of the government, so the history of patronage
is full of scandal. Given the possibility their patron may fail in the next round of elections,
the appointees feel uncertainty and do not have strong incentives to comply. The political
uncertainty resulting from this possibility of election failure can be understood as an
agency cost. The merit civil service, by restricting a political patron’s control on officials’
employment, reduces this uncertainty, thus reducing agency costs.
Level 4 Citizen as the Principal, Politicians and Bureaucrats as the Agents
Usually, the slogan “citizen-principal” serves as the symbol of democracy. In
reality, a citizen’s role is limited.
By complaining about service delivery or by
demanding services of different kinds, citizens provide politicians with inputs that are
directly relevant both to monitoring the bureaucracy and furthering their re-election goals.
Conclusion
A principal-agent framework provides a full range of powerful analytical methods
and tools that can integrate both the managerial and political dimensions of administrative
62
performance. With this background knowledge, we are ready to move on to the
substantive issue of the Chinese civil service. In chapter 3, I will specify the components
and logic of the analytical framework in this chapter to China, and thus establish an
agency model of Chinese Civil Service Reform and government performance.
63
Chapter 3
An Agency Model of Civil Service Performance in China
This chapter builds on the understanding of chapter 2 and specifies concepts and
analytical tools of the principal-agent theory to China. I argue that the impacts of China’s
Civil Service Reform on local government performance can be explored in a principalagent logic. Under the Cadre Management System, because of conflict of interest and
information asymmetry, there were 3 levels of principal-agent problems involved in the
Chinese government. Through studying the formal rules and regulations of China’s Civil
Service System and existing literatures on China’s Civil Service Reform, I investigate
whether the components of China’s Civil Service System could serve as the institutional
solutions to these problems and if so, how. I will first have a detailed look at the
differences between the old Cadre Management System and the new Civil Service System.
Then, I will examine the principal-agent problems embedded in the old system and the
proposed institutional solutions in the new system level by level. For each level, the
exploration will proceed in four steps. Step 1 briefly lays out the fundamentals of this
micropolitical model—actors and their motivations, and game rules. Step 2 describes
what kind of principal-agent problems are involved in the Cadre Management System.
Step 3 investigates whether and how the components of China’s Civil Service System
could serve as the institutional solutions to the problems identified before.1Finally, some
hypotheses regarding local government performance will be built for empirical testing.
1
The analysis in this chapter is mainly based on the formal rules and regulations included in China’s Civil
Service System package. The aim is to build some hypotheses regarding local government performance that
can be subjected to empirical test in the following chapters. Moreover, we should notice that the design of
reform initiatives and the implementation of reform measures are different things (operations in practice
may diverge from institutional design). Therefore, it is possible that new principal-agent problems will
emerge during reform implementation. I will further identify the new agency problems and investigate the
countermeasures of local governments to alleviate the newly-emerged problems in chapter 7. I hope the
64
China’s Cadre Management System vs. China’s Civil Service System
Over the course of two thousand years, agrarian China had developed a personnel
system based on merit selection for membership in the administrative elite. The system
was deeply embedded in traditional Chinese history and culture, and admission into the
elite was based on a national examination system. 2 Despite its historical tradition of
recruiting government officials through competitive examinations, China adopted a
Soviet-style cadre system in the early days of the People’s Republic (this Soviet-style
cadre system is referred to as the Cadre Management System in this dissertation). During
the 1980s, China underwent a transition to a market economy, and the Cadre
Management System became incompatible with the new situation. To fit the market
economy, China began building a modern civil service system to replace the Cadre
Management System in 1993 (this 1993 civil service system is referred to as China’s
Civil Service System in this dissertation). China’s Civil Service System consolidates
various experiences since 1949, especially the reform after 1979, and builds on examples
from more advanced countries, especially the United States.3
In this section, I investigate the differences between the old Cadre Management
System and the 1993 China Civil Service System. The portrayal and comparison will
serve as a foundation to establish an agency model (how the changes caused by China’s
design and implementation of various countermeasures would account for the performance variations across
different policy areas and localities.
2
Liu yunbai, Zhongguo gudai guanli sixiang shi [Management Thought in Chinese History] (Xi’an:
Shangxi renmin chubanshe, 1997).
3
Some scholars argue that when building its civil service system, the United Kingdom mimicked China’s
historical tradition of recruiting government officials through competitive examinations; and when building
its civil service system, the United States followed the United Kingdom. Interestingly, the 1993 Civil
Service System in China is based on examples from more advanced countries, especially the United States.
See Chen Zhenming (ed.), “Guojia gongwuyuan zhidu” [State Civil Service System] (Fuzhou: Fujiang
People’s Publisher, 2002).
65
Civil Service Reform will influence the performance of local governments) in the
following sections.
Cadre Management System
In Maoist China, the personnel of the Party, state organs, and some other public
institutions were generally regulated by the Cadre Management System.
4
The
fundamental principle of the Cadre Management System was that the Party controls the
cadres. At the core of this unified management structure were the CCP Committees and
their Organization Departments at various levels and the elaborate Nomenklatura system.5
The Nomenklatura (a Russian term, meaning a list of positions) system is the main
instrument of Party control of the selection and appointment of leading cadres in
institutions in China. Party committees at different levels have their own list that
describes the offices over which they have authority. The appointment, promotion,
transfer or removal of any party or state main leader requires the approval of the party
committee controlling the Nomenklatura on which the leader’s office is listed. Through
the Nomenklatura system, the Party could retain full control of personnel placement.6
4
For a comprehensive discussion of the Cadre Management System, see Doak A. Barnett, Cadres,
Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967);
Harry Harding, Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy 1949-1976 (California: Stanford
University Press, 1981); Lee Hong Yung, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist
China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in
Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).
5
For a comprehensive discussion of the Nomenklatura system, see John P. Burns, “China’s Nomenklatura
System,” Problems of Communism No. 36 (1987), pp. 36–51; John P. Burns, “Contemporary China’s
Nomenklatura System,” Chinese Law and Government Vol. 20, No. 4 (Winter 1987–88), pp. 3–134; John P.
Burns, “Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: the 1990 Nomenklatura,” The China
Quarterly No. 138 (1994), pp. 458– 491; Melanie Manion, “The Cadre Management System, post-Mao: the
Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of Party and State Leaders,” The China Quarterly No. 102
(1985), pp. 203–233. For a more recent article, see Hon S. Chan, “Cadre Personnel Management in China:
the Nomenklatura System 1990-1998,” The China Quarterly No. 179 (2004), pp.703-734.
6
The central leadership in China decentralized certain personnel management to local governments through
administrative reforms, but kept the basic principle of Nomenklatura control untouched.
66
The Cadre Management System had serious defects. It was a highly centralized
and undifferentiated approach to personnel management. The selection and promotion of
the employees were not based on competition, but mostly on political loyalty to the
Communist Party and appropriate social class background. 7 There were only vague
procedures for recruitment, promotion, appraisal, and the like. 8 In addition, different
occupations which require wildly different skills all shared a similar pay structure.9 As a
result, talented people were not motivated to make a conscientious effort to work and
poor performance was tolerated.
It was acknowledged by the central leadership of the PRC that the old Cadre
Management System stood in the way of selecting and promoting qualified people. When
reporting to the 13th National Party Congress in 1987, Zhao Ziyang (the then Party
general secretary) mentioned several serious defects of the Cadre Management System.
First, the concept of the “state cadre” was too general and lacked a scientific classification;
second, the power of cadre management was over concentrated, and the people who
handled personnel affairs lacked professional knowledge; third, the management methods
were outdated and simplistic and hindered the rise of talented people; fourth, there were
no adequate laws and rules to govern personnel management.10
1. Classification
7
See Burns, “China’s Nomenklatura System”; Manion, “The Cadre Management System, post-Mao: the
Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of Party and State Leaders.”
8
See Li Weiqiang, “Reform in the Chinese Public Personnel System,” Public Personnel Management Vol.
19, No. 2 (1990), p. 164; King K. Tsao and John Abbott Worthley, “Chinese Public Administration:
Change with Continuity during Political and Economic Development,” Public Administration Review Vol.
55, No. 2 (1995), pp. 169 – 174.
9
See F. L. Cooke, “Seven Reforms in Five Decades: Civil Service Reform and Its Human Resource
Implications in China,” Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy Vol. 8, No. 3 (2003), pp. 380-404.
10
See Zhao Ziyang, Yanzhe you zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi daolu qianjin [Advance along the Road of
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics], Report Delivered at the Thirteenth National Congress of the
Communist Party of China, in Documents of the Thirteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of
China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987), p. 37.
67
The Cadre Management System was an undifferentiated approach to personnel
management. By not distinguishing different types of cadres and accordingly developing
different structures of management, the Cadre Management System failed in catering to
the specific needs and requirements of different types of cadres.
2. Recruitment and Selection
The Cadre Management System embodied the principles of recruitment through
political channels and secretive selection. There was no institution to check and balance
the power of the strong man, thus increasing the possibility of rent-seeking. In the Maoist
era, governments at various levels were responsible for allocating jobs to new graduates
and demobilized soldiers. They were also responsible for promoting employees to take
charge of more complicated tasks and for assessing the demands of human resources. The
ministries and other government bureaus annually estimate the number of new job
openings. A summary of these job openings serves as a plan for next year’s job allocation.
Cadres had little freedom in selecting jobs when entering employment or in seeking
transfer once assigned to a unit. Some people were assigned to a work place with little
relevance to their professional qualifications. In such cases, talented people could not
fully display their potential or receive normal and regular promotion, while superfluous
workers could not be removed. This highly centralized and irrational principle often
resulted in malpractice and corruption such as nepotism and guanxi (back-doorism) in
employment.11 The cadres charged with job allocation wielded great staffing power and
could hire their protégés or relatives as they liked. For example, entry level openings were
filled by universities, where professors chose which candidates could interview for which
openings and ultimately decided which students went to which jobs. The professors
11
See Dong Lisheng, “The Establishment of the Chinese Civil Service System: A Delayed Political Reform
Program,” in Dong Lisheng (ed.) Administrative Reform in the People’s Republic of China since 1978
(Leiden: IIAS, 1994), pp. 43-61.
68
and/or party secretaries at the universities played key roles in these decisions. Therefore,
guanxi between the personnel cadres and the candidates as opposed to candidate merit
was often the main consideration in staffing decisions.
3. Performance Evaluation
Under the Cadre Management System, regular annual appraisal was not the norm.
The emphasis of performance appraisal was put on employees’ political loyalty. There
was no adequate description of performance indicators. The difficulty of producing
objective performance indicators might lie in the lack of clear position specification in the
Cadre Management System. Besides the lack of position specification and performance
indicator in its design, performance evaluation was not strictly enforced in practice.12 This
might have been due to officials’ priority to maintain good co-work relations
(organizational harmony). As a result, the appraisal system under the Cadre Management
System neither distinguished employees of different performance, nor linked the
performance of employees with reward and punishment. Appraisal results therefore did
not motivate employees to make a conscious effort to work.
4. Pay System
Prior to 1985, the pay of cadres was not attractive compared with that of
employees in enterprises. The economic reforms, by linking benefits with performance,
had not improved the material welfare of bureaucrats and that of enterprise employees by
the same degree. 13 In 1977, the central leadership reinstituted bonus payments to
12
See Li Weiqiang, “Reform in the Chinese Public Personnel System”.
See Yasheng Huang, “Web of Interests and Patterns of Behavior of Chinese Local Economic
Bureaucracies and Enterprises during Reforms,” The China Quarterly No. 123 (1990), pp. 442-443. This is
a result of several differences between government officials and enterprise employees. First, the income
structure is different. While a government official receives a basic salary and various subsidies, an
enterprise employee receives bonuses in addition to a basic salary and subsidies. Second, while the bulk of
13
69
enterprise employees with the purpose of raising their work incentives. This bonus
widened the pay gap between the enterprise employees and their counterparts working in
government. A cadre working in government only received a basic salary and various
subsidies; in contrast, an enterprise employee received bonuses in addition to a basic
salary and subsidies. In 1993, the average pay of a manager in a state-owned enterprise
was 26% higher than a government cadre’s at comparable rank.14 Poor pay demoralized
the officials and turned them away from government. Second, there was neither a regular
mechanism for adjusting the entire wage level of the government officials to the overall
price index nor a mechanism allowing salary to increase with the growth of working
experience and length of time in a position. Before 1985, officials of the same rank
received the same pay, regardless of the complexity of their duties or actual work
performance. Third, Chinese public organizations distributed the extra pay equally. That
is, the distribution of subsidies and awards was on an egalitarian basis, regardless of
employees’ performance and contributions. For example, the egalitarian distribution
practices of award under the Cadre Management System meant the award could be spent
purchasing office supplies which would be equally distributed to the employees, or the
award itself could be distributed equally among employees.
5. Promotion
Under the Cadre Management System, political loyalty to the Party and /or
powerful superiors and social class background were the main criteria for promotion
the salary of government official is fixed, that of an enterprise employee varies with pieces of work
performed and time and effort expended. These factors, compounded by lack of job mobility between the
public and profit-oriented sector, have contributed to a widening income gap between government officials
and enterprises employees.
14
National Bureau of Statistics (ed.), Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1995[China Statistical Yearbook 1995]
(Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1996), p. 123. As cited in Chou Kwok Ping, “Conflict and Ambiguity in the
Implementation of the Civil Service Reform in China, 1993-2000,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Hong
Kong: The University of Hong Kong, 2003), p. 206.
70
within the Party-state. Although defined and redefined, political integrity was the most
important criteria for promotion. During the Maoist era, political integrity meant
adherence to a set of orthodox communist virtues, though later the reformist leadership
redefined the concept to embrace its emphasis on economic development.15 After the
Tiananmen Incident of 1989, the leadership attempted to revert to the traditional
definition of political integrity. In his report on “Party Building” to the heads of
Organization Departments, Song Ping, the Politburo member in charge of party discipline
and personnel, renewed emphasis on the ideological purity of cadres. 16 In the second
place, family origin, i.e., social class background, also served as a criterion.
6. Training
Training is supposed to reduce the gap between the cadres’ current qualifications
and the requirements of their respective designated positions. In order to achieve this gapreduction, formal education and/or practical work experience at a lower level might be
required. Under Cadre Management System training, too much emphasis was put on
literacy and political training and insufficient attention to job-related skills training. 17
Moreover, given that the problem-solving ability and work performance were not the
main consideration during performance appraisal and promotion, employees did not have
an incentive to voluntarily participate in training programs to update their work-related
knowledge and skills.
7. Retirement
15
See John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in Contemporary China,” Australian Journal of Chinese
Affairs No. 18 (1987), pp. 62-63.
16
See Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], 23 August 1989. As cited in Yasheng Huang, “Web of Interests and
Patterns of Behavior of Chinese Local Economic Bureaucracies and Enterprises during Reforms”.
17
See Chou Kwok Ping, “Conflict and Ambiguity in the Implementation of the Civil Service Reform in
China, 1993-2000,” op. cit., p. 172.
71
The Cadre Management System was almost a life-tenure system and there were no
strict rules specifying when the cadres should retire. This life tenure system came from
the belief that a socialist state was supposed to take care of cadres’ livelihoods, regardless
of whether they were on active duty, and that to be a cadre was to contribute to
revolutionary work which was a lifetime career. Cadres were to remain in office until
they passed away.18 Moreover, in practice, cadres postponed their retirement to gain more
retirement benefit. China had a rank-in-person classification system, which meant
employees did not lose rank, even if they switched to a less responsible position, unless
the switch was the result of disciplinary action. Pay and pensions were based on rank; so
many cadres postponed retirement to improve their retirement benefits.19 A life-tenure
system and cadres who were reluctant to retire constituted an aging bureaucracy under the
Cadre Management System in China.
8. Establishment Control
The regulations of establishment in the Cadre Management System stipulated the
staff size of government bureaus but not the number of deputy chiefs or the proportion of
non-leading officials in government bureaus. In some government bureaus, there were
more high ranking officials than low ranking ones, with many high ranking officials as
deputy bureau chiefs or non-leading officials at the same level. 20 This situation made it
impossible to control administrative expenditure.
18
See Lee Hong Yung, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China; Melanie,
Manion, “The Cadre Management System, post-Mao: the Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal
of Party and State Leaders”; Melanie, Manion, Retirement of Revolutionaries in China: Public Policies,
Social Norms, Private Interests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
19
See Steven E. Aufrecht and Li Siu Bun, “Reform with Chinese Characteristics: the Context of Chinese
Civil Service Reform,” Public Administration Review Vol. 55, No.2 (1995), pp. 175-182.
20
See the Notice Concerning Establishment Planning in Local Governments issued in 1988, the Notice
Concerning Temporary Establishment and Cadre Transfer for Population Census issued in 1988 and the
Notice Concerning Increase in the Establishment for in Local Family Planning Agencies. The three Notices
can be found in the Chinese Personnel Yearbook Editorial Office (ed.), Zhongguo renshi nianjian 1988 – 89
72
Overall, I find the Cadre Management System put negative influence on
administration efficiency. This might be because before Civil Service Reform, the CCP
did not institutionalize the merit principle in personnel management. Instead, it sought to
maintain a similar ideological identification among the cadres in order to solicit their
voluntary compliance. As a result, the Chinese bureaucracy was run by revolutionary
cadres with good political credentials but poor job-related knowledge.
Civil Service System
In August 1993, the Chinese government officially promulgated the Provisional
Regulations on State Civil Servants (referred to as the 1993 Provisional Regulations
hereafter).21 Later on, the Ministry of Personnel began to issue a number of subsidiary
regulations.22 The culmination of the 1993 Provisional Regulations and other subsidiary
regulations constitutes China’s Civil Service System package, which governs the current
personnel management in China.23 China’s Civil Service System is a rational personnel
management system, under which people should be recruited through open and
competitive examination and the emphasis should be put on merit (as opposed to only
focusing on political criteria under the Cadre Management System). China’s Civil Service
[Chinese Personnl Yarbook 1988 – 89], pp. 666 – 668 and 679 – 680. As cited in Chou Kwok Ping, op. cit.,
p. 106.
21
A copy of the 1993 Provisional Regulations can be retrieved from website
http://www.eol.cn/article/20040702/3109473.shtml on 7 April 2006.
22
The subsidiary regulations include the provisional regulations on selection, appointment and promotion,
regulations on resignation and dismissal, on rotation and exchange, internal competition, and performance
evaluation. See Caroline Haiyan Tong, Jeffrey D. Straussman and Walter D. Broadnax, “Civil Service
Reform in the People’s Republic of China: Case Studies of Early Implementation,” Public Administration
and Development No. 19 (1999), pp. 193-206; Tao-Chiu Lam and Hon S. Chan, “Reforming China’s Cadre
Management System: Two Views of a Civil Service,” Asian Survey Vol. 36, No. 8 (1996), pp. 772 – 781.
23
To upgrade the status of the 1993 Provisional Regulations to law, the National People’s Congress
approved the new Civil Service Law on 27 April 2005. The Civil Service Law consists of eighteen chapters
of one hundred and seven articles. A copy can be retrieved from the website of the Ministry of Personnel
http://www.mop.gov.cn/Desktop.aspx?PATH=rsbww/sy/xxll&Gid=4e34f9d2-e5bb-4efe-be332a60057946e4&Tid=Cms_Info on 7 April 2006.
73
System embodies the principles of “openness, fairness, competition and selection of the
best.” 24 This endorsement marks a significant departure from the secretive process of
selecting and promoting cadres. Competition is a characteristic of many aspects of
personnel management, ranging from entrance examinations to evaluation and promotion.
China’s Civil Service System also designs initiatives to curb nepotism, patronage,
corruption and other undesirable behaviors. China’s Civil Service Reform encompasses
the following programs: establishment control, position specification, recruitment and
selection, performance appraisal and promotion, training and compensation, avoidance
and rotation, award, discipline, and an appeal system.
1. Categorization
China’s Civil Service System is a personnel management system with
classification to cater for requirements of different types of government employees. As I
mentioned in chapter 1, the distinction between political appointees and career civil
servants was removed from earlier drafts of the Provisional Regulations. In its place is a
division between “leading” and “non-leading” positions. The 1993 Provisional
Regulations define “non-leading” positions as clerks, section members, deputy section
chiefs, section chiefs, assistant researchers, researchers, assistant inspectors and
inspectors. All other jobs are considered leading positions. The introduction of nonleading positions is an attempt to alleviate the ever-present pressure to increase the
number of leading positions in government. Non-leading positions can be created as
senior and equivalent to directors of departments/bureaus and above. Non-leading
positions have all the benefits and status associated with the leading positions, except
administrative power. Therefore, an official who deserves a promotion but cannot get it
24
See the 1993 Provisional Regulations, Chapter 1.
74
because of the lack of a vacancy may be promoted to a non-leading position. Non-leading
positions also make it possible to arrange that cadres reaching a certain age level step
down from the leading positions to give way to the young aspirants.25
2. Establishment Control and Position Specification
The new regulations on establishment planning closed up the earlier loopholes.
The Method of the Establishment on Non-leading Positions in State Civil Service issued
by the State Council in 1993 stipulated that no government bureaus with a staff of three or
less could establish a deputy head position. Those staffed by 4 to 7 members could
establish one deputy head position. If the staff size exceeded 8 they could establish 2
deputy head positions. A particularly large work unit had at most 4 deputy heads.26
On 11 January 1994, the Ministry of Personnel issued the Method of
Implementing Position Specification for State Civil Servants. Article 4 states position
specification should specify the job titles, duties and requirements of each office, as well
as expected performance and career path of the office holder. Article 6 states position
specification should form the benchmarks for recruitment and selection, appraisal,
training and promotion.
3. Recruitment, Examination and Selection
Recruitment and selection through open competitive examinations mark a
significant departure from the secretive process of selecting cadres. The analysis of
formal rules and existing literature on reform implementation suggest that competitive
25
See Lam, Tao-Chiu and Hon S. Chan, “China’s New Civil Service: What the Emperor Is Wearing and
Why,” Public Administration Review Vol. 56, No. 5 (1996), pp. 479-484.
26
See The Method of the Establishment on Non-leading Positions in State Civil Service, a copy can be
retrieved from the website http://www.eol.cn/article/20040702/3109473.shtml on 7 April 2006.
75
selection will help to raise the quality of the government work force in several ways. 1).
The fact that government has opened up its recruitment to the general public will help to
attract talents into the civil service. 2). Competition involved in the entrance examinations
will help to raise the quality of the recruits. In recent years, the government has been
raising the entry-level qualifications for civil servants, believing that the recruitment and
initial placement of civil servants are crucial determinants of the enduring quality of the
civil service. Most applicants must now have at least a university degree.27 3). The open
process will help to reduce the malpractices and corruption in the staffing process. 4).
The 1993 Provisional Regulations stipulate that an individual organization has the
autonomy to decide whom to recruit into their organization. This autonomy will help to
rationalize the selection.
Under China’s Civil Service System, job applicants will be subjected to
competitive examinations (written exams and interview) to enter into the civil service.
The scope of the examinations includes writing skills, numeracy, technical skills and
political dogma in order to select “all-round” talent.28 The emphasis of the examinations
is put on a candidate’s job-related knowledge, abilities, and skills. Political knowledge
based on the CCP’s interpretation is no longer the determining selection criterion.29
4. Performance Appraisal
The 1993 Provisional Regulations specify that civil servants are required to have a
formal annual assessment and the results of assessment are graded and referred to for
promotion and reward. Performance evaluation is not a new practice in the Chinese
27
Interview, the Ministry of Personnel, March 2004.
See Cooke op. cit.
29
See Liu Meiru, Administrative Reform in China and Its Impact on the Policy-making Process and
Economic Development after Mao (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001).
28
76
government. The Cadre Management System also practiced performance evaluation. The
difference lies in the overriding criteria for performance assessment. The Cadre
Management System focused on political loyalty and social class background while
China’s Civil Service System instead favors merit and performance. The 1993 Provisional
Regulations state that civil servants will be comprehensively evaluated (through selfevaluation, peer assessment and appraisal by the superiors) for “virtue (de), ability (neng),
diligence (work attendance, qin) and achievements (ji).” 30 There are no standard
definitions for these criteria; the common understanding could include the following
descriptions: virtue means political attitude, moral integrity, professional ethics and
obedience to law; ability means professional and managerial skills; diligence means
attendance and number of days worked; and achievement means quality, quantity and
outcome of work.
31
The performance appraisal puts emphasis on actual work
achievements. According to one handbook, work achievements should account for 60%
to 70% and political integrity, competence and diligence should together account for 30%
to 40% of the evaluation.32 On the basis of performance assessments, cadres are judged to
be outstanding (youxiu), competent (chenzhi) or incompetent (bu chenzhi).
To achieve greater objectivity in the appraisal process, article 10 of the Appraisal
Regulations stipulates that democratic appraisal (minzhu pingyi) should be used to
evaluate the bureau/ directorate-level leading officials in the State Council and the leading
officials in the bureaus of governments at county level and above.33 Democratic appraisal
30
See the 1993 Provisional Regulations, Chapter 5.
See Xu Songtao, Guojia gongwuyuan zhidu jiaocheng [Text on the State Civil Service System] (Beijing:
China Personnel Press, 1994); Tong et al. op. cit.
32
See Maria Edin, “State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from A
Township Perspective,” The China Quarterly No. 173 (2003), p. 37.
33
In March 1994, the Ministry of Personnel promulgated the Provisional Regulations of State Civil
Servants Appraisal. A copy can be retrieved from the website
http://www.fsrs.gov.cn/workinfo/Info_txt.asp?id=236 on 7 April 2006.
31
77
is a mass line approach in the communist tradition for evaluating leading officials.
Through peer feedback in small group discussions, appraisal polling, appraisal surveys, or
face-to-face interviews, cadres could have a more comprehensive knowledge of their
strengths and weaknesses. A democratic appraisal could be very significant to the overall
evaluation result. Usually participants in democratic appraisals are the peers and
subordinates of the person under appraisal.
Another characteristic of the appraisal reform is the introduction of a better
performance classification system. Article 5 of the Provisional Regulations of State Civil
Servants Appraisal outlines a three-grade classification of annual appraisal results:
outstanding, competent and incompetent. Article 6 stipulates that no more than 15% of
the members of a government organ can be rated as outstanding. Recently the Ministry of
Personnel has introduced a four-grade appraisal classification, that is, outstanding,
competent, basically competent and incompetent.34
5. Promotion
Under China’s Civil Service System, the results of a performance appraisal should
be considered as the basis for promotion. Moreover, the promotion of an official to the
next grade requires a specific educational qualification and a minimum service period in
the current rank. The higher the rank, the higher the educational qualification required
from the job holder; and the longer the minimum service (usually five years) in the
current rank. Public opinion is another new criterion which promotion seekers need to
satisfy.35
34
35
Interview, the Ministry of Personnel, March 2004.
See Cooke op. cit.
78
6. Training
Civil service training programs include pre-service training for new recruits, prepromotional qualification training, knowledge update training and other types of
continuous education. According to the 1993 Provisional Regulations, all newly recruited
civil servants must go through pre-post training before they start work. The induction
training lasts for a minimum of ten days. Passing the induction training is mandatory.
Once in the post, regular training courses are provided. Training content ranges from
dissemination of government documents to new IT skills, management skills or new
procedures relating to the profession. All civil servants are supposed to receive threemonth refresher training every five years.
Training was also an important part of the Cadre Management System. However,
the emphases of the two systems differ. The training programs of the Cadre Management
System focused mostly on teaching Marxist political ideology and fostering Party loyalty.
Party Schools (dangxiao) at the national and local levels provided education and training
for both Party and government cadres. The government recognizes that updating the skills
and knowledge of the civil service force is an essential task in modernizing the service.
To implement China’s Civil Service System, the authority established the China National
School of Administration (guojia xingzheng xueyuan), a key education and training
institution for senior civil servants. Provincial and local administration schools were also
established, or converted from Party schools, to train and educate lower/middle-level civil
servants in their respective jurisdictions. While these schools still teach political ideology,
their mandate is to provide civil servants with the knowledge and training they need to
manage the government.36
36
See Tong et al. op. cit.
79
7. Rotation, Exchange and Avoidance
To reduce the possibility of corruption and to broaden the experience and vision
of corps members, the Ministry of Personnel issued the Provisional Regulations of the
State Civil Servant Position Rotation in 1996. Article 2 and 4 state that officials in leading
positions in government departments are obliged to participate in position rotation every
five years.37 Non-leading officials charged with the following duties are also obliged to
participate in position rotation: personnel, finance, material management, issue of
certificates and license, and approval of fund appropriations and investment projects.38 In
exchange practice, those who have worked in the same locality or department for ten
years should change positions with their counterparts in other localities. The central
leadership formalized the cadre exchange system with Provisional Regulations on
Exchanging Leading Party and Government Cadres in 1999.
The avoidance system includes the avoidance of kinship and avoidance of native
place. According to Article 61 in Chapter 12 in the 1993 Provisional Regulations, the
kinship avoidance is applicable to spouses, lineal blood relations, and collateral relatives
(blood or marriage) within three generations. If any two officials are related through the
above-mentioned ties, they should not work in the same work unit if both directly report
to the same leaders or if one is a direct superior or subordinate of the other. If one person
is a leader in an agency, the other person so related to him should not engage in such
work as personnel, discipline inspection, auditing or financial affairs in the same unit.
According to Article 63 in Chapter 12, native place avoidance requires that a person
37
See Guojia gongwuyan zhiwei lunhuan zhanxing tiaoli [Provisional Regulations of the State Civil
Servant Position Rotation], in Zhongguo renshi bao [Chinese Personnel Post] 13August 1996, p. 1.
38
See “National Meeting on Improving the Civil Service System,” (text) Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service
in Chinese (18 July 1999) Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report –
China, 5 August 1999 (PrEx. 7.10: FBIS-CHI-99-0803).
80
should not hold a county magistrate (city mayor) or party secretary position in his or her
native place. County magistrates and party secretaries who are elected to their position in
their native place should be relocated after the initial term expires.
8. Compensation Reform
The compensation reform includes institutionalizing the regular pay increments
and establishing a merit-based pay, and reducing the proportion of egalitarian fringe
benefits in compensation packages. In 1985, a new wage system was introduced to offer
different wages dependent on the civil servants’ duties. The new wage package was
composed of four parts: a basic wage (jiben gongzi) that is uniform among all the
employees, a post wage (zhiwu gongzi) that is based on the complexity of one’s duty, and
seniority wage (gongling gongzi) that is based on the number of years an employee has
worked. The fourth part is the award wage (jiangli gongzi). Starting from 1986, officials
who performed well would be entitled to an award wage which amounted to 10% of the
aggregate amounts of their basic, post and seniority wages.
The State Council’s promulgation of the Notice Concerning Reform of the Wage
System for the Employees in Governments and Service Units on 15 November 1993 and
the Circular Concerning Several Questions about Implementation of Compensation
Reform in Government and Service Units on 29 January 1994 further deepened the
compensation reform. These regulations state that every two years, the government
should adjust the overall wage level according to the change in the price index to protect
the standard of living of civil servants against inflation.
81
To establish a merit-based pay, China’s Civil Service System set up a new wage
system with five major components: basic wage, post wage, seniority wage, award wage
and grade wage (jibie gongzi) based on the 1985 compensation reform. There are 6 to14
incremental grades in the category of post wage and 15 increments in the grade wage
category. Even if an official does not get a promotion, his salary will climb up along a
much widened salary scale. The lower the rank, the more grade points there are. Given
that over 92% of civil servants in China were at section level or below, and about 58%
worked in county and township-level governments, 39 many employees do not have
promotion opportunities. Wage grades allow for more opportunity for pay increments.
Both post wage and grade wage are the essential components of merit pay. Two factors
determine a civil servant’s level of post wage: duty complexity and annual appraisal
grades. Civil servants charged with more complex duties are entitled to a higher grade
than their counterparts at the same ranking. They enjoy a grade increment if they are rated
outstanding or competent in two consecutive annual appraisals. Like the post wage, the
grade wage seeks to link extra pay with performance. An employee could be entitled to
jump up a grade if he is graded competent in five consecutive annual appraisals or
outstanding in three consecutive annual appraisals.
We should note that the subsidies and bonus together with welfare and housing
investment, may account for over 80% of the total remuneration to civil servants. 40
Reform leaders hoped to reduce the subsidy proportion of remuneration because fringe
benefits were distributed on an egalitarian principle and contributed little to staff
motivation.
39
See Xi Liu, Zhongguo gongwuyuan zhidu [Chinese Civil Service] (Beijing: Tsinghua University Press,
2002), p. 29.
40
Besides foundation wages, civil servants will receive subsidies (a wide range of allowances for daily
necessities, air-conditioning and transportation), bonus -jiangjin- and welfare and housing investment.
82
9. Award Reform
Award reform in the 1990s is supposed to replace the egalitarian practice of award
distribution with a merit-based award. Article 12 of the Provisional Regulations of State
Civil Servants Appraisal states that those civil servants who are rated competent or
outstanding will be entitled to a bonus equal to their monthly salary.
10. Dismissal, Discipline and Appeal System
The Provisional Regulations of the Resignation and Dismissal of State Civil
Servants issued on 18 July 1995 aims to make it easier to dismiss civil servants.41 Article
9 stipulates the conditions for dismissal, article 11 stipulates procedure of dismissal, and
article 17 guarantees the right of civil servants to appeal. In particular, civil servants who
fail the annual performance assessment are given one of the following three options:
demotion, retraining and waiting for a post, or resignation.
Principal-Agent Relationship within an Agency (Level 1)
In this chapter, I identify three levels of principal-agent relationships in the
Chinese government. They are the superior-subordinate relationship within an agency;
the relationship between upper-level agency and lower-level agency; and relationships
among political leaders, bureaucrats and citizens. China’s Civil Service Reform would
touch the control mechanisms available to the principal and the incentives of the agents
on all these three levels. Hypotheses regarding the performance change of local
41
A copy can be retrieved from the website http://www.jincao.com/fa/law20.15.htm on 7 April 2006.
83
governments will be present at the end of each level of analysis. I first examine the
superior-subordinate relationship within an agency in this section.
Actors and Motivations
Within an agency, the superior-subordinate relationship parallels a principal-agent
relationship, where the superior acts as the principal and subordinates act as agents. The
interest of the principal within Chinese government agency lies in the performance of the
organization in her charge.42 The principal wants to achieve organizational performance
by qualified personnel and scientific personnel management. Her detailed requirements
might be to select qualified agents; these agents would then apply themselves
conscientiously to their work and voluntarily update their work-related knowledge and
skills, and proper performance appraisal and compensation methods would exist to shape
agents’ performance incentives.
However, the agents want to spare the effort that the principal requires from them.
This is because over 92% of civil servants in China are at section level or below, and
about 58% work in county- and township-level governments.43 The promotion vacancy is
limited compared with the large population of low-rank civil servants. In the agents’ view,
promotion opportunities are rare. Those things associated with promotion, such as power,
influence, and status, are beyond their reach. Therefore they prefer to maintain the status
quo and welcome more welfare, more spare time and more leisure activities.
42
Chinese government practices the Leading Cadre Responsibility System, under which the leading cadre’s
work performance is evaluated based on the organizational performance in her charge. In December 1982,
the Ministry of Labor and Personnel issued the Notice Concerning the Establishment of Cadre
Responsibility System in State Organs. See “Laodong renshibu guanyu jianli guojia xingzheng jiguan
gongzuorenyuan gangwei zerenzhi de tongzhi” [the Notice of the Ministry of Labor and Personnel
Concerning the Establishment of Cadre Responsibility System in State Organs], in the Cadre Bureau of the
Ministry of Labor and Personnel (ed.) Jiangcheng gongzuo wenjian huibian [A Collection on Documents
Concerning Reward and Punishment], pp. 608-609.
43
Xi Liu, op. cit.
84
Nature of Problems under the Cadre Management System
Besides conflict of interest (as the above two paragraphs mentioned), information
asymmetry also exists in this principal-agent relationship. Given that the administrative
work cannot be easily observed and measured, the agents have information advantage
over their principals regarding their effort input. The Cadre Management System did not
provide measures to deal with conflict of interest and information asymmetry. Adverse
selection, moral hazard, and shirking were involved in almost all personnel procedures.
First, the selection practices under the Cadre Management System nurtured
adverse selection. Consequently, selected agents were often not capable enough to fulfill
the principal’s tasks, while those with specific talents failed to get the right work place to
utilize their potential. For example, governments at various levels were responsible for
allocating work units to all school graduates and demobilized military officials. This
method was over centralized and irrational. The cadres in charge of work allocation could
not get all the necessary information regarding the work unit’s labor needs or the
candidate’s professional ability. Therefore, they could seldom find scientific matches. In
some cases, the allocated employees held professional qualifications unrelated to the
agency’s function. Moreover, without open competitive exams, selections were processed
in secret. Rather than being based on candidates’ problem-solving ability, criteria of
selection were general political loyalty to the CCP and proper social class background.
This secretive non-competitive process increased the possibility of corruption.
85
Second, the practice of performance appraisal failed to motivate the agents to
work hard. Due to a lack of objective performance indicators, the principals met
difficulties in measuring the agents’ performance. The agents might shirk at work. The
political-oriented criteria made the situation even worse. Instead of working
conscientiously, agents tried their best to cater to their superiors to gain better
performance appraisal results. The fact that the performance appraisal was not linked with
pay provided the agents little motivation to put effort into their work, and even less
motivation to participate in training and the updating of knowledge and skills.
Third, under the Cadre Management System, pay was linked to the rank of an
employee but not the actual work he had done. The pay did not change if there was no
rank change, since there was no method allowing one’s salary to increase with the growth
of working experience and length of time in a position. The pay of government officials
was not attractive compared with that of enterprise employees. There were no methods to
adjust the overall wage level in line with inflation.
Admittedly, pay does not serve as the strong motivator for Chinese officials.
Compared with their business counterparts, governmental officials have more power,
more influence and more rent-seeking possibilities. Therefore their “grey income” can not
be correctly estimated. Scholars argue that it is the “grey income” that motivated Chinese
officials.44 But we should note that the power and rent-seeking possibilities vary across
policy areas, positions, and regions. Some policy areas, like environmental protection, are
known to be less powerful. Officials in poor regions and/or in lower positions lack access
44
See Yang Zhong, Local Government and Politics in China: Challenges from Below (Armonk, N.Y.;
London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2003).
86
to rent-seeking. To investigate the impacts of China’s Civil Service Reform on local
government, it is necessary to pay attention to pay reform.
Supposed Institutional Solutions in China’s Civil Service System
The principal-agent theory holds that the principal can use incentive-alignment
arrangement, monitoring, competition and credible commitment to induce the desirable
behaviors from the agents. Then the question is whether China’s Civil Service System
provides the principal with institutional solutions to better control the agents.45 To be
specific, under China’s Civil Service System, can the proper and capable candidates be
recruited and selected into governments? Can the superior properly measure the
subordinates’ performance and then decide proper award or sanction? Can the new pay
scheme motivate the officials in government to make a conscientious effort with their
work and voluntarily update their work related knowledge and skills?
The analysis of formal rules suggests that the components of the Civil Service
System help the principal better control the agents in a Chinese government agency. First,
local officials should sit examinations to transfer to civil servants within the first three
years. This initiative is rooted in the belief that the transition can filter out unqualified
officials and also push current position holders to voluntarily update their skills.
Second, the Civil Service System would improve selection: it would stop the
practice of work unit allocation; open recruitment to all walks of people; select people
45
I do not suppose that the two conditions, i.e., the conflict of interest and information asymmetry just
disappear; however, I do suppose that the Civil Service System provides institutional solutions to counter
these two conditions. For example, one of the solutions to conflict of interest can be the compensation
reform that helps the principal to shape agents’ incentives.
87
through open competitive examinations; and focus on a candidate’s knowledge and
problem-solving ability. All these could help to reduce the possibility of adverse selection
during selection, and guarantee capable candidates be selected. Under China’s Civil
Service System, particular agencies could have some autonomy to choose the capable and
professionally relevant people they need. This autonomy could help the agency principals
to choose like-minded agents. In principal-agent logic, if the principal could select likeminded agents, it would be easy for the principal to control them. Moreover, the open
competition practices would help to reduce corruption.
Third, as one initiative of China’s Civil Service Reform, the compensation reform
would help the principals to shape the agents’ incentive for performance. The
compensation reform first institutionalized a normal mechanism for wage increase. It
clearly states that every two years, the government should adjust the overall wage level to
protect the standard of living of civil servants against inflation. Pay increases in 1995,
1997, 1999 and 2001 were indicative of the successful institutionalization of this part of
reform. These initiatives narrow the pay gap between the state and non-state sectors, from
40.6% in 1993 to 15.05% in 1999.46 The pay-gap reduction plus other “grey income”
makes government work quite attractive for the job-seekers. Under China’s Civil Service
System, even if an official does not get a promotion, his salary will increase with the
growth of working experience and length of time in a position along a much widened
salary scale. To some extent, pay could motivate employees to apply their talents and
energy to their work. At least the new compensation system can motivate those officials
who lack access to rent-seeking and promotion opportunities.
46
Chou Kwok Ping, “Conflict and Ambiguity in the Implementation of the Civil Service Reform in China,
1993-2000,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong, 2003), p. 206.
88
Fourth, performance appraisal would focus on ability and work performance;
political loyalty would no longer be the only consideration. Punishment would follow a
bad performance appraisal. That means principals will have objective indicators that can
measure agents’ performance.47 And if the commitment that punishment will follow poor
performance is credible, then it can deter the agents from shirking or moral hazard.48 Fifth,
competition is instilled into almost all the personnel procedures, such as selection,
promotion, performance appraisal and award practices.
Hypotheses
In this section, I apply the principal-agent logic to understand how various Human
Resource Management practices will shape the incentives of civil servants and thus
influence the agency performance. In general, I suppose under the Civil Service System
there would be the following improvements: the principals in an agency could select
qualified and like-minded people; the principals could to some extent objectively measure
the agents’ performance and accordingly decide proper award or sanction; the new pay
scheme could motivate the agents to put conscious effort into their work and voluntarily
update their work related knowledge and skills; competition would thus be instilled into
selection, promotion and award practices. All these will have positive influence on
agency performance.
Multiple Principals Model (Level 2)
47
China’s Civil Service System includes position specification. Article 6 of the 1993 Provisional
Regulations stipulates position specification should form the benchmarks for recruitment and selection,
appraisal, training and promotion.
48
As a policy, those who fail their annual performance assessment are given one of three options: demotion,
retraining and wait for a post, or resignation.
89
Actors and Motivations
In this level, I identify three actors and their motivations. In China, local agencies
in various local governments are formally under two lines of leadership, one professional
and the other regional. This arrangement derives from one organizational principle in
Chinese governance, i.e. tiao-kuai (professional and regional) separation. The
professional leadership provides policy guidance on various issues, and the regional
leadership interprets them to suit the local conditions.49 As will be discussed in more
detail later, this institutional design has significant implications for the incentives and
behaviors of local agents.
The professional leader is the agency in the upper level government and carries
the same function as the local agency. Her motivation is to implement and enforce the
functional laws and regulations. Her requirements for the local agency are that they
follow policy guidance and enforce the relevant regulations strictly.
The regional leader is the leader of the local government to which the local agency
belongs. Local leaders are in charge of the overall development of the regions under their
jurisdiction. A local leader’s motivation is the local economic development. Why do the
leaders of local governments strongly promote local economic development? The
political and economic incentives provided to local governments by the reform era
policies can be divided into incentives for local governments as organizations, and
49
Formally, the Chinese bureaucratic system distinguished between so-called “regional leadership”
(xingzheng lingdo guanxi) and “professional leadership” (yewu lingdao guanxi). Regional leadership refers
mainly to relations of an administrative nature, i.e., a regional leader is able to have a primary say over the
appointment, removal and transfer of cadres of a subordinate unit, and regional leader’s administrative
expenditures cover the subordinate’s personnel payroll. Professional leadership means a professional leader
is able to issue relatively binding operational directives to the subordinate unit and a professional leader
enjoys some degree of prerogative over the personnel decisions affecting the top officials of the subordinate
unit. See Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and
Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 148-151.
90
incentives for local officials as individuals. For local governments as organizations, the
fiscal reform decentralized some rights for the local governments to retain and use
revenues generated from their own local development. In specific, the decentralization
granted the local leaders the right to retain profits from local collective enterprises for
their own administrative use, including the payment of staff salaries and bonuses. Thus
the local governments as organizations have incentives to promote their own economic
growth. Referring to local leaders as individuals, the common understanding is that they
want to get promoted. In the post-1978 era, the central leadership of the PRC wants to
regain and boost legitimacy through fast economic growth and rising living standards for
the people. Furthermore, the central leaders in China can control the fate of local
bureaucrats through making appointments or dismissals. Under such circumstance, local
leaders who show ability and performance in boosting local economic development can
have a better chance of gaining promotion.50
This dual leadership arrangement has implications for a local agent’s motivation.
As discussed in chapter 2, difficulties arise for an agent when she must respond to
multiple principals, each with their own objectives. If the objectives of the multiple
principals are in conflict, the agent is forced to choose which objectives to pursue, and
regardless of the action taken by the agent, at least one of the principals is likely to be
dissatisfied with the outcomes. The agent’s choice of which objectives to pursue, and
therefore which principal to satisfy, depends largely on the incentives that each principal
provides to the agent, and the controls that the principals put in place to monitor and limit
the actions of the agent.
50
See Zhiyue Bo, Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949
(Armonk, N.Y.; London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2002); Jean C. Oi, State and Peasant in Contemporary
China: The Political Economy of Village Government (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1989); Susan H. Whiting, Power and Wealth in Rural China: the Political Economy of Institutional Change
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
91
In China, the strength of the control mechanisms available to the regional (local
government) leaders significantly outweighs those available to upper level professional
leaders. The upper level professional leaders use administrative procedures (for example,
the work plan) and detailed inspection, neither of which is sufficient to guarantee full
compliance. In contrast, the regional leaders control the annual budgetary funds to the
local functional agencies and the careers of local agents. Because the regional leaders
tightly control their careers and budgets, local agents in various local agencies share their
interests more closely with the regional leaders. 51
Nature of Problems under the Cadre Management System
The unbalanced dual leadership meant that a local agency shared her interests with
the regional leader. Therefore, a control problem between the professional leader and the
local agency existed. Bureaucratic non-compliance of a professional leader’s directives is
usual phenomena. For example, in policy of environmental protection, according to one
recent study,52 only about 36% of the enterprises in its sample met the standards with
regard to industrial waste and pollutants. Instead of strictly enforcing the standards, local
agents at environmental protection agencies engaged in bargaining and colluded with
local enterprises. They would take a tougher line only during national campaigns of
environmental protection.
51
In 1984, Chinese central leadership decentralized moderately some personnel appointment power, that is,
from a two-level down management system to a one-level down management system.
52
See Ma Xiaoying and Leonard Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in China: Institutions, Enforcement,
and Compliance (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), p. 182.
92
Both conflict of interest and information asymmetry were present in the
relationship between the professional leader and local agent. The professional leader
wanted the local agency to strictly implement and enforce the regulations, while the
requirements from the professional leaders were often in conflict with the local leader’s
goal of economic development. For example, the upper level Environmental Protection
Bureau required the local Environmental Protection Bureau strictly enforce regulations on
the local enterprises (pollution-makers). However, the local leader might rely on these
enterprises for taxation and revenue; she did not want the local Environmental Protection
Bureau to regulate that strictly. Sometimes, the enterprise managers might contact the
local government leaders to complain about specific enforcement actions (e.g., fees or
fines) imposed by the local Environmental Protection Bureau. If the leaders agreed with
the enterprise managers that the imposition of these environmental enforcement actions
might cause the enterprise economic harm, the local leaders might request the local
Environmental Protection Bureau reduce or cancel the proposed fees or fines.53
Information asymmetry lay in the fact that the professional leader could not
inspect the local agency’s everyday work. This information problem intensified if the
local leader colluded with the local agent. For example, when the professional leader
caught the local agent not enforcing regulations strictly, the severity of punishment would
be lessened if protection from the local leader was forthcoming. In short, from the
perspective of the professional leader, the local agency’s performance sometimes was not
qualified. Or we can say, to some extent, the local agency did not faithfully fulfill its
functional mission.
53
See Abigail R. Jahiel, “The Contradictory Impact of Reform and Environmental Protection,” The China
Quarterly No. 149 (1997), pp. 81-103; Abigail R. Jahiel, “The Organization of Environmental Protection in
China,” The China Quarterly No. 156 (1998), pp. 757-787.
93
Institutional Solutions Provided by the Civil Service System
During China’s Civil Service Reform, the central leadership institutionalized
evaluation of the performance of leading cadres and formulated the Leading Cadre
Responsibility System. The measures for evaluating and promoting the leading cadres
became more comprehensive and had less focus on economic development. The Chinese
leadership established a cadre evaluation (ganbu kaohe) system in 1979. Over the years,
there has been an effort to institutionalize this form of performance check by making it a
regular and systematic operation.54
To develop the economy, the central leadership decentralized power to local
governments. Apparently China’s economy has been boosted in the past two decades by
this decentralization and the autonomy given to local governments. However, there is
evidence showing that China’s fast economic growth is taking place at the expense of
poor implementation of other policies. 55 The central leadership realizes the whole
nation’s (overall) interest lies in the proper implementation of all policies (including
policy in non-economic fields, such as environment and education). So the new leading
cadre evaluation scheme focuses on other policy indicators (for example, environment
and education) as well as economic development.
Under the Leading Cadre Responsibility System, the regional (local government)
leaders can not totally disregard the implementation of non-economic policies. If they do
disregard other policies completely, local governments will risk attracting the attention of
54
For more details on the evolution process of cadre evaluation system, see Yasheng Huang,
“Administrative Monitoring in China,” The China Quarterly No. 143 (1995), p. 830; Yasheng Huang,
Inflation and Investment Controls in China: the Political Economy of Central-Local Relations during the
Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 95.
55
See Ma Xiaoying and Leonard Ortolano, op. cit.
94
the higher levels of government, and punitive action may follow. At least a minimum
level of enforcement is necessary to avoid attracting the attention of higher level
governments. Therefore, local governments must, at a minimum, maintain a façade of
compliance with the policies of the higher levels of government.56
Local leaders’ incentive has changed. They will now strongly promote local
economic development, but at the same time implement other policies (for example,
environment and education) sufficiently so as not to attract the attention of a higher level
of government. Therefore the local functional agencies’ incentives have also changed; to
some extent, they will implement and enforce the regulations strictly.
Another point, after the adoption of China’s Civil Service System, establishment
control put pressure on local agents’ job security. Maintaining job security is also likely
to be an important objective for local functional officials. Job security is enhanced when
local government leaders attach importance to some particular functional work. If we take
the example of the environment again, in the interests of their job security, local
Environmental Protection Bureau officials have an incentive to promote the value of
environmental protection by enforcing environmental regulations at enterprises and
reducing pollution as a way to show the continued importance of their organizational
mission.
Hypotheses
56
See Jean C. Oi, op. cit.
95
I suppose that under China’s Civil Service System, by evaluating the regional
leading cadre’s performance more comprehensively, the local non-compliance of
professional leaders’ directives will decrease. This will put positive influence on local
functional agency performance. In other words, a local functional agency will more
faithfully fulfill their professional missions.
Control of the Bureaucracy (Level 3)
Actors and Motivations
In this section, I will investigate how the political leadership controls the
bureaucracy. In dealing with the issue of control of the bureaucracy, the central leadership,
civil servants, and citizens are collectively involved. In general, power is concentrated in
the Chinese political system. In theory, it is concentrated in the hands of the National
People’s Congress. In reality, it is monopolized by the central leadership of the Partystate.57 The central leadership is a group of decision-makers at the top of the hierarchy,
including top leaders in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Political Bureau and the
central government’s State Council. In democratic regimes, the main motivator for the
politicians is to win re-election; and the political winner’s legitimacy is based on strong
justification mechanisms, such as voting or multi-party competition. China is different
from democratic regimes in this respect. Scholars agree that China is an authoritarian
regime. In this authoritarian regime, the central leadership, like politicians elsewhere,
wants to maximize their chances of staying in power. That means they need legitimacy or
57
The State Constitution stipulates that the National People’s Congress (NPC) is the “highest organ of the
state power” of the PRC. The State Council and the Supreme Court derive their power from the NPC and
are thus accountable to the NPC. Furthermore, all of these three state organizations—the NPC, the State
Council and the Supreme Court—are ultimately subject to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). A copy of the Constitution can be found in Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Governing China: from
Revolution through Reform (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1995), pp.355-381.
96
public support to guarantee their stay in power. No strong mechanisms, such as voting
and multi-party competition, exist in authoritarian regimes, but politicians are no more
secure than their counterparts in democracies. In fact, precisely because of the lack of
these mechanisms, politicians in authoritarian regimes have an acute need to legitimize
their assumption of power and dismiss any suspicions the public may have.
The concept of local bureaucrats (civil servants) in this dissertation can be
grouped into two large categories of officials in various local governments. The first are
leaders in the local governments, such as governors of provinces, mayors of cities, and
magistrates of counties. They are in charge of the overall development of the regions
under their jurisdiction. We may call them local leaders. The second are bureaucrats
working in various local government agencies, such as personnel, environment, and
education. They are responsible for the developments in their respective functional areas.
We may call them local agents.
We have already discussed the incentives and behaviors of individual local agents
in level 1. So here we discuss the local leaders’ motivation.58 Promotion serves as the
strongest motivator for the local leaders. As local leaders, they want to get promoted in
the bureaucratic hierarchy. There is one unified national bureaucratic ranking system,
where each official position is ranked systematically. Bureaucrats can easily compare
their rankings in the hierarchy across governmental agencies and geographic areas.
Higher ranks on the hierarchical ladder are usually associated with more income, more
58
In practice, these categories can be blurred very quickly since there are no professional boundaries among
governmental agencies. For example, local agents can transfer from one agency to another; they can also be
promoted to the position of local leaders and local leaders can be promoted to head an agency at a higher
level.
97
amenities (luxury cars and mobile phones), more discretion (bigger budgets and more
manpower), and higher social prestige.
The interests of the general public (citizens) lie in fast economic growth and rising
living standards. The general understanding of living standard can include many noneconomic indicators, such as a clean environment and more opportunities for receiving
education, etc.
In this three-actor game, the central leadership is the de facto principal, the citizen
is the symbolic principal, and the local bureaucrat is the agent. The central leadership has
to look for public support from the citizen, while career-oriented civil servants need to
look for approval from the central leadership. In China, the civil servants will please the
leadership since they are appointed by and responsible to their superiors and central
leaders, and look to these figures for promotions. Their incentives and behaviors are very
responsive to the rules that central leaders have adopted to regulate them. Moreover, the
culture that the civil servants will please the leadership is institutionalized in Chinese
tradition. For an official, the ability to fully and truly understand the superior’s will is a
valuable asset.
Nature of Problems under the Cadre Management System
The games among the three actors are different under the two institutional
arrangements (the Cadre Management System and China’s Civil Service System). The
most important difference lies in the promotion criteria. Under the Cadre Management
System, the criteria for bureaucratic promotion were political loyalty and social class
98
background. From the superior’s perspective, people who were loyal and could faithfully
follow the superior’s commands should be promoted and entrusted with more
responsibilities (here loyalty includes both personal attachment to the superior and
commitment to the communist ideology). Consequently, civil servants aimed to please the
central leadership but cared little about the citizens. If we consider this from the citizenprincipal’s perspective, there was a moral hazard problem in the local agents’ behavior.
The interest of local bureaucrats lay in promotion. If they got promoted through
pleasing the central leadership, then they had no motivation or necessity to effectively
fulfill their professional duties. Citizen interests lay in fast economic growth, a clean
environment, and more opportunities for receiving education, etc. All these are the
bureaucrats’ professional duties. Central leadership interest lay in gaining legitimacy,
public support, or in other words, citizen satisfaction. But if the bureaucrats did not make
a conscientious effort to accomplish their professional duties, citizens could not get what
they wanted and the central leadership’s legitimacy would collapse since the citizens were
not satisfied with bureaucracy performance. So under the Cadre Management System,
there were some mismatches among the interests of the three actors.
Local bureaucrats had information advantage over both their de facto principal
and the symbolic principal. Neither of the two principals could oversee every detail of the
agent’s daily work. This was the information problem caused by the unobservability
factor inherent in the agent’s action as discussed in chapter 2. In China, the large
bureaucracy, the geographic span, and the underdevelopment of infrastructure further
intensified the informational problems. The problem of gathering more policy
implementation information, especially regarding local bureaucrats in remote areas, was a
99
challenging issue facing the central leadership. The fact that citizens did not have a say in
politics and their lack of access to the information concerning policy implementation was
another problem.
Institutional Solutions Provided by the Civil Service System
The most important difference between the Cadre Management System and Civil
Service System is the promotion criteria. Under China’s Civil Service System, the
promotion criteria focus on work performance and problem-solving ability. Deng
Xiaoping first put reform of the cadre system on the Party’s agenda in his August 1980
address to the Politburo. 59 In 1982, the four criteria—revolutionized, better educated,
professional and young—were formally enshrined in the Communist Party Constitution
as a guideline for the selection of new leading cadres. 60 Only the need to be
“revolutionized” is related to Mao’s criteria for loyalty and social class background in
some way; the other three important criteria (better educated, professional, and young) are
all on a technological level. The focus on work performance and problem-solving
capabilities can be easily deciphered from this technological level.
Scholars of China study notice this change in criteria; they argue that the
overemphasis on political loyalty in the Mao era was replaced by merit-based standards
59
See Deng Xiaoping, “Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership,” in Deng Xiaoping, Deng
Xiaoping wenxuan, [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping] (Beijing: People’s Publishing, 1984), pp. 302-325.
60
The “four modernizations” are written in the Eight-Year Plan Concerning “Four Modernizations” of
Leading Cadres, the Regulation Concerning Reforming Cadre Management System, the Opinions
Concerning Establishment of Reserve Cadres at Provincial level, and the Notice Concerning Reforming the
Party and State Organs at County level issued by the Organization Department of the CCP Central
Committee in 1983. See the Ministry of Personnel (ed.) Guojia gongwuyuan zhidu quanshu [A Collection
of Articles on State Civil Service System] (Changchun: Jilin Literature and History Press, 1994), p. 1105.
100
of education and professional competence.61 Liu demonstrates in her book Administrative
Reform in China that better trained and educated people are replacing the ideologically
correct when it comes to recruitment and advancement in positions. Professionalism,
youth, competence, and a cosmopolitan outlook are in demand; party loyalty is on the
decline.
Why has the central leadership changed the promotion rule? I will explore
historical and institutional contexts to understand the origins of this change. First, as
discussed above, China is an authoritarian state, without the strong justification
mechanisms that exist in democratic regimes; consequently she is in acute need of
legitimacy and public support. Second, as a revolutionary party before 1949, the CCP’s
goal was to win sovereignty. During that period, the CCP gained legitimacy through
revolution and masterful manipulation of ideology. After the establishment of the PRC in
1949, the CCP’s role changed to that of a ruling party. Therefore, the main goal now is to
maintain sovereignty and stay in power as long as possible. The legitimacy base needs a
transition too, from revolution and ideology to performance and service. The CCP
promises the Chinese citizen a prosperous country and happy life. These can only be
achieved through fast economic development and with the main assistance of capable
bureaucracy corps.
Third, during the period of Mao, severe shortages and many rounds of destruction
(the Anti-rightist Campaigns, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution)
inflicted with the CCP’s promise of a prosperous country and a strong nation. The general
public became highly skeptical of both the leadership and communist ideology. The post61
See Zhiyue Bo, op. cit.; Liu Meiru, op. cit.; Maria Edin, “State Capacity and Local Agent Control in
China: CCP Cadre Management from A Township Perspective,” The China Quarterly, No. 173 (2003), pp.
35-52.
101
Mao leadership has sought to regain legitimacy by vigorously pushing economic
development. They believe that the citizens will support them only if they can develop the
economy and raise the standard of living of the citizens.62 That is, the new legitimacy
should be based on performance and service. The CCP can only regain legitimacy with
the assistance of a capable civil service. To build a capable civil service, the CCP has
changed the criteria of evaluating and promoting civil servants to work performance and
problem-solving ability. It was generally understood that promotions have been granted
to people who are capable of promoting economic development and boosting the new
leadership’s legitimacy.63
How does this new promotion rule work? To some extent, the new promotion
rule is self-reinforced. One principle working rule of Chinese bureaucracy is that the top
leader be responsible for the overall development of the region she governs. This leading
cadre responsibility system helps the central policy transfer down through the
bureaucracy. When the top leaders evaluate the provincial governors for promotion, they
first consider the provincial governors’ work performance. In most cases, this work
performance can be illustrated by the economic growth of that province. The economic
growth of one province equals the sum of the economic growth of the cities governed by
the province. So accordingly, the provincial governor will promise to her subordinates,
the city mayors, that promotion consideration will be based on work performance.
Similarly, this work performance can be illustrated by the economic growth of the city.
Accordingly, the economic growth of one city equals the sum of economic growth of the
counties governed by the city. So the mayor of the city will transfer the superiors’ will to
her own subordinates. So far we can see the leader responsibility system helps the new
62
63
See Lieberthal, op. cit., pp. 124-127.
See Zhiyue Bo, op. cit.
102
promotion rule transfer smoothly along various levels of superior-subordinate
relationships by repeatedly applying the command-obedience action pattern.
The new promotion rule is not only transferred through the whole bureaucracy,
but is also welcomed by the civil service. Deng’s leadership decentralized fiscal power
and tried to establish a Taxes Distribution System between central and local governments
during the post-1978 era (the Taxes Distribution System was established in 1994). This
fiscal decentralization provided strong incentives for local governments and local civil
servants to foster the growth of the local economy. Local governments have been granted
the right to retain and use revenues generated from development. Local leaders are able to
retain profits from local collective enterprises for their own administrative use, including
the payment of staff salaries and bonuses. If a particular locality shows fast local
development, the local leaders may get promotion and local civil servants will get extra
welfare.64
The new promotion rule will be welcomed by the citizens since it carries net
benefit to them. To show their work performance, civil servants will try to develop the
economy and improve other non-economic performance. Citizens will enjoy benefits
from fast economic development and other non-economic development.
Now, I will have a detailed look at the games that play out among the three actors
before and after the reform. The new promotion rule induces some new interaction
patterns among these three actors. The basic interaction between the leadership and the
civil servants is the leadership releases orders to the civil servants and the latter try to
64
See Whiting, op.cit.; Edin, op. cit.
103
please the former by fulfilling their orders and requirements. Before reform, the
leadership demanded loyalty and the proper social-class background of the civil servants.
That meant showing their loyalty to the party and leaders, and being a member of the
“poor class”. In such cases, pleasing powerful leaders was a better strategy for civil
servants than performing well at work or caring about the citizens. Different requirements
from leadership can elicit quite different forms of behavior from the civil servants. After
China’s Civil Service Reform, the leadership focus changed to work performance,
meaning civil servants can not now get promotion based solely on their loyalty to the
superiors.
For work performance, civil servants must find in their performance some
physical and material basis. The apparent material basis could be economic growth,
infrastructure construction, increased foreign investment, and so on. Most of these
material bases are public goods or public services, and of course will influence the
citizens’ interests. More important, these public goods and public services can not be
produced or provided without the cooperation of the citizens. Well realizing this, the civil
servants will care about the citizens and try to induce cooperative behavior from them. In
general, after the reform, civil servants aim to please both the leadership and the citizens.
Civil servants seek to please the citizens since they want to induce their cooperation in
co-production of the public goods. The production or provision of public goods can in
turn serve as proof or material basis when civil servants show their work performance to
the leadership. Thus, if citizen satisfaction is used as a measure, the performance of local
government agencies will likely be improved.
104
Although not strong enough, citizens have some channels to provide information
regarding civil service performance to the leadership after the reform, for example, the
petition system (xinfang zhidu). Petitions refer to both letters and visits from the citizens
to officials. Chinese policy makers seem to be quite reliant on this source of information.
This might be because under an authoritarian regime where the press is the voice of the
authorities rather than a reflection of public opinion, policy makers need other channels to
obtain objective and truthful information. The leadership’s paying attention to citizens’
petitions and complaints gives citizens some indirect bargaining power in the post-reform
games.
Hypotheses
In the game before the reform, civil servants tended to only please the leadership,
and did not care about the citizens. Citizens did not have a say in public affairs, and
instead played a passive role. In the game after the reform, civil servants tend to please
both the leadership and the citizens. Civil servants please the citizens since they want to
induce their cooperation to co-produce the public goods. The production or provision of
the public goods can in turn work as proof or material basis when civil servants try to
show their work performance to the leadership. In general, after the reform, the civil
servants tend to care about, please, and serve the citizens. I suppose that if the citizens’
perceptions or feedback are used as a measure, the performance of Chinese government
will be improved.
Conclusion
105
In the analysis of level 1, I focus on individual incentives, and make the
hypothesis that the Human Resource Management initiatives included in China’s Civil
Service System will positively influence the local agency performance. In the analysis of
level 2, referring to the relationship between upper level and lower level agencies, I
suppose that after reform, the local agency will put more weight on professional leaders’
requirements than before. This will put positive influence on agency performance. In
investigation of the issue of control of the bureaucracy (level 3 analysis), I suppose that if
citizen satisfaction is used as a measure, agency performance will be improved. Thus, this
dissertation will cover both the managerial and political dimensions of administrative
performance.
In this chapter, I show how the principal-agent logic helps structure coherent
hypotheses of China’s Civil Service Reform and local agency performance. These
hypotheses lay down some theoretical expectations for the empirical analysis. Now we
are ready to move to performance measurement issues and to subject the hypotheses to
empirical test.
106
Chapter 4 Measuring Government Performance:
Dimensions and Indicators
In the last two chapters, I have explored the logic of China’s Civil Service Reform
in a principal-agent framework. Drawing on historical and institutional backgrounds, I
have built an agency model of the Chinese civil service and have got three sets of
hypotheses that incorporate both managerial and political dimensions of administrative
performance. To demonstrate the validity of these testable hypotheses, I will, in the next
four chapters, examine Chinese government performance changes after adopting the Civil
Service System. Before examining performance changes, first we should be clear about
how to understand, conceptualize and measure government performance. By
conceptualizing government performance and setting benchmarks on measurement, I
want to establish a foundation from which to assess in detail the impacts of China’s Civil
Service Reform on local government in the following chapters.
This chapter proceeds in four sections. Section 1 reviews literatures of
government performance, focusing on how to conceptualize and measure government
performance and the relationship between government performance and citizen
satisfaction. Section 2 points out some methodological concerns that warrant new
techniques in order to achieve valid and reliable evaluation of government performance.
This section provides justification for applying Confirmatory Factor Analysis in this
study. Section 3 provides a detailed case study on how citizens evaluate government
environmental performance in China. This section applies Confirmatory Factor Analysis
107
and creates a scale against which government environmental performance can be
measured. The scale of citizens’ evaluation of government environmental performance
could be used for further systematic research. After making sense of the results of the
case study, in section 4, I introduce the governance structure of educational policy in
China.1
Knowledge Gaps on Conceptualizing and Measuring Government
Performance
Literatures of government performance focus on two main issues: dimensions and
measures. I first talk about dimensions. In a very broad sense, performance refers to the
accomplishment of a certain task so as to bring about results that fulfill certain
requirements.2 Public organizations are required to address a range of goals, and hence
the performance of a public organization is multi-dimensional. Scholars have long
recognized this.3 Boyne has identified the dimensions as quantity of output, quality of
output, efficiency, effectiveness, equity, responsiveness, outcomes and citizen /client
satisfaction4. I will discuss them one by one.
1 The data for government educational performance in this study does not qualify to apply Confirmatory
Factor Analysis, so I just introduce the governance structure of educational policy in this chapter. The
evaluation of government educational performance will appear in chapter 6.
2 Waifung Lam, Governing Irrigation Systems in Nepal: Institutions, Infrastructures and Collective Action
(Oakland, Calif.: ICS Press, 1998), p. 81.
3 See Herman L. Boschken, “Organizational Performance and Multiple Constituencies,” Public
Administration Review, Vol. 54, No. 3 (1994), pp. 308-314; Terry Connolly, Edward J. Colon and Stuart J.
Deutsch, “Organizational Effectiveness: A Multiple-Constituency Approach,” Academy of Management
Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1980), pp. 211-217; Raymond F. Zammuto, “A Comparison of Multiple
Constituency Models of Organizational Effectiveness,” Academy of Management Review, Vol. 9, No. 4
(1984), pp. 606-616.
4 Boyne argues that most of the frameworks to conceptualize the multi-dimension are no more than a repackaging of the basic elements of the 3Es or IOO models. The 3Es model refers to the “economy –
108
First, inputs refer to the resources used by the government, commonly money, but
also the factors that can be purchased with money such as labor, time and equipment.
According to Newcomer, traditionally, inputs, or the resources allocated to the delivery
of programs, have been measured to track programs. Newcomer argues that traditional
process-oriented management techniques in both the public and nonprofit sectors have
traced budgetary and staffing figures to assess how programs are faring.5 However, input
itself reveals little about organizational performance but much about the leadership’s
attention. Thus scholars now advise against measuring inputs alone and suggest that
emphasis should be on outcomes, citizen satisfaction, and like matters.6
Second, outputs refer to the immediate material effects of government programs.
Outputs should include the quantity of a service and also its quality. Boyne gives
examples both on the quantity and quality of the outputs. For quantity, he mentions the
number of operations performed in hospitals, hours of teaching delivered in schools,
number of houses built and so forth. For quality, he mentions speed and reliability of
service, and courtesy of staff.7
efficiency-effectiveness” of government performance. The IOO model refers to the “inputs-outputsoutcomes” of government efforts. I agree with Boyne that the two models are enough to cover the
important dimensions of government performance. See George A. Boyne, “Sources of Public Service
Improvement: A Critical Review and Research Agenda,” Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2003), pp. 367-394.
5
Kathry E. Newcomer, “Using Performance Measurement to Improve Programs,” in Kathry E. Newcomer
(ed.), Using Performance Measurement to Improve Public and Nonprofit Programs, (San Francisco, Calif.:
Jossey-Bass, 1997), pp. 5-14.
6
Margaret Plantz, Martha Greenway and Michael Hendricks, “Outcome Measurement: Showing Results in
the Nonprofit Sector,” in Kathry E. Newcomer (ed.), Using Performance Measurement to Improve Public
and Nonprofit Programs (San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass, 1997), pp. 15-30.
7
Boyne, op. cit., p. 368.
109
Third, efficiency means the ratio of outputs to inputs. Fourth, effectiveness means
the achievement of the formal objectives of service. Fifth, equity means fairness of the
distribution of service costs and benefits between different groups. According to Boyne,
public sector performance puts emphasis on this equity dimension because the public
sector is expected to allocate service on criteria of need, rather than ability to pay.8 Sixth,
responsiveness indicates whether the services provided by the government meet public
preferences or public demands. In Boyne’s opinion, services that are efficient and
formally effective may be of little real value unless they meet public demands. 9 The
concept of responsiveness, in turn, can be divided into two main components: the extent
to which services match the preferences of 1). direct consumers (for example recipients
of social services) or their representatives (for example parents of primary school pupils),
and 2). the wider community of local citizens (for example taxpayers and residents who
may make little direct use of major services).
Seventh, outcomes are the social changes following outputs or processes.
Outcomes not only encompass the formal effectiveness of a service, but also its
“impacts”, which include both positive and negative side-effects. Popular examples on
outcomes include the percentage of students passing exams, and the percentage of
hospital patients treated successfully.
Last and most important, client / citizen satisfaction is a significant dimension of
performance and can be considered as an external measure of service effectiveness
8
9
Boyne, op. cit., p. 368.
Boyne, op. cit., p. 368.
110
gathered from citizens, usually through surveys. Elements of satisfaction may include
physical and cultural accessibility, timeliness, courteousness, the physical condition of
facilities, and overall satisfaction. Scholars argue that citizen satisfaction is the most
important dimension of government performance. It could be a proxy for some or all of
the above, depending on the questions posed to service users. 10
Logically, any movements in any of the above aspects of government
performance can be considered as evidence of performance changes. So referring to the
indicators of government performance, we should notice that in government performance
literature, the boundaries of dimensions and measures sometimes blur. For instance, some
scholars argue citizen satisfaction is the most important dimension of performance
because it can be a proxy of all the other dimensions; while other scholars argue citizen
satisfaction is the most important measure of government performance.11 The common
point these two schools hold is that government performance and citizen satisfaction
should be studied together. The following part reviews the evolution of literatures of
government performance and citizen satisfaction.
10
Plantz, Greenway and Hendricks, op. cit., p. 18.
For example, Brown and Coulter and Parks define citizen satisfaction data as a subjective indicator, and
other performance data as objective indicators. Similarly, Brudney and England characterize citizen
satisfaction data as a “soft” measure and other performance data as “hard” measures. See Karin Brown and
Phillip B. Coulter, “Subjective and Objective Measures of Police Service Delivery,” Public Administration
Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 (1983), pp. 50-58; Roger B. Parks, “Linking Objective and Subjective Measures of
Performance,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 (1984), pp. 118-127; Jeffrey L. Brudney and
Robert E. England, “Urban Policy Making and Subjective Service Evaluations: Are They Compatible?”
Public Administration Review, Vol. 42, No. 2 (1982), pp. 127-135.
11
111
Many researchers contribute to literatures of government performance and citizen
satisfaction. Their interests evolve from the utility of subjective indicators, 12 to the
relationship between subjective indicators and objective ones, 13 to the correlations of
these two types of indicators across different policy domains and localities.14 From the
late 1970s, researchers began to debate the utility of subjective indicators of government
performance measurement. Proponents of subjective indicators (citizen satisfaction data)
argue that citizen satisfaction data can measure some aspects of service that objective
measures cannot. Inputs, efficiencies, and outputs are typically collected and reported as
administrative performance measures, while citizens’ evaluations are likely to be based
on effectiveness and outcomes that are meaningful to them. Proponents also argue
subjective data can carry information about the dimensions of performance that cannot be
measured by objective indicators. For example, subjective indicators can carry
information about political concerns, such as responsiveness and equity.15
Other proponents emphasize the importance of subjective measures by identifying
the weaknesses of objective measures. While objective measures have certain strengths
(such as relative cost-economy and less confusion and disapproval among different
12
See Brian Stipak, “Citizen Satisfaction with Urban Service: Potential Misuse as A Performance
Indicator,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 (1979), pp. 46-52; Brian Stipak, “Local
Governments’ Use of Citizen Surveys,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 40, No. 5 (1980), pp. 521-525.
13
See Brown and Coulter, “Subjective and Objective Measures of Police Service Delivery”; Parks,
“Linking Objective and Subjective Measures of Performance”; Brudney and England, “Urban Policy
Making and Subjective Service Evaluations: Are They Compatible?”
14
See David Swindell and Janet M. Kelly, “Linking Citizen Satisfaction Data to Performance Measures: A
Preliminary Evaluation,” Public Productivity and Management Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2000), pp. 30-52;
Janet M. Kelly and David Swindell, “A Multiple-Indicator Approach to Municipal Service Evaluation:
Correlating Performance Measurement and Citizen Satisfaction across Jurisdictions,” Public
Administration Review, Vol. 62, No. 5 (2002), pp. 610-621.
15
The basic dimensions of government performance are economic issues and political concerns; later four
new dimensions emanated from the basic division, namely efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, and
equity, see Brudney and England, “Urban Policy Making and Subjective Service Evaluations: Are They
Compatible?”
112
parties due to their strictly statistical format and sophisticated and systematic process and
procedures), critics suspect some bias will emerge through the procedures of reporting
and coding information since the objective measures and their results are produced by the
bureaucracy itself or some professions internally, and they focus primarily on
quantifiable /available information.16
Gradually scholars began to focus on the relationship between the subjective
measures and objective measures. Some have empirically found that the results from the
subjective measures are not statistically associated with the results from the objective
measures. 17 How can this low level of congruence be explained? Researchers have
investigated what criteria citizens use to evaluate performance and how much accurate
information citizens have on which to base their evaluations. 18
Citizens obtain
information about a particular government function through the relevant agency’s
propaganda or through personal contact and experience. Sometimes citizens are not
informed sufficiently and sometimes they may not have a chance to personally contact
with a particular agency. For example, if the nature of a policy is to fix a problem,
citizens who have never faced such a problem in their daily life will have no idea about
the provider. Besides information, citizens may be short of knowledge to evaluate an
agency’s performance, especially in those areas where a professional or educational
background is necessary to comprehend the policy function. Maybe because of this
shortfall in information and knowledge, citizens tend to assess government performance
16
See Stipak, “Citizen Satisfaction with Urban Service: Potential Misuse as A Performance Indicator”;
Stipak, “Local Governments’ Use of Citizen Surveys”.
17
Brown and Coulter, op. cit., pp. 50-58.
18
Brudney and England, op. cit., pp. 127-135.
113
based upon subjective feelings and perceptions. It is possible that a citizen may believe
government is providing a service that it is not in fact providing, or may believe
government is not providing a service when it is. 19
In terms of the reasons for the low level of congruence between subjective and
objective data, scholars have found that the construction and development of a citizen’s
perception of an agency’s performance are not solely based on the agency’s actions and
the results of those actions; a number of confounding factors are also involved. Brown
and Coulter classify these factors into socioeconomic background (age, gender, and race),
socioeconomic status (measured by education and income), and political attitude. They
argue the citizens’ perceptions of agency performance are affected by their overall
political attitude toward government.20
In the 1990s, the movement of reinventing government has made performance
measurement quite a common practice, leading many scholars to discuss how best to
make full use of subjective and objective measures, and their relationship. Some of these
studies are empirical tests and comparisons across different policy domains and different
localities. For example, Kelly and Swindell choose four policy domains (police services,
fire and emergency medical services, road maintenance, and parks and recreational
services) and test whether correlations exist between objective data and subjective data.
They analyze the four domains one by one, listing the patterns of relationship between
19
Swindell and Kelly called this attribution error. See Swindell and Kelly, “Linking Citizen Satisfaction
Data to Performance Measures: A Preliminary Evaluation”; Kelly and Swindell, “A Multiple-Indicator
Approach to Municipal Service Evaluation: Correlating Performance Measurement and Citizen Satisfaction
across Jurisdictions”.
20
See Brown and Coulter, “Subjective and Objective Measures of Police Service Delivery”.
114
objective indicators and subjective data. The very mixed results lead them to argue that
scholars should ask specific questions in citizen satisfaction surveys when considering
different policy fields.21 The argument for raising function-specific and further programspecific questions is based on the fact that the emerging complexity of public service
provision and delivery has made it more challenging and sometimes impossible to raise a
general protocol in citizen survey.
Methodological Concerns
Based on the above review of the main components of government performance
and citizen satisfaction literatures, I find that three methodological concerns regarding the
collection of valid and reliable citizen satisfaction data on government performance need
to be emphasized and addressed.
General Attitude toward Government
Research has found that citizen perception of government performance and
satisfaction are embedded in the broader socio-political settings in which the citizens live.
Brudney and England, for example, argue that citizens’ subjective evaluation of agency
21
In their words: new attention to the specificity of citizen satisfaction questions may be warranted. Public
administrators and survey researchers working on their behalf may need to push beyond general and
generic service satisfaction questions to more specific questions tied directly to major performance
elements related to each department’s mission. See Kelly and Swindell, op. cit., p. 618.
115
performance is significantly confounded by their general attitude toward government.22
Given this concern, it might not be appropriate to simply ask citizens about their overall
feelings regarding government performance (such as “are you satisfied with the
government?”), especially when researchers are interested in a particular policy area and
aim to gain insights as reference for the government to improve this field.
Citizens’ Basis for Assessment
The amount of accurate information available to citizens on which they can base
their evaluations of government performance is questionable. If not sufficiently informed,
citizens may tend to look at the desirability of the overall situation as the basis for their
judgment of agency performance. In some situations, clients may not feel satisfied even
when public officials have achieved their organizational objectives or improved their
practices and work routines. In these cases, the officials will decry their clients’
impressionistic way of evaluating performance. To reduce the confounding power of the
citizens’ impressionistic habit, researchers should obtain detailed citizen perceptions of
government performance that are policy-specific, function-specific and program-specific
(that is, case-sensitive data).
How to Integrate Policy-specific, Function-specific, and Program-specific Data
22
See Brudney and England, “Urban Policy Making and Subjective Service Evaluations: Are They
Compatible?” They argue citizen assessments of particular local services may represent a “generalization”
of attitudes toward local government as a whole.
116
Kelly and Swindell have found that citizens’ perception of government
performance is highly function-specific and program-specific. 23 However, to piece
together the scattered citizen survey data of different functions and programs in a
particular area, and for it to make sense to policy analysts and public managers,
researchers need an overarching model that can incorporate / merge the function-specific
and program-specific perceptions into an overall citizen evaluation which is not
confounded by the general attitude and impressionistic habit of citizens.
What kind of measurement model can address the above three methodological
challenges? The answer is Confirmatory Factor Analysis, which can be used to generate
and fit such a measurement model. Usually, constructs in social sciences, especially the
constructs related to human behavior, are difficult to directly observe or measure. An
example would be citizen satisfaction with government performance. We call these
constructs “latent variables”. To understand the “latent variables” (in this study, citizen
evaluation on government environmental performance in China), we have to rely on
observed variables (in this study, interviewees’ perceptions of government efforts
manifested in various environmental functions and programs) to serve as the proxies for
them. It is the relationships between the observed variables and latent variables constitute
the measurement model that Confirmatory Factor Analysis aims to work out. Before
proceeding to the case illustration, I first introduce what Confirmatory Factor Analysis is.
23
See Kelly and Swindell, “A Multiple-Indicator Approach to Municipal Service Evaluation: Correlating
Performance Measurement and Citizen Satisfaction across Jurisdictions”.
117
Confirmatory Factor Analysis is a sub-model of the more general modeling
technique of covariance structure analysis. Covariance structure analysis is used to
decompose and describe the structure of the covariance of observed variables in terms of
the parameters of a set of equations that relate both the observed and latent variables to
one another. A full covariance structure model is composed of a measurement model,
which specifies the relationships between observed variables and latent factors, and a
structural model that describes the causal relationships between latent factors.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis is the measurement part of a full covariance structure
model. 24
A confirmatory factor model can be expressed as a factor equation as follows:
Χ=Λξ+δ
In this equation, X is a vector of observed indicator variables; ξ is a vector of latent
factors; Λ is a matrix of loadings that gives the magnitude of the effects of ξ on X; δ is a
vector of residuals. The basic idea behind a confirmatory factor model is that the variance
of an observed variable can be explained by an underlying factor that cannot be observed,
as well as other unique factors and measurement errors which are not of interest to
researchers. The task of the researchers, then, is to specify and estimate the relationships
between observed variables and latent factors.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis is a useful tool for formally assessing proposed
measurement models. In Confirmatory Factor Analysis, a model is hypothesized and the
24
For more discussion of techniques of Confirmatory Factor Analysis, see Waifung Lam, op. cit., pp. 81104.
118
data is tested to determine if it is consistent with the model. If an initial model is rejected
due to a poor overall model fit, alternative models with more complicated formulation
may be tested against the data. This technique is far superior to traditional exploratory
factor models because in the traditional factor analysis, hypotheses are not made and the
analysis is arbitrarily carried out with largely mechanical criteria of how many factors to
extract and which variables “load” on which factors.25
Case Illustration
This section provides a case illustration on developing and testing an overarching
model of how citizens evaluate government environmental performance in China. The
model can systematically incorporate citizens’ evaluations on various specific
environmental functions and programs into an overall scale. This model is overarching in
that it not only demonstrates what main dimensions constitute citizens’ evaluations on
government performance, but also illustrates the configuration of the dimensions, that is
how the different dimensions relate to one another. The developing and testing of the
overarching model is mainly based on application of Confirmatory Factor Analysis.
The case study proceeds in four steps. Step 1, delineate the governance structure
for local Environmental Protection Bureau; step 2, conceptualize environmental
performance and describe various variables used as indicators in measuring different
dimensions of environmental performance; step 3, use the technique of covariance
25
For more detailed discussion of the strengths of Confirmatory Factor Analysis, see Kenneth A. Bollen,
“A Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Subjective Air Quality,” Evaluation Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1982), pp.
521-535.
119
structure analysis to set up and estimate several confirmatory factor models; step 4, after
examining the validity and reliability of various indicators, make sense of the results
with reference to various substantive issues.
Chinese Governance Structure for Local Environmental Protection Bureaus
China has undergone rapid economic growth in the past two decades, and during
the same period it has experienced rapid environmental deterioration in its urban and
rural areas.26 Recently, confronted with increasingly serious environmental threats, the
Chinese government has given priority to environmental protection.27Thus, the Chinese
government has put enormous effort and a considerable amount of resources into
environmental protection. A relatively comprehensive environmental law and regulation
system has been established by the central government, and various national policy
programs have been designed and implemented in order to achieve its environmental
quality goals.28
Within the State Council, on the top of the environmental hierarchy, is the State
Environmental Protection Administration, which is in charge of making national policy,
designing national programs and supervising their implementation by various local
26
See Ma Xiaoying and Leonard Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in China: Institutions, Enforcement,
and Compliance (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000).
27
The central government has listed sustainable development as the basic strategy for China’s long-term
economic and social development. For example, the Ninth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and
Social Development and the Program of Long-Range Objectives for 2010 have given full priority to
sustainable development.
28
The policy programs include environmental impact assessment, three synchronizations, pollution levy
system, pollution control within deadlines, discharge permit system, environmental responsibility system,
assessment of urban environmental quality, and centralized control of pollution. For more discussion, see
Ma and Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in China: Institutions, Enforcement, and Compliance.
120
governments. Environmental Protection Bureaus are created from provincial to municipal
and county level governments. They are the major departments of local government
responsible for making and implementing environmental regulations, dealing with the
enterprises, and providing environmental protection services. In most cities, the
Environmental Protection Bureau is overseen by a municipal environmental policy
committee, which represents all major municipal agencies and is usually headed by either
the mayor or the deputy mayor. The municipal people’s congress also oversees the
Environmental Protection Bureau through its environmental protection committee. The
Environmental Protection Bureaus receive budgets from the corresponding local
governments and collect fees, such as pollution charges, from enterprises in their
jurisdiction.
Municipal Environmental Protection Bureaus, together with their subordinate
environmental protection offices at the district level, are responsible for enforcing a wide
array of environmental laws and regulations originating from different levels of
government—national, provincial, and local. Among their enforcement responsibilities
are the implementation of environmental impact assessments, with their threesynchronization requirements, collection of pollutant discharge fees, the issuing of
pollutant discharge permits, control of vehicular emissions, control of excessive noise,
and reduction of pollution from aged enterprises. Since municipal governments are
empowered by national law to establish their own specific rules and regulations, many
121
municipal Environmental Protection Bureaus are also actively involved in drafting local
environmental rules and regulations.29
After formulating rules and regulations, Environmental Protection Bureaus
enforce these rules and regulations to the enterprises (the pollution-makers and the
potential pollution-makers). As I discussed in chapter 3, Environmental Protection
Bureaus’ enforcement practices are strongly influenced by the priorities set by the
municipal leadership.30 For example, some cities may have many residents who work for
state-owned enterprises, many of which are technologically backward and financially
strapped. In these cities, it would be difficult for the municipal Environmental Protection
Bureau to insist on strict enforcement of pollution control measures on the part of the
enterprises since the local governments’ administrative budget and officials’ income to
some extent depend on the prosperity of the enterprises. The enforcement practices of
Environmental Protection Bureaus are not only influenced by the leadership but also, to a
degree, by the regulated enterprises, since within the enterprises, the workers’ satisfaction
with wage and employment status is a guarantee of social stability in China. Once the
enforcement of environmental regulations imposes a threat on the profits and survival of
polluting industries, the local governments including the Environmental Protection
Bureaus will be placed under substantial pressure.
29
Due to great heterogeneity in various regions of China, Chinese local governments have great
discretionary powers in local administration, such as directing local economic development and providing
public services. Article 16 of chapter 3 of the Environmental Protection Law of China states that: the local
people’s government at various levels shall be responsible for the environmental quality of areas under
their jurisdiction and shall take measures to improve the quality of the environment.
30
See Barbara J. Sinkule and Leonard Ortolano, Implementing Environmental Policy in China (London:
Praeger, 1995).
122
The victims of pollution are mainly local residents and they sometimes file
complaints with the government. Because of the increasing consciousness of urban
residents and the utilizing of mass media vehicles in contemporary China, there is a clear
trend of increasing public pressure for environmental protection although the residents do
not actually have many organized environmental groups. They express their discontent
mostly through letters of complaint or telephone hotlines, and sometimes pay visits to
government offices. Accordingly, the Environmental Protection Bureaus practice certain
citizen-oriented activities, such as propaganda, addressing complaints, and making use of
the environmental protection non-government organizations (NGOs).
Justification of Dimensions of Environmental Performance and Variables
Based on the above description of local Environmental Protection Bureaus’
missions and functions, I roughly group the activities of Environmental Protection
Bureaus into three categories: internal capacity building, regulation-enforcement, and
citizen-oriented activities. I choose eight indicators to measure these three dimensions of
environmental performance. Environmental protection propaganda and education (X1),
addressing complaints (X2), and making use of environmental NGOs (X3) are used to
measure Environmental Protection Bureaus’ performance in citizen-oriented activities.
Formulating rules and regulations (X4), supervising enterprises to abate pollution (X5),
and enforcing environmental rules and regulations (X6) are used to measure regulationenforcement. Internal capacity building is indicated by technological advancement (X7)
and financial input (X8).
123
We conduct a random sampling survey on permanent residents of Haidian district
in Beijing city to test their evaluation on Haidian district government performance in
terms of environmental protection and basic education (see Appendix 1 for survey
information). In the survey, interviewees were asked to give a rating of the performance
of each activity that Haidian Environmental Protection Bureau conducted on a four-point
“excellent, good, fair and poor” scale. The questions (as they were worded) and
descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in Table 4.1.
124
Table 4.1. Question wording, definitions, and descriptive statitics for the model variables
Performance indicator
EDUPRO (X1)
In general during the past 12 months, would you rate the education and propaganda from the
HDEPB available to you as excellent, good, only fair or poor?
CITICOMP (X2)
Based on your experience in the last 12 months, how would you rate HDEPB's effort in
addressing citizens' complaints concerning environment-- would you say excellent, good, only
fair or poor?
EPNGO (X3)
Based on your experience in the last 12 months, how would you rate HDEPB's effort in taking
use of non-government EP organizations-- would you say excellent, good, only fair or poor?
FORMRULE (X4)
In general during the past 12 months, would you rate the HDEPB's effort in formulating rules
and regulations as excellent, good, only fair or poor?
SUPENT (X5)
In general during the past 12 months, would you rate the HDEPB's effort in supervising
enterprises abating pollution as excellent, good, only fair or poor?
ENFRUL (X6)
In general during the past 12 months, would you rate the HDEPB's effort in enforcing rules and
regulations as excellent, good, only fair or poor?
IMPTEC (X7)
In general during the past 12 months, would you rate the HDEPB's effort in improving EP
technology as excellent, good, only fair or poor?
INCFIN (X8)
In general during the past 12 months, would you rate the HDEPB's effort in increasing financial
input as excellent, good, only fair or poor?
125
Min
Max
N
Mean
1
SD
4
495
2.97
0.484
1
4
480
2.61
0.712
1
4
394
2.38
0.768
1
4
461
2.69
0.623
1
4
437
2.47
0.782
1
4
460
2.47
0.739
1
4
431
2.55
0.708
1
4
350
2.6
0.794
Measurement Modeling
In this study, Confirmatory Factor Analysis is used to generate and fit the
measurement models, and the measurement models are estimated through LISREL 8.72
software. Confirmatory Factor Analysis is a useful tool for formally assessing proposed
measurement models. In determining whether the proposed model fits the data,
Confirmatory Factor Analysis provides some indices of overall fit of the model, which
indicate how well the proposed relationships fit the covariance matrix. A good fit would
suggest that the data are consistent with the model. A poor fit would suggest the need for
a more complicated formulation. If the initial model is rejected, then the model may be
modified and tested again using the same data. Such formal, rigorous measurement model
testing is less common in public management research, with the exception of Perry’s
work in 1996.31
In this study, 10 indices are used to assess the fit of the models. The first one is
the chi-square tests. The chi-square test is used to test the null hypothesis that the
population covariance matrix, as represented by the sample covariance matrix of the
observed variables (S), equals the covariance matrix predicted by a model (∑(Ө)). When
the model is valid, the chi-square should not be statistically significant. So a low and nonsignificant value of the chi-square represents a good fit to the data. The probability level
(p) of the chi-square is “the probability of getting a chi-square value larger than the value
actually obtained, given that the hypothesized pattern is true. Thus, small values of p
31
See James L. Perry, “Measuring Public Service Motivation: An Assessment of Construct Reliability and
Validity,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1996), pp. 5-22.
126
correspond to poor fit”.32 Thus, practically, the goal of p-level is to achieve a p>.05.
Though commonly used, the chi-square model fit test is known to be a poor indicator as it
almost always rejects model fit due to sensitivity to sample size, and the substantive
requirements for uncorrelated error terms and unidimensionality. Thus, the inability to
achieve a non-significant chi-square can be discounted. The third index is the ratio of the
model chi-square to degrees of freedom (a ratio up to 2 is considered a satisfactory
value). RMSEA (root mean square error for approximation) is arguably the best measure
of absolute fit as it has a known sampling distribution. Values less than .10 are considered
good, below .08 are excellent, and below .05 deemed strong evidence of absolute fit. In
accordance with other studies, I also used normed fit index (NFI), non-normed fit index
(NNFI), comparative fit index (CFI), incremental fit index (IFI), goodness of fit index
(GFI), and adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI). The closer the value of NFI, NNFI,
CFI, IFI, GFI, and AGFI to 1, the better is the fit. The acceptable level of these six
indices is above .90.
1. Unidimension Model:
A reasonable model to begin with is a simple unidimensional conceptualization of
citizen evaluation on government environmental performance. This one-dimensional
model contains the following specifications: 1).One dimension, that is, only one
unobserved variable, represents an individual’s overall evaluation of government
performance. 2). Eight observed variables, each loading on the latent variable as indicated
in Figure 4.1. 3). Uncorrected error terms. The model is identified according to Bollen’s
32
See Karl G. Joreskog, “A General Approach to Confirmatory Maximum Likelihood Factor Analysis,”
Psychometrika No. 34 (1969), p. 195.
127
identification rules for Confirmatory Factor Analysis.33 Figure 4.1 is a path diagram used
to represent the relationship between the true, unobserved citizen evaluation on
government performance and the 8 indicators of it. Each of these indicators, X1-X8, is
assumed to be caused by the individual’s unobserved subjective evaluation of Haidian
Environmental Protection Bureau performance. That is, if a person’s subjective
evaluation of performance changes, then this will be indicated by changes in X1-X8.
Figure 4.1 also reports the results of estimating this model using LISREL 8.72.
The chi-square statistic for the model is 72.24 with 20 degrees of freedom
(p=.000), RMSEA of model 1 is .096, the ratio of chi-square to degrees of freedom is
3.602, and the AGFI is .74; all these suggest a poor model fit.
33
See Kenneth A. Bollen, Structural Equations with Latent Variables (New York: Wiley, 1989).
128
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-Square =72.24 (P=0.00)
Figure 4.1
129
2. Three-dimension Model:
Given the disconfirmation of the initial model, efforts are made to estimate
alternative models. As discussed in the above section, based on substantive and
theoretical knowledge, the daily routines of Haidian Environmental Protection Bureau
include three main components: regulation-enforcement; internal capacity-building; and
citizen-oriented activities. I suggest that they are three dimensions that constitute citizens’
evaluation. By using the term “dimensions”, I try to highlight the organic relationships
between the regulation-enforcement, capacity-building, and citizen-oriented activities as
the three coherent parts of citizens’ evaluation of the Environmental Protection Bureau’s
efforts. The confirmatory factor model represents this conceptualization as is shown in
Figure 4.2. The three dimensions of the concept of environmental performance, that is,
citizen-oriented activities, regulation-enforcement, and internal capacity-building are
modeled as latent variables ξ1, ξ2, and ξ3, respectively. The eight variables in boxes
(X1…X8) are observed indicators used to measure the latent dimensions. Variables X1X3 are intended to measure Haidian Environmental Protection Bureau’s effort in
promoting citizen-oriented activities. Variables X4-X6 measure the effort in enforcing
environmental regulations and abating pollution. X7 and X8 measure the effort in
building internal capacity. I use straight arrows linking the latent dimensions and
observed indicators to show the above loadings. The residuals of the indicators, which are
not explained by the latent dimensions, are reflected in δi. All the residuals are specified
to be uncorrelated to one another. In this model, sub-dimension variance is presumed
caused by the primary latent variable and hence the sub-dimensions should correlate. The
130
curved arrows between ξ1 and ξ2, ξ2 and ξ3, ξ1 and ξ3 (φ12, φ23, φ13) stand for the
covariance between the respective latent dimensions.
Figure 4.2 presents the path diagram and reports the estimations. The chi-square
statistic for the model is 50.66 with 17 degrees of freedom (p=.000), suggesting a poor
model fit. RMSEA of model 2 is .083, suggesting a good model fit. But the chisquare/d.f. ratio is 2.98, which does not meet the informal rule-of thumb criteria that the
ratio should be below 2. As further indication of poor model fit, the adjusted goodness of
fit index (AGFI) is .78, below the .90 benchmark typically used for acceptable fit.
131
Chi-Square=132.29 , df=17, P-Value=0.000 , RMSEA=0.083
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-Square =50.66 (P=0.00)
Figure 4.2
132
3. Refined Three Dimension Model (Remove X4):
Given the overall model fit of model 2, some improvement may still be possible
and worthwhile. The re-specification process will use such a heuristic: variables whose
modification index indicated association with multiple dimensions, which is contrary to
the goal of having each observed variable load on a single latent factor, are eliminated
one at a time to increase the unidimensionality of the factors. As a result of this
procedure, the correlations among dimensions will be altered.34 The application of this
heuristic resulted in the elimination of X4. X4 was removed because the modification
index showed it loaded on the other two dimensions. After removal of X4, the correlation
between regulation-enforcement and citizen-oriented decreased from .75 to 0.70. The
correlation between regulation-enforcement and capacity-building decreased from .79 to
0.76.
Figure 4.3 represents the path diagram and estimations. All the indicators for
overall goodness of fit for the model suggest a good fit. The chi-square statistic for the
model is 20.53 with 11 degrees of freedom (p=.039), suggesting a good model fit.
RMSEA of model 3 is .055, suggesting an excellent model fit. As further indication of
good model fit, all the NFI, NNFI, CFI, IFI, and GFI are above the .90 benchmark
typically used for acceptable fit. Moreover, the chi-square/d.f. ratio is 1.87, which meets
the informal rule-of thumb criteria that the ratio should be below 2. AGFI is .86, which is
near .90.
34
See James L. Perry, “Measuring Public Service Motivation: An Assessment of Construct Reliability and
Validity,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1996), pp. 5-22.
133
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-Square =20.52 (P=0.039)
Figure 4.3
134
Figure 4.4 presents the t-value for the estimated path for the model 3 (refined
three-dimension model). The absolute value of the t-statistics for each factor loading
exceeds 1.96, suggesting that based on their t-statistics all the estimated parameters
would be highly significant in a random sample of this size. After knowing that in model
3 all the coefficients are significant, I can go further to investigate the validity and
reliability of indicators. The factor loadings measure the structural relationships between
the observed indicators and the latent dimensions. Like a regression coefficient, factor
loading tells the expected change in an observed variable for a one-unit change in a latent
dimension. Because the factor loading is measuring the direct link between a latent
dimension and an observed variable, it can serve as a measure of the validity of observed
indicators, which refers to whether an indicator measures what it is supposed to measure.
Thus, the bigger the factor loading an indicator has, the more valid the indicator is. In
model 3, the standardized loading of X6 is large, which means this indicator is the most
responsive indicator to the dimension of regulation-enforcement.
The R 2 values for indicators measure the portion of variability in an indicator
accounted for by the latent dimensions. As shown in Table 4.2, the values of R 2 of the
indicators range from .33 to .79.
Table 4.2 R-square values for the indicators of Model 3
X1
X2
X3
X5
X6
X7
X8
0.33
0.63
0.68
0.70
0.79
0.61
0.49
135
Figure 4.4 T-Value for Model 3
136
Table 4.3 presents a summary of the fitting process. In conducting the above
analysis, one major methodological issue is addressed, that is proper estimate techniques
for ordinal, Likert items. Standard Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation in
Confirmatory Factor Analysis assumes a sample covariance matrix from a multivariate
normal distribution. The discrete, non-continuous distributions are not suitable.35 I use
the asymptotic covariance matrix to correct the standard error and resulting statistics for
non-normality. I use the Robust Maximum Likelihood (RML) estimation.
35
See Karl G. Joreskog, “Analysis of Ordinal Variables: Cross-sectional Data”, unpublished manuscript
(2001).
137
Table 4.3 Summary of model fit and comparisons of models
Model
Figure
RMSEA
M0
M1
4.1
0.096
Model
test
chisquare
1248.26
72.24
M2
4.2
0.083
50.66
M3
4.3
0.055
M4
4.5
0.055
Comparison
M1-M2
M2-M3
M2-M4
chisquare
21.58
30.13
30.13
p-level
d.f.
chisquare/d.f.
NFI
NNF
I
CFI
IFI
GFI
AGF
I
0.0000
0.0000
28
20
3.61
0.96
0.96
17
2.98
0.97
0.97
20.53
0.0031
11
1.87
0.99
0.99
20.53
0.0031
11
1.87
0.99
0.99
0.9
7
0.9
8
0.9
9
0.9
9
0.8
6
0.9
0
0.9
5
0.9
5
0.74
0.0000
0.9
7
0.9
8
0.9
9
0.9
9
Model
comparisons
d.f.
p-level
delta
3
6
6
0.299
0.595
0.595
<.001
<.001
<.001
138
0.78
0.86
0.86
139
In the measurement modeling process, I suggest and demonstrate a way to
examine the measurement properties of citizen satisfaction indicators on government
environmental performance. By using Confirmatory Factor Analysis, I identify a set of
questionnaire items that provide the best measurement reliability and data fit. Now I
transform model 3 to model 4 as a second order measurement model. As Figure 4.5
shows, in model 4, citizen satisfaction is perceived as a multidimensional construct. That
is, citizen satisfaction is an overall unobserved latent variable with various unobserved
latent sub-dimensions. The sub-dimensions are expected to be caused by citizen
satisfaction; this is a first-order reflective model. And then, each of the 7 indicators is
assumed to be caused by only one sub-dimension latent variable, this is a second-order
reflective model. That is, I expect variation in an indicator, say X1, to be due to the real
level of citizen-oriented (second-order). Model 4 is referred to as a second-order factor
model. This is an overarching model that can incorporate the function-specific and
program-specific perceptions into an overall evaluation of citizens on government
environmental performance, while this overall evaluation is not confounded by the
general attitude and impressionistic habit of citizens. Figure 4.5 shows the final empirical
model with standardized parameter estimates. Among the three sub-dimensions, capacitybuilding significantly represents the citizen satisfaction.
139
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-Square =20.527 (P=0.0386)
Figure 4.5
140
Making Sense of the Results
The above case illustrates how citizens evaluate government environmental
performance in China. The measurement modeling process reports the several steps to
develop a scale of citizen evaluation of government performance. Overall, citizen
evaluation is a multidimensional construct. Citizens’ perceptions of government efforts in
enforcing regulations, building internal capacity, and citizen-oriented activities constitute
the main dimensions of this overall evaluation. In specific, the refined model (model 4)
illustrates how the three dimensions relate to one another. And among the three
dimensions, capacity-building significantly represents overall citizen satisfaction. The
model developmental process indicates the scale has good validity and high reliability.
This scale can be a valuable tool for accumulating empirical evidence about local
governments’ efforts in protecting the environment.
In general, this study advances a means to understand how citizens in China
evaluate local government efforts in protecting the environment. Through these initial
efforts, I understand citizen evaluation is based on the configuration of three dimensions.
If enough empirical evidence is accumulated, this scale can be used for further systematic
research.
The Governance Structure of Education Policy in China
141
The Ministry of Education is the highest administrative organ of education in
China, and is directly under the jurisdiction of the State Council. The task of the Ministry
of Education is to initiate laws and directives that govern educational work throughout
the whole nation. In specific, it draws up plans for educational development, and
formulates and issues regulations and directives governing the work of primary and
secondary education as well as higher education. It is, however, responsible only for
overall guidance, and the local governments and corresponding organs at provincial
(Sheng), prefecture (Diqu), municipal (Shi), county (Xian), and local district or township
(Xiang) levels have their own educational bureaus and their equivalents. The structure
and function of education are controlled by the Ministry of Education and its departments
at various levels of government. According to the relevant regulations, higher education
is administrated by the city, province and the central government depending on the level
of their importance. Senior middle schools are administrated by the regional or county
government, junior middle schools and important primary schools are administrated by
the district or village government.36 The sub-national educational authorities come under
the dual leadership of the local government and the Ministry of Education.
Since the mid-1980s, the central government has decentralized financial
responsibility for providing basic education to various local governments and other
sectors of society. The financial decentralization was associated with decentralization in
36
See Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaoyu tizhi gaige de jueding [Decision on the Reform of the
Education Structure], issued by CCP Central Committee in 1985. Can be retrieved from website,
http://xhongcom.diy.myrice.com/page1/fagui/newpage112.htm, on 7 April 2006.
The Decision also pointed out that the basic aim of restructuring education was to improve the quality of
the nation and to produce as many skilled people as possible. Also see 1986 Compulsory Education Law of
PRC.
142
administration and management as well. As a result of education reform, local
governments nowadays are responsible for the finance and management of basic
education. In other words, they are responsible for finding finance for the schools and for
appointment and retention of teachers, and have limited authority over the curriculum.37
The rationale behind the education reform is that decentralization can efficiently mobilize
resources. Indeed, education has become the essential consumer of local resources
(including local government and local community).
Haidian is a district in Beijing with a total population of around 2.24 million. The
district has an education bureau which is responsible for the general middle schools,
some professional secondary schools and all primary schools. Haidian Education
Commission comes under the dual leadership of the Haidian district government and
Beijing Education Commission. The Haidian district Education Commission comprises
about 23 divisions.38 They are general office, personnel office, finance office, pre-school
education division, primary education division, secondary school education division,
adult education division, audit division, inspection division and education supervision
office, etc. The personnel section is responsible for the teaching staff in the district, e.g.
promotion matters, salary scales, and issue of certificates to teachers who pass their
examinations. The finance section is in charge of teachers’ salaries, wages for nonteaching staff, expenditure on school equipment etc. The administrative section deals
37
It is even stipulated in the reform documents that revenues at the township level should be used mainly
for funding basic education, see Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaoyu tizhi gaige de jueding [Decision on
the Reform of the Education Structure], issued by CCP Central Committee in 1985. Can be retrieved from
website, http://xhongcom.diy.myrice.com/page1/fagui/newpage112.htm, on 7 April 2006.
38
Source: Haidian district government, retrieved from website,
http://www.bjhd.gov.cn/docs/www/zwgk/jgzn/OrgInclude.jsp?orgid=13, on 7 April 2006.
143
with a variety of tasks, such as administering awards and punishments, settling
disciplinary matters (where teachers are involved), keeping records of teacher offences,
and collecting information and statistics within the district. The education supervision
office is responsible for the supervision of the implementation of the educational plan in
the district and for ensuring that the various laws and regulations are followed by
educators. The general office serves the bureau in the handling of everyday matters. The
education section (primary education and secondary education) and inspection division
are in charge of general administration, supervision and inspection of the schools, and the
setting of entrance examinations for junior secondary schools. The entrance examinations
for the senior secondary schools are set by the Beijing Education Commission for the
whole municipality. An institution for educational research and a teacher training college
are attached to Haidian Education Commission. The teacher training college is in charge
of the in-service training and updating of teachers. The education bureau also organizes
meetings and conferences for experience exchange between teachers within the district.
Conclusion
In this chapter, literatures on government performance have been reviewed, with a
focus on how to conceptualize and measure government efforts. Given that some
methodological concerns cannot be addressed by the conventional methods, I apply a
relatively new technique - Confirmatory Factor Analysis - in setting benchmarks for
Chinese government performance. A case illustrates how to model citizens’ evaluation on
government performance in China. In particular, I develop a conceptualization of
144
environmental performance in China that comprises three dimensions: regulationenforcement, internal capacity-building and citizen-oriented activities. Accordingly a
measurement model has been established and tested. The results suggest that such a
conceptualization is consistent with the empirical world as reflected in the survey data.
Comparisons of models based upon different conceptualizations further suggest that the
three-dimensional
conceptualization
reflects
reality
better
than
some
other
conceptualizations.
The measurement model not only provides insights on how citizens understand
and evaluate environmental performance in China, but is also a means for researchers to
compile and compare citizen evaluations on government performance across various
localities. This is possible since, in the second-order confirmatory factor model, I can get
a general scale of every interviewee’s evaluation on government performance (the
underlying latent factor that I try to catch) through calculation. If the data of the three
cities is available, I can compare their government performance in terms of protecting the
environment. Similarly, if education attainment data is available for the three cities, I can
apply Confirmatory Factor Analysis to compare the three local governments’
performance in basic education too.
145
Chapter 5 Output of Reforms: Personnel Quality, Extent of
Local Implementation, and Effects on Officials’ Behavior
The following three chapters are organized to correspond to the three research
questions raised in chapter 1. Chapter 5 will investigate outputs of China’s Civil Service
Reform, including personnel quality, extent of local implementation, and effects on
officials’ behavior. In particular, chapter 5 will test the first level of the hypotheses.
Chapter 6 will test second and third levels of hypotheses. Chapter 7 will explain
performance variations across various policy areas and localities.
This dissertation is about the general issue of efficacy of the rational design of
China’s Civil Service Reform. The central concern is to investigate whether the
objectives of the reforms have been or can be obtained within a realistic time period. If
China’s Civil Service Reform works, we will expect to see the following: an
improvement in the quality of the civil service; the implementation of reform measures
and initiatives by local governments1; an increase in quantity of public service provision;
and an increase in the level of citizen satisfaction with government performance (a sort of
1
Before we describe and analyze the local implementation of China’s Civil Service Reform, a clear
definition of local government in the Chinese political system is needed. China is a unitary country with
five-tier government. On top of the hierarchy is the central/national government; ranking in the middle are
province, prefecture, and county; and at the bottom exists township government. From the middle to the
bottom are all called local governments. Paralleling the provincial, prefecture and county-level
governments are cities of equivalent status. The four directly administered cities (Beijing, Shanghai,
Tianjin, and Chongqing), for example, are the provincial-level cities. 15 cities now have “vice-provincial”
rank (fushengji). They are Dalian Guangzhou, Xi’an, Shenyang, Wuhan, Ningbo, Hangzhou, Chengdu,
Nanjing, Shenzhen, Qingdao, Harbin, Changchun, Xiamen, and Jinan. The geographical jurisdictions with
output from secondary and tertiary sectors accounting for more than half of the GDP at township level are
called towns (zhen). By 2000, there were 31 provincial-level governments, 331 prefecture-level
governments, 2,109 county-level governments, 19,200 town governments, and 25,600 township
governments. See Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2000 [China Statistical Yearbook 2000], p. 3.
146
reflection on the quality of public service, as discussed in chapter 4). To test these
hypotheses (I have already shown how to get these hypotheses in chapter 3) in an ideal
way, I would need to compile the materials on the implementation of China’s Civil
Service Reform from all local government agencies, and statistics and citizen satisfaction
data on public service provision both before and after the reforms. Then I would be able
to compare the personnel composition and public service provision after the reforms with
those of before the reforms, and hence evaluate the general efficacy of the reform design.
This is the most straightforward method. Unfortunately, collecting all these materials
seems to be an impossible mission. Therefore, some proxies for various issues mentioned
above are warranted. In chapter 5, I will first investigate some national level statistics on
civil service quality in a historical order. Then I will use case studies of three cities’
experiences of implementing China’s Civil Service Reform to illustrate the extent to
which the reform measures are being adopted and implemented by local governments. In
chapter 6, the provision and delivery of two public services - environmental protection
and basic education - and citizen evaluation of these efforts in these three cities will serve
as proxies for outcomes of China’s Civil Service Reform.
The goal of chapter 5 is to test the level one hypotheses, in other words, to
describe, analyze, and evaluate the outputs of China’s Civil Service Reform, including
personnel quality, extent of local implementation, and effects on officials’ behavior. The
logic embedded in the level one hypotheses is that high quality personnel under scientific
management implies good organizational performance. As I explored in chapter 3, a
high-quality individual will be highly motivated under scientific management, and this
147
will lead to organizational performance improvement. Hence this chapter investigates
two questions: first, whether the quality of civil service improved after reform; and
second, whether the specified new rules and regulations included in China’s Civil Service
System really are implemented by local governments. After summarizing the cases of
local implementation of China’s Civil Service Reform, I will link the findings to the
principal-agent framework.
Efforts of Authorities to Raise Civil Service Quality
Usually, the educational level and the average age of the cadres are the two main
indicators used by scholars of China study to evaluate personnel quality. Existing
literatures argue that to some extent, the administrative reforms initiated by post-Mao
authorities do increase the educational level and reduce the average age of government
employees. 2 The administrative reforms aiming at modernizing the staff corps of the
Chinese Party-state can be traced back to the early 1980s.3 I will analyze these efforts and
their impacts in a historical order.
The Mandatory Retirement Program 1982-1983
2
See Zhiyue Bo, Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949
(Armonk, N.Y.; London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2002); Meiru Liu, Administrative Reform in China and Its
Impact on the Policy-making Process and Economic Development after Mao (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin
Mellen Press, 2001). They both argue civil service quality improved after administrative reforms and they
both use educational level and average age as the main indicators to evaluate the leading cadres’ quality.
3
Deng Xiaoping put this issue on the Party’s agenda in 1980. See Deng Xiaoping, “Reform of the System
of Party and State Leadership,” in Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, [Selected Works of Deng
Xiaoping] (Beijing: People’s Publishing, 1984), pp. 302-325.
148
The Mandatory Retirement Program of the early 1980s dealt with the way
bureaucrats are retired and new comers selected. Deng Xiaoping decided to adopt this
program when he and his allies felt an urgent need to resolve the problems related to an
aging bureaucracy.4 The crucial contents of the program were the institutionalization of
cadre retirement and initiation of leadership selection on the basis of youth, education and
professional competency.5
In order to successfully carry out the strict retirement ages (men retire at age 60
and women retire at age 55), the authority provided some special arrangements for the
revolutionary veterans who were the first and biggest potential opponents of the reform.
The retirement of these people is called lixiu, meaning literally leaving the post and
resting. After lixiu, retired officials continued to enjoy all their former political privileges,
such as reading government circulars of the same confidentiality level. Some served as
special counselors for their successors. They could continue to use their official cars and
security guards. In addition, officials under lixiu received the same level of pay as before
and extra housing for their children and grandchildren.
Special arrangements combined with strong central commitment brought about
the Mandatory Retirement Program some positive consequences. The direct consequence
of the program is that the profile of the Chinese leadership at all levels changed within a
4
In 1980, Deng proclaimed that the purpose of this reform is to “abolish the lifetime tenure system of
government officials” and to “modernize the contingent of government officials.” See Deng Xiaoping,
“Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership,” in Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping wenxuan,
[Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping] (Beijing: People’s Publishing, 1984), pp. 302-325.
5
Melanie Manion, Retirement of Revolutionaries in China: Public Policies, Social Norms, Private Interests
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
149
few years. In 1982 alone, over 30,000 veteran cadres retired throughout China, including
145 minister-level cadres (64% of which should have retired) and 2,273 division or
bureau-level cadres (88% of which should have retired).6 From 1982 to 1989, 3.9 million
veteran cadres took retirement and over 220,000 young cadres were promoted to
leadership positions at and above county level.7 Table 5.1 serves as a summary of the
results of this program. After the Mandatory Retirement Program, government leadership
at central, provincial, prefecture and county levels became leaner, younger and more
educated. The average ages of leading cadres at all levels dropped by over 5 years. While
central leaders averaged 58 years of age, provincial and prefectural leaders were 55 and
50 respectively. County leaders were even younger at 45 years. The educational level of
the leadership increased rapidly, especially at local levels: the percentage of party and
government leaders with a community college (dazhuan, a two-year college education)
degree or above at the prefecture and county levels increased by 30% to reach 43% and
45% respectively.
Table 5.1 Chinese leadership profile before and after the Mandatory Retirement Program
age
number
leaders
mandatory
retirement age
of
average
before
average
after
before
central
leaders
provincial
leaders
prefecture
leaders
county
leaders
65
65
60
55
64
62
58
n.a.
58
55
50
<45
540
698
16658
n.a.
age
age
6
Ren Xiao, Zhongguo xingzheng gaige [Chinese Administrative Reforms] (Hangzhou, China: Zhejiang
People’s Press, 1998), p.185.
7
Zhang Zhijian et al., Dangdai zhongguo de renshi guanli [Personnel Management in Contemporary
China] (Beijing: Contemporary China Publisher, 1994), p. 286.
150
after
percent
dazhuan
degree
with
180
463
10603
n.a.
37%
20%
14%
11%
52%
43%
44%
45%
before
after
Sources: Ren, op. cit., p. 185 and p.267. Zhang et al., op. cit., p.285. Data of county
leaders is adapted from David D. Li, “Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy,”
American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (1998), p. 394.
The positive consequences of the Mandatory Retirement Program not only
include the fact that many younger and more educated bureaucrats have replaced the old
revolutionary veterans; but also that new and young officials are generally more
supportive of reforms, more adaptable, and more pragmatic. Being better educated, they
are also generally more competent than their predecessors.8 So I conclude that the norm
of retirement constitutes a powerful mechanism to guarantee that relatively young
cadres—who are arguably better trained and more likely to contribute to a market
economy—reach leadership positions in local China.
Efforts during 1984-1998
In 1987, at the 13th National Party Congress, the former General Secretary Zhao
Ziyang announced that the Cadre Management System was in urgent need of reform and
that a new Civil Service System should be established. Zhao highlighted many wellknown problems of the Cadre Management System, for example, rigidity, over-
8
Through a large-scale survey, Tang and Parish find that the young and educated officials in China are
significantly more supportive of reform than are the old and uneducated. See Tang Wenfang and William
Parish, Chinese Urban Life under Reform: the Changing Social Contract (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998).
151
centralization, and a lack of professionalism and legal regulations. Zhao’s overriding
concern was to improve the efficiency and motivation of China’s administrators in
keeping with the fast economic reform. After several drafts and revisions, the Chinese
government formulated a formal Civil Service System package.
In 1993, the State Council promulgated the Provisional Regulations on State Civil
Servants. The 1993 Provisional Regulations, consisting of eighteen chapters of eightyeight articles, were comprehensive in scope, covering all major areas of personnel
administration. The main principle of the 1993 Provisional Regulations was to improve
the capacity of the civil service and make it more competitive. The main contents
included first, all newly recruited civil servants were to be selected based on open
competition, usually through an examination process and limited to the most part to
university graduates. Second, civil servants were to be provided with a career structure
and stable employment. Third, personnel management systems were to be performance
oriented. Fourth, civil service compensation was expected to be competitive with rates
paid in the market. Fifth, civil servants were expected to be of high integrity.9
In February 1995, the Central Committee of the CCP issued Temporary
Regulations on Selection and Appointment of Party and Government Leading Cadres.10
This document specified general principles, basic requirements, basic procedures, and
9
See detailed discussion in chapter 3 and John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in China,” in Governance
in China (OECD, 2005), pp. 51-74.
10
Dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo zanxing tiaoli [Temporary Regulations on Selection
and Appointment of Party and Government Leading Cadres]. Translations and details can be found in
Zhiyue Bo, “Selection and Appointment of Leading Cadres in Post-Deng China,” in Chinese Law and
Government, Vol.32, No.1 (1999), pp. 45-61.
152
disciplines regarding leading cadres’ appointment, promotion, demotion, resignation,
exchange, and avoidance. The document not only indicated the central leadership’s
intention to strengthen the control on cadre management but also its emphasis on
candidates’ work performance and ability.11
The impacts of the above efforts are apparent in civil service quality improvement.
First, the cadre corps have undergone a process of rejuvenation. In 1980, more than 80%
of provincial or ministerial level officials were 60 years of age or older, whereas by 1998,
the proportion over the age of 60 had dropped to about 54%. At the same time, at bureau
level the number of officials over the age of 60 fell from 37% to 11%, while at county
level those over the age of 60 are only about 1% of the total.12 By the mid-1990s, more
than half of the civil service as a whole was under the age of 40.13 Moreover, in 1979
only 29% of the cadres were younger than 35 years of age. Now the proportion has
increased to 49%.14
Second, the cadre corps have become more professionally qualified. While the
share of cadres with junior middle school education and below was almost 50% in 1979,
11
This document mainly serves as an instrument of the CCP to strengthen control over the bureaucracy. I
will discuss it in detail in chapter 6.
12
Organization Department (ed.), Dangzheng lingdao ganbu tongji ziliao huibian 1954-1998, [Collection
of Statistical Information on Party and Government Leading Cadres 1954-1998] (Beijing: Dangjian duwu
chubanshe, 1999). As cited by Burns op. cit.
13
Zhongguo jigou [China Organization], (July 1998). As cited by Burns op. cit.
14
Zhonggong Zhongyang Zuzhibu, Zhonggong Dangshi Yangjiushi, and Zhongyang Dang’an guan,
Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao, 1921-1997, fujuan 1 [Materials on the Organizational History of
China’s Communist Party, 1921-1997. Appendix volume 1] (Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe,
1998), pp. 1344-1347.
Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1999 [China Statistical Yearbook 1999], pp.1355-1356. As cited by Kjeld Erik
Brodsgaard, “China’s Cadres and Cadre Management System,” in Wang Guangwu and Zheng Yongnian
(eds.), Damage Control: the Chinese Communist Party under the Jiang Zemin Era (Singapore: Eastern
Universities Press, 2003), pp.209-231.
153
it declined to 7.8% in 1998. Now more than 44% of the cadre force has a university
degree compared to only 17.9% in 1979.15 By 1998, from 80 to 90% of the top civil
servants at ministry, bureau, and division level were university or community college
graduates (see Figure 5.1). This represents a substantial improvement in the capacity of
the Chinese civil service.16
100.00%
90.00%
80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
ministry
bureau
97
19
95
19
93
19
91
19
89
19
87
19
85
19
83
division
19
19
81
Percentage
Figure 5.1 Leading Cadres in China with University Education,
1981-1998
Year
Source: Organization Department (ed.), Dangzheng lingdao ganbu tongji ziliao huibian
1954-1998, [Collection of Statistical Information on Party and Government Leading
Cadres 1954-1998] (Beijing: Dangjian duwu chubanshe, 1999).
15
Brodsgaard, Ibid.
Organization Department (ed.), Dangzheng lingdao ganbu tongji ziliao huibian 1954-1998, [Collection
of Statistical Information on Party and Government Leading Cadres 1954-1998] (Beijing: Dangjian duwu
chubanshe, 1999). As cited by Burns op. cit.
16
154
Data on civil servants exclusively is not available; as a result, all the above data
are based on the characteristics of cadre corps.17 The available data for the civil service
is with regard to size and distribution. In 1998, the profile of the civil service in China
was as follows:
Table 5.2 Number and distribution of civil servants by administrative level, 1998
administrative level
central level
provincial level
prefectural level
county level
township level
number of civil servants
495022
592589
1133977
2186263
926471
percentage
9.28
11.11
21.26
40.98
17.37
total
5334322
100.00
Source: Xi Liu, Zhongguo gongwuyuan zhidu [Chinese Civil Service] (Beijing: Tsinghua
University Press, 2002), p.29. As cited in Chou op. cit., pp. 11- 12 and Burns op. cit.
Most civil servants (90%) work in local governments in China. Only about 10%
of civil servants work at the central level. Another 11% work at provincial level, 21% at
prefectural level, 41% at county level, and 17% at town township level. Less than 1,000
civil servants are ranked at minister/provincial governor level, while most civil servants
who work in China’s counties hold the rank of section chief or deputy chief (35.7%) or
section member (46.8%). Bureau-level officials, employed in the central government and
at provincial level, make up less than half a percent of the total, while about 5.5% of the
civil servants are division chiefs (employed in central ministries and in provincial
government) or county heads.
17
The concept of cadre in China is broad. Generally, cadres include the civil servants and the employees
who work in other state organs and public organizations.
155
Table 5.3 Number and distribution of civil servants by rank, 1998
rank
provincial/ministerial level #
directorate/bureau level #
county/division level #
township/section level #
section staff level
clerical level
number of civil servants
867
21152
295347
1904020
2495489
617447
percentage
0.02
0.40
5.54
35.69
46.78
11.57
total
5334322
100.00
# the figure includes civil servants at deputy level.
Source: Xi Liu, Zhongguo gongwuyuan zhidu [Chinese Civil Service] (Beijing: Tsinghua
University Press, 2002), p.29. As cited in Chou op. cit., pp. 11- 12 and Burns op. cit.
Efforts after 1998
In 2005, the Minister of Personnel, Zhang Bolin, generalized the nationwide
experiences of implementing China’s Civil Service Reform.18 According to his speech,
the central party and government organs altogether selected 31,000 newcomers through
open examinations since 1994. From 2000 to 2004, various local governments altogether
selected more than 630,000 newcomers through open examinations. In various levels of
governments, more than 98% of the civil servants participated in performance appraisal
every year from 1994. From 2000 to 2004, in various levels of party and government
organs, more than 645,000 people got new positions through open competition
nationwide. From 1996 to 2003, more than 900,000 people nationwide rotated and
exchanged their positions. And more than 30,000 people changed their positions
according to the avoidance regulations. From 1996 to 2003, about 16,000 employees
18
Zhang Bolin, Tuijin ganbu renshi gongzuo kexuehua, minzhuhua, zhiduhau de zhongda jucuo [Great
Measures to Make Cadre Personnel System more Scientific, Democratic and Institutionalized:
Understanding and Implementing Civil Service Law of PRC]. Can be retrieved from website,
http://www.mop.gov.cn/Desktop.aspx?PATH=rsbww/sy/xxll&Gid=36796243-b120-477e-9c3ebcab0545fd88&Tid=Cms_Info, on 7 April 2006.
156
were dismissed by the government and about 30,000 employees resigned from their
government positions. From 1994 to 2004, the numbers of civil servants participating in
training programs reached 20 million.19
The practices of China’s Civil Service System significantly improve the education
level of civil servants. In 2001, more than 56% of the 5.4 million civil servants had a
minimum of a tertiary education, a 25% increase since 1993.20 China’s Civil Service
Reform has been successful at improving civil service quality, especially at the central
and provincial levels. Thus, by 2003, nearly 70% of civil servants had university or
community college degrees.21
Given the positive results gained by implementing China’s Civil Service System
and the still urgent need to constantly reform the public personnel management system,
the central leadership decided to upgrade the status of the 1993 Provisional Regulations
to law. In 2000, the central leadership asked the Organization Department of the CCP
and Ministry of Personnel and other related organs to discuss and formulate the new Civil
Service Law based on the 1993 Provisional Regulations and nationwide experiences. On
27 April 2005, the new Civil Service Law was approved by the National People’s
Congress. The Civil Service Law consists of eighteen chapters of one hundred and seven
articles.22 There are three main differences between the new Civil Service Law and the
19
Zhang Bolin, Ibid.
“Personnel reforms produce results”, China Daily, 14 November 2001. Can be retrieved from website,
http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/2001-09-21/34847.html, on 7 April 2006.
21
Interview, Ministry of Personnel, 19 March 2004.
22
A copy of the Civil Service Law of the People’s Republic of China can be retrieved from the website of
the Ministry of Personnel http://www.mop.gov.cn/Desktop.aspx?PATH=rsbww/sy/xxll&Gid=4e34f9d2e5bb-4efe-be33-2a60057946e4&Tid=Cms_Info on 7 April 2006.
20
157
1993 Provisional Regulations. First, the Civil Service Law expands the scope of the civil
service in China. According to the 1993 Provisional Regulations, “civil servants” are the
managerial, administrative, professional employees of the “administrative organs of the
state” (Article 8). According to the new Civil Service Law, the “civil service system” has
been extended to many other public organizations including the CCP and organizations
on the central committee-controlled Nomenklatura, such as mass organizations, the
legislature, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and the democratic
parties. The judiciary and the procuratorate are also managed according to the Civil
Service System. Second, the new Civil Service Law further perfects the categorization in
the civil service management. At present, positions in civil service are classified as
“general management position” (zonghe guanli lei), “professional technology position”
(zhuanye jishu lei) and “administrative execution position” (xingzheng zhixing lei).
Third, new Civil Service Law specifies more contract-based positions to recruit more
expertise and talents into the government.
Local Implementation of China’s Civil Service Reform
After historically reviewing the authorities’ efforts to raise the quality of the civil
service and providing some preliminary assessment, in this section, I will describe and
analyze 3 cities’ experiences of implementing China’s Civil Service Reform. As I
mentioned before, implementation of reform measures differs from the policy design. We
should never expect there to be cases that exactly and perfectly implement rules and
regulations as proposed by the reforms. Moreover, in China, the central government only
158
provides general policy principles and leaves local governments a great deal of autonomy
during implementation. On the one hand, various local governments have their own
understanding and concerns; on the other hand, they can build and justify their own
measures based on the autonomy. This circumstance increases the possibility of deviation
from the policy design. Thus, detailed descriptions and analysis of local experiences are
warranted. I hope these cases provide snapshots of the implementation of Civil Service
Reform in local China.
Context of Implementing China’s Civil Service Reform
In order to investigate the local implementation of China’s Civil Service Reform,
I need to identify the institutions involved and delineate the context within which the
reform is carried out. Institutions involved first include party committees in various
functional departments under the State Council and at various levels of local governments
at and above the county level; and Organization Departments of various party
committees. 23 The party committees, especially the CCP Central Committee, are
responsible for long-term policy planning and the formulation of principles on personnel
management. One member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the highest organ
of political power in China, has responsibility for overseeing “organization and personnel
work”, including management of the civil service. The party committees are also
23
The context of implementing China’s Civil Service Reform is adapted from the following works: Chen
Zhenming (ed.), Guojia gongwuyuan zhidu [State Civil Service System] (Fuzhou: Fujiang People’s
Publisher, 2002), pp. 254-258; Zhu Qianfang, Li Ruhai and E Guaihong (eds.), Guojia gongwuyuan
guanli [State Civil Servants Management] (Beijing: China Personnel Press, 1996), p.235 and pp. 402-403;
John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in China,” in Governance in China (OECD, 2005), pp. 51-74.
159
responsible for nominating candidates for the leading positions of governments. The
Organization Departments of various party committees are responsible for supervising
the implementation of the party line on civil service management and relevant personnel
regulations. The Organization Departments also hold veto power over the candidates for
government positions on behalf of the relevant party committees. The party committees
and their Organization Departments are supposed to focus on general direction and longterm policy making rather than getting too involved in detailed personnel matters.
Institutions involved also include the Ministry of Personnel. The Ministry of
Personnel is responsible for the formulation and interpretation of regulations regarding
state civil servants, and the coordination of their implementation. On behalf of the State
Council, the Ministry of Personnel directly manages civil servants appointed by the State
Council; it provides guidance and supervision for the management of civil servants in
various functional departments under the State Council and in various local government
bureaus. The Ministry of Personnel implements the policy under the supervision of the
Organization Department. The two bodies, one party and the other one government, are
tightly linked. A Vice Minister of Personnel is concurrently a Deputy Head of the
Organization Department, and personnel of the two bodies may be seconded to the other
body for special projects as needed. By all accounts, party and government bodies in
charge of the civil service work seamlessly together.
Personnel Bureaus in various functional departments under the State Council are
responsible for the management of civil servants of their departments and the
160
management of civil servants who are affiliated with the functional departments.
Personnel Bureaus in local governments at and above the county level are responsible for
the comprehensive management of the civil servants in their own regions and, on behalf
of local governments at the same level, directly manage the civil servants appointed by
them.
Anti-corruption work (somehow related to civil service management since one of
the goals of China’s Civil Service Reform is to improve the cleanness of the civil service)
is handled by the Party’s Central Inspection Discipline Commission, the government’s
Ministry of Supervision and the People’s Procuratorate. On the local level, anticorruption is handled by the Inspection Discipline Commission of various party
committees and Supervision Bureaus of various local governments.
Case Study 1: Haidian Implementing China’s Civil Service Reform
In June 1992, Haidian district was chosen by Beijing Municipal Party Committee
and Beijing Municipal government as a sample district for them to experiment with the
design of the civil service. An ad hoc Leading Committee (with the name “tui gong
lingdao xiaozu”) was formed soon after, charged with the experimental implementation.
The deputy secretary of Haidian District Party Committee in charge of the organizational
and personnel work chaired this committee. Other leading members included the deputy
head of Haidian district government, who was in charge of government personnel work,
and major officials from the Organization Department of Haidian District Party
161
Committee, the Personnel Bureau, Supervision Bureau, and Finance Bureau of Haidian
district. The experimentations were first carried out in the Family Planning Committee of
Haidian district, the Civil Affairs Bureau, and the Audit Bureau.24
In 1994, the Personnel Bureau published a book detailing the experimental
implementation of China’s Civil Service System in Haidian district. 25 This book, “shijian
yu tansuo”, included comprehensive reports on the implementation of the “three fixes”
program,
26
position classification, performance appraisal, training, promotion and
avoidance, etc. On the basis of the experiences and lessons of the experimentation, the
Leading Committee formulated the Haidian District Plan of Implementing Civil Service
System, which was approved by the Beijing Municipal Personnel Bureau at the end of
1994. Haidian then began to implement its plan in all district government bureaus. Later,
the Leading Committee issued the Method of Implementing State Civil Service System of
Haidian District in 1995.
1. Transition
After the 1993-1995 Institutional Reform (jigou gaige) and the “three fixes”
program, Haidian district government had 38 district-level bureaus. There were 14 Urban
24
Personnel Bureau of Haidian District, Haidian qu guanyu guojia gongwuyuan zhidu zhifa jiancha de
zicha baogao [Internal Investigation on the Implementation of Civil Service System in Haidian District]
(1998).
25
See Chen Qiyao (ed.), Shijian yu tansuo [Experimental Implementation of Civil Service System in
Haidian] (Beijing: China Personnel Press, 1994).
26
The “three fixes” program: the “three fixes” refers to determining the functions of each bureau,
determining the organization of the bureau, and determining the number of employees that each bureau
should employ. This is a program aiming to restructure the local government bureau before transferring
cadres to civil servants. The logic is first control the number of positions in civil service through
establishment planning, and accordingly can control the number of staff in civil service.
162
Street Offices and 8 townships under Haidian district government.27 In specific, there
were 3,434 positions in 52 administrative organs in Haidian government (including 14
Urban Street Offices). Among these, 1,762 belonged to the district government, while
1,672 belonged to the Urban Street Offices. Together 2,906 position specifications were
made, including 1,539 for the district government bureaus. In December 1996, Haidian
position classification work was assessed by Beijing Municipal Personnel Bureau and
was evaluated as excellent. 28 After finishing the work on position classification, the
Leading Committee formulated a plan for civil servants’ transition for the whole district.
A general mobilization meeting was held on 15 November 1996. The transition training
programs for Haidian government staff were also arranged, with 3, 910 employees
trained at that time.
In December 1996, the transition program was closed. Table 5.4 summaries the
transition program in Haidian. 2,432 people directly transferred as civil servants; 68
people were transferred through administrative investigation (shenpi); 395 people were
transferred through examination; 92 people delayed entering the transferring process29
and 9 people failed to transfer as civil servants.
27
There were 22 Urban Street Offices and 11 townships under Haidian district jurisdiction in 2002.
Interview, Haidian Personnel Bureau, 10 June 2002.
28
Haidian finished the position classification work in October 1996.
29
Yanhuan transfer, the Education Commission of Haidian district is one of the organs which delayed the
transition. Haidian Education Commission finished the transition in 2000.
163
Table 5.4 Transition program in Haidian
Directly
transferred
1371
Through
shenpi
61
Through
exam
18
Yanhuan
transfer
40
Fail
District
6
government
Urban Street 1061
7
377
52
3
Offices
Total
2432
68
395
92
9
Source: Personnel Bureau of Haidian District, Internal Investigation on the
Implementation of Civil Service System in Haidian District, (1998).
2. Recruitment and Selection
Since Haidian was chosen as the test site for Civil Service System implementation,
it opened up the recruitment and selection of civil servants to the general public as early
as May 1993. 8 district government bureaus planned to recruit 35 people. Through
competitive examinations and other procedures, 20 people were selected. 30 Up to
October 1998, 243 people were selected for more than 60 party and government organs
through open and competitive examinations. Table 5.5 summarizes the civil servant
selection situation of Haidian government. Haidian district claimed that every civil
servant ranked below section chief entered government through examinations.
30
Haidian opened this recruitment to all people in Beijing city, not just Haidian permanent residents.
164
Table 5.5 Haidian district government civil servants selection situation, 1995-2002
year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
number
25
53
64
0
0
24
0
200
recruitment
type
from
society
0
33
27
university
graduates
25
20
37
education
level of
new
comers
postgraduate
3
6
7
0
24
60
140
university
18
25
39
community
college
3
21
16
high
school
1
1
2
4
15
0
5
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Source: Personnel Bureau of Haidian district, June 2002
3. Performance Appraisal
According to the Provisional Method of Performance Appraisal for Haidian Civil
Servants, issued by Haidian government in 1996 as the result of annual performance
appraisal, the individual civil servant is judged as one of four performance grades:
outstanding (yiuxiu), competent (chenzhi), basically competent (jiben chenzhi), and
incompetent (bu chenzhi). Among these ranks, basically competent serves as kind of
warning to those under appraisal. If a person is judged basically competent at an annual
performance appraisal, he receives 50% of the original annual bonus. Those ranked as
incompetent go through a probation period of about 6 to 12 months and do not get a
bonus. From 1994 to 1998, 34 people were ranked as basically competent and 24 as
incompetent in annual performance appraisals. One person was dismissed due to failing
165
the appraisal. Up to October 1998, no individual lodged an appeal regarding the
performance appraisal results.31
4. Training
There are four types of civil servant training: induction training, training for civil
servants promoted to leading positions, refresher training and professional training.
Training for civil servants promoted to section-chief level started in October 1993 in
Haidian. By the end of 1998, there had been six rounds of this kind of training program,
training 341 section-chief level civil servants. Professional training in Haidian focused on
training civil servants in charge of personnel work and general office work. Haidian
initiated special refresher training, providing different programs for different targets. The
Personnel Bureau of Haidian district provided a basic computer course for civil servants
aged between 45 and 50. In total, 1,017 civil servants passed this course. For civil
servants at section-chief level and above aged below 40, a more complicated computer
application program was provided. 195 civil servants passed this course and some of
them felt satisfied with the quality of the program.32
In China, governments are responsible for absorbing demobilized soldiers into the
civil service after they have served their tour of duty. The district government as a whole
is assigned a quota of demobilized soldiers every year and is expected to fill it. Some of
these demobilized soldiers are considered poorly-educated; hence the special training
programs are designed for them. The training courses cover knowledge of the legal
31
32
Personnel Bureau of Haidian District, op. cit..
Interview, Personnel Bureau of Haidian District, June 2002.
166
system, public administration, the economy, and some work-related skills. Up to October
1998, 404 demobilized soldiers passed such training. Compared with the total number of
demobilized soldiers transferred into Haidian (410 at the end of 1998), the participation
rate is as high as 98.5%. Table 5.6 summaries the absorbing of demobilized soldiers in
Haidian.
Table 5.6 Total demobilized soldiers transferred into Haidian district, 1995-2001
year
total
number
female
type of employer
party-state organs
service
units
1995
66
25
26
21
1996
96
37
48
20
1997
111
48
69
22
1998
137
58
69
37
1999
187
80
45
95
2000
178
64
61
78
2001
97
n.a.
40
48
Source: Personnel Bureau of Haidian district, June 2002
enterprises
3
8
3
12
16
3
9
new developing
area (shiyanqu)
16
20
17
25
31
36
0
5. Rotation and Avoidance
In July 1997, Haidian district government issued the Method on Civil Servant
Rotation. From 1997 to October 1998, 109 employees from 17 organs rotated their posts
and they all reported to the Personnel Bureau (bei’an). Among these people, 71 are civil
servants at or above the level of section chief and 38 are section members. The Bureau of
Industrial and Commercial Management of Haidian district started rotation in 1994. Up
to October 1998, 96% (79) of civil servants at or above the section-level rotated their
posts. 72.7% (402) of ordinary cadres rotated their posts.33
33
These people are not civil servants or administrative Bianzhi, they are market-regulators working on a
contract basis, so-called Shiye Bianzhi
167
Avoidance (huibi) is the transfer of officials who had relatives and working
relationships with various officials to other related positions. Avoidance is in place to
prevent nepotism or corruption. In a survey in 1998, 80 spouses were in a situation that
required avoidance. Haidian government had re-assigned positions for 158 people by the
end of 1998. Table 5.7 shows the distribution of these people.
Table 5.7 Avoidance in Haidian district government 1998
Positions
Division
chief
Vice
Section chief Vice section Section
division
chief
member
chief
Number
1
3
18
30
108
Source: Personnel Bureau of Haidian District, Internal Investigation on the
Implementation of Civil Service System in Haidian District, (1998).
6. Compensation and Reward
From 1994 to 1997, 1,396 civil servants were given a one-level grade wage
increment as required by the national policy for regular pay increase. Based on the results
of the performance appraisals for 1994-1998, if a person was assessed as outstanding for
two successive years or competent for three successive years, he or she would get a onelevel increment at post wage. Some people were awarded two increments of their post
wage during this period. If a person was assessed as outstanding for three successive
years, he would get a one-level increment at grade wage. A total of 102 civil servants
gained a grade wage increment based on their appraisal results.34
7. Discipline and Punishment
34
Personnel Bureau of Haidian District, op. cit..
168
Haidian government issued regulations to punish poor-performers in 2001.35 The
civil servant ranked bottom in the organization at the annual performance appraisal would
receive one of the following punitive measures: a warning, demotion, a re-assigned post,
or training till a new post is allocated. The methods used to rank the staff in an
organization and accordingly find the bottom-ranked are quite quantitative in nature. The
quantitative evaluations encompassed three parts: evaluation from the leader group of
organization in which the person under appraisal belonged; evaluation from the upper
level organization in charge; peer evaluation and the mass poll. These three parts were
given different weights (see Table 5.8).
Table 5.8 Weights of different parties’ evaluation
Organization
Leader group
Upper level
Peer evaluation &
mass poll
Percent
30-50%
20-30%
30-40%
Source: Personnel Bureau of Haidian District, Collection of Documents on Management
of Civil Servants in Haidian, (2002).
8. Summary and Analysis
High capacity civil service systems are characterized by open and competitive
selection processes, mechanisms that appropriately utilize talent, ensuring that all
employees are appropriately trained, setting and communicating the performance
standards, evaluating performance and feeding back the results of evaluation to
employees, and linking performance to rewards.36 To a large extent Haidian’s experience
of implementing China’s Civil Service System approached this ideal model. First, the
selection of new civil servants is open and competitive (see Table 5.5).
35
See Personnel Bureau of Haidian District (ed.) Beijing shi Haidian qu guojia gongwuyuan guanli wenjian
huibian [Collection of Documents on Management of Civil Servants in Haidian] (2002).
36
John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in China,” in Governance in China (OECD, 2005), pp. 51-74.
169
From 1995 to 2002, a total of 366 people become civil servants through open and
competitive examinations. Of these, 246 are graduates of higher education; 120 are from
the general public. These newcomers are well-educated. 20 received post-graduate
education. 97 received university education. More than 70% of these newcomers are
educated to university level and above.
37
Another improvement is that the training
programs for Haidian government staff are comprehensive and effective. 38 Further, to
motivate the officials to utilize their talents, Haidian has initiated strict performance
appraisal measures and linked the results with rewards. Before the performance
evaluation, the performance standards are set and communicated. From 1996 to 2001,
Haidian district government issued 21 rules and regulations on civil service management.
39
In interviews, several interviewees felt satisfied with Haidian’s implementation of
China’s Civil Service System.40
Most importantly, officials of the Personnel Bureau of Haidian district thought the
personnel quality of Haidian government had improved since China’s Civil Service
Reform. And the improvement of personnel quality somehow was brought about by the
reform. 41 Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 show that the educational level of Haidian
government personnel apparently improved. During the period of 1991-2000, Haidian
government was downsized; the number of staff was reduced from 3,193 to 2,351 (a 26%
37
Data of education level of newcomers in 2002 was not available when I conducted the interview. This
percentage is estimated by the interviewee.
38
Interviewees felt satisfied with the quality of training programs.
39
See Personnel Bureau of Haidian District (ed.) Beijing shi Haidian qu guojia gongwuyuan guanli wenjian
huibian [Collection of Documents on Management of Civil Servants in Haidian] (2002).
40
Interviews, Haidian Personnel Bureau, June 2002.
41
Interviews, Haidian Personnel Bureau, June 2002.
170
reduction). The number of highly educated staff (post-graduate or university degree)
increased drastically from 11.4% of all staff to 29.2% (from 365 staff to 687). The age of
Haidian government staff decreased but not drastically. Table 5.9 shows that the number
of staff aged below 35 decreased, while the number of staff aged between 36 and 45
remained almost the same. The improvement in the quality of the staff of Haidian
Personnel Bureau manifested a similar pattern: the number of staff with a higher
education drastically increased while the average age of all staff increased a little.
171
Table 5.9 Number of civil servants, their education level and age in Haidian district government, 19912000
year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
bianzhi
3193
3296
3116
3072
2987
2753
2915
3269
2985
2351
education
level
postgraduate
24
26
29
41
60
58*
university
365
394
379
364
369
368
451
559
618
629
community
college
1143
1271
1221
1315
1287
1231
1335
1490
1405
1084
high
school
1427
1404
1324
1240
1190
1017
1002
1103
858
548
Source: Personnel Bureau of Haidian district, June 2002
* Among these 58, 14 are PhDs.
172
middle
school
258
227
192
153
117
111
98
76
44
32
age
below
30
1045
1002
789
557
521
349
443
411
283
136
30-40
1044
1071
1074
1195
1139
1095
1113
1270
1196
825
40-50
760
875
894
966
988
991
1017
1183
1121
1007
50 and
above
344
348
359
354
339
318
342
405
385
383
Table 5.10 Number of civil servants, their education level and age in Personnel Bureau of Haidian
district, 1991-2000
year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
bianzhi
28
34
32
32
32
33
35
34
31
31
education
level
postgraduate
3
3
5
university
6
7
6
5
11
11
13
16
19
17
community
college
19
24
23
24
18
20
20
15
9
9
high
school
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
0
0
0
Source: Personnel Bureau of Haidian district, June 2002
173
age
30 and
below
9
11
6
8
7
7
7
7
4
5
30-40
13
14
17
17
19
17
15
14
13
12
50 and
above
6
9
9
7
6
9
13
12
13
13
1
1
1
Case Study 2: Ningbo Implementing China’s Civil Service Reform
On 26 July 1995, an ad hoc leading group in charge of implementing China’s
Civil Service System was formed in Ningbo. The then mayor, Zhang Weiwen, chaired
the leading group. Its membership included leading cadres of the CCP Ningbo Committee,
the Organization Department of the CCP Ningbo Committee; and leading officials of
Ningbo city government, Personnel Bureau, Supervision Bureau and Finance Bureau. Its
executive arm - the Office of Implementing China’s Civil Service Reform - was also
established and attached under Ningbo Personnel Bureau.42
In October 1995, Ningbo government issued the Method of Implementing State
Civil Service System in Ningbo City. In November 1995, a mobilization meeting was
held by the city government to mobilize the whole staff corps and assign the tasks to
various bureaus. The emphasis was put on the training program for transition, position
classification, and the transition of cadres to new-called civil servants. Six rounds of
training programs for transition were provided to cadres working in party and
government organs. A total of 20,750 cadres received this training. Every bureau within
the city government was required to make a plan for the transition work. If a bureau’s
“three fixes” plan was approved by the city government, it could begin the transition
work. By the end of 1997, 44 out of 51 city government organs had their “three fixes”
42
Personnel Bureau of Ningbo City, Ningbo shi guanyu shixing guojia gongwuyuan zhidu de zicha baogao
[Internal Investigation on the Implementation of China’s Civil Service System in Ningbo City] (1999).
174
plan approved by the city government and finished position classification for 2,045 posts
within these 44 organs.43
All cadres in Ningbo city government were asked to sit examinations to transfer to
the civil service during 1996, 1997, and 1998. By December 1998, all the government
bureaus at and above township level in Ningbo had finished this transition. Previously,
the total workforce in city, county, and township level bureaus in Ningbo government
was 19,029. Among these, 18,564 (or 97.56%) were transferred to the civil service
according to the results of examinations and other performance appraisals. 37 persons
could not be transferred since they failed the examinations. Of these 37 persons, 8
worked in city government, and 29 worked in county and township level governments.
Another 428 persons who failed this transition could be grouped into 3 categories.
Category one: those who either were approaching retirement age or whose education was
limited (only middle school education). Category two: those who were under discipline
procedure (chufen) during the transition period. Category three: those who quit their job
(most of them moved into the business sector).44
1. Recruitment and Selection
In response to the policies, documents and spirit of the Organization Department
of the CCP and the Ministry of Personnel, Ningbo government began to select staff
through examinations in 1989. In 1996, Ningbo government opened the recruitment of
civil servants to all walks of people. This was the first practice of open recruitment of
43
44
Personnel Bureau of Ningbo City, op. cit..
Personnel Bureau of Ningbo City, op. cit..
175
government officials in Zhejiang province. In April 1996, 43 city government organs and
5 district-level organs planned to recruit 192 newcomers. 1,658 applicants registered for
the examinations. 152 people were selected; 106 for the city government organs and 46
for district government organs.45
In 1997, county-level government organs opened their recruitment to the general
public. This was the first example in Zhejiang province of applications not being
restricted to Ningbo permanent residents or to cadre status. All peasants and workers
were qualified applicants and could register for the examinations. 1,904 people registered
for the exam. Among these, 65 were peasants and 576 were workers. Through
competitive examinations, interviews, and physical and body tests (tijian), 178 people
were selected and appointed as civil servants by the county government. Among these, 5
were peasants and 37 were workers. In 1996 and 1997, the city and county governments
in Ningbo together selected 356 new recruits from the general public. From 1998,
however, a centrally-imposed downsizing campaign stopped Ningbo’s attempts to recruit
new civil servants.
Another important pool from which new civil servants may be selected is that of
graduates of universities and colleges. In 1997 various local government bureaus together
selected 618 new civil servants (or new cadres, since some of them are not civil servants,
but cadres whose management referred to China’s Civil Service System) who were
higher education graduates. Of these 618, the authorities recruited 146 at city level, 336 at
45
Ningbo Local History Editorial Committee, (ed.) Ningbo Yearbook 1997 (Ningbo: Ningbo Yearbook
Press, 1997), p. 316.
176
county level, and 38 at town and township level.46 Taken together, the newcomers of
1996 and 1997 (356 and 618) made up about 5.2 % of Ningbo’s 18,564 civil servants.
The 146 newcomers of city government were appointed to different bureaus. 5 went to
the General Office of city government, 5 to the city Education Commission, and 5 to the
Civil Affairs Bureau. The Agriculture Bureau, Audit Bureau, and Technology Inspection
Bureau were each assigned 4 newcomers. The Petition Office, Construction Committee,
Environmental Protection Bureau, Planning Bureau, Medicine Management Bureau,
Forest Bureau, Labor Bureau and some other organs were each assigned 3 newcomers.47
Because of the 1998 downsizing campaign, Ningbo stopped recruiting new civil
servants from the pool of higher education graduates and the general public; however, the
absorption of demobilized soldiers continued. In 1997 and 1998, Ningbo absorbed 1,273
demobilized soldiers to three levels (city, county and township) of government bureaus.
Given that most demobilized soldiers were poorly-educated, it is likely their large number
had a negative impact on the quality of Ningbo’s civil service (see Table 5.11).
Table 5. 11 Ningbo absorption of demobilized soldiers
no.
of dependent
people
demobilized
soldiers
1997
358
37
1998
369
40
1999
546
67
Source: Ningbo Yearbook, 1997-2001
year
2. Performance Appraisal
46
Others were assigned to organs who managed their employees according to China’s Civil Service System
(canzhao guanli). 48 for city level, 50 for county level and 38 for township level organs.
47
Personnel Bureau of Ningbo City, op. cit .
177
In 1997, 28 civil servants were assessed as incompetent in various city
government bureaus; they constituted 0.1% of all civil servants who participated in the
performance appraisal.
In 1998, 39 civil servants were assessed as incompetent in
various city government bureaus; they constituted 0.14% of all those appraised.48
3. Training
In January 1997, the Organization Department of Ningbo Party Committee and
Personnel Bureau issued the Implementation Method for Civil Servants’ Training.
Ningbo Personnel Bureau was responsible for designing training programs for civil
servants. They conducted a questionnaire survey to 1,700 civil servants and got 1,331
replies. Based on the survey results, 31 rounds of different training programs were
arranged. The programs included language training, computer applications, and
knowledge of the legal system and economy. In total, 8,410 places on these training
programs were filled (one person might take part in several programs).49
In May 2000, the National School of Administration (Guojia xingzheng xueyuan)
arranged a special training program for Ningbo personnel officials; 40 personnel officials
(personnel bureau chiefs at and above county level) took part. This was the first time the
National School of Administration provided a special training program for local
personnel officials.50 This effort motivated the personnel officials of Ningbo government.
48
Personnel Bureau of Ningbo City, op. cit .
Personnel Bureau of Ningbo City, op. cit .
50
Ningbo Local History Editorial Committee, (ed.) Ningbo Yearbook 2001 (Ningbo: Ningbo Yearbook
Press, 2001), p. 358.
49
178
4. Summary of Ningbo Case
To some extent, the implementation of China’s Civil Service Reform had a
positive impact on the quality of Ningbo’s civil service. First, the transition program
helped to filter out incapable cadres. Of the 465 cadres who failed to transfer to the civil
service, more than 50% fall down to the old or the poorly-educated.
Second, the educational level of Ningbo government personnel improved. For
example, the educational level of Ningbo Environmental Protection Bureau personnel
improved. In 1996, Ningbo Environmental Protection Bureau did not employ any postgraduate degree holders; in 2000, the bureau employed 3 such degree holders. The
number of poorly-educated people decreased from 3 to 1 during the period 1996 to 2000.
The development of personnel quality of Ningbo Education Commission manifested a
similar pattern. The number of staff with higher education (university degree) drastically
increased from 38 to 66, that is, from 50.7 % of all staff to 83.5%.
Table 5.12 Number of civil servants, their education level and age in Environmental Protection
Bureau of Ningbo city, 1996-2000
year
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
bianzhi
education
level
21
25
22
23
22
postgraduate
0
2
3
3
3
university
9
11
9
9
8
community
college
8
7
8
9
9
Source: Personnel Bureau of Ningbo city, June 2002
179
high
school
4
4
2
2
2
age
30
and
below
1
4
4
3040
6
7
8
40-50
3
4
3
50 and
above
11
10
7
Table 5.13 Number of civil servants in Ningbo Education Commission,
and their education level, 1991-2001
year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
bianzhi
education
level
75
73
77
82
81
122
119
98
98
99
79
university
38
37
41
45
44
87
86
71
71
68
66
community
college
24
25
28
29
29
30
29
24
24
28
10
high
school
13
11
8
8
8
5
4
3
3
3
3
Source: Personnel Bureau of Ningbo city, June 2002
Case Study 3: Changchun Implementing China’s Civil Service Reform
In November 1994, an ad hoc Leading Committee was established to be in charge
of Changchun’s implementation of China’s Civil Service Reform. The then mayor
chaired the Leading Committee. The Leading Committee formulated a plan to implement
China’s Civil Service System and had it approved by the Personnel Department (ting) of
Jilin province in 1995.51
1. Transition
After the 1993-1995 Institutional Reform, there were 60 party and government
organs at Changchun city level. Among these, 8 were party organs and 52 were
51
Changchun Personnel Bureau (ed.), Changchun shi jigou gaige yu gongwuyuan zhidu gaige wenjian
ziliao huibian [Collection of Documents on Changchun’s Implementing Institutional Reform and China’s
Civil Service Reform] (1997).
180
government bureaus. In September 1995, the Leading Committee handed out study
materials to various party and government organs.52 Training courses were arranged for
personnel officials of these organs to provide them with the necessary knowledge of the
new Civil Service System. Party and government organs were required to make their own
implementation plan regarding transferring their cadres to civil servants. By the end of
1995, the plans of 21 organs were approved by the Leading Committee. On 14 December
1995, a mobilization meeting was held. The Leading Committee addressed the questions
and concerns raised by various organs. Most concerns were on the question of how to
reallocate (fenliu) redundant personnel. From then, the work of transferring cadres to the
civil service started.
By the end of 1996, 55 organs of Changchun city party and
government finished their position classification and transition work (see Table 5.14).
The transition work of the Police Bureau (gong’an ju) was delayed and carried out in
1997.
Table 5.14 Changchun position classification 1996
level
no. of
position
bureau
chief and
deputy
nonleading
position at
bureau
level
division
chief
and
deputy
nonleading
position at
division
level
section chief
and deputy
section
member
total
228
67
949
514
934
487
3179
Source: Changchun Personnel Bureau, Collection of Documents on Changchun’s
Implementing Institutional Reform and China’s Civil Service Reform, (1997).
2. Recruitment and Selection
In 1996 the 60 Changchun city-level government and party organs opened their
recruitment to the general public. They planned to recruit 544 people. 5,727 people
registered for the examination. 489 people were selected. Among these, 39 were peasants,
52
Changchun Personnel Bureau, Ibid.
181
36 were workers, and 22 were unemployed. Changchun government claimed that its open
recruitment of civil servants was not constrained by permanent residence or cadre status.
In 1997, 57 party and government organs planned to recruit 339 new civil
servants. 336 of the 6,233 applicants were selected through examinations and competition.
The open recruitment of civil servants stopped in 1998 due to conflict with the
requirements of the 1998 Downsizing Campaign. Government stopped openly recruiting
higher education graduates and the general public, but still had to absorb demobilized
soldiers. In 2002, Changchun government again openly recruited new civil servants from
higher education graduates and the general public through competitive examinations. 397
people were selected and appointed as civil servants by the city government.
Table 5.15 Changchun absorption of demobilized soldiers
year
1996
1997
1998
1999
no.
147
108
151
376
Source: Changchun Yearbook 1997-2000.
3. Performance Appraisal
Civil servants were assessed at one of three grades after the annual performance
appraisal. In 1995, the proportion of cadres who ranked as outstanding, competent and
incompetent were 15.1%, 81.4%, 0.4% respectively. Changchun had initiated some
special measures in their performance appraisal practices. In 1998, the Organization
Department of the Changchun Party Committee together with the Personnel Bureau and
Supervision Bureau issued punishment regulations for poor-performers. The regulations
182
required that every organization should report the civil servant who ranked lowest in the
annual performance appraisal to its superior organization. In 1998, 44 civil servants were
dismissed due to failing the appraisal. In 1999, 272 civil servants who ranked last in their
organizations were reported to the Organization Department of Changchun Party
Committee by various party and government organs. Follow-up investigations were
carried out on these cases. 91 of them received an administrative warning.53
In 2000, 14.67% of civil servants were assessed as outstanding in the annual
performance appraisal and 0.14% as incompetent. In 2001, the figures were 14.99%
assessed as outstanding and 0.14% incompetent.54
4. Training, Competition and Discipline
3,767 people received training in 1996. 140 of them were at or above the division
chief level. 4,327 people received training in 1997. Changchun Administration School
(Changchun xingzheng xueyuan) was established in August 1997, making training for
civil servants more systematic. In 2000, 2,827 civil servants received professional
training. 900 personnel officials of various organs were asked to sit examinations to test
their knowledge of personnel policy and regulations. In 2002, 3,000 civil servants
received professional training and 2,000 civil servants received knowledge-update
training. In 1996, 312 people gained their positions in Changchun city level organs
through open competition. In 1996, 391 civil servants of various party and government
53
Changchun Local History Editorial Committee (ed.), Changchun nianjian 1999 [Changchun Yearbook
1999] (Changchun: Changchun Yearbook Press, 2000).
54
Changchun Local History Editorial Committee (ed.), Changchun nianjian 2000 [Changchun Yearbook
2000] (Changchun: Changchun Yearbook Press, 2001).
183
organs rotated their positions. In 1997, 38 civil servants received a warning after failing
the annual performance appraisal. In 1999, this number had risen to 91.55
Discussion
Analysis of the Three Cases
Case studies of local implementations indicate a high degree of local compliance
with key central policies in personnel management. By and large, the formal rules of
China’s Civil Service System are respected in local practices. The three local
governments share certain attributes in their implementation of China’s Civil Service
Reform. In this section I will identify the similarities and provide some preliminary
assessment on local implementation in terms of achieving the intentional goals. First, all
three local governments finished the transition to the civil service program at the end of
1996. The transition program includes three sub-programs. The first one is that local
authorities set up special institutions to lead and organize the implementation of China’s
Civil Service System. These special institutions include an ad hoc leading committee and
an executive arm—office of implementation. Since implementing China’s Civil Service
System is an important task, the leading committee is usually composed of local party
and government leaders, i.e., leaders from local Party Committee, Organization
Department, local government, Personnel Bureau, Supervision Bureau and Finance
Bureau. The executive arm—office is usually attached to the Personnel Bureau.
55
Changchun Local History Editorial Committee (ed.), Changchun nianjian 2000 [Changchun Yearbook
2000] (Changchun: Changchun Yearbook Press, 2001).
184
The second sub-program is the “three fixes” program. The “three fixes” involve
determining the functions of each bureau, determining the organization of the bureau, and
determining the number of employees that each bureau should employ. This program
restructured the local government bureau before transferring cadres to civil servants,
enabling them to first control the number of positions in the civil service through
establishment planning, and then to accordingly control the number of staff in the civil
service.
The third sub-program is transferring cadres to the civil service. To maintain and
improve the capacity of the civil service, all government officials were asked to sit
examinations to test whether they were qualified to be transferred. The leading committee
and the implementation office designed examinations or other evaluation methods to
entitle only the qualified cadres to transfer to the new Civil Service System. The
transition examination required understanding of the rules and regulations of China’s
Civil Service System. Cadres’ transition depended on the results of both the transition
exams and appraisal, instead of solely on the transition examination.
The transition programs have led to some positive consequences. First, the cut-off
personnel mainly fell on old employees or poorly-educated ones. For example, in Ningbo,
of the 465 cadres who failed in transition, more than 50% were either the old or the
poorly-educated. Second, after transition, the proportion of employees with college or
university education rose. For example, the educational level of personnel of Haidian
district government, Haidian Personnel Bureau, Ningbo Environmental Protection Bureau
185
and Ningbo Education Commission all rose.56 Third, during transition, the possibility of
not being transferred served as pressure and motivation for the individual official to
prepare for examinations and update work-related knowledge.
However, the transition program had a weakness. The Implementation Plan of
China’s Civil Service Reform and Handbook for Civil Service Transition issued by the
Ministry of Personnel did not mention the method of transition, thus leaving the transition
method to the discretion of the local governments, in particular, the leading committee
and implementation office. Some interviewees reflected the exams were too easy for
them. It was true that the transition rate was very high.57 Some interviewees perceived
that most of their colleagues got transferred. The high pass rate of transition implied that
civil service transition was probably not that effective in screening out incapable officials.
Second, in the recruitment and selection process, all these three local governments
opened up civil servant recruitment to society, and claimed that the recruitment is not
constrained by the permanent residence or cadre status. All three local governments
selected newcomers from a high-quality pool—graduates of university and college. The
competition instilled into the recruitment process was extensive. The ratio of applicants to
recruits climbed year by year. And this helped to increase the quality of newcomers. The
interview with the personnel official reflected that officials believed the introduction of
competition had led the staffing practices in the right direction.58 One additional benefit
of competition was that it put pressure on the current government employees. They
56
See table 5.9, table 5.10, table 5.12 and table 5.13 respectively.
Ningbo 97.56% and Haidian 91.64%. Data for Changchun is not available.
58
Interview, Haidian Personnel Bureau, June 2002.
57
186
voluntarily update their knowledge and work-related skills. For example, during my
fieldwork in Haidian Education Commission, four of 15 interviewees mentioned that
people in Haidian Education Commission had sought to improve their professional
knowledge and skills through training programs and self-study. All these four
interviewees were registered in part-time master study during my fieldwork period.59
Moreover, various bureaus had the autonomy to select their potential employees
(the bureau could only select from qualified candidates who had already passed the
unified entrance exam). The selection committee included at least one member from the
potential employer. To a large extent, the open and competitive recruitment and selection
was a success. Capable people were selected into local governments. This caused the
personnel quality of local government to improve. For example, the personnel quality of
Haidian district government, Haidian Personnel Bureau, Ningbo Environmental
Protection Bureau and Ningbo Education Commission all improved in my study.
Third, all three local governments practiced annual performance appraisal. After
the annual performance appraisal, civil servants in Ningbo were judged to be one of three
grades. The three-grade classification was too limited to discriminate employees’
performance. Usually more than 80% of the personnel were rated as competent.60 In
order to get a more discriminatory classification system, Haidian and Changchun
introduced the grade of “basically competent” between the grades of “competent” and
“incompetent”. Therefore, civil servants in Haidian and Changchun were judged to be
59
60
Interviews, Haidian Education Commission, March 2004.
Interview, Ningbo Education Bureau, February 2005.
187
one of four grades. Being rated as “basically competent” implies warning. The Ministry
of Personnel approved these innovations and popularized them in other parts of the
country.61
Both Haidian and Changchun implemented special measures to make full use of
the appraisal results. Based on the appraisal results, they both issued punitive measures
to poor-performers. These punitive measures deterred the civil servants from laziness or
other undesirable behaviors. Trying not to be identified as poor-performers within their
own organization has become the goal of most of the staff. This has made the individual
staff of the organization serious about performance evaluation, and hence gradually more
performance –oriented.
Fourth, all three local governments arranged to increase civil servants’ pay to
fulfill the national policy requirement. However, during my fieldwork, the point
frequently complained of is the pay system. Interviewees did agree that their pay had
increased compared with the pay they received before reforms.62 However, most thought
their pay was not linked to their performance. As Table 5.16 shows, when I ask the
interviewees whether their pay is somewhat linked with their work performance, most of
them do not think so. For example, most officials (65%) in the environmental protection
domain and officials in Changchun (73%) think their pay is not properly linked with their
work performance.
61
62
Interview, Ministry of Personnel, March 2004.
I ask this comparing question only to the civil servants who began to work before 1993.
188
Table 5.16 Are Pay and Performance Linked?
Yes
Education
12 (46 %)
Environmental
5 (19%)
Haidian education
6 (55%)
Haidian environmental
4 (36%)
Changchun education
6 (40%)
Changchun environmental
1 (7%)
Source: fieldwork survey, March- April 2004.
No
12 (46 %)
17 (65%)
4 (36%)
6 (55%)
8 (53%)
11 (73%)
Based on this part of the data, I conclude that the compensation reform included
in China’s Civil Service Reform failed to provide as much motivation to civil servants as
expected. But I cannot conclude that the compensation reform totally failed since the
central government raised civil service pay twice by a total of 30% in 2001 when the
economy was in deflation and experiencing rising unemployment. Civil service pay has
become more competitive and a civil service career is quite attractive for graduates of
higher education. 63 Moreover, not only does the pay serve as a motivator for those
working in government in China, but so also does status and “grey income”, etc. Working
in a governmental organization as a civil servant is considered to be prestigious and
desirable in China, which yields authoritative power and consequently material rewards.
Many of these rewards, often classified as “grey incomes” and unapproved by the state,
are difficult to capture.
Links to the Principal-Agent Framework
63
See Chou Kwok Ping, “Conflict and Ambiguity in the Implementation of the Civil Service Reform in
China, 1993-2000,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong, 2003), p.
267.
189
Several findings linked to the principal-agent framework can be drawn from the
above analysis of local implementation of China’s Civil Service Reform. Whether the
principal-agent relationship is a successful one or not depends largely on the incentives
that the principal provides to the agent, and the controls that the principal puts in place to
monitor and limit the actions of the agents. The principal-agent theory holds that the
principal can use incentive-alignment arrangement, monitoring, competition and credible
commitment to induce the desirable behaviors from the agents. I find these mechanisms
have been applied by local governments in implementing China’s Civil Service Reform.
1. Incentive-alignment Arrangement
In principal-agent construction, incentives are firstly provided through
employment contracts that allow rewards based on the agent’s work performance.
However, within government bureaucracies, incentive-based employment contracts and
similar individual bonuses for good performance are rarely possible because salaries of
government workers are usually set without regard for work performance. In this study,
interviewees said salaries are more often linked to seniority than performance. Therefore,
pay as an incentive mechanism played a limited role in China’s Civil Service System.
However, this does not mean that in the principal-agent relationship in China’s
civil service, the principal does not have strong incentive mechanisms to apply; to the
contrary, the principal in Chinese government can use personnel appointment and
promotion as incentive instruments. This research has shown these instruments are very
powerful.
190
First, the retention rule is applied in China’s Civil Service System. Local officials
were asked to sit examinations to transfer to the civil service during the first three years
of the implementation. Those who succeeded in the examinations or in other appraisals
were transferred to the civil service; those who failed these procedures were transferred to
other organizations. This measure is a useful instrument for the principal, since each
decision to promote or retain carries with it the threat of dismissal, and this may be
powerful motivation for the agents to work in a desirable way. A single promotion or
retention decision can also separate “good” agents from “bad” ones. In the transition
program of China’s Civil Service Reform, the single decision of whether to transfer a
particular cadre to the position of a new titled civil servant is rooted in the retention rule.
As discussed earlier, the transition program to some extent filters out unqualified officials
and also pushes the current position-holders to voluntarily update their knowledge and
skills.
After being selected, the newcomers had a one-year probation period. Those who
succeeded in this one-year probation were appointed as formal civil servants. Both the
transition program and the one-year probation are the retention rule in China’s Civil
Service System. They motivated the newcomers to make a conscious effort to work and
helped the principal in an organization distinguish good agents from the bad ones.
Second, China’s Civil Service Reform has shaped promotion into a more
powerful mechanism that can induce civil servants to work hard. Before the adoption of
191
China’s Civil Service System, the promotion criterion was loyalty to the CCP and to the
superior. Frequent practices of personal loyalty easily led to a tightening of the personal
relationship between the immediate superior and subordinates. This was a major source
of the emergence of network (Guanxi), and in turn corruption practices. After China’s
Civil Service Reform, the promotion criterion changed to work performance. As holders
of bounded rationality, people sometimes do not have a clear mind about how to show
loyalty to their superiors. As the promotion criterion changed to work performance, the
issue became relatively less abstract for ordinary bounded-rational civil servants. Hence
the civil servants are more likely to be motivated to put conscious effort into their work
rather than struggling to figure out how to please superiors.
2. Monitoring
Performance evaluation and annual performance appraisals were strictly
implemented in local governments. The principals to some extent objectively measured
the agents’ performance. This had made civil servants serious about performance
evaluation, and hence gradually become performance –oriented. Moreover, some special
sanction measures were designed to deter civil servants from undesirable behavior. For
example, punitive measures were issued to the poor-performers in Haidian and
Changchun governments. Under pressure of not being identified as poor-performers in
their performance evaluation, individual civil servants put conscious effort into their
work. In addition, the clients had a say in the performance evaluation process after reform
(see detailed discussion in chapter 6). This helped the principals effectively monitor the
agents’ behavior. For example, if several clients complained about one official, the
192
superior of the organization would begin an investigation to gather more information
about that official’s behavior and performance. To avoid such investigations, officials
made more effort to communicate with and serve the clients.64
3. Competition
In China’s Civil Service System, competition has been intensively instilled in
selection, promotion, and award practices. The positive consequences of this competition
include improvement in the quality of the civil service, and the increased enthusiasm of
civil servants for training. In the recruitment and selection process, the qualifications and
experience required of the recruited have been increased. Only graduates of college and
university have been selected by the government since reform. The improvement of the
education level of newcomers has increased the quality of the civil service as well as put
some pressure on current civil servants. Given that the competition for promotion and
award is extensive, and education is a major indicator of the qualification of candidates,
the current civil servants have been put under pressure to improve their education through
training programs or self-study. In my field work, 88% (46 of 52) of the interviewees had
participated in training programs. Of the 46, 35 had been given the opportunity for
training by the organization they belonged to while the remaining 11 participated in selffunded training programs. Some interviewees told that the training programs help them
a lot. 65
All these measures, such as participating in training courses, intentionally
64
Interview, Haidian Education Commission, March 2004.
For example, civil servants in the planning sub-division of Ningbo Environmental Protection Bureau
think computer training raises their work efficiency. With computer skills, they can provide environment
quality reports in an efficient and exact way; they can compile the statistics for upper level government
more quickly too.
65
193
upgrading education level, have positively influenced the quality of the civil servants and
their work efficiency.
China’s Civil Service Reform not only motivates the officials to work hard but
also pushes them to adjust the way they exercise discretion. After China’s adoption of the
Civil Service System, clients and the general public play a role in the process of
evaluating civil servants. That is, in conjunction with the evaluation by the superior, a
democratic appraisal meeting (mingzhu pingyi), where colleagues and “the masses”
gather to evaluate the particular civil servant, is held. The term “masses” (qunzong) refers
to representatives of the level immediately below the unit undergoing evaluation. In the
case of Ningbo Environmental Protection Bureau, the masses include staff of district
Environmental Protection Bureaus and managers of city-regulated enterprises. All six of
the bureaus in my study invited clients’ opinions during staff performance appraisal.
Typically, the clients were asked to fill in a questionnaire rating the work performance of
the appraisee on a scale from excellent to incompetent along the four criteria of political
integrity, competence, attitude, and work achievements. The rating was conducted
anonymously. Although some scholars dismiss democratic appraisal meetings as having
little practical effect, 66 in my study, interviewees argued ratings send signals to the
superiors / principals, and influenced civil servants’ behaviors. If many people express
dissatisfaction with the performance of the civil servant under appraisal, the superiors or
the personnel office would begin an investigation. 67 Such an investigation implied
66
Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang, “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,” Comparative
Politics Vol. 31, No.2 (1999), p. 174. They dismiss democratic appraisal meetings as having little practical
effect.
67
Interview, Personnel Office of Haidian Education Commission, March 2004.
194
warning to the civil servant and put negative influence on his career advancement. Given
clients’ opinions gradually caught leaders’ attention, civil servants accordingly changed
their attitudes towards the clients and the general public.
Conclusion
The results of the empirical study are consistent with the hypotheses of level one
raised in chapter 3. In particular, statistics indicate that the cadre corps have been
successfully modernized through China’s Civil Service Reforms in the sense that the
local officials are now better educated and younger. Moreover, case studies of local
implementation of China’s Civil Service Reform indicate that to a large extent, the formal
rules and regulations are adopted and implemented by various local governments.
Therefore, the local civil servants are better trained in the daily management of the local
governments. Civil servants under China’s Civil Service System put more conscious
effort in their work and adjust the way they treat their clients.
195
Chapter 6 Control of the Bureaucracy, Public Service Provision
and Citizen Satisfaction
This dissertation views China’s Civil Service System not only as a means
designed to improve government efficiency, but also as an instrument for the CCP to
control the government and for the central government to control the local bureaucrats.1
In chapter 5, I have already shown that local implementation of China’s Civil Service
System to a large extent motivated government employees to improve performance. In
this chapter I will examine whether the implementation of China’s Civil Service System
has helped the central leadership strengthen control over local bureaucrats.
Although some personnel power devolved to local governments during the reform
era, the central leadership remains the authority to appoint and dismiss local leaders.
Similarly, the local leaders exercise tight control through appointment and dismissal over
their immediate subordinates. This tight control repeated itself along the Chinese
hierarchy. A great deal of literature has argued that the Chinese Communist Party is
capable of great institutional adaptability and that the central leadership’s capacity to
control and monitor lower level agents has increased in China.2 I agree with this. This
1
The concept of “control of the bureaucracy” in Chinese politics refers to the CCP controlling the
government and the central government controlling the local bureaucrats. For similar arguments, see Kjeld
Erik Brodsgaard, “China’s Cadres and Cadre Management System,” in Wang Guangwu and Zheng
Yongnian (eds.), Damage Control: the Chinese Communist Party under the Jiang Zemin Era (Singapore:
Eastern Universities Press, 2003), p.209. His sentence: “cadre management is an instrument used by the
Chinese leadership to maintain control over the political and administrative system”.
2
John P. Burns, “The People’s Republic of China at 50: National Political Reform,” The China Quarterly,
No. 159 (1999), pp. 580-594; Maria Edin, “State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre
Management from A Township Perspective,” The China Quarterly, No. 173 (2003), pp. 35-52; Yasheng
Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China: the Political Economy of Central-Local Relations
during the Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
196
chapter first reviews and analyzes how upper levels of the Party-state have strengthened
their political control over lower level bureaucrats through appointment, promotion and
rotation and so on.3 Second, this chapter shows that under strong central control, local
governments do improve their performance in providing and delivering public service.
The manifestations include statistical data and case study of public service provision and
delivery. Third, another important manifestation of strengthened control of the
bureaucracy is the increased level of citizen satisfaction with government performance.
The control of the bureaucracy being strengthened implies local bureaucrats will work for
the best interest of central leaders. The best interest of central leaders lies in regaining
legitimacy and public support. Given that citizens would support the authority when they
receive better public service and consequently feel satisfied with government
performance, it is in the central leaders’ interest to improve public service provision and
thus the citizens’ evaluation on government performance. Accordingly local bureaucrats
pursuing these goals will manifest in better provision and delivery of public services and
an increased level of citizen satisfaction with government performance.
In this
connection, I argue the improved local government performance and increased citizen
satisfaction are the main outcomes of China’s Civil Service Reform.
In the past two decades, the Chinese leadership has made a considerable effort to
build formal mechanisms in order to strengthen the CCP’s control over the bureaucracy
and the central government’s control over local bureaucrats. In this process, the Chinese
3
The central leadership in China adopts and applies in practice a series of measures. The Civil Service
System is one of the major components of this series of measures. My review will focus on the Civil
Service System package and related administrative monitoring measures. Some other control mechanisms
will also be covered in very broad and slight brushes for the comprehensive investigation of control of the
bureaucracy in China.
197
leadership has appeared to be a very strategic principal who successfully engineers
/maneuvers the agents’ behavior. She has made full use of her supreme position in the
political system and employed all sorts of tactics to achieve her goals. In particular, the
central leadership has employed two strategies (the devolution of some personnel power
and reassertion of control) simultaneously and achieved success to a large extent.
Control of the Bureaucracy
Decentralization of Personnel Management
To tailor personnel management to the more decentralized economy, and to
induce more investment in human capital from local governments, the central leadership
has to decentralize some personnel power. One major illustration is that leadership
changed the two-level down cadre management system to a one-level down system. Prior
to 1983, the central party authorities (formally the Central Party Committee and
Organization Department) were responsible for cadre management at the next two lower
levels. Thus, for central government posts, the central committee was in charge of
ministerial and bureau-level officials; as for local government posts, the central
committee was in charge of provincial and their bureau-level officials and prefectural
officials. The 1983-1984 reforms delegated bureau-level appointments to ministries and
provinces. That is, under a one-level down system, the central Organization Department
manages ministerial and provincial officials; bureau-level officials within ministries and
provinces are managed by the ministerial party group or by the provincial party
committee.
198
As a result of this change, the party center has, as of 1984, been directly
responsible for the appointment and removal of 7,000 cadres, a reduction of some 6,000
from the previous system. 4 Personnel power was further decentralized in the 1990s.
Burns estimates the central Nomenklatura positions numbered around 4,100 as of 1990.5
Another critical illustration is the establishment of the Ministry of Personnel in
March 1988. After its establishment, the CCP Central Committee and Organization
Department delegated some personnel power to the Ministry of Personnel. The Ministry
of Personnel was set up to implement China’s Civil Service Reform and to manage the
civil service. In specific, it takes charge of revising the drafts of the regulations,
experiments with the designs, consults with the Organization Department, and holds
conferences on the Civil Service System and so on.
All these changes at the first glance seem that the CCP gave away substantial
personnel power to government (especially to the Ministry of Personnel) and the upper
level Party-state (particularly the central leadership) delegated certain personnel power to
lower levels of the Party-state. However, we should see the central leadership giving
away some personnel power as a deliberate tactic to provide local levels of Party and
government and local bureaucrats incentives as well as necessary means to fulfill the
tasks that the central leadership cannot handle alone.
4
See Yasheng Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China: the Political Economy of Central-Local
Relations during the Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 92-93.
5
See John P. Burns, “Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: the 1990
Nomenklatura,” The China Quarterly, No. 138 (1994), pp. 458–491.
199
First, two-level down management proved to be a heavy work burden for the
central leadership. Too much power had been concentrated at the top and the number of
cadres was too large for the party center to handle. Leadership claimed that the central
party officials were too involved in detailed personnel decisions, leaving little time for
long-term policy planning and the formulation of principles.6 Second, in the two-level
down management system, for one particular hierarchical level in the middle, two legal
superiors could be in charge of its personnel matters. This overlapping situation not only
caused conflict of interests, but also conflict of instructions. For example, for a bureau in
a prefecture, both the provincial and the prefecture leaders could claim personnel power.
It was possible that the instructions from the leaders conflicted with each other. Third,
due to the over-centralization of personnel power, local governments lacked the
incentives and autonomy to invest in their own human capital (for example, provide
training to their staff).
Devolution of power relieved the central leadership from a heavy personnel
management burden on the one hand, and on the other hand motivated the local
governments to manage their immediate subordinates and to some extent invest in their
human capital. The rationale of decentralization of personnel management was that by
gaining more authority, the local level party committees and governments would take
initiatives to recruit more young and capable employees who could best promote local
economic development.
6
Yasheng Huang, op. cit., pp. 94-96.
200
Reassert Control 1: Components of China’s Civil Service System
While decentralizing some personnel power to motivate local governments and
local bureaucrats, almost simultaneously, the central leadership applied a series of other
administrative measures to reassert control over local governments and local bureaucrats.
I will first analyze China’s Civil Service System components, and then related
administrative monitoring measures and then some other control mechanisms.
The 1993 Provisional Regulations on State Civil Servants consisted of eighteen
chapters of eighty-eight articles. The regulations were comprehensive in their scope,
covering all major areas of personnel administration. In major staffing procedures, such
as appointment and promotion, the Party exercises considerable control. The 1993
Provisional Regulations did not explicitly mention the role of the CCP in civil service
management;7 the Ministry of Personnel appeared to play the principle role. However,
the 1993 Provisional Regulations gave considerable power to “agencies in charge of
appointments and removals” in every critical personnel area, including recruitment and
promotion, performance appraisal, rewards and punishments, and discipline. Under the
rules of the Nomenklatura, real authority to manage appointments and removals for all
leading positions rests either with party committee organizations departments or with
party core groups within the government agencies. Thus, the 1993 Provisional
Regulations preserved the Party’s authority over the new civil service.8
7
The regulations, named The 1995 Temporary Regulations on Selection and Appointment of Party and
Government Leading Cadres, explicitly mentioned that the Party should control and manage the cadres.
8
See John P. Burns and Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Editors’ Introduction,” in Chinese Law and Government
Vol.23, No.4 (1990), pp. 1-5.
201
Besides appointment and promotion, another critical initiative in China’s Civil
Service System package that can strengthen control over the bureaucracy is exchange and
rotation of civil servants. As an instrument controlling the bureaucracy, the rotation and
exchange program has been widely studied.9 Under the rotation and exchange program,
local officials are regularly rotated among equally-ranked positions and across different
geographical areas. These practices have become institutionalized as a key ingredient of
the Chinese personnel management system since the 1990s. In 1996, the Ministry of
Personnel issued the Provisional Regulations of the State Civil Servant Position Rotation
to regulate this part of the reform. Article 2 and 4 state that officials in leading positions
in government departments are obliged to participate in position rotation every five
years. 10 Non-leading officials charged with the following duties are also obliged to
participate in position rotation: personnel, finance, material management, issue of
certificates and license, and approval of fund appropriations and investment projects.11 In
exchange practice, those who have worked in the same locality or department for ten
years should change positions with their counterparts in other localities. The central
leadership formalized the cadre exchange system with Provisional Regulations on
Exchanging Leading Party and Government Cadres in 1999. These regulations include
9
See Naughton and Yang, Holding China Together: Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng
Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Maria Edin, “State Capacity and Local Agent Control
in China: CCP Cadre Management from A Township Perspective,” The China Quarterly, No. 173 (2003),
pp. 35-52.
10
See Guojia gongwuyan zhiwei lunhuan zhanxing tiaoli [Provisional Regulations of the State Civil
Servant Position Rotation], in Zhongguo renshi bao [Chinese Personnel Post] 13August 1996, p. 1.
11
See FBIS, “National Meeting on Improving the Civil Service System,” (text) Beijing Xinhua Domestic
Service in Chinese (18 July 1999) Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily
Report – China, 5 August 1999 (PrEx. 7.10: FBIS-CHI-99-0803).
202
detailed rules of exchanges and stipulate that the exchanges are targeted at cadres with
promotion prospects so that they may broaden their experience.12
In practice, the State Council chose 20 civil servants (28%) at directorate level
and 57 (42%) at division level to participate in rotation in 1994. In 1996, the figures rose
to 32 civil servants (42.6%) at directorate level and 78 (58.6%) at division level.13 On
local levels, in 1996, 52,000 civil servants participated in job rotation across the country.
In 1999, the number rose to 145,000.14 From 1996 to 2003, more than 900,000 people
nationwide rotated and exchanged their positions.15
From the principal-agent perspective, rotation and exchange programs result in
several benefits and hence help the central leadership strengthen control over the
bureaucracy. First, rotation can curb the local deviation from central instructions. If an
official expects ex ante that he will be rotated to another position, his incentive to abide
by the upper level leaders is strengthened. This is because he will gain little in overaggressively pursuing the interests associated with his current position given that he will
leave shortly. By the same logic, since the rotation has a fixed term, if one official is
12
The aims are first, to broaden the experience and vision of corps members so as to strengthen their
capacity, and second, to ameliorate organizational corruption. See Songtao Xu, Guojia gongwuyuan zhidu
jiaocheng [Text on the State Civil Service System] (Beijing: China Personnel Press, 1994).
13
See “Renshibu tuixing gongwuyuan zhidu youshang xin taijie” [A Breakthrough of the Ministry of
Personnel in the Implementation of Civil Service System], in Zhongguo renshi bao [Chinese Personnel
Post], 16 April 1996, p.1.
14
See “Woguo gongwuyuan lungang youxiao cujin lianzheng jianshe” [Our Country’s Civil Service
Rotation can Efficiently Promote Administrative Cleanness], Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese,
16 August 2000, http://www.xinhuanet.com
15
Zhang Bolin, Tuijin ganbu renshi gongzuo kexuehua, minzhuhua, zhiduhau de zhongda jucuo [Great
Measures to Make Cadre Personnel System more Scientific, Democratic and Institutionalized:
Understanding and Implementing Civil Service Law of PRC]. Can be retrieved from website,
http://www.mop.gov.cn/Desktop.aspx?PATH=rsbww/sy/xxll&Gid=36796243-b120-477e-9c3ebcab0545fd88&Tid=Cms_Info, on 7 April 2006.
203
rotated to a new post, he will know ex ante that when this rotation ends, he will go to
another post. Thus he will not over-aggressively pursue the interests associated with this
new post at the expense of deviating from the upper leaders’ instructions. Moreover, the
rotators will be motivated to cooperate with other agencies since they may head other
agencies in the future.
Second, rotation and exchange programs make available some information
regarding local implementation to the central leadership that would be otherwise
unavailable. This information is uncovered by the successors. No matter how
successfully an official can hide his practices from his superior, he cannot hide them from
his successor. Since the successor will on a daily basis repeat his predecessor’s function,
any hidden information will gradually be revealed. From the successor’s perspective, he
will have the motivation to release this information to the leaders, since his performance
evaluation will be based on the gap between the end condition and the beginning
condition of his term. If he can change a poor beginning point to a successful end point
(at least indicate such in his own work report), he may gain a promotion or some other
rewards. In this connection, rotation and exchange programs help the central leadership
get some valuable ex post information about the local implementation of central policy.
Given that China has a comprehensive personnel dossier system, this information will
help the center single out real performers.
Third, rotation and exchange programs help to strengthen the control of the
bureaucracy through reducing the length of tenure of local officials. Scholars have found
204
that through rotation programs, the central government has strategically accelerated elite
turnover at the local level, hence informally reducing the length of tenure of local
officials. 16 Landry shows turnover among Chinese local cadres is extremely high and
that central government has successfully reduced the length of tenure of municipal
officials. Among mayors, the average length of tenure has been steadily shrinking from
an average of 3.2 years in 1990 to a mere 2.5 years by 2001. Few mayors serve a full
term; in 1990, 42 had served more than five years in the same city, against only 10 in
2002.17 Obviously, the shorter the tenure is, the greater the number of opportunities to
appoint replacements. Given that each re-appointment is subject to both review and
authorization by the relevant organization department, a greater number of opportunities
to replace officials must enhance the political control of organization departments and
party committees.
The practice of avoidance in China’s Civil Service Reform also helps the central
leadership to constrain local officials’ exercising discretion. The avoidance system
includes the avoidance of kinship and avoidance of native place. According to Article 61
in Chapter 12 in 1993 Provisional Regulations, the kinship avoidance is applicable to
spouses, lineal blood relations, and collateral relatives (blood or marriage) within three
generations. If any two officials are related through the above-mentioned ties, they should
not work in the same work unit if both directly report to the same leaders or if one is a
direct superior or subordinate of the other. If one person is a leader in an agency, the
16
See Yasheng Huang, op. cit.; David D. Li, “Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy,” American
Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (1998), p. 394.
17
See Pierre F. Landry, “Informal Responses to Formal Decentralization in China,” paper presented at the
annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 2004, p. 11.
205
other person so related to him should not engage in such work as personnel, discipline
inspection, auditing or financial affairs in the same unit. According to Article 63 in
Chapter 12, native place avoidance requires that a person should not hold a county
magistrate (city mayor) or party secretary position in his or her native place. County
magistrates and party secretaries who are elected to their position in their native place
should be relocated after the initial term expires. The avoidance system has been adopted
in China since the times of imperial rulers in order to avoid nepotism and to prevent local
officials from developing a local power network. The avoidance system has been
implemented broadly in local China since the 1990s. From 1996 to 2003, more than
30,000 people changed their positions in line with the avoidance regulations. 18 The
avoidance system serves to reduce the tendency of local officials to form entrenched
interests with their relatives or natives; it therefore guarantees the commitment of local
officials in the faithful implementation of central policies.
Reassert Control 2: Administrative Monitoring Related to China’s Civil Service
System19
For the Chinese leadership, it is especially important to keep control over the
leading cadres, who form the backbone of the system. Leading cadres are defined as
18
See Zhang Bolin, op. cit.
This section focuses on measures managing and controlling the leading cadres. These administrative
monitoring measures are related to China’s Civil Service Reform since they have overlapping areas with
the package of China’s Civil Service System. China’s Civil Service System manages all the employees in
governments, including leading members and non-leading members. Measures reviewed in this section will
focus only on leading members, no matter whether they are in government or in other political and
administrative organs, such as Party, People’s Congress, and Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference.
19
206
cadres at county (division) level and above.20 Numbering 508,025, they constitute only
about 8% of cadre corps in government organs.21 The most important leading cadres are
those at the ministerial /provincial level and above. In 1998, they numbered only 2,562.22
They are controlled by the Central Committee’s Nomenklatura. 92% (or 466,355) of the
leading cadres are cadres working at provincial level and below such as local city and
county party secretaries. And only 34,221 of the leading cadres work in the central organs
in Beijing.23 Given that leading cadres hold all the important positions within the political
and administrative system and their number is large, controlling leading cadres
constitutes one of the major parts of the central leadership’s agenda.
1. Measures on Appointment and Selection
In February 1995, the Central Committee issued the Temporary Regulations on
Selection and Appointment of Party and Government Leading Cadres. 24 This document
indicates the central leadership’s intention to strengthen the control over leading cadre
management and its emphasis on candidates’ work performance and ability. This
document specifies general principles, basic requirements, basic procedures, and
20
According to the 1995 Temporary Regulations, leading cadres refer to “leading members of departments
of the Central Committee of the CCP, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the State
Council, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate; and leading
members of the party committees, standing committees of People’s Congresses, governments, political
consultative conferences, commissions for discipline inspection, courts, procuratorates and their
departments at the county level and above.” See 1995 Temporary Regulations on Selection and
Appointment of Party and Government Leading Cadres, article 4 in chapter 1: general principles.
21
For detailed statistics, see Zhonggong Zhongyang Zuzhibu, Zhonggong Dangshi Yangjiushi, and
Zhongyang Dang’an guan, Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao, 1921-1997, fujuan 1 [Materials on the
Organizational History of China’s Communist Party, 1921-1997. Appendix volume 1] (Beijing: Zhongyang
Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1998), p. 1357. As cited by Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, “China’s Cadres and Cadre
Management System,” op. cit.
22
Ibid., p.1357.
23
Ibid., p.1357.
24
For translations and details of this document, see Zhiyue Bo, “Selection and Appointment of Leading
Cadres in Post-Deng China,” Chinese Law and Government, Vol.32, No. 1 (1999), pp. 45-61.
207
disciplines regarding leading cadres’ appointment, promotion, demotion, resignation,
rotation, exchange, and avoidance. In particular, the document emphasizes that when
selecting and appointing leading cadres in China it is important to follow a number of
basic principles. These principles include some meritocratic principles, such as openness,
competition, and selecting the best; more importantly, they stress that the Party should
control and manage the cadres. For example, the first three of the six general principles
are: 1). the Party controls the cadres. 2). cadres must have both political integrity and
professional competence and be appointed on their merits. 3). the selection and
appointment should emphasize candidates’ achievements and should involve some mass
approbation (see Article 2 in Chapter 1: general principles). The principle of the Party
controlling cadres is listed as the first principle in selecting and appointing party and
government leading cadres. It is true that the Party still controls cadres in both party and
government organs in China.
Besides emphasizing the Party’s dominant role in leading cadre management, the
regulations also aim to raise the education level of leading cadres. The regulations
explicitly prescribe that all leading cadres in party and government organizations must
meet two educational criteria: 1). they must have some university-level education. 2).
they must undergo at least three months of training in a party school or an institute of
administration (xingzheng xueyuan). The regulations imply a positive correlation between
rank and the level of formal education. This helps the central leadership employ control
over leading cadres.
208
2. Leading Cadres Responsibility System
The Leading Cadres Responsibility System is a powerful instrument applied by
upper level Party-state to ensure control over lower level Party-state and their leading
officials through a performance check system. Superiors set targets at the beginning and
evaluate subordinates’ performance at the end of a period, and accordingly give rewards
and punishments. The origin of the Leading Cadres Responsibility System dates back to
1979 when the Chinese leadership established a cadre evaluation system (ganbu kaohe).
Over the years, there has been an effort to institutionalize this form of performance check
by making it a regular and systematic operation. The Organization Department at first
only delineated a vague requirement for cadre evaluations; thereafter it defined the
content and procedure of the process in an increasingly detailed manner.25 Gradually, the
evaluation methods to determine performance of leading cadres in local party and
government organs aggregated into the Leading Cadres Responsibility System.
In the Leading Cadres Responsibility System, the targets given to local party and
government leaders by the central government gradually become comprehensive and
concrete, meaning the performance criteria can be adjusted and new ones added in
response to changing circumstances. The Organization Department of the CCP
established official guidelines for the annual evaluation (kaohe) of local party and
government leading cadres in 1988, which contained very specific performance criteria,
such as industrial output, output of township-run and village-run enterprises, taxes and
25
For more details of the evolution process of the cadre evaluation system, see Yasheng Huang,
“Administrative Monitoring in China,” The China Quarterly No. 143 (1995), p. 830; Yasheng Huang,
Inflation and Investment Controls in China: the Political Economy of Central-Local Relations during the
Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 95.
209
profits remitted. 26 As discussed in chapter 3, besides the striking emphasis on local
economic development, the central leadership is also concerned about other noneconomic policies and gradually puts considerable weight in measuring local
performance in these fields. For example, family planning, environmental protection,
education and social order are all important criteria that were given priority.
Besides indicating performance criteria and quantifying targets, the Leading
Cadres Responsibility System also spells out evaluation procedures through performance
contracts (zerenzhuang). The performance contracts specify the rewards or penalties that
accompany levels of performance. To increase the likelihood that assigned tasks are
carried out, a higher government level typically withholds a substantial portion (as much
as 15%) of its subordinates’ compensation. Allocating these funds is based solely on
one’s performance evaluation. Thus, local leaders who do poorly might lose out to their
more successful peers. Moreover, officials at higher levels sometimes award generous
bonuses to those who attain unusually tough targets. Sometimes simply meeting a target
could bring a substantial payoff.27
The Leading Cadres Responsibility System has several benefits. First, the central
government, by setting and adjusting the performance criteria, can send a clear message
to local agents about work priorities, and give them a good sense of how to fulfill the
26
Organization Department, “Guanyu shixing difang dangzheng lingdao ganbu niandu gongzuo kaohe
zhidu de tongzhi” [Notice Regarding Implementation of the Annual Job Evaluation System for Leading
Cadres of Local Party and Government Organs] in Zhongguo renshi nianjian [China Personnel Yearbook]
(Beijing: China Personnel Press, 1992). As cited in Edin op. cit., p. 38. Also cited in Susan H. Whiting,
Power and Wealth in Rural China: the Political Economy of Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), pp. 102-103.
27
See Kevin J. O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,” Comparative
Politics Vol. 31, No. 2 (1999), p. 173. As cited in Edin op. cit., p. 38.
210
expectations of the central leadership and be rewarded. Second, the evaluations of local
cadres also provide vital information to the central leadership about local performance.
Based on the information, the central leadership rewards the excellent and competent
local officials and demotes the incompetent ones. Third, given that under such a system
local cadres’ personal income as well as political promotion are tied to their work
performance (particularly in economic terms), the local cadres should rationally input
more effort in their work. Scholars have extensively studied the effectiveness of the
Leading Cadres Responsibility System. For example, Edin finds this system has been
very useful for the central government to monitor and control local agents. She suggests
that the Chinese Party-state has the capacity to be selectively effective, that is, to
implement its priority policies, and to control its key local leaders strategically in
important areas.28
Reassert Control 3: Other Monitoring Mechanisms
By decentralizing personnel power, signing performance contracts and practicing
competitive appointment and promotion, the central leadership has constructed an
incentive structure that can induce compliance from local agents. Moreover, practices of
rotation and exchange programs in China’s Civil Service System and other related
administrative monitoring measures to a large extent reveal information on local agents’
behaviors. Besides the above mentioned administrative monitoring measures, there are
28
Maria Edin, “State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from A
Township Perspective,” The China Quarterly No. 173 (2003), pp. 35-52.
211
other monitoring mechanisms. Are they as effective as the measures mentioned above in
helping the central leadership to reassert control?
1. Police Patrolling
The central government can dispatch working groups to some localities to inspect
local work, which is the “police patrol” inspection as McCubbins and Schwartz call it
(see discussion in chapter 2). However, it is not easy for the central work groups to dig
out the problems since local officials are in informational advantageous positions.
Moreover, the extensive social networks common among local officials also increase the
difficulty of investigation if multiple officials are involved. Therefore, there is no
conclusion on how effective the police patrol is.
2. Petition System
The central government can also ask a third party who are affected by the
behaviors of local agents, i.e. local citizens or corporations, to report any illicit local
practice. This is the “fire alarm” in McCubbins and Schwartz’s words (as discussed in
chapter 2). A “fire alarm” with Chinese characteristics is the petition system. At various
levels of governments there are petition departments that deal with complaints from
citizens, the State Petition Bureau (guojia xinfang ju) at the central level and local
petition bureaus (difang xinfang ju) in the provinces and municipalities. Besides, many
government organs above the county level also have petition offices (xinfang
bangongshi). The function of these petition departments is to receive complaints from
212
citizens about local governments and their bureaus. Once the petition bureaus or offices
accept the complaints, they investigate the cases and try to address the complaints.29
This petition system serves as a channel of information to facilitate the upper
level government to monitor the lower levels. Petition has been utilized by a large
number of people and recently, the number of petitions has continued to increase.
However, in face of the tremendous amount of complaints from citizens, the small
number of officials and the extremely limited power of the central and local petition
departments make the petition system rather ineffective and unable to address most of the
grievances brought up by petitioners. I can only say that petitioning provides necessary
information to higher levels of Party-state but is of course not by itself decisive for
government action.
3. Public Media
With the development of the market economy, more and more commercial
newspapers and magazines as well as internet media sources are emerging in China.
Public media increasingly plays a role in monitoring the behaviors of local governments.
Driven by commercial interests, the media sources pursue to expose the illicit
government practices enthusiastically.30 Public media’s exposing illicit local behaviors
serves as a useful channel for the central government to detect local governments’
29
See Laura M. Luehrmann, “Facing Citizen Complaints in China, 1951-1996”, Asian Survey Vol. 43, No.
5 (2003), pp. 845-866.
30
However, the exposure of government misfeasance by most commercial media sources is limited to
below the provincial level. Stories that depict a negative image of the provincial or central government are
usually blocked by the provincial or central authorities and can hardly reach the public. But stories about
lower-level governments (municipal, county, and township levels) are easier to publish. Even if they are
blocked in the localities where the governments are concerned, they can still be published in media sources
in other localities.
213
misconducts. Sometimes, the central government has indirectly encouraged exposure of
corruption at lower levels, tolerating a degree of media criticism as a safety valve.31 In
this sense, the media can serve as a third party that monitors the local agents on behalf of
the central government, if the central government utilizes this resource properly.
4. Ideological Persuasion
In communist and authoritarian regimes, an additional mechanism for the central
leadership to ensure control over local bureaucrats is ideological persuasion. It refers to
the leadership’s capacity to instill and maintain formal norms among officials. In China,
ideological persuasion has served as a control tool since the establishment of the PRC. It
is embodied in the concepts of “red” and “virtue” (de). At times, it meant the political and
moral credentials of the cadres were more important than their professional and technical
abilities. However, the ideological persuasion was severely discredited during the
Cultural Revolution. A further de-ideologisation was witnessed during Deng’s era. Deng
favored pragmatism and empirical work and downgraded lofty ideological debates and
campaigns. This trend has led to a weakening of party legitimacy. 32
Unlike Deng, Jiang Zemin focused on developing a stronger ideological
orientation for the Party and its cadres. He introduced the “three talks” (san jiang)
campaign in 1999 and “three represents” (sange daibiao) in 2000. Soon after, the “three
represents” campaign formed the core of the CCP’s current propaganda work.
31
“China’s Media: Please Adjust Your Set,” The Economist, 20 November 2004, p. 64.
John P. Burns, “The People’s Republic of China at 50: National Political Reform,” The China Quarterly,
No. 159 (1999), pp. 580-594.
32
214
In this new round of applying ideological persuasion as a control mechanism, the
Organization Department’s role in cadre management is again increasing. The
Organization Department of the Central Committee has always been an important
department in the communist political system.33 At the establishment of the Ministry of
Personnel in 1988, the Organization Department decentralized some personnel power
with regard to the management of government personnel to the Ministry of Personnel.
From 1998 this process was reversed. The Ministry of Personnel had to shift most of its
management functions back to the Party, in particular to the Organization
Department.34Notably, the Organization Department regained its appointment authority
of ju-level leaders at the central level. In March 1999 Jiang Zemin’s right-hand man Zeng
Qinghong was appointed to this important position. During his term, he has managed to
turn the Organization Department into a major platform for strengthening the role of the
Party in organizational as well as ideological work.
Reassert Control 4: A Summary
In the above sections, I have described and analyzed how the central leadership
has tried to reassert control over the bureaucracy over the past two decades. How can the
central leadership strengthen control of the bureaucracy after devolving some personnel
power to the government and local bureaucrats? This can be done because, in principalagent logic, the central leadership and the local governments are not locked in a zero-sum
game. Neither a reduction in formal power nor central relaxation of control in certain
33
See Thomas Kampen, “The CCP’s Central Committee Departments (1921-1991): A Study of Their
Evolution,” China Report, Vol.29, No. 3 (1993), pp. 299-317.
34
See Guowuyuan jigou gaige gailan [General Survey of the Institutional Reform of the State Council], in
Zhoukan bianjibu (ed.), “Liao wang” (Beijing: Xinhua renmin chubanshe, 1998), pp.85-92.
215
areas represents a sign of diminishing central control. On the contrary, with more aligned
interests, the redistribution of power among the central and local governments has
increased local incentive to comply and increased the central government’s ability to
control.
The control mechanisms can be roughly grouped into three categories. The first
category includes components of China’s Civil Service System; the second category
includes related personnel management mechanisms that are not wholly covered by
China’s Civil Service System package, such as management measures of Party-state
leading cadres; the third category includes measures not related to personnel management,
such as the citizen petition system and public media. Why should I include the third
category? As we all know, controlling the bureaucracy is a complex political issue, and
many factors must have been at work simultaneously during this process to achieve the
objectives. To show the analytical power of the principal-agent framework in deciphering
Chinese politics, I have to cover almost all major control mechanisms that central
leadership applied, some of which can not be included in China’s Civil Service System
package. Preliminary assessments on the effectiveness of these mechanisms show that
only through all these efforts can the central leadership reassert control over the
bureaucracy and local bureaucrats. The answer to my research question—whether the
implementation of China’s Civil Service System helps the central leadership in
reasserting control—is embedded in the above statement.
216
The success of the control of the bureaucracy lies in the capacity of the central
leadership to ensure that the substantive decisions and behaviors of local governments
remain consistent with Beijing’s broad policy principles. Of course, it is impossible to
check the daily behaviors of local governments in China’s thousands of localities. I argue
the ultimate test of the control of the bureaucracy is not whether specific local decisions
are explicitly cleared by the central leadership, but whether local decisions and actions
conform in significant ways to the broad requirements set by the central leadership. In
following sections, I will first analyze local governments’ behavior and performance in
providing and delivering public services. The objective statistics and a detailed case study
of one public service - environmental protection provision pattern - constitute important
empirical tests of the central government’s ability to set policy targets and have them
implemented at local levels. Finally, findings of citizen satisfaction surveys are presented.
High levels of citizen satisfaction with local government performance in providing two
public services—environmental protection and basic education—indicate that the
performance of local governments improved.
Public Service Provision
I collect both objective data and perception data to measure the performance of
the three cities in providing and delivering public services. For environmental
performance, I mainly rely on perception data; while for educational performance, I
mainly rely on objective data. This is because environmental policy is technology-
217
oriented in nature. Listing the statistics on an environmental indicator, such as SO2 or
CO2, does not make sense to readers. So I mainly rely on the perceptions of officials and
clients to grasp the pattern change of governments’ efforts in protecting the environment.
Educational policy involves more actors than environmental policy, including educational
bureaus, schools, teachers, parents, and students and so on. It is difficult to aggregate all
these actors’ perceptions and to figure out the pattern change. So I mainly rely on
objective statistics.35
Statistics on Educational Performance
First, I use the promotion rates from primary to secondary school and from junior
secondary to senior secondary school to measure the educational performance of the three
cities. In the two cities for which I have data (Beijing and Ningbo), promotion rates
remained high and steady for primary to secondary in Beijing and improved in Ningbo,
and improved for junior secondary to senior secondary in both cities from 1995 to 2000
(see Table 6.1).
Table 6.1
Educational Performance in Terms of
Promotion Rates, 1995-2000 (Percent)
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
From Primary to Junior Middle
National
Beijing
Ningbo
90.8
99.29
92.6
99.25
99.37
93.7
98.63
98.95
94.3
98.68
99.57
94.4
98.32
100.0
35
From Junior to Senior Middle
National
Beijing
Ningbo
48.3
56.84
48.8
91.09
65.18
51.5
92.32
67.82
50.7
92.24
68.58
49.5
94.70
78.81
The objective statistics are mainly based on Beijing city since I cannot find the relevant statistics of
Haidian district alone.
218
2000
94.9
98.99
100.0
51.2
94.83
82.35
Sources: Beijing Municipal Education Bureau Website http://www.bjedu.gov.cn/
zlzx/jiaoyutongjifenxi-2.htm (June 6, 2002) and http://www.bjedu.gov.cn/ zlzx/jjyw.htm
(June 6, 2002); and Ningbo Statistics Bureau, Ningbo’s Achievements in the Ninth FiveYear Plan [Dakuayue – Ningbo jiuwu chengjiu] (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2001), p.
315.
Although I do not have similar outcomes data for Changchun, I do have indicators
of the relative investment in education in the three cities. While not performance data,
these data indicate the relative priority that officials in the three cities placed on education.
The data show that although there was some variation, from 1997 to 2000 government
investment in education increased in all three cities (see Table 6.2). Moreover, again with
some variation, student-teacher ratios of the three cities decreased from 1995 to 2000.
Student-teacher ratio is an indicator of resource endowment. The decrease of the ratios
implied that on an average level, the amount of instruction a student received from
teachers increased. This again indicates investment in education improved in all three
cities (see Table 6.3).
Table 6.2
Education Expenditure per Capita, 1997-2000 (unit: RMB yuan)
Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
Beijing
Changchun
Ningbo
education
expenditure
per capita
(A)
GDP
per
capita
(B)
Ratio of
A to B
education
expenditure
per capita
(A)
GDP
per
capita
(B)
Ratio of
A to B
education
expenditure
per capita
(A)
GDP
per
capita
(B)
Ratio of
A to B
233
122
257
545
16735
18478
19803
22000
1.39%
0.66%
1.30%
2.48%
132
135
223
154
7959
9062
10261
12381
1.66%
1.49%
2.17%
1.24%
194
246
289
372
16879
18219
19405
21786
1.15%
1.35%
1.49%
1.71%
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics, Urban Statistical Yearbook of China (various
years, 1998-2001) (Beijing: China Statistics Press).
219
Table 6.3
Student-Teacher Ratio, 1995-2000
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Primary School
Beijing Changchun
16.50
18.47
16.10
18.66
15.70
18.81
15.70
18.33
13.70
17.22
12.81
16.88
Ningbo
21.12
21.05
21.18
20.99
20.96
20.46
Middle School
Beijing Changchun
13.60
14.47
13.70
13.80
13.20
13.35
13.20
13.42
13.20
14.59
14.14
16.23
Ningbo
16.76
16.82
15.88
15.15
14.91
15.46
Overall
Beijing
14.95
15.07
14.57
14.57
13.47
13.42
Changchun
16.95
16.81
16.71
16.46
16.25
16.64
Ningbo
19.22
19.17
18.82
18.45
18.26
18.15
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics, Urban Statistical Yearbook of China (various
years, 1996-2001), (Beijing: China Statistics Press); Beijing Municipal Statistics Bureau,
Beijing Statistical Yearbook (various years, 1996-2001), (Beijing: China Statistics Press);
Changchun Statistics Bureau, Changchun Statistical Yearbook (various years, 19962001), (Beijing: China Statistics Press); and Ningbo Statistics Bureau, Ningbo Statistical
Yearbook (various years, 1996-2001), (Beijing: China Statistical Press).
Provision Pattern of Environmental Protection
According to the National Environmental Protection Administration, from 1994 to
1999 the environments of two of the three cities included in this study improved (see
Table 6.4). If, as many apparently believe, the government has a major responsibility for
environmental performance, 36 then I would expect the interviewees to perceive that
bureau performance improved in Ningbo and Changchun. In Beijing, however, the
36
See the survey in Chi Xiaolin and Xu Qinghua (eds.), Zhongguo gongzhong huanjing yizhi diaocha
[Survey of the Public’s Environmental Knowledge] (Beijing: Beijing huanjing kexue chubanshe, 1998);
National Environmental Protection Administration, Quanguo gongzhong huanjing yizhi diaocha baogao
[National Public Environmental Knowledge Survey Report] (Beijing: Zhongguo huanjing kexue
chubanshe, 1999).
220
environment apparently deteriorated during the period. Accordingly I might expect the
interviewees, especially clients who tend to be more critical, to perceive that bureau
performance declined during the period.
Table 6.4
Environmental Performance Scores, 1994 and 1999
Measures
Beijing
1994
83.62 (2)
General
Evaluation
Environment 22.31 (18)
Quality
Pollution
44.01 (3)
Control
1999
79.03 (17)
Changchun
1994
1999
70.88 (27) 79.67 (14)
Ningbo
1994
70.17 (29)
1999
85.33 (3)
20.78 (26)
18.36 (33)
26.03 (10)
20.46 (24)
28.17 (3)
22.58 (9)
35.06 (32)
22.01 (17)
36.89 (28)
22.49 (11)
Note: The lower the score, the worse the performance. The scores are a composite of
from 6 to 10 different indicators. The number in brackets is the rank out of 37 cities in
1994 and 38 cities in 1999.
Source: National Environment Protection Administration, China Environment Yearbook
(various years, 1995-2000), (Beijing: National Environment Protection Administration
Press).
Interestingly, the perception data of the officials and clients indicates that all the
three cities’ performance in providing environmental protection improved. This may be
because the national ranking is for the environment of Beijing city while the survey we
conducted focuses on Haidian district efforts in protecting the environment. Given that
Haidian is only a district under Beijing city jurisdiction, I speculate that officials and
clients were less ready to blame the Haidian district Environmental Protection Bureau for
Beijing’s deteriorating environment.
However, it is not enough to rely only on statistics as proxies of government
performance. To deepen the understanding of government efforts in providing and
221
delivering public services, we should learn from the perceptions of officials and clients.
To collect the perception data, our research project team conducted ninety in-depth
interviews with open-ended questions. Given the perception data is subjective in nature
and broad in scope, only open-ended questions can to a large extent reveal interviewees’
subjective feeling and thus draw out as much information as possible. However, the
perception data in my study is much diversified. I have difficulty presenting them in a
strict statistical way such as through a percentage. Therefore, I try to array the patterns
based on the common points generalized from the interviews. I also provide rich
illustrations to support the arguments.
Case Study 1: Environmental Protection Provision Pattern Improvement
As discussed in chapter 4, studying the pattern changes of public service
provision requires investigating several aspects of the way in which public services have
been provided and been delivered. Better provision and delivery of public service implies
improvements in the quality, quantity, speed and reliability of the service, courtesy of the
government staff who provide it. It also implies that it is easier for clients and citizens to
access the service. After arraying and analyzing the information and data from interviews,
I find some improvements in providing and delivering environmental protection in all
three cities. I will describe and analyze the pattern aspects one by one.
First, environmental protection is a public service for the citizens; high quality of
this service means clean air, no noise and the discharge of waste without harming the
citizens’ health, and so on. Thus, high quality of this service requires the Environmental
222
Protection Bureaus strictly enforce the relevant regulations. Many interviewees point out
their affiliated Environmental Protection Bureaus’ performance in enforcing rules and
regulations has improved.37
Interviewees reflected Ningbo Environmental Protection Bureau strictly enforced
the regulations; sometimes Ningbo’s enforcement requirements were even more
demanding than the requirements of national policy. For example, during the period of
the Ninth Five-Year Plan, the total discharge of SO2 in Ningbo is 147,100 tons. Based on
this, the national requirement for Ningbo’s SO2 discharge during the period of the Tenth
Five-Year Plan was not to exceed 162,000 tons. However, Ningbo city hardened the
requirement itself; that is, they stated discharge during the period of the Tenth Five-Year
Plan should not exceed the discharge of Ninth Five-Year Plan, i.e., 147,100 tons.38
Second, high quality environmental protection not only requires the
Environmental Protection Bureaus enforce regulations strictly, but that they also provide
enough services for enterprises in abating pollution. The interviewees reflected the main
content of environmental officials’ work has changed. Previously the officials only
focused on enforcing the regulations; now they put almost the same weight on providing
service to the clients as enforcing regulations. As one interviewee stated, “Previously,
they mainly focused on issuing fine / administrative penalty to enterprises whose
discharge of waste exceeds the standard level; now they focus more on the instructions to
37
Interview with an environmental protector of an enterprise in Haidian, 5 July 2001; Interview with an
environmental protector of an enterprise in Ningbo, 3 August 2000.
38
Interviews, Ningbo Environmental Protection Bureau Pollution Abatement Division and Ningbo
Environmental Protection Bureau Technology Division, 2 August 2000.
223
the enterprises; they always try to give instant responses and solutions to the problems
enterprises met”. 39
One client explained that Ningbo Environmental Protection Bureau provides
training courses to environmental protectors of the enterprises. As an environmental
protector, he has to take two or three courses every year.40 The fact that Environmental
Protection Bureaus provide such service to their clients was further illustrated by the
interviews of environmental officials. One official said that “training for the ovenoperators of enterprises is one of the public services Haidian Environmental Protection
Bureau provided. The training course is mainly about how to safely operate ovens and to
save energy and protect environment as well. During the initial stage, the participation is
not compulsory for the oven-operators, which lead to the participation rate not very
high—just above 20%. Given the importance of the training course to safe production
and environmental protection, Haidian Environmental Protection Bureau issued local
regulations to make participation of training course for the oven-operators compulsory.
After a long period of safe operation of ovens in Haidian, this special measure received
praises from citizens”.41
Third, the quantity of environmental protection service increased. This quantity
improvement can be illustrated by more frequent inspections and increased financial
input.
One interviewee said that “previously officials of Haidian Environmental
Protection Bureau inspected our enterprise once a month or once every two months, now
39
Interview with an environmental protector of an enterprise in Haidian, 5 July 2001.
Interview with an environmental protector of an enterprise in Ningbo, 3 August 2000.
41
Interview, Haidian Environmental Protection Bureau Law and Regulation Section, 11 June 2001.
40
224
they inspect more frequently, on average level, three times a month. During the
inspections, they answer questions and resolve problems instantly”. 42 A client said
officers of Ningbo Environmental Protection Bureau inspect his enterprise more than
once every month.43 An official of Ningbo Environmental Protection Bureau said in 1999,
Ningbo city’s expenditure on environmental protection was 1.89% of its GDP. He argued
that Ningbo’s expenditure exceeds the national average level, i.e. 1.5% of the GDP.44
Fourth, referring to the reliability of the service, interviewees claimed that most
complaints they raised with Environmental Protection Bureaus got addressed. Thus, they
are likely to contact Environmental Protection Bureaus when confronting problems. In
my study, the complaints indicate that citizens trust Environmental Protection Bureaus.45
An interviewee told me her personal experience in raising complaints to Haidian
Environmental Protection Bureau.
The interviewee is the party secretary of an Urban
Residential Committee. While a building was being constructed near their residence,
some residents found the quality of drinking water degraded (having a strange smell).
The interviewee complained to Haidian Environmental Protection Bureau. The problem
was resolved in one month.46
Another interviewee raised a complaint to Changchun Environmental Protection
Bureau through the environmental protection hotline (12345 in Changchun) regarding the
42
Interview with an environmental protector of an enterprise in Haidian, 5 July 2001.
Interview with an environmental protector of an enterprise in Ningbo, 3 August 2000.
44
Interview, Ningbo Environmental Protection Bureau Technology Division, 2 August 2000.
45
There are debates on the signaling function of complaints. Do more complaints indicate poor government
performance or more trust of citizens in government? In my study, interviewees argue that citizens in China
raise complaints to government due to trust.
46
Interview, an Urban Residential Committee in Haidian, 23 August 2001.
43
225
poor hygiene of public restrooms in his neighborhood. The problem was resolved shortly
after Changchun Environmental Protection Bureau criticized and issued a fine to the
relevant Urban Residential Committee which was in charge of this restroom’s hygiene.47
Fifth, in terms of speed of service provision and delivery, Environmental
Protection Bureaus address complaints from citizens in a timely manner. For example,
officials of Haidian Environmental Protection Bureau promise to respond to every
complaint raised with them, and with complaints about noise, they promise to take action
or give a response within 24 hours. As one interviewee said, “Previously I thought most
of the complaints could not get any response. Now even some problems can not be
addressed immediately, they explain instantly; and give a plan about the measures that
would be taken within a fixed period”.48 Indeed, one interviewee made a complaint to
the Ningbo Environmental Protection Bureau regarding the noise in the neighborhood,
and officials resolved the problem that same day.49
Sixth, the attitude of officials to their clients and citizens is a major aspect of
public service provision. Interviewees in general believe the attitude of officials of
Environmental Protection Bureaus has become more polite and appropriate. Haidian
Environmental Protection Bureau has some special measures to prevent arbitrary
enforcement of regulations. One environmental protector of an enterprise explained that
“once they found some unusual phenomena, they would instantly inform the
environmental protector of that particular enterprise to confirm the situation and make the
47
Interview, an Urban Street Office in Changchun, 23 November 2000.
Interview with an environmental protector of an enterprise in Haidian, 5 July 2001.
49
Interview, an Urban Residential Committee in Ningbo, 3 August 2000.
48
226
records with the presence of the environmental protector”.50 Moreover, the interviewee
said, “Haidian Environmental Protection Bureau transferred the data they collected
regarding to waste-discharge to enterprises regularly. They asked the delegates of
enterprises to confirm and sign. If some disputes arise, they would try to resolve as soon
as possible”. By using this measure, Haidian Environmental Protection Bureau reduced
disputes arising from enforcing regulations.
An interview with a vice-chief of Haidian Environmental Protection Bureau
further emphasized these measures. He said, “When enforcing rules and regulations, such
as issuing fine or recording law-breaking actions, at least two environmental protection
officials are request to present. Haidian Environmental Protection Bureau use this
measure to achieve justice in regulation-enforcement”.51 A client reflected officials of
Ningbo Environmental Protection Bureau have discipline: “They never have dinner with
the entrepreneur,” he said.52
Seventh, better provision of public service implies the service becomes easier for
citizens to access. In my study, interviewees felt they could contact and raise complaints
with Environmental Protection Bureaus more easily nowadays. As discussed above, the
rising frequency of complaints indicates that citizens increasingly trust Environmental
Protection Bureaus. In addition, Environmental Protection Bureaus design arrangements
to elicit citizens’ views, which also contribute to the growing levels of trust.
50
Interview with an environmental protector of an enterprise in Haidian, 3 July 2001.
Interview, Haidian Environmental Protection Bureau, 11 June 2001.
52
Interview with an environmental protector of an enterprise in Ningbo, 3 August 2000. In China,
regulatory officers are not allowed to accept benefits from the entrepreneurs, not even dinner. People think
having dinner might lead to corrupt behaviors.
51
227
Haidian Environmental Protection Bureau conducted a survey to collect the
clients’ views regarding their work performance. Every year, the chief of Haidian
Environmental Protection Bureau leads all staff to certain large enterprises (main clients
or major regulated targets) and asks the enterprises to evaluate their work of that year.
They have a very comprehensive and detailed evaluation form. Interviewees think their
views have been considered.53
Changchun Environmental Protection Bureau also has in place certain special
measures that allow citizens to participate in officials’ performance evaluations. Every
year ten people are invited to be the “special supervisors” (jianduyuan) to over-see
officials’ behavior. These people should know about environmental protection, and are
willing to help improve Changchun’s environment (since they are not paid for this work).
The leaders of Changchun Environmental Protection Bureau meet these ten people every
month and review their supervision report. To a large extent, the views of these people
are influential. For example, during the annual performance appraisal, officials who
receive criticism from the “special supervisors” do not receive any awards that year.54
Citizen Satisfaction Data
53
Interview with an environmental protector of an enterprise in Haidian, 3 July 2001; interview, Haidian
Environmental Protection Bureau Planning and Development Section, 11 June 2001.
54
Interview, Changchun Environmental Protection Bureau Regulation Enforcement Division, 22 November
2000.
228
Citizen satisfaction data is considered an external measure of service effectiveness,
usually gained through surveys. Citizen satisfaction is the most important dimension of
government performance. Our research project team interviewed a total of 40 officials
working in environmental and education bureaus and 50 clients of the bureaus in the
three cities. The 90 interviews were carried out in 2000 and 2001 (see Appendix 1). The
interviews with officials and clients reveal that both groups perceived that the
performance of environmental protection and education bureaus has improved in recent
years, that is, since the reforms of the civil service began (see Table 6.5). Clients were
more generous than officials in their appraisal of bureau performance in the
environmental protection arena, but less generous than officials in the education arena.
Generally, our survey result is consistent with policy outcomes data presented above,
except in the case of Beijing. In Beijing’s Haidian district, officials and clients perceived
that the performance of the environmental protection bureau improved, although in
relative terms the environment in Beijing deteriorated during the period. How can I
explain this anomaly? An asymmetry in the research design may be responsible for this
result. In design I have compared two sub-provincial level cities (Ningbo and Changchun)
with much smaller Haidian district in Beijing. I speculate that officials and clients were
less ready to blame the Haidian district environmental protection bureau for Beijing’s
deteriorating environment. Still, the data indicates that there is not a linear relationship
between perceived bureau performance and the environmental and educational outcomes
on which performance perceptions are based. Officials and clients perceived improved
government performance most clearly in Ningbo where both environmental and
educational conditions improved.
229
Table 6.5
Perception that Bureau Performance Has Improved (Percent)
Environment
Education
Officials Clients
Total
Officials
Beijing
87.5 (8)
100.0 (6)
93.0 (14)
80.0 (5)
Changchun 87.5 (8)
90.9 (11)
89.5 (19)
100.0 (6)
Ningbo
100.0 (6) 100.0 (10) 100.0 (16) 100.0 (7)
Note: Number in brackets is number of respondents.
Source: 90 In-depth Interviews database, 2000 and 2001.
Clients
50.0 (10)
100.0 (7)
66.7 (6)
Total
60.0 (15)
100.0 (13)
85.0 (13)
Case Study 2: Haidian Educational Performance (Citizen Survey Findings)
To illustrate in detail how citizens evaluate government performance, in this
section I present some findings from the Haidian citizen satisfaction survey (see
Appendix 1 for information of Haidian citizen satisfaction survey) as a case study of
Haidian educational performance.
1. Entity Responsible for Educational Mission
China’s education decentralization (started in the early 1980s) has devolved the
finance and management of basic education to local governments. Were citizens aware of
this decentralization process and hence able to know who was responsible for the local
area educational mission? As Table 6.6 shows, near half of the respondents (46.9%) think
Haidian Education Commission should be responsible for Haidian’s basic education.
Less than 15% of the respondents said that the central government should be responsible
for basic education for the whole nation. Interestingly, 28.3% of the respondents think
that all the actors involved should take some responsibility, i.e. the central government,
Haidian Education Commission, schools, teachers, principals of the schools, and students.
230
This may indicate that some respondents realized the governance structure changed
because of the education reform and also the changing roles of multiple actors, but still
cannot grasp the exact task of each person (this may be impossible in a fast changing
society like China).
Table 6.6 Public’s perception of the entity responsible for educational mission (N=501)
Entity responsible for Haidian basic education
Percentage
Central government
14.4
Haidian Education Commission
46.9
Schools
4.8
Teachers
1.6
Principals of the schools
0.6
Students
All above roles take equal responsibility
28.3
Others (specify)
0.6
Source: Haidian citizen satisfaction survey database, January-March 2003
2. Evaluations of Government Effort and Policies
Public awareness of government performance has increased in recent years,
largely as a result of expanded government propaganda and enhanced coverage of
government issues by the mass media in China. Before investigating how people in
Haidian evaluate government educational performance, I would like to know how
accurate the information is that citizens base their evaluation upon. The survey tests how
and by what channel the citizens are informed about Haidian government policy and
activities. The respondents were first asked whether they know the listed policies and
regulations of Haidian government. As Table 6.7 shows, 93% of the respondents know
regulations on stopping the illegal fees charged by the schools. This shows government
propaganda enjoys quite a high level of success. Over 70% of the respondents know the
regulations on private provision of foods to students in or near the campus. This
231
illustrates the idea that both the government and the respondents care about the children’s
food hygiene and health. 63.1% of the respondents know the regulations on teachers’
ethics and qualifications. The respondents were then asked whether they know the listed
activities Haidian Education Commission conducted. Over half of the respondents know
the large-scale check of school facilities. When asked through what channels they know
the above policies and activities of Haidian government, half of the people report TV,
newspaper and magazines, and broadcasts (see Table 6.8).
Table 6.7 To what extent citizens are informed about government policy & activities
Do you know the following policies or regulations?
Percentage
Regulations controlling corruption within Haidian education system
Regulations managing education quality in basic education
Regulations stopping illegal charges by schools
Regulations on teachers' ethics and qualifications
Regulations on private provision of foods to students in or near the campus
Regulations on self-evaluation and expert supervision on the implementation of
comprehensive quality education
34.3
34.9
93.0
63.1
70.7
Regulations on performance measurement in Haidian education system
Do you know of the following activities of Haidian education system?
Year of teachers' ethics-building
Activity serving the tax payers
Modernization of archive management
Large-scale check of school facilities
Select teaching performers
Source: Haidian citizen satisfaction survey database, January-March 2003
Table 6.8 Through what channels citizens know of the policies and activities (N=501)
Percentage
Broadcasts
41.1
Work unit's activities
16.4
Newspaper and magazines
44.9
Government propaganda activities
8.6
TV
57.3
Communication with others
23.2
Internet
5.6
Source: Haidian citizen satisfaction survey database, January-March 2003
232
28.9
14.8
12.8
34.9
33.5
51.9
41.9
How do people in Haidian perceive and evaluate government performance in
education policy? Table 6.9 shows the respondents’ general evaluation of education
performance of Beijing city and Haidian district. Overall, people are satisfied with
Beijing city and Haidian district performance in education. 78.8% of the respondents said
they are satisfied or very satisfied with Haidian district. 78.5% of the respondents said
they are satisfied or very satisfied with Beijing city. Referring to the satisfaction with the
quality of Haidian junior middle school graduates, 61.1% of the respondents said they are
satisfied or very satisfied.
Table 6.9 General evaluation of educational performance compared with 5 years ago (%)
apparently
improved
improved
no change
retrogress
apparent
retrogress
unsure
Beijing city
23.4
55.1
10.8
3.4
0.4
7.0
Haidian district
25.7
apparently
improved
53.1
improved
9.0
no change
2.0
retrogress
Quality of Haidian
junior middle school
graduates
12.2
48.9
13.6
6.2
Source: Haidian citizen satisfaction survey database, January-March 2003
10.2
apparent
retrogress
0.6
18.6
Do different demographic and socioeconomic groups differ in their evaluations of
government educational performance? In other words, does the level of evaluation persist
across citizens who represent differing genders, ages, education levels, and incomes? To
address this question, I use the statistical analysis of variance to detect any such
differences. This analysis is designed to examine the variability in the sample in order to
determine whether the population means are not equal. The results, displayed in Table
6.10, show that gender, university education, and having a child in basic education seem
233
to affect somewhat the respondents’ evaluation of Haidian educational performance.
Specially, I found that both women and individuals with a university degree seem to be
critical of Haidian Education Commission. Interestingly, gender seems to be the strongest
factor related to assessment, with women most critical of Haidian Education Commission.
In addition, the non-university educated respondents tend to give the government higher
marks for its performance in education policy than university graduates. People with
children receiving basic education seem slightly more critical than people who do not
have children receiving basic education. Age and income do not seem to have much
impact on respondents’ evaluation since the mean of evaluations of sub-population
remain constant among 3 age groups and among 3 income groups.
Table 6.10 Evaluation of Haidian education performance by gender, age, education and income
N=450
Mean
F-Ratio
Significance
Male
Female
4.24 (218)
4.05 (232)
9.615
0.002
Young (18-29)
Middle (30-49)
Old (over 50)
4.14 (58)
4.12 (275)
4.19 (117)
0.374
0.688
Non-university
University
4.2 (335)
3.98 (115)
8.774
0.003
Lower (RMB 999 or
below)
Middle (RMB 1,000-2,000)
Upper (over RMB 2,000)
4.16 (167)
4.17 (201)
4.04 (82)
1.261
0.284
Gender
Age
Education
Income
Children
Have children in basic
education
No children in basic
education
4.05 (121)
4.18 (329)
3.126
Source: Haidian citizen satisfaction survey database, January-March 2003
234
0.078
Overall, people in Haidian think highly of government educational performance.
To give a more detailed picture, I test how people evaluate individual government
programs in the field of basic education. As Table 6.11 shows, highest satisfaction levels
are for Haidian government efforts in improving teachers’ professional qualifications and
in improving school equipments. People are also satisfied with government effort in
stopping the illegal charges by the schools.
Table 6.11 Citizens' evaluation of Haidian educational performance (N=501)
Choose which one of the following is the most satisfactory job
Haidian Education Commission has done. (%)
Guarantee equality for access to basic education
Improve the enforcement of government regulations
Stop the illegal charges by the schools
Build teachers' ethics
Improve teachers' professional qualifications
Improve school facilities
Increase financial input
Don’t know
Source: Haidian citizen satisfaction survey database, January-March 2003
Percentage
11.8
5.0
17.6
4.0
21.0
21.0
8.8
11.0
3. Evaluation of the Policy Responsiveness and Subgroup Difference
Responsiveness refers directly to the accuracy and speed of government agency
reaction to citizens’ demands. The respondents were asked whether the government
policy is responsive and flexible in terms of meeting their different and varied needs. The
question, as worded, and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6.12. Do different
demographic factors play any role in the respondents’ evaluation of government
responsiveness? An analysis of variance presents some interesting findings in that regard.
The results, displayed in Table 6.12, show that evaluations of responsiveness remain
constant with men vs. women and with all age and income groups. The only possible
factor that might affect the evaluation of government responsiveness is education. The
235
university-educated respondents tend to give the government lower marks for its policy
responsiveness.
Table 6.12 Evaluation of government policy responsiveness
To what extent does Haidian educational policy meet the needs of you and your household? (%)
Very large extent
26.3
Large extent
57.7
Small extent
10.6
Not met
1.6
Don’t know
3.8
Evaluation of government responsiveness by gender, age, education, and income
(N=482)
Gender
Mean
F-Ratio
Significance
Male
Female
3.08 (229)
3.17 (253)
2.299
0.130
Young (18-29)
Middle (30-49)
Old (over 50)
3.11 (62)
3.12 (291)
3.16 (129)
0.127
0.881
Non-university
University
3.17 (356)
3.02 (126)
4.526
0.034
Lower (RMB 999 or
below)
Middle (RMB 1,000-2,000)
Upper (over RMB 2,000)
3.12 (184)
3.16 (213)
3.07 (85)
0.657
0.519
Age
Education
Income
Children
Have children in basic
education
No children in basic
education
3.09 (127)
3.15 (335)
0.774
Source: Haidian citizen satisfaction survey database, January-March 2003
0.379
Conclusion
The perception data of officials and citizens, especially that of the clients, reveals
that the actual behavior of the local officials in providing public service largely conforms
236
to the directives from upper level government. More importantly, findings of citizen
survey indicate a high level of citizen satisfaction with government performance in China.
I conclude that without its effective control over local governments and local bureaucrats
through China’s Civil Service System and other measures, the central leadership’s goal in
terms of providing better service to citizens would be far more difficult to achieve. In this
connection, the results of empirical study in this chapter support the level 2 and level 3
hypotheses.
237
Chapter 7 Explaining Performance Variations
The main aim of this dissertation is to examine the impacts of China’s Civil
Service Reform on local government performance.
The experiences and lessons
generalized from this effort thus can provide some references to next round decision
making and reform design. In this connection, the goal of chapter 7 is to explain
performance
variations
among
various
government
bureaus
during
China’s
implementation of Civil Service Reform. By comparing performance of various bureaus,
I want to single out some of the determining factors that can lead to great performance
improvement. I hope this effort can highlight some of the good experiences in improving
local government performance.
Empirical studies in chapter 5 and chapter 6 show that performance variations
exist not only across different policy areas but also across various localities within one
policy. How do we understand these variations? Why does the performance of local
governments vary across different policy areas? Why does the performance of local
governments vary across various localities?
This chapter compares the performance of 6 bureaus in various sub-issues to
single out the forces that could shape great government performance improvement. First,
I compare environmental policy with educational policy in China in terms of which
policy by nature involves more serious principal-agent problems. Second, I try to find out
the determining factors in performance variations at organizational level. Three sub-
238
issues are examined: local implementation of the reform measures; newly-emerged
principal-agent problems experienced during implementation; and countermeasures
designed and implemented by various bureaus to alleviate principal-agent problems.
Empirical evidence on these sub-issues is presented. The chapter concludes with the
driving forces behind local government performance improvement, which is embedded in
China’s Civil Service Reform.
Policy Nature
Existing literature argues that all governmental bureaus, in sum, do not behave
alike. Accordingly, the performance of various government bureaus varies vastly.
Scholars have found it a complicated task to search for determining factors in
performance variations. In general, almost everything matters. To make it simple,
scholars frequently locate their searching on two levels—institutional (external aspect)
level and organizational (internal) level.1 For example, Chang and his colleagues argue
that to achieve a comprehensive understanding of government performance, all the
internal and external aspects of government bureaus should be considered. That is, all the
institutional factors and internal organization features matter.2 On the institutional level,
various institutional (external) factors lead to vastly different behaviors and performance
among bureaus. These institutional factors may include the nature of tasks the bureaus
perform, their interest-group environments, their political context, and their institutional
1
See Kelly H. Chang, et al. “Rational Choice Theories of Bureaucratic Control and Performance” in
William F. Shughart and Laura Razzolini (eds.), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice (Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2001), pp. 271-292; James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why
They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
2
Chang et al., Ibid, p. 272.
239
constraints. On the organizational level, a number of factors of the internal organization
of bureaus may vary: organizational cultures, missions, incentives of agents at different
levels of hierarchy, reporting relationships and task assignments. All these can determine
what kind of outputs a bureau will produce. 3
In this study, I also try to identify explanatory factors for performance variations
at institutional and organizational levels. Given that my research targets are bureaus in
Chinese local governments, their external aspects, such as the political context, the
institutional constraints, and to a large extent, the interest-group environments, should be
similar. Only the nature of tasks the bureaus need to fulfill may vary. So first, I will
explore why government performance varies across different policy areas (bureaus in
different policies have different tasks to fulfill). In the next section, the exploration of
determining factors will focus on organizational features.
This dissertation applies the principal-agent framework to understand government
performance. From the principal-agent perspective, government performance variations
across different policy areas might be due to the fact that some policy areas by nature will
involve more serious principal-agent problems; in other words, principals will face more
challenges in controlling the agents in certain policy areas.
In this section, I will identify the characteristics of the policy areas where more
serious principal-agent problems are involved. If the principal-agent logic is right, it
should be able to shed some light on this important topic. There are two possible routes to
3
Wilson, op. cit..
240
tackle this question. One is to look at the variation in the degree of information
asymmetry. The other is to look at the variation in the degree of conflict of interest. I first
talk about information. Depending on the technology and the nature of the issue, some
policy areas are going to face a higher level of informational asymmetry, and therefore
more serious control problems for the principal. For example, Horn has argued that
regulatory agencies and administrative bureaus have different institutional structures
because of their different levels of information asymmetry.4
This dissertation studies the performance of Chinese local governments in
environmental policy and educational policy. Apparently, the degrees of information
asymmetries involved in environmental policy and educational policy are different in
China. Environmental policy is technology-oriented in nature. The degrees of information
asymmetries involved in environmental policy vary across different levels of principalagent relationships. Without the assistance of some background knowledge and advanced
equipments, it is difficult for the general public to fully comprehend the environmental
situation of their neighborhood and the work performance of the relevant Environmental
Protection Bureau. Hence, the information asymmetries existing between the citizenprincipal and the environmental bureaus (agents) are relatively high. On the other hand,
given that technology-oriented natures can be easily transferred into objective
performance indicators, the upper level Environmental Protection Bureaus do not find it
difficult to understand and monitor the performance of lower level Environmental
Protection Bureaus. The upper level Environmental Protection Bureaus (principals) apply
4
See Murray J. Horn, The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public
Sector (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 40-78.
241
sophisticated objective performance indicators to monitor their agents (lower level
Environmental Protection Bureaus). For example, the pollution index, one main indicator
used in environmental policy, is generated through sophisticated calculation of many
basic objective indicators. Hence the information asymmetries existing in this principalagent relationship are not quite so high.
In contrast with the technology-oriented nature of environmental policy,
educational policy focuses more on human-oriented activities. 5 The missions of
educational policy do not simply lie in building schools and employing teachers to give
lectures, but in establishing an environment that allows productive teaching and learning
happen. To establish such an environment, in China, the educational bureaus (I mainly
focus on basic education in this study) need to manage and regulate schools, teachers,
students and parents and more importantly the interactions among these actors. The
degrees of information asymmetries involved in educational policy also vary across
different levels of principal-agent relationships. Citizens construct their perceptions and
evaluations of educational bureaus quite easily. They just base their perceptions and
evaluations on their children’s studying performance and personal growth. Citizens who
do not have children of their own can refer to the students of their community. Through
the students, citizens can gain some information about what teachers do; what schools do;
and somehow what educational bureaus do. Compared with environmental policy, the
5
During my fieldwork, I find that environmental policy officials are more eager to consider technical
indicators as appropriate measures while educational policy officials consider human-oriented indicators
more important. This is because environmental protection involves much more technical knowledge while
education focuses on human-oriented activities.
242
information asymmetries existing at this level of principal (citizens) and agents (bureaus)
are not that high.
However, the upper level educational bureaus face difficulty in monitoring and
evaluating lower level educational bureaus. Given that the link between the efforts of
educational bureaus and the studying performance and personal growth of students is
remote and tenuous, upper level educational bureaus can not simply base their
evaluations on student studying performance. In China, upper level educational bureaus
use many indicators to measure the lower level performance, such as the promotion rate,6
student-teacher ratio (the sort of work load of teachers), the number of activities that
educational bureau organize, and number of incidents, etc. Many of these indicators are
subjective in nature and can only be approximate indicators of the performance of
educational bureaus. In general, complicated educational bureau missions and the lack of
objective performance indicators suggest that the information asymmetries existing in
this principal-agent relationship are high.
Based on the above analysis, it is hard to conclude in China which policy,
environment or education, faces a higher level of information asymmetries. Fortunately,
there is a second route to explore why some policy areas will involve more serious
principal-agent problems. That is to look at the variation in the degree of conflict of
interest. As discussed in preceding chapters, the promotion rule of Chinese hierarchy has
led the local governments (especially local leaders) to set local economic development as
6
Promotion rate in this study refers to the percentage of the primary school students who can be promoted
to junior middle schools, and the percentage of the junior middle school students who can be promoted to
senior middle schools.
243
their most important goal. Bureaus whose policy missions cause conflicts with this goal
will face more serious problems in fulfilling their missions. This is because the local
leaders will put pressure on the implementation if they find this policy jeopardizes local
economic development.7 Therefore, in this policy area, the local bureau is confronted
with pressure from local leaders and will not faithfully fulfill its missions. In other words,
the upper level governments (professional leaders) will face more serious problems to
control their subordinates in some policy areas where their missions to a degree conflict
with local economic development.
For a local government, given the budget constraints, investing in non-economic
policies implies that the amount available to be invested in the local economy will
decrease. In this connection, both environmental policy and educational policy somehow
cause conflicts with local economic development. However, in local China,
environmental bureaus will face more challenges in fulfilling their missions than
educational bureaus. As discussed in chapter 3, an upper level Environmental Protection
Bureau requires the local Environmental Protection Bureau strictly impose regulations on
the local enterprises (pollution-makers and potential pollution-makers). While local
leaders may rely on these enterprises for taxation and revenue, they do not want the local
Environmental Protection Bureau to regulate that strictly. Sometimes, the enterprise
managers may contact the local government leaders to complain about specific
enforcement actions (e.g., fees or fines) imposed by the local Environmental Protection
7
As discussed in chapter 3, every local bureau has two leaders, one regional and the other professional. The
local bureau shares its interests more closely with the regional leader. This is because, on the one hand, the
regional leader tightly controls its budget and staff careers; on the other hand, the professional leader does
not have enough resources and power to compete with the regional leader for the local bureau’s faithful
fulfillment of its commands.
244
Bureau. If the leaders agree with the enterprise managers that the imposition of these
environmental enforcement actions may cause the enterprise economic harm, the local
leaders may request the local Environmental Protection Bureau reduce or cancel the
proposed fees or fines.8
Besides causing different degrees of conflicts with local economic development,
environmental policy also differs from educational policy in the degree of conflict of
interest between officials and their clients. Given that environmental policy is a
regulatory policy while educational policy is sort of distributive policy, educational
policy has one more function than environmental policy. While both environmental
bureaus and educational bureaus carry out inspections and provide services to clients,
educational bureaus also allocate resources to schools under their control. This difference
has implications. Officials in environmental protection seek to impose regulations,
including levies, on enterprises. The fees or the fines might cause harm to the profit of
enterprises. The entrepreneur often tries to go around bureau officials and complain to the
local leaders. This indicates the degree of conflict of interest between an environmental
bureau and its client is bound to be high. The work of education bureaus is very different.
Education bureaus, responsible for implementing a distributive policy, allocate funds to
schools which could encourage schools to comply. Undoubtedly there is less resistance to
education bureau activities. Apparently, allocating resources to their regulating targets
diminishes the degree of conflict of interest between the educational bureaus and their
clients.
8
See Abigail R. Jahiel, “The Contradictory Impact of Reform and Environmental Protection,” The China
Quarterly No. 149 (1997), pp. 81-103; Abigail R. Jahiel, “The Organization of Environmental Protection in
China,” The China Quarterly No. 156 (1998), pp. 757-787.
245
In general, the strength of regulation-enforcement by local Environmental
Protection Bureaus is compromised by intervention from the local leaders whose main
priority is economic development. The degree of conflict of interest between officials and
their clients seems higher in environmental policy than education policy. So I conclude
that in China, environmental policy tends to involve more serious principal-agent
problems than educational policy.
Determining Factors of Government Performance Variations
Organizational Change vs. Institutional Change
In the remaining part of this chapter, the exploration of bureau performance
variations will mainly focus on internal organizational features. This dissertation studies
impacts of China’s Civil Service Reform on local government performance. That is, the
institutional change and its effects. Chapter 5 and chapter 6 have already studied the
institutional change and the effects. Chapter 7 will study organizational changes, which
are embedded in the larger institutional change. Why is studying organizational change
necessary? It is because organizational change could be a pathway for institutional
change. We should never assume that institutions can be transformed without
organizational changes. Organizational changes can serve as an engine that helps
transform larger institutional arrangements. The usual process is that the institutional
change manifests itself as top-down initiatives or directives; the organizations- which are
246
embedded in the institutional context- change according to these initiatives and
directives.9
To explore which factors cause performance variations among bureaus during
China’s implementation of Civil Service Reform, I conducted fieldwork research. In
particular, I conducted in-depth interviews and questionnaire surveys in environmental
bureaus and educational bureaus of Haidian district and Changchun city during March
and April of 2004 and of Ningbo city in February of 2005.10 Details of the fieldwork
survey can be found in Appendix 1. In searching for the determining factors of
performance variations at organizational level, I first compare the implementation of
reform measures among the three local governments; second, I investigate whether
certain new principal-agent problems emerged in any of the bureaus; third, I investigate
whether the bureaus designed and implemented some countermeasures to alleviate the
newly-emerged principal-agent problems.
Comparison of Reform Implementation
As I cautioned before, reform design and implementation are different things;
local implementation of reform measures might diverge from central policy design.
Although evidence in chapter 5 and chapter 6 shows that formal lines designed by the
9
This is the case of my study. The unusual process can also illustrate how organizational changes serve as
engines for institutional change. That is, the organizations change endogenously and exert an effect on the
larger set of institutions in which the organizations are embedded. This is not the case of my study.
10
The data collected from Ningbo is not as sufficient as that of Haidian and Changchun. In the remaining
part of analysis, some comparisons are conducted just among four bureaus (two bureaus of Haidian and two
of Changchun).
247
higher level of the Party-state are respected in the local practices of personnel reform and
public service provision, we cannot easily conclude that all central policies (in particular,
all components of China’s Civil Service System in this study) are faithfully implemented
by all local governments. Even if we assume that local governments comply with central
directives most of the time, the sheer number of bureaucratic layers and the large territory
of China severely reduce the likelihood that a central directive will be implemented 100%
at local levels. The large territory and many bureaucratic layers increase the cost for the
upper level governments to detect lower level governments’ deviating behaviors.
Existing literature finds that the implementation of Civil Service Reform in China
progresses across the country at an uneven pace.11 This uneven progress is also evident
in the multiple programs included in China’s Civil Service Reform.12 Chou finds that
some of China’s Civil Service System programs are just symbolically implemented by
some local governments. Therefore, I suppose that the driving forces of performance
variations among bureaus first lie in the different extents to which various local
governments adopted and implemented Civil Service System components.
Further, why does the extent of implementation of China’s Civil Service System
vary among local governments? The possible determining factors could be financial
resources of local government and local leaders’ commitment to China’s Civil Service
Reform. Existing literature argues that in China, different local governments’ abilities to
11
See John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in China,” in Governance in China (OECD, 2005), pp. 51-74.
See Chou Kwok Ping, “Conflict and Ambiguity in the Implementation of the Civil Service Reform in
China, 1993-2000,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, (Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong, 2003).
12
248
bear the administrative costs of implementing the new system are different. 13 Local
governments in prosperous regions are more likely to succeed in implementing the
reforms than those in impoverished regions. Existing literature also argues that without
the necessary political support from local leaders, the reform implementation process can
be slow and arduous. 14 Therefore, I suppose that the resource availability of local
government and local leaders’ commitment to reform would account for bureau
performance variations.
1. Financial Resources
Among the three cities, Changchun is relatively poor. According to incomes, in
2000 the per capita GDP of Beijing and Ningbo (RMB 22,000 and RMB 21,786
respectively) was almost double that of Changchun (RMB 12,381). The poorer
Changchun failed in implementing some of the Civil Service Reform programs due to
lack of financial resources. The limited resources also led to Changchun’s poor
performance in providing one public service—environmental protection.
First, interviews with officials reflected that Changchun failed in implementing
training programs for China’s Civil Service System.15 In particular, in the fieldwork, I
found that neither the environmental bureau nor the educational bureau of Changchun
had enough resources to provide training to their staff. Table 7.1 identifies the average
13
In poorer counties where personnel costs can amount to 70% or more of total expenditure (World Bank
2002), paying bonuses and increments (which are required by China’s Civil Service Reform pay policy) is
undoubtedly a real hardship. See Burns, op. cit.
14
See Burns, “Civil Service Reform in China”; Chou, “Conflict and Ambiguity in the Implementation of
the Civil Service Reform in China, 1993-2000”; and Haiyan Caroline Tong, Jeffrey D. Straussman, Walter
D.Broadnax, “Civil Service Reform in the People’s Republic of China: Case Studies of Early
Implementation,” Public Administration and Development No. 19 (1999), pp. 193-206.
15
Interviews, Changchun Environmental Protection Bureau, 2 August 2000.
249
hours of training the staff of 4 bureaus received in year 2003. I found that on average,
staff at Changchun Environmental Protection Bureau only received 24.5 hours of training
to update their work-related knowledge and skills, far less than the 86.5 hours of training
given to staff at Haidian Environmental Protection Bureau. Staff at Haidian Education
Commission also received rather more training than staff at Changchun.
Table 7.1 Average Hours of Training
Policy
4 bureaus
domain
Education
Environment Changchun
Education
60.7
65.3
4.7
Haidian
Education
69.3
Changchun
Haidian
Environment Environment
24.5
86.5
Source: fieldwork survey, March- April 2004.
Note: I ask the officials to point out hours of refresher training (training to update workrelated knowledge and skills) they received in year 2003. Data in table is the average
level.
Second, scholars argue that training is helpful for the government employees to
fulfill their missions. The lack of training will cause poor policy implementation. For
example, according to one survey 65 % of officials in environmental protection bureaus
in Guangzhou, Nanjing and Zhengzhou said that a lack of technical knowledge was the
major problem confronting them and 56 % of them saw a shortage of technical staff was
the major problem in implementing environmental protection policy.16 The evaluation
of Changchun environmental performance in this study is consistent with the above
survey. The lack of financial resources and accordingly the lack of training were
perceived to be important constraints on bureau performance in Changchun
16 See Hon S.Chan, Koon-kwai Wong, K. C. Cheung and Jack Man-keung Lo, “The Implementation Gap
in Environmental Management in China: The Case of Guangzhou, Zhengzhou and Nanjing,” Public
Administration Review Vol. 55, No. 4 (1995), p. 337.
250
environmental policy. Respondents in Changchun called this “a key bottleneck”. They
argued that government provides too few financial resources to protect the environment.
According to them, with economic development, many new environmental problems had
emerged which the resource starved Environmental Protection Bureau had difficulty
handling. They asked for more financial resources to renew equipment and provide more
technical training. 17
Third, the poor performance of Changchun in environmental protection may also
be due to the limited human resources. According to another study, limited human
resources have been an important constraint on environmental protection work. “They
[environmental protection bureaus] need more staff, more skill, and more expertise to
implement environmental policies.” 18
The limited human resources of Changchun
government manifest in the bureaucratic infrastructure. Poorer Changchun appears to
have been under resourced in both environmental protection and education. In my study,
environmental protection bureaus ranged from 28 to 30 employees (in spite of variation
in population – the Environmental Protection Bureau in Changchun with twice as many
people was the same size as the bureau in Ningbo). Education bureaus/commissions, by
contrast, varied in size from 64 employees in more populous Changchun to 90 or more in
less populous Ningbo and Beijing’s Haidian district.19
17 Interviews, a Division Chief and a Deputy Division Chief, Changchun Environmental Protection
Bureau, 2 August 2000.
18 See K E Swanson, R G Kuhn and W Xu, “Environmental Policy Implementation in Rural China: A
Case Study of Yuhang, Zhejiang,” Environmental Management Vol. 24, No. 4 (2001), p. 487.
19 The administrative establishment of the three Environmental Protection Bureaus and the three
Educational Bureaus are 30, 28, 28, 148, 90, and 64 respectively in Haidian, Ningbo, and Changchun.
There is a relatively larger education establishment in Haidian District. Indeed, 148 employees staffed two
agencies that dealt with “education work”, including both the Education Commission and the CCP
Education Work Committee.
251
Both Haidian and Ningbo have more resources available for the reform than
Changchun. As a result, in implementing some of the reform programs, poorer
Changchun did not perform as well as Haidian and Ningbo.
2. Local Leaders’ Commitment to China’s Civil Service Reform
The lack of financial resources might cause local governments to fail in
implementing some reform programs, and to fail in providing some public services. Local
leaders’ commitment also might determine performance of local governments in
implementing reform programs and in providing public services. Local leaders’ support is
clearly identified in the literature on environmental protection as an important
determining factor for government performance. 20 As Sinkule and Ortolano point out,
“Support from the [Shenzhen] city government, especially from the mayor, played a key
role in allowing the environmental protection bureau to carry out and expand the scope of
its work”.21
In this study, I find both local leaders of Haidian and Changchun are quite
committed to China’s Civil Service Reform, while leaders of Ningbo are not as
committed to the reform. The commitments can be reflected in their different resolutions
to implement performance appraisal programs. As discussed in chapter 5, Haidian
government had issued regulations to punish poor-performers. The regulations indicate
that the civil servant ranked bottom at the annual performance appraisal in his
20 See Xiaoying Ma and Leonard Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in China: Institutions, Enforcement,
and Compliance (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), p. 154; Barbara J. Sinkule and
Leonard Ortolano, Implementing Environmental Policy in China (London: Praeger, 1995), p. 97, p. 101 and
p. 152.
21 Barbara J. Sinkule and Leonard Ortolano, Ibid, p.152.
252
organization would be dealt one of the following punitive measures: a warning, demotion,
a re-assigned post, or training till a new post is allocated. The methods used to rank all of
the staff in an organization and accordingly find the last are quite quantitative in nature.
Changchun had initiated special measures in their performance appraisal practices
too. In 1998, the Organization Department of Changchun Party Committee associated
with the Personnel Bureau and Supervision Bureau issued regulations regarding
punishment of poor-performers. The regulations required that every organization should
report the civil servant who ranked last in the annual performance appraisal to its superior
organization. In 1998, 44 civil servants were dismissed due to failing the appraisal. In
1999, 272 “last” civil servants were reported to the Organization Department by various
party and government organs. Follow-up investigations were carried out on these cases.
91 of them received an administrative warning.
Both Haidian and Changchun implemented special measures to make full use of
the appraisal results. Based on the appraisal results, they both issued punitive measures to
poor-performers. These punitive measures deterred the civil servants from laziness or
other undesirable behaviors. Trying not to be identified as poor-performers within their
own organization has become the goal of most of the staff. This has made the individual
staff of the organization serious about performance evaluation, and hence gradually more
performance –oriented.
253
Ningbo did not have such special measures to faithfully implement the
performance appraisal program. Individual civil servants were graded as one of three
grades after performance appraisal. The three grades are limited in distinguishing good
performers from the bad ones. Almost all the civil servants are graded as outstanding and
competent. Moreover, the civil servants assessed as incompetent were not really
punished.22
In general, the commitment of local leaders to the reform was high in Haidian and
Changchun. The high commitment was illustrated by the special measures, which were
initiated by the local leaders to conduct serious performance appraisal. Highly committed
local leaders are more likely to lead the local governments in faithfully implementing
Civil Service Reform programs. In this connection, local leaders of Ningbo were not that
committed to the reform.
I conclude that performance variations among bureaus derive from the different
extents to which various local governments implemented the reform components.
Bureaus in the local governments who relatively more faithfully implemented the reform
components had achieved great performance improvement. Bureaus in the local
governments whose financial resources were relatively more available had achieved great
performance improvement. Bureaus in the local governments whose leaders were
22
See case study of Ningbo implementing China’s Civil Service Reform in chapter 5. In 1997, 28 civil
servants were assessed as incompetent in various city government bureaus; they constituted 0.1% of the
civil servants who participated in the performance appraisal. In 1998, 39 civil servants were assessed as
incompetent in various city government bureaus; they constituted 0.14% of all the appraisalees.
254
relatively more committed to China’s Civil Service Reform had achieved great
performance improvement.
The Emergence of New Principal-Agent Problems during Implementation
Chapter 5 and chapter 6 show that the implementation of China’s Civil Service
System has helped to alleviate the principal-agent problems involved in Chinese local
governments. However, the principal-agent problems can be mitigated but never
eliminated, since they are inherent in all organizations and in all stages of government
processes. As Miller points out, for any given incentive scheme, the agent still has some
room to pursue his own interest or shirking.23 This indicates that during the process of
transforming institutional arrangements, new principal-agent problems might emerge. In
my study, it is possible that new principal-agent problems emerge during the process of
government bureaus implementing China’s Civil Service Reform.
1. Newly-emerged Collusion Problems in the Implementation of Award Programs
As discussed in chapter 5, local governments practice annual performance
appraisal. After performance appraisal, individual civil servants will be graded as
outstanding, competent, basically competent or incompetent. Within a local bureau, only
15% of the staff can be graded as outstanding. These outstanding employees will be
entitled to awards. The aim of the award program in China’s Civil Service System is to
improve government performance. The competition for awards is supposed to be the
23
See Gary J. Miller, Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992).
255
motivator for civil servants to make more effort and hence improve the bureau
performance (the collective productivity of bureau staff). However, the award program
will fail if the subordinates of a bureau collude with one another and together cheat the
superior. In other words, the award program will fail if the horizontal trust of an
organization is high.
From the principal-agent perspective, the horizontal (subordinate-subordinate)
trust of an organization is likely to cause harm to the organizational productivity. This is
because when horizontal trust of an organization increases, new principal-agent problems
will emerge. These new principal-agent problems usually take form as collusion among
agents. That is, the agents collude with one another and together cheat the principal. The
agency lost of the collusion problem can be illustrated in the following award practices of
organizations. To improve the organizational productivity, the principal of the
organization may launch a competitive award program. The principal hopes that the
competition for the awards may induce more effort from the agents and accordingly the
collective performance (organizational productivity) will improve. However, ordinal
measures of performance rather than cardinal measures are used in competition and
award practices. That is, the principal just relates the agents with one another because he
does not know every agent’s absolute performance. In other words, these practices
evaluate and then compensate one agent’s performance relative to that of other agents.
Such schemes will fail when the agents collude with one another against the principal.
How do the agents collude? They do not make more effort; they just keep to the work
routine and sometimes even shirk. Under such circumstances, the principal should still
256
find a relatively “good” performer and give the award. When realizing that they did not
make more effort yet some of them were given extra benefits (the awards), the agents will
find it in their interest to collude with one another. Under such circumstance, the
principal pays extra costs (the awards), but the organizational productivity does not
improve because no more effort was made by the agents.
Evidence shows that in Ningbo Educational Bureau and Haidian Educational
Commission, serious collusion problem emerged during their implementing award
programs. First, I find collusion problems among officials in Ningbo Educational Bureau
during field research. When asked about the implementation of the award program, one
official reflected that he and his colleagues had a kind of common understanding. They
would just keep the work routine and get the awards one by one and year by year.24 The
collusion problem emerged in Ningbo Educational Bureau. Why did collusion emerge in
this bureau? In the interviewee’s opinion, the bureau superiors wished to maintain the
harmony of the bureau and thus would not award one subordinate twice while all the
others received none. If this interviewee’s opinion is the common understanding shared
by the staff of Ningbo Educational Bureau, I could conclude that quite a serious collusion
problem emerged during implementing the award program in this bureau. The
interviewee’s opinion was confirmed by another interviewee in Ningbo Educational
Bureau. She said the bureau superior’s preference for organizational harmony was
understandable since the traditional Chinese culture prefers organizational harmony.25
24
25
Interview, Ningbo Educational Bureau, 21 February 2005.
Interview, Ningbo Educational Bureau, 22 February 2005.
257
Second, I also find a collusion problem among officials in Haidian Educational
Commission. One interviewee told me that “there was no competition at all”. Upon
realizing that the bureau superiors favor organizational harmony and treat the
subordinates equally, he saw there was little point in putting more effort into his work.26
Another interviewee reflected the monetary value of the award was limited, just 300 to
400 yuan (RMB). The limited money was not enough to motivate the subordinates to
compete. “We do not care about it,” the interviewee said.27 I conclude that in Haidian
Educational Bureau, the award program failed due to the emergence of collusion and the
disappearance of competition.
2. Horizontal Trust in Four Bureaus
To measure the level of horizontal trust of an organization, I design the following
survey instrument. The survey instrument asks the interviewee: do you think
organizational harmony a good thing? As the instrument supposes, people who think
organizational harmony a good thing are more likely to collude with their colleagues.28
Table 7.2 lists interviewees’ preference on organizational harmony. Based on patterns of
Table 7.2, I generalize the horizontal trust level of the four bureaus in Table 7.3.
26
Interview, Haidian Educational Commission, 20 March 2004.
Interview, Haidian Educational Commission, 29 March 2004.
28
This survey instrument is partially adapted from “Social Capital Assessment Tool”. See Anirudh Krishna
and Elizabeth Shrader, “Social Capital Assessment Tool,” Washington, D. C., can be retrieved from the
World Bank website
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/External/lac/lac.nsf/51105678feaadaea852567d6006c1de4/d2d929b5fff4b55
5852567ee000414ad?OpenDocument on 7 April 2006. Admittedly, this survey instrument is problematic,
but combined with my observations of the four bureaus, the results make sense.
27
258
Table 7.2 Interviewees’ Preference on Organizational Harmony
Haidian
Haidian
Education (11)
Environment (11)
Yes
6
5
No
3
3
Unsure
2
3
Source: fieldwork survey, March- April 2004.
Changchun
Education (15)
3
10
2
Changchun
Environment (15)
6
4
5
Table 7.3 Horizontal Trust Level
Haidian Education
Haidian
Changchun
Environment
Education
High
High
Low
Source: fieldwork survey, March- April 2004.
Changchun
Environment
High
The finding that Haidian Educational Commission has high horizontal trust is
consistent with the finding from in-depth interviews, and indicates that a serious
collusion problem emerged during their implementing award programs. In general, new
principal-agent problems had emerged during the implementation process of China’s
Civil Service Reform; organizations with a high level of horizontal trust are more likely
to be faced with serious new principal-agent problems.
Countermeasures against the Principal-Agent Problems
As discussed in chapter 3, under China’s Civil Service System, the interest of the
bureau superior/principal lies in organizational performance. Therefore, I suppose the
bureau superior/principal should design countermeasures to mitigate the newly-emerged
principal-agent problems. It should be the design and implementation of the
259
countermeasures that account for performance variations among bureaus during reform
implementation.
As discussed in chapter 2, a purely materialistic arrangement can hardly be
sufficient to control self-interested agents. Certain organizational cultures and norms that
can inspire agents to forgo narrow self-interest and align their own goals to that of the
organization are needed in hierarchies.29 Norms and organizational cultures have to be
intentionally built and installed by organizational leaders. Instilling cooperation norms
and building organizational cultures that are conducive to organizational productivity are
the manifestations of effective organizational leadership. Organizations with effective
leadership are supposed to perform well.
One requirement of leadership is to increase vertical (superior-subordinates) trust
of an organization. That is, make the subordinates believe that the commitment from the
principal / superior is credible. Vertical trust of an organization tends to improve the
organizational productivity. 30 The other requirement is to instill cooperation norms and
build organizational culture conducive to organizational interest. Norms are usually
defined as standards of behaviors shared by a community of actors.31 Cooperation norms
of an organization should mean members share the understanding that everyone in the
29 See Gary J. Miller, Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992); David Kreps, A Course in Microeconomics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990).
30 See A. Breton and R. Wintrobe, The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct: an Economic Analysis of
Competition, Exchange and Efficiency in Private and Public Organizations (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press, 1982); A. Breton and R. Wintrobe, “The Bureaucracy of Murder Revisited,” Journal of
Political Economy No. 94 (1986), pp. 905-926.
31 See Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
260
organization is playing the same Pareto-improvement game. Such norms could inspire
subordinates to forgo narrow self-interest and align their own goals to that of the
organization.
In the remaining part of my analysis, I will investigate whether leaders of the 6
bureaus design and implement countermeasures against the newly-emerged problems.
One of the goals of these countermeasures is to increase the vertical trust within an
organization. In particular, superiors would try to make their commitment credible to
their subordinates. Second, superiors would try to instill cooperation norms that are
conducive to organizational productivity in their organizations.
1. Propensity to Cooperation in the Four Bureaus
How individual members of staff understand the importance of the work of other
sub-divisions and how they evaluate the performance of other sub-divisions will
influence their intention to cooperate with other sub-divisions. Accordingly, I use
insiders’ evaluation of performance of other sub-divisions within one bureau to measure
the degree to which the bureau staff tend to cooperate with one another.32 The design of
this survey instrument is based on the following logic: if a civil servant thinks that the
work of other sub-divisions is important and colleagues in other sub-divisions perform
well, he is more likely to cooperate with them. Table 7.4 and 7.5 show the evaluation
results for education and environment respectively.
32
I design questions to measure officials’ perceptions and evaluations of performance of other subdivisions (excluding the sub-division the interviewee belonged to) within their bureau. To get valid and
reliable perception data of organization performance, I explained clearly both in my briefing and in the text
of the interview questionnaire that all the data were collected solely for academic purposes and would
remain strictly confidential.
261
Table 7.4 Insider Evaluation of Other Sub-divisions’ Performance in Education (5-point
scale)
Haidian Education
Changchun Education
Mean
(Std. Deviation)
General office
4.50 (.941)
4.63 (.518)
Personnel office
4.25 (.754)
4.57 (.535)
Teaching regulation 4.00 (.784)
4.14 (.690)
division
School regulation 4.14 (.690)
4.29 (.914)
division
Middle-school
4.14 (.690)
4.79 (.426)
management office
Primary-school
4.25 (.754)
4.43 (.535)
management office
Social
education 4.00 (1.206)
4.43 (.535)
regulation office
Budget office
4.43 (.535)
4.00 (1.348)
Source: fieldwork survey, March- April 2004.
Table 7.5 Insider Evaluation of Other Sub-divisions’ Performance in Environment (5point scale)
Haidian
Changchun
Mean
Environment
Environment
(Std. Deviation )
General office
4.64 (.505)
4.57 (.756)
Personnel office
4.36 (.674)
4.00 (1.038)
Environment
4.36 (.674)
4.00 (.961)
supervising division
Pollution
control 4.45 (.688)
4.00 (.961)
division
Regulations
4.45 (.688)
4.14 (.770)
enforcement
division
Policy
and 4.27 (.647)
4.64 (.633)
regulation division
Environment
4.45 (.522)
4.21 (.699)
monitoring station
Technology division 4.10 (.738)
NA
Source: fieldwork survey, March- April 2004.
As the survey instrument supposes, higher scores imply a higher level of
propensity to cooperate. I found the sub-divisions of Changchun Education Bureau
262
receive higher scores than those of Haidian (except for the budget office). I conclude the
officials’ propensity to cooperate in Changchun Education Bureau is higher than in
Haidian. Similarly, I found the sub-divisions of Haidian Environmental Protection
Bureau receive higher scores than those of Changchun (except for the policy and
regulation division). I conclude the officials’ propensity to cooperate in Haidian
Environmental Protection Bureau is higher than in Changchun.
Readers may argue traditional culture will influence people’s evaluating
behaviors; Chinese people tend to give a high score in evaluation. To reduce the bias
caused by culture, I design another survey instrument: if a colleague of another subdivision asks you a favor to fulfill his work duty, what is your response? Table 7.6 lists
people’s tendency to help other sub-division colleagues in the 4 bureaus.
Table 7.6 Tendency to Help Other Sub-division Colleagues
Haidian
Haidian
Changchun
Education (11)
Environment (11)
Education (15)
Help
4
5
Not help 3
3
Unsure
4
3
Source: fieldwork survey, March- April 2004.
10
2
3
Changchun
Environment
(15)
5
5
5
In a bureau, the fact that most of the staff would like to help their colleagues in
another sub-division implies a high level of propensity to cooperate. Aggregating the
patterns of Table 7.4, Table 7.5 and Table 7.6, I conclude that staff in Changchun
Educational Bureau are more likely to cooperate with each other than staff of Haidian
Educational Commission; staff in Haidian Environmental Protection Bureau are more
263
likely to cooperate with each other than staff of Changchun Environmental Protection
Bureau.
2. Credible Commitment: Changchun Educational Bureau Case
During local governments’ implementation of China’s Civil Service Reform, new
principal-agent problems emerged in various bureaus. Leaders/ superiors of the bureau
should design and implement countermeasures to mitigate these new problems. How can
the vertical trust of an organization be increased? How can the superiors make their
commitment credible to the subordinates? One useful mechanism is to sign performance
contracts. Usually the performance contract lists who should attain what targets and the
reward or penalty that would follow positive or negative results. Economic incentives are
used to encourage goal fulfillment, usually taking form as a bonus. Over time, the
performance targets can be adjusted and new ones added in response to the changing
circumstances. The performance contracts inform the subordinates about the superiors’
priorities. Economic incentives motivate the subordinates to invest more effort to attain
their targets.
In my fieldwork, I found the practice of Changchun Educational Bureau a good
illustration of performance contract and credible commitment. Competition was launched
among all city government bureaus in Changchun. The leaders of the city government
were to rank all the city level government bureaus according to their performance every
year. A total score is calculated for each bureau at the end of evaluation. Based on the
264
final score, bureaus are ranked to find out good performers. No doubt, being ranked a
good-performer is helpful to the bureau as a whole and to the careers of bureau leaders.
In Changchun Educational Bureau, leaders sign performance contracts with all
staff at the bureau. The main content of these performance contracts is that the bureau
leaders promise extra bonuses to all staff if the bureau can rank in the first five in the city
government campaign. The bureau chief first signs a performance contract with the
division chiefs. In these contracts, the division chiefs pledge to attain certain targets as
listed in their work plan or as laid down by the bureau chief, and are held personally
responsible for attaining those targets. The division chiefs then sign contracts with their
own subordinates in a similar fashion.
In 2003, Changchun Educational Bureau ranked as the third bureau in the city
government campaign. All the educational bureau staff received an extra bonus of RMB
1,800 yuan in 2003.33 This bonus is not financed from the bureau’s budget, but paid from
the bureau’s collective funds. That is, income from the semi-profit organizations
affiliated to Changchun Educational Bureau, such as teachers’ training schools operated
by the bureau (jiaoshi jinxiu xuexiao) and publishing houses (yinshua chang) affiliated to
the bureau.34 This practice of Changchun Educational Bureau provides a good illustration
of credible commitment. The principal first promises commitment (an extra bonus) to
33
Interview, Changchun Education Commission, 26 March 2005.
This is a special phenomenon during economic transition in China. To survive with limited financial
resources from local governments, government bureaus have established many service organizations to
relieve the government’s financial burdens in the course of economic transition. These service
organizations have to sponsor their own operation by engaging in revenue-generating or fund raising
activities. These service organizations are affiliated with government bureaus and sometimes provide
collective funds to them.
34
265
induce desirable behaviors of the agents. The signing of the performance contracts made
the agents believe that the commitment from the principal is credible. During interviews,
several officials told me that they believe rewards would follow their conscious efforts to
work. Finally this vertical trust of the organization leads to organizational performance
improvement (the bureau ranked third in the city government campaign).
In general, under China’s Civil Service System, the principal’s interest lies in
organizational performance; the principal has tried to make his commitment credible so
as to shape the agents’ incentive for performance and deter them from undesirable
behavior. Organizations with such leadership had achieved great performance
improvement. In addition, the principal had tried to instill cooperation norms conducive
to organizational productivity in their organization. Organizations with such leadership
had also achieved great performance improvement. In other words, organizations with a
high level of vertical trust and cooperation norms are more likely to mitigate the newly
emerged principal-agent problems.
Conclusion
My fieldwork materials, admittedly scattered, still allow me to figure out the
ranking of the three cities according to their performance in environmental protection and
education. The government of poorer and more populous Changchun appeared to have
been comparatively under resourced in environmental protection. The richer Ningbo
266
invested more in environmental protection.35 However, in implementing performance
appraisal programs, leaders of Ningbo government did not commit to reform as much as
leaders of Haidian and Changchun. Interviews found serious collusion problems emerged
in Ningbo and Haidian educational bureaus. I found the officials’ propensity to cooperate
with each other higher in Changchun Educational Bureau than in Haidian, while the
officials’ propensity to cooperate with each other higher in Haidian Environment
Protection Bureau than in Changchun. The leaders of Changchun Educational Bureau
successfully made their commitment credible to their subordinates through performance
contracts. In this bureau, subordinates behaved in ways that were consistent with and /or
beneficial to the organizational as a whole.
To rank the three cities according to their performance is not the ultimate goal.
What is important is to generalize the experiences and lessons through comparing the
performance of various bureaus. The most important thing is to further single out the
determining factors that cause great performance improvement.
I conclude that, in China, environmental policy tends to face more serious
principal-agent problems than educational policy. Performance variations among bureaus
first derive from the different extents to which various local governments implemented
the reform measures. I find the good experiences of local implementation of China’s
Civil Service Reform as follows. The local governments who found enough financial
resources to support the implementation of reform programs achieved great performance
35
In 1999, the environmental input of Ningbo equaled 1.89% of its GDP, which is higher than the national
requirement (1.5% of the city’s GDP). See interview, Ningbo Environmental Protection Bureau
Technology Division, 2 August 2000.
267
improvements. The local governments whose leaders were more committed to China’s
Civil Service Reform achieved great performance improvements. The local governments
that faithfully implemented reform components (or most of the components) achieved
great performance improvements. The local government bureaus whose leaders made
their commitment credible to the subordinates achieved great performance improvements.
The local government bureaus whose leaders instilled a higher level of cooperation norms
in their organization achieved great performance improvements.
268
Chapter 8 Conclusion
This dissertation has examined the impacts of China’s Civil Service Reform on
local government performance. In particular, I have investigated how the implementation
of China’s Civil Service System influences performance of government bureaus in charge
of environmental protection and education in three cities (Haidian district of Beijing,
Changchun, and Ningbo).
The principal-agent theory provides an insightful framework for my analysis.
From the viewpoint of principal-agent theory, in order to understand the institutional
change and its impacts on government performance, it is vital to study the multiple
principal-agent relationships embedded in government. Through applying the principalagent framework, the analysis of formal rules and regulations suggests that government
performance will improve after China’s adoption of the Civil Service System. Under the
institutional arrangement of the Cadre Management System, because of information
asymmetry and conflict of interest, bureaucratic superiors on three hierarchical levels had
trouble in obtaining full compliance from their bureaucratic subordinates. Components of
China’s Civil Service System provide superiors solutions to mitigate these problems by
aligning incentives or improving information. The results of empirical study support
these predictions. In general the managerial and political objectives of China’s Civil
Service Reform have been met. As the outputs of the reforms, evidence suggests civil
service quality has improved and local governments have adopted and implemented
China’s Civil Service System to a large extent. Referring to the outcomes of the reforms,
269
better public service provision and a high level of citizen satisfaction are evident. All
these illustrate that local government performance improved after China’s implementing
Civil Service Reform.
This dissertation yields eight main findings. First, evidence indicates that the
cadre corps have been successfully modernized through China’s Civil Service Reform in
the sense that local officials are now better educated and younger. Second, case studies of
local implementations of the reform suggest that to a large extent, local governments
faithfully adopted and implemented China’s Civil Service System. Third, the
implementation of China’s Civil Service System has motivated the civil servants to put
more conscious effort into their work and accordingly adjust the way they treat their
clients. Fourth, reforms have caused the evaluation of leading cadres to be more
comprehensive, and not purely based on local economic development. This has led
regional leaders to pay more attention to non-economic policies, and local bureaus in
non-economic fields more faithfully fulfill their professional missions.
The perception
data of officials and clients reveals that the actual behaviors of the local officials in
providing public service largely conform to the directives from upper level government.
That is, there is a high degree of local compliance with key central policies in providing
public service. Fifth, administrative reforms have caused the promotion rule of Chinese
hierarchy to be based on work performance and problem-solving ability. In order for their
work performance to impress their superiors, local bureaucrats are bound to please the
citizens (so as to induce cooperation behavior from the citizens). In my study, citizens
agree that performance of local governments improved after reforms and citizens feel
270
satisfied with local governments’ performance. Sixth, the implementation of China’s
Civil Service System components and other administrative monitoring mechanisms help
the central leadership in China to successfully strengthen control over the local
governments and the local bureaucrats. The strengthened control of the bureaucracy
manifests itself in better provision and delivery of public service, which in turn leads to
increased citizen satisfaction with government performance. Seventh, referring to
performance variations across policy areas, I find environmental policy involves more
serious principal-agent problems than educational policy in China. Eighth, referring to
performance variations across bureaus, I find the following characteristics are crucial in
achieving great performance improvement: more financial resources and more committed
leaders to support the local implementation of the reform measures; and effective
leadership that can design and implement countermeasures to mitigate the newlyemerged principal-agent problems during the implementation process.
This chapter first summarizes the findings. Second, several policy and
methodological implications resulting from the analysis are identified. After noting some
limitations, the chapter closes on further directions for research.
Summary of Research Findings
I have applied the principal-agent framework in this dissertation and considered
three levels of principal-agent relationships in the Chinese government. The
implementation of China’s Civil Service System has helped the principals on various
271
hierarchical levels to align interests between them and their agents and to discover more
information about their agents’ behavior. In figure 8.1, I summarize the control
mechanisms available to the principals after the reforms and the impacts of interestalignment and information discovery on the agents’ behavior.
272
Chinese
leadership
Civil service
Professional
leader
The citizens
Local
(regional)
leader
Local
bureau
Superior
Subordinate
Figure 8.1 Actors and controls in 3 levels of principal-agent relationships in Chinese
government
273
Legend of Figure 8.1:
Principal
Agent
Strong control
Weak control
Figure 8.1 first generalizes actors and control mechanisms in the three levels of
principal-agent relationships in the Chinese government. Actor 1 is the superior in a
bureau, for example, bureau chief of Haidian Environmental Protection Bureau. Actor 2
is the subordinate in a bureau, for example an official of Haidian Environmental
Protection Bureau. Actor 1 and actor 2 constitute the level 1 principal-agent relationship,
where actor 1 is the principal and actor 2 is the agent. After China’s adoption of the Civil
Service System, the available control mechanisms for the principal in this level include:
incentive-alignment arrangement, monitoring, competition and credible commitment. All
these have helped to motivate the agents (civil servants) to work hard and hence have a
positive influence on bureau performance.
Actor 3 is a local bureau, for example Haidian Environmental Protection Bureau.
Actor 4 is the regional (local) leader, for example Haidian district government. Actor 5 is
274
the professional leader, for example Beijing municipal Environmental Protection Bureau.
Actor 3, actor 4 and actor 5 constitute the level 2 principal-agent relationship, where actor
3 is the agent, actor 4 is the principal with strong control and actor 5 is the principal with
weak control. As discussed in chapter 2, the control mechanisms available to these two
principals vary significantly in strength. The regional leader exerts strong control over the
local bureau by controlling its budget and personnel appointments. In contrast, the
professional leader has relatively weak methods available to control the action of the
local bureau, through work plans, work reports and direct inspections. China’s Civil
Service Reforms have caused the evaluation of leading cadres to become more
comprehensive, and not purely based on local economic development. This has led
regional leaders to pay more attention to non-economic policies and local bureaus in noneconomic fields more faithfully fulfill their professional missions.
Actor 6 is the Chinese bureaucracy. Actor 7 is the central leadership. Actor 8 is
the Chinese citizenry. Actor 6, actor 7 and actor 8 constitute the level 3 principal-agent
relationship, where actor 6 is the agent, actor 7 is the principal with real power and actor
8 is the symbolic principal.
Reforms have caused the promotion rule of Chinese
hierarchy to be based on work performance and problem-solving ability. In order to
impress the central leadership and their superiors, local bureaucrats are bound to provide
better public service and try to please the citizens.
The results of empirical study are consistent with the hypotheses raised in the
theoretical exploration part. In particular, empirical study in chapter 5 indicates that the
275
cadre corps have been successfully modernized through China’s Civil Service Reforms in
the sense that the local officials are now better educated and younger. Moreover, case
studies of local implementation of reform measures in chapter 5 indicate that to a large
extent, the formal rules and regulations of China’s Civil Service System are adopted and
implemented by various local governments. Therefore, local civil servants are better
trained in daily management of the local government. High-quality personnel and
scientific personnel management together contribute to local government performance
improvement.
Chapter 6 shows, through implementing China’s Civil Service System and other
administrative monitoring mechanisms, the central leadership in China has improved its
capacity to shape, reward and control local governments and local bureaucrats. Despite
the tremendous pressures induced by the continual reforms and decentralization, the
central leadership has achieved a reasonably high degree of cohesion among cadres by
designing effective mechanisms of elite recruitment, promotion and rotation, etc. The
perception data of officials and clients in chapter 6 reveals that the actual behaviors of the
local officials in providing public service largely conform to the directives from upper
level government. That is, there is a high degree of local compliance with key central
policies in providing public service. And more importantly, citizens agree that local
government performance improved after reforms and they feel satisfied with local
governments’ performance in our survey. These two positive indicators—better public
service provision and increased citizen satisfaction, indicate that local government
performance improved after China’s Civil Service Reform.
276
To understand the logic of chapter 6, one point needs to be elaborated on. It was
the strengthened control of the bureaucracy that pushed local governments to improve
public service provision and to try to please the citizens. Both the better public service
provision and increased level of citizen satisfaction are proxies of government
performance. In this connection, I argue the implementation of China’s Civil Service
System and other administrative monitoring measures has helped the central leadership
strengthen control over local bureaucrats and that the strengthened control of the
bureaucracy in turn manifests itself in local government performance improvement. I
conclude China’s Civil Service Reform positively influences local government
performance.
Chapter 7 finds that, in terms of local implementation of China’s Civil Service
Reform, not all the reform programs achieve the same degree of success. Hence
government performance varies across different policy areas and across various bureaus.
I find in environmental policy, the principals tend to face more serious control problems
than the principals in educational policy. Chapter 7 also generalizes some good
experiences in improving local government performance. In particular, it finds the
following characteristics of local bureaus are crucial in achieving great performance
improvement: more financial resources and more committed local leaders to support the
reform implementation; and effective leadership that can design and implement
countermeasures to mitigate the newly-emerged principal-agent problems during the
implementation process.
277
Policy Implications
This dissertation not only deepens our understanding of the rationale behind and
the direction of administrative reforms, but also helps us to relate the public personnel
management to the general political development in China.
Rationale Behind and Direction of Administrative Reforms in China
The main aim of this dissertation is not to describe the implementation situation
of China’s Civil Service Reform, but to examine the impacts of the reform on
government performance in order to understand and evaluate the rationale behind this
reform. Given that implementing the Civil Service System has consumed considerable
resources (including financial resources, human resources, and technology), evaluating
the return on this investment is of great importance. Moreover, understanding how the
institutions operate on a day-to-day basis is important, but not as important as
understanding why they work in this way. To answer why they work in certain ways
requires understanding the rational design of these institutions.1
Twenty years of economic reforms and liberalization have brought great
challenges to the outdated governance structure and personnel management in China.
Whether the Chinese authorities can survive the tremendous pressures induced by the
continual economic reforms and decentralization is a significant issue. China is an
1
In evaluating the rational design of China’s Civil Service Reform, there is no existing literature that can
serve as the benchmark to which to relate my findings.
278
authoritarian regime. The political system is highly centralized under the CCP rule. The
power of all local government officials comes from appointment by superiors, not from
local community election. In such a regime, how can the local governments and local
bureaucrats be induced to serve the citizen and hence help the central leadership gain the
public support necessary to sustain its level of power?
The answers to the above questions lie in rebuilding the state and increasing the
control of the bureaucracy. Needless to say, state rebuilding and the control of the
bureaucracy are important tasks for contemporary Chinese authority. Administrative
reforms are warranted to accomplish these tasks. This dissertation studies the general
issue of efficacy of Chinese administrative reforms since the late 1970s, with a focus on
the 1993 China Civil Service Reform.
Through applying the principal-agent framework, I find the institutional design of
administrative reforms in China is rational. Because of information asymmetry and
conflict of interest, bureaucratic superiors on three hierarchical levels within the old
Cadre Management System had trouble in obtaining full compliance from their
bureaucratic subordinates. But, being rational, the bureaucratic superiors (especially the
central leadership) design rules and institutions to mitigate the problems. The
introduction of China’s Civil Service System in 1993 to manage cadres is one such kind
of effort.
279
Empirical evidence reinforces the argument that the institutional design of
China’s Civil Service Reform is rational. To a large extent, the implementation of the
reform serves the proposed goals well. That is, the implementation of China’s Civil
Service System to some extent motivates the individual government employee to work
hard and adjust their way of exercising discretion and so be welcomed by the clients and
citizens. Furthermore, the implementation of reform measures and other control
techniques help the central leaders strengthen their control over the local governments
and local bureaucrats. The control of the bureaucracy being strengthened implies the
agents (civil servants) will work for the best interest of the principal (the Chinese
leadership), which is providing better public services and regaining public support. Both
these two goal-fulfillments find themselves the same manifestation—improved local
government performance, which is measured by the objective indicators and citizen
satisfaction survey in this study.
In this dissertation, I do not simply argue that till now China’s Civil Service
Reforms succeed. Instead, I try to provide some predictions on the direction of the
reforms through studying the impacts of the reforms. Because history provides insights
into the future, the descriptions, evaluations and predictions are all connected. I try to
analyze the rationale behind China’s Civil Service Reform and accordingly identify its
implications for China’s politics in general. Findings in this dissertation convinced me
that some reform efforts do not coincidently just happen; rather, they are components of
incremental changes intentionally made by Chinese leaders. Civil Service Reform in
China is part of a much greater transformation that the Chinese authorities will and have
280
to go through. Therefore, I think China’s Civil Service System will develop well in
general.
Chinese Political Development and Public Personnel Management
Where will the reforms lead China to? Observers expect that continued and
extensive economic reforms and decentralization will ultimately lead to fundamental
political change in China. 2 I agree that economic reforms and decentralization have
fundamentally changed the parameters of Chinese political development. Democratic
elections have been gradually introduced in some local governments and grassroots
organizations, mostly at the village level.3 But the process is continuing at a snail’s pace.
In my study, I find citizens in China cannot yet be considered as the real principal. Even
after reforms, citizens are still poorly informed about government affairs. They are
involved in only a relatively limited number of specific cases. This may be because
citizens influenced by Chinese traditional culture are passive. But more importantly, the
Party-state suppresses independent groups, fearing that they may form the bases for
dissenting individuals and ultimately challenge their authority. Moreover, the
authoritarian nature of the Chinese political regime has not been fundamentally changed.
The political system is still highly centralized under the CCP rule. The power of all local
government officials comes from appointment by superiors, and not from local residents’
elections. In my study, I find effective monitoring and control mechanisms are in place to
2
See Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private entrepreneurs, and Prospects for
Political Change (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
3
See Kevin J. O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,” Comparative
Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1999), pp. 167-186.
281
hold local bureaucrats accountable for and responsive to the needs of superiors but not
the local residents.
More important developments in Chinese politics lie in state rebuilding and the
control of the bureaucracy. The Chinese authorities have devoted tremendous energy to
adjust the governance structure and improve their ability to manage and control the
bureaucrats / public personnel. The school of comparative communist politics finds an
interesting question: why has the CCP survived, when most of the other ruling
communist parties have not?4 The answer lies in the CCP’s adaptability. Many scholars
argue that the Chinese leadership is capable of great institutional adaptability.5 Despite
the tremendous pressures induced by the continual reforms and decentralization, the
central leadership in China has achieved a reasonably high degree of cohesion among
cadres by designing effective mechanisms of elite recruitment, promotion and rotation.
This study demonstrates that carefully devised reforms can contribute to the
gradual building of institutional norms consistent with the new environment and the
regime’s objectives. In particular, this dissertation finds that public personnel reforms
have helped the leadership sustain/ improve its capacity to shape, reward and control
local bureaucrats and hence provide better public service to gain /regain public support.
4
See Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political
Change.
5
See John P. Burns, “The People’s Republic of China at 50: National Political Reform,” The China
Quarterly, No. 159 (1999), pp. 580-594; Maria Edin, “State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China:
CCP Cadre Management from A Township Perspective,” The China Quarterly, No. 173 (2003), pp. 35-52;
Yasheng Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China: the Political Economy of Central-Local
Relations during the Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Naughton and Yang,
Holding China Together: Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng Era (UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2004).
282
In this way, the Chinese leadership can survive the pressures induced by the economic
reforms and keep the regime authoritarian.
Referring to the impacts of personnel reforms on the relationship between the
central and local governments, this study also sheds some light on one continuing debate.
The debate involves two predictions regarding China’s future: the “collapse” and the
“strong state”. The “collapse” prediction argues that there is a governance crisis in China
and the regime is facing institutional collapse.6 On the other hand, the “strong state”
prediction argues Chinese central control has not diminished, especially in the area of
public personnel management.7 The “collapse” prediction underestimates the ability of
the CCP to adapt to the changing political environment. I agree with the “strong state”
prediction. Officials in my study believe that China’s Civil Service Reforms have been
carried out in a fashion that is broadly consistent with the central government’s stated
objectives. Therefore, Chinese leaders maintain the ability to shape, reward, and control
the local bureaucrats.
Methodological Implications
6
See Pei Minxin, From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New
York: Random House, 2001).
7
See Yasheng Huang, “Administrative Monitoring in China,” The China Quarterly, No. 143 (1995), pp.
828-843; Yasheng Huang, “Managing Chinese Bureaucrats: An Institutional Economics Perspective,”
Political Studies Vol. 50, No. 1 (2002), pp. 61-79; Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market
Transition and Politics of Governance in China (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004);
Naughton and Yang, op. cit.
283
In this dissertation, I apply the principal-agent framework to examine the impacts
of China’s Civil Service Reform on local government performance. Naturally, principalagent logic is not the only answer to all important questions, but it provides insights for
us to understand the complex political institutions in China. With the assistance of
principal-agent framework, the rationale behind some policy choices and institutional
designs in Chinese personnel management and the political system becomes
understandable.
The Three Ways to Apply Principal-Agent Framework in One Study
In the exploration of how reforms influence government performance, I
investigate many important issues, i.e., the interaction between institutions and incentives;
control of the bureaucracy; and government performance measurement and comparison,
etc. The principal-agent framework helps me to organize them into a coherent whole. In
particular, I demonstrate three ways to apply the principal-agent framework in one study.
In investigating the issue of individual incentive (chapter 5), I first describe and analyze
local implementation of China’s Civil Service Reform, and then link the findings to the
principal-agent framework. By making sense of the results in the principal-agent
framework, I explicate the mechanisms and processes through which the reform has
impinged upon the incentives of the civil servants and hence affected agency
performance. In investigating the issue of control of the bureaucracy (chapter 6), I first
analyze how the central leadership acts as a strategic principal in ensuring control over
local governments and local bureaucrats. Evidence of better provision of public service
284
and citizen satisfaction data are then presented as the proxies of government performance.
By studying both the central leadership in China as a strategic principal and the empirical
evidence, I get some hints on the impacts of the reforms and their rational design. In
exploring performance variation (chapter 7), I compare the performance of the 6 bureaus
concerned in this study. At both institutional and organizational level, the principal-agent
framework instructs me to find out determining factors in performance variations. Based
on the comparative study, I generalize some experiences in improving government
performance.
The Applicability of Principal-Agent Framework to the Analysis of Chinese Politics
As I mentioned before, citizens cannot yet be considered as the real principal in
China. This political reality underlies the utility of a principal-agent model in
understanding Chinese political economy. Moreover, some control mechanisms have
different applicability in China compared to democratic countries.
For example, the
“fire alarm” as a control mechanism does not work as successfully in China as in
democratic countries. This is due to the absence of an independent court system and the
authorities’ restrictions on the formulation of interest groups and powerful nongovernment organizations. The Party-state fears that the independent groups may form
the bases for dissenting individuals and ultimately challenge their authority. Another
difference is that in China, civil servants should be politically in line with the leadership
and hence ideological persuasion could serve as a control mechanism.
285
Government Performance Measurement
To empirically demonstrate government performance improvement is a
challenging task. The challenge is rooted in the difficulty of defining and measuring
government performance meaningfully.8 This dissertation tries to contribute in this area.
In chapter 4, I have developed and estimated a confirmatory factor model to demonstrate
a new method to conceptualize and measure government environmental performance in
China. By using the sophisticated calculation of observable variables as the proxy of the
unobservable, a human-behavior construct, the results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis
(citizens’ evaluation of government performance in this study) are not confounded by the
general attitude and impressionistic habit of citizens (see chapter 4 for the strengths of
Confirmatory Factor Analysis). However, because I only have qualified data to apply
Confirmatory Factor Analysis to Haidian’s environmental policy, I cannot develop and
estimate a confirmatory factor model of educational performance in China. Moreover, I
cannot conduct a systematic comparative study of the six bureaus’ performances based on
the results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis. The lack of qualified data is one limitation
of this study and also a direction for further investigation.
Limitations
8
See Kaifeng Yang and Marc Holzer, “The Performance-Trust Link: Implications for Performance
Measurement,” Public Administration Review Vol. 66, No. 1 (2006), pp. 114-126.
286
First, the timing of conducting such research (investigation of reform impacts) is a
challenge in itself. Obviously, surveys administered once the reforms have already taken
place cannot directly test the effect of reforms. When this study began, institutional
change had occurred nationwide, leaving no control group (local government) untouched
by the reform. Besides the point that testing most of the hypotheses of this study calls for
a before-and –after comparative analysis, the complete lack of systematic studies in this
area precludes reliance upon preexisting studies as benchmarks against which to compare
post-reform performance data.
Second, using perception data as the main measure of government performance is
obviously limited. I focused on perception data because objective data of Chinese
government performance is not readily available. On the one hand, Chinese governments
seldom practice organizational performance measurement; on the other hand, documents
on this issue are considered as internal briefings and remain closed to researchers. In
order to examine the impacts of reforms on local government performance, I have to set a
benchmark of government performance myself. That is, I conduct surveys and rely on
interviewees’ perceptions and evaluations. But skeptical readers will keep in mind that
my results are probably biased against the subjective factors. We should remain skeptical
of these findings until more objective data on government performance are available or
more case studies are conducted.
In using and analyzing perception data as a main measure of public service
provision pattern, I take some precautions. I not only try to understand every individual
287
interviewee’s views but also try to compare the views of related interviewees (here
“related” refers to the interviewees in the same organization; or those which have an
official-client relationship). Uncovering the extent and the structure of the information
that the related interviewees are willing to reveal can teach me a lot about the nature of
their organization. More importantly, I try to identify the common knowledge of a sample
or a sub-sample. In other words, it is critical to measure the extent to which information
that is revealed by individual respondents is common knowledge within the sample.
Third, the Confirmatory Factor Analysis cannot be used throughout the
dissertation and the confirmatory factor model I developed cannot be applied in the
comparisons across settings. As I mentioned before, I only have qualified data to apply
Confirmatory Factor Analysis to Haidian’s environmental policy. I cannot develop and
estimate a confirmatory factor model that can deepen our understanding of educational
performance in China. Further I cannot conduct a systematic comparative study of the
performance of the six bureaus based on the results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis. The
data in this study does not allow comprehensive comparisons. Both more qualified data
that allows for conducting Confirmatory Factor Analysis and more objective data are
warranted.
Further Direction
As I cautioned in the introductory chapter, both administrative reform and
government performance are complex political issues and a multifaceted research agenda
288
is needed to understand them. In the next step of research, I have three directions in
which I may go.
Where to Attribute the Personnel Quality Improvement
My findings are consistent with the existing literatures in that the quality of the
civil service has improved in China. Scholars hold different views as to the driving forces
of this improvement. Some argue this improvement derives from personnel management
reform; others argue this improvement is a benefit of the education reform.9 In my study,
officials and clients perceived that the quality of the civil service improved in the years
since China’s Civil Service Reform was initiated in 1993. As to where to attribute this
improvement, there were some variations in point of view. Some agree China’s Civil
Service Reform had motivated the civil servants and hence improved the quality of the
civil service. Others argue civil servants are now better-educated and younger just
because more university graduates are available for government work. Therefore, more
research is needed to decide where to attribute the personnel quality improvement in
China.
Others may argue the link between the implementation of reforms and
improvement in performance still needs to be strengthened. In my study, civil service
reform was perceived to contribute to government performance improvement. In
interviews, government officials and their clients perceived that bureau performance has
9
See John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in China”, in Governance in China (OECD, 2005), pp. 51-74.
289
improved in recent years. Both officials and clients perceived that the improvement in
bureau performance was related somewhat to improvements in the quality of civil
servants. But again whether China’s Civil Service Reform totally accounts for the
personnel quality improvement still needs further research.
China’s Civil Service Reform: A Long Way to Go
China still has a long march ahead to establish a successful Civil Service System.
China’s Civil Service Reform aimed to promote work efficiency of government and to
help the central leadership strengthen control over local governments. Turning these
objectives into reality are far from easy tasks. Successful implementation of China’s Civil
Service Reform demands improvements in governance structures: accountability,
transparency, adherence to the rule of law, and greater use of direct democracy in public
decision-making. Great improvements in the above governance structures are not the case
in contemporary China. Referring to the degree of success of Civil Service Reform in
China, scholars who have studied the reform implementation situation conclude it has
failed.10 In case studies of local implementation of China’s Civil Service Reform, I find
variations in the degree of implementation of reform programs. In fact, some programs
succeeded while others did indeed fail. 11 In this dissertation, I am not arguing that
China’s Civil Service Reform till now is successful. Instead, I predict a positive
10
See Chou Kwok Ping, “Conflict and Ambiguity in the Implementation of the Civil Service Reform in
China, 1993-2000,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Hong Kong: the University of Hong Kong, 2003).
11 The reasons for program failure may include: the local implementation of Civil Service Reform took
place at a time the central government launched a downsizing campaign; the central government’s
determination to downsize the bureaucracy undermined mobility within the civil service and to some extent
prevented organizational renewal; local governments could not hire new civil servants through open
competition, but were still obliged to provide jobs to demobilized soldiers who were generally considered
as poorly-educated.
290
developing trend through examining the impacts of reforms on local government
performance. And this prediction is also based on the evaluation of the rationale behind
the reforms.
Data Availability
I have set a benchmark to measure environmental government performance in
China in chapter 4. If I conduct the same survey protocol in Changchun and Ningbo, then
I can reliably compare the environmental performance of three cities. If I design survey
protocol that can gather data in educational policy that qualifies for the application of
Confirmatory Factor Analysis, I can compare educational performance of the three cities
too. Qualified data and Confirmatory Factor Analysis will allow me to comprehensively
compare performance of local governments. Second, more objective data of government
performance is warranted to avoid subjective bias of perception data.
291
Appendix 1: Detailed Information on The Database Used in This
Dissertation
The empirical database in this dissertation comprises three main parts, including
90 in-depth interviews with officials and their clients, a citizen satisfaction survey (a
large-scale random sampling survey) in Haidian and fieldwork interviews and a survey.1
The 90 In-depth Interviews
In order to investigate local implementation of China’s Civil Service Reform and
citizen evaluation on government performance in providing public services, we carried
out 90 in-depth interviews of officials and their clients in the Environmental Protection
Bureaus and Educational Bureaus of Beijing (Haidian district), Ningbo, and Changchun
in 2000 and 2001. Each interview was administered with the endorsement and support of
the respective Environmental Protection Bureaus and Educational Bureaus. We observed
no evidence that the leadership of the six bureaus attempted to affect the outcomes of the
interviews, and we explained clearly both in our briefing and in the text of the interview
questionnaire that all the data were collected solely for academic purposes and would
remain strictly confidential. Thus we can reasonably believe that the responses represent
the true opinions of the respondents.
In this study, we interviewed 40 officials from a pool of 388 (the administrative
establishment of the three Environmental Protection Bureaus number 30, 28 and 28 and
the three Educational Bureaus number 148, 90, and 64 respectively in Beijing, Ningbo,
1
The data for this dissertation came in part from a CERG research project supported by the Hong Kong
Research Grants Council, entitled “The Impact of Reform of the Civil Service Entry Selection System in
China since 1993” RGC No. HKU7128/98H.
292
and Changchun).To increase the variety of responses, we interviewed officials of various
bureaucratic ranks. We also interviewed 50 clients of government environmental
protection services and education services. A total of 90 in-depth interviews were
conducted. Each lasted about 90 minutes and was conducted in Mandarin. The interviews
were conducted in late July 2000, late November 2000, and April-December 2001, and
subsequently tabulated. A structured questionnaire was prepared for face-to-face
interviews. Most of our questions were open-ended. These were intended to complement
the inadequacies of using closed-ended questions and thereby provide further information
for interpreting our findings.
Following is a profile of the interviewees.
Table 1 PROFILE OF INTERVIEWEES
Officials, N=40
Characteristics
Average Age
41.64 years
Education Background
27 have university degrees
2 have master’s degrees
Bureaucratic rank
Bureau Chief/Deputy Chief 2
Division Chief/Deputy Chief 16
Section Chief/Deputy Chief 13
Others 6
NA 3
Customers, N = 50
Average Age
39.8 years
Education Background
24 have university degrees
2 have master’s degrees
Occupation
Principal 7
Teacher 5
Student 5
Parent 6
Factory manager or worker 14
Retired 3
Service Unit worker 10
Source: 90 in-depth interviews database, 2000 and 2001
293
Haidian Citizen Satisfaction Survey
In order to collect data on how citizens evaluate government performance in
environmental and educational policy, we conducted a large-scale random sampling
survey in Haidian. This citizen satisfaction survey was conducted in collaboration with
the Research Center for Contemporary China of Peking University in January and March
of 2003.2
The sample site is Haidian District of Beijing city, and it has two salient
features which are desirable for an empirical study of citizen satisfaction with Chinese
local government. First, as the capital of the country, Beijing is often viewed as the
cultural, industrial and commercial center in contemporary China. Thus the residents of
Beijing tend to be more familiar with or informed about government issues than people
elsewhere in China. Haidian district in Beijing is the district with the most developed
education system and institutions in the city. Thus the residents of Haidian may be more
familiar with or knowledgeable about government educational performance. Due to these
factors, we think the residents of Haidian district in Beijing are good candidates for
survey research on citizens’ evaluation of local environmental and educational
performance.
The Probabilities Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling method was adopted to
generate a random sample of 728 adults in the Haidian District. This probability sample
was derived from a multi-stage sampling process. Step1, 25 Urban Residential
2
Conducting a good survey in China depends heavily on having a reliable Chinese partner. The Research
Center for Contemporary China of Peking University in Beijing, which was set up in 1988, has conducted
numerous surveys for both Chinese and foreign organizations. Their website is
http://www.rcccpku.org/ch/index.php
294
Committees (Juweihui) were randomly chosen at the first stage of sampling. Step 2, 29
households were randomly chosen from each of the 25 Urban Residential Committees,
producing a total of 728 households. Step 3, one individual of 18 or older but younger
than 67 was randomly chosen from each of the 728 households as the interviewee.
During the survey, a field worker took the questionnaire to the randomly chosen
individual respondent and then conducted the interview. On average, the interview took
45 minutes. Then the field worker brought the questionnaire back to the survey center.
Given the previous experience that, in collecting quality research data in China, the
presence of research professionals is often important, all the field workers of this survey
are intensively trained undergraduates from the Political Science Department of Peking
University. As a result of this effort, a total of 501 permanent urban residents aged
between 18 and 66 were interviewed. The response rate was approximately 69%.
Demographic information on the interviewees is shown in table 2. The sample was
roughly divided between the two genders (48.3% males and 51.7% females). All age
groups (from 18 years old to over 60) and urban occupation sectors are represented in the
sample. About 5% in our sample had primary schooling or below, 23.4% had junior
middle school diplomas, 45.7% had a senior middle school and /or vocational education,
and 25.5% had university degrees or above.
295
Table 2 Profiles of interviewees
characteristics
gender
male
female
age
18-29
30-49
50-66
education background
primary school or below
junior middle school
senior middle school
upper middle specialized school
university and above
occupation
party & government institutions
state-owned enterprises & public institutions
private enterprises & work units
three kinds of foreign-invested enterprises
sole-proprietorship
others (including unemployed, students,
housewives and retired)
number
percentage
242
259
48.3
51.7
64
301
136
12.8
60.1
27.1
26
117
149
80
128
5.0
23.4
29.7
16.0
25.5
32
229
36
15
21
6.4
45.7
7.2
3.0
4.2
167
33.3
monthly income
258
RMB 1,000 or below
RMB 1,001156
2,000
RMB 2,00155
3,000
32
RMB 3,000 or above
Source: Haidian citizen satisfaction survey, January –March 2003.
51.5
31.1
11.0
6.4
In the survey, respondents were asked to assess a variety of programs or activities
that Haidian district Environmental Protection Bureau and Haidian district Education
Commission conducted. They also provided their perception of the overall environmental
situation and overall quality of education in Haidian. They were also asked to assess the
policy responsiveness of Haidian district Environmental Protection Bureau and Haidian
district Education Commission. Care was taken to minimize respondent effects and
linguistic misinterpretations. We considered the Chinese social and cultural context when
designing the wording of the questionnaire. The questionnaire was pre-tested in draft
296
form during October 2002 to test the clarity of the language, the smoothness of the flow
of questions, the appropriateness of the length and the time needed to answer the
questions. The questionnaire was subsequently revised to its final format. Respondents
were offered confidentiality and encouraged to provide answers that best captured their
true feelings. In general, circumstantial evidence suggests that Chinese respondents feel
much freer to express their views in such a public opinion survey as ours than typically
assumed by the western media. Since those in our sample are permanent residents of
Haidian district in Beijing city, we do not intend to generalize our findings to the rest of
China. Nonetheless, we do believe that our findings are indicative and illustrative of the
popular evaluation of local government performance in the PRC.
Fieldwork
My fieldwork research was financially supported by the Graduate Student Grant
of the Urban China Research Network at the State University of New York at Albany,
USA. The fieldwork was also financially supported by the Thomas H C Cheung
Postgraduate Scholarship, Hong Kong Association of University Women. I visited and
conducted in-depth interviews and questionnaire surveys in environmental protection
agencies and education agencies of Haidian district (in Beijing city) and Changchun city
during March and April of 2004, and of Ningbo city in February of 2005. During the
fieldwork, I tried to collect data and information on the implementation of China’s Civil
Service Reform, performance measurement in local government agencies, officials’
perceptions of their clients and their agency performance.
297
The survey questionnaire includes five sub-issues: interviewee background,
perceptions of implementation of China’s Civil Service Reform, understandings of
agency performance, identification of clients, and evaluations of sub-division
performance. In general, the survey data helps to address three questions: 1). How do the
officials perceive and evaluate the 1993 China Civil Service Reform? 2). How do they
understand and evaluate the agency performance and the sub-division performance within
their agency? 3). How do they identify and treat their clients during their work routines?
Altogether I have 52 samples. Table 3 and 4 provide the nature of the
interviewees.
Table 3 Sampling Number
Education
Environmental protection
Haidian
11
11
Changchun
15
15
Total
26
26
Source: fieldwork survey, March-April 2004
Table 4 Profile of Interviewees
Average age
Gender
Education background
Bureaucratic rank
Average years worked
Source: fieldwork survey, March-April 2004
38.6
Male 29
Female 23
College 6
University 39
Master 7
Division chief 2
Deputy division chief 5
Section chief 10
Deputy section chief 9
Section member 24
NA 2
9.12
298
Total
22
30
52
Appendix 2: Information on Socio-Demographic and Economic
Development in the Three Cities
BEIJING
1. Permanent Residents (10000 persons)
Source: Beijing Statistics Yearbook 2005.
2. Gross Domestic Product (100 million yuan)
Source: Beijing Statistics Yearbook 2005.
299
3. Industry Composition of Gross Domestic Product
Source: Beijing Statistics Yearbook 2005.
4. Students Enrollment Per 10000 Population(person)
Source: Beijing Statistics Yearbook 2005.
300
Changchun
population
(unit:
10000)
GDP (unit:
100 million
yuan )
GDP per
capita (yuan)
industry composition of GDP
(unit: 100 million yuan)
primary secondary tertiary
1999
286.6
738.8
10722
132.1
304.7
302.0
2000
2001
292.8
298.0
861.0
1003.0
12381
14274
123.0
135.9
372.3
443.6
365.7
423.5
2002
303.9
1150.2
16220
146.9
522.4
480.9
157.3
630.3
550.4
2003
310.0
1338.0
18704
Source: Changchun Statistics Yearbook 2004.
Ningbo
population
(unit:
10000)
2003
510.76
per capita GDP
(yuna)
32629
2004
538.41
39173
source: Ningbo Statistics Yearbook 2005
301
Comparisons among the Three Cities
Per Capita Income and Expenditure of Urban Residents
unit: yuan
annual discretionary income per capita
2004
2003
2004 as % of 2003
Beijing
15637.8
13882.6
112.6
Changchun
8901.2
7905.3
112.6
Ningbo
15881.3
14277.3
111.2
annual living expenditure per capita
2004
2003
2004 as % of 2003
Beijing
12200.4
11123.8
109.7
Changchun
7538.7
6766.0
111.4
Ningbo
11281.9 10462.9
107.8
Source: National Statistical Bureau, Urban Statistics Yearbook
of China 2004, China Statistics Press 2005.
302
Appendix 3: Protocol for The 90 In-depth Interviews
(Questions for Officials)
Sex
Coding
1
2
total
Meaning
Male
Female
Section A. Interviewee Characteristics
A1. Work unit: which government bureau/ division/ section you belong to?
A2. Bureaucratic rank (Bureau Chief/Deputy Chief, Division Chief/Deputy Chief,
Section Chief/Deputy Chief, Others)
A3. Birth year
A4. Education background
Coding
3
4
5
6
7
8
Meaning
Primary school
Junior middle school
Senior middle school (including middle specialized school)
Upper middle specialized school
University
Post-graduate
A5. Place of birth
Section B. Responsibilities of Position
B1. Please list out the main responsibilities of your position.
B2. Among the above responsibilities, which are from the directives of the upper level
governments?
B3. Among the above responsibilities, which are to suit the local circumstances?
B4. Which responsibilities mentioned above is the most important in your opinion?
B6. Are you familiar with the directives from the upper level governments?
303
B7. Did your organization make some adjustments to the directives from the upper level
governments?
Section C. Perception of Clients
C1. Please identify the clients of your organization.
C2. How do you communicate with your clients?
C3. Do the clients play a role in the decision-making of your organization?
Section D. Measures to Fulfill the Organizational Missions
D1. What regular measures have been adopted to fulfill the missions in your organization?
D2. Among the measures mentioned above, which are directives from upper level
governments; which are initiated by your organization?
D3. What activities have been organized to fulfill the missions?
D4. Among the activities mentioned above, which are directives from upper level
governments; which are initiated by your organization?
D5. How do you evaluate the effects of these measures and activities?
Section E. Assessment of Organizational Performance
E1. Please evaluate the performance of your organization.
E2. Please elaborate the criteria you used for the above evaluation.
E3. In your opinion, what are the main weaknesses of the existing organizational
performance measurement system?
E4. Please describe the existing organizational performance measurement system,
including the actors, the resources, and the process.
E5. Do you think the following are the determining factors for the organizational
performance? Please rank them according to their strength in determining organizational
performance.
Coding
Meaning
304
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Increased financial input
Improved technology
Political support
Improved quality of civil servants as the result of China’s Civil Service Reform
Perfection of relevant rules and regulations
Improvement of internal administrative leadership
Strategic planning
Public support
E6. We list out some components of China’s Civil Service Reform. Please assess their
impacts on local government performance respectively.
Coding
1
2
3
4
5
6
Total
Meaning
Open and competitive selection
Performance appraisal
Linking the results of performance appraisal to the pay
Training program
Reward and discipline
Installment of competition in the staffing process
E7. In your opinion, what factors will hinder the organizational performance
improvement?
(Questions for Clients )
Sex
Coding
1
2
total
Meaning
Male
Female
Section A. Interviewee Characteristics
A1. Work unit
A2. Birth year
A3. Education background
Coding
3
Meaning
Primary school
305
4
5
6
7
8
Junior middle school
Senior middle school (including middle specialized school)
Upper middle specialized school
University
Post-graduate
A4. Place of birth
Section B. Demand & Preference on Public Service
B1. As a citizen, what kind of public services you want the environmental protection /
educational bureaus to provide?
B2. Why do you think these public services important?
Section C. Perception of Government Efforts
C1. Are you familiar with the policies and regulations of the environmental protection /
educational bureaus?
C2. Are you familiar with the activities of the environmental protection / educational
bureaus?
C3. How did you get the information regarding the above activities?
C4. Do you think the above policies, regulations, or activities of the environmental
protection / educational bureaus cover the demands and preference of the general public?
C5. Did you contact the environmental protection / educational bureaus recently? For
what?
C6. Did the environmental protection / educational bureaus contact you recently? For
what?
Section D. Assessment of Government Performance
D1. Do you know the criteria that the environmental protection / educational bureaus
used to evaluate their own performance?
306
D2. In your opinion, what should be the criteria to evaluate the performance of the
environmental protection / educational bureaus?
D3. Compared with 5 years ago, which of the following will be your evaluation of the
performance of the environmental protection / educational bureaus?
Coding
1
2
3
4
5
Meaning
Apparently improved
Improved
No changes
Retrogress
Apparent retrogress
D4. Please identify the successful jobs that the government bureaus have done.
D5. Please identify the areas where improvements are warranted in government works.
Section E. Determining Factors of Government Performance
E1. Do you think the following are the determining factors for the government
performance? Please rank them according to their strength in determining government
performance.
Coding
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Meaning
Increased financial input
Improved technology
Political support
Improved quality of civil servants as the result of China’s Civil Service Reform
Perfection of relevant rules and regulations
Improvement of internal administrative leadership
Public support
E2. In your opinion, what factors will hinder the government performance improvement?
307
Appendix 4: Haidian Citizen Satisfaction Survey Questionnaire
Sex
Coding
1
2
total
Meaning
Male
Female
Section A. Interviewee Characteristics
A1. Occupation nature
Coding
1
2
3
4
5
7
99
Total
Meaning
Party & government institutions
State-owned enterprises & public institutions
Private enterprises & work units
Three kinds of foreign-invested enterprises
Sole-proprietorship
others
No answers, reject to answer or the interviewer forget to ask
A2. Work place
Coding
1
3
99
Total
Meaning
Work place in Haidian district
Work place outside of Haidian
No answers, reject to answer or the interviewer forget to ask
A3. Birth year
A4. Education background
Coding
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
Meaning
Illiterate
Lower primary school
Primary school
Junior middle school
Senior middle school (including middle specialized school)
Upper middle specialized school
University and above
No answers, reject to answer or the interviewer forget to ask
308
Total
A5. How long did you lived in Haidian?
A6. No. of children
Coding
0
1
2
3
4
5
Total
Meaning
No child
1 child
2 children
3 children
4 children
5 children
A6a. No. of children attending primary school
Coding
0
1
Total
Meaning
No child attending primary school
1 child attending primary school
A6b. No. of children attending junior middle school
Coding
0
1
Total
Meaning
No child attending junior middle school
1 child attending junior middle school
A6c. No. of children attending senior middle school
Coding
0
1
2
Total
Meaning
No child attending senior middle school
1 child attending senior middle school
2 child attending senior middle school
Section B. Evaluation on Environmental Situation
B1. We list out some of the problems the world confronting now, please rank the first
three important problems in your mind.
Coding
1
2
Meaning
Poverty
Education deficiency
309
3
4
5
6
88
99
Total
Too many people
Environmental pollution
Natural calamity
Regional war
Interviewee not know
No answers, reject to answer or the interviewer forget to ask
B2. We list out some of the problems China confronting now, please rank the first three
important problems in your mind.
Coding
1
2
3
4
5
6
Total
Meaning
Social security
Education deficiency
Too many people
Unemployment
Environmental protection
Social welfare
B3. We list out some of the problems Haidian confronting now, please rank the first three
important problems in your mind.
Coding
1
2
3
4
5
6
88
Total
Meaning
Social security
Education deficiency
Too many people
Unemployment
Environmental protection
Social welfare
Interviewee not know
B4. We list out 5 important goals of China’s development, please rank them according to
their importance.
Coding (goal)
Meaning
1
Economic development
2
Science and education
3
Controlling population
4
Social equity
5
Environmental protection
88
Interviewee not know
310
B6. How do you think the environment pollution situation in China?
Coding
1
2
3
4
8
9
Total
Meaning
Very serious
Serious relatively
Not very serious
No problem
Interviewee not know
Without answer
B7. What do you think are the main problems of China’s environment?
Coding
1
2
3
4
7
8
9
Total
Meaning
Water pollution
Air pollution
The plant destroying
Solid rubbish
Others (please specify)
Interviewee not know
Without answer
B8. Compared with 5 years ago, what will be your evaluation on Haidian’s
environmental protection performance?
Coding
1
2
3
4
5
8
Total
Meaning
Apparently improved
Improved
No change
Deterioration
Apparent deterioration
Interviewee not know
B8a. Please elaborate the criteria you used for the above evaluation.
B9. In your mind, who should take the responsibility for Haidian’s environmental
protection?
Coding
1
2
3
Meaning
Government
Enterprises
Social groups
311
4
5
7
8
9
Total
Individual
All the above roles take equal
responsibility
Others (please specify)
Interviewee not know
Without answer
B10. We list out some of the reasons for environment pollution. In your mind, which of
them is/ are the reasons for Haidian’s environment pollution?
reasons
Yes
No
(frequency) (frequency)
Not know
B10s1. people’s weak
environmental
awareness
B10s2. government’s EP regulation deficiency
B10s3. people’s weak legal awareness
B10s4. population grow too fast
B10s5. consumption increase too fast
B10s6. be influenced by the adjacent region’s
pollution
B10s7. too fast economic growth
B10a. Among the above reasons, please choose three important ones and rank them
according to the importance.
B11. Now we try to understand the environment problem from law perspective, in your
mind which is the reason for environment pollution in China?
Coding
1
3
5
8
9
Total
Meaning
Rules & regulations deficiency
Laws & regulations are poorly implemented
Institutions or individuals not abide to law
Interviewee not know
Without answer
B12. Who should take responsibility for environmental protection? And should take how
much of the responsibility. (There is a 0 to 10 equal-distance scale on the answer sheet.
“0” represents no responsibility; “10” represents most of the responsibility. )
Coding
B12s1
B12s2
Meaning
The central government
The local government
312
B12s3
B12s4
B12s5
Enterprises
Individual
Social group
B13. We list out some of the aspects of government’s environmental protection work.
Please evaluate them one by one.
Coding
Work
B13s1
EP
propaganda
&
education
Prefect rules & regulations
Address citizen’s
complaints
Supervise enterprises’ EP
work
Enforce EP rules &
regulations
Improve EP technology
Take use of social EP
groups
Increase EP financial input
B13s2
B13s3
B13s4
B13s5
B13s6
B13s7
B13s8
Very
good
Good
Bad
Very bad
Not
know
B13a. Among the above works, which is the most urgent one need to be pushed?
B14. How did you access to environmental protection information? Please choose three
out of the following.
Coding
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
77
Meaning
broadcast
Work unit’s education activities
Newspaper & magazines
Government education & propaganda activities
TV
Communications with others
Internet
Others (please specify)
Section C. Environmental Protection Performance
C1. Did you ever hear the following activities of Beijing municipal environmental
protection bureau?
313
Coding
C1a
C1b
C1c
C1d
C1e
Meaning
Control air pollution and impose water & noise pollution standard
Good environment project (blue sky & clean water)
Control coal gas & oil gas
Control gas produced by car
Beautiful city project (clean retailers on the street)
C2. How did you access to the above information? Please choose three out of the
following.
Coding
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
77
Meaning
broadcast
Work unit’s education activities
Newspaper & magazines
Government education & propaganda activities
TV
Communications with others
Internet
Others (please specify)
C3. The Beijing municipal environmental protection bureau made some new policies and
rules these years. Do you know them?
Coding
Meaning
C3a
Stop the use of coal oven
C3b
Extra benefits of coal-change-togas and electricity-to-gas for old
city area
C3c
Fund return policy after the
installment of online-watch
machine
Low rent loan policy concerning
environmental engineering
C3d
Know
Not know Without
(frequency) (frequency) answer
C3e
Policy of “who pollute, who take
the responsibility”
C3f
Policy concerning air pollution
control
C4. In your opinion, to what extent the above policies cover the citizens’ need?
314
Coding
1
2
3
4
8
9
Total
Meaning
To a very large extent
To a large extent
To a small extent
Not cover at all
Interviewee not know
Without answer
C8. Do you think the following work relevant to environmental protection need to be
improved?
Coding
C8a
C8b
C8c
C8d
C8e
C8f
C8g
Meaning
Pro-pollution management: permissions for project constructing, enlarging, and
changing.
Supervise and regulate the polluting enterprises
Control the emergence and cases reported by citizens
EP broadcasting, reporting, educating and training
Measure environment quality and over-watch the pollution origins
Environmental technology research & promotion
Environmental protection evaluation
C9. Do you know the criteria that the environmental protection bureaus used to evaluate
their own performance? Please choose from the following criteria.
Coding
Meaning
C9a
C9b
Pollution index
No. of large-scale
project & activities
C9c
No.
of
citizens’
complaints & praises
C9d
No. & influence of
accidents
Honors from upperlevel administration
C9e
Choose
(frequency)
Not
(frequency)
Not
know
(frequency)
C10. Referring to the most satisfactory job Haidian environmental protection bureau done,
you will choose which one of the following?
Coding
Meaning
315
1
2
3
8
9
Total
Improve the enforcement of EP law, rules, and regulations
Perfect EP laws, rules, and regulations
Change attitude to citizens (service-oriented)
Interviewee not know
Without answer
C11. Referring to the most satisfactory job, what are the determining factors that lead to
the good results in your mind?
Coding
Meaning
1
2
3
4
Increased financial input
Improved technology
Political support
Improved quality of civil
servants as the result of
China’s Civil Service Reform
Perfection of relevant rules and
regulations
Improvement
of
internal
administrative leadership
Public support
5
6
7
Yes
(frequency)
No
(frequency)
Not know
C11a. Among the above reasons leading to the satisfactory job, which are the first three
important ones? Please rank according to their importance.
Section D. Evaluation on Education Situation
D1. Which of the following will be your general evaluation of China’s education
situation?
Coding
1
2
3
4
8
Total
Meaning
Very serious problem
Serious problem
Not serious
No problem at all
Interviewee not know
D2. In your opinion, which of the following is the most serious problem of China’s
education?
316
Coding
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total
Meaning
Education quality
Teachers’ capability
Equal opportunity for receiving education
Schools’ facility
Government education input
Lot of children cannot access to education
Others (specify)
Interviewee not know
D3. Compared with 5 years ago, which of the following will be your evaluation of
Beijing’s education performance?
Coding
1
2
3
4
5
8
Total
Meaning
Apparently improved
Improved
No changes
Retrogress
Apparent retrogress
Interviewee not know
D3a. Please elaborate the criteria you used for the above evaluation.
D4. Compared with 5 years ago, which of the following will be your evaluation of
Haidian’s education performance?
Coding
1
2
3
4
5
8
Total
Meaning
Apparently improved
Improved
No changes
Retrogress
Apparent retrogress
Interviewee not know
D4a. Please elaborate the criteria you used for the above evaluation.
D5. In your mind, who should take the responsibility for Haidian’s education
performance?
Coding
1
2
Meaning
The central government
Haidian’s education commission
317
3
4
5
6
7
77
88
Total
Schools
Teachers
Headmaster of the schools
Students
All the above roles take equal responsibility
Others (please specify)
Interviewee not know
D6. Compared with 5 years ago, which of the following will be your general evaluation
of quality of Haidian graduates?
Coding
1
2
3
4
5
8
Total
Meaning
Apparently improved
Improved
No changes
Retrogress
Apparent retrogress
Interviewee not know
D6a. In your mind, who (teachers, parents, students, education commission) should take
the main responsibility for the changes of graduates’ quality? Please rank according to
their importance.
D7. In your mind, which of the following is/ are the reasons for the Haidian educational
problems?
Coding
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Meaning
Without equal opportunity for receiving education
Government regulations deficiency
Illegal charges by the schools
Poor ethics of the teachers
Poor qualification of the teachers
Population growth
Poor schools’ facility
Government input inadequate
Section E. Education Performance
E1. Did you ever hear the following activities of Beijing municipal education
commission?
Coding
E1a
Meaning
Year of teachers’ ethics construction
318
E1b
E1c
E1d
E1e
E1 f
E1g
E1h
Serve for the tax payers
Construction model for senior middle school
Haidian junior & senior middle schools’ teaching conference
Modernization of archive management
Large-scale check of school environment
Qualification of academic leaders
System reform of 11 school in Beijing
E2. How did you access to the information of the above activities? Please choose three
out of the following.
Coding
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
77
Meaning
broadcast
Work unit’s education activities
Newspaper & magazines
Government education & propaganda activities
TV
Communications with others
Internet
Others (please specify)
E3. The Beijing municipal education commission made some new policies and rules
these years. Do you know them?
Coding
E3a
E3b
E3c
E3d
E3e
E3f
E3g
Meaning
Control corruption and enforce responsibility system within Haidian
education party system
Regulations on “education quality management in primary & middle
schools”
Stop illegal charges concerning education
Regulations on teachers’ ethics, qualification and education
background
Regulations on private provision of foods to students in or near the
campus
Self-evaluation and expert supervision on the implementation of
comprehensive quality education
Performance measurement in CCP working branches of Haidian
education system
E4. In your opinion, to what extent the above policies cover the citizens’ need?
Coding
1
2
3
Meaning
To a very large extent
To a large extent
To a small extent
319
4
8
9
Total
Not cover at all
Interviewee not know
Without answer
E8. Do you think the following work relevant to education need to be improved?
Coding
E8a
E8b
E8c
E8d
E8e
E8q
Meaning
School education management & service
Adult education management & service
Ethics & culture education management & service
Career & social education
Education propaganda
Others (please specify)
E9. Do you know the criteria that the education commissions used to evaluate their own
performance? Please choose from the following criteria.
Coding
E9a
E9b
E9c
E9d
E9e
Meaning
Promotion rate & education popularization
No. of large-scale activities & projects
No. of citizens’ complaints & praises
No. & influence of education accidents
Honors from upper-level administration
E10. Which one of the following is the most successful job Haidian education
commission has done?
Coding
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Total
Meaning
Guarantee equal opportunity for receiving education
Improve the enforcement of govt. regulations
Stop illegal charges by the schools
Construction of teachers’ ethics
Improve teachers professional quality
Improve schools’ facility
Increase education input
Interviewee not know
Without answer
E11. Referring to the most satisfactory job, what are the determining factors that lead to
the good results in your mind?
Coding
Meaning
Yes
(frequency)
320
No
(frequency)
Not know
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Increased financial input
Improved technology
Political support
Improved quality of civil
servants as the result of
China’s Civil Service Reform
Perfection of relevant rules and
regulations
Improvement
of
internal
administrative leadership
Public support
E11a. Among the above reasons leading to the satisfactory job, which are the first three
important ones? Please rank according to their importance.
G. Other information
G1. Which of the following is /are the transportation methods for you to go to work
usually?
Coding
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
77
Meaning
Bus of work unit
Taxi
Subway
Bus
Bike
Private car
By foot
Others (please specify)
G2. Do you have income?
Coding
1
5
Total
Meaning
Has income
No income
G2a. Your total income of last month (including salary, bonus, wage of second
employment, given from friends or relatives, benefit from investment, and all the other
means).
G3. How many persons have income in your family?
321
G4. Total income of your family last month (including salary, bonus, wage of second
employment, given from friends or relatives, benefit from investment, and all the other
means)
G5. How many persons in your family live on the above family income?
G6. Family consumption last month
G7. How much did your family spend on the following items last month?
House rent
Gas, water, electricity, and warming facility
Food
Clothes
Children education
Leisure
Support for the relatives
Transportation
G8. Did you install the telephone in your house?
322
Appendix 5: Fieldwork Survey Questionnaire
Sex
Coding
1
2
total
Meaning
Male
Female
Section A. Interviewee Characteristics
A1. Work unit: which government bureau/ division/ section you belong to?
A2. Bureaucratic rank (Bureau Chief/Deputy Chief, Division Chief/Deputy Chief,
Section Chief/Deputy Chief, Others)
A3. Birth year
A4. Education background
Coding
3
4
5
6
7
8
Meaning
Primary school
Junior middle school
Senior middle school (including middle specialized school)
Upper middle specialized school
University
Post-graduate
A5. How long have you worked for this bureau?
Section B. Implementation of China’s Civil Service Reform
B1. When did your organization finish the transition program of China’s Civil Service
Reform?
B2. Did your organization recruit newcomers in year 2003? How many of them were
selected through open competitive examinations?
B3. Did you receive training in year 2003? What kinds of training? How many hours for
each kind?
B4. Please describe the existing individual performance appraisal in your organization.
323
B5. Please describe the existing organizational performance measurement system in your
organization, including the actors, the resources, and the process.
B6. Was your pay linked to your performance?
Section C. Perception of Clients
C1. Please identify the clients of your organization.
C2. How do you communicate with your clients?
C3. Do the clients play a role in the decision-making of your organization?
Section D. Assessment of Organizational Performance
D1. Please evaluate the performance of your organization.
D2. Please elaborate the criteria you used for the above evaluation.
D3. Please describe the existing organizational performance measurement system in your
organization, including the actors, the resources, and the process.
D4. In your opinion, what are the main weaknesses of the existing organizational
performance measurement system?
Section E. Assessment of Sub-division Performance
E1. Do you think organizational harmony a good thing?
324
E2. How would you evaluate the performance of the other sub-divisions in your bureau?
Please use 5-point scale, “5” means very good while “1” means very bad.
Insider Evaluation of Other Sub-divisions’ Performance in Education (5-point scale)
Haidian Education
Changchun Education
General office
Personnel office
Teaching regulation
division
School regulation
division
Middle-school
management office
Primary-school
management office
Social
education
regulation office
Budget office
Insider Evaluation of Other Sub-divisions’ Performance in Environment (5-point scale)
Haidian
Environment
Changchun
Environment
General office
Personnel office
Environment
supervising division
Pollution
control
division
Regulations
enforcement
division
Policy
and
regulation division
Environment
monitoring station
Technology division
E3. If a colleague of another sub-division asks you a favor to fulfill his work duty, what
is your response? Help, not help or not sure?
E4. In your opinion, what factors will hinder the organizational performance
improvement?
325
Bibliography:
Works in English
Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs and Economic
Organization,” American Economic Review Vol. 62, No. 5 (1972), 777-795.
Alt, J. E. and K. A. Shepsle (eds.), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
Aufrecht, Steven E. and Li Siu Bun, “Reform with Chinese Characteristics: the Context
of Chinese Civil Service Reform,” Public Administration Review Vol. 55, No. 2 (1995),
175-182.
Baiman, Stanley, “Agency Research in Managerial Accounting: A Survey,” Journal of
Accounting Literature No. 1 (1982), 154-213.
Baiman, Stanley, “Agency Research in Managerial Accounting: A Second Look,”
Accounting, Organizations and Society Vol. 15, No. 4 (1990), 341-371.
Baiman, Stanley and Joel Demski, “Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and
Control Systems,” Journal of Accounting Research No. 18 (1980), 184-220.
Banks, Jeffrey and Rangarajan Sundaram, “Optimal Retention in Agency Problems,”
Journal of Economic Theory No. 82 (1998), 293-323.
Barnett, Doak A. Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1967).
Bates, Robert Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry Weingast,
Analytic Narratives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
Becker, Brian and Barry Gerhart, “The Impact of Human Resource Management
Practices on Organizational Performance: Progress and Prospects,” Academy of
Management Journal Vol. 39, No. 4 (1996), 779-801.
Beetham, David, Bureaucracy (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1987).
Beetham, David, “Theorizing Democracy and Local Government,” in D. King and G.
Stoker (eds.) Rethinking Local Democracy (London: Macmillan, 1996), 28-49.
Bekke, Hans A. G. M., James L. Perry and Theo A. J. Toonen (eds.), Civil Service
Systems in Comparative Perspective (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996).
Bendor, Jonathan, “Formal Models of Bureaucracy,” British Journal of Political Science
Vol. 18, No. 3 (1988), 353-395.
326
Bendor, Jonathan and Terry Moe “An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics,”
American Political Science Review Vol. 79, No. 3 (1985), 755-774.
Bendor, Taylor and Van Gaalen, “Bureaucratic Expertise vs. Legislative Authority: A
Model of Deception and Monitoring in Budgeting,” American Political Science Review
No. 79 (1985), 1041-1060.
Bendor, Taylor and Van Gaalen, “Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Asymmetric
Information,” American Journal of Political Science No. 31 (1987), 796-828.
Bernheim and Whinston, “Common Agency,” Econometrica No. 19 (1986), 269-281.
Bian Yanjie, “Guanxi and the Allocation of Urban Jobs in China,” The China Quarterly
No. 140 (1994), 971-999.
Bo Zhiyue, “Selection and Appointment of Leading Cadres in Post-Deng China,”
Chinese Law and Government Vol.32, No. 1 (1999), 45-61.
Bo, Zhiyue, Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility
since 1949 (Armonk, N.Y.; London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2002).
Bollen, Kenneth A. “A Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Subjective Air Quality,”
Evaluation Review Vol. 6, No. 4 (1982), 521-535.
Bollen, Kenneth A. Structural Equations with Latent Variables (New York: Wiley,
1989).
Boschken, Herman L. “Organizational Performance and Multiple Constituencies,” Public
Administration Review Vol. 54, No. 3 (1994), 308-314.
Boyne, G. A., Public Choice Theory and Local Government: A Comparative Analysis of
the UK and the USA (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998).
Boyne, G. A., “Planning, Performance and Public Services,” Public Administration Vol.
79, No. 1 (2001), 73-88.
Boyne, G. A. (2003), “Sources of Public Service Improvement: A Critical Review and
Research Agenda.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 13 (3): 367394.
Boyne, G. A. and J. Dahya, “Executive Succession and the Performance of Public
Organizations,” Public Administration Vol. 80, No. 1 (2002), 179-200.
327
Brewer, Gene A. and Sally Coleman Selden, “Why Elephants Gallop: Assessing and
Predicting Organizational Performance in Federal Agencies,” Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory Vol. 10, No. 4 (2000), 685-711.
Breton A. and R. Wintrobe, The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct: an Economic Analysis
of Competition, Exchange and Efficiency in Private and Public Organizations
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
Breton A. and R. Wintrobe, “The Bureaucracy of Murder Revisited,” Journal of Political
Economy No. 94 (1986), 905-926.
Brodsgaard, Kjeld Erik, “China’s Cadres and Cadre Management System,” in Wang
Guangwu and Zheng Yongnian (eds.) Damage Control: the Chinese Communist Party
under the Jiang Zemin Era (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003), 209-231.
Brown, Karin and Phillip B. Coulter, “Subjective and Objective Measures of Police
Service Delivery,” Public Administration Review Vol. 43, No. 1 (1983), 50-58.
Brudney, Jeffrey L. and Robert E. England, “Urban Policy Making and Subjective
Service Evaluations: Are They Compatible?” Public Administration Review Vol. 42, No.
2 (1982), 127-135.
Burns, John P. “The Chinese Civil Service System,” in Ian Scott and John P. Burns (eds.)
The Hong Kong Civil Services and Its Future (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press,
1987), 204 – 226.
Burns, John P. “Civil Service Reform in Contemporary China,” Australian Journal of
Chinese Affairs No. 18 (1987), 47 – 83.
Burns, John P. “China’s Nomenklatura System,” Problems of Communism No. 36 (1987),
36 – 51.
Burns, John P. “China's Governance: Political Reform in a Turbulent Environment,” The
China Quarterly No. 119 (1989), 481-518.
Burns, John P. “Chinese Civil Service Reform: The 13th Party Congress Proposal,” The
China Quarterly No.120 (1989), 739 – 770.
Burns, John P. The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenklatura System: A Documentary
Study of Party Control of Leadership Selection, 1979 – 1984 (NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989).
Burns, John P. “China’s Administrative Reforms for a Market Economy,” Public
Administration and Development Vol. 13, No. 4 (1993), 345 – 360.
Burns, John. P. “Administrative Reform in China: Issues and Prospects,” International
Journal of Public Administration Vol. 16, No. 9 (1993), 1345–1369.
328
Burns, John P. “Civil Service Reform in China,” Asian Journal of Political Science No. 2
(1994), 44 – 72.
Burns, John P. “Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: The 1990
Nomenklatura,” The China Quarterly No. 138 (1994), 458 – 491.
Burns, John P. “Changing Environmental Impacts on Civil Service Systems: The Cases
of China and Hong Kong,” in Hoi-kwok Wong and Hon S. Chan (eds.) Handbook of
Comparative Public Administration in the Asia-Pacific Basin (New York: Marcel Dekker,
Inc, 1999), 179 – 218.
Burns, John P. “Rewarding Comrades at the Top in China,” in Christopher Hood and B.
Guy Peters with G. Lee (eds.) Reward for High Public Office: Asian and Pacific Rim
States (London: Routledge, 2003), 49-69.
Burns, John P. “The Civil Service System of China: The Impact of the Environment,” in
John P. Burns and Bidhya Bowornwathana (eds.) Civil Service Systems in Asia
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2001), 79-116.
Burns, John P. “Downsizing the Chinese State: Government Retrenchment in the 1990s,”
The China Quarterly No. 175 (2003), 775-802.
Burns, John P. Government Capacity and the Hong Kong Civil Service (Hong Kong;
New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
Burns, John P. “Governance and Civil Service Reform,” in Jude Howell (ed.)
Governance in China (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 37-57.
Burns, John P. “Civil Service Reform in China,” in Governance in China (OECD, 2005),
51-74.
Cabestan, Jean –Pierre, “The Reform of the Civil Service,” China News Analysis June 15
(1991), 1-9.
Cabestan, Jean –Pierre, “Civil Service Reform in China: the Draft Provisional Order
Concerning Civil Servants,” International Review of Administrative Sciences Vol. 58, No.
3 (1992), 421–436.
Calvert, Randal, Mathew D McCubbins and Barry R. Weingast, “A Theory of Political
Control and Agency Discretion,” American Journal of Political Science No. 33 (1989),
588 – 611.
Chan, Hon S. “In Search of Performance Profile in the People’s Republic of China,”
Public Administration Quarterly Vol. 24, No. 4 (2001), 469 - 490.
329
Chan, Hon S. “Cadre Personnel Management in China: the Nomenklatura System 19901998,” The China Quarterly No. 179 (2004), 703-734.
Chan, Hon S. and Tao-Chiu Lam, “Designing China’s Civil Service System: General
Principles and Realities,” International Journal of Public Administration Vol. 18, No. 8
(1995), 1301 -1321.
Chan, Hon S. and Tao-Chiu Lam, “Civil Service System: Policy Formulation and
Implementation,” The China Review 1995 (HK: CUHK Press, 1995), 2.1-2.43.
Chan, Hon S., Koon-kwai Wong, K. C. Cheung and Jack Man-keung Lo, “The
Implementation Gap in Environmental Management in China: The Case of Guangzhou,
Zhengzhou and Nanjing,” Public Administration Review Vol. 55, No. 4 (1995), 333 – 340.
Chan, Kin-man, “Corruption in China: A Principal-Agent Perspective,” in Hoi-kwok
Wong and Hon S. Chan (eds.) Handbook of Comparative Public Administration in the
Asia-Pacific Basin (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1999), 299 – 324.
Chang, Kelly H., J. P. Rui, de Figueiredo, Jr and Barry R. Weingast, “Rational Choice
Theories of Bureaucratic Control and Performance” in William F. Shughart and Laura
Razzolini (eds.) The Elgar Companion to Public Choice (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001),
271-292.
Chang, Gordon, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001).
Chen Weixing, “Ideology, Policy and Change: A Framework for Understanding Change
and Continuity in Mainland China,” Issues and Studies Vol.30, No. 5 (1994), 45 – 62.
Cheung, A. B. L., “Civil Service Reform in Shenzhen: Expectations and Problems,”
(paper prepared for Annual Pearl River Delta Conference, City University Contemporary
China Research Centre, 1995).
Cheung, Peter T. Y., Jae Ho Chung and Zhimin Lin (eds.), Provincial Strategies of
Economic Reform in Post-Mao China: Leadership, Politics and Implementation (Armonk,
N.Y. ; London, England : M.E. Sharpe, 1998).
Chew, D. “Civil Service Pay in China, 1955–1989: Overview and Assessment,”
International Review of Administrative Sciences No. 56 (1990), 345–364.
Chew, D. “Recent Developments in Civil Service Pay in China,” International Labour
Review Vol. 129, No. 6 (1990), 773–782.
Chou Kwok Ping, “Conflict and Ambiguity in the Implementation of the Civil Service
Reform in China, 1993-2000,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, (Hong Kong: The
University of Hong Kong, 2003).
330
Chow, King W. “Reform of Chinese Cadre System: Pitfalls, Issues, and Implications of
the Proposed Civil Service System,” International Review of Administrative Sciences No.
57 (1991), 25-44.
Chow, King W. The Performance Appraisal System of the Chinese State Administration
(Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1984).
Chow, King W. “Political Succession in the People’s Republic of China: Politics and
Implication of Cadre Assessment (1949-1984), Asian Profile Vol. 15, No. 5 (1987), 396 –
401.
Chow, King W. “The Management of Cadre Resources in Mainland China: The Problems
of Job Evaluation and Position Classification, 1949 – 1987,” Issues and Studies Vol, 24,
No. 8 (1988), 18-28.
Chow, King W. “The Politics of Performance Appraisal,” in Miriam K. Mills and Stuart
S. Nagel (eds.) Public Administration in China (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993), 109
– 115.
Chow, King W. “An Opinion Survey of Performance Appraisal Practices in Hong Kong
and the People’s Republic of China,” Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources
No. 32 (1994), 62–79.
Chung, Jae Ho, The Politics of Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China: Central
Control and Provincial Autonomy under Decentralization (Ann Arbor: UMI Dissertation
Services, 1993).
Chung, Jae Ho, “Studies of Central-Provincial Relations in the People’s Republic of
China: A Mid-Term Appraisal,” The China Quarterly No. 142 (1995), 487 – 508.
Coase, Ronald H. “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica No. 4 (1937), 386-405.
Coleman, James S., Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and
London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1990).
Connolly, Terry, Edward J. Colon and Stuart J. Deutsch, “Organizational Effectiveness:
A Multiple-Constituency Approach,” Academy of Management Review No. 5, No. 2
(1980), 211-217.
Cooke, F. L., “Manpower Restructuring in the State-Owned Railway Industry of China:
the Role of the State in Human Resource Strategy,” International Journal of Human
Resource Management Vol. 11, No. 5 (2000), 904–924.
Cooke, F. L., “Seven Reforms in Five Decades: Civil Service Reform and Its Human
Resource Implications in China,” Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy Vol. 8, No. 3
(2003), 380-404.
331
Courty, Pascal and Gerald Marschke, “Measuring Government Performance: Lessons
from a Federal Job-Training Program,” The American Economic Review Vol. 87, No. 2
(1997), 383-388.
Dai Guangqian, “Proposing a Reform of the Cadre and Personnel System and the State,”
Chinese Law and Government Vol. 23, No. 4 (1991), 61 – 73.
Dai Guangqian, “The Establishment of an Examination and Recruitment System with
Chinese Characteristics in the People’s Republic of China,” in John P. Burns (ed.) Asian
Civil Service Systems: Improving Efficiency and Productivity (Singapore: Times
Academic Press, 1994), 190 – 196.
Das, S. K., Civil Service Reform and Structural Adjustment (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998).
Delaney, Hohn T. and Mark A. Huselid, “The Impact of Human Resource Management
Practices on Perceptions of Organizational Performance,” Academy of Management
Journal Vol. 39, No. 4 (1996), 949- 969.
Delery, John E. and Harold D. Doty, “Modes of Theorizing in Strategic Tests of
Universalistic, Contingency, and Configurational Performance Predictions,” Academy of
Management Journal Vol. 39, No. 4 (1996), 802-835.
Dickson, Bruce J., Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private entrepreneurs, and
Prospects for Political Change (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
DiIulio, J., G. Garvey and D. Kettl, Improving Government Performance: An Owner’s
Manual (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993).
Dixit, Avinash K., The Making of Economic Policy: a Transaction-Cost Politics
Perspective (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
Dixit, Avinash K., “Studies of Incentives in Government Bureaucracies: Power of
Incentives in Private versus Public Organizations,” American Economic Review Vol. 87,
No. 2 (1997), 378-382.
Donaldson, Lex., “The Ethereal Hand: Organizational Economics and Management
Theory,” Academy of Management Review Vol. 15, No. 3 (1990), 369-381.
Dong Lisheng, “The Establishment of the Chinese Civil Service System: A Delayed
Political Reform Program,” in Dong Lisheng (ed.) Administrative Reform in the People’s
Republic of China since 1978 (Leiden: IIAS, 1994), 43-61.
Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row,
1957).
332
Downs, Anthony, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967).
Downs, D. and P. Larkey, The Search for Government Efficiency: from Hubris to
Helplessness (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1986).
Dresang, D., Public Personnel Management and Public Policy (New York: Addison
Wesley Longman Inc., 1998).
Edin, Maria, “State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management
from A Township Perspective,” The China Quarterly No. 173 (2003), 35-52.
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” Academy of
Management Review Vol. 14, No. 1 (1989), 57-74.
Fewsmith, Joseph, “Institutions, Informal Politics and Political Transition in China,”
Asian Survey Vol. 36, No. 3 (1996), 230 – 245.
Fewsmith, Joseph, “Reaction, Resurgence and Succession: Chinese Politics since
Tiananmen,” in Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.) The Politics of China: the Eras of Mao and
Deng (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 472 – 532.
Flynn, N., Public Sector Management (New York: Harvester/ Wheatsheaf, 1993).
Grindle, M. Getting Good Government: Capacity Building in the Public Sectors of
Developing Countries (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1997).
Goodman, David and Gerald Segal, (eds.) China Deconstructs (New York: Routledge,
1994).
Grossman, S. and O. Hart, “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Lateral
and Vertical Integration,” Journal of Political Economy No. 94 (19860, 691-719.
Gu Baohua, “Beijing Municipal Bureau Chiefs Performance Appraisal Plan and
Implementation,” Chinese Law and Government Vol. 23, No. 4 (1991), 74 – 89.
Halachmi, A. and Bouckaert, G. Organization Performance and Measurement in the
Public Sector (Westport: Quorum Books, 1996).
Hardin, Russell, Collective Action (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982).
Harding, Harry, Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy 1949-1976 (California:
Stanford University Press, 1981).
Hart, Oliver and Moore, J., “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,” Journal of
Political Economy No. 98 (1990), 1119-1158.
333
Heinkel, Robert and N. M. Stoughton “The Dynamics of Portfolio Management
Contracts,” The Review of Financial Studies Vol. 7, No. 2 (1994), 351-387.
Holmstrom, B., “Moral Hazard in Teams,” Bell Journal of Economics No. 13 (1982),
324- 340.
Holmstrom, B. and Milgrom P. “Multitask Principal-Agent Analysis: Incentive Contracts,
Asset Ownership, and Job Design,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization No. 7
(1991), 24-52.
Horn, Murray J., The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in
the Public Sector (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
Hou Jianliang, “Building up a Personnel System Compatible with Socialist Market
Economy,” in IIAS (ed.) New Challenges for Public Administration in the Twenty-First
Century (Brussels: International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1997), 119 – 126.
Huang Jianrong, The Applicability of Policy-Making Theories in Post-Mao China
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999).
Huang Yasheng, “Web of Interests and Patterns of Behavior of Chinese Local Economic
Bureaucracies and Enterprises during Reforms,” The China Quarterly No. 123 (1990),
431 – 458.
Huang Yasheng, “Administrative Monitoring in China,” The China Quarterly No. 143
(1995), 828- 843.
Huang Yasheng, Inflation and Investment Controls in China: the Political Economy of
Central-Local Relations during the Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996).
Huang Yasheng, “Political Institutions and Fiscal Reforms in China,” Problems of PostCommunism Vol. 48, No. 1 (2001), 16 – 26.
Huang Yasheng, “Managing Chinese Bureaucrats: An Institutional Economics
Perspective,” Political Studies No. 50 (2002), 61-79.
Jahiel, Abigail R., Policy Implementation through Organizational Learning: The Case of
Water Pollution Control in China’s Reforming Socialist System, (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1994).
Jahiel, Abigail R., “The Contradictory Impact of Reform and Environmental Protection,”
The China Quarterly No. 149 (1997), 81-103.
Jahiel, Abigail R., “The Organization of Environmental Protection in China,” The China
Quarterly No. 156 (1998), 757- 787.
334
Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics No. 3 (1976),
305-360.
Jensen, Michael C., “Organizational Theory and Methodology,” Accounting Review No.
58 (1983), 319- 338.
Johnson, David B. Public Choice: an Introduction to the New Political Economy
(Bristlecone Books, Mayfield Publishing Company, 1991).
Joreskog, Karl G. “A General Approach to Confirmatory Maximum Likelihood Factor
Analysis,” Psychometrika No. 34 (1969), 183-202.
Joreskog, Karl G. “Analysis of Ordinal Variables: Cross-sectional Data,” Unpublished
Manuscript (2001).
Jreisat, J. Public Organization Management: the Development of Theory and Process
(Westport: Quorum Books, 1997).
Kampen, Thomas., “The CCP’s Central Committee Departments (1921-1991): A Study
of Their Evolution,” China Report Vol.29, No. 3 (1993), 299-317.
Kelly, Janet M. and David Swindell, “A Multiple-Indicator Approach to Municipal
Service Evaluation: Correlating Performance Measurement and Citizen Satisfaction
across Jurisdictions,” Public Administration Review Vol. 62, No. 5 (2002), 610- 621.
Kiser, Larry and Elinor Ostrom, “The Three Worlds of Action: A Synthesis of
Institutional Approaches,” In Elinor Ostrom (ed.) Strategies of Political Inquiry (Beverly
Hill, CA: Sage, 1982), 179-222.
Kreps, David. A Course in Microeconomics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990).
Laffont, Jean-Jacques (ed.), The Principal-Agent Model: the Economic Theory of
Incentives (Cheltenham, UK; Northhampton, MA: Elgar Publishing, 2003).
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole, “Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in
Procurement,” Review of Economic Studies No. 57 (1990), 597-625.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: the PrincipalAgent Model (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
Lam, Tao-Chiu and Hon S. Chan, “China’s New Civil Service: What the Emperor Is
Wearing and Why,” Public Administration Review Vol. 56, No. 5 (1996), 479- 484.
335
Lam, Tao-Chiu and Hon S. Chan, “Reforming China’s Cadre Management System: Two
Views of a Civil Service,” Asian Survey Vol. 36, No. 8 (1996), 772 – 781.
Lam, Tao-Chiu and Hon S. Chan, “The Civil Service System: Policy Formulation and
Implementation,” in Lo Chi Kin, Suzanne Pepper and Tsui Kai Yuen (eds.) China Review
1995, (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1995), 2.2 – 2.35.
Lam, Tao-chiu and Cheung, Kai-chee, “The Rise and Challenge of Administrative
Reform in China: Post-Mao and Beyond,” in Joseph Y. S. Cheng (ed.), China in the PostDeng Era (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1998), 137 – 170.
Lam, Tao-chiu and James L.Perry, “Service Organizations in China: Reform and Its
Limits,” in Peter Nan-shong Lee and Carlos Wing-hung Lo (eds.), Remaking China’s
Public Management (Westport: Quorum Books, 2001), 19 – 40.
Lam Waifung, Governing Irrigation Systems in Nepal: Institutions, Infrastructures and
Collective Action (Oakland, Calif.: ICS Press, 1998).
Lampton, David M., “The Implementation Problem in Post-Mao China,” in David M.
Lampton (ed.), Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1987), 3 – 24.
Lampton, David M., “Water: Challenge to a Fragmented Political System,” in David M.
Lampton (ed.), Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1987), 157 – 189.
Lan Zhiyong, “Understanding China’s Administrative Reform”, Public Administration
Quarterly Vol. 24, No. 4 (2001), 437- 469.
Landry, Pierre F. “Informal Responses to Formal Decentralization in China,” paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (2004).
Lee, Hamrin Carol and Suisheng Zhao, “Introduction: Core Issues in Understanding the
Decision Process,” in Lee Hamrin Carol and Suisheng Zhao (eds.), Decision-Making in
Deng’s China (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), i – xxxiii.
Lee Hong Yung, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
Lee, R., Public Personnel Systems (Maryland: Aspen Publishers, Inc., 1993).
Lee, Peter Nan-shong and Lo, Carlos Wing-hung, “Remaking China’s Public
Management: Problem Areas and Analytical Perspectives,” in Peter Nan-shong Lee and
Carlos Wing-hung Lo (eds.), Remaking China’s Public Management (Westport: Quorum
Books, 2001), 1 – 18.
336
Li, David D. “Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy,” American Economic
Review Vol. 88, No. 2 (1998), 393-397.
Li Weiqiang, “Reform in the Chinese Public Personnel System,” Public Personnel
Management Vol. 19, No. 2 (1990), 163-174.
Lieberthal, Kenneth G., “Introduction: The ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’ Model and Its
Limitations,” in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds.), Bureaucracy,
Politics and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1992), 1 – 32.
Lieberthal, Kenneth G., Governing China: from Revolution through Reform (New York:
W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1995).
Lieberthal, Kenneth G., Governing China: from Revolution through Reform 2nd ed. (New
York: Norton, 2004).
Lieberthal, Kenneth G. and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders,
Structures and Processes (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).
Lieberthal, Kenneth G. and David M. Lampton (eds.), Bureaucracy, Politics and
Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
Liou, K. T., “Issues and Lessons of Chinese Civil Service Reform,” Public Personnel
Management No. 26 (1997), 505– 514.
Liu Meiru, Administrative Reform in China and Its Impact on the Policy-making Process
and Economic Development after Mao (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001).
Liu Siyang, “State Organs Improve Cadre Appraisal System” (text) Beijing Xinhua
Domestic Service in Chinese (8 June 1995), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report – China, 15 June 1995 (PrEx. 7.10: FBIS-CHI95-115), 27 – 28.
Lo, Carlos Wing Hung, Plato Kwong To Yip and Kai Chee Cheung, “The Regulatory
Style of Environmental Governance in China: The Case of EIA Regulation in Shanghai,”
Public Administration and Development Vol. 20, No.4 (2000), 305 – 318.
Lo, Jack Man Keung, “Urban Government and Administrative Reform in Post-Mao
China: Issues, Trends and Future Directions,” International Journal of Public Sector
Management Vol. 6, No. 6 (1993), 42-54.
Luehrmann, Laura M. “Facing Citizen Complaints in China, 1951-1996”, Asian Survey
Vol. 43, No. 5 (2003), 845-866.
337
Ma, Stephen K., Administrative Reform in Post-Mao China: Efficiency or Ethics
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996).
Ma, Stephen K., “Man of Efficiency and Man of Ethics: Can China’s Administrative
Reform Produce Both for Her Economic Development,” Policy Studies Review Vol. 16,
No. 2 (1999), 133 – 146.
Ma Xiaoying and Leonard Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in China: Institutions,
Enforcement, and Compliance (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000).
Manion, Melanie, “The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment,
Promotion, Transfer and Removal of Party and State Leaders,” The China Quarterly No.
102 (1985), 203- 233.
Manion, Melanie, Retirement of Revolutionaries in China: Public Policies, Social Norms,
Private Interests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
March, James and Herbert Simon, Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958).
McCubbins, Mathew and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Political Patrols versus Fire Alarm,” American Journal of Political Science Vol. 28, No.
1 (1984), 165- 179.
McGregor, D., The Human Side of the Enterprise (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).
Migue and Belanger, “Toward A General Theory of Managerial Discretion,” Public
Choice No. 17 (1974), 27-43.
Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1992).
Miller, Gary J. and Terry Moe, “Bureaucrats, Legislatures, and the Size of Government,”
American Political Science Review N0. 77 (1983), 297-322.
Miller, Gary J. Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University, 1992).
Miller, Gary J. and Andrew B. Whitford, “Trust and Incentives in Principal-Agent
Negotiations: The Insurance / Incentive Trade-Off,” Journal of Theoretical Politics Vol.
14, No. 2 (2002), 231- 267.
Miner, J. B., Theories of Organizational Behavior (Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press, 1980).
Mitnick, B. M., “The Theory of Agency: the Policing Paradox and Regulatory Behavior,”
Public Choice No. 24 (1975), 27-42.
338
Mitnick, B. M., “The Theory of Agency and Organizational Analysis,” in N. E. Bowie
and R. E. Freeman (Eds.) Ethics and Agency Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992), 75-96.
Moe, Terry, “The New Economics of Organization,” American Journal of Political
Science Vol. 28, No. 4 (1984), 739- 777.
Moe, Terry, “The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy” in Dennic C. Mueller (ed.)
Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997), 455- 480.
Mookherjee, Dilip, “Competition and Motivation: An Organizational Perspective,”
unpublished paper (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1988).
Morgan, Philip E. and James L. Perry, “Re-orienting the Comparative Study of Civil
Service Systems,” Review of Public Personnel Administration Vol. 8, No. 3 (1988), 84 –
95.
“National Meeting on Improving the Civil Service System,” (text) Beijing Xinhua
Domestic Service in Chinese (18 July 1999) Translation by the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report – China, 5 August 1999 (PrEx. 7.10: FBIS-CHI99-0803).
Naughton, Barry, “The Decline of Central Control over Investment in Post-Mao China,”
in David M. Lampton (ed.), Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1987), 51 – 80.
Naughton, Barry and Dali Yang, Holding China Together: Diversity and National
Integration in the Post-Deng Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
Newcomer, Kathry E., “Using Performance Measurement to Improve Programs,” in
Newcomer (ed.), Using Performance Measurement to Improve Public and Nonprofit
Programs (San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass, 1997), 5-14.
Niskanen, William, Representative Bureaucracy (New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1971).
Niskanen, William, “Bureaucracy” in William F. Shughart and Laura Razzolini (eds.)
The Elgar Companion to Public Choice (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001), 258- 270.
North, Douglass C., “Government and the Cost of Exchange in History,” Journal of
Economic History Vol. 44, No. 2 (1984), 255- 264.
North, Douglass C., “Institutions, Transaction Costs and Economic Growth,” Economic
Inquiry Vol. 25, No. 2 (1987), 419- 428.
339
North, Douglass C., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
North, Douglass C., “Institutions,” Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 5, No. 1
(1991), 97-112.
North, Douglass C. and Barry R.Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” The
Journal of Economic History Vol. 49, No. 4 (1989), 803- 832.
Nunberg, Barbara, Managing the Civil Service: Reform Lessons from Advanced
Industrialized Countries (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1995).
O’Brien, Kevin J. and Lianjiang Li, “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,”
Comparative Politics Vol. 31, No. 2 (1999), 167-186.
OECD, Public Management Occasional Papers no.3: Performance Management in
Government: Performance Measurement and Result-oriented Management (Paris: OECD,
1994).
OECD, Integrating People Management into Public Service Reform (Paris: OECD,
1996).
OECD, Public Management Occasional Papers no.9: Performance Management in
Government: Contemporary Illustrations (Paris: OECD, 1996).
OECD, Public Management Occasional Papers no.13: Putting Citizens First:
Portuguese Experience in Public Management Reform (Paris: OECD, 1996).
Ogden, Suzanne, China’s Unresolved Issues: Politics, Development and Culture (New
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989).
Oi, Jean C., State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village
Government (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989).
Oi, Jean. C., Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform
(Berkeley, CA & London, UK: University of California Press, 1999).
Paine, Lynn, “The Educational Policy Process: A Case Study of Bureaucratic Action,” in
Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds.), Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision
Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 181 – 215.
Parks, Roger B., “Linking Objective and Subjective Measures of Performance,” Public
Administration Review Vol. 44, No. 2 (1984), 118- 127.
340
Pei Minxin, From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the
Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
“Personnel Exchange Program Aids Poorer Provinces” (text) Beijing Xinhua in English
(22 June 1994), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily
Report – China, 22 June 1994, (PrEx.7.10: FBIS-CHI-94-120), 27 – 28.
Perry, James L., “Measuring Public Service Motivation: An Assessment of Construct
Reliability and Validity,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Vol. 6,
No. 1 (1996), 5-22.
Perry, James L. and J.C.N. Raadschelders, Protocol for Comparative Studies of National
Civil Service Systems (Bloomington/Leiden, 1995).
Peters, B. Guy, The Politics of Bureaucracy 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 1995).
Peters, B. Guy, “Theory and Methodology,” in Hans A. G. M. Bekke, James L. Perry
and Theo A. J. Toonen (ed.), Civil Service System in Comparative Perspective
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 13 – 41.
Peters, B. Guy and Donald J. Savoie, “Civil Service Reform: Misdiagnosing the Patient,”
Public Administration Review Vol. 54, No. 5 (1994), 418 – 425.
Plantz, Margaret, Martha Greenway and Michael Hendricks, “Outcome Measurement:
Showing Results in the Nonprofit Sector,” in Newcomer (ed.) Using Performance
Measurement to Improve Public and Nonprofit Programs (San Francisco, Calif.: JosseyBass, 1997), 15-30.
Pollitt, Christopher and Geert Bouckaert, Public Management Reform: A Comparative
Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
Popovich, M. (ed.), Creating High-Performance Government Organizations: A Practical
Guide for Public Managers (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1998).
Putnam, R., Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1993).
Pye, Lucian, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and
Hain, 1981).
Pye, Lucian, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press,
1992).
Raadschelders, Joe C. N. and James L. Perry, “Protocol for Comparative Studies of
National Civil Service Systems,” (Bloomington: Comparative Civil Service Research
Consortium, 1994).
341
Rainey, Hal G. and Paula Steinbauer, “Galloping Elephants: Developing Elements of a
Theory of Effective Government Organizations,” Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory Vol. 9, No. 1 (1999), 1-32.
Ragin, C.C. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative
Strategies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
Rees, R., “The Theory of Principal and Agent,” Bulletin of Economic Research No. 37
(1985), 4-28.
Rosen, Stanley, “Restoring Key Secondary Schools in Post-Mao China: The Politics of
Competition and Education Quality,” in David M. Lampton (ed.), Policy Implementation
in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 321 – 353.
Ross, Stephen A. “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem,” The
American Economic Review Vol. 63, No. 2 (1973), 134- 139.
Schein, E., Organizational Psychology 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
1970).
Schurmann, Franz, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1968).
Shirk, Susan, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (California: University of
California Press, 1993).
Shirk, Susan, How China Opened Its Door: the Political Success of the PRC’s Foreign
Trade and Investment Reforms (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994).
Simon, Herbert A., “The Proverbs of Administration,” Public Administration Review No.
6 (1946), 53-67.
Simon, Herbert A., Models of Man: Social and Rational (New York: Wiley, 1957).
Simon, Herbert A., Administrative Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1947).
Sinkule, Barbara J. and Leonard Ortolano, Implementing Environmental Policy in China
(London: Praeger, 1995).
Spence, Michael, “Job Market Signaling,” Quarterly Journal of Economics No. 87
(1974), 355- 374.
“Staff Members Dismissed after Evaluation,” (text) Beijing Xinhua in English (21 June
1995) Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report –
China, 22 June 1995, (PrEx.7.10: FBIS-CHI-95-120), 16 – 17.
342
Stiglitz, Joseph E., Economics of the Public Sector 2nd ed. (New York and London: W.W.
Norton, 1988).
Stiglitz, Joseph E., “Principal and Agent,” in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter
Newman (eds.), Allocation, Information and Markets (London and Basingstoke:
MacMillan, 1989), 241-253.
Stiglitz, Joseph E., Economics of the Public Sector 3rd edition (New York/London: W.W.
Norton and Company, 2000).
Stiglitz, Joseph E., “Formal and Informal Institutions,” in Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin
(ed.), Social Capital: a Multifaceted Perspective (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2000),
59-68.
Stipak, Brian, “Citizen Satisfaction with Urban Service: Potential Misuse as A
Performance Indicator,” Public Administration Review Vol. 39, No. 1 (1979), 46-52.
Stipak, Brian, “Local Governments’ Use of Citizen Surveys,” Public Administration
Review Vol. 40, No. 5 (1980), 521-525.
Strausz, Roland, “Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship,” Review
of Economic Studies No. 64 (1997), 337- 357.
Swindell, David and Janet M. Kelly, “Linking Citizen Satisfaction Data to Performance
Measures: A Preliminary Evaluation,” Public Productivity and Management Review Vol.
24, No. 1 (2000), 30-52.
Swanson, K E, R G Kuhn and W Xu, “Environmental Policy Implementation in Rural
China: A Case Study of Yuhang, Zhejiang,” Environmental Management Vol. 24, No. 4
(2001), 481-491.
Takahara, Akio, The Politics of Wage Policy in Post-Revolutionary China (London:
Macmillan, 1992).
Tang, Wenfang and William Parish, Chinese Urban Life under Reform: the Changing
Social Contract (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
Tirole, Jean, “Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organization,”
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization No. 2 (1986), 181-200.
Tirole, Jean, “The Internal Organization of Government,” Oxford Economic Papers Vol.
46, No. 1 (1994), 1-29.
343
Tong, Caroline Haiyan, Jeffrey D. Straussman and Walter D.Broadnax, “Civil Service
Reform in the People’s Republic of China: Case Studies of Early Implementation,”
Public Administration and Development No. 19 (1999), 193-206.
Torenvlied, Rene, Political Decision and Agency Performance (Dordrencht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2000).
Tsao, King K. and John Abbott Worthley, “Chinese Public Administration: Change with
Continuity during Political and Economic Development,” Public Administration Review
Vol. 55, No. 2 (1995), 169 – 174.
Tsao, King K., “Civil Service Reform,” in J. Cheung and M. Brosseau (eds) China
Review 1993 (HK: CUHK, 1993).
Tullock, Gordon, The Politics of Bureaucracy (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press,
1965).
Tullock, Gordon, “The Economic Theory of Bureaucracy,” in Michael Hill (ed.), The
Policy Process: A Reader (Hertfordshire: Prentice Hall, 1997), 87 – 96.
Tvorik, Stephen J. and Michael H. Mcgivern, “Determinants of Organizational
Performance,” Management Decision Vol. 35, No. 6 (1997), 417-435.
Van de Ven, A. and D. L. Ferry, Measuring and Assessing Organizations (New York:
Wiley, 1980).
Walder, Andrew G., “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order,” American
Sociological Review Vol. 60, No. 3 (1995), 309– 328.
Walters, J., “Performance-Driven Government: Using Measures to Manage,” Governing
Vol. 13, No. 4 (2000), 69-73.
Wang Feiling, Institutions and Institutional Change in China (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, Inc., 1998).
Wang Guixiu and Manliang Zhu, “A Research and Investigative Report on the
Pioneering Implementation of a Civil Service System in the Shenzhen Special Economic
Zone,” Chinese Law and Government Vol. 23, No.4 (winter 1990 – 1991), 85 – 97.
Wang Shaoguang, “Central-Local Fiscal Politics in China,” in Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin
(eds.), Changing Central-Local Relations in China: Reform and State Capacity (Boulder:
Westview, 1994), 91 – 112.
Wang Shaoguang and Angang Hu, The Political Economy of Uneven Development: the
Case of China (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).
344
Warner, M., “Human Resources in the People’s Republic of China: the “Three Systems”
Reforms,” Human Resource Management Journal Vol. 6, No. 2 (1996), 32–42.
Weingast, Barry and Mark Moran, “Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?
Regulatory Policy-making at the Federal Trade Commission,” Journal of Political
Economy No. 91 (1983), 765-800.
Whiting, Susan H., Power and Wealth in Rural China: the Political Economy of
Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
Williamson, Oliver E., Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications – A
study in the Economics of Internal Organization (London: The Free Press, 1975).
Williamson, Oliver E., Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: The Free Press,
1985).
Williamson, Oliver E., “Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost
Economics Perspective,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization Vol. 15, No. 1
(1999), 306- 342.
Wilson, James Q., Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It
(New York: Basic Books, 1989).
Wintrobe, Ronald, “Modern Bureaucratic Theory,” in Dennic C. Mueller (ed.)
Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997), 429- 454.
Wood, R. and A. Bandura, “Social Cognitive Theory of Organizational Management,”
Academy of Management Review No.14 (1989), 361- 384.
Yan Huai, “Establishing a Public Service System,” in Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng
Zhao (eds.) Decision-Making in Deng’s China: Perspectives from Insiders (Armonk:
M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 169-175.
Yang, Dali L., “Reform and the Restructuring of Central-Local Relations,” in David S. G.
Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds.), China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism
(London: Routledge, 1994), 59 – 98.
Yang, Dali L., Beyond Beijing: Liberalization and the Regions in China (London and
New York: Routledge, 1997).
Yang, Dali L., Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and Politics of
Governance in China (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004).
345
Yang Kaifeng and Marc Holzer, “The Performance-Trust Link: Implications for
Performance Measurement,” Public Administration Review Vol. 66, No. 1 (2006), 114126.
Yang Zhong, Local Government and Politics in China: Challenges from Below (Armonk,
N.Y.; London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2003).
Zammuto, Raymond F., “A Comparison of Multiple Constituency Models of
Organizational Effectiveness,” Academy of Management Review Vol. 9, No. 4 (1984),
606- 616.
Zhang Zhijian, “Establishment of an Administrative System Compatible with the
Socialist Market Economy,” in IIAS (ed.), New Challenges for Public Administration in
the Twenty-First Century, (Brussels: International Institute of Administrative Sciences,
1997), 133 – 140.
Zhou Xueguang, “Partial Reform and the Chinese Bureaucracy in the Post-Mao Era,”
Comparative Political Studies No. 28 (1995), 440– 468.
Zhu, C. J. and P. Dowling, “Managing People during Economic Transition: the
Development of HR Practices in China,” Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources Vol.
38, No. 2 (2000), 84–106.
Works in Chinese
Beijing Local History Editorial Committee (ed.), Beijing nianjian 1997 [Beijing
Yearbook 1997] (Beijing: Beijing Yearbook Press, 1998).
Beijing Local History Editorial Committee (ed.), Beijing nianjian 1998 [Beijing
Yearbook 1998] (Beijing: Beijing Yearbook Press, 1999).
Beijing Local History Editorial Committee (ed.), Beijing nianjian 1999 [Beijing
Yearbook 1999] (Beijing: Beijing Yearbook Press, 2000).
Beijing Local History Editorial Committee (ed.), Beijing nianjian 2000 [Beijing
Yearbook 2000] (Beijing: Beijing Yearbook Press, 2001).
Beijing Local History Editorial Committee (ed.), Beijing nianjian 2001 [Beijing
Yearbook 2001] (Beijing: Beijing Yearbook Press, 2002).
Beijing Local History Editorial Committee (ed.), Beijing nianjian 2002 [Beijing
Yearbook 2002] (Beijing: Beijing Yearbook Press, 2003).
Changchun Local History Editorial Committee (ed.), Changchun nianjian 1999
[Changchun Yearbook 1999] (Changchun: Changchun Yearbook Press, 2000).
346
Changchun Local History Editorial Committee (ed.), Changchun nianjian 2000
[Changchun Yearbook 2000] (Changchun: Changchun Yearbook Press, 2001).
Changchun Personnel Bureau (ed.), Changchun shi jigou gaige yu gongwuyuan zhidu
gaige wenjian ziliao huibian, [Collection of Documents on Changchun’s Implementing
Institutional Reform and China’s Civil Service Reform] (1997).
Chen Qiyao (ed.), Shijian yu tansuo [Experimental Implementation of Civil Service
System in Haidian] (Beijing: China Personnel Press, 1994).
Chen Zhenming (ed.), Guojia gongwuyuan zhidu [State Civil Service System] (Fuzhou:
Fujiang People’s Publisher, 2002).
Chi Xiaolin and Xu Qinghua (eds.), Zhongguo gongzhong huanjing yizhi diaocha
[Survey of the Public’s Environmental Knowledge] (Beijing: Beijing huanjing kexue
chubanshe, 1998).
Chinese Personnel Yearbook Editorial Office (ed.), Zhongguo renshi nianjian 1988 – 89
[Chinese Personnl Yarbook 1988 – 89] (Beijing: China Personnel Press, 1989).
Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping] (Beijing:
People’s Publishing, 1984).
Li Ruhai and Zhu Qingfang, Zhongguo gongwuyuan guanlixue [The Management of
Civil Service in China] (Beijing: Legal Press, 1993).
Liu Yunbai, Zhongguo gudai guanli sixiang shi [Management Thought in Chinese
History] (Xi’an: Shangxi renmin chubanshe, 1997).
Ministry of Personnel (ed.), Guojia gongwuyuan zhidu quanshu [A Collection of
Documents on State Civil Service System] (Changchun: Jilin Literature and History Press,
1994).
Ministry of Personnel, Guojia gongwuyan zhiwei lunhuan zhanxing tiaoli [Provisional
Regulations of the State Civil Servant Position Rotation], Zhongguo renshi bao [Chinese
Personnel Post] 13August 1996, p. 1.
Ministry of Personnel website, the Civil Service Law of the People’s Republic of China
(27 April 2005). A copy can be retrieved from
http://www.mop.gov.cn/Desktop.aspx?PATH=rsbww/sy/xxll&Gid=4e34f9d2-e5bb-4efebe33-2a60057946e4&Tid=Cms_Info on 7 April 2006.
Ministry of Labor and Personnel, Laodong renshibu guanyu jianli guojia xingzheng
jiguan gongzuorenyuan gangwei zerenzhi de tongzhi [the Notice of the Ministry of Labor
and Personnel Concerning the Establishment of Cadre Responsibility System in State
347
Organs], in the Cadre Bureau of the Ministry of Labor and Personnel (ed.) Jiangcheng
gongzuo wenjian huibian [A Collection on Documents Concerning Reward and
Punishment] (1982), 608-609.
National Bureau of Statistics (ed.), Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1995[China Statistical
Yearbook 1995] (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1996).
National Bureau of Statistics (ed.), Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2000 [China Statistical
Yearbook 2000] (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2001).
National Bureau of Statistics (ed.), Zhongguo chengshi nianjian 2004 [Urban Statistical
Yearbook of China 2004] (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2005).
National Environmental Protection Administration, Quanguo gongzhong huanjing yizhi
diaocha baogao [National Public Environmental Knowledge Survey Report] (Beijing:
Zhongguo huanjing kexue chubanshe, 1999).
Ningbo Local History Editorial Committee (ed.), Ningbo Yearbook 1997(Ningbo: Ningbo
Yearbook Press, 1998).
Ningbo Local History Editorial Committee (ed.), Ningbo Yearbook 2001 (Ningbo:
Ningbo Yearbook Press, 2002).
“Renshibu tuixing gongwuyuan zhidu youshang xin taijie” [A Breakthrough of the
Ministry of Personnel in the Implementation of Civil Service System], Zhongguo renshi
bao [Chinese Personnel Post], 16 April 1996, p. 1.
Organization Department, “Guanyu shixing difang dangzheng lingdao ganbu niandu
gongzuo kaohe zhidu de tongzhi” [Notice Regarding Implementation of the Annual Job
Evaluation System for Leading Cadres of Local Party and Government Organs], in
Zhongguo renshi nianjian [China Personnel Yearbook] (Beijing: China Personnel Press,
1980).
Personnel Bureau of Haidian District (ed.), Haidian qu guanyu guojia gongwuyuan zhidu
zhifa jiancha de zicha baogao. [Interval Investigation on the Implementation of Civil
Service System in Haidian District] (1998).
Personnel Bureau of Haidian District (ed.), Beijing shi Haidian qu guojia gongwuyuan
guanli wenjian huibian [Collection of Documents on the Management of Civil Servants in
Haidian] (2002).
Personnel Bureau of Ningbo City (ed.), Ningbo shi guanyu shixing guojia gongwuyuan
zhidu de zicha baogao, [Interval Investigation on the Implementation of China’s Civil
Service System in Ningbo City] (1999).
348
Qiang Yingyi, Xiandai jingjixue yu zhongguo jingji gaige [Economics and Economic
Reform in China] (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2003).
Ren Xiao, Zhongguo xingzheng gaige [Chinese Administrative Reforms] (Hangzhou,
China: Zhejiang People’s Press, 1998).
Su Yutang, Guojia gongwuyuan zhidu jianghua [Talks on the State Civil Service System]
(Beijing: Labor and Personnel Press, 1988).
“Woguo gongwuyuan lungang youxiao cujin lianzheng jianshe” [Our Country’s Civil
Service Rotation can Efficiently Promote Administrative Cleanness], Beijing Xinhua
Domestic Service in Chinese, August 16 2000, http://www.xinhuanet.com
Xi Liu, Zhongguo gongwuyuan zhidu [Chinese Civil Service] (Beijing: Tsinghua
University Press, 2002).
Xu Songtao, Guojia gongwuyuan zhidu jiaocheng [Text on the State Civil Service System]
(Beijing: China Personnel Press, 1994).
Zhang Bolin, Tuijin ganbu renshi gongzuo kexuehua, minzhuhua, zhiduhau de zhongda
jucuo [Great Measure to Make Cadre Personnel System more Scientific, Democratic and
Institutionalized: Understanding and Implementing Civil Service Law of PRC].
http://www.mop.gov.cn/Desktop.aspx?PATH=rsbww/sy/xxll&Gid=36796243-b120477e-9c3e-bcab0545fd88&Tid=Cms_Info
Zhang Zhijian et al., Dangdai zhongguo de renshi guanli [Personnel Management in
Contemporary China] (Beijing: Contemporary China Publisher, 1994).
Zhao Ziyang, Yanzhe you zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi daolu qianjin [Advance along
the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics], Report Delivered at the Thirteenth
National Congress of the Communist Party of China, in Documents of the Thirteenth
National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press,
1987), 3 – 77.
Zhu Qianfang Li Ruhai and E Guaihong (eds.), Guojia gongwuyuan guanli [State Civil
Servants Management] (Beijing: China Personnel Press, 1996).
349