International Journal of Public Opunon Research Vol. 8 No. 2
0954-2891/96 $3.00
THE CAUSES OF THIRD-PERSON
EFFECTS: UNREALISTIC OPTIMISM,
IMPERSONAL IMPACT, OR
GENERALIZED NEGATIVE ATTITUDES
TOWARDS MEDIA INFLUENCE?
Hans-Bernd Brosius and Dirk Engel
ABSTRACT
The present study looks into the psychological origins of the third-person effect, i.e.
the tendency of people to expect the media to be more effective on diird persons than
on themselves. Based on previous research literature, three different psychological
mechanisms are distinguished that might cause the phenomenon. The concept of
unrealistic optimism would predict that media effects described in a negative way will
produce large third-person effects because individuals want to preserve a positive self.
The same can be expected when subjects are described as passively suffering media
effects. Empirically this means that die third-person effect will be smaller if media
influences are described as a benefit, or the recipient suggested to be actively controlling
the effects. The concept of impersonal impact suggests that the extent of the third-person
effect varies with the psychological distance between the first and the third person. If
third persons are described as psychologically close, the third-person effect will be
smaller. The third concept of generalized negative attitudes towards media effects suggests
that, regardless of the description, a third-person effect will always occur because
negative predispositions to media influence are so strong that they cannot be overriden
by variations in question wording. An experiment with 181 individuals produced mixed
results. Depending on the kind of media effects, all three concepts can account for
some of the results. The discussion centers around the question of whether different
experimental designs could clarify the theoretical explanations, or whether third-person
effects might be caused by combinations of psychological mechanisms rather than by
only one such mechanism.
People are inclined to perceive a discrepancy between the effect the media have
on others and on themselves. Others—the third persons—are considered more
malleable by mass communication than oneself—the first person. W. Phillips
Davison (1983) was the first to describe this phenomenon and to coin the notion
of'third-person effect'. He mostly recounted his own experiences, and presented
© World Association for Puilic Opinion Research igg6
CAUSES OF THIRD-PERSON EFFECTS
143
several smaller pilot studies. The relevance of the third-person effect, Davison
suggests, lies in the consequences the perceived stronger media effects have on
the behavior of those involved. It is of secondary concern whether the others
are really influenced more strongly, or whether one only thinks so. This can be
regarded as an application of Thomas's theorem: when we perceive a situation
as real, its consequences become real for us. The (false or correct) idea that
others are more strongly influenced has real consequences for one's own behavior.
Davison (1983, see also Baughman 1989) tells several anecdotes about how the
third-person effect is able to influence subsequent behavior. Especially persons
with a high rank, or members of elite groups, might fall victim to this. For
instance, politicians might overestimate the general impact of a negative news
story and resign because of it, whether or not the public at large has been
influenced by the coverage. Thus, the third-person effect is not dependent on
whether there are media effects or not. It is a perceptual phenomenon.
C O N D I T I O N S FOR T H I R D - P E R S O N E F F E C T S
Some 20 individual studies (see the overview in Perloff 1993) have since collected
empirical results on a broad basis. Findings cover three areas. First, there were
efforts to empirically prove the effect Davison had hypothesized. Second,
conditions influencing the effect's existence and its extent were identified. Third,
it was attempted to discover the psychological bases which bring about the
effect.
Results can be briefly summarized as follows: except for one study (Glynn
and Ostman 1988), all authors could demonstrate third-person effects. One can
therefore assume that it is a persistent phenomenon in public opinion. There
is a lot of research on various media and message variables in connection with
the third-person effect: an especially large effect is brought about by a low
credibility message and a highly obvious persuasive intention. Less research
has been devoted to how different forms of presentation and different features
of messages influence the third-person effect. Gunther and Thorson (1992) are
an exception to the rule. They found that emotional appeals in advertising spots
diminished the occurrence of third-person effects.
Turning to recipient variables, the influence of age is especially well founded:
the older one is, the more susceptible one is to the third-person effect. For
education, there are conflicting results: some but not all studies found that the
higher education was, the larger the effect. Media use was also regarded as a
significant factor in some studies, with newspaper readers primarily being
subject to third-person effects (see Innes and Zeitz 1988, Glynn and Ostman
1988, Cohen et al. 1988, Mutz 1989, Perloff 1989, Rucinski and Salmon 1990,
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
Tiedge et al. 1991, Cohen and Davis 1991, Atwood 1994, Lang 1995 for these
findings).
Respondents' conceptions of self appear to be important in the emergence
of third-person effects. Perloff (1989) highlighted the role of ego-involvement.
He shows that people strongly interested or involved in an issue overestimate
the effects on others more than those less involved. Related to this, Lasorsa
(1989) found that self-reported level of political knowledge is correlated with
the strength of the third-person effect, while objective knowledge is not. People
who believe they know a great deal show a larger discrepancy between the
perception of self and others.
Some studies addressed the question of whether the third-person effect might
be a methodological artifact created by the order and contrast of survey questions.
Price and Tewksbury (1996) systematically varied the order and the inclusion
of questions measuring the perception of self and others. They argue that
inclusion of both questions measuring the perception of self and of others in
surveys might trigger a process of comparison in the recipients' minds that
otherwise would not have been started. Thus, the questions per se and their
order might produce artifacts. They gave some experimental groups one question
only, either the one measuring perception of self or of others. Other groups got
both questions, but the order was varied. Neither question order nor the
presentation as such has an influence on the existence of a third-person effect.
Methodological artifacts due to question order can therefore be excluded.
Summarizing the conditions which have to be fulfilled for a third-person
effect to emerge, the desirability of a media effect appears to be a crucial
variable: if an effect is considered desirable either for an individual or for
society, the discrepancy in the estimated size of the effect between self and
others decreases. In some cases, even a slight reverse third-person effect (e.g.
Gunther and Mundy 1993) could be observed.1
EXPLANATIONS FOR T H E T H I R D - P E R S O N E F F E C T
The third field addressed in the literature is the psychological basis of the
effect. As this paper is primarily concerned with this, past research is looked
at more closely, leading to hypotheses tested in our study.
1
The second aspect of Davison's hypothesis—the behavioral consequences of the third-person effect—have
hardly been addressed empirically. An exception is Gunrher's (1995) study on the third-person effect and
pornography. The results confirm the third-person effect people overestimate the negative impact of
pornography on others. The larger the third-person effect, the more respondents favored censorship of
pornographic content (see also Thompson et al. 1090, Rojas et al. 1996). Even if these are attitudes rather
than actual behavior, the results highlight the significance of the third-person effect for one's behavior.
CAUSES OF T H I R D - P E R S O N EFFECTS
145
UNREALISTIC OPTIMISM
Gunther and Mundy (1993) conducted an experiment with students of journalism. They used eight print advertisements for certain products or issues as
stimuli. For each product or issue, there was also a newspaper or magazine
article, using the same wording, as far as possible. The articles were said to
come from highly credible papers or magazines. Four issues were positive, i.e.
respondents might appear to be smart to let themselves be influenced by it.
The other four issues were negative, i.e. respondents would appear less smart
if they were influenced by this material.2 The respondents confirmed the
researchers' decisions as to what were positive and negative effects: respondents
mostly agreed it was 'not smart to be influenced' for the four negative issues,
while for the others, they mostly agreed that it was 'smart to be influenced'.
The effects of articles were generally valued more positively than the effects of
advertisements (see Gunther and Mundy 1993, pp. 62-4). As expected, a larger
persuasive intention was ascribed to ads than to articles. In relation to positive
issues, respondents were more inclined to admit to a positive effect on themselves.
A discrepancy between estimated effects on self and others was thus hardly
noticeable, and for two articles, there was even a weak reverse third-person
effect (see Gunther and Mundy 1993, p. 65). In relation to negative issues, a
considerable third-person effect appeared: people consider themselves immune
against influence, whereas they assume of others that they are influenced strongly
by the articles and ads.
Gunther and Mundy interpret their results as follows: the discrepancy
between estimated effect on the self and on others in case of third-person effects
serves the function of preserving an image of the self which is as positive as
possible. This is necessary only if effects are considered negative, i.e. the
influence disliked. If on the other and effects are considered positive, i.e.
approved by recipients, a discrepancy between estimated effect on the self and
on others does not emerge, or even the direction of this discrepancy is reversed.
People deem forces they approve of more effective on themselves than on
others.
Gunther and Mundy (1993) interpret these results in terms of an optimistic
bias, or respectively, of unrealistic optimism. These terms refer to the more
general observation that people have a more positive image of themselves than
of others. They believe that negative experiences occur to themselves less often
than to others, while they also think that their own chances for positive
experiences are above average (Weinstein 1980, p. 806; Heine and Lehman 1995,
p. 596). Similar observations were made in the field of risk communication as
2
A simiUr distinction was made by Gunther and Thorson (1992) who also contrasted positive and negative
effects as far as communicative intentions were concerned.
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far as the perception of risks is concerned (Otway and Wynne, 1993, p. 103).
In his seminal study, Weinstein (1980) gave a list of 42 events to college
students and asked them how likely they thought it was that these events could
happen to them. About half of the events were positive (e.g. possessing a home,
having a well-paid job, holding weight over 10 years, etc.); the others negative
(e.g. alcohol addiction, divorce, being unemployed, breaking a bone, car accident,
cancer, etc.). For each of the events, students were also asked to estimate the
likelihood that it could happen to other students of the same university and
their own gender. In most cases, students said their own chances for positive
experiences were above average, while they considered their chances for negative
experiences below average. Likelihood estimates were mostly influenced by
perceived controllability: if respondents believed they could bring about or
prevent an event from happening by their own effort, likelihood estimates for
self and others differed more strongly.
That unrealistic optimism is not necessarily a pervasive human feature was
demonstrated in a comparative study on the subject: Japanese people showed
less unrealistic optimism than Canadians even for unpleasant experiences (Heine
and Lehman 1995). This might be the case because the social conditions of
Western culture support the perspective of an unrealistic optimism (Oyserman
and Markus 1995, pp. i46ff).
The influence of the mass media can also be understood as a danger or a
risk: it goes along with a restriction of one's own will and of one's choice of
activities, or at least many people think so. Advertising makes one buy things
one does not need, and propaganda might seduce people to do things they would
have never done otherwise. Regardless of whether these popular assumptions are
correct, media can well be considered an external danger. Therefore, we can
assume a structural similarity between unrealistic optimism and the third-person
effect: People think they are—compared to others—as immune against alcoholism and cancer as they are safe from manipulations by the media.
Gunther's and Mundy's (1993) data suggest that the third-person effect
dwindles or vanishes for media effects associated with a high benefit likelihood.
In their study, however, the benefit likelihood of media effects was confounded
widi the type of issue. In our study, we want to expand their results by applying
different formulations for the effect to the same issue. We have to keep in mind
that almost all studies known to us use the negative 'being influenced' in their
question wording. We assume that by this wording alone media effects are
perceived negatively, which puts unrealistic optimism in motion. Based on the
rationale of unrealistic optimism, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: If media effects for an issue are presented as beneficial ('getting
ideas from the media'), the third-person effect will be smaller than in the case
CAUSES OF THIRD-PERSON EFFECTS
147
when the effects, for the same issue, are presented negatively, as they usually
are ('being influenced by the media').
If unrealistic optimism is related to people's attempts to 'enhance their ego'
(Gunther and Mundy 1993), we might also expect that the extent of the
third-person effect is dependent on the degree to which an individual has
control over media effects. In third-person questions the respondent can be
described either as active ('Do you let yourself be influenced by the media?')
or passive ('Do the media influence you?'). According to the concept of
unrealistic optimism we expect that discrepancies between estimates of influence
on self and others are larger when respondents are presented passively. Mentioning the media as the grammatical subject of the question and referring to
the respondent as the object tends to contrast with the respondent's positive
image of self. The opposed version—respondent is referred to as the subject
of the question phrase who does the influencing—corresponds more to a positive
image of self. This might make respondents agree more easily to an effect of
the media on themselves. The corresponding hypothesis can be stated as follows:
Hypothesis 2: The extent of the third-person effect is influenced by the degree
of activity ascribed to the respondent. (1) The discrepancy between estimates
of effect on self and on others is larger when the respondent is referred to as
the object in the question. (2) The discrepancy between estimates of effect on
self and on others is smaller when the respondent is referred to as the subject
of the question phrase.
IMPERSONAL IMPACT
Tyler and Cook (1984) distinguish two kinds of judgments. Societal level
judgments are based on other people's experience with societal phenomena such
as events in the neighborhood, information in the mass media, and official
statistics. Personal level judgments refer to one's own experience with the same
societal phenomena (Tyler and Cook 1984, p. 693).
Discrepancies might arise between the two levels. For instance, most people
think crime is an important issue on the societal level. However, when asked
whether they believe they might be crime victims themselves, most people are
optimistic and consider themselves mostly immune. Tyler and Cook conclude
that on the one hand, people are capable of distinguishing between personal and
societal levels when they judge on issues and developments. On the other hand,
the mass media exert a stronger influence on the societal level, whereas the personal
level is more strongly influenced by interpersonal communication. The authors
demonstrate that risk estimates on the personal level were independent of risk
estimates on the societal level. This was even true when victims of crime or other
risks were presented as sharing qualities with the respondents.
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People's ability to distinguish between the personal and the societal level
when making judgments can be applied to their judgments on media effects.
Similar to other influential agents, the media would be judged to have a large
effect on society in general, or on others in general, while people would rather
deny an effect on themselves. One can further conclude: the less specifically
the others are described in third-person effect studies, the more judgments on
societal level must be expected. The more similar the others are to the
respondent, the more personal judgments must be made. Former studies did
vary the definition of the third person, but never in terms of psychological
proximity or distance. Based on the rationale of 'impersonal impact', we
hypothesize:
Hypothesis j : The larger the psychological proximity suggested in the question
wording, the smaller the third-person effect will be. (1) In the case of introducing
third persons in the questionnaire who are psychologically close to the respondent, the difference in estimates of effects on self and others will be
smaller, or vanish completely. (2) In the case of introducing persons who are
psychologically not close to the respondents, the difference will be larger.
GENERALIZED NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS MEDIA INFLUENCE
Several authors referred to the so called hostile media phenomenon as a potential
explanation for the existence of a third-person effect (Atwood 1994, p. 269;
Cohen and Davis 1991, p. 681; Gunther 1991, p. 356; Gunther 1995, p. 28;
Gunther and Mundy 1993, p. 59; Gunther and Thorson 1992, pp. 577f; Mutz
1989, pp. sf; Perloff 1989, pp. 24of; Perloff 1993, p. 173; Price and Tewksbury
1996). The phenomenon was studied by Vallone, Ross and Lepper (1985). They
found that respondents strongly involved in an issue perceive media coverage
of that issue as biased against the position they take. Pro-Israeli and pro-Arab
students were asked to make judgments on the objectivity of TV stories on the
1982 Beirut massacre. Respondents were chosen from members of Jewish and
Arab activist groups. It appeared that pro-Israeli students believed the stories
were pro-Palestinian and depicted a wrong picture of Israel's standpoint. The
pro-Palestinian students on the other hand saw the Palestinian position as
misrepresented. Moreover, both groups thought that the stories would move
neutral viewers' attitudes away from their own point of view.
The hostile media phenomenon as described applies to position issues: people
strongly involved or people holding extreme attitudes see the media as hostile
towards their own position, independent of how the media really cover the
issue. As one is aware of the bias, and as one believes oneself to hold the truly
legitimate point of view, any assumed media effect is necessarily an effect on
CAUSES OF THIRD-PERSON EFFECTS
149
others, and it is negative. This thinking might lead to third-person effects for
position issues, which should be stronger for those involved or holding extreme
attitudes than for people holding moderate attitudes.
One can similarly conceive of media effects as a position issue, and assume
that for this issue also, there are highly involved people who generally believe
the media are a threat to a good and peaceful society, to traditional values or
endangered elements of their culture. Those highly involved in this issue might
come to the same conclusion as outlined above: effects are always effects on
others because oneself is well aware of the danger. By definition, the effects are
negative. If a hostile media phenomenon causes the third person effect, the
discrepancy between the estimated effect on oneself and on others should
correlate with generalized negative attitude towards media effects. We therefore
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4: As compared to others, the third-person effect is larger for persons
who generally perceive media effects as strong and negative.
METHOD
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 can be tested by variations in question wording, i.e.
different formulations were used to measure estimates of influence on self and
others. A small number of formulations dominated previous research. Only a
few studies used formulations that could be replicated for the problems discussed
here. Not a single one presented respondents with third persons who were
psychologically close to them. Studies rather conceptualized the third person
as psychologically or socially distant from the respondent. Variations of distance
occurred mostly in terms of geography (students of the same university, students
in general, citizens of the same community, or Americans in general). Perloff
(1993, pp. 175O already criticized this type of variation and recommended the
variation of psychological instead of geographical or social distance. One way to
do it is to inquire about the extent of effects on friends as opposed to others
in general. As it is mostly friends and family who are close to us, we defined
the psychologically close as friends and acquaintances, and the psychologically
distant as other people in general.
Only a few studies used explicitly positive or neutral descriptions of media
effects (Glynn and Ostman 1988, Lasorsa 1989, Thompson et al. 1990). They
implied that certain media presentations (e.g. shows giving practical advice) or
certain issues would necessarily be regarded positive by the respondents. At
the same time, however, these studies cast media effects in undesirable notions
('impact', 'influence', etc.) in the questionnaire. To be under the influence of
something or somebody always implies one is not the master of one's own
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decisions. Being influenced equals a loss of freedom. Others want to force their
will upon oneself. Everyday talk has it that someone has come under the
influence of a sect, or that someone crashed his car under the influence of
liquor. All in all, it is not very flattering to admit to standing under the influence
of something and not making one's own decisions any more. Corresponding to
the terminology in Gunther and Mundy (1993), media effects characterized as
influence have a small or a negative benefit likelihood. A positive benefit
likelihood is suggested in our study by describing the effect as stimulation or
transfer of ideas. Accordingly, we have distinguished two groups. One was
asked about the extent of effects in terms of influence, the other in terms of
stimulation or transfer of ideas.
Not all published studies note the precise question wording. Therefore
conclusions about question wording cannot be drawn in every case. Supposedly,
the great majority of studies used a sentence structure with the respondent as
the grammatical object and the medium as the subject of the action. We found
the alternative structure, i.e. the one with the self in a more active role, used
explicitly in only a few studies (Thompson et al. 1990, Tiedge et al. 1991). We
varied activity by using different sentence structures. In one group, the first
and the third person were mentioned as the grammatical subject and placed at
the beginning of the sentence; in the other the media were the subject, mentioned
first.
DESIGN OF THE STUDY
To test our hypotheses, we have construed a questionnaire experiment. In
contrast to most third-person studies, we have not chosen a student sample,
but included respondents from all social strata, using a simple system of quotas.
There were 8 different versions, varied according to a complete three-factorial
( 2 x 2 x 2 ) design. The three independent variables entered by varied item
formulation were: (1) the benefit likelihood of the described effect (positive vs.
negative), (2) the framing of the self (active vs. passive) and (3) the psychological
distance between self and others (close vs. remote). Additionally, respondents'
attitudes towards media effects in general (hypothesis 4) were inquired about
with two questions: 'In general, how strong, do you think, is the effect of the
mass media on the public?' and 'And is this effect negative or positive?'
A quasi-experimental variable was construed from the responses, dividing
respondents into two groups: those who are generally convinced that media
have strong and negative effects, and others.
Formulation of items according to the design comprising three independent
variables for the example of advertising (see below for different genres) was as
follows:
CAUSES OF THIRD-PERSON EFFECTS
151
/. Respondent active, positive benefit likelihood
First person: 'I let myself be stimulated by advertising when I go shopping.'
Third person, close distance: 'My friends and acquaintances let themselves be
stimulated by advertising when they go shopping.'
Third person, remote distance: 'Other people let themselves be stimulated by
advertising when they go shopping.'
2. Respondent active, negative benefit likelihood
First person: 'I let myself be influenced by advertising when I go shopping.'
Third person, close distance: 'My friends and acquaintances let themselves be
influenced by advertising when they go shopping.'
Third person, remote distance: 'Other people let themselves be influenced by
advertising when they go shopping.'
j . Respondent passive, positive benefit likelihood
First person: 'Advertising stimulates me when I go shopping.'
Third person, close distance: 'Advertising stimulates my friends and acquaintances when they go shopping.'
Third person, remote distance: 'Advertising stimulates other people when they
go shopping.'
4. Respondent passive, negative benefit likelihood
First person: 'Advertising influences me when I go shopping.'
Third person, close distance: 'Advertising influences my friends and acquaintances when they go shopping.'
Third person, remote distance: 'Advertising influences other people when they
go shopping.'
To measure estimates of effect on self and others, respondents were asked to
indicate the degree with which they agreed with different items on seven digit
scales ( i = I don't agree; 7 = 1 completely agree). The third-person effect is
calculated as the difference between scale values for estimate of effect on self
and on others.
We employed four different media genres to measure the third-person effect.
The order of these genres in the questionnaire was the same for all respondents.
Selection of genres was guided by variation of prestige and the obviousness of
persuasive intent. The four genres used in third-person effect questions were:
TV commercials, campaign ads, TV news, and radio music programs. We
assume that TV commercials and campaign ads have low prestige and highly
obvious persuasive intent. The genre that is considered highly credible, with
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persuasive intent being less obvious, is TV news. In Germany people put great
trust in the news broadcasts of public stations. The prestige of radio music
programs can be expected to correlate with age; persuasive intent there is less
obvious than in advertising, however. The effect caused by the four media
genres was specified as follows: the items spoke of the effect of advertising on
shopping behavior, of campaign ads on voting behavior, of TV news on attitudes
regarding recent events, and of radio music programs on people's taste in music.
To keep the selection of respondents as uncomplicated as possible for
interviewers, quotas for age and education were used. By combination four
groups were formed: (1) those under 40 without a German high school diploma
(Abitur), (2) those under 40 with the diploma, (3) those over 40 and no diploma,
and finally (4) those over 40 with a diploma. Using these quotas did not create
a representative sample, but it yielded variety in social characteristics and
enabled us to consider age and education as intervening variables based on a
sufficient number of cases. This was done because previous studies identified
age and education as being important for the third-person effect. The intention
was to collect at least 40 interviews for each of the four quota groups. That
meant that in each quota group at least 5 respondents could be allotted to each
of die 8 experimental groups.
PROCEDURE
Respondents were handed the printed questionnaire to be filled out. A total of
46 interviewers was recruited among students. Their task was first to select
respondents according to their quotas, then to explain to them briefly what
they were to do. Respondentsfilledin the questionnaire alone, but the interviewer
answered questions and helped when something was not clear. Interviewers also
took care that respondents stuck to the given order of the questionnaire.
Respondents could be chosen among the acquaintances of interviewers, as long
as the quotas were fulfilled.
Data were collected between December 16, 1994, and March 2, 1995. A total
of 200 questionnaires was distributed among interviewers, who were only briefly
informed about the general subject studied. Experimental manipulations were
not explained to them. Every questionnaire noted the quota features of the
person to be interviewed. The individual load of interviews ranged between 1
and 13 among interviewers. 181 completed questionnaires were returned. There
were between 20 and 24 of them for each of the 8 experimental versions. 91
respondents were under 40, and 90 were over 40; 97 persons belonged to the
group with lower formal education, and 84 had a higher education.
Aside from the four couples of items aiming at the third-person effect and
the usual socio-demographic queries, the questionnaire included the following:
CAUSES OF THIRD-PERSON EFFECTS
TABLE I
181)
153
Differences between the estimated influence on self and others (N=
Media type
Self
Others
Difference
TV commercials
Campaign ads
TV news
Radio music programs
2.78
1.60
4-73
4-43
3-30
5-15
4-35
-1.65
-1.70
— 0.42
— 1.09
326
Means range from 1 (no perceived media effects on self or others) to 7 (maximum
perceived media effects).
All four differences are significant at p<.ooi according to paired f-tests.
• twelve questions from the EPI (Eysenck and Eysenck 1985) belonging to
the scale of extraversion; they were to be answered with yes or no, and
were used to measure a person's degree of introversion or extraversion;
• ten questions measuring strength of personality (Noelle-Neumann 1983,
Weimann 1994);
• a number of questions measuring use of TV, radio and newspapers,
including frequency of exposure, preferred contents, credibility and preferred medium;
• two questions on the perceived strength and negativity of media effects in
general in order to test hypothesis 4, as mentioned above.
RESULTS
To test hypotheses i to 4, we conducted multiple analyses of variance with the
experimental variables 'benefit likelihood', 'activity of the self, 'psychological
distance between self and others' and the quasi-experimental variable 'perceived
negativity of media influence' as independent variables, and the question asking
the perceived effect on oneself and on others as dependent variables. Analyses
were run parallel for the four media genres.
Table 1 shows that there is a significant third-person effect in all four genres.
Means for the estimated effects on self and others range between 1 and 7. Low
values (below the theoretical means of 4) indicate that an effect of a given genre
is denied; high values that it is assumed. Negative differences mean that the
estimated effect on others is stronger than the estimated effect on the self.
Respondents believed themselves to be influenced only to a small extent by TV
commercials ( ^ = 2.78), campaign ads (/W=i.6o) and radio music programs
(yVf = 3.26). For TV news, they admit more of an effect on themselves (M =
4.73). While they largely negated an effect on themselves for three of the four
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
TABLE
2 The impact of a benefit likelihood on the third-person effect
Estimated effect on
Others
Media type
Benefit
Self
TV commercials
negative
positive
negative
positive
negative
positive
negative
positive
2.8l*
2-75'
Campaign ads
TV news
Radio music programs
439 V
4-69b
b
4 -i8
3-36b
3-24b
5-3ib
S-o/
4-99
1.561.64'
2-57^
3-95*
4-27
Difference
-1.88
-M3
-1.80
-1.60
— 0.92*
+ o.o8B
b
— i.70 A
b
-o.49 B
4-44
Means in a column with different upper case superscripts differ at p<.o$ according
to f-tests for independent samples. Means in a row with different lower case superscripts
differ at p<.o$ according to paired /-tests.
genres, they believed, on the other hand, that others were indeed influenced
by three of the genres (TV commercials: M = 4.43; TV news: ^ = 5.15; radio
music programs: ^ = 4.35). The third-person effect was larger for those
two genres with a highly obvious persuasive intent and low credibility (TV
commercials and campaign ads) than for the other two. In the former two cases,
the difference amounts to almost two points on our seven digit scales. The
third-person effect is smallest for TV news, a genre with low persuasive intent.
Radio music programs, with a medium persuasive intent, produce a medium
sized third-person effect. These results confirm the findings of Gunther and
Mundy (1993), showing a strong influence of prestige of a genre on the size of
the third-person effect. However, the effect is significant for all four genres
across all experimental versions. There is no indication that it vanishes or is
even reversed for prestigious media.
Table 2 shows the influence of benefit likelihood on the size of the third-person
effect. In seven of the eight cases, there is a third-person effect, no matter
whether it was suggested that the effect be beneficial and desirable ('be
stimulated') to the respondent, or undesirable and negative ('be influenced').
For TV commercials and campaign ads, the two genres with low credibility, a
benefit likelihood had no significant influence on the estimated effect on the
self nor on the others. The third-person effect was largely the same. This,
however, was different for the other two genres, TV news and radio music
programs. A suggested positive benefit likelihood made respondents believe in
a significantly stronger effect on themselves, as compared with a negative
beneficial likelihood (TV news: positive M = $.o~], negative 7^ = 4.39; radio
music programs: positive ^ = 3 . 9 5 , negative ^ = 2.57). Estimates of the effect
CAUSES OF THIRD-PERSON EFFECTS
TABLE
155
3 The impact of psychological distance on the third-person effect
Media type
TV commercials
Campaign ads
TV news
Radio music programs
Psychological
distance
remote
close
remote
close
remote
close
remote
close
Estimated effect on
Others
Self
2.84*
2.71-
4-93^
3-90^
I.6I"
3.87^
2.68 B - b
S-22b
I-59'
4.62'
4.85
507
3-34'
4-79^
3-89^
3-i7*
Difference
— 2.00 A
-i.i8B
-2.2/
-i.09B
—0.61
— 0.22
-i-45A
-o.7iB
Means in a column with different upper case superscripts differ at /><.O5 according
to f-tests for independent samples. Means in a row with different lower case superscripts
differ at p<.o$ according to paired /-tests.
on third persons were, however, not altered. For TV news under the condition
of the likelihood of a positive benefit there even appears a small difference with
a positive sign. This indicates the third-person effect vanishes completely in
this case. Evidently, for genres with low credibility and a highly obvious
persuasive intent, one cannot influence the respondents' estimates of effect sizes
on themselves and on others by suggesting the likelihood of a different benefit.
Only for genres with medium or high credibility can the third-person effect be
reduced or even erased by suggesting that media influence is beneficial. Hypothesis 1 can therefore be partly confirmed, i.e. for genres with high credibility.
The ascribed activity of respondents did not have a significant influence on
respondents' effect estimates for the self or others. When respondents were
referred to as the subject of the phrased item, i.e. when they were cast in a
more active role, third-person effects tended to be smaller, as hypothesized, but
the differences did not reach significance. Hypothesis 2 must therefore be
discarded.
Table 3 shows the results for the influence of psychological proximity on the
third-person effect. If the third persons are close to the respondent, the
third-person effect can be expected to be smaller, or even disappear, according
to hypothesis 3. In fact, the differences between effect estimates for the self
and for others were clearly smaller, in all four genres, when the third person
was described as psychologically close. Differences in effect sizes were significant
in three of the four cases, and the fourth, TV news, went in the same direction,
but did not reach significance. As the variation of psychological proximity
occurred only in questions concerning the effect on others, proximity only
affected the estimates referring to others, not those referring to the self. For
156
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
the latter judgments, there was no discernible difference in any of the four
cases. Effect estimates referring to others were, however, affected in three of
the four cases: respondents thought the effects on psychologically close people
were smaller than the effects on others. Hypothesis 3 can therefore be confirmed
more clearly than hypothesis 1. If third persons are conceptualized as psychologically close, the third-person effect dwindles, but does not vanish altogether.
To analyze the influence of a generalized negative attitude towards media
effects, the questions asking the respondents' opinions on the extent and
negativity of media effects in general were combined. Both opinions were
measured on seven digit scales (1= positive or weak; 7 = negative or strong).
On average, respondents believed the effects of the media were negative (M =
5.03) and strong (JW = 6.2O). A total of 103 persons saw the effects generally as
very strong and very negative, i.e. they indicated '7' on both scales. The
remaining 78 respondents had less extreme opinions, at least on one of the
scales. Differences between these two groups, in estimated sizes of effects on
self and others, were assessed by /-tests. There were no significant differences.
However, the group of people who thought media in general had strong negative
effects tended to produce stronger third-person effects than the other group
(TV commercials JW=—1.75 vs. M= —1.53; campaign ads M= — 1.87 vs.
M = —1.47; TV news M= —0.48 vs. M= —0.35; radio music programs M =
— 1.15 vs. M = —1.01). Hypothesis 4 is therefore only weakly supported. There
is only a rudimentary influence of generalized attitudes of media effects on the
third-person effect.
Table 4 shows the differences between effect estimates for the self and for
others separately for the two beneficial likelihoods and the two psychological
distance groups. This is to enable a comparison of both factors. In three of
eight cases, there was a significant difference to be accounted for by variation
of the likelihood of benefit, and in six of eight cases, there were differences due
to variation of psychological proximity. This is to say the latter factor is the
more influential. There is also an additive effect of positive benefit likelihood
and psychological closeness. For each of the four genres, the third-person effects
were weakest in the group to whom media effects were put in desirable terms
and to whom the third persons were described as close. In reverse, a negative
likelihood of benefit and large psychological distance created the largest thirdperson effects.
The influence of socio-demographic and psychological variables is now
analyzed. As we did not develop hypotheses for this, results are only presented
in a summary fashion. Former studies on the third-person effect more or less
agreed that the effect increases with age (Perloff 1993). In our data, we can
clearly replicate this for all four genres, even if the difference did not reach
CAUSES OF THIRD-PERSON EFFECTS
157
TABLE 4
The combined impact of benefit likelihood and psychological distance
on the third-person effect
Media type
Psychological distance
TV commercials
remote
close
remote
close
remote
close
remote
close
Campaign ads
TV news
Radio music programs
Benefit likelihood
Negative
Positive
-i.85A
— 2-32
-i.4oB
-2.40A
-o.98B
B
— i.i4
-1.23^
-0.58^
-2.26^
-2.i3A
-i.o5B
+ 0.02"
+ 0.14"
-0.64"
-034
Means in a column with different upper case superscripts differ at/K.05 (independent
samples): Means in a row with different lower case superscripts differ at /»<-O5
(independent samples). Cell entries are the sizes of the third-person effect, i.e. the
differences between first- and third-person estimates.
significance for radio music programs: the third-person effect is generally weaker
for those under 40 (TV commercials M= —1.10 vs. M= — 2.21, /><.ooi;
campaign ads M = — 1.46 vs. M= — i.94,/><.o5; TV news M= —.12 vs. M =
— .72, p<.oi; radio music M = — .87 vs. M= —1.32, n.s.).
While we confirm previous research concerning age, our data resemble the
mixed evidence for education. Lasorsa (1989), Rucinski and Salmon (1990) and
Gunther (1995) found that the third-person effect grew with increasing education. Our data indicate the opposite. Except for the genre of radio music
programs, persons with low levels of formal education displayed larger thirdperson effects than those with a higher level of education (TV commercials
M= — 1.87 vs. M = —1.41, p<.io; campaign ads M= — 1.99 vs. M = — 1.37,
p<.oi; TV news M=— .50 vs. M=— .32, n.s.; radio music M=—1.03 vs.
M = —1.17, n.s.).
The size of the third-person effect was not systematically related to the
intensity or the type of media use. A few significant results did emerge but
went in different directions. The influence of media use must therefore be
regarded as weak, and its direction as unpredictable. Neither the respondents'
degree of extraversion nor their strength of personality varied systematically
with the size of the third-person effect.
DISCUSSION
The third-person effect emerges from this study as a persistent and stable
phenomenon of public opinion. Its strength is highly dependent on some of
158
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
the factors included here, but we only found a single case where the third-person
effect vanishes, or maybe even turns around, and that was for the perceived
effect of TV news under the condition that the effect is suggested to be desirable.
For TV news and radio music—genres which both have a high credibility and
low persuasive intent—the third-person effect is clearly smaller than for genres
with low credibility (TV commercials and campaign ads). The size of the effect
is thus dependent on the type of genre analyzed, but it exists also for highly
credible genres.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the benefit likelihood of the media effect described
was responsible for the existence of the third-person effect. This was confirmed
for genres with a medium or high credibility. For TV commercials and campaign
ads, however, the size of the third-person effect could not be influenced
by differences in benefit likelihood. This might be due to the respondents'
preconception of these media as clearly not beneficial, a preconception that
cannot be overcome by positive question wording. The reasoning would be:
respondents clearly conceptualize commercial and political ads as detrimental
forces, which makes their effects socially as well as personally undesirable in
any case. One conceives of oneself as a self-reliant consumer and voter, making
rational decisions nobody is allowed to tamper with. In this area, no influence,
no matter how it is described, appears to be flattering, and any influence is
categorically rejected.
News, however, is different: media effects in this area can be flattering, or at
least they do not contradict conception of one's self. Whoever pays attention
to the news and learns from it, is considered well informed, and thus well
educated. This is why the third-person effect is generally small there. The
positive look at news effects is thoroughly disturbed by the notion of'influence':
an influence reminds people too much of manipulation, even for a newscast of
repute. Respondents want to preserve their positive conception of self and are
no longer willing to admit to an 'influence' on themselves by the news.
Hypothesis 2, stating an influence of respondents' ascribed activity on the size
of the third-person effect, could not be confirmed.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the strength of the third-person effect was
dependent on respondents' psychological distance to the third persons. This
was confirmed for three of the four genres. Differences were largest for the
genres with low credibility. While benefit likelihood affected the third-person
effect for genres with high credibility, and altered mostly the effect estimates
for the self, psychological distance predominantly affected the third-person
effect for genres with low credibility, and influenced the estimates for the others.
There was only rudimentary support for hypothesis 4, postulating a correlation
between the third-person effect and generalized negative attitudes toward media
effects. Third-person effects were generally larger for older people and for those
CAUSES OF THIRD-PERSON EFFECTS
159
with less education, as compared to younger and better educated people.
What conclusions may be drawn for the applicability of the concepts described
at the beginning? All in all the results fail to single out a unique or unequivocal
psychological cause for the third-person effect. The likelihood of a benefit
affects mostly self-perception, psychological distance mostly the perception of
others. This suggests that both 'unrealistic optimism' and 'impersonal impact'
are responsible for the emergence of a third-person effect. Self-perception is thus
guided by the effort to preserve a positive self-image and to protect one's
illusions about one's (relative) invulnerability. This could also explain why a
positive benefit likelihood does not exert any influence for clearly persuasive
genres. Answers in this case are overridden by a persistent conception of media
effects as detrimental. Perception of others, on the other hand, is affected by the
perceived similarity of the first person with the third. Media effects on friends
and acquaintances are judged more on the individual level, whereas the impact
on others in general is seen more on the societal level. The third-person
effect is thus produced by at least two psychological mechanisms. The dual
conditionality of the effect has so far been hidden by relatively invariable
questions.
The way we operationalized them, generalized negative attitudes towards
media influence did not have a significant influence. However, the results for
the 'unrealistic optimism' suggest that general attitudes might nevertheless play
their part, but only as far as genres with highly obvious persuasive intent are
concerned. Another argument for an effect of generalized negative attitudes
towards media influence is that—except for one case, TV news with a positive
benefit likelihood—the third-person effect never vanished completely. To most
respondents, media effects do appear as negative from the start. Our results
also show that the choice of wording used for measuring effect estimates on
self and others clearly influence the third-person effect. It is therefore imperative
that researchers first document the wording of questions used, and secondly
justify their decisions both methodologically and theoretically.
Communication scholars working in the area of the third-person effect should
deal with the psychological bases of the effect not only in terms of the effects
of mass media, but also, for instance, in term of media use. It might be
conceivable that there is a third-person effect in that area, too: people imply
that others use the media more than they do, or that they use other media than
oneself, guided e.g. by their tastes for the vulgar.
It would also be important to find out how all sorts of media related
third-person effects connect with other known 'self-other'-phenomena. Aside
from the concepts dealt with at the beginning, the 'false consensus effect'
(Marks and Miller 1987), the 'false uniqueness effect' (Suls and Wan 1987),
the spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann 1993, Willnat 1996) or 'pluralistic
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
ignorance' (e.g. O'Gorman and Garry 1976, Taylor 1982) should be considered
as being related to third-person effects.
Research so far has analyzed the third-person effect merely as a dependent
variable. It is desirable that future studies of media effects and media use also
consider the effect as an independent or intervening variable. The difference
between the effect estimates on self and others could be included as a personality
variable. This would allow conclusions to be drawn on the credibility of media
genres and the benefit, respectively the acceptance, of media messages. Whether
a person's individual susceptibility to the third-person effect tells us anything
about media effect on him or her could then be investigated on a broader basis.
Equally desirable are studies looking into the relationship between third-person
effect and other personality traits, in order to gain more insight into the
psychological causes.
Third-person effects are to be found (even if our results contradict this for
education) most strongly among people of higher age and education. This could
lead to the assumption that especially elites such as politicians, media researchers,
or advertising people ascribe to others a stronger effect than to themselves.
This might explain why politicians consider negative news stories so strong a
challenge to their reputation, why media researchers never analyze media effects
on themselves although they might have the highest levels of exposure, or why
advertising people are so convinced of commercial effectiveness. To shed some
light on such relationships, quite a number of studies on the third-person effect
will be necessary, especially on its relevance for people's behavior and attitudes.
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
Hans-Bernd Brosius is a Professor at the Institut fur Kommunikationswissenschaft
(Zeitungswissenschaft) of the Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich, Germany. His
research interests include media effects, public opinion and journalism. He also serves
as the Journal Review Editor of IJPOR.
Dirk Engel recently graduated from the Institut fur Publizistik, Mainz, Germany. He
is currently a freelance writer for the Wiesbadentr Kurier, a daily newspaper.