University of South Carolina
Scholar Commons
Senior Theses
Honors College
Spring 5-5-2016
Causes and Consequences of the Syrian Civil War
Chelsea Marie Baltes
University of South Carolina - Columbia
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Baltes, Chelsea Marie, "Causes and Consequences of the Syrian Civil War" (2016). Senior Theses. 105.
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Baltes
HistoricalCauses&ModernConsequencesoftheSyrianCivilWar
I.
II.
Introduction
a. BackgroundonSyria
b. ThesisStatement-Thecauseofthecivilwarisnotsimplyonecomponent,but
amultitudeofhistoricalmomentsthathaveleduptothemodernand
currentonesweseetodayallcombinedtogethercreatingadeteriorationof
stabilityinSyria
i. Causes
1. FrenchMandates
2. ConflictbetweenSyriaandIsrael-SixDaysWar
3. SectarianDivides
4. UnionBetweenEgypt&Syria
5. Hafizal-AsadRisetoPower
6. Alawite&SunniHateforOneAnother
7. Basharal-AsadSuccessiontopower
8. ArabSpring
ii. Consequences
1. Lebanon
2. Economic
3. DemographicChange
4. RefugeeMovement
Body-Causes
a. SectarianDivisions
i. SunniMajority
ii. Minorities-Christian,Druze,Alawi
iii. Alawi&SunniHate
iv. Tribal,Geographic,Religious,EthnicDivisions
b. FrenchMandates
i. PartitionSyria
ii. ControlofArmy
iii. ImpositionofImperialRule
1. FrenchCulture
c. UnionBetweenEgypt&Syria
i. Nasser’sControl
ii. Ba’thPartyDissention
iii. CitizenCoups
iv. SyrianResignationfromUnion
d. ConflictBetweenSyria&Israel
i. SixDaysWar
ii. GolanHeights
iii. Israel’sWesternAllies
iv. Zionism
e. Hafizal-Asad’sRisetoPower
i. Ba’thPartyBackground
ii. BattleforPowerwithSalahJadid
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III.
IV.
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iii. Asad’sMilitaryConnections
1. RoleinBa’thistMilitaryCommittee
iv. AsadAttacks
v. AsadBecomesFirstAlawiPresident
f. AlawiandSunniHate
i. ReligiousDifferences
ii. FrenchSupportofAlawi
1. FrenchoppressionofSunni
g. Basharal-AsadSuccessiontoPower
i. LifePriortoPolitics
ii. ClaimofSupportinDemocracy
iii. OppressionandDictatorship
1. CivilianDiscontent
a. ArabSpring
h. ArabSpring
i. Der’a
1. SchoolChildrenGraffiti
a. Arrest
ii. ProtestsGrowInResponsetoArrests
1. RegimeBrutalityAgainstProtestors
a. CiviliansBeginAttackingGovernmentOffices
iii. CivilWarBrakesOut
Body-Consequences
a. Lebanon
i. ViolenceSpillsOverIntoNeighboringStates
1. Ethno-sectarianNatureofBattle
ii. LebanonExperiencesEconomicGrowth
b. Economy
i. SyrianEconomyFailing
1. Infrastructure
2. Education
3. Trade&Investments
c. DemographicChanges
i. Intellectuals&EducatedFlee
ii. WeakeningofCertainSectsPopulationinSyria
d. RefugeeMovements
i. TerroristInfiltration
ii. LackofResources
iii. SeekingPeace&Comfort
Closing
a. MyOpinion-Thecauseofthecivilwarisnotsimplyonecomponent,buta
multitudeofhistoricalmomentsthathaveleduptothemodernandcurrent
onesweseetodayallcombinedtogethercreatingadeteriorationofstability
inSyria
b. Reiterationofmainkeypointsorcauses/consequencesofcivilwar
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Abstract
ThisseniorthesisisanindepthanalysisofthehistoricalcausesoftheSyriancivil
war.IarguethatthemaincomponentsleadingtothecivilwarunderBasharal-Asadwere
asfollows;Sectariandivision,Frenchinterventionandmandates,Israeli&Syrianconflict,
Egypt&SyrianUnion,andHafizal-Asad’srisetopower.Myresearchandanalysisprovided
demonstratesthatthesepreviouslymentionedhistoricalstimulihaveallamalgamated
leadingtotheinstabilityunderBasharal-Asadandultimatelythemoderncivilwarwesee
today.Thepaperwillalsoanalyzetheconsequencesofthisinstabilityseeningovernment
andsociety,thesourceofthebrutalcivilwar.Theseconsequencesincludealookat
Lebanonasacasestudy,theeconomybothdomesticallyinSyriaandinternationally,
demographicchanges,andafocusonrefugeemovementsseentoday.Itconcludeswiththe
establishmentthatthecivilwaristheresultofnotjustoneindividualevent,asisoften
arguedinternationally,butratheraconglomerateofdeeplyintertwinedhistorical
moments.
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I.
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OPENING
TheMiddleEastoftenbringstoone’smindthoughtsofturmoil,instability,strife,and
overallchaos.Aregionoftheworldplaguedbycivilandinternationalwars,ithas
experiencedincreaseddissentionamongcitizens,failinggovernments,andgrowthin
terroriststrongholds.Whatwasonceseenasaproblemforafew,hasgrowntobea
problemformany.Manyoutsideforces,includingtheUnitedStates,feltinterventioncould
aidandalleviatethesituation.InterventionintheMiddleEastthough,hasnowcomeata
heftyprice.WiththeUnitedStates,andmanyothereffectedcountries,facingdomestic
debateconcerningtheissuesathandintheMiddleEastandhowtoproceed,theyaretoo
farintoleavebutareconstantlyriskingthelivesoftheirownpeople.Manyarguethe
UnitedStatesshouldhaveneverinvadedIraqin2003,andthatthiswasthestartof
internationalplayersmeddlingwithforeignaffairsinthisregion.Whilethiscanbedebated
foryearstocome,onethingismuchmoreclear.NotonlywiththeUnitedStates,butall
internationalpowerswhoplayaprominentroleininternationalrelations,thelackof
understandingthedeeplyrootedhistoryofthesecountriesiswheretheyhavegonedirely
wrong.Iaimwiththispapertoprovethatinternationalbeliefinonespecifiedeventasthe
causeofthecivilwardoesnotbringusclosertoasolutionforSyria.
Toevenbegintomakeapositivechangeanddemocratizearegionoftheworldso
differentfromwesternculture,onemustanalyzewhereithasbeenandhowitgottowhere
itcurrentlyis.TheMiddleEastiscomplexlyintertwined,withvehementlydevotedpersons
ofbothreligionandethnicity.Thehistoricaleventsbetweenthesemultitudesofvarious
sects,datessignificantlyfartherbackthanmostothercountries’existence,especiallythe
UnitedStates,thefundamentaloutsidecomponentweseetoday.Whileeachcountryhasa
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differentstorytotell,itisSyriathathasstolenthemodernspotlightanddebatefloor.Syria,
acountrymanyfelttobestableandsecureundertheAsadRegimehascometoppling
downinthepastfiveyearsbyaragingcivilwar.Thiscivilwar,fullofviolentactsagainst
humanityandcivilrights,hasledtoamassexodusofSyrianpeoples.Seekingrefuge
whereverwillacceptthem;therefugeecrisishasbecomeanewfocalpointforpolitical
debateconcerningtheMiddleEast.TerroristgroupshaveseentheSyriancivilwarand
resultingrefugeemovementsasanopportunitytoimposeharmontheirtargetcountries
throughinfiltrationintodifferentcountriesposedasarefugee.Ofcoursetherearemany
terriblesideeffectsoftheSyriancivilwar,howeverthispaperwillfocusonthemosttragic
consequence;refugeemovements.TounderstandhowSyriahasarrivedatthiscataclysmic
point,onemustfirstanalyzeandunderstandthehistoryofthecountry.Thehistorical
eventsthatwillbeanalyzedincludethesectariandivides,Frenchimperialismand
mandates,theIsraeli&Syrianconflict,theunionbetweenEgypt&Syria,Hafizal-Asad’s
risetopower,andthecurrentruleofBasharal-Asad.Thispaperwillanalyzethehistoryof
theSyriancivilwarinawaythatsupportsamultifacetedviewofitshistoricalcauses.It
willalsoexaminethemoderntragicconsequencesbroadlythatweareexperiencingtoday,
andthenspecificallytheresultingrefugeemovement.Itconcludeswiththeestablishment
thatthecivilwaristheresultofnotjustoneindividualevent,asisoftenargued
internationally,butratheraconglomerateofdeeplyintertwinedhistoricalmoments.
II.HISTORY
Theremustbeanunderstandingofthemainhistoricalmomentsthathave
contributedtotheSyrianfailure.AsSyrianexpertJosefOlmertstated,“itsfundamental
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causes,aswellasitscourseandpossibleimplicationsareuniquelyboundwiththepolitical
developmentoftheSyrianstatefromitsveryinception”(SPME).UnderstandingSyria
beginswithananalysisofhowTheMiddleEastevencameintoexistence.Beforeitwas,as
itistoday,modernlyknownas“TheMiddleEast”,itwashistoricallyreferredtoas“the
NearEast”.Theextensivehistoricalbackgroundofsucharegioniswhatplayssucha
deeplyprominentroleinwhereitisattoday.Nootherregionorcountryhasthedepthof
historyquiteliketheMiddleEast;afterall,oneauthordescribesitas“themostancient
regionofhumancivilization”(Mansfield).Tounderstandthecausesofthemoderncivilwar
inSyria,includingtheFrenchruleandmandate,thewarwithIsrael,thevarioussectsand
ethnicgroups,theBa’athparty,andtheAssadRegime,onemustfirstunderstandhowthey
allcameabout.Withthat,letusstartfromthebeginning.
Syriatodayismarkedbyitsdiverseethnicandreligiousgroups.Havingsucha
varietyofpeoples,withthesmallestdifferences,playsnotonlyintoitsrichculture,butits
undertoneforviolence.EvenfromthestartSyriawasrecognizedasaneccentric
populationhavingamixtureofpeoplesandculture.Oneofthefirstrecognizedgroupsto
dominateSyriaforathousandyearsfrom3500B.C.werethenon-Semiticandhighly
civilizedSumeriansfromMesopotamia(Mansfield).ThencametheSemiticAmorites,
nomadsfromcentralArabia,whodefeatedtheSumerians.Afterthat,theBabyloniansinthe
middleofthethirdmillenniumwhowerefollowedbytheEgyptians.TheEgyptians
however,weredrivenoutthroughouthistorybydifferentinvadersincludingtheHittites’
whocompletelyconqueredallofSyriain1450B.C.(Mansfield).Asthesegroupsbeganto
settleandmakeSyriaandPalestinetheirhome,theybecameknownasacollectivewhole
calledtheCanaanitesin1600B.C.Thisgroupwasuniquebecausealthoughtheywere
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knownbyonename,theyweremadeupofmanydifferentpeoplefrommanydifferent
places.Next,in1200B.C.theArmaeansgainedcontrolofDamascus.Astimepassedon,
controlofSyriachangedhandsoften.Throughitallthough,theCanaanitesavoided
violenceandbattlebygettingalongwiththeirconquerorsandmakingcivilizationbetween
thetwopossible.
AsAlexandertheGreatcametoTheMiddleEastandbeganconqueringcitiesand
states,SyriafellintothehandsofSeleucus.SeleucuswasaPersianrulerandfriendof
Alexander’s,whomeventuallyfoundedthecapitalcityofSyria,Antioch.AsRomebecamea
dominantforceintheMiddleEast,GreekrivalsSeleucidandPtolemaicsentSyriaintoa
decline.ThisdeclinewasplayedoutthroughthelocalpowersinSyriawhosawthebattle
andweaknessasachancetoassertthemselvesandclaimwhattheywanted.Thiscreated
moretensionandhostilefeelingsthanwerealreadyoncepresent.Eventually,from29B.C.
toA.D.14theentireMiddleEastregionwasincorporatedintotheRomanEmpire.From
thispointonforawhile,Syriaandseveralothercountriesexperiencedpeaceandorder
throughRomanlaw.TheRomanswerearatherfairconquerorwithmuchofSyria,allowing
locationstoremainautonomoussolongastheydidn’tthreatenanysortofinstabilityinthe
Romanrule.AswewilllaterseeamongsttheminoritiesandSunniinSyria,even
historicallytheurbanpopulationwasmoreeducatedandpartoftheintellectualelite,while
theruralpopulationtendedtobethoseofthelowersocioeconomicclassesconstituting
peasantsandtribesman.
LatercontrolledbytheByzantines,asmallgroupofIslamicfaithfollowerssettheir
sitesonregainingSyriaandEgypt,whichtheysucceededbyunifyingthroughtheir
resentmenttowardsimperialpowers.UponconqueringSyria,thedeathoftheprophet,and
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theassassinationoftheCaliphsuccessor,thefirstcousinoftheProphetwastobethe
successor.However,AliwasdefeatedbytheUmayyads,whichledtothefirstandonly
greatdivisioninIslam:betweentheSunnis,or‘peopleofthesunnah’,whoarethegreat
majority,andtheShiaor‘partisans’ofAli(Mansfield).Thishashadamajoraffectonthe
modernregionweseetodayaseachcountryisdominatedorhasamajoritygroupof
typicallyeitherSunniorShiitecausinggreatdissentionandturmoil.
Syriafromthebeginninghashadacivilizationmarkedbynumerouschangesof
power.Theinstantaweaknessisshownbythegrouporpersonincharge,orthemoment
morethanonegroupfindsynonymousgroundtogoupagainsttheauthority,iswhena
changeinpowerandconfrontationoccurs.Ashostilefeelingstowardsimperialoutside
forcesbecameaunifyingforceagainsttheByzantinepeople,itwouldalsobecomeafactor
inSyrianinteractionwiththeFrench.AsthecollapseoftheOttomanEmpirecametothe
forefront,BritainandFrancetookituponthemselvestodowhattheywantedintheMiddle
East.
III.SECTARIANDIVISIONS
UnderstandingSyrianhistoryshouldbelikebuildingblocks.Tobegin,theremustbe
anunderstandingofthevariousreligiousandethnicgroupsthathaveemergedoverthe
years.Thisisakeyfactortobasicunderstandingbecause,“despiteagreatmeasureof
culturaluniformity,Syria’spresentpopulationischaracterizedbystrongreligiousand
ethnicdiversity”(VanDam).Someofthisdiversitystemsfromthereligiousminorities,
whicharetheAlawis(11.5%),Druzes(3.0%),Isma’ilis(1.5%),andtheGreekOrthodox
Christians(4.7%),whoconstitutethemostimportantcommunityofallChristiansinSyria
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(14.1%)(VanDam).Theothersideofdiversitystemsfromtheethnicbranchofminorities.
TheseprincipleminoritiesaretheKurds(8.5%),Armenians(4.0%),Turcomans(3.0%),
andCircassians(VanDam).AportionoftheminoritiesbelongtotheSunniMuslim
population,allowingthemtoidentifytosomeextentwithamajorityofthepopulation
whileothersfindthemselvesfallingintheminoritycategoryinbothreligionandethnicity.
ItisthusevidentthatSyriaisfilledwithanarrayofreligiousandethnicvariations
contributingtotheirdiversity,andtheirturmoil.AuthorNikolaosVanDam,aspecialiston
Syria,attributestheexistenceofsomanyreligiousandethnicgroupsinSyriatosevenmain
factors.Thefirstfactoris,“Thethreemajormonotheisticreligions,Judaism,Christianity
andIslam,allhavetheiroriginsinthewiderregionofwhichSyriaispart.TheFormationof
sectsanddifferentschoolswithinthesereligionsledtoagreatdiversityoffaiths”(Van
Dam).Inotherwords,theMiddleEastisthesourceofthethreemainumbrellareligions:
Judaism,Christianity,andIslam.Thesmallerbranchesofeachofthesereligiousgroupsthat
haveformedovertheyearsofhistory,eachhavedivertedfromthemaintrainofthoughtin
theirownright.Withslightvariationsinbeliefsandworship,thefactionshavecreatedan
assortmentofnewreligiousfaithsandpracticesallatplayaroundtheworld,andmore
importantlyinSyria.
ThesecondinfluentialfactorthatVanDampointsoutis,“TheFertileCrescent,of
whichSyriaispart,hasinthepastregularlybeenexposedtoconquestbyvarious
populationgroups,suchastheArabs,Kurds,MongolsandTurks,andhasalwaysbeena
centreoftribalandindividualmovement”(VanDam).TheFertileCrescentisanamegiven
toacrescentshapedareaoftheMiddleEastregionthatwasmadeupofIraq,Syria,
Lebanon,Jordan,Israel,andnorthernEgypt.Thissameregionhasalsobeennicknamed
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“TheCradleofCivilization”.Thisregioncanbedeemedanareatypicalofconquestdueto
itsprimeconditionsforagriculturalprosperityincludingthefertilityoftheland.An
exampleofhistoricalevidenceprovingtheattempttoconquerthisareabydifferent
populationgroupsisseenduringthetimeoftheOttomanrulefrom1708-1758,when“the
provinceofDamascuswascaughtinavisebetweendisplacedArab,Turkman,andKurdish
tribesaswellasthegreatmovementofArabtribesfromthesouth,allthreateningthe
wholeoftheFertileCrescent”(Barbir).
Thethirdfactoristhat,“AttimestheMiddleEasthasbeenaplaceofrefugefor
peoplewhowerepersecutedinsurroundingregionsonpoliticalorreligiousgrounds.
GroupsoftheserefugeeswereabletosettleinSyriaoritssurroundings”(VanDam).The
nextfactorwas,“Tribalandnationaldifferencescausedbyallthesedevelopmentsoften
tookonareligiousaspectandcontributedtotheriseofdifferentreligiouscommunities.It
isonlynaturalthatpoliticalandreligiousdiversitiesdevelopedsimultaneouslyaspartof
thisprocess”(VanDam).Theriseofdifferentreligiouscommunitieswasthesourceofthe
nowpluralisticcultureandsocietyapparentinSyria.Religiouspluralismisoftendefinedas
thediversityofreligiousbeliefsystemsco-existinginsociety.Religiousaffiliationsare
stronginthesensethatpeoplechoosebasedonwhichtruthstheybelievetobecorrect.In
thisthoughtprocessitleavesnoroomforacceptanceoftrulyvaryingopinions.Religious
sectsoffertheirownexclusiveclaims,sotospeak.AstheSyriansocietybecamea
conglomerateofpersecutedpeoplefromoutsidetheirborders,thiscultivatedtheriseof
differingopinions,whichultimatelycrossedoverintothepoliticalrealm.Thefifthfactor
wasthat,“Religious,tribalandlinguisticdifferenceshavefrequentlybeenpreservedand
strengthenedasaresultoflocalism,anintenselocalloyaltywhichincertainregionswas
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fosteredbythegeographicalstructure.Thiswasparticularlytrueofthemountainsand
valleysoftheLatakiaregion,andoftheJabalal-Duruz,withitsdifficultaccess”(VanDam).
Thenextfactorwastheroleofdeficientcommunicationsinareasofdifficultaccess
andthelackofastrongcentralauthoritywhichhavebothhelpedtopreservethe
distinctivecharacterandindependenceofreligiousandnationalgroups(VanDam).In
otherwordsifaspecificgroupwishedtoremainoutofstateandgovernmentcontrolthey
wereabletosecureseclusioninordertobeundisturbed.Asaresult,theareasthatthe
governmentdidandcouldextendcontrolovertendedtobeinhabitedbythedominant
religiousandnationalgroups.InthecaseofSyria,thiswastheSunniArabs.Intheirbest
efforttoavoidsubjectiontheminorities,Alawis,Druzes,andIsma’ilis,historicdecisionto
secludethemselves,hassincelefttheirpopulation’sfatesealedinthelessaccessible
regions.Thefinalfactoristhat,“religiousandethnicdiversitieswerealsoencouragedby
thetolerationshownbyIslamtowardsChristiansandJewsaswellastheformalequalityof
nationalgroupsinsideIslam.Ultimately,farreachingassimilationtookplace”(VanDam).
Inconclusion,notonlyweredifferingreligiousandethnicminoritygroupsspreadinglike
wildfireinSyria,theywerespreadinginasocietythatwasdoingnothingtostopitatthe
time.Thispartialacceptance,ortoleration,canbeattributedtothelackofemphasison
nationalismatthetime,whichwouldlatergrowexponentiallycausinggreatriftsamong
thegrowingdiversity.
TheAlawis,Druzes,andIsma’ilis,whichallmakeupthe“compactreligious
minorities”mustbediscussedbasedontheirstrongpoliticalroleinSyrianhistory.Aswas
mentionedpreviously,manyoftheminorityethnicandreligiousgroupssoughtout
seclusiontoabstainfromtheruleoflawofthegovernment.ThiscausedtheAlawistofind
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themselvesparticularlyconcentratedintheLatakiaregionwheretheyconstitutealocal
majorityofabout75%ofallSyrianAlawis(VanDam).Whilemakingupamajorityin
Latakia’sruralpopulationtheyconstitutedaminorityintheurbancoastalcities.Asa
result,rural-urbanandclasscontrastsmoreoftenthannotcoincidedwithsectarian
differences(VanDam).Furthermoretheurbanpopulation,primarilymadeupofSunnis,
becameincreasinglydominantandcontrollingovertheruralpopulation,primarilymade
upofAlawis.Beatendownandpoverty-stricken,distrustandangertowardsSunnisbythe
Alawisgrewstrong.
TheAlawisaretypicallysubdividedintofourmainconfederations.These
confederationsaretheirtribalaffiliations.Thefourmainconfederationsare:the
Khayyatun,Haddadun,MatawirahandKalbiya(VanDam).Perpetuatingthedeeplydiverse
cultureofSyria,“ofthefourAlawitribalconfederationstwoimportantreligiousgroups
havesplitoff;theHaydariyunandtheGhasasinah”(VanDam).TheHaydariyunwhohave
theirownreligiousdifferentiatingunitycontinuedtoupholdtheirtribalties.The
GhasasinahcametotheforefrontfollowingtheFirstWorldWarundertheleadershipof
Sulaymanal-Murhsid.Uponhisdeath,mostofhisfollowersre-associatedandreconnected
tiestotheirformertribes.VillagesandlandintheMiddleEast,specificallySyria,aresplit
upandownedamongsttheeclecticfamiliesofvarioustribes.Thesetribeswerefurther
subdividedandeachsubdivisionhaditsownforemanor“muqaddam”(VanDam).Alawi
tribesalsohadtheirownreligiousleaderwhowasexpectedtoperformthesameduties
withlesspower.Inmanycasesthough,thereligiousleadersweresoinfluentialthatthey
wereabletocompetewiththetriballeaderforpowerandleadershipwithinatribe.Dueto
thelandbeingsplitupaccordingtofamilyties,mostoftenthetribesoftheselandswere
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acquiredthroughinheritance.However,therewereselectinstanceswhereanindividual
becameatriballeaderbasednotonfamilyconnectionsbutbypersonalqualitiesor
influenceinSyrianpowerinstitutionsatanationallevel(VanDam).Thelatter
circumstanceofgainingtriballeadershipallowedtheopportunityforafewpoorAlawi
familiestobeplacedinpowerfulpositions(VanDam).Oneessentialexampleofthisis
PresidentHafizal-Asad.Thisfamilyultimatelybecamethepowerhouseregimethathasled
theoutbreakofcivilwarinSyria.
The“AlawiMountains”astheywerecalled,weresoremoteandunderdeveloped
thatthelowsocio-economicstatusoftheAlawiswastakenadvantageofbytheSunnis
throughinadequatepayfortobaccosales.Relationsbetweenthetwogroupsweresewn
withcontemptandresentment,especiallyaspoorAlawifamiliesbegansellingtheir
daughtersashouseservantsforurbanSunnis(VanDam).However,sincetherisetopower
oftheAsadregimeandBa’thpartyin1963,circumstancesforAlawipeasantshavegreatly
improved.EducationwashighlysoughtafterfortheAlawipeople.Theywereabletoattain
highereducationandmoreweightydegreesbytheirnowpowerfulco-religionistBa’th
party.Raisingtheirstatusasdoctors,lawyers,engineersanduniversityprofessors,“bythe
1990stheAlawipeoplewererivalingandsometimesdisplacingtheSunniandChristian
intelligentsia”(VanDam).SyriaexperiencedatransferofpowerandwasnowunderAlawi
dominatedBa’thistrule(VanDam).OvertimemanyofthepreviouslyconsideredSunni
coastalcitieshadbecomemajorityAlawithroughwhatbecameknownas“Alawisation”
(VanDam).ThistrendalsobecameapparentinthesuburbsofamajorcityinSyria,
Damascus.
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TheSyrianDruzes,liketheAlawis,experiencedseclusionandhighconcentration,
butinal-Suwayda.Theirpercentconcentrationisfargreaterinal-SuwaydathantheAlawis
intheLatakiaregion.TheDruzesintheal-SuwaydaregionhaveancestralrootsinLebanon,
PalestineandtheAlepporegion.Inthisregionthepeopleareevenlydistributedwiththe
urbanandruralareasbothconsistingofprimarilyDruzepeoples.Asaresultofthis,a
differingpointbetweenthetworegionsthatmustbeaddressedis,unlikeintheLatakia
regionwherethetraditionaleliteisamixtureofAlawi,Christians,andSunni;the
traditionaleliteinal-SuwaydaisentirelyDruze(VanDam).Thesetworegionsandtheir
populationsareacrucialcomponenttounderstandinginternalSyrianrelations,something
verycentraltothecivilwar.Thehomogeneouspopulationinal-Suwaydacontributestoits
overallstrongerregionalidentificationandthereforesocialcohesionthanispresentin
Latakiawhereintra-regionaltensionsaregreater(VanDam).Therefore,“Religious-tribalfeudalrelations,suchasthoseexistingwithintheAlawicommunity,havenotoccurred
amongtheDruzes”(VanDam).WhentheDruzemigratedfromLebanon,Palestine,and
Aleppo,theywereabletodominateandleadintheal-Suwaydaregionforoneoftwo
reasons;either“theynumericallywereamajorityorbecausevillageswerecomposed
almostentirelyofmembersofoneextendedfamily”(VanDam).TheDruzesofthisregion
havebeenmarkedbytheirstrengthtoshowrelativelyconsistentunity.Whenthecentral
OttomangovernmentortheSyriangovernmentinDamascusattemptedtoextendtheir
authorityovertheDruze,theyresistedandremainedundivided.Syriaisacountrywhose
historyisfullofdivision,divisioninreligion,ethnicity,regionalterritory,politics,and
more.Onecanbegintoseehoweasilyandevenlikelydissentionamongthevariousgroups
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is,especiallyinaregionoftheworldthatculturallyholdssodearlyandrecognizesso
firmlythesedifferences.
TheprovinceofHamaisthemajorcenterfortheminoritygroupIsma’ilis.More
specificallytheyarelocatedprimarilyinthedistrictsofMasyafandSalamiyah.Inthe
eleventhcenturymostIsma’ilisfledtothemountainsoftheLatakiaregion.Atthistime
theybegantosettleinthetownsofMasyafandQadmus.ThedivisionoftheLatakiaregion
betweentheIsma’ilisandtheAlawiswasnotwithgoodspirit.TheAlawistendedtobe
hostiletowardstheIsma’iliswhoeventuallymigratedbacktoSalamiyah“aftertheOttoman
Sultan‘Abdal-HamidIIgrantedthempartoftheEmpire’sdomaintherein1845”(Van
Dam).TheIsma’ilislocatedintheAlawimountainshaveremainedpoorovertimewhile
thosewhoreturnedtoSalamiyahadvancedeconomicallyandsocially(VanDam).This
contrastcanbeattributedtothesuppressionanddominationbythemajorityAlawi
populationintheLatakiaregionovertheminoritygroupofIsma’ilis.WhereasinSalamiyah
theIsma’ilisaremoreconcentrated,constitutingamajority,aswellasprotectedbythe
OttomanSultanhavingformallygrantedthemlandthere.ThisallowstheIsma’ilistobe
theirowneliteandtheirownleadersnothavingtoabidebyanothersect’srulesor
subjections.
Historians,reporters,politicians,andvariouscitizensofdifferentcountriesoften
pointtothemostobviousculturaldifferencesintheArabworldasthereasonforits
troublesanddownfall.Sectarianism,regionalism,tribalism,andclassstrugglearesooften
thrownoutbutneveranalyzed.Yes,theyplayanincrediblyimperativerolein
understandingandstudyingSyriaandtheircivilwar.Yet,itisnotassimpleasjustsaying
thosecategories.Afurtheranddeeperunderstandingmustbeattainedtoseethe
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complexitiesbetweenthecategoriesandthepeoplethatfallintothem.Oftentheproblems
arisewhenpeoplefallintovaryingpositionsamongstmorethanoneofthecategories.For
example,affiliatingwithacertainreligionthatdoesn’tmatchupwithyourspecifictribe,
class,orsectarianviews.Thisiswhereconflictarises.Therearecategoriesordivisions,
thenwithinthosetherearesubcategoriesandsubdivisions,allthewaydownthepoleuntil
thereisaplethoraofoffshootswithwhichasingleindividualorgroupcanindentifywith.
Whenthecategoriesoverlap,itmakesit“difficulttodeterminewhichplayaroleina
particularsituation.Intheeventofoverlap,thereisadangerofinterpretingtriballoyalty
asregionaland/orsectarianloyalties,forinstance,orviceversa”(VanDam).Inanother
instance“sectarian,regional,andtribalgroupsmayinturnpartiallyoverlapwithsocioeconomicdifferences”(VanDam).Thiscausesissuesbecauseforstartersareligious
communityusuallyismadeupofallsocio-economicclasses.Ontheflipside,“sectarian
loyaltiescanhaveacatalyzinginfluenceonthetake-offofaclassstruggleifsectarian
contrastscoincidewithsocio-economicdifferences”(VanDam).IncountriesliketheU.S.
thisispraisedtobedifferent.Longedfortobeuniqueandthinkforyourself,followwhat
youbelieve.IntheMiddleEast,inSyria,whereancestralandfamilyviewsandbeliefsareso
prided,wherethecategoriesyouidentifywitharesohighlyexamined,yourdifferencescan
bethedecidingfactorbetweenfriendsorenemies,peaceorviolence.
Aswasseenpreviouslyintheanalysisofthevariousgroupsandsectscreating
divisionamongSyriansasawhole,thereisastrongurban-ruraldivergence.Thereligious
minoritieswerecompactinthecountryside,themostpoverty-orientedareainthecountry
whilethelargerandwealthycitieswerecomposedprimarilyofSunnis.Thisrealitymakes
itnearlyunattainabletoseparatetheanalysisofurbanSunnisandruralreligious
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minoritieswhenstudyingthemanygroupsanddifferencestheSyriaisfloodedwith.Even
greaterthanthat,“itisdifficultifnotimpossibletoisolatesectarian,regional,tribalor
socio-economiccategorieswhentheyshowstrongoverlapandapparentlyforman
inseparablewhole”(VanDam).Thisisanimportantkeynotebecauseitisexactlywhatisat
playandhasbeenatplayforthestruggleforpowerbetweentheAlawis,Druzes,and
Isma’ilisinSyriasince1963.
IV.FRENCHMANDATES
WhileBritainandFrancelaidclaimtodifferentterritoriesacrosstheMiddleEast,
onlyonecountrylookedtoFranceasasupportingforceandthatwasLebanon.Syriaonthe
otherhanddespisedtheideaofFrenchcontrolorinterventionintheircountrytoeventhe
smallestdegree.Infact,mostMiddleEasterncountrieswantedtobeindependentofthe
rulesandlawsimposedbytheallies.Inanattempttore-establishArabsentiments
throughout,EmirFeisalwassentasarepresentativetotheParispeaceconferencewhere
hecalledforreconsiderationofallypresenceandinterventionincountrieslikeSyriaand
Palestine.Feisalarguedthatthedecisionshouldbeuptotheinhabitantsthemselveson
whethertheywantedthisEuropeanimperialhelpornotandshouldbedeterminedby
sendinga“commissionofinquiry”(Mansfield).PresidentWilsonoftheUnitedStates
approvedofthisplanwiththesuggestionthatthecommissionbemadeupofFrench,
British,ItalianandAmericanrepresentatives.TheBritishandFrenchthough,were
obviouslyopposedbecauseitwouldmeantheremovaloftheirstrongholdsandtheir
powersotheywithdrew.UltimatelyitendedupbeingsolelyAmericanswhocarriedout
theinquiry.TheirfindingswerethatthecitizensofSyriaandPalestine“overwhelmingly
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opposedtheproposaltoplacethemundergreat-powermandates”(Mansfield).These
countries,awareoftheirsituationandcurrentstatus,didrecognizetheneedforoutside
helpbuthadrequesteditcomefromtheUnitedStatesorBritain,strictlynotFrance.
Despitethefindingsandthesuggestionsmadebythecommission,thealliescompletely
ignoredit.BritainandFrancechosetoignoreit,forpreviouslymentionedreasons,andthe
UnitedStatesbecausetheywereonthevergeofisolationism.ThoughtheAllieswere
knownasaunifiedfrontintheinternationalarena,theyinternallybegantobattlewith
eachother.TheBritishgovernmentopenedupthatitsawtheFrenchambitionsinSyriaas
excessive(Mansfield).WhentheFrenchproceededforwardwiththeirplansto“garrison
SyriawithFrenchtroops,Britainrefusedtoagree”(Mansfield).OnMarch8,1920the
GeneralSyrianCongressinDamascuspassedaresolutiondeclaringtheindependenceof
SyriaandPalestine.Inresponse,theSupremeCounciloftheLeagueofNationsannounced
itsdecisiononMay5,1920thatSyriawouldbepartitionedintothetwoFrenchMandates
ofLebanonandSyria(Mansfield).Angeredbythedecisions,theArabpeopleofSyria
beggedtheirleaderFeisaltodeclarewaronFrance.Herecognizedtheirill-equipped
militarywouldbenomatchfortheFrenchsoinsteadhegaveyoung,brashofficersthe
clearancetoattackFrenchpositions.InresponsetheFrenchdemandedthattheybe
allowedtooccupyAleppo,Homs,Hama,andtheBekaaplain,whichFeisalaccepted.This
ultimatelyledtotheFrenchcompletelyseizingSyriaandexilingFeisal.
Nowthatthemandateshadbeenapprovedandsolidified,thefirstthingtheFrench
didwastoenlargeLebanonatSyria’sexpenseastomakeLebanonitsMiddleEastern
headquarters(Mansfield).FranceenactedpolicythatplacedFrancophileMaronite
ChristianelementsonMuslimArabpeoples.Francepracticedcompletecontroloversociety
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inSyriasuppressinganysortofbehaviorthatwentagainsttheirculturalviewstheywere
attemptingtoimplement.PartitioningtheOttomanEmpirecamewithviolenceand
fighting,especiallyinSyria.ItalsocreatedfivenewMiddleEasternstates;Syria,Lebanon,
Transjordan,IraqandPalestine,allofwhichwereunderthecontrolofeitherBritainor
France.ThemandateswerebackedandlegitimizedbytheLeagueofNationsandinstilled
forthesakeofkeepingtheirinhabitantsfrombeingreturnedtotheirformermastersas
wellasaformoftrustwherethepowerwasadministeredtotheterritoryunder
supervision(Mansfield).Manysawthisasaniceway,orpoliticallycorrectway,ofmaking
theseterritoriescoloniesoftheBritishandFrench.TheresultoftheFrenchMandatesin
Syriawasonlyabeginningglimpseofseparationanddivision.FrancehadsplitSyriaupin
anattempttoruleitmoreeasilybycreatingdistricts.Thesedistrictswereasfollows;“One
intheAlawitemountainsinthenorth-eastinhabitedmainlybythesub-ShiaAlawitesect,
oneintheJebalDruzeinthesouthwheremostofthepeoplewereDruze,andoneinthe
restofSyriawithDamascusasthecapital”(Mansfield).Itisclearinunderstandingthe
FrenchimpactonSyriawhymoderndaySyriaissodeeplydivided.TheFrenchwerethe
firstkeycomponenttoturmoilandpoorfeelingsamongstvariousgroups.The“processof
politicalradicalizationwasinitiatedduringtheeraoftheFrenchmandate,thelegacyof
whichwasalmostaguaranteeofSyria’spoliticalinstability”(Fildis).
SyriahavingfinallywonitsindependencefromFrancewasleftindisarray.
EverythingtheSyriansearnedwasnotwithoutafightandbattle.Thisisneverapositive
wayforanationtobebornasitleftitonitssideandunpreparedforchallengesthatmay
layaheadafterexhaustingitselfindeterminationofindependencefromFrance.Asauthor
McHugophrasedit,“Syriahadnoalliesandhasbeenaptlydescribedasapoliticalorphan.
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Inaddition,Syriansnowhadtheirownstateandademocracy,butthatdemocracywas
fragile-aswerethestateanditssenseofnationhood”(McHugo).
V.SYRIAN&EGYPTIANUNION
AnotherimportantfactorinthehistoryofSyriaasanexplanationforitsmodernday
strugglesthatmustbelookedatistheunionthattookplacebetweenSyriaandEgypt.The
unioncameasaresultofthe“bifurcationofpowerwhichledtoastalemate,preventing
majorreforms,butalsotosuchintenseconflictthatSyrianpoliticianssoughtsalvationin
unionwithEgypt”(Hinnebusch).ThismergertookplaceofficiallyonFebruary2,1958asa
resultofthegrowingtensionsbetweenthewest,mainlytheUnitedStates,andMiddle
EasterncountrieslikeSyria.Itwasalsoanoutcomeof“theinabilitytomaintainaunited
state”(Olmert).Thistensionwasontheriseanddirectlycorrelatedwiththegrowing
emphasisandrelationshipbetweenSyriaandtheSovietUnion.Astimecontinuedonand
theSovietUnioncontinuedtobackMiddleEasterncountries,specificallythrough
supplyingthemwithmilitaryequipment,theUnitedStatessawadramaticincreasein
threatfromtheSovietcamp.In1957SyriahadaccusedTurkeyofmassingtroopsonits
frontier,whichNasserrespondedtobysendingabodyoftroopstoDamascustoexpress
support(Mansfield).Oldschoolpoliticianstypicallywouldhavepreservedarelationship
withthewestbutunfortunatelyforSyriaanditsgrowinginstability,thepowerlayinthe
handsoftheBa’athparty.
AlthoughitseemedsupportoftheSovietUnionwasbecomingmorewidespread,
SyriabegantofearacommunisttakeoverandsosawdiversionthroughunionwithEgypt.
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WhenthismergerbecamecompleteonFebruary2,1958thepresidentsofthetwo
countriesannouncedthenameoftheirnewterritoryastheUnitedArabRepublic.King
SaudofSyriawasforcedtoresignwhenitbecameevidentthathehadplanstoassassinate
EgyptianPresidentNassertopreventtheunionofSyriaandEgypt(Mansfield).KingSaud’s
brotherFeisaltookover,ashewasknownforbeingmorepro-Egyptian.Thingsquickly
spiraleddownhillforSyriaaspressurefromIraqileaderKarimKassemwasexertedinan
efforttodestroytherelationshipbetweenSyriaandEgypt(Mansfield).Kassemandhis
organizationoverthrewtheregimeinSyria,declaredarepublic,andkilledFeisalandhis
familymembers.ThisnewrepublicofIraqunderKassemdeclareditssupportforEgypt
andNasserandNasserismbecametherulingideologyinSyria.
Thisquicklyspreadingtakeoverofapro-Arabcommunityalongwiththe
destructionofpro-westernsitesintheMiddleEastgavewaytofearandactivateda
responseonthewest’spart.TheUnitedStatesandBritainintervenedwithtroopstotheir
lastfewcamplocationsholdingontotheirthreadofanattachmenttotheMiddleEast.
Whilethiswashappening,Nasserwasheadedforadownfallinhisreign.Hisgoal,heftyand
ambitious,wouldultimatelyfailasthevastlydifferentstatesoftheMiddleEastweretoo
ideologicallydifferentandreligiouslydiversetohavepan-Arabismunitethem.
FeelingsbetweenSyriaandEgyptbecamerockyastheSyrian’srealized,though
theirideologiesweresimilar,theywerestillverydifferent.Ontopofthis,theBa’athparty
demandedpowertoruleinSyriawhileNasserwouldhavenoneofthatunderthe
“umbrellaruleofhisauthorityandprestige”(Mansfield).Thenewpoliticalstructurein
SyriawasshapedaftertheEgyptianoneandalthoughNasserappointedtwoSyrianvicepresidentsandmanyministerstothegovernment,henevergavethemfullcontrolas
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poweralwaysremainedinhisownhands.Theunionbetweenthetwostatesrapidlyfell
apartforacoupleofreasons.First,theSyriansbegantofeelthattheywerenolonger
partnerswithEgyptratherbeingcompletelywatchedover.Second,theSyriansfeltthe
Egyptiansdidn’tholdahighenergeticpro-Arabrationaleastheydid.Third,Syria,which
hadalwaysbeenbuiltonafreeeconomy,watchedasNasser’ssocialistprincipleswere
imposeduponthem(Mansfield).Next,Syria’sagriculturalsectorsufferedthreeyearsof
consecutivedraughtsbetween1958and1960(Mansfield).Despitehisbestefforts,Nasser,
likemanyothers,failedtostabilizeSyriaandfindaworkinggovernmentforitspeople.On
September28,1961agroupofSyrianarmyofficersrebelled(Mansfield).Thismarkedthe
endoftheunionbetweenthetwoinanefforttocreateaUnitedArabRepublic.Though
Nasserletthemleave,healsostatedthattheywouldalwaysbewelcomebackshouldthey
feelsoinclinedtorejoin.
Theattemptedunionbetweentwosimilarstatesshowsthemessandfailurethat
continuestobeSyria.Itissostructurallyandinternallydamagedandbrokenthatthe
diversepopulationandstrong-sidedviewscreateahostileenvironmentwhereturmoilis
inevitable.Ashistorycontinuesonitisclearthatwitheachpassingevent,Syriaisnearlya
lostcausewhenevenfellowMiddleEasterncountriesarefailingatinterventioninlast
hopesofsavingit.Civilwarisclearlyinthepathahead. WhatbecameknownastheSeparatistMovementfrom1961-1963provednotonly
toshowaseparationoftheSunnisandminorities,butachangeofpowerinmajorpolitical
rolesaswell.TheMilitaryCommandwaspredominantlyled,withmostauthoritative
positionsbeingheld,bySunnis.ThemilitaryhadastrongholdinDamascus,whichaswe
knowfromearlier,wasamajorSunnicontrolledcity.TheSyrianArmyCommandwas
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madeupoftenmembers,fiveDamasceneSunnis,fourofthefiveotherswereSunni,and
onewasDruze.TheSyrianOfficersCorpsrecognizedthepowerbeingheldbyDamascene
Sunnis,anddemandedthatanon-Damascenecommander-in-chiefbeappointed.Druze
Major-General‘Abdal-KarimZahral-Din,thenfourthinseniority,acceptedthisposition
(VanDam).However,SunniDamasceneal-Nahlawioccupiedthekeymilitarypositionof
deputydirectorofofficers’affairs,apositionthatallowedhimtomoveandcontrolofficers
hewantedtounitshepreferred.Inotherwords,hecouldsethimselfuptobeevenmore
powerfulbymovingcertainofficerstopositionsandunitsthatbestsupportedhim.
Unfortunatelyforhim,henevercouldgainsolidsupportamongstthenon-Damascenes,
whichwouldultimatelyplayakeyroleinthedownfallofhisandhisfellowDamascene
officers.Inalastefforttoholdontohisdwindlingpower,heorchestratedamilitarycoup
thatfailedandresultedinhisandfiveofhisgreatestDamascenemilitarycolleagues
expulsionfromSyria.TherewasaclearseparationbetweentheDamasceneandnonDamascenewithinthemilitary.TheHomsMilitaryCongresswastoconveneinanattempt
todiluteanyviolentactionsfromoccurring.However,atthecongress,Damascene
Lieutenant-ColonelMutial-Sammandemandedthatsixnon-Damasceneofficersbe
expelledfromSyriainequalcompositionfortheremovalofal-Nahlawi(VanDam).Quite
theoppositeaffectendeduptakingplace.OverthenextcoupleofyearsDamasceneofficers
andmilitarymemberswereslowlypurgedfromanysortofpoliticallystrategicposition
andwerereplacedwith,asthethenDruzeGeneralZahral-Dinputit,“officerswho
harborednothingbuthatredandaversiontowardsDamascusanditsinhabitants”(Van
Dam).ThemilitarywasdwindlingitsnumbersinSunniandDamascenerepresentationand
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wasgrowingstrongerandstrongerwithminorities,apowerfulhandtoholdforthe
minorities,andapoliticallystrategiconeatthat.
ThemonopolizationofpowerbytheminoritygroupsinSyriadidnotstopthere.It
grewevenstrongerin1963whenamilitarycoupbyBa’thistssucceededinbringingdown
this“separatistregime”andinsteadstrengtheneditsnumbersinminoritiesattheexpense
oftheSunnis.ThiswasadirectresultoftheBa’athmilitaryleaderswhomquicklyputinto
positionsofpowerandleadership,familymembersandfriendsfromtheirownchoosing.
Mostofthesepeoplecalledupthen,weremainlyAlawis,Druzes,andIsma’ilis(VanDam).
Theminoritieswereonlypickingupsteam.Thoughtheyoncehadlivedlivesinthepoor
countrysideofSyria,theywerefindingthemselvesgrowingstrongerasacohesiveunit,
gainingmilitarypower,andthereforepoliticalpower.Arolethatrequiredthemtotread
lightlywiththeirnewfoundpower,soasnottoabuseit,andnottoloseit.
VI.ISRAELI&SYRIANCONFLICT
Thenextimportanthistoricalfocalpointinunderstandingtoday’scivilwarinSyria
isthedebateoverZionismresultinginaSyrianwarwithIsrael.FollowingtheendofWorld
WarOne,thepeacesettlementdeclaredPalestinein1918aJewishstateforrefugeestogo
andsettle.However,PalestinestillconsistedofstrongArabNationalistswhoshowed
disdainfortheirnewneighborsandfrustrationandangerovertheJewishpopulation
receivingtheirland.Uponaskingforreconsiderationoradifferentareatobethe
designatedplaceforJewishrefugeesfollowingtheHolocaust,tensionsbegantoriseasthe
Alliedpowersdeniedtheirrequest.Ultimately,itwasdecidedthatPalestinewouldbesplit
intotwonewstates,onethatwouldbeknownasmoderndayIsrael.Israelwastobethe
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landfortheJewishpopulation;thisallowedthemtocarryoutZionism.Manyinternational
leaderssawthisasaresolutiontotheproblem,butinsteadPalestineArab’sgrewintheir
angerandhateandpulledintheirownallies,whichconsistedofmanycountriesthat
borderedIsrael,includingSyria.Violentrevoltsbegantobreakoutandborderbattlesand
land/territoryownershipbecamethenewtopicofdebateamongsttheMiddleEast(Oren).
ThisiswhateventuallyledtoabattlebetweenIsraelandmuchoftheMiddleEast,though
theywerebackedbyBritainandFrance,andmorespecificallywithSyria.Agreatportionof
discontentbetweenIsraelandSyria,whichalsocontinuestoday,isthestruggleoverthe
GolanHeights.ThispieceoflandwasseenasaprimeterritorialcontroloftheSyriansbut
waspartitionedofftotheIsraelis.Ithassincethenbeenthetopicofgreatdiscussionand
reconsiderationandnowevenbattleoverwithwhomitshouldbelong.Thisunfinished
businessandinabilitytocometoafairandsatisfyingconclusionbetweenthetwocountries
haspittedthemagainstoneanotherhistorically,andstilltoday.
TheArabrevoltof1936-39isarguablywhatpulledinmoreoftheMiddleEastthan
justPalestine.ItisseenasthespreadingtheconflictnolongerbetweenJewsandArabsin
PalestineratherZionismandArabseverywhere(Oren).OnMay14whentheBritish
Mandateended,theregionalbattlebrokeoutagainstIsrael.SyriaandIraqwerethetwo
borderingnationswholedtheinvasion.EgypteventuallyjoinedoutoffearofotherMiddle
Easternstatesgrowingtheirterritoriesintheprocess(Oren).Egypthadalsosigneda
mutualdefenseagreementwithSyriain1966.Unfortunatelyforthem,Syriabecame
quicklydissatisfiedwiththeeffortstodemolishIsraelandZionismandtookitupon
themselvestobetheleaderindoingso.
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Syriantanksrainedthirty-oneshellsonKibbutzAlmagor,killingoneandwounding
twoothersbytheendoftheattack(Oren).ThiswasthestartoftheSyrianefforttomove
fromthedefensivetoattack.ThoughtherewasnoclearunderstandinginwhytheSyrians
hadbecomesoabruptlyviolentanddeterminedonthematter,itisimportanttopointout
thattheBa’athpartyofthetimehadastrongideologicalbeliefintheeliminationofIsrael,
Zionism,andimperialism(Oren).ItshouldalsobenotedthatanotherfactorinSyria’s
involvementwasadirectresultoftheircurrentconflictwithIraqovertheIraqPetroleum
Company.SyriawasupinarmsovertheirpaymentreceivedforallowingIraqioiltoflow
overtheirland.Muchofthisnewlyfoundresentmentonthetopic,clearlystemmedfrom
thefactthattheIPCwasaBritishownedcompanyandwasthereforeanimperialist
presenceintheMiddleEastthatSyriawasdeterminedtoridof.Anotherimportantcatalyst
ofwarbetweenSyriaandIsraelstemmedfromtheSovietUnionpressureandmisleading
informationuponSyria.TheSovietUnionwaspubliclyannouncingthatitwasavoiding
conflictintheArabMiddleEast,thoughitwasactuallypushingSyriatobecomemore
active.TheSovietUnionsawthisastheirchancetoattaintheirlongtimegoalofowningkey
waterwaysintheMiddleEastandisolatingTurkey(Oren).
AllofthesereasonswerekeyplayersinSyria’smovetoattackIsrael,butoneever-
presentissueinSyriawastheultimatecatalyst.Syriasointernallydividedofficersagainst
civilian“doctorswithPresidental-AtassiandforeignministerMakhous,Hafezal-Assad
withsupportoftheairforce,thearmypittedagainstPresidentJadid,andbothgenerals
wereopposedbyIntelligenceChiefAbd’al-Karimal-Jundi(Oren).Explosions,fighting,
attemptedassassinations,wereallbecomingpartofatypicaldayinSyria.Thisinternal
strifeplayedadirecthandintheinternalinsecurityoftheSyrianRegimeleadingthemto
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feeladesperatedesireto“out-Nasser-Nasser”(Oren).Inanattempttodiffusethe
mountingtensiononthebordersspecificallybutbetweenIsraelandSyriaasawhole,a
meetingorconferencewasheldwheretheywereaskedtoupholdtheirpreviouslysigned
agreementtorefrainfromactsofhostility.Bothdeniedtheagreementandeventuallythe
meetingcametoaclosewithfeelingsmorebitterthanwhentheyhadarrivedandless
likelytocometoanysortofagreement.SyriaandIsraelcontinuedattacksoneachother,
andtheyevenbegantomultiplyontheborder.SyriahadbeguntobackPalestineintheir
actsofaggressionagainstIsraelaswell.ItwentsofarthattheUnitedStatesrecognizedand
announcedthattheSyrianswerenotgoingtostopuntilwarbrokeout.Forthat,the
AmericansimploredtheIsraelistodisregardtheirlong-standingoppositiontoretaliations
(Oren).
Warbrokeoutinwhatbecametitledthe“SixDaysWar”.Theshortestwarin
history,theIsraelisbattledagainstmultipleArabstates.Shockingtomany,Israelcame
throughvictoriousandwithoverwhelmingnumbers.Syriawaslaterblamedforhaving
startedawarinwhichtheydidnotreallyparticipatefightingin.Yet,farafterthewarSyria
continuedtodenounceIsraelandZionismandyetperpetuallybattlesitselfwithinitsown
borders.SyriastronglyrejectedapprovalofapeacetreatywithIsraelandopenlysharedits
disapprovaloftheEgyptian-IsraeliPeaceTreaty.ThoughSyriahadSovietbackingand
otherstatesatwarwiththem,theirinternalstrifeandstruggleultimatelyledtotheir
defeatagainstIsraelandtheAllies.Syria’sgreatestlossinthisbattlewithIsraelhowever,
rosefromthelossofterritory:theGolanHeights.TheGolanHeightsisaplateauthatis
borderedbytheSeaofGalilee,HulaValley,YarmoukRiver,MountHernon,andWadi
Raqqad.ItwasoriginallyandareaconsideredpartofSyriabutwasconqueredbythe
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IsraelisduringtheSixDayWar.ThefalloutbetweenIsraelandSyriahascontinuedfor
yearsasaresultofthedisputeoverthispieceofland.Todayithascontributedtothe
SyrianCivilWar,asithasbecomeastrongholdfortheterroristorganizationISIStocarry
outattackacrosstheMiddleEast,infiltraterefugeemovements,andcontributetothe
overallinstabilityandviolenceinSyria.IsraeliPrimeMinisterBenjaminNetanyahu
requestedIsraelbeallowedtoimposeIsraelilawinanattempttohelpoustthepresenceof
terroristactivityduetothefactthatSyriaisincapablebecauseasthePrimeMinisterputit,
“Syriahasdisintegratedbeyondthepointofreunification”.Hisrequestsweredeniedand
ISISandthestruggleforcontroloftheGolanHeightsragesonperpetuatingtheinstability,
violence,andstrifethroughoutSyria.
VII.HAFIZAL-ASAD’SRISETOPOWER
Syria’stumultuouspoliticalandsocialhistoryhasleduptothepointofHafizalAsadtakingcommand.Itisclearthatwiththeinabilitytomaintainstabilitywithboth
internalandexternalinfluence,thestruggleforpowerwillcontinuetooccur.UnderFrench
MandateandunitywithEgypt,Syriastillmadeirrationaldecisionsandfoughtagainsthelp
fromanyoneexactlylikethemselves.ThecountryburnedbridgeswithnotonlytheAlliesof
thewestbutalsowithfellowMiddleEasterncountriesaswell,leavingthemtofendfor
themselveswithbadbloodsurroundingthem.Understandingthesectarian,regional,and
tribaldivideofthecountryalsodemonstratesthelackofonecohesiveunittoprogress
forwardinanysortofgroundbreakingdecision-making.Muchofthisstemsfromtheethnic
andreligiousdifferencesthatareseenassogreatadivide,theyareunabletotrusttheir
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ownfellowSyriansfromvariousgroups.Thesefactorsareallwhathaveledustothebattle
forpowerbetweenal-AsadandSalahJadid.
Jadid’spowerstemmedfromhiscontrolonalargeportionofthearmedforcesand
militarythroughinsideconnections.However,ontheflipside,al-Asadwasministerof
defensegivinghimtheupperhandalongwithhisroleastheBa’thistMilitaryCommittee.
DifferenceofopinioninthecountryledtotheArabmilitarydefeatin1967andultimately
totensionsrising.Thetwosidesoftheargumentconsistedoftheideologicalviewof
pursuingasocietybasedonsocialistidealsorasocietybasedonArabnationalistpolicy.
AsadandJadidrepresentedeachofthesepoliticalsidesattheRegionalandNationalBa’th
PartyCongress.Jadidbelievedina“socialisttransformation”withgreaterdependenceon
theSovietUnionandotherCommunistcountries(VanDam).Thisgroupalsorejected
anything“reactionary,rightest,orpro-western”(VanDam).Asadontheothersidebelieved
inanArabnationalistleaningwithfocusonthestrugglewithIsraelanddefeatingthem
(VanDam).JadiddominatedAsadatthecongress,winningmajorityofthesupport,yet
Asadwasnotsatisfiedwiththis.Asadusedhismilitaryconnectionsandtitlestogain
control,support,andultimatelypowerofthearmedforces.ThisthenforcedJadidtogrip
tighterontohiscivilianpartyapparatus.ThiscreatedthebiggestdivideinSyriawesee
today;thearmedforcesandthecivilianapparatusoftheBa’thinSyria.
Asadmadehismoveforcontrolbyabductingthethenchiefofthenationalsecurity
andgeneralintelligenceservicesaswellasahandfulofJadid’sotheraidesandsupporters.
Theconfrontationbetweenthetwoleaderscontinuedtogrowwhenin1970Syrian
politicalleadersmadethedecisiontointerveneintheJordaniancivilwar,whichultimately
failed.TheTenthExtraordinaryNationalCongressoftheBa’thPartywasconvenedin1970
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inanattemptedeffortatfindingasolutiontothepartystruggle.Al-Asadandhissupporters
strategicallypreparedthemselvesforadefenseattackshouldal-Asadbelessfavoredthan
Jadidintheconference.Aswasfeared,Jadidheldoverwhelmingsupportfromthose
membersofthecongress.Asadrespondedinattacksthroughthetakingofcivilianparty
sectionsandcapturingandarrestingprominentleaderslikeJadidfromtheoppositeparty.
ManyotherhighpoliticalmembersfledthecountryfromfearofarrestleavingAsadto
monopolizehisnewfoundpowermarkingthestarttohisnewregimeinNovember1970,
andeventuallytoAsadin1971beingnamedSyria’sfirstAlawipresident(VanDam).The
periodofSunnirulehadcometoanend,andtheHafizal-AsadRegimenowraged.
UnderAsad’srule,heusedhispositionandpowertosuppressanysortofuprising
thatmayhavebeenstirredupinanticipationtoousthim.Oneveryimportantexampleof
thiswasthe1982HamaMassacre.DuringthismassacreSyriansecurityforcesenteredthe
denselypopulatedoldcityofHamainanattempttoseizeweaponspossiblyheldby
Islamistmilitants.Thesituationescalatedasattacksirensragedthroughthenight,
concerningthelocalresidentsandinfluencingthemtoattackthetroopsinthetown.As
armedmilitantsbegantobattlewiththesecurityforcesinabrutalshowdown,HafizalAsad’sbrother“rushedtotheareaandfromtheheightsofthenearbycitadel,rained
artilleryandtankfireintothetown,levelingitsmajorcommercialandresidentialdistricts”
(Lawson).HamawasknownforitsoutbreaksofchallengeagainsttheBa’thRegime.The
1982uprisingchangedperspectivesasitnowbecameknownfor“itsmassivescale,the
broadrangeofsocialforcesthattookpart,thehighdegreeoforganizationevidencedbyits
leaders,andtheruthlessnesswithwhichitwascrushed”(Lawson).Theresultwas
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widespreadasevenmoderateIslamistsscaledbacktheiractivitydrastically.Foradecade,
thecitiesruinswereleftto“standasastarkwarningtootherdissidents”(Lawson).
TounderstandfurtherAsad’sreignandtheparadoxbehindhisrisetopower,we
mustnexttakealookattheBa’thpartyingeneral,furtherleadingtothehatebetweenthe
AlawitesandSunnis.Itbecameaquestionofdiscrepancyasto“howBa’thistofficersfrom
oneminoritysect,theAlawis,emergedasaseeminglydominantclique,mostmanifestafter
1970underHafizal-Asad,wasexplainedbyfactorssuchastheirdisproportionate
recruitmentintothearmyandpartybefore1963andclassandregionaldivisionsamong
themajoritySunniactors”(Hinnebusch).TheBa’thpartywasapoliticalgrouporiginally
knownas“ThePartyoftheArabRenaissance”(Ben-Tzur).Thispartywasfirstestablished
inSyriainthefortiesasapartyoftheurbanpetit-bourgeoisintelligentsia(Ben-Tzur).The
ideologyofthisArabpartywasformulatedafteradoctrinefromthepartyplatformatthe
firstconventionin1947.Thedoctrineofthisconventionwas“ablendofnationalistpanArabradicalismwithamoderatesocialprogramme-agrarianreformandpartial
nationalizationwithoutinfringingindividualpropertyrights,andwithaneutralistpolicy
towardstheglobalstrugglebetweenthecommunistandwesternblocs”(Ben-Tzur).This
SyrianpoliticalpartyhasnotconsistentlybeenactiveinSyriahowever.Therewasaperiod
in1958-59wherethepartyhaddissolvedinSyriabutremainedaliveinotherMiddle
Easterncountries.AfterthreeconferencesinLebanon,theSyrianBa’thpartywasreestablished.
VIII.BA’THPARTY
31
Baltes
In1958SyriaandEgyptweretobeunified.However,beforethisplanwouldbe
carriedout,EgyptianPresidentNasserdemandedallSyrianpoliticalparties,includingthe
Ba’athparty,bedissolvedpriortounification(VanDam).Itwasn’tuntilMay1962thatthe
Ba’athParty’sNationalCommandmadethedecisiontorebuildthepartybastionthathad
onceexistedinSyria.Bythistime,manyoftheformermembersoftheBa’athpartyhad
foundnewpoliticalpartiestoassociatewith.OnMarch8,1963agroupofBa’athistofficers
andothersseizedpowerinSyriathroughamilitarycoup.TheBa’athistmilitaryleaders
eachclaimedsomelevelofnewgovernmentresponsibility,buttherewerenotenough
Ba’athistcivilianstocopewiththeextentofitall.ThoughNasserhaddemandedthe
dissolutionofallpoliticalparties,someBa’athistsinSyriahadsecretlyremainedorganized.
So,followingthecoupof1963thesepartymembersplayedaprominentroleintheSyrian
civilianpartyapparatusthankstotheirclosetieswiththeleadersoftheBa’athistmilitary
partyorganizationwhichheldactualpowerinSyrianow(VanDam).Therehadbeenrules
andregulationssetinplacetolimitthepartysupporters,bythepartythemselves,orrather
aprocesstheyhadtomakeitthroughtobecomeanactivemember.Atthispointintime
though,theyweresolowoncivilianmembers,participation,andsupportthattheypassed
aresolutionallowingallsupporterstobepromotedtoactivemembers(VanDam).
However,thiswastakenadvantageofasmanyleadersoftheBa’athPartyusedittohave
relatives,friends,andacquaintancesaddedtothepartywithoutthemmeetinganyofthe
previouslyestablishedrestrictionsandguidelines,whichtheymightnothaveotherwise.
Thisinturncreatedanextensiveamountofpartyblocswhosememberswereconnected
notbyideologicalprinciplesbutratherbysectarian,regional,ortribalbackgrounds(Van
Dam).Thisdrovefurtherdivision,nowamongstthepartyitself.
32
Baltes
Whatwasoncedivisionbetweenthepartymembersandthosewhowerenon-
membershadnowgrowntodivisionamongthemembers.Itcreatedaseriouspower
struggleinboththecivilianandmilitarypartyorganizationbecauseitunderminedparty
discipline(VanDam).Therivaldivisionswithinthepartywerenotevenseenasdiffering
forideologicalreasonsasmanywouldhaveunderstoodmore.Factionalismwasanother
prominentissueamongsttheBa’athParty,particularlyduringelections.Oneauthorstates
that,“asaresult[ofthefactionalism]somepartymemberswerenotalwaysfreetochoose
theirleaders,andthisinturncausedsomeofthemostcapablememberstobeprevented
fromattainingcommandingpositions”(VanDam).Thecorruptionduringelectionswasfar
reaching.SometimesitwouldbeBa’athistdominatedpowerinstitutionswhointerferedin
electionstopushtheirownpreferredlistofpeopleandsometimesitwasnon-party
memberswhodidwhattheycouldtoswaythevotinginthedirectiontheydesired.Inone
case,thereweresomanyirregularitiesobservedthattheSyrianCommandhadtocallfor
newelections(VanDam).
Whomakesupthemilitaryofacountry,andwhohasinfluenceoverit,arevery
important.TheSyrianarmedforceswerestronglymadeupofminoritiesbeforetheBa’thist
officerstookoverin1963.Thisinfluenceinthearmy,ofminorities,canbeattributedto
politico-historicalandsocio-economicfactors.Oneofthesefactorsdatesbacktowhen
SyriawasunderFrenchMandateandtheyrecruitedAlawis,Druzes,Isma’ilis,Christians,
Kurds,andCircassians,whiletheydiscouragedSunniArab’s(VanDam).SunniArab
landowningcommercialfamilieswerefinewiththisarrangement,astheyfelttheirsons
shouldnotbesentformilitarytrainingtodefendwhattheysawas“FrenchImperial
Interests”(VanDam).Furthermore,themajoritySunniArab’ssawthemilitaryasaplace
33
Baltes
forthoseeconomicallyandsociallybelowthem.Morespecificallythosewhocouldnot
excelinsocietyontheirownorthrougheducation.So,theysawitasaninsulttobeapart
ofthemilitary.Ontheflipside,thoseminoritieswhostruggledtomakeendsmeetsaw
joiningthemilitaryasawaytoboostthemselvesinsocietyandmakeadecentliving.
TheBa’thParty,whichcametopowerin1963,isthecornerstoneoftheriseofthe
Syrianminorities.Thispoliticalgroupcameaboutthroughsocialchannelsthatdefine
whomitsfollowersare.Itwasagroupseekingoutsocialistideals,allowingallindividuals
tobeequaldespitereligious,tribal,orgeographicaffiliations.ItsupportedtheideaofArab
Nationalism,thoughtheSunnisfeltitwasrepresentingeverythingArabNationalism
wasn’t.TheBa’athpartywasfoundedinDamascusin1940byMichel‘Aflaq,aGreek
OrthodoxChristian,andSalahal-DinBitar,aSunniMuslim,bothwhowereteachersand
partofthemiddleclass(VanDam).Asaresultoftheiroccupations,mostofthepeoplethey
recruitedandsoughtouttojointheirpartywerestudentsofhighereducationthatwere
mostoftenmigrantswhohadcometoDamascusforhighereducation.Thoughtherewas
notalaidoutplanofactionthepartybegantospreadamongsttheminoritiesofSyriawith
norhymeorreason.ThestrongshowingofDruzeamongsttheBa’athpartyisoften
attributedtotheleader‘Aflaq’arelationshipwithmanyfamiliesoftheJabal-alDuruz(Van
Dam).Manyofthepeoplewhoconstitutedthegreatestareasofpovertyandruralareas,
arethosewhowerepulledtotheBa’athpartybasedontheirsocialistidealsversusthoseof
thecities,asmentionedbefore,thatweremadeupofthewealthyor“bourgeoisie”.The
Ba’athpartytookuptheideasofArabNationalismaswell.Whilethisangeredmany
Sunnis,whohadbeenthegrouptomostcloselyidentify,theBa’athpartyhadtheirown
understandingandinterpretationofArabNationalism.Tothem,onedidnothavetofull
34
Baltes
identifyasreligiouslyIslamic.Theyneedonlyrecognizethatthisistheculture,the
backgroundwithwhichtheycomefrom;itwastheirArabheritage.Oneoftheleadersand
foundersoftheBa’athpartyevensaidthatChristianArabsforexample,shouldinnoway
feelrestrictedfromalsobeinganArabNationalist(VanDam).Theseviewseconomically
withsocialismbeingamaintooloftheBa’athparty,religiouslywiththeacceptanceof
outsidereligions,andthebeliefthattheseminoritiescouldstillassociatewiththesacred
ArabNationalism,createdgreatdissentionamongtheminoritiesofSyriaandtheymajority
SunniofSyria.Notonlythereligiousdifferencesbutalsothesocial,economic,and
geographicdifferencesmadeitincrediblydifficultforthepartytoattractbothminorities
andSunnis.Thiswasthestartfriction.
ThereweredifferentbranchesoftheBa’athpartybasedonthelocationandcity.
TheDamascusbranchwasverysmall.Theurban-ruraldifferentiationand
Damascene/non-Damascenecontrastwasstronginthisbranch.Rightfullyso,asDamascus
wouldbemadeuppredominantlyofSunnis,themajoritypopulation,andwerehesitantto
jointheBa’athPartyofpredominantlyminorities.TheHamaBranchhadvery,verylittle
support.LocatedinthecityofHama,theBa’athpartywasupagainstaSunnistronghold.
WhilethegeographicdifferenceiswhatcreatedfrictionamongsttheBa’athPartymembers
andnon-membersinDamascus,inHamaitwasbasedmoreonthesectariandifferences.In
April1964,thestrongoppositionoftheBa’athpartywasplayedoutwhenananti-Ba’thist
revoltoccurredbackedbytheMuslimBrotherhood(VanDam).Onecouldqualifytherevolt
asasuccessbasedonthefactthatBa’athPartyactivitiescametoastandstill.
TheBa’athpartyhadflawsofitsowninitscreationandcomingtomilitarypower.
Theleaderswantedtoorganizethepartytobelargerandacohesiveunit,butlike
35
Baltes
elsewhereinSyriaatthetime,itwasabattleforpowereveninternally.Inanefforttogrow
thepartyinsizeandnumber,theleadersbeganrecruitingmoremembers.However,the
membersweregrantedadmissiondespitenotmeetingqualificationsnorhavingsupport
fortheParty’sviews.Instead,membershipwasgrantedtothosewhomtheorganizations
leadersfeltwouldkeepthemmostprotectedintheirpositionsofpower.Beyondthat,those
memberseventuallycametopowerandleadershiproleswithintheorganizationand
begantransformingitintowhatevertheywantedittobecome,overshadowingand
minimizingthosememberswhohadriskedeverythingfortheparty’ssakeincludingtheir
lives.Sectarianpolarizationwasattheforefrontandpavedthewayforsectarian
discrimination.Thesectariandiscriminationbegantotakeformonthepart,shockingly,of
theminorities.TheremovalanddismissalofSunnileadersinthearmedforceswas
shamelessandbrutal.Somuchsothatmainbranchleaderswerebeingdismissedsuchas
theleaderoftheNationalGuardandtheleaderoftheAirForce(VanDam).Thosegiven
preferentialtreatmentforthepositionopeningstendedtobeAlawis,Druzes,Isma’ilisand
Christians,allminorities.Theminoritiesinchargewouldstrategicallyplacethosethey
trusted,fellowminoritymembers,inpositionsofgreaterimportance,whileSunniswould
beplacedinpositionsfarthestawayfrommaincities(VanDam).Theentirearmy
commandstructureanddisciplinewereunderminedbythemanipulationofsectarianties
andloyalties(VanDam).Toattainagrasponhowhostilethesectariandivisionswere,a
BritishConsularreportfromthe1870’sstated,“theyhateeachother…Sunnisboycottthe
Shi’ites…bothresenttheDruze…alldespisetheAlawites”(Olmert).
TheBa’thpartyhasnotexistedwithoutstruggle,similartoSyriaitself.After
agreeingtotheunionwithEgypt,manycitizensofthestatedenouncedthisunion.The
36
Baltes
peoplefeltsoupsetattheEgyptiandominationoverthecommandoftheBa’thpartythata
militarycoupoccurredon28September1961,whichledtothesecessionofSyriafrom
Egypt.StillunsatisfiedwiththeperformanceoftheBa’thparty,manypeasantsaswellas
intellectsconsideredrejoiningEgyptaswellascarryingoutaseriesofattemptedcoupsin
1962.ThefifthBa’thconferenceinLebanon“advocatedanall-embracingArabunion‘ona
newbasisbutwithdueregardtothemistakesoftheformerone’;itwastobeafederative
unionundercollectiveleadership”(Ben-Tzur).ThisnewBa’thpartywasrecreatedfour
yearsafterthedissolutionandinlessthanayearithadregainedcontrolofthecountry
throughamilitarycoupandhadunidentifieditselfwiththeoldpartywhohadagreedto
theunionwithEgypt.
AfteryearsofstrugglewithintheBa’thpartyandshiftingofpower,anewideology
wasformed.The“theoreticalconfusionandideologicalbackwardnessinthepartywasfelt
evenmorekeenlyinviewoftheideologicaldevelopmentsintheotherrevolutionary
regimesoftheArabworld,whichtendedtoemphasizethesocialcommitmentsofthe
nationalrevolution,andofthedevelopmentsinthecommunistworldwhichtendedto
emphasizethenationalcharacterofthetasksalongtheroutetosocialism”(Ben-Tzur).The
changeinpoweraswellasthestructuralandideologicalframeworkproposedbytheold
partyleadership,themilitarygroup,theregionalistsorthecareerists,werenever
supportedinaunifyingmannerwithintheparty.Whatthenformedwastheneo-Ba’th
partyofSyriabasedon“scientific-socialistingredientsandthemilitancyoftheideology”
(Ben-Tzur).ThisultimatelyundertheinfluenceandcreationbyAl-Hafizbecameknownas
“ArabSocialism”.
37
Baltes
ThisstrongArabpartyposesaparadoxthough,asapoorAlawitemantookover
controlandpower.Hafizal-AssadcamefromoneofthepreviouslymentionedpoorAlawi
familiesinthecountryside.Theparadoxthatispresentedishowaminoritygroupandman
couldcometopowerinamajorityandArabpoliticalparty,vastlydifferentfromwhateach
otherbelieved.Tounderstand,itisworthnotingandanalyzingtheAlawigroupindetail.
AlawismwasmadeintoaseparatebranchofreligionfromShi’iIslam.Whereby
Muslimsfaithfulsayingis“thereisnodeitybutGodandMuhammadisHisprophet”,Alawis
believe“ThereisnotdeitybyAli,noveilbutMuhammad,andnobabbutSalman”(Pipes).
TheAlawisthereforerejectIslam’smaintenets,forcingthemtobeconsiderednonMuslims(Pipes).ThefargreatestparalleltothebeliefsandtraditionsoftheAlawisis
Christianity.Forthesereasons,“manyobservers-missionariesespecially-havesuspected
theAlawisofasecretChristianproclivity”(Pipes).ThoughwomenintheAlawireligionare
treated“abominably”theyexperiencefargreaterfreedomthantheveiledMuslimwomen
(Pipes).AlawisdoinfactrejectIslam’ssacredlawofShari’a.ThehateoftheSunnisstems
fromthestrongreligiousdiversions,especiallyinthesensethatSunniswereconsidered
theupperclassofSyriaandtheAlawisconsideredofthelowerminoritysimilartothoseof
Christianity.Therefore,“AlawisdonotactlikeSunniMuslims;rather,theyresemble
ChristiansandJewsinpursuingawhollydistinctwayoflife”(Pipes).Giventhatthe
AlawitesarewhomultimatelytakecontrolofthegovernmentandpowerthroughHafizalAsad,itisreasonabletounderstandthatthechangeinsocioeconomicroleandreligious
deviationspurtheSunnihatredtowardstheminorityAlawites.Thisunderstandingthen
beginstoexplaintheparadoxbetweentherisetopowerofanAlawitethroughapan-Arab
party.
38
Baltes
ItshouldbenotedthatsincetheFrenchMandates,theAlawitesandSunnishave
cultivatedadeepinternalhateforoneanother.TheAlawitesbenefitedfromthemandate
morethananyotherminoritygroup.TheAlawites“gainedpoliticalautonomyandescaped
Sunnicontrol”(Fildis).TheFrenchevencreatedanAlawitestateknownasthe“stateof
Latakia”,aswellaswerebestowedlegalautonomyfromtheFrench.TheFrench
strongholdsandimperialinfluenceinSyriadidnotstopthereincultivatingthisdeeprift
betweenSunnisandAlawites.Another“majorinstrumentoftheFrenchinfluenceonthe
AlawiteswastheirrecruitmentintotheTroupesSpecialesduLevant,alocalmilitaryforce
formedin1921andalterdevelopedintotheSyrianandLebanesearmedforces”(Fildis).
TheFrenchcontrolofthearmyallowedthemtodividethetroopsaccordingtogroupsoas
tomaintainalowlevelofeach,preventinganyoneofthemfrombecomingsopowerfulthat
theycouldousttheFrenchadministrationandpresenceinSyria.TheFrenchhandpicked
anddesignedtheSyrianArmyalongstrongruralandminorityrepresentation.TheFrench
consideredAlawitesareliableandtrustworthyminorityandsomaintainedabranch
servingundertolocalFrenchofficers.ThepurposeoftheFrencharmyinaimingtopadthe
militarywithruralminoritieswas“becausetheywerefarfromurban-dominantpolitical
ideology,Arabnationalism”(Fildis).TheyfurtherattemptedtoweakentheArabSunnis,
theonegroupcapableofoverturningFrenchSyria.Itisclearintheunderstandingofthe
FrenchinfluenceontheSyrianarmythatanincreasedsparkofdistrustwasimplemented
betweentheSunnisandtheAlawites.TheAlawites,stronglyfavoredbytheFrench,were
givenfarmoreopportunitiesandpowerthanwerethemajoritySunnis.Inaddition,the
FrenchuseofmandatesandimperialinvasiontookcontrolovertheSyrianarmy,molding
39
Baltes
ittotheirexactstandardsandpreferencessotoappeasethosetheysupportedand
minimizethepresenceofthosegroupstheydisliked.
Pan-ArabismandthefundamentalbeliefsandvaluesheldbytheBa’thpartywere
farfromrelatabletotheAlawites.Aswaspreviouslymentioned,thepan-Arabviewwas
heldbysocially,economically,andfinanciallywell-establishedSunnisinSyria.Itis
interestingthereforethatthepeoplewouldelectandthensupportforsolongapoor
minorityAlawiteman,religiouslybelievingineverythingnearlyoppositethatofthosein
supportofpan-Arabism.ThiscontinuedtoangermanySunnispittingthemfurtheragainst
theAlawitepeoples,yetthecontinuitythatAsadputinplaceandtherelativestabilitythat
hemaintainedwereenoughtoearnhimthebackingofeventhoseBa’thpartymembers
whowerereligiouslyorculturallydifferentfromhimself.
AsadwasthefirstleadertoholdontothereinsofpowerinSyriaforanextended
periodoftime.ItisarguedthatAsad’sregimeinSyriaactsinasystemofthreeinterlocking
orbits-Alawi,SyrianandArab(Zisser).TheAlawiorbitwouldbetheinternalcore;the
SyrianorbitwouldbetheoutershellandtheAraborbitwouldbeitssoulsupportingthe
authority(Zisser).TheSyrianregime,composedofthesepertinentlevels,hadbecomea
personallycontrolledregimethroughthesuccessionofroleswithintheAsadfamilyand
Asad’stribalaffiliations.Asadmirroredhisregimestructureandfunctioningtothatofthe
SovietUnionlookinguptocommunistregimerulerslikeNicolaeCeausescuandKimIl
Sung.Syria’sregimehadnowbecometheproductoftheAlawi’srisefrom“humblestatusof
aminoritytopre-eminence”(Zisser).Asad’sregimedependedonthesectariansupportof
theAlawis.Asad’sregimewasalsodeeplyrootedintheSyriancomponentthatstemmed
fromtheBa’athrevolutionin1963andtheneo-Ba’threvolutionof1966,whichdrove
40
Baltes
hometheresultingsocio-economicandpoliticalorderofSyria.Alawidominanceandthe
Asadregimegrewinstrengthandsupportatthetimeastheotherminoritygroups
includingtheChristians,Druze,andIsmailibackeditinanefforttopreservetheirown
security.Asadrulesasadictatorappointingpeopleclosesttohimtothehighestmost
powerfulandauthoritativepositions.Likemostdictators,hedoeswhatneedstobedone
firstandforemosttomaintainhisleadershiprole.Itcanbearguedthatthetwostrongholds
thatnotonlyplacedAsadinapositionofpowerbutalsokepthimtherearehismilitary
connectionwiththearmyandtheBa’thpartywhichattractedmembersofprominentsocial
circles(Zisser).Overall,thelargeminoritynumberinSyria,aslongastheyremainin
supportofAsadandhisregime,anysortofuprisinglikewasseenwiththeIslamicRevoltof
1976-82,willbecrushed.
Sowhythen,despitehiscommunist,dictatorial,oppressiveways,wasAsad
successful?Oneanswerarguesthathegavetheconstituentsanswerstosomedegreewhile
givingthemagovernmentandsocietytoparticipateandbelong(Zisser).Finally,theArab
orbit.ThoughAsadwasyoung,inexperienced,andlackedconfidence,hisstrongideological
tiestoArabismiswhatprovidedhimandhisregimelegitimacyinnotonlytheeyesofhis
fellowSyrianpeople,buttheinternationalarenaandworldasawhole.Inregardstohis
repressiveregimesuccessandabilitytoholdontopowerforsolongandwithinhisfamily,
Asadhadcreatedtwoarmies.Ofthetwoarmies,“onewasmadeupofpraetorianguard
unitsrecruitedfromhiskinandsectthatdefendedtheregime,theothertheprofessional
armythatdefendedthecountry’sborders”(Hinnebusch).Furthermore,Hafizal-Assad’s
abilitytocreatefurtherlegitimacyinhisregimestemmedfromhisabilitytoidentifywhat
oneauthornamedDawishpointedoutasparty,army,bureaucracy,secretpolice
41
Baltes
(Hinnebusch).These“pillarsofpower”arewhatadominantpresidencyrestedonand
allowedtheleader’ssubordinationofandbalancingabovetheseinstitutionsasasolution
toinstability(Hinnebusch).WhatfurtherlegitimizedtheAsadregimewashisabilityto
turnSyriafromalosingplayertoasuccessfulplayerinthedisputeswithIsrael.This
changeingrowthandpowerallowedhimto“promoteahegemonicnationalistdiscourse
andturnSyriaintoakeyregionalpowerinstruggles”(Hinnebusch).
Asad’sregimecanbeviewedashavingtwomaincomponentsstructurally.First
therewastheformalsystemofgovernment.Thissideincludedanexecutiveand
legislature.TheformalstructurehadrootsintheSyrianConstitutionandtheBa’thparty.
Equallyasimportantistheinformalsystemofgovernmentthatcontains“theheadsofthe
securityservicesandseniormilitarycommanders”(Zisser).Thissideofthegovernmental
structureisexpectedto“ensurestabilityinthestateandprotectit”(Zisser).Thepartyand
theciviliangovernmentconstitutetheformalstructuralcomponentthoughthepartytakes
priorityinsocietyandpolitics.TheheadofthepartyisknownastheParty’sSecretaryGeneralandisheldandmaintainedbyHafizal-Asad.TheSyrianEliteunderAsadwasmade
upofpeoplefromhisownfamily,theAlawibarons,andmemberoftheSunnicommunityin
supportofhisfuturestate(Zisser).Althoughthereisastronglypersonalandsectarian
naturetotheSyrianRegimecreatedbyAsad,hehasgainedrespectandsupportwithinthe
bordersofSyrianandbeyondintheMiddleEastduetohispoliticalandsocialabilityto
establishafunctioningstateandthenmaintainitfarlongerthananyotherattempted
leaderororganization.
Asad’slegacyandregimedidnotcomewithouttrials.WhentheSovietUnion
appointedanewGeneralSecretary,MikhailGorbachev,Syriasawthisasanopportunityto
42
Baltes
increasetheirrelationsandfriendshipwiththecommunistcountry.Inthemeantime,they
hadtheirsitesfirstandforemostondefeatingIsrael.Theywerealsodedicatedtoridding
theMiddleEastofZionismespeciallyinLebanon,“anArabrejectionistfrontagainstthe
Israeli-Egyptian-Americanaxiswasnowestablished”(Zisser),andtheIslamicRevolthad
beensquashed.AsSyria’sconfidenceandstrengthgrew,theybegantoinvestfinanciallyin
improvingtheirmilitaryandweaponries.Thespendinghowever,wasnotlimited.They
begantoincurlargedebtsastheyplungeddeeperanddeeperintounnecessarysecurity
purchases.ThefocusonsecuritycausedneglectinotherrealmsofSyriansocietysuchas
health,education,andwaterssupply,leadingtoafailingsocietyoverall(Zisser).Theresult
ofthesepoorfinancialexpenditures;aneconomiccrisisin1985thatinturnledtothe
beginningofanti-regimesentimentandcriticism(Zisser).Syriagrewmoreandmore
erraticleadingtofurtherfalloutwiththewest,specificallytheUnitedStates.Somuchso
thattheUnitedStatesrefusedtohaveAsadtoWashingtonforhigh-levelmeetingswiththe
President.Syriafullofanti-AmericansentimentpairedwiththeAmericansupportofIsrael
continuedtocreatearockypathbetweenthetwopolaroppositecountries.Asadalso
playedadirectroleinhisdecliningpositionofpowerwithintheregimeascorruption
becameapparentandbroughttotheforefront.ItIarguedthatwhiletheeconomyandhis
peoplestruggledtosurvivefinanciallyhewasmakingdecisionsandactinginwaysto
improvethefinancialpositionsofthoseclosesttohim,andalreadywell-off.This
corruptionwasjustanotherfactorinhibitingthegrowthandprogressionofSyriansociety
andgovernment
IX.BASHARAL-ASAD’SRISETOPOWER 43
Baltes
UponAsad’sdeath,andBasil’s,Basharal-Asadtookpoweratjustage34.Hewas
studyingtobeaneyedoctorinLondonwhenhewascalledhomeafterthedeathofhis
brother(McHugo).Inhisinauguralspeech,Basharnotonlypraisedhisfatherforhis
achievements,buthealsocriticizedfailedSyrianinstitutionsandgovernmentpolicy
(McHugo).FurthermorehetouchedonthepopulartopicofregainingtheGolanHeightsin
exchangeforpeacewithIsrael.Hecalledforlesscorruption,moretransparency.
Surprisingly,andimportantinlaterunderstanding,Bashardiscusseddemocracy.Hespoke
aboutitwithreverenceandrespectwiththepossibilityofasimilargoalforSyria.Though
heacknowledgewhatadifficulttaskthiswouldbe,usingtimeandtalkasapossibleexcuse
shouldthepeoplenotsupportdemocraticreforms.TheDamascusSpringcameoutofthese
discussionsbutwasquicklycrushedwithgreatoppositionandafearofthelossofpower
forBashar.Itdidnottakelongforwordtospreadthatthepoliticalfreedomofthe
DamascusSpringwasactuallyjust“apublicrelationsexercisebytheauthoritiesandlittle
more”(McHugo).
TherisetopowerbyBasharal-AsadwasasuccessionmanySyriansfearedcould
overthrowtheirnewlyfoundstabilityunderHafiz,oncehepassed.Itwasunknown
whether“oppositionwouldmobilizeoncethefearedstrongmandepartedortheregime
evendisintegrateininternecinestruggle”(Hinnebusch).However,thetransferofpower
wasrathersmoothandsuccessful.Thiscouldpotentiallybeattributedtothefactthat
Basharrepresentedtothepeople’sdesireforbothcontinuityandchangethroughhis
abilitytocontinuewhathisfatherhadstartedanddonewhilestillbeingconsidereda
modernizer,helpinghimearnsupportfromtheyoungergenerations.Itmayappeartothe
outsideeyethatthisisareflectionofthesuccessfulinstitutionsthathadbeeninstilledin
44
Baltes
theonceunstablecountry,butaccordingtoauthorLesch,itshowsratherthat“theelites
cametogetherinaconsensus”(Hinnebusch).Withinthreeyearsofcomingtopower
Basharhadreinventedtopoliticalelite,“withaturnoverof60%intopoffices,via
retirement,therebytransferringpowertoanewgeneration”(Hinnebusch).Perhapspartof
Basharal-Asad’scrumblefrompowerintheeyesofthepeoplebeganwhenhebeganto
movehisideologiesandreformsawayfromBa’thistviewsandchoseamoreliberalizing
strategy.However,whilehemadethisriskymodification,hehadnoplanorpreparation
withwherehewouldgowithitandthereforehadtomakesurehischangesweregradual,
avoidinganysortofbacklashandinstability.Politically,Perthesarguesthat“Bashar’s
projectcanbeunderstoodas‘modernizingauthoritarianism’,makingthesystemwork
bettersothatitcouldsurviveanddeliverdevelopment”(Hinnebusch).Basharmadethe
acknowledgementthattheSyriansocietywasnotinaplacetoinstillawesterndemocracy.
Hisgoalswerefirstandforemostaimedatsocialandeconomicmodernizationandthen
followedwithdemocratization.
TounderstandtherolethatBasharal-Asadwasplacedin,onemustreflectonthe
majorhistoricaleventsthathaveledtothispoint.TheBritishandFrenchpartitioningof
Syria,acquisitionofcompleteSyrianindependence,unityandfalloutwithEgypt,constant
battleandturmoilwithIsraelasaresultofthepartitioningofPalestine,allofthesefactors
ontopofhisownfather’simprintonSyria(bothgoodandbad),arecomponentsofthe
societyandculturewithwhichBasharhasauthoritativelyinherited.Whathecandowith
thatwillnotonlybeachallengebutatest.
OnSeptember11,2001OsamabinLaden’sterroristsuicideteamcrashedairliners
intotheU.S.WorldTradeCenters.ThismarkedfurtherMiddleEasterninvolvementbythe
45
Baltes
U.S.inamoredirectwaythaneverbeforeasPresidentBushdeclared“waronterror”.The
terroristgroupthathadcarriedouttheattackswasknownasIslamistmilitantsofal-Qaida.
Syriasawthisasanopportunitytoamendrelationswiththewesterncountryandsoused
theirintelligenceservicestoprovideinformationtotheAmericangovernment.However,
Syriacouldnotdefinitivelycommittobeing“with”theUnitedStatesintheirMiddle
Easternbattles(McHugo).SyriaopposedtheU.S.invasionofIraqin2003becauseIraqwas
amainsourceofincomeforthecountry.Whileothercountriesdecreasedtheirtradeand
relationswithIraqpersupportoftheU.S.Syriafailedtodoso(McHugo).AsAmerican
troopsbegantolinethebordersofSyria,andDamascusbecameacenterforfleeing
citizens,SyriabegantoquestioniftheywerenextontheAmericanradar.Syriamadethe
poordecisionofallowingterroristinfiltrationacrossitsborders,leadingtheU.S.toidentify
themasterroristsponsors,andultimatelyfurtherdamagingwhatlittleprogresshadbeen
madebetweenthetwo.Inaddition,itwasasifSyriasawtheirrelationswiththewestand
theU.S.asirredeemablebecausetheychosetoalignthemselvesandallywiththeterrorist
groupHezbollah.HezbollahincessantlyattackedIsraelfurthercreatingadisparitybetween
thepro-ArabcountryofSyriaandthepro-westerncountryofAmerica.Whatlittleglimpse
ofpossiblepositivechangeinSyriangovernmentwasfeltinBashar’sinauguralspeechwas
nowwipedclean,asitwasclearhewouldfollowinhisfather’sfootsteps.Ashebecame
morecorruptbypowerandwealth,thoughhehadmanyfollowersandsupportersof
varioussectsthroughoutthecountry,Basharwasrapidlyincreasingthegapbetweenthe
wealthyandthepoor(McHugo).WhenBasharal-Asad’seconomicreformsbeganto
dwindleandbecomelesssuccessful,helookedelsewheretocontinuethelegitimizationof
hisregimeand“adoptedahardlinetowardIsraelamidsttheal-Aqsaintifadahandopposed
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theU.S.invasionofIraq;this,inarousingintenseAmericanhostility,souredthe
internationalenvironmentforhiseconomicreforms”(Hinnebusch).TheDamascusSpring,
aliberalizationmeasurethatwasseenaspositiveinregardstoBashar’sregime,werethen
tarnishedwhenhe“reassertedtheauthorityoftheoldregime,includingacrackdownin
2001onpoliticaldiscussiongroupsandtheimprisonmentofprodemocracymilitants”(St
John).Basharal-Asadhadquicklybeguntolosesupportandwasnowspiralingdownward.
HecontinuedtonosediveasheopenedtoIraq,andsupportedthePalestinianintifadaas
waspreviouslymentioned.Furthermore,hisinabilitytomakepeacewithIsraelprevents
SyriafromformingapositiverelationshipbetweenSyriaandtheUnitedStates.Inthe
process,“theIsraeli-Palestinianconflict,U.S.occupationofIraq,andconcernsthatthewar
onterrorismcouldtargetSyriaallreinforcetheintransigenceoftheoldguardinSyrian
politicsandbecomeapretextforobstructingchangeinbothexternalandinternalpolicies”
(StJohn).Asthecitizen’sdiscontentgrewoverthelackofchange,amajormovementinthe
MiddleEastsparkedthefirstoutcrytobeheardanddemandchange.Basharal-Asad
believedSyriawastoostabletohaveanuprisingunderhiswatchandcontrol,perhapsthat
iswhyherespondedwithsuchbrutalitywhentheArabSpringspreadtoSyria.
X.THEARABSPRING
TheArabSpringwasademocraticuprisingthatstartedinTunisiaandspread
amongagroupofMiddleEasterncountries.TheArabSpringwasaresultoffrustrationand
failurethroughouttheMiddleEast.TheArabSpringwasbornoutofa“broadsetofideas
andgrievancesthataremotivating”change(Jones).AsJonesstates,“theArabworld
underperformsallotherregionsoftheworldonvirtuallyallsocial,political,andeconomic
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indices,andhasdoneformanyyears”(Jones).Jonesthenidentifiedthreeimportantfactors
thatwouldincreasethelikelihoodoftheArabSpringspreadingtospecificcountriesand
destabilizingthem.Jonesidentifiesthesethreefactorsaspoverty,lackofeconomic
opportunity,andarepressiveanddislikedregime.Chillingly,thesethreethingsthroughout
thispaperhaveallbeenproventobepresentinSyria.Inaddition,thetechnologicaland
socialinnovationsfomoderntimeshasgiventhe“underemployed,educated,and
frustratedurbanyouththeabilitytocommunicateinrealtimeandtoorganizethemselves
viasocialmedia,revolutionalizingthecollectiveimaginationofwhatispossible”(Jones).
Ultimately,oneofthemainfactorsoftheArabSpringandgeneralinstabilityintheMiddle
Eastasawhole,andSyriaspecifically,comesfromtheinabilityforleadersandregimesto
establishlegitimacy.
AuthorMcHugostatesthat“whattheywantedwashumanrights,democracyand
jobs:threedemandswhichtheysummedupwiththeoneword‘dignity’”(McHugo).The
ArabSpringfirstspreadtoplaceslikeEgypt,Libya,Bahrain,andYemenbeforefinally
reachingSyria.ThisoutbreakofdemocraticcrieswastheeventthatfinallybrokeSyriainto
acivilwar,somethingithadbeenonthevergeoffornearlyitswholehistory.Perhapsit
canbearguedthatitwasavoidablehadviolencenotbeenseenasthesolutionbythe
regime.Unfortunately,thisisnotthecase,anditwasratherinevitable.ItallstartedinSyria
inasoutherntowncalledDer’awhereagroupofyoungschoolchildrenhadbegunwriting
“freedom”andaslogancallingforthefalloftheregime,asgraffitiontheirschoolwalls.
Thismostlikelycamefrominfluencebothwithintheirownhouseholdsofhearingtheir
parent’svoicedopinionsaswellasinsocietyandthemedialearningabouttheotherArab
countrieswhohadcarriedoutsimilarevents.Thechildren,ranginginagefrom9-15,were
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arrestedandtakentoDamascusforinterrogationandtorture(McHugo).Afterpleasfor
releasebythefamilieswereignored,demonstrationbrokeoutcallingforthechildren’s
releaseinDer’a.Thesecurityforcesshowedtheirinsensitivitytobrutalitywhentheyshot
fourpeopledeadatthesedemonstrations.Thisonlyfueledthedemonstratorsandthe
peopleofSyria,increasingtheprotestorturnout.Dar’a’sinvolvementquicklybecame“a
rallyingcryacrossthecountryforwhatbeganasaruralandprovincialdrivenuprising”
(CNN).Theprotestorsbeganattackinggovernmentofficesandbuildingsandthesecurity
forcesbeganattackinghospitalsandinnocents’aswellaslocalBa’thpartyheadquarters.
On23March,thesecurityforcesraidedamosquewhichhadbecomeatemporaryhospital
totreatthosenowbeinginjuredintheongoingdisturbancesandonthisday,15people
werereportedkilledandhundredsinjured(McHugo).Inanattempttopreservehis
authorityandpower,Basharblameditallonaforeignconspiracy(McHugo).Hefurther
claimedthat“stabilityinSyriadependedonits[hisregime]stayinginpower”(Olmert).Yet,
thegovernmentbrutalityagainstprotestorsdidnotletupandthebattlebetweenSyrian
citizensandtheSyriangovernmenthadescalatedintoalloutchaosandcivilwar.Itquickly
spiraledintoamoresectarianbattleasitbecameevidentthatBasharal-Asad’sregime,
Alawite,hadcommittedtheatrociousmassacres.
XI.ANALYSISRESULTS
Todayitishighlydebatedwhathasledtothegruesomeoutbreakofviolenceand
civilwarintheMiddleEastasawholeandSyriaspecifically.Onecountrybelievesand
arguesitisthecolonialandimperialmockrulethattookplacebywesternstates
historically.AsaresultSyriahasneverbeenabletoriditselfofhostilefeelingsfrom
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unwantedintervention.OthersarguethatitisaresultofthebadbloodfromtheSixDays
WarbetweenSyriaandIsraelbecauseIsraelwasultimatelya“friend”oftheU.S,increasing
anti-westernviewsinanalreadystronglypro-Arabregionandcountry.Themostpopularly
arguedreasonfortheSyrianstrugglesandwararethesectariandifferencesandvast
varietyofdifferinggroups.ThelatteristhemostcommonchoiceofblamefromtheUnited
States.Yetstilltheargumentstemstosocioeconomicdivergence.
WhatthesewesternandEuropeancountriesontheoutsidelookinginoften
misunderstand,isthattheSyrianCivilWarisnottheresultofonepointedfinger.Meaning,
theSyriaweseeandexperiencetodayisaSyriashapedandmoldedbyallofthese
influencesandfactorsdeeplyrootedinhistoricalsignificance.TheFrenchMandates,
FrenchandBritishintervention,Israeli-SyrianWar,Syrian-Egyptianunity,andsectarian
dividesallplayaroleintheinstabilityinbothSyriansocietyandgovernment.Theyhave
builtontopofeachother,oneinfluencingtheother,intertwiningthemselvesasintricately
asthehistorytheyresidein.Theinabilityofaleaderorgrouptomaintainpowerand
createanenvironmentsuitableforprogressionhasledtoshort-livedtermsofpowerand
extensivehandoffsofauthoritybetweenmanydifferentpeople.Thesecomponentslaidthe
groundworkforwhatismoremodernlytheAsadRegime.Aleaderwhoprovidedsome
degreeofcontinuityforaperiodoftimecouldbeconsideredthemostsuccessfulSyrian
ruler,securingthepositionofpowertoremaininhisfamily.Assuccessorshaverisenup,
theyinevitablyfollowsuitintheirideologiesandpoliticalpolicies,leadingthemtonever
quiteimpactSyriapositivelyonalong-termscale,normakethechangesordifferences
necessarytosocietyandgovernmentasawhole.
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TheAsadRegimewasmerelyasheetofhopecastoveralandofdeeplyrooted,
extensiveissues.Theseissueshavenevertrulybeenaddressedinalegitimatewayof
findingasolution,ratherafaçadetoalleviatethehereandnow.Literatureemphasizesthe
goalsofmostleaders,especiallythosebasedondictatorialideologies,tendtohaveonegoal
ontheirmind;power.Moreimportantly,theironegoalismaintainingthatpower.TheAsad
familyisnodifferent.Theyhavedonewhattheycanandwanttoinsuretheirroles,
finances,andpowerneverescapetheirgrasp.Asaresult,theunderlyinghistoricaltensions
havealwaysmanagedtofindawaytorisebackup,sendingSyriaspiralingbackdowninto
itsquicksandofabrokensocietalsystem.Thecivilwar,isnotonlyproductofthese
unsolvedbrokenlinkages,butisalsothecurrentstateoffailureweareexperiencingin
modernSyriatoday.
Syria’sstrengthinideologycontributestoalevelofstubbornnessinfixingitsissues.
UnfortunatelytheimageofoutsidehelphasbeensotaintedbypastinteractionsthatSyria
willnotevenconsidertheideaofpeacefulinterventionbyanotherstate.Thefirsttopicthat
shouldbeaddressedisSyriaanditsinternationalrelations.Uponimprovementinthis
realm,Syriacouldpotentiallybemoreopentoassistanceandaidfromthecountriesitso
deeplyloathes,butcouldhelp.ForexamplemendingtheirrelationshipwiththeUnited
Stateswouldnotonlyhelpthisdirectrelationshipbutwouldalsorequirethecomingtoa
jointagreementonthetopicofIsrael,therebyfindingasolutiontotwoprominent
impactfuleventsthathadonceshapedtheminnegativeways,potentiallypavingtheway
foranowpositiveoutcome.SupportfromacountryliketheU.S.wouldallowSyriato
receiveforeignaid,butwouldalsoimprovetheiroverallimageinternationally.TheUnited
Statesistrustedandwell-likedasaretheirfriendsandallies.Manycountriesrightnow
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fearattachingthemselvesinanywaytoSyriasosomesortofpeacefulnegotiationsand
approvalscouldimmediatelyimprovetheirsituation.
Thoughhistorycanneverbeforgotten,andshouldneverbeforgotten,Syria’sbest
interestslieinathird-partyintervention.Startingthere,gettingthecountryonitsfeet,and
mentoringthemtoaplacepromotingprogressionisastrongandaggressivewayto
“attack”theissuesinSyria.Aslongastheycontinuetorageon,theproblemsgrowand
begintospreadbeyondthebordersofthisMiddleEasterncountryaswaspreviously
mentionedasaconsequenceinmanyaspects.Outsideassistancemayalsobeableto
implementamoresuccessfulandflourishingeconomicprogram.Asanotheroneofthe
downfallsinSyria,thewealthytopooreconomicgap(andgrowing),stabilizingthe
economythroughmeansotherthanasocialistsystem,aswashadinthepast,wouldmean
decreasingthisdisparity.Howeverthistacticpresentsachallengeofitsown.Syriahas
alludedto“involvingIsraelinafull-scaledwarifattackedeitherbytheUnitedStates,
NATP,orTurkey”(Olmert).IncapableofattackingIsraelinanimpactfulway,itismorethe
SyrianallyHezbollah,andthemeanstoattainchemicalwarheads,thattheU.S.isskeptical
aboutupsetting.
XII.CONSEQUENCES
TheimpactoftheSyriancivilwarhasbeenwidespread.Ithasshakenthestateof
Lebanon,areligiouslydiversenationthatisonthebrinkofitsownimbalanceinits
sectariandivisionsaswellasthosewhosupportandopposePresidentBasharal-Asad.
MuchofthisstemsfromtheborderingcountryandSyriaanditscivilwar,offshootingand
effectingcountrieslikeLebanon.Tomanyresearcherssurprisethough,theeffectsithas
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hadonLebanonarelessnegativethanothersurroundingcountries.Themerchandise
importsandexportsaswellasserviceexportshadremainedratherstableduringthecivil
war.ThelossofSyriangoodstocompeteinthemarkethasopenedfurtheravenuesfor
Lebanontotakeadvantageofandfinanciallyboosttheirowneconomy.
Stemmingfromtheeconomicimpactisthequestionofregionalresourcessuchas
oil.Simply,priceswillfluctuateduetouncertainty,butisthatall?Regionalunrestand
majorevents,suchastheArabSpring,couldpotentiallycauseoilpricestoskyrocket.While
theGulfStatestendtobemorestableandcanworktostabilizeoilpriceslongterm,thereis
stillthepossibilityofsporadicshorttermsharpincreasesinthepriceofoilastheMiddle
Eastistheoilcapitaloftheworld.
AnotherconsequenceoftheSyriancivilwaristheeconomicdownturnofSyria.
Syria,notthestrongesttradingnationintheMiddleEast,hascreatedsuchbadblood
betweennotonlythemselvesbutalsofellowMiddleEasterncountriesandespecially
westerncountries.ThishascausedmanynationstorestricttradewithSyriaorcuttrade
tiesoffaltogether.Intermsofdomesticeconomythecivilwarhasdestroyedinfrastructure,
preventedchildrenfromgoingtoschool,closedfactories,anddeterredoverallinvestments
andtrade(Cal).Citizensarefacinghighlevelsofunemploymentat57percent,whilein
2013Syria’sGDPdroppedastaggering20.6percent,andin2014theeconomywasso
disruptednoformulacouldevenproduceaccuratestatistics(GlobalEnvision).According
totheEuropeanCouncilonForeignRelations,theSyrianHDIhasfallenbacktowhereit
was38yearsago,meaningthattodaytheaverageSyrianhasthesamelifeexpectancy,
educationandemploymentprospectsasin1977(GlobalEnvision).Inalookatthefuture,if
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thewarweretoend,theUnitedNationsanticipatesthedamagewillbesimilartosome
nationsafterWWII,taking40-50yearstofullyrecover(GlobalEnvision).
SyrianexpertJosefOlmertalsoemphasizesthedemographicchanges,whichareto
beexpectedasaconsequenceoftheSyriancivilwar.InLebanon,“theircivilwarand
aftermathbroughtabouttwoverydistinctchanges,thefirstwasthedramaticweakeningof
theChristianpopulationofthecountry,mostlytheMaronites,butalsootherChristian
sects,andthesecond,wasthebraindrain,asmanywholeftbelongedtothemoreeducated
andskilledelementsofthepopulation”(Olmert).Hegoesontofurtherclaimthiscanbethe
demographicoutcomeweshouldexpectto,sadly,seeinSyria.TheviolenceinSyriahas
alsoshiftedtowardsanethno-sectarianbattle,whichhasprompted,theKurdish
communitytomobilizetoprotectitself(Lawson).The“ethno-sectarianizationofthecivil
war,alongwiththepoliticalmobilizationofalmostallofSyria’sminoritycommunities,has
promptedmembersoftheseethnicandreligiousminoritieswhoresideinneighboring
countriestointervenedirectlyintheconflict”(Lawson).Thegreatestofthesetypesof
involvementcamethroughtheLebaneseShi’ImovementthePartyofGod,knownmore
typicallyasHezbollah.Thisiswherewebegintoseethemosttragicconsequenceofthe
Syriancivilwar,refugeemovements.Muchoftherefugeemovementhasdramatically
increasedinnumbersrecently,astheinstabilitythathasbeenfurtherperpetuatedbythe
civilwarhasopenedthedoorforterroriststolocateandcreateastrongholdinthecountry.
OneoftheseterroristorganizationswhomareactiveinSyriaisISIS.
OneofthemosttragicconsequencesistherefugeemovementfromSyriatonearby
MiddleEasterncountriesinanefforttoattainpeace,security,andanoverallbetterquality
oflife.Whatwasoncelessthan58,000“asylumseekers”inAprilof2015hasdramatically
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risentocloseto89,000inJune(Heisbourg).InJunetherewasnearly190,000Syrian
refugees.FromJanuarytoSeptember2015,75%ofrefugeeswereseekingshelterinGreece
fromTurkey(Heisbourg)and70%ofthesewerenearlyallSyrian.Thismassexodusof
peoplehasconsequenceshowever,forthecountriesthatareapartoftheEUtheyare
arrivingin.Notonlydoesitcreatetensions,overcrowding,lossofjobsforcurrentcitizens,
anddrainfinancestosustaintheabruptlyspikedpopulationnumbersetc.Butitalsobrings
asecuritydynamictoplay,especiallyasitbecomesmoreevidentthattheserefugeegroups
arenowbeinginfiltratedbyterroristgroupssuchasISIS,seekingtousethemasatacticto
employterroristactivityintheopencountries.Overalltheabilitytohouseandprotectthe
displacedmigrantsinthenewcountriesisstrainingthesecountriesbecauseoflimited
numbersofresources.Thisdisplacementis“causinganenormoushumanitariancrisiswith
implicationsforhostcountries,internationalaidagencies,and,ofcourse,forthosewhose
liveshavebeenforeverchanged”(Kirisci&Ferris).ThecivilwarinSyriahasalsohadthe
effectofforcingneighboringcountries’leadersintheMiddleEasttoeitherbackBasharalAsadortheSyrianopposition,whattheychoosecanpotentiallyhavetopowertocreate
moreinstabilityandinternationalhostilityinanalreadyfragileregion.
ThecontinuedviolenceandcivilwarinSyria,whichappearstohavenoimminent
end,provides“noprospectfortheirearlyreturnhome”(Heisbourg).Asrefugeesare
increasing,moreandmorecountriesarealsochoosingtoclosetheirdoorsforamultitude
ofvariousreasons.ItwasstatedbySlovakianleaderJaroslawKaczynskithat,“InSlovakia,
wedon’thavemosques,weonlywanttochoosetheChristians”(Heisbourg).Manyregional
concernshaveshiftedinjustafewshortyears.Onemainregionalconcernregardingthe
Syriancivilwaroutbreakwouldbeto“avoidlarge-scalerefugeeflows”(Heisbourg).A
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secondimportanttopicworthaddressingtomanyregionalcountrieswouldbethe
eliminationofISISaswellasprovidingthenon-JihadicomponentoftheSyrianrebellion
withtheabilitytoresistRussianandIranianoperationsinsupportofAsadwhilestill
pursuinghisremovalthroughpoliticalmeasures(Heisbourg).Mostliteratureonthetopic
ofrefugeemovementsassertsitasaconsequenceofcivilwar.Itisinterestingtonotethatit
hasalsobeenarguedtobeapossiblecauseofcivilwar.Onearticleoninternational
organizationsnotes,“thatinternationalmigrationingeneral,andrefugeemigrationin
particular,canhaveimportantsecurityconsequences,whichsuggeststhatrefugeeflows
andpopulationmovementscanspurthespreadofconflictbothbetweenandwithinstate”
(Salehyan&Gleditsch).
XIII.CONCLUSION
ItiseasytofallvictimtothebeliefthatthesolutiontotheSyrianCivilWarissimple
andstraightforward.Itiseasytobelievefixingoneminordetailwillputthecountryasa
wholebackonitsfeet.TheSyrianCivilWarisaresultofmorethanjustcorruptionand
sectariandivisionasismostregularlydepictedinwesternpolitics.Itistheproductofa
longlineofhistoricaleventsthatstartedbyimplantingaseed,andcontinuedtogrowon
eachother,eachonestirringupbadfeelings.TheSyrianCivilWarisanoutbreakofinternal
violencebasedonthehistoricaleventsofFrenchandBritishcolonialrule,French
mandates,Israeli-Syrianwar,EgyptianandSyrianunification,sectariandivisions,andthe
AsadRegime.Allofthesefactorscreatedanenvironmentofpoliticaldistrust,instability,
turmoil,chaos,andultimatelyviolenceaswenowseetoday.Moresimplyput,itisthe
productofaconglomerateofhistoricalimperfections.Althoughtherearemany
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consequencesofthecivilwar,somethathaveyettoevenoccur,oneofthemosttragicis
therefugeemovementtheworldisexperiencingtoday.Nowraisedasamoral,ethical,and
civilissue,therefugeemovementhasbecomeasourceofgreatdebateanddiscomfortin
theinternationalarena.Thequestionofwhatisrightandwhatiswrongisattheforefront
asmanycountriesintervenetodowhattheycan,butevenmorestayquietinavoidance.As
theworldcontinuestosearchforasolution,Ibelievetheanswerliesintheunderstanding
thatthecivilwaristheresultofnotjustoneindividualevent,asisoftenargued
internationally,butratheraconglomerateofdeeplyintertwinedhistoricalmoments.
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