The Phenomenon of Religious-political Subculture in Poland.
Democracy in Practice – a Case Study from Central Europe.
Rafał Riedel
Institute of Political Science, State University of Opole
Centre for European Studies ARENA, University of Oslo
Abstract
This paper seeks to define the specifics of political-religious subculture present in Poland on
the extreme right-wing of political spectrum gravitating around media consortium commonly
known as ‘Radio Maryja’. The investigated case will empirically focus on a subculture which
is basically constituted on a specific religious component that is dominant and that determines
the emotional, cognitive and evaluative orientations of a considerable part of citizenry in
Poland. The socio-demographic profile of this subculture is defined by the available
quantitative data taken from the latest panel studies report. The authors build their
conceptualizations on content analysis methodology (widely used in political media studies)
covering large time span (2000-2007) and different types of media used by this subculture.
This investigation is systematically structured and the researchers present attitudes
communicated and promoted by the analyzed ultra-religious media in differentiated fields important from the point of view of the political culture perspective.
Keywords: political subculture, religion, secularism, ‘Radio Maryja’, Poland
Introductory remarks
Enlightenment is said to have finally dethroned religion after its previous domination
in almost all domains of human life. However, one cannot ignore the fact that religion is still
present in modern political life, offering inspiration for American Constitution, being a moral
base for the Solidarity movement in Poland, or finding its place in the preamble of the
European (Communities and Union) treaties. 85% of the inhabitants of our globe still profess
a religion. The majority of them claim that religion is more important in their lives than
politics (Esmer, Pettersen, 2007, p. 481). Religion has serious consequences for the
organization of social life, including its political aspect; although they proved more serious in
certain periods while less in others, as well as more serious in certain societies or states and
less in others.
The correlations between politics and religion make the Polish case especially
interesting due to its superficially monolithic Catholic profile of the society, specific
secularization pattern, and the recent (2005-2007) developments in electoral politics. Poland
is a country with one dominant religion, namely Roman Catholicism. That was not the case in
the past, when the territory of the state spread between the Baltic and the Black Sea,
embracing many nations, ethnic groups, religions and cultures. This multi-culturalism and the
richness are still present in Polish art; although the collapse of the Polish state in the late
XVIII century and almost two hundred years (1795-1918; 1939-1945; 1945-1989) of
different forms of dependence made it invisible in everyday life. Nowadays’ Poland is one of
the very few places in Europe which are homogenous in terms of ethnicity, nationality or
religion; where one can cover hundreds of kilometers and travel throughout the country not
meeting a person that is not of Polish nationality and ethnicity, or Catholic by religion (and
who would be familiar with the concept of multi-culturalism). However, today’s Polish
homogeneity does not make it a compact community because there exist factors, related to the
weak social capital, which make the society fragmented or even atomized. Polish politics is
also much more turbulent than one would expect in a religiously, ethnically, racially and
culturally relatively homogenous system. At the same time, it is not legitimate to link religion
as such with the political instability in Poland. It is, however, legitimate to link one stream of
religiousness in Poland with the developments on the right wing of the political spectrum and
its consequences for the whole political system.
This paper is also going to explore the relationships between the conservative stream
within Polish Catholic Church gravitating around the media consortium in Toruń and the
dynamically changing right wing part of the political scene. Those correlations appeared to be
vital for Polish political system, due to the fact that the electoral behavior of the subculture
became decisive in 2005 and partly in 2007 elections.
First, the authors refer to some basic conclusions derived from the literature of politics
– religion correlations (issues of secularization, democracy-religion links), trying to
contextualize them in Polish circumstances. This leads to the theoretical background for
which classical works in political culture studies, namely Almond and Verba, are the point of
departure. Consequently, the successive theories are recalled, especially the conceptualization
of subculture, so that they can be confronted with the empirical material, and the thesis about
the existence of political subculture in Poland can be verified. However, the center of gravity
of this study are empirical investigations; therefore, two ways of identifying the dominant
features of this subculture are employed: firstly, the quantitative method based on the data
taken mainly from the recent CBOS Report (Center for Public Opinion Research; Report
from August 2008), also the reports of MillwardBrown SMG/KRC (Radio Track 2006-2008)
2
was taken into consideration, to be used to define the socio-demographic profile. Secondly,
content analysis methodology (widely used in political media studies), covering a large time
span (2000-2007) and different types of media used by this subculture is employed. This
investigation is systematically structured and the researchers present the attitudes
communicated and promoted by the ultra-religious media in the following fields (important
from the point of view of the political culture perspective):
- attitudes towards political system as such
- attitudes towards political institutions and leaders
- attitudes towards processes, mechanisms, and decision-making in politics
- self-positioning in the political structure/system.
The concluding remarks summarize the quantitative-qualitative analysis and offer a
description of the analyzed political-religious subculture. They also explain its place and role
in the Polish political system. The summary is, traditionally, used to unveil the potential paths
of a further scientific investigation of this important aspect of the Polish political scene.
Correlations between politics and religion
There are at least three ways in which religion may be important in politics: religious
issues may enter and be present on the political agenda, political issues may be related to the
teachings of a particular religion, or members of a particular religion may identify with and
support specific political forces as a result of longstanding loyalties or associations (Heath,
Taylor, Toka, 2002, pp. 49-80). This article positions itself in the third stream, trying to
recognize the socio-political features and attitudes towards important aspects of the political
system attributed to the individuals constituting the analyzed subculture. Therefore, it is
important in the analyzed subject to refer to the role of the secularization process and the
correlations between religion and democracy.
State secularism became the mainstream of liberal democracy paradigm, which is
strongly correlated to protestant ethic. Secularism refers to a number of phenomena and
processes, e.g. secular state, secular society, or secular individuals. Yilmaz Esmer and
Thorleif Pettersen state that: “Secularization theory asserts that modernization (…) will
decrease the need for and the significance of religion both at the macro- and at the microlevels” (Esmer, Pettersen, 2007, p. 485; compare: Bennet, 2008, pp. 211-242; Welzel, 2007,
pp. 185-222; see also: Boggs 2000).
Despite the strong evidence of declining interest in religion, some scholars, usually
philosophers and theologians, have argued that enduring secularization is impossible because
there is something about the human condition that persistently leads us to ask spiritual
questions. The critics of secularization theory we can especially find among scholars
representing rational choice theory approach, but the reasonable conclusion could be
assumption that, secularization is not inevitable (Bruce, 1999, pp. 8-30).
The theory of secularization is updated by the concept of existential security by P.
Norris and R. Inglehart (2004; compare: Corm, 2007, pp. 179-180), which explains the varied
advance of secularization in the world by the extent to which the need for security is met in
different populations . Norris and Inglehart believe that religiosity persists more strongly
among vulnerable populations, especially those living in poorer conditions Norris, Inglehart,
2004, p. 4). According to these authors, the communities that face dangers threatening their
lives, health, or everyday existence, and that come from poor peripheral regions of the world,
are the most religious. The wealthy and secure residents of the countries of the world center
manage life without the help of religion. This concept obviously refers not only to a
community as a whole, but also to its particular groups and socio-demographical categories
3
which encounter bigger or smaller dangers, and consequently, have bigger or smaller needs of
religious character.
In spite broadening range of the global range of secularization, particular regions of
the world and particular demographic groups are to a different extent effected by its
processes. Secularization is clearly dominant in the West, especially in Western Europe and
protestant societies; and, if we take into account the socio-economic aspect, it refers much
more to the center that to the peripheries (more often to men and middle-aged people living in
big cities; Beger, 2005, p. 151).
However, the American case seems to support the thesis which claims that religious
voices quite aggressively occupy the public discourse also in developed societies (Bhargava,
2006, p. 636). The relationship between religious affiliation and party preferences remain
visible in America where nobody questions the correlation between the two. In Europe, both
the studies conducted in the 60. (Rose and Unwin 1969) and 70. (Lijphart, 1979) as well as
those covering more present times (Knutsen, 2004) reveal that religion is still a strong
predictor of party choice, even though the religious topics and debates are often being absent
in the political discourse. Interestingly, the degree of religiosity seems to have more
explanatory power than the religious denomination. Deeply dedicated Protestants and
Catholics in a given society might make similar electoral choices, which, on the other hand,
differ from the choices of the uncommitted members of their own church (Esmer, Pettersen,
2007, p. 492). So the cleavage should rather be according to the level of religiosity and not to
religious denomination.
The process of secularization run in Poland in specific way:
“There are Catholic states in which class formation and social differentiation have not issued in
widespread sharp antagonism towards the church, because the church has provided a central focus of cultural
identity in the face of an imperialistic neighbour that tried to impose an alien set of cultural values and identities
upon a reluctant populace. Religious adherence remained strong as an expression of protest and of rejection of
alien values and domination, and as an expression of cultural and social integrity. The obvious cases here are
Poland and the Irish Republic. To a lesser extent the national Lutheran churches of Scandinavia play a similar
role” (Bruce, 1999, p. 23).
Polish Catholicism offers a serious challenge to the agreed claims of modernization
theorists suggesting that, together with the process of industrialization, literacy, etc., the
religiosity and the role of religion in public life are going to decrease. The main indicator is
usually church attendance, whereas Polish Catholics still massively go to churches, ‘ignoring’
the dynamic prosperity growth observed in the last decade1.
Poland is one of the few European countries where political divisions on religious
grounds play a significant role (Grabowska, Szawiel, 2003, pp. 277-280)2; in spite of a low
religious fragmentation index, i.e. in spite of religious homogeneity. At the same time there is
a high religious attendance rate, which, nevertheless, does not standardize political attitudes
1
The predicted decline of religions or the privatization of religion do not seem to work in the Polish case. Polish
Catholicism also challenges the critics of secularization tendencies, the so called ‘supply side’ theories of
religion, which claim that the degree of religiosity is determined by the nature of the ‘religion market’ in a
particular society. The more competition among the religions, the more vigorous the religions remain and the
more they are observed.
2
Polish right-wing radicalism may be recognized as a part of world-wide trend. It is increasing in countries
where social and political impact of religion is significant. For instance in the USA, where there is strong neoconservative stream in Republican Party. Neoconservatism appeared in the USA in the 60. and 70. It was a kind
of reaction against the nihilistic left-wing revolt. American people were in particular defending the conventional
morality and religion. The „neocons” are today an influential political power in the USA, thanks to the support
from religiously engaged American citizens. In Western Europe nineteen ultra right-wing parties came into
existence between 1965 and 1995. Half of them gained 4% and more of electoral support from the beginning of
the 80. The extent of electoral favour for these parties was dependent on the kind of civic culture in a particular
country. In Eastern Europe ultra right-wing parties gained even more than 20% of parliamentary seats in the
years 1990-2004, the most in Russia, Romania and Poland (Wolfson, 2007, p. 264; Kristol, 2007, p. 75).
4
within one persuasion. It could be said that religion in Poland, like in Western Europe, or
rather the way it is practiced within the frames of catholic normative basis, is a private
business of each person. The process of secularization and privatization of religion, which, in
Poland, has a very specific course, makes the members of the same parish, attending the same
mass in the same church, vote for a completely different party. A decisive element here is,
what can, in simple terms, be called a type of mentality which defines one's attitude to the
surrounding reality and one's reaction to the changing world, i.e. conservatism,
fundamentalism, dogmatism, axiological and normative stiffness as a reaction to civilization
changes – neo-traditionalism (neo-conservatism); or openness to changes, axiological and
normative flexibility, independence, individualism – a pro-modernization attitude (culturalpolitical liberalism).
All the complexities of the correlations between religion and democracy are too broad
an issue to be discussed in this study, which is not a philosophical one. However, for the
purpose of this work, it is necessary to point that there are different points of view, and
consequently, different (at least two) strands in literature: one that would focus on the
compatibility of world religions with democracy, and another one interested in religion
fragmentation and its relation to political stability and culture in a given society and state. The
authors locate this study in the second stream.
In a relatively new, freshly emerged and consolidating democracy, which Poland is
(being at the same time home to one of the most religious societies in Europe), the relations
between religion and democracy are also important. Democracy is believed to be a secular
type of government, in which plurality of ideas and values is acknowledged. One of the
democratic founding values is tolerance, and thus democracy also requires religious tolerance.
State neutrality is, however, not the same as religious tolerance, which is the most clearly seen
in the example of the United States of America. In general, democracy, political culture of
pluralism, human rights, and liberal tolerance are basic products of modernity. At the same
time, religion, and religious fundamentalism in particular, are incompatible with democratic
governance 3.
Some religions are said to be more 'democratic' than others. Jan-Erik Lane and Svante
Ersson claim that: “(…) Among the world religions, one may dare to suggest that
Protestantism is most easily combined with democracy, whereas Islam would be the religion
which could be seen as the least in agreement with democracy” (Lane, Ersson, 2003, p. 109)..
Roman Catholicism may, at the same time, play different roles in the same state (…)”. One
part of the church has, by tradition, been allied to the authorities, whoever they may happen to
be, whereas another part has defended the interests of the poor” (Lane, Ersson, 2003, p. 113).
The employment of religion for government purposes – the phenomenon that is
characteristic for the functioning of the analyzed subculture - is not a new one (although it
rather depreciating for the religion). It can be observed both in democracies as well as in nondemocracies. Taking into account that religion is a system of beliefs and values, Roman
Catholicism, historically speaking, proved to be highly (and surprisingly) adaptive. Certainly,
however, democracies require a mechanism which guarantees the right of all to participate in
politics, which is the ‘marketplace of ideas’ (Gibson, 2007, pp. 323-325). Whereas doctrinebased political thinking (religious one) presupposes that some ideas are right and others are
wrong. There is no coordinative dialog between them.
Religious-political fundamentalism, connected with church and its strong social
influences, constitutes a subculture present in Polish political life for more than three electoral
cycles; and that makes it a phenomenon that is worth describing, explaining and interpreting.
3
Democracy relies on the will of people, which can be relativistic. Religion deals with absolute truths. When
laws are given by the will of God, there can be no room for compromise.
5
Theoretical background
Political culture is one of the most often explored and most influential approaches in
analyzing political attitudes and values, which have produced important empirical findings
about political behavior (Newton, van Deth, 2005, p. 137). Almond and Verba’s path
breaking work (The Civic Culture: Political attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, 1963)
has become a reference and source of inspiration for generations of researchers making the
concept of civic and political culture one of the most important ones in empirical and
theoretical studies. Regarded as classic for the political science, the definition of political
culture was formulated by G. Almond and S. Verba as follows:
“The term political culture thus refers to the specifically political orientations – attitudes toward the
political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system. We speak of a
political culture just as we can speak of an economic culture or a religious culture. It is a set of orientation
toward a special set of social objects and processes” (Almond, Verba, 1963, p. 12).
In opposition to a rational choice of theoretical approach, the political culture
paradigm continuously gains relevance (Fuchs, 2005, p. 161). The founding fathers of this
research strand defined political culture very broadly, and this deficit of a specific and narrow
definition is still present. In its simplest form, political culture refers to a set of values and
orientations which determine and influence the public’s perception of politics. Political
culture is, consequently, the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and
subjective dimensions of politics.It has the same effect on political behavior that the general
culture has on social behaviour: it shapes and provides guidelines not only for political values
and orientations but also for patterns of mass political behavior (Kavanagh, 1972; Inglehart,
1988, pp. 1203-1230; Kamrava, 1996, pp. 58-59).
The political culture, aggregated from individual level competences, knowledge,
information about politics, affirmative and emotional aspects of decision making, as well as
norms and (internalized in the process of socialization) patterns of political behavior usually
constitute elementary definitions of political culture. The main attitudinal components of civic
culture are: cognitive, emotional, evaluating and behavioral4.
No political system has an utterly uniform political culture, but rather a variety of subcultures. The members of a subculture certainly share in a larger culture, but they also have
their own strong characteristics (Newton, van Deth, 2005, p. 143). In their studies, Almond
and Verba were much more interested in national rather than subnational cultural patterns.
Therefore, a separate research design ought to be developed for examining subcultures that
could include differences in values between social classes and demographic groups, and their
repercussions on political behavior (Kavanagh, 1980, pp. 166-167). The scholarly literature
usually distinguishes an elitist political subculture and a mass political subculture. Other
dividing lines may be formulated according to the criteria of geography, age, income, religion
and many more5. Even within the part of the (political) culture that is oriented towards
participation, there will be persistent and significant differences in political orientation
(Almond, Verba, 1963, p. 27).
Subculture is not only a component of political culture (Linton, 1945). It is a
component that differs vitally from the rest of heterogeneity (separate, oriented towards
diffuse authorities). Some people confuse political culture with cleavages or other dividing
lines within a society, or a political system (Koch, Matters, 1993, p. 137). Political culture
4
In this study we may skip the problem of aggregation – the question: does it aggregate? As we do not attempt
to formulate generalizations on the society level but rather in the scale of a sub-group that is identified according
to the criterion of its member responsiveness to Radio Maryja and the messages sent by the RMC.
5
One of the imperfections of the concept of political culture is that the research can show the existence of subcultures, but not their relative importance.
6
may combine subcultures that are defined territorially, or, for example, are co-existent subject
culture and participant culture. They may be conflicting or not (Almond, Verba, 1963, p. 2729). It is acknowledged in the literature that new religiopolitical, fundamentalist movements
(Gill, 2001, p. 124) usually arise in the times of crisis (actual or perceived). The sense of
danger is, therefore, a constituent incentive for religious-political subculture building process.
What constitutes a problematic aspect of sub-cultures is usually a very strong
polarization, practically based on self-exclusiveness, self-isolation, or even some kind of
political sect (compare: Rowinski, 2004, pp. 12-13; 109 and next) or fundamentalism. This
strong polarization is usually connected with strong political cleavages associated with
economic stress, geographical hostilities, or racial antagonisms. In this particular case, it is
associated with religious dogmatism, ultra-conservative, ultra-nationalistic views and values,
the feelings of relative deprivation, as well as the charisma and authority of the RMC leader.
The conceptualization of political subculture
G. Almond and C. Verba defined political subculture as the type of political culture
persisting in formally merged traditional units (1963, p. 27), but the meaning of this term, the
authors proposed, may be perceive at present rather as political cleavage.
The broaden, socio-political meaning of political subculture is referred to be a culture
of a social group that can be differentiated from the dominant type within a given system, as
well as a set of political attitudes and orientations different from the ones most often present
(and dominant) in a certain political culture (compare: Pye, 1971, p. 103; Kamrava, 1996, p.
67).
Taking into account the so far theoretical conceptualizations and the authors' own empirical
analysis, we suggest to define the political subculture as a set of political behaviours of an
identyfiable group of citizens. These behaviours constitute a separate (different from the
dominant) political subculture. The components of subculture decisive for an individual's
political orientation, exclusiveness and belonging to a particular political subcultural group
are the following:
- attitude towards the political system as such
- attitude towards the political leaders and institutions
- attitude towards the political processes, mechanisms, decisions and events
- self positioning in the political system
Relations to the above mentioned elements appear in a cognitive, emotional,
evaluational and behavioral dimension. All of these dimensions may be, and to a large extent
are, shaped by one of the leading determinants, namely: (axiologically coherent) media or
media conglomerates. Apart from their usual socialization function, the media often take the
mobilizing role, persuading its audience to certain actions, or even to political movements.
Based on the theoretical background, the legitimate question is: why can we talk about
religious sub-culture in a religiously uniform society? And the ad-hoc answer is that Polish
Catholicism is not monolithic or homogenous but differentiated, which is acknowledged by
many authors. The objective of this study, however, is not to define the dividing lines in
Polish religious (counter-intuitively monolithic) landscape, but to identify (quantitatively)
and describe (qualitatively) the features that constitute a religious-political subculture in
Poland.
The socio-political character of the RMC group
After Poland regained independence in 1989, catholic milieus attempted to set up
media of religious character. From the beginning of the 90. such initiatives were successfully
7
undertaken by a Polish Redemptorist, father Tadeusz Rydzyk. Since November 1992 the first
Polish catholic station Radio Maryja has begun to broadcast, having about 2% official share
in the radio market (Raport otwarcia, 2006, p. 6; Radia w górę, 2007)6. In January 1998 the
first issue of nation-wide catholic daily “Nasz Dziennik” was published. With initial
circulation of about 250 copies, it today is the only Polish newspaper which does not
officially reveal its circulation (at present its circulation is assessed to have reached 150 000
copies; Piskala, 2007, p. 116). In October 2001 The College of Social and Media Studies was
set up, and it has become the main source for staff recruitment for Rydzyk Media Consortium
(the authors created this name from T, Rydzyk’s family name, because of his ideological and
‘institutional’ signification to this media emprise; the RMC abbreviation RMC will be used in
the rest of the article). The Consortium also comprises private satellite TV Trwam (only 0,09
share in TV-market in July 2007; Rekordowy lipiec TVN24, Disney Channel i VIVY, 2008).
which has broadcast since June 2003. The most significant role within the analyzed
consortium belongs, however, to Radio Maryja, whose activity also resonates most widely
among the official public opinion.
What is most mysterious is both Rydzyk's political and business success, as well as the
actual position on the media market of Rydzyk Media Consortium, whose actual share in that
market has not been so far defined. It seems that Rydzyk's charisma is based on his
exceptional devotion and intransigence in goal achieving, but also on the ability to get at
simple people (Those features enabled T. Rydzyk to achieve a huge success in the mediareligious business as well as in the realm of public life.
The birth of Radio Maryja and its development from a local to a nation-wide radio
station, with a status of a social broadcaster (which does not broadcast commercials and pays
a reduced license fee), is a testimony of father T. Rydzyk's organizational skills and
determination, but also of a social need for such a radio station7. Religious content prevails in
Radio Maryja's broadcasts. What is controversial, though, are the programmes of wide scope,
especially “Unfinished conversations”, that are broadcast daily. It is in these programmes
where the critics of the Toruń radio station discern antisemitic and nationalistic content, as
well as hostility towards others – European Union, liberalism, liberals and Jews. It was in this
programme where the pro-Law and Justice (pl: PiS – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) and anti-Civic
Platform (pl: Platforma Obywatelska) political propaganda was detected.
The Polish sociologist, professor Jacek Raciborski, claims that the secret of Radio
Maryja is that, in Poland, there is no strong Christian-democracy party, and in consequence,
there is a space for religious movements and communities. Radio Maryja Family community
was united and integrated by T. Rydzyk thanks to faith and fear. The religiosity of these
people is traditionalist, ethnic and ritual in his character, and leads to forming an integral,
collective community (Sadowska, 2005, p. 4).
6
Because of the fact that Radio Maryja broadcasts reach about 80% of listeners in Poland, and because of the
pressure within the official public opinion to criticize the actions of the radio, the suggested 2% share of Radio
Maryja in the general listening audience could be significantly underestimated. Many people do not want to or
are afraid to admit that they listen to Radio Maryja.
7
There have been many initiatives around Radio Maryja. The listeners identifying with the station create Radio
Maryja Family (it is a structure rooted, with the bishop's consent, in the perishes where it has its offices),
Associtions of Radio Maryja's Friends (also for the young) and Local Rosary Groups for Children associated
with Radio Maryja. Since 1993, on the second Sunday in July, pilgrimages of Radio Maryja Family to Jasna
Góra have been organized. The 16th pilgrimage (13 July 2008) gathered about 200 000 pilgrims, including
Jarosław Kaczyński – the president of Law and Justice and the former Prime Minister. The radio station in Toruń
has also been, for a few years, the seat of the annual rally of Radio Maryja listeners. A monthly magazine “Radio
Maryja Family” has also been published. “Nasz Dziennik” (“The our Daily”), whose journalists are frequent
guests of the radio station, remains closely associated with it, although formally independent (Grabowska, 2008,
p. 2).
8
In Poland there exists a social basis of religious right, i.e. traditionally religious people
who are socially conservative, worse educated, poorer, and from outside of big cities. Until
1989 they existed only privately, but after 1989 they had a chance to exist in public, which
they did. Radio Maryja has given a voice to the circles that had been, until recently, mute,
which not only supported legal solutions profitable for the church and Catholics, but also
expected more, while at the same time rejected moral changes. The radio had an ambition to
represent and organize such people in the public sphere, and with time, also in the political
one; first through media, and later on through particular politicians and political parties (for a
few years partly through Law and Justice; Grabowska, 2008, pp. 15-16).
RMC and its audience in numbers - quantitative data analysis
RMC with its actions has quite an unfavourable attitude towards all kinds of studies
and it unwillingly offers access to the statistics associated with its activity. Nevertheless,
attempts at such studies are undertaken. Because of the dominating role of Radio Maryja
within RMC, we should consider data referring to the listeners of this radio station as valid for
the audience of the other media, and as representative of the described subculture Grabowska,
2008; Radio Track 2006-2008; Portret moherowych beretow, 2008).
Basing on the data gathered by various study centers in the past few years, it can be
estimated that Radio Maryja is listened to by only 2 to about 4 % of the society. The studies
referring to its share in the media market give it a slightly over 2% share, but at the same time
place it on a high fifth position among the nation-wide stations.
Table 1. The level of radio station reception in Poland (2007-2008) (nation-wide
broadcast)
Share of the Media Market (%)
2007
2008
1.
Radio RMF FM
22,60
23,10
2.
Radio Zet
19,20
18,90
3.
Jedynka
12,30
12,30
4.
Trójka
6,60
5,90
5.
Radio Maryja
2,10
2,20
6.
Dwójka
0,70
0,60
7.
Bis Polskie Radio
0,30
0,40
Source: Radio Track SMG/KRC A Millward Brown Company, February - April 2007, February - April 2008;
051http://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/article/2332421_RMF_liderem_ostro_w_dol_Trojka.htm; 07.08.2008.
The data can, however, be lower than the actual level of the radio's reception, which can be
indicated by the 6-million-membership of the so called Radio Maryja Families. CBOS studies
from August 2008 show that more than 8% of Poles listen to Radio Maryja. This divergence
can be also associated with the mechanism of the spiral of silence caused by the noticeable
9
stereotypical negative popularity of Radio Maryja among the wide and dominant public
opinion (e.g. in the opinion shaping media). About 3% of the surveyed admit to watch TV
Trwam, while about 14% of potential media receipients are within the reach of the two
stations.
The reports of: The Center for Public Opinion Research (Grabowska, 2008) and The
MillwardBrown SMG/KRC (Radio Track 2006-2008) revealed important sociodemographical information about Radio Maryja listeners. Women more often than men are
the audience of Radio Maryja (about 60% - of women and 40% of men in the period 20062008) Age is also an important indicator. Only 4% of the audience of the Toruń radio station
are the youngest of the surveyed, while the most numerous group 28-30%consist of people
who are 60-69 years old) . Age is also connected with the marital status and career status –
27% of the listeners of Radio Maryja are those who lost their spouse, 50% are pensioners,
while only 2% are pupils and students. There are slightly more of Radio Maryja listeners in
the country than in the city, and the bigger the city the smaller their number.
Education is another important indicator. The audience of Radio Maryja comprises
49% of people with elementary education, but 20 % with vocational education, 23% with
secondary education, and still fewer with higher education (8%). It can be thus said that the
education above elementary strongly decreases the probability of listening to the described
radio station.
If we take socio-occupational groups into account, there are more listeners among
farmers (14%) and unqualified workers (9%) than among blue- and white-collar workers
(4%), or people with their own business (4%). Among the professionally passive listeners, the
biggest group comprise old-age pensioners and disability pensioners (22% and 20% of Radio
Maryja audience respectively), as well as pupils and students – only 2% of the listeners. In the
groups analyzed with respect to a monthly income per capita in a household, the biggest
number of Radio Maryja listeners come from among those who earn between 501 and 900
zloty ([between 120 and 220 euro] 15%), fewer from the lower or higher income category,
and the fewest from among the better-off, reaching more than 1200 zloty (about 270 euro) per
capita (7%).
The biggest differentiation can be, however, observed with respect to faith and
religious practice. Radio Maryja is received by 33% of strong believers, 9% of believers, 6%
of rather non-believers and 2% of total non-believers. It is also received by 33% of people
who perform their religious practices a few times a week.
10
Figure 1. Who listens to Radio Maryja?
Source: Grabowska M. 2008 (August). Słuchacze Radia Maryja (Radio Maryja Listeners), Center for Public
Opinion Research, Research Report /131/2008, Warszawa, p.4-6.
The listeners of Radio Maryja are among the most disciplined electoral groups. Their
electoral attendance is usually somewhat higher (from a few to up to 20% than the national
average). 70% of Radio Maryja listeners declared to have participated in the 2001 elections,
65% in 2005, and 67% in 2007.
Although the electoral attitudes of Radio Maryja voters are not unanimous, in the last
three elections the majority voted for one party considered fundamentally right or ultra-right,
and for other parties which, at that certain moment, had the support of T. Rydzyk. In 2001 it
was League of Polish Families (41%), while in 2005 and 2007 it was Law and Justice (40%
and 62% respectively).
11
Figure 2. RMC’s political alignment (Elections 2001, 2005, 2007)
Source: Grabowska M. 2008 (August). Słuchacze Radia Maryja (Radio Maryja Listeners), Center for Public
Opinion Research, Research Report /131/2008, Warszawa, p.7-9.
Although the votes of the listeners were not unanimous, apart from the main 40-60%
part, the several percent support for the party preferred by Radio Maryja and Father Rydzyk
(thanks to their disciplined electorate) could tip the scales. It is not the majority, then, which
did not listen to father director T. Rydzyk which counts but the minority which did listen to
him. The listeners of Radio Maryja, to a large extent, succumbed to their station, which is
visible in their shifting support: for League of Polish Families in 2001 and for Law and
Justice in 2005.
A significant part of Radio Maryja listeners are people of low political awareness. As
many as one third of them find it difficult to define their opinion. 42% claim they are rightwing followers, one third place themselves in the center, and 7% claim to be left wing. The
level of interest in politics is also low: half of the listeners define it as little or none, and only
12% as big. Among the people of greatest respect are father director T. Rydzyk, president
Lech Kaczyński, and former prime minister Jarosław Kaczyński (2005-2007).
Radio Maryja listeners tend to be more critical than other citizens while assessing the
general state of affairs in the country, which, in their opinion, is going in the wrong direction
(49%). The majority of them suspect that nothing will change within the coming year (53%),
and even if it does, it will rather change for the worse (27%) than for the better (20%).
Likewise, they have a more critical assessment of the political and economic situation, as well
as more critical predictions in this respect for the coming year. Although the situation on the
local job market (where they live or in the neighbourhood) concerns them to a smaller degree
than other people, they, less often than others, think that it is possible to find a job there (52%
among Radio Maryja listeners, and 62% among others), while more often that it is difficult or
even impossible (40% and 31% respectively).
In the 2007 elections Radio Maryja listeners voted for Law and Justice three times
more often than for Civic Platform. It is thus not surprising that their attitude towards Donald
Tusk's (the prime minister since 09.11.2007) cabinet is neutral or critical. They are
discontented with the fact that Donald Tusk is the head of the cabinet (44%, while the
majority of other respondents claim the opposite – 57%). Their assessment of the effects of
the current cabinet's performance is much worse: 44% of Radio Maryja listeners claim the
effects to be bad (compared with 31% of other respondents), and 32% to be good (compared
with 52% of the others). Less often than other citizens, they think that the policy of the
12
government creates a chance for the improvement of the economic situation (29% of Radio
Maryja listeners, and 49% of other respondents).
Both the listeners of the Toruń radio station and other respondents are critical of the
representative institutions, most often evaluating them negatively: 53%-57% of negative
opinions about the work of the Sejm, and 45% of the Senate. President Lech Kaczyński's
activities are perceived by Radio Maryja listeners as rather positive (although there are quite a
number of negative opinions among them), while by other respondents as negative.
The majority of Radio Maryja listeners trust Jarosław Kaczyński (55%), and even
more Lech Kaczyński (61%), while they are, more often than others, distrustful towards
Radosław Sikorski (the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Tusk cabinet; 30%) and Donald
Tusk (37%). On the other hand, those who do not listen to the Toruń radio station, first of all,
do not trust Jarosław Kaczyński (61%) and Lech Kaczyński (54%), while they are, more often
than others, trustful towards Radosław Sikorski (70%) and Donald Tusk (70%)8.
Radio Maryja listeners are also significantly more pessimistic than other citizens.
Opinions like “it's bad and it will be worse” are dominant with respect to the family situation,
the general state of affairs in the economic situation, political situation, and the government –
they are of the opinion that government's policy does not create any chance for the
improvement of the present situation (Grabowska, 2008, p. 13).
Although Radio Maryja and RMC have a statistically small share in the media market,
they are nevertheless quite influential politically. It is due to the discipline within RMC
electorate and the massive participation in elections of the people, the so called “mohair
berets”, who are submissive to T. Rydzyk's propaganda. The political success is also achieved
thanks to strategic coalitions which T. Rydzyk creates with the right party at the right moment
of the political process. In these activities church is used for electoral agitation in favour of
“the true Polish Patriots”, and at the same time, Church as an institution and religion as a
system of values become instrumentalized.
Attitudes promoted and cultivated in the subculture communicative system - qualitative
analysis
The proposed qualitative analysis realized in correlation with quantitative data of the
CBOS’s and MillwardBrown’s reports is grounded in content analysis of press and radio
reports and strive to make conclusion about political attitudes and political culture on the
basis of press or radio statement of listeners and journalists of RMC. To be honest, content
analysis is not regarded as the most proper form of the attitudes examining, but in that
researching efforts in enables to get set of crucial information about opinions and views of the
subjects being explored. The observation of communication processes (and its character)
running among these objects (listeners, religious/political leaders and journalists) permit to
make essential observation about the features of political culture – consequently the political
subculture of this social group. The present in this study summarizing motions are not of final
empirical conclusions. Our theoretically and empirically justified propositions may be
regarded as assertions, that need further empirically deepened investigation.
The basic empirical material comprises press and radio reports acquired from the
catholic daily “Nasz Dziennik” and from the catholic radio station “Radio Maryja”. The
analysis focused on the articles of socio-political subject matter published between February
3 2007 and August 3 2008, and selected radio programmes of the same subject matter
broadcast by Radio Maryja between November 11 2000 and December 19 2007. Reports on
the performance of the analyzed media prepared by public institutions (National Committee
8
In the context of this study the reason of being distrustful toward Radosław Sikorski may be his wife who is
Jewish and toward Donald Tusk, that he is the member of polish minority group: ‘Kasubian’.
13
of Television and Radio) as well as by specialized investigative bodies and nongovernmental
organizations (Association Against Antisemitism and Xenophobia) were taken into
consideration.
The methodology applied in the research was based, first of all, on the analysis of the
content of press articles and radio broadcasts; while the scheme of the analysis was prepared
on the basis of A. Almond and S. C. Verba's assumptions of the classical conception of
political culture (1963), and, in consequence, of the functioning of political subcultures as a
result of the coexistence and mutual interactions between varied types of political cultures.
The research process prepared in that manner aimed at establishing a set of attitudes of a
specific audience of the analyzed media - Rydzyk Media Consortium, towards the political
system and its particular elements; and eventually, at drafting the picture of political
subculture of that environment. Carrying out the investigation as below, the authors try to
indicate that within Polish public life there exists a religiously motivated, extremely rightwing, nationalistic political subculture which is in opposition to political culture shared by the
prevailing majority of citizens.
Attitude to the political system as a whole
The opinions of the leaders and the audience of Rydzyk Media Consortium are
accompanied by a general reflection which amounts to a strongly negative assessment of
many aspects of the existing political system in Poland. It concerns, for example, the ideas
and principles of the democratic form of government which does not fulfill its function
because it does not meet the needs of true Polish catholics; as well as the existing legal system
which is too independent of catholic principles of faith and morality (Wenzel, 2005, pp. 2-15).
It is connected with a misunderstanding of the function of law in a contemporary state, or
even a pursuit to “marry” religion with law (Bartoś, 2008, p. 22-23). The following problems
seem to be the most fundamental:
− Polish-Jewish conflict (the influence of Jewish lobby, in Poland and worldwide, directed
to and used against Polish interests; antisemitism, xenophobia)
− Polish-German conflict (German claims against Poland, responsibility for WWII and its
consequences)
− Polish-Ukrainian conflict (the crimes of Ukrainian nationalists during WWII)
−
communist heritage in the III Republic of Poland (lustration, decommunization, exposing
Social Security collaborators (SB, UB)
−
the defense of conceived life, the defense of human life from conception to natural death
(the amendment to the Constitution forbidding abortion and euthanasia9)
− the defense of the traditional family model
− pauperization of Polish country, old-age and disability pensioners, improvement of living
conditions for families
− secularization of culture and mass media (“the culture of garbage”)
− more rigorous methods of fighting crime.
According to Radio Maryja circles, the political system is controlled by the forces
hostile to Poland, and is contaminated by the treaty agreed upon in 1989 at the Roundtable,
whose signatories were Jews on the part of the Solidarity, and communists on the part of the
government. After Law and Justice took power in 2005 and formed a coalition with the Polish
Families Leaugue and Self-Defense, the advocates of Radio Maryja and T. Rydzyk were
convinced of the possibility to build a truly national state. However, the conflicts that often
9
Compare with the questions in the questionnaire for the candidates for deputies before parliamentary elections
of 2007: Mamy prawo wiedzieć. Pytajmy, 2007.
14
arose within the coalition provoked the commentators and guests of Radio Maryja to state
opinions that put into doubt the sense of the functioning of the democratic system in Poland.
A specific reason for distress was lack of such changes in the legal system which
would guarantee legal sanctions for not respecting the principles of catholic teachings and
morality (antiabortion law, lustration and de-communization law, more rigorous or new
penalties for some crimes). And thus, the advocates of Rydzyk Media Consortium and its
leader himself aimed at introducing some elements of a religious state. The inability or lack
of perspective to realize this plan was a direct reason of withdrawing the unconditional
support for the cabinets created by Law and Justice.
Attitude to political institutions and leaders
A persistent feature of RMC's broadcasts is harsh criticism of those in power. One can
hear not only clearly negative, but even aggressive, opinions about the government and the
President, the Parliament and other public institutions, as well as statements urging the
listeners and readers to take action in the form of protests, demonstrations, etc., aimed directly
at the representatives of the authorities (conflicts among T. Rydzyk, the government and the
President on moral grounds – attitude to abortion, and on national grounds - attitude to Jews,
Germans, and Ukrainians).
It is quite problematic to define the attitude of Rydzyk Media Consortium audience
towards the institution of Church and its teachings, as well as to bishops who represent it.
Although they declare the affiliation, attachment and membership in the Catholic Church, in
the analyzed media broadcasts we can often notice opinions and reports contrary to the
catholic teachings of church10. The source of conflict and the division into the so called Toruń
Church (Toruń is the seat of Radio Maryja station) and Łagiewniki Church (Czaczkowska,
2006) or between so called ‘Open Church’ and ‘Closed Church’ (Michlic, 2004, p. 461) - the
options favoured by particular bishops, is the attitude to such home affairs as lustration,
decommunization and abortion law, while in the area of foreign policy, the integration with
European Union and the attitude to other nations.
What was especially ambivalent were the relations between T. Rydzyk with his milieu
and the authorities of the Catholic Church including the Pope, John Paul II. The statements of
the latter, especially on the need for integration of Poland and Europe, evoked a kind of
emotional panic and were met with an attempt of their illogical reinterpretation in a
nationalistic strain, contradictory to the original intention11. The relations between Radio
Maryja circles and Polish bishops assumed the form of a prolonging stalemate situation in
which the episcopate and T. Rydzyk with his advocates occupy a more or less equivalent
positions with respect to the strength of influence on the congregation and on public opinion.
The situation gets rather complicated with the fact that within the episcopate itself there are
divisions among bishops, who are not of unanimous approach towards the activity of Radio
Maryja and T. Rydzyk (Toruń vs Łagiewniki Church), which limits the possibility of exerting
influence on this radio station and the content it broadcasts. The numerous attempts
10
The attitude to abortion, homosexuality and public role of faith is at present most successful way of gaining
electoral support by Republican Party in the USA (McDaniel, Ellison, 2008, p. 180); it is also indicated that the
so called Radio Maryja Family – Nongovermental Organization, which are associated with the Radio, repeat the
phenomenon of “moral majority” awoken and created by radical protestant preacher Falwell in the US
(Milcarek, 2006).
11
The apostolic adhortation “Ecclesia in Europa” in philosophical reflection by the Holy Father John Paul II, the
broadcast of Radio Maryja from 4th June 2003; The concern of Committee for Elimination of any form of
discrimination of women (UNO), about stereotypes and prejudices referring to the traditional male-female role
division and the methods of family planning , which were deeply rooted in Polish society, was considered, by
“Nasz Dziennik”, an attack on Poland (Szafraniec, 2007).
15
undertaken to discipline Radio Maryja and T. Rydzyk, or to change the management of the
radio station, have been so far unsuccessful (Bajda, 2005)12.
Beginning with presidential elections in 1995 Radio Maryja has actively participated
in electoral campaigns, and, in a more or less evident way, suggested to the listeners which
electoral choice would be adequate, and which candidate was a true Pole. At the end of the
90. this Radio openly sympathized with certain political groups (Solidarity Electoral Action
and Christian National Union), offering support and encouraging listeners to support these
parties. In the elections of 2001 and 2002 the support was granted to Catholic-National
Movement, while the attitude of Radio Maryja towards the Polish Families Leaugue remained
changeable, the party being either supported by or conflicted with the chimerical and
unpredictable leader of RMC, T. Rydzyk. The situation was likewise with Self-Defense,
whose president, Andrzej Lepper, often appeared on the radio, in spite of his participation in a
notorious sex scandal in the years 2006-2007.
The analysis conducted after parliamentary and presidential elections in 2005
confirmed, that the support of Rydzyk's media for Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński, granted in
the elections of 2005, tipped the scales for the victory of Law and Justice13. Nevertheless,
within the two-year administration of that party, the conflicts between T. Rydzyk and the
Kaczyński brothers abounded.
Civic Platform which came into power as a result of earlier parliamentary elections in
2007, is under constant criticism and attacks from Radio Maryja and “Nasz Dziennik”. The
reason for this criticism, or even a pathological fear of the consequences of Civic Platform
administration, is the fact that the party is identified with an extremely liberal approach to
social, moral and economic needs of the citizens, as well as is suspected of the associations
with Jewish and Mason lobby and the continuation of post-communist administration.
Attitudes towards processes, mechanisms, decisions in politics
RMC broadcasters, building in their broadcasts a dichotomous picture of the world,
identify a few hostile social, religious and ethnic groups. These are, first of all, Jews, but also
Germans and Ukrainians, as well as post-communists, liberals, masons (especially from UE)
and homosexuals14. The rich are also included in this group, as, according to T. Rydzyk, in
Poland they come mainly from among Jews and Germans (70 %)15. The enemies within the
Church are liberal bishops and the so called catholic left wing (liberal-left wing stream of
Catholicism; Dolecki, 2008).
RM broadcasts present anti-Semitic content in an either direct or indirect way. Their
main suggestion is that Jewish lobby has huge political and economic influences in Poland, as
well as in other countries worldwide (e.g. in the US). In the context of shaping public opinion
by media, Polish opinion shaping media, and especially the press, are controlled by Jewish
12
Compare with the broadcast on the same topic in Radio Maryja from 20th August 2005 (broadcast three times
during presidential and parliamentary campaign),
http://www.radiomaryja.pl.eu.org/nagrania/20050820pralat/20050820-pralat.html, 08.08.2008.
13
Public opinion polls carried out on the day of parliamentary elections of 2005 and 2007 showed that the
electors voting for Law and Justice recruited mainly from among people over 60 years old, living in the country
or in a small town and having elementary or vocational education. The same socio-demographic groups are also
the source of listeners of Radio Maryja (Markowski, 2007 (Exit-poll Research PBS, 2005), p. 162; “Gazeta
Wyborcza”, October 23, 2007 (Exit-poll Research PBS DGA, 2007), p. 8; see also: Winnicka, 2005, p. 4;
Majcherek, 2006; Samospalanie DIAGNOZY, 2006; Krzymowski, 2007; Łoziński, 2007, p. 3; Hołub, 2007, p.
2; compare: Bojkot dziennikarzy, 2006).
14
The conversation of father Jan Król, hosting the night broadcast, with a listener, Radio Maryja, February 1,
2007, http://www.radiomaryja.pl.eu.org/nagrania/20070201-sluchacz-krol/20070201-slucha, 08.08.2008.
15
The opinion of father Grzegorz Moj in a night broadcast of Radio Maryja, October 9, 2006,
http://www.radiomaryja.pl.eu.org/nagrania/20061009-bartnik/200061009-bartnik.html, 08.08.2008.
16
and German capital (Strzeszewski, 2003) and they constitute a crushing competition for truly
Polish media, i.e. Rydzyk Media Consortium.
The reports of institutions and organizations called to monitor mass media, confirmed
that the broadcast content is in collision with the law and social principles. Radio Maryja
reports about road blockages organized by farmers and Self-Defense, were qualified by
National Committee of Television and Radio as: “Propagation of activities that are against the
law and social good, and that invite behaviour which could be of menace to health or safety,
and thus violate article 18, p. 1&3 of the radio and television act. It can also evoke hatred on
national grounds violating article 22 of the Directions of the Council of European Union and
European Parliament from 19 June 1997”16.
The report of the nongovernmental organization (NGO) called Open Republic:
Association Against Anti-Semitism and Xenophobia from 2001 also states that most of the
statements on socio-political topics recorded at that time in Radio Maryja, advocated hatred
on racial, ethnic or religious grounds, although often in an indirect way, by means of
metaphors, suggestions or generalizations. The report is a proof of “hatred speech” used in the
broadcasts, which is evident in the functioning of racial, ethnic and religious stereotypes and
prejudices (compare: Mueller, 2007; Dziwisz, 2007; Paluch, 2007; Bishop K. Nycz Christmas
wishes, 2005).
The approach of Radio Maryja circles towards the integration with EU becomes the
groundwork for emotionally negative attitudes and actions of their members. The integration
is perceived as a process menacing both national identity of Poles and the sovereignty of the
Polish state, as well as the moral condition of Polish society. The Europhobia of the far rightwing circles could be especially easily observed in Poland in the period of conflict around the
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.
What induces serious doubts of socio-moral character is the perspective of the
ratification of Basic Rights Charter, which, according to the representatives of the right wing
and the far right wing, will lead, as a result of liberal jurisdiction of European courts, to
legalizing abortion and homosexual marriages in Poland. In consequence, European Union is
presented to the audience of Rydzyk's media as a totalitarian socialist super state in which
Poland will soon become only one of its “voivodships”.
Self-positioning in the political system
The circles surrounding T. Rydzyk define themselves, in a political sense, as patriotic
or national-patriotic camp, which means “true Poles”. At the same time, they announce that
the advocates and listeners of Radio Maryja and the station itself, as well as other catholic
media of T. Rydzyk do not identify with any of the parties.
The patriotic camp, represented by Rydzyk Media Consortium, is convinced of being a
goal of attacks and negative campaign from other media controlled by Jewish (“Gazeta
Wyborcza”) and German (“Dziennik”) businessmen (Piłka, 2008; Kowalski, 2007; Nowak,
2008, compare: Ojciec Tadeusz Rydzyk: rząd chce zniszczyć radio, 2007). The JewishGerman press lobby is, next to a strategic Russian-German partnership which controls
European politics, the main danger for the interests of true Poles. Identifying the menace to
catholic-national faith, morality and culture with foreign media, T. Rydzyk is also conscious
of the power of media influence he himself possesses, or would like to possess by controlling
the radio, the newspaper, the TV, and the college, which is the exclusive educator of his
journalist staff. “Having the press, we will have everything”, said T. Rydzyk in one of Radio
Maryja broadcasts (O. Rydzyk o rabinach panujących nad prasą, 2007).
16
The apostolic adhortation “Ecclesia in Europa” in philosophical reflection, by the Holy Father John Paul II, the
broadcast of Radio Maryja,
August 4, 2003, http://www.radiomaryja.pl.eu.org/nagrania/20030804nowik/20030804-nowik.html, 08.08.2008.
17
Religious-political subculture in Poland - concluding remarks
Statistical data defining the features of national ultra-religious political subculture and
the above characteristics of RMC members’ attitude to the political systems and its elements
constitute a picture of a political subculture functioning in Poland that is separate from the
dominant one. It consists of citizens as well as of religious and secular activists who are
united by a specific approach to the problems of the state and its politics. Their approach can
be characterized as national-catholic, fundamental, ultraconservative and strongly emotionally
loaded against the real or imagined enemies. The characteristic way of mobilization (RMC)
and activeness (within a nongovernmental organization Radio Maryja Family, pilgrimages,
mass celebrations and demonstrations whose aim is only originally religious), the specifics of
psychological and personality conditioning (the sense of injustice, menace, exclusion,
paranoiac fear of “alien” characterized by a set of specific features), as well as nonconformity
and brave, or even provocative, lack of respect for political correctness, amount to the fact
that the analyzed audience and leaders of Rydzyk Media Consortium create a political stream
separate from the mainstream, religious-political subculture. In the sense of subject matter, the
subculture consists of RMC audience, RMC media (radio, TV, newspaper and college),
political groups and its activists, as well as religious group and activists (priests and monks)
supporting RMC and T. Rydzyk (for example Radio Maryja-based organizations - Radio
Maryja Family) and also businessmen and science representatives who support Rydzyk's
activity intellectually and financially, and finally, father Tadeusz Rydzyk himself whose
charisma is based not so much on his exceptional features as on the perfect adaptation to the
features, needs and mentality of his advocates.
In the sense of object matter the analyzed political religious subculture is defined by
the above attitude to the political system and its elements, which, in cognitive sense, is created
by a set of far right-wing, nationalistic, ultraconservative, fundamentalist Catholic myths,
symbols, stereotypes, beliefs, as well as pieces of knowledge and information reinterpreted
according to specifically understood social teachings of the Church. Social teachings of the
Church and its specific interpretation also create axiological and assessment basis of the
analyzed subculture, in which the fundamental role is, nevertheless, played by specific
emotions. The exceptionality, or rather the hypocrisy, of the emotional picture lies in a clear
division of objects into good and bad, or enemies and friends. Interestingly enough, enemies
are decisively excluded from the jurisdiction of the most important of Catholic
commandments, the commandment of love. They should be fought with and destroyed (“the
language of hatred”). Behavioral dimension, being a consequence of emotional incitement, is
based on mobilization to participate in actions and activities, which can be religious
(pilgrimages), both religious and political (signing the petition to UNO on the issue of
abortion), or clearly political (indicating the duty to participate in elections and to vote for
Catholics).
This media-held political subculture created also its individual way of constructing
political broadcast; i.e. a sort of political communication. It is, first of all, characteristic of
emotional and irrational broadcasts (in which objective, scientific, empirically proven
knowledge plays a marginal role), the rhetorics of struggle, war and conflict (e.g. one of the
regular sections of “Nasz Dziennik” is called “Thought is a weapon”), the simplicity of
broadcast (the language of reports is simple, and occasionally naïve and infantile), as well as
unilateralism and negligence of objectivity (statements such as “If you are a Pole, you will do
this or that”).
The reasons for the functioning of the characterized political subculture could be
found not only in the tradition and roots of Polish populist Catholicism, but also in the
movement of Radio Maryja circles. It is, first of all, a response (and opposition) to the
18
processes of modernization and secularization of religion and social life, which the older
generation, having difficulties adapting to the new reality, cannot and does not want to accept.
Second of all, it is a reaction of a rather small but, nevertheless, active and determined part of
anti-liberal public opinion to having been rejected and excluded from political discourse
because of strongly antiquated opinions and not very flexible beliefs. Rydzyk's media are the
place where they can safely present their opinion; while their fidelity and gratitude towards
him, as well as obligation for assertion of respect for “real Poland and Poles” generates a
conviction of Rydzyk's charismatic leadership. To summarize the background and the main
reasons of the existence of this nationalistic ultra-religious subculture, it is legitimate to
certify that it arises from its social isolation, lack of confidence, and intolerance.
The conclusions of the empirical part are going to be confronted with the previous
scholarly generalizations which suggest that the existence of this type of subculture may bring
about the effect of stabilization of political culture of the whole system on a low level.
Political culture is a part of a broader notion, namely civic culture. In the analyzed
subculture, the civic culture is on a low level. It can be confirmed by a low level of trust
which is correlated with a negative assessment of public institutions (CBOS 2008). We can
also observe lack of tolerance for other subjects and sharp divisions into the familiar and the
other, as well as a tendency to mind one's own business, e.g. the legalization of the rules of
Christian morality. The subculture is also characterized by a low level of knowledge of the
mechanisms of public life, low education level, low earnings, and peripheral residence. It
results in the violation of the formal rules, e.g. the separation of church and state. The low
level of trust and civic competence as well as the negative attitude to public institutions are
both the effects and could be probably regarded as the reasons of the low quality of political
culture.
Traditionally, the conclusion is used to unveil the potential paths of further scientific
investigation of this important part of Polish political scene. In the analyzed field, it can be
assumed and further hypothesized that, the functioning of the analyzed subculture can result
in at least temporary stabilization of political culture of the whole society on a low level. It
indicates that there are created and maintained sharp political divisions. They are based on
inducing fear, frustration, the sense of evil and the deprivation of some groups in respect to
others. The emotional conditioning of such divisions makes them difficult to overcome and
destructive to the political process (e.g. irrational electoral decisions based on the dysfunction:
the familiar against the other). Another serious sign is lack of wide acceptance for basic
principles and norms of public life, i.e. lack of the so called procedural and political
consensus (G. Sartori 1987, D. Easton 1965), which are essential for the effective functioning
of democracy (decentralized democracy, Lijphart, 1977).
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to the participants of the “Culture and Citizenship CRESC Annual
Conference” (Oxford 3-5 th September 2008), where this paper was presented and
discussed, for their useful comments and advice as well as to Max Planck Institute for the
Study of Societes in Cologne (Germany), thanks to whose resources this study was possible.
19
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