Locating the Islamic Concept of Qadar: P a g e | 46
An International Journal
J. Hum. & Islam 3(1), 46-52, April 2013
HATAM Publishers
Journal of Humanity & Islam
ISSN 2231-7252
Journal homepage: http://www.hgpub.com/jhi.html
Locating the Islamic Concept of Qadar (Predestination) in the African
Worldview: A Philosophical Inquiry
Luqman Lekan Adedeji, Saheed Ahmad Rufai*
Department of Arts and Social Sciences Education, University of Lagos, Nigeria
*Corresponding author, Phone:+ 234-8033077359, Email: [email protected]
ARTICLE INFORMATION
ABSTRACT
Article history
Qadar is one of the Islamic Philosophical concepts that have
variants and equivalents in various cultures and civilizations of
the World. It is equally one of the Islamic concepts that have
attracted considerable attention and contributions from scholars
across disciplines and across the ages. Yet it has remained one
of the Islamic concepts that are regarded as both perturbing and
controversial. The purpose of this paper is to articulate the place
of Qadar in the African Worldview. To fulfill its aim, the paper
employs analytic philosophy as a tool for the study. With specific
illustrations from some of the dominant African cultures, the
paper highlights the Islamic concept comparatively and
contrastingly alongside the concept of predestination in those
cultures.
The paper underscores the similarities and
dissimilarities in the Islamic view of the concept of predestination
and the African view as well as the Western view of the same
concept. It also offers some critical but Islamic-based explanation
on some of the controversies surrounding the concept, among
some leading Islamic philosophico-religious schools of thought.
Received 24 May 2011
Revised 10 Feb 2013
Accepted 15 Feb 2013
Available online 01 April 2013
Keywords
Qadar
African Worldview
Analytic philosophy
Predestination
Western view
Islamic concept
© 2013 HATAM Publishers. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Qadar, as a concept, has attracted a multiplicity of interpretations from various quarters. The
degrees to which such diverse interpretations capture the essence of the Islamic concept vary. Some
are elastic enough to have made possible the inference or conclusion that all the experiences being
recorded in the life of man are undoubtedly a product of his Qadar. To this end, it is rationalized that
whatever happens to man in terms of fortune or misfortune is a product of Allah’s decree. Yet there
are others who maintain a medial view by holding an in-between stance, between the life of man and
his efforts or actions. The diverse nature of views on Qadar accounts for the disparate nature of
interpretations attracted thereby. It is therefore not uncommon to find students who fail examinations,
traders who incur losses, individuals who are befallen by one calamity or another, attributing all the
unfavourable experiences to Qadar. Similarly, is it not uncommon to hear people attribute to Qadar
progress, success and any other form of accomplishment for that matter. The irrational use of the
word has assumed an alarming dimension, having been extended to justifying any atrocity committed
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Locating the Islamic Concept of Qadar: P a g e | 47
by some and even to the extent of being invested as a justification for any heinous act perpetrated by
any criminal. However, it may not be out of place to state that some of the earliest cultures known to
man nurtured and promoted the perception through their view of the concept of predestination.
Predestination is a concept that is as old as man himself. Its origin is traceable to man’s
desperate search for a justification for his sins or mistakes. A drunkard will attribute his action to God
in the same manner that an armed robber will do. Every offender naturally wants another man held
responsible for his own offence, that he may go unpunished. The first creature of God to demonstrate
this tendency was Iblis who, having refused to prostrate before Adam, attributed his disobedience to
Allah, to Allah Himself saying, “Because thou hast thrown me out (of the way), lo! I will lie in wait for
them on thy straight way” (Q 7:16), and in another injunction, “O my Lord! Because Thou hast put me
in the wrong, I will make (wrong) fair-seeming to them on the earth, and I will put them on the earth,
and I will put all in the wrong” (Q: 15: 39).
Mankind has since embraced the line of thinking and argument demonstrated by Iblis in this
regard which is why the concept of Qadar has attracted the thinking that there is a strong connection
between man’s actions on earth and the influence of some heavenly spirits or divine elements. One
is tempted to agree with Al-Qarani (2006) that it was owing to such belief alongside the fear of being
struck by the heavenly beings that the people of the earliest cultures and civilizations offered ritual
sacrifices to appease such beings which, in their estimation, included the sun, moon, stars and even
cloud. It is not out of place to infer that the people of those cultures may have extended their belief in
the heavenly beings to the earthly creatures, which was why some of them appeased as idols some
animals, plants and even objects.
This conjectural inference seems to have found a confirmation in the word of Al‘Aqqad (1994:43)
who writes about the belief system of the ancient Indians, that, right from his birth, man has no choice
or control over his destiny which had been written on him from time immemorial and which, to them,
inevitably determined his fate in life, to be either blissful or tortuous. It is obvious from Al-Qarani’s
analysis that the ancient Indians believed in the concept of predestination. Conversely, the ancient
Egyptians believed in the concept of freewill (Al-Qarani, 2006). However, the reverse is the case with
the ancient Babylons who believed that the star under the influence of which man is born determined
his fate in life (Al-Aqqad, 1994). The Jahiliyyah Arabs held a similar belief as they attributed rainfall,
sunshine, eclipse of the moon and harvest of their farmland, to various stars and natural conditions.
To the Greek, man by virtue of his thinking faculties, should be held responsible for his actions.
Socrates espoused the principles of knowledge and articulated the relationship of knowledge to the
recognition of virtue. However, Plato favoured freewill on one hand and predestination on the other
hand. In this way, he maintained that man should be held responsible for his action though he, at
times, may be helpless. As regards Aristotle, the Prime Mover had destined the life of man although
man is not without freewill which is often controlled by material considerations, which may hinder its
action in consonance with the wish of the Prime Mover (Omoregbe, 1996).
Yet in pre-Islamic Arabia, some Arabs were living the life of natural believers in Allah. However,
there were others who practiced idolatry. The Qur’an insists that such a polytheist tendency was not
intended to deny the existence of Allah but merely a consideration for some gods with a view to
seeking favour from them. That those Arabs, notwithstanding their polytheist practices believed in
Allah, is confirmed in several verses of the Qur’an some of which may be quoted as follows: But those
who take for protection other than Allah (say): “ We only serve them in order that they may bring us
nearer to Allah” (Q. 39: 13), Say: to whom belong the earth and all beings therein? (say) if ye know”
they will say, “to Allah” say: “Yet will ye not receive admonition?...” (Q. 23:84 – 89), Say: “who is it
that sustains you (in life) from the sky and forms the earth? Or who is it that has power over hearing
and sight? And who is it that brings out the living from the dead and the dead from the living? And
who is it that rules and regulates all affairs?” They will soon say “Allah” say, “will ye not then show
piety (to Him)?” (Q10:31). If thou ask them, who it is that created the heavens and the earth. They will
certainly say, “Allah”, say: “praise be to Allah! But most of them know not (Q31:25).
However, it should be pointed out that the pre-Islamic Arabs believed in Qadar and yet did not
deny freewill (Al-Qarani, 2006). They maintained a medial position by believing that man is in a
position to exercise his intellect and take appropriate decisions while, at the same time, regarded
Qadar as a heavenly force that cannot be manipulated. In the Judaist thought, the concept of
predestination is of two dimensions. The Qaraite Jews recognized and believed in both freewill and
predestination (Shalabi, 1996) while the saints or brothers in God embraced only freewill and reject
the idea of predestination. However, the Talmud is categorical in describing God as the source of
both good and evil. The book also sees God as having given man bad nature and at the same time
required him to exercise the Shari’ah which is why man could not obey Him. This particular statement
as contained in the book, alongside other teachings of Judaism was responsible for the non-
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Locating the Islamic Concept of Qadar: P a g e | 48
recognition and in fact the outright rejection of the book by some Jews. Yet the dominant Jewish view
in this regard is favourably disposed to freewill.
In Christianity, the dominant position is that of freewill. This is evident in the works of most of
their thinkers. For instance, Augustine (1998) defined freewill as man’s ability to accept or reject a
particular concept. To expatiate on this he said, “if freewill is not mine, I wonder what I can regard as
truly mine…” (p.54). It is common knowledge among scholars of philosophy that Christian dialectics
of the East emphasized the freewill of man as well as man’s total responsibility for his action, Thus,
why the Christian view of predestination cannot be said to have been shrouded in any confusion or
controversy, the Islamic view of the concept is not totally devoid of controversial elements which are
explained in the following section.
The Western Conception of Qadar
The Islamic concept of Qadar is closely related to the concept of causality as known in the
Western thought where it is somewhat scientific and philosophical. The Oxford Advanced Learner’s
Dictionary describes causality in a manner that suggests that nothing can happen without a cause.
Accordingly, causality concerns the relationship between something that happens and the reason for
its happening. The implication of this is that causality involves at least two elements where one is
instrumental to the occurrence of the other. This in fact is the meeting point of qadar and causality.
However, it should be pointed out that while Allah is regarded as responsible for the occurrence of
every experience with regards to qadar, causality does not always attribute the cause of the
occurrence of an action to a divine factor.
According to Mackie (1995:120), causality is associated with the idea of something producing or
bringing about something else. According to him, the word “cause” refers to an event prior to an
effect as in the case of severe draught (A) which could be said to be the cause of famine (B) or the
case of petrol (A) stored close to a burning candle which could be said to be the cause of fireoutbreak (B). According to Omoregbe (1996), it is generally believed that there is necessary
connection between an action and its cause which is why such feature as uniformity, universality and
others are central to the philosophical concept of causality. Similarly, there is such necessary
connection between Allah and his creatures, with regards to the Islamic concept of qadar. However,
there is no place for such a belief in the Islamic thought that since there is uniformity of nature, then
causes would always produce like effects. There is no uniformity of nature between Allah and his
creature and Allah, as a cause, designer or originator of actions, does not necessarily produce like
effects.
However, Akpan (2010) resists the temptation that there is a necessary connection between
event A and B such that we could easily conclude that A necessarily causes B. Relying on David
Hume as quoted in Edet (2006), Akpan (2010:722) insists that it is rather our experience and habit of
associating things that usually go together in sequence that make us believe that A causes B where B
is always seen following A. ”He argues that the idea of necessary connection arises because we
have, for example, repeatedly observed that thunder follows lightening, we always come to the
conclusion that lightening causes thunder where actually there is no necessary connection, as there
are moments where lightening occurs and thunder fails to follow which is a falsifying instance of the
idea of necessary connection.” The commonality between this and the Islamic view of the question is
that there are exceptions to what may be attributed to Allah, in Islam, as man himself is held
responsible for certain actions and experiences. Hence the need for an elaboration of the Islamic
view.
The Islamic View of Predestination
It is on a reliable record through an authentic tradition on the authority of Imam Muslim that the
holy prophet was once asked by Angel Jibril as to what constitutes iman (i.e. faith). The holy
prophet’s reply came in the form of a list of prerequisites among which was the acceptance of fate, be
it good or bad (an tu’mina bial qadar khayarihi washarrihi). According to Dhaou (2005:70), the shared
belief in predestination significantly narrowed the gap between the two leading rival Islamic schools of
thought on the issue predestination, namely, the Jabarites and the Qadarites. Relying on Fazlur
Rahman (2000), Dhaou (2005) posits that the statement “human beings possess free will” in an
Islamic context, asserts Divine Power rather than decrees it, since the phrase means “God has
endowed human kind with a free will and that this will is efficacious so that a person is completely free
to choose and to act” (Pp. 70-71)
Yet it should be pointed out that Islamic jurists and theologians did not disagree on the preordained nature of human destiny. The implication of this is that the human being’s life span and the
experiences that will be recorded throughout the duration of his life are preordained. However, Dhaou
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Locating the Islamic Concept of Qadar: P a g e | 49
(2005) observes that the area of divergence among Islamic jurists and theologians, with regards to
predestination, concerns, whether the concept includes human actions. One of the two rival Islamic
philosophical schools of thoughts, the Jabrites (fatalists) rationalize that a human being’s reactions to
external happenings are predetermined alongside the happenings themselves whereas the other
group, known as Qadarites (libertarians) maintain that what happens to a person is determined by
God, but the person’s reaction to those happenings is not necessarily determined (Watt, 1985:29).
According to Dhaou (2005:71), the Jabrites, in addition to that conviction, hold that God presents the
course through which every man operates and no human being can change this course (fatalism).
“Accordingly, they question the logicality of the thinking that while the ultimate destiny is already
predetermined, can people perform effective actions” (p.71). It logically follows that “what people
appear to be performing can in no way be taken as their own actions, but rather as part of the
predetermined path” the fatalists rationalize. Dhaon (2005) observes that “the close logical
association between predestination and fatalism has been so obvious to the Jabrites that they did not
feel any need to seek any additional argument to support their fatalistic formulations.” (p.72). It is
interesting to note that the same set of Qur’anic injunctions and prophetic traditions advanced by
them in supporting their fatalistic considerations were employed in articulating predestination.
In a similar token, Dhaou (2005:73) maintains that “the qadarite objection to the fatalist
interpretations of the holy Quran and prophetic traditions does not amount to an explicit denial of
divine power over human fate, although some of their extreme propositions with regard to human
actions may lead to controversial conclusions. Relying on Hassan al-Basri’s famous epistle to Caliph
Abdul-Malik on Marwan Watt (1985:27) argues that such verses as “Allah sends astray who He wills”.
(Al-Ra’d:22) “appear fatalistic only when understood in isolation from the general Qur’anic context,”
adding that such a verse as this “ would have had a different meaning had it not been interpreted in
accordance with other verses like “God sends astray the evil doers (Ibrahim:27).” It is obvious from
the foregoing that the holy Qur’an contains a strong basis for the position of each of the two opposing
schools of thought and that it is only when a Qur’anic injunction is interpreted in isolation from other
similar injunctions that the interpretation, with regards to the question of predestination and freewill,
becomes problematic.
Al-Qadar is a derivative of the Arabic verb Qaddara, which means to fashion, form or formulate a
thought wisely, rightly and appropriately. Qadar is a singular Arabic noun that is pluralized as aqdaar.
Qadar itself is specifically a derivative of the Arabic verbal noun taqdeer. This explains why qadar
and taqdeer could be used interchangeably in expressing the idea of measurement and its variants;
with the Arabic word Miqdar which also derives from the same source verb. Somewhat related to but
totally different from the three is the word qudrah which, though a derivative of the same source as
they are, merely means power, ability or potency. The attribute of Allah, al-Qadeer, meaning the
Able, derives from Qudrah and expresses in connection with Allah the idea of being able to do
everything. Clear illustrations of the three predestination-related words are given in the Qu’ran. As
regards Qadar, the Qu’ran says: “Verily, all things have we created in qadar (i.e. proportion and
measure” (Q54:49), while it says about miqdar “…Every single thing is with Him in miqdar (i.e. due
proportion) (Q. 13:8), whereas it says about taqdeer “…He who created all things and ordered them in
taqdeer (i.e. due proportions)” (Q25:2).
The doctrine of Qadar is closely related to the conception of human responsibility, and that
agrees with that side of the Islamic revelation which is the conception of a righteous God who
demands righteousness from His creatures” (Watt, 1948:48). The doctrine infact has much to do with
a religio-philosophical group known as Qadariyyah, which is why there is a growing misconception of
the doctrine as one associated with the teachings of the group. However, such a misconception has
been given adequate attention by writers and researchers notable among them being Nallino (1938)
who, according to Watt (1948) noted that “the name ‘Qadari,” which ought to mean an upholder of
Divine Qadar, does in fact mean exactly the opposite” (p.48). Watt further alludes to Nallino in
establishing that notwithstanding, the fact that the discussions in the first century of Islam always
centered on the Qur’an, there were people who spent a lot of time discussing the Qadar, and who
made it an important question; because of this the term “Qadariyyah” was applied to them, without
reference to the precise view they adopted about Qadar”. It is not out of place to illustrate, at this
juncture, with a statement contained in Al-Ashari’s Ibanah, in connection with the concept of Qadar,
as quoted by Watt (1948: 123).: “The Qadariyyah consider that we deserve the name of Qadari
because we say that God determines (qaddara) evil and unbelief, and whoever affirms (yuthbitu) the
Qadar is a qadari, and not those who do not affirm it. The reply to them is: The Qadari is he who
affirms that the Qadar is his own and not his Lord’s and that he himself determines (yuqaddiru) his
acts and not his creator. This is the proper use of language. The goldsmith is the man who does
goldsmith’s work, and not the man who has goldsmith’s work done for him… since you consider that it
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Locating the Islamic Concept of Qadar: P a g e | 50
is you who determine your acts and perform them, and not your lord, you must be qadariyyah and not
we; for we do not ascribe the acts to ourselves and not to our Lord, and we do not say that we
determine them and not He, but we say that they are determined for us. Reply: If whoever affirms that
the determination is God’s (man athbata i-taqdir li-llah) is a Qadari, then, since you hold that God
determines acts of obedience, you ought to infer that you are Qadariyya; since this inference does not
stand, your view is worthless and your argument self-contradictory.” The above passage has
meaningfully put the conception of Qadar in its proper place; it gives clear pictures of its origin, usage
and implication. It is in fact self explanatory for the purpose of the present discourse. It is of great
value to articulate at this juncture the African view of predestination with specific illustrations with
three notable African cultures namely Yoruba, Igbo, and Akan cultural settings.
The Yoruba View of Predestination
The Yoruba view of predestination presupposes that no human effort can change what has been
decided by God. The implication of this is that man’s actions are not a product of freewill but rather, in
keeping with a predetermined destiny. However, it should be pointed out that the Yoruba belief in
predestination revolves around the thinking that there is a supreme being (Olodumare) whose
decisions are beyond human influence and who is regarded as creator of the universe. According to
Oladipo (1992:37), “the Yoruba believe that Olodumare not only creates physically, but also ordains
the destiny of his creatures, especially that of men’ and whatever anybody does on earth is according
to this belief, a fulfillment of what has been preordained by Olodumare”. The real essence of being in
the Yoruba belief is the soul which is the” inner person” called “Ori”. The word “Ori”, in contrast to its
English meaning as the physical “head” or its biological description as the seat of the major sensory
organs, to the Yoruba connotes the total nature of its bearer” (Ademuleya, 200:214). The term “Ori”
is not without some “intrinsic meaning and value” for the physical head which is the object it is
identified with which itself “carries with it the essential nature of the object associated with it that is the
man’… as “the physical “Ori” is but a symbol of the “inner head” or the “inner person”, the
“Ori-inu”
(the inner head) (p.215).
In the Yoruba view, every man must, before his birth or even conception, kneel down before
Olodumare “to receive what his lot will be in the world. And, while kneeling down, it is ori (the physical
head) that bows down reverently to get that portion conferred on him” (Oladapo,1992:37)
The
portion that is thereby conferred on the person is what man will fulfill on earth and is called “ipin-ori
“(Ori’s portion). No human effort, the Yoruba believe, can change that which has been so
apportioned. However, by the time man arrives on earth, he becomes totally oblivious of all that had
transpired in the heaven especially his destiny. Yet his ori shall be fully conscious of his chosen
destiny.
According to Ademuleya, “the “ori” is invisible, and is therefore referred to as ori-inu (the inner
head), destined to become the person’s instructor, his “guardian angel,’ which is equally referred to as
‘semi-split entity’, the “man’s double” (p.217). The centrality of the place of ori to man’s destiny
among the Yoruba is evident in their philosophical assertions such as ‘Akunle yan l’adayeba’ (that
which man kneels down to receive is what he meets on earth), ‘ori eni l’awure ‘(one’s head is the final
determinant of one’s fate),’ Ayanmo o gboogun’ (that which has been conferred on the head is not
alterable), ‘ori-inu eni niu ba ni s’aye eni (one’s ori-inu makes his life for him), ‘ori laba bo ti aba fi
orisasile’(it is ori that should be worshipped and not the deities). All these could be interpreted to
mean that one’s choice of head determines his success or failure. Yet it should be pointed out that
man is given freewill which he could exercise and be ready to face its consequences.
The Igbo View of Predestination
Predestination in the Igbo view revolves around the concept of chi or Ankara as tersely summed
up in the traditional saying that ‘onye kwe chi ya ekwe’ meaning when a person says “yes” his chi also
says “yes”. The implication of this is that a man who is determined to be successful in life will find his
chi solidly behind him and favourably disposed to that determination. Accordingly, a man is regarded
as the architect of his own destiny. According to Achebe (1975:69), “the Igbo believe that a man
receives his gifts or talents, his character indeed his portion in life generally-before he comes into the
world. At that point, man’s chi “presides over the bargaining”. This explains the implication of the
saying ‘Obu etu nya na chie si kwu,’ which as noted by Achebe is often heard when ‘a man’s
misfortune is somehow beyond comprehension and so can only be attributable to an agreement he
himself must have entered into, at the beginning, alone with his ‘chi’ for there is a fundamental justice
in the universe and nothing so terrible can happen to a person for which he is not somehow
responsible” (p.69).
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This in fact is the meeting point of the Yoruba view, as noted earlier, and the Igbo view as the
two cultures hold man responsible for whatever turns out to be his portion on earth. In other words,
the chi assumes among the Igbo the same status as that assumed by the ori in Yoruba cosmology.
However, the Igbo believe that when a man says yes his chi will also agree, as stated earlier, may not
always be true. For instance, Achebe (1975) observes that “a man may struggle with all his power
and say yes most emphatically and yet nothing he attempts will succeed.” In such a situation, the
Igbo say chie ekwero (his chi does not agree). This, according to Achebe, may mean one of two
things; “either the man has a particularly intransigent chi or else it is the man himself attempting too
late to alter that primordial bargain he had willingly struck with his chi, saying yes now when his first
unalterable word had been no, forgetting that the first word gets to Chukwu’s house”. The implication
of this is that whatever effort made by man will be fruitless and futile as long as it is not in consonance
with his first word to which his chi had consented.
Yet the thinking that an intransigent chi may be responsible for man’s misfortune can not flourish
unchallenged. Achebe posits that it is not impossible to hear Igbo talk of ajo chi that is bad chi and
maintains that such a thinking has more to do with fortune than character. He argues that a man of
impeccable character may yet have a bad chi so that nothing he puts his hand to will work out right
and concludes that chi is more concerned with success or failure than with righteousness or
wickedness (p.69). The essence of the place of chi in Igbo cosmology is graphically captured by the
Igbo concept of two brothers, both of the same mother, yet dissimilar in character, as one is good
while the other is bad. Accordingly, the Igbo say: ‘Ofu nne n’amu, ma ofu chi adeke,’ meaning one
mother gives birth, different chi creates. It is not out of place to reiterate that no man, in the Igbo
cosmology, is destined to fail or succeed in life. Rather, every individual is regarded as the architect
of his own success or failure. This is so in view of the fact that man is expected to say yes before
having his wish or desire endorsed by his chi who, in turn, says yes.
Predestination in the Akan Cosmology
The place of predestination in the Akan cosmology revolves around the Akan traditional saying
that “all men have one head but heads differ” (nnipa nyinna wo ti baako nanso won ti rise). Shedding
light on this Gyekye (1990:227) observes that the first use of “head” (ti) refers to the physical head,
the second to the soul, the bearer of destiny. The implication of this, as elucidated by him is that “all
people are basically alike as people; they are all created in the same way but they differ in their
fortunes, luck, capacities, etc (p. 106). This is illustrated with the case of the maker of a car who is in
a position to determine its speed, size, and shapes, so can the creator can determine a number of
things about human beings. The basis of the Akan concept of destiny is an interesting one. This is
because it is reached by reflecting upon the experiences of individuals. It is called nkrabea and it is
what really constitutes the individuality of a person. The nkrabea of a person is ‘unique and
idiosyncratic’ as illustrated by Gyekye, with the following proverbs: “Each destiny is different from the
other all men having one head but heads differ antelopes’ soul (destiny) is one, duiker’s another. Oh
cock, do not compare your destiny with that of hen (p. 107).
Two Akan words are central to the concept of destiny namely nkrabea and hyebea. According to
Gyekye (1990) nkra means message and bea, manner, thereby making the two words “the manner of
the message”. The message being talked about here is understood in Akan cosmology as meaning
the message given by the Supreme Being to the individual soul, which (message) was to determine
the manner in which the individual was to live in the world. The other word used synonymously with
nkrabea is hyebea, which is also composed of two words namely hye, to fix or arrange and bea,
manner. The word is therefore applicable to the manner in which one’s destiny was fixed or arranged.
A clear picture of the place of destiny among the Akan is given in the following various traditional
saying by them.
Onayame nkrabea nni kwatibea
There is no bypass to God’s destiny.
Onyame hybea yennae no
God’s destiny cannot be altered.
Ade A Onyame ahyehye odasani ntumi nsee no
No living man can subvert the order (arrangement of God)
It is obvious from the language of proverbs as illustrated above that the theory of destiny is
divinely imposed in the Akan cosmology.
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Locating the Islamic Concept of Qadar: P a g e | 52
Conclusion
This paper has articulated the place of the concept of Qadar in the African Worldview, given the
controversial nature of the concept as one of the Islamic philosophical concepts that have variants
and equivalents in various cultures and civilizations of the World. The paper employed analytic
philosophy as a tool for the study and drew specific illustrations from some of the dominant African
cultures such as Igbo, Yoruba, and Akan. The paper highlighted and analyzed the Islamic concept
comparatively and contrastingly alongside the concept of predestination in those various cultures.
The paper underscored the similarities and dissimilarities in the Islamic view of the concept of
predestination and the African view of the same concept, as well as the Western view. It also offered
some critical but Islamic-based explanation on some of the controversies surrounding the concept,
among some leading Islamic philosophico-religious schools of thought.
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Journal of Humanity & Islam, Volume 3, Issue 1, April 2013