Public Affairs Qualification Course
Doctrinal Foundations of Public Affairs
Doctrinal Foundations of Public Affairs
"One of the serious problems in planning the
fight against American doctrine is that the
Americans do not read their manuals, nor do
they feel any obligation to follow their doctrine..."
- From a Soviet junior lieutenant's notebook
(date unknown).
Assuming this is a true statement — it dates
from at least the early 1980s — it is likely that
you will find this to be true even today. We often
fail to follow our own doctrine, and public affairs is no
exception.
To be an effective PAO, to be viewed as credible in
your command, and to have the opportunity to impact
your command’s public communication effort you need
to be aware of public affairs doctrine and how it was
created and evolved.
Photo courtesy of usarmy.vo.llnwd.net
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Doctrinal Foundations of Public Affairs
History
DOD Public Affairs From Vietnam to Present
World War II became the first war the American
people could see in pictures and video footage.
Because cameras were still big and bulky, most of
the images and footage were filmed by the Army and
used in reports designed to boost morale at home.
“War journalists in those days mostly saw themselves
as a part of the war effort, and happily kept in line
with military policy” – eBlogger, Linn.
Up until the 1960s, many military members were
of a generation that only knew of the media that
supported the military through positive affirmation.
The Vietnam War was viewed as an aberration in
military-press relations (Terry, p. 24-25).
“Independent journalists roamed free in Vietnam,
reporting back on a war that was much harder to sell
back home” (eBlogger, Linn).
The Vietnam War produced both a high point and
a low point in the relationship between the military
and the media. The high point for reporters and
news organizations was that no censorship was ever
imposed (Odd Couple, p. 40; Venable, p. 67).
Journalists were free to cover whatever they wished,
subject to the availability of military operations and
transportation. Their copy, photographs and footage
went out unimpeded by any security review (Odd
Couple, p. 40).
Hal Buell, who ran The Associated Press photo
service for 23 years, said the Vietnam War was
a turning point for war photographers like Eddie
Adams.
“No war was ever photographed the way Vietnam was,
and no war will ever be photographed again the way
Vietnam was photographed,” he says. There was no
censorship. All a photographer had to do, said Buell,
“is convince a helicopter pilot to let him get on board a
chopper going out to a battle scene. So photographers
had incredible access, which you don’t get anymore”
(Adler).
The low point came when some members of the military
blamed the press coverage for the loss of the war (Odd
Couple, p. 40; Venable, p. 67).
“Vietnam has been called the ‘first TV war,’ a test of
the American public’s tolerance for battle brought into
its living rooms. Journalists were allowed practically
unrestricted access, accompanying units and freely
filing stories, photographs, and film. The idea that
reporters opposed to the war used this freedom to
publish negative stories that contributed significantly
to the final defeat quickly became standard; it was
espoused by Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard
Nixon, as well as by the U.S. commander in Vietnam
from 1964 to 1968, General William Westmoreland”
(Porch).
There were few restrictions on the media related to
access to geographical areas, but restrictions at the
source, through withheld and inaccurate information,
soured the press.
Press coverage was generally favorable until the Tet
offensive of 1968. That dramatic campaign blasted
the credibility of claims by the White House and
Westmoreland that the United States and South
Vietnam were on the threshold of victory. The critical
tone adopted by the press thereafter confirmed the
widespread view held by the public before the Tet
offensive that the prospects for success were in fact
doubtful. Arguably, then, the press did not create public
skepticism but simply reflected public concern about
casualties and the lack of tangible progress. Certainly,
neither the White House nor the military was honest
with the press. Official briefings in Saigon, dismissed by
the press as the ‘Five o’Clock Follies,’ were remarkably
uninformative, when not deceptive (Porch).
Pulitzer Prize winning photo Vietnamese Brig. Gen. Nguyen Ngoc
Loan executing a Viet Cong suspect. Saigon, 1968. Photo by
Eddie Adams/AP
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History (continued)
Sidle Commission and Operation Urgent Fury
In 1983 President Ronald Reagan ordered an
invasion of Grenada to rescue American medical
students who were believed to be in danger in a
Marxist takeover of the government there (Odd
Couple, p. 17).
independently from the operators and were rarely
familiar with details of the plan for military action (Odd
Couple, p. 44).
The White House, concerned that any leaks could
cost the lives of troops or bring harm to the students,
ordered the military commanders to exclude
journalists during the critical first two days of the
conflict (Odd Couple, p. 17).
“Arguably, this restriction stemmed from ill feelings
toward press involvement in Vietnam and the belief
that the press coverage and opinions caused the
public to protest the war” (Kumar Singh, p. 41). By
the time of Grenada, there was an entire generation
of military officers who did not think “public affairs.”
More felt they had more to lose than to gain by
interacting with the press (Odd Couple, p. 44).
A medic applies a band-aid to the leg of a Grenadian child during
Operation URGENT FURY, Nov. 3, 1983 (U.S. Air Force photo by
Tech. Sgt. Mike Creen).
The U.S. commander in Grenada, Adm. Joseph
Metcalf, said the restrictive policy of the press ban
had been counter-productive because the American
public was denied the full appreciation that "in both
a military and strategic sense all objectives were
realized" (Terry, p. 12).
Commanders considered only the operational
aspects of the deployment, excluding public affairs
personnel from the planning even more than was
normally the case because of pre-invasion secrecy
imposed by the White House (Odd Couple, p. 44).
Public affairs officers conducted their planning
Members of the media document the activities taking place at the
airport during Operation URGENT FURY, Nov. 18, 1983 (U.S. Navy
photo by Chief Petty Officer Gary Miller).
“Following Urgent Fury, the press strongly protested
the ban. To help reconcile military-media relations, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair General John W. Vessey Jr.
convened a panel of military officers and journalists
to examine the situation and determine guidelines for
future coverage. Known as the Sidle Panel, named for
its leader, Maj. Gen. Winant Sidle, its recommendations
were the basis for the Department of Defense National
Media Pool. Among the panel’s recommendations
were that public affairs planning be conducted with
operational planning” (Kumar Singh, p. 41).
The Sidle commission recommended — and the
Pentagon established, with the help of professional
news organizations such as the American Society
of Newspaper Editors — the Department of Defense
National Media Pool (Odd Couple, p. 18). The media
pool was composed of small groups of journalists
who were allowed into battle zones, and then the pool
shared its reporting with its colleagues. The media pool
details are covered in a subsequent lecture later in the
course.
Ironically, this proved to be counterproductive to
improved PA planning by military commanders. Many
in the military had the impression the media pool would
smooth relations with the press, negating the need for
military commanders to become more involved in the
PA process than they had before (Odd Couple, p. 44).
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History (continued)
Hoffman Report and Operation Just Cause
In the 1980s, there were numerous Department of
Defense directives prescribing military responsibilities
for supporting the news media. Events in Panama
in 1989 continued the evolution of PA support to
operational commanders.
Then-Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega sought
and was given by the Panamanian legislature the title
of chief executive officer of the government on Dec.
15, 1989. The Noriega-led assembly declared that a
state of war with the United States existed. The next
day Panamanian soldiers fired upon four unarmed
U.S. military members dressed in civilian clothes
and killed a Marine officer (U.S. Invasion of Panama;
Odd Couple, p. 18, pp. 44-45). On Dec. 20, 1989,
President George H.W. Bush ordered the Panama
invasion plan, known as Operation Just Cause.
Noriega surrendered to the U.S. military on January
3, 1990.
critical phase of the conflict was over (Odd Couple, p.
44).
Flames engulf a building following the outbreak of hostilities between
the Panamanian Defense Force and U.S. forces during Operation
Just Cause, Dec. 21, 1989 (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Morland).
Prior to the 1990s, the prevailing view among military
personnel was that relations with news media should
be handled only by assigned public affairs personnel.
Other service members became involved only when
the public affairs officers requested they do so; to them,
dealing with the news media was the purview of public
affairs personnel (Odd Couple, p. 43).
The media pool, created by the Sidle commission,
was tested for the first time in Panama. But instead
of facilitating their access to the military action,
reporters were sequestered during the first few days
of Operation Just Cause.
DOD PA leadership requested an analysis of the news
media aspects of the Panama conflict and provided
recommendations. The study was led by former
Associated Press Pentagon correspondent Fred
Hoffman. The Hoffman Report made three significant
recommendations (Hoffman).
In this undated file photo, members of the U.S. Navy's Seal Team
4 participate in Operation Just Cause in Panama. (U.S. Navy file
photo)
● The Secretary of Defense should require all
operational commanders to support the National Media
Pool.
The media pool, created by the Sidle commission,
was tested for the first time in Panama. But instead
of facilitating their access to the military action,
reporters were sequestered during the first few days
of Operation Just Cause.
The media pool was deployed without involvement
of local military commanders whose support was
necessary for reporters to operate in-country. As
in Grenada, members of the press were only able
to cover the later stages of the operation, after the
● Combatant commanders should be responsible for a
PA plan in support of operations.
● Commanders would not use safety concerns to
prevent media from covering combat operations (Odd
Couple, p. 194- 195).
Then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Colin Powell stressed the importance of planning
and support for news media coverage. The text of
his guidance is in Odd Couple, Appendix III. This is
assigned reading for this class.
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History (continued)
Operation Desert Shield and Kuwait
When Iraq unleashed its sneak attack on Kuwait
in August 1990, no one in the American military or
media had given prior thought to covering the type of
war that was to evolve there (Odd Couple, p. 45).
Media pools and a system of restraints imposed by U.S.
military officials limited the news networks’ ability to
cover the war despite new technologies that created the
potential for live coverage. News organization leaders
voiced strong criticism of the military's treatment of the
media.
This resulted in these organizations and the Pentagon
developing the DOD Principles for News Media
Coverage of DOD operations, which was published
in April 1992. This document simply highlighted
concepts and procedures that had been in other DOD
documents for many years, but it emphasized to
military commanders the importance of their personal
involvement in planning for news coverage of combat
operations (Odd Couple, p. 45).
U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook helicopters takeoff on a mission during
Operation Desert Shield, June 17, 1992 (U.S. Army photo by Spc.
Henryc).
Many military members blamed the media coverage
for the loss in Vietnam. Those attitudes lingered
on and prevailed through the Gulf War. Because
of those lingering attitudes, the military restricted
the media’s coverage of the war. On the eve of
Operation Desert Storm, the Pentagon announced
new guidelines that required journalists to participate
in pools, exclude restricted information from their
articles and broadcasts, and submit their reports to
military officials for security review.
Read the principles in Appendix IV, p. 197 in “The Odd
Couple.” More details of the principles will be covered
in a subsequent class later in the course.
The Persian Gulf War was heavily televised, and for
the first time people all over the world were able to
watch live pictures of missiles hitting their targets and
fighter jets taking off from aircraft carriers. Yet in all
this reporting about war, TV provided an extremely
limited view of the fighting. The Defense Department
supplied most of the video of the air war.
U.S. Marines deploy concertina wire to prevent infiltration of their
encampment during Operation Desert Shield, June 17, 1992 (U.S.
Marine Corps photo by Staff Sgt. J. R. Ruark)
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History (continued)
Lessons Learned: Somalia, Haiti and Iraq
There were few, if any, complaints from the news
media about their treatment by the military in
Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, 1994, or
Operation United Shield in Somalia, which ended in
1995 with the extraction of United Nations forces.
Senior military commanders were personally involved
in the media planning for these operations (Odd
Couple, p. 45).
Pfc. Micheal Tognacci from the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized),
secures the street during an early morning raid on July 11, 2003, in
Amiriyah, Iraq, during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The unit’s mission in
post-war Iraq was to carry out such searches for illegal weapons and
other criminal activity. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Derek Gaines).
● Transparency (accountability) was the best guarantor
that problems would be fixed quickly.
A Haitian man blows a kiss to an American soldier while she tries
to keep a crowd of cheering Haitians from interfering with the
weapons seizure operation during Uphold Democracy in Portau-Prince, Haiti, Oct. 14, 1994. Blaine was with the 55th Military
Police Company. (U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Kyle Davis.)
An embedded journalist refers to those news
reporters who are attached to military units that
are involved in armed conflicts. A large-scale
embed process resulted from planning for the 2003
beginning of the Iraq War (Embed PAG, para 2a).
Then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made
clear that “communications would be a top priority
should hostilities occur not as a public relations
imperative but as a military one. The essence
of the communication plan is to flood the zone
with information… information dominance.” The
communications plan was nearly as exhaustive as
the war plan, and its centerpiece was the embedding
of journalists with military units on a scale never seen
before (Clarke, p. 54-55).
There were three essential facts that supported the
embedding strategy (Clarke, p. 57):
● There was a good story to tell, and media coverage
of it would be the best antidote to Saddam Hussein's
propaganda.
● The only way to maintain credibility was to own up to
mistakes quickly.
"I think that as a principle, given our Constitution and
the way our free system works, that it's always helpful,
generally almost always helpful, to have the press
there to see things and be able to report and comment
and provide information about what's taking place"
(Rumsfeld, as quoted in Clarke, p. 57). You’ll learn
more about embeds in a future lecture in the course.
Having barely scratched the surface of the history of
DOD public affairs, this brings us to today. Tensions
remain in military-media relations, but they can be
healthy. DOD public affairs is charged with educating
and informing its public audiences while respecting
operations security and privacy; independent media is
called to report news. Where there is conflict, it is up to
respective professionals to carry out their role.
Joint doctrine increasingly emphasizes the
operational role public affairs has in fulfilling its
requirements. According to JP 3-61 (2010), p. I-2,
para. 2.a: “Information in the public domain impacts the
operational environment.”
Media reporting continues to strive for independence
while identifying and reporting legitimate news. See
the Stars and Stripes Ombudsman letter from March
2, 2012, found in your reading, which advocates for its
independence from military influence.
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Doctrinal Foundations of Public Affairs
Mission
Now that you have the background of how DOD
public affairs has evolved since the Vietnam War,
let’s look at the doctrinal mission of DOD public
affairs.
Define the overall mission of DOD public affairs
The mission of joint PA is to plan, coordinate and
synchronize U.S. military public information activities
and resources for two main objectives: support the
commander’s intent and support the commander’s
concept of operations.
planning process and be prepared to respond.
Well-planned public affairs support should be
incorporated into every phase of operations.
Regardless of the type or scope of military operations,
public affairs should facilitate making accurate and
timely information available to the public (JP 3-61, p. ix).
● Support the commander's concept of operations
JP 1-02 defines “support the commander’s concept
of operations” as a verbal or graphic statement that
clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force
commander intends to accomplish and how it will be
done using available resources ( p. 68).
The public affairs officer advises the joint forces
commander on the implications of command decisions,
actions, and operations on foreign and domestic
public perceptions and plans, executes, and evaluates
public affairs activities and events to support overall
operational success.
U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond T. Odierno testifies before
the House Armed Services Committee during the Army posture
hearing Feb. 17, 2012, in Washington, D.C. (U.S. Army photo by
Staff Sgt. Teddy Wade).
Public affairs is also responsible, in conjunction with
information operations, for generating the information
requirements to assess the public perceptions of foreign
audiences and integrating that information into mission
planning.
● Support the commander's intent
This is a clear and concise expression of the
purpose of the operation and the desired military
end state that supports the mission command. It
provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and
supporting commanders to achieve the commander’s
desired results without further orders, even when the
operation does not unfold as planned (JP 1-02, p.
62).
The term mission command in the above definition
is a relatively new term that means "a way of doing
business." Specifically, mission command is the
conduct of military operations through decentralized
execution based upon mission-type orders (JP 1-02,
p. 207).
Photo courtesy of www.pacaf.af.mil
Commanders and staffs at all levels should anticipate
external interest in operations as part of the normal
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Functions
Now that you know the mission of DOD public
affairs and have the appropriate historical context,
we can look into specific PA functions.
Three Primary PA Functions
Public affairs has three basic functions: public
information, command information and community
engagement, as outlined in JP 3-61 (p. III-1).
● Public Information
Public information is that information of a military
nature, and the dissemination of that information
is consistent with security and the DOD principles.
Military public information is still largely a
matter of coordinating media relations. While
telecommunications technology continues to provide
new public information opportunities, military public
information is still largely a matter of ensuring media
have access to information they need to report on
military operations.
Media relations activities are designed to provide
information to the domestic and international
publics. Commanders and their PA staffs should
conduct briefings, issue statements, conduct
interviews, respond to queries and arrange for
access to operational units. They also need to
provide appropriate equipment, transportation and
communication support to the media. Plans should
include specific provisions for each phase of the
operation and, as appropriate, the inclusion of media
on deploying aircraft, ships and with deploying units
(JP 3-61, p. III-1).
During a commercial break of "Fox & Friends," U.S. Army
Spc. Aaron Ellerman, a public affairs specialist with the 143rd
Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), discusses the show's
camera angles with Jaime Ball, a production manager for the Fox
News Channel, during a 15th Anniversary celebration, in The
Villages, Fla., Sept. 19, 2011. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. John
Carkeet IV).
Doctrinal Foundations of Public Affairs
● Command Information
Command information is communication by a military
organization directed to the internal audience to help
them understand the goals of the organization, its role
in joint operations, as well as significant developments
affecting them. Base and organizational publications
are traditional ways of reaching these groups (JP 3-61,
p. III-1).
The public affairs mission involves informing the various
internal audiences about the participation of military
forces. Full coverage is particularly important for the
participating forces, those military personnel and civilian
employees who remain behind, and all family members
(JP 3-61, p. x).
During a joint operation, commanders should consider
all dissemination capabilities available, particularly the
Internet, to communicate details about the operations
and the role of the joint force. When military families
are kept informed, affected service members may be
more focused on the mission, particularly when forward
deployed (JP 3-61, p. III-1).
● Community Engagement
Community engagement is the process of working
collaboratively with, and through, groups of people
affiliated by geographic proximity or special interest
to enhance the understanding and support for military
operations.
During a joint operation, any number of personnel
may be involved in activities that engage the
community, including but not limited to, PA, civil
affairs, military information support operations,
military health specialists, lawyers and engineers. All
community engagement activities should support the
overall civil-military operations plan. Senior military
leaders have responsibilities to engage key leaders
in their operational areas, including those from
other government agencies and nongovernmental
organizations. PA assists in identifying key leaders and
recommending opportunities for military engagement
(JP 3-61, p. III-1).
Public affairs professionals work with people affiliated
by geographic proximity or special interest to enhance
the understanding and support for military operations.
PA and information operations activities directly support
military objectives, counter adversary disinformation
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Functions (continued)
and deter adversary actions. Although both public
affairs and information operations require planning,
message development and media analysis, the
efforts differ with respect to audience, scope and intent,
and must remain separate (JP 3-61, p. xi).
U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Felicia Welch, with a Mobile Public Affairs Advisory Team
(MPAAT), trains Afghanistan National Police noncommissioned officer Nazir Ahmed about
how to use different angles when shooting video at the 606th Police Headquarters in Herat,
Afghanistan, Sept. 28, 2011. The MPAAT helped Afghanistan security forces public affairs
personnel become more productive communicators. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman
Tyler Placie).
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Functions (continued)
Publics
Closely related to the three functions of public affairs
(public information, command information and
community engagement) is the concept and use of
publics. Publics are communities of people, whether
or not they are organized as groups, that have a
direct or indirect association with an organization.
JP 3-61 discusses broad descriptions of audiences
or publics of which public affairs practitioners should
be aware (p. I-8). The following are abbreviated
descriptions:
● American Public
Commanders have an obligation to inform the
American public about its nation’s military. This
communication enhances morale and readiness
and increases public trust and support. Through
active engagement, the military demonstrates it is
a community partner and a responsible steward of
national resources.
● International
Current information technology allows information
and imagery to be available worldwide. International
interest in military operations may be just as high,
and sometimes higher, than U.S. media interest,
especially in military operations conducted overseas.
DOD, in coordination with the Department of
State and host partner nations, should keep the
international community informed about U.S. military
operations and activities within the constraints of
operation security.
● Internal
Command information programs are the primary
means commanders use to communicate with
military members, retirees, DOD civilian employees,
contractors and their family members.
● Adversaries
adversary actions. It is critical that PA and information
operations synchronize their communications efforts
with respect to the adversary due to the fluidity of the
information environment.
Broad descriptions are good to initially segment PA's
focus of effort in supporting a commander; however,
public affairs practitioners must discard notions about
"the general public" (Broom, p. 201).
A public is any group whose members have a common
interest or common values in a particular situation
(Guth & Marsh, p. 88). It is for this reason that
broad characterizations are insufficient for effective
communication. Sociographic and demographic
variables such as age, education and income, naturally
segment society into very large groups.
According to your textbook, Effective Public Relations,
the concept of a general or mass public holds little,
if any, value in public affairs when you also consider
different ethnic, racial, religious, geographic, political,
occupational, social and special-interest groupings.
Effective programs communicate and build relationships
with specifically defined "target publics." Specific
definitions and detailed information about intended
audiences of messages enable program planners to
(p. 201):
● measure public opinion
● establish program objectives
● develop meaningful message and action strategies
● select media to deliver messages selectively and
effectively
● and determine whether the program worked
The subsequent classes in communication planning will
further explore how to specify an intended audience.
PA distributes timely, truthful, and accurate
information regarding U.S. intentions and actions
to adversary audiences to counter misinformation,
disinformation and propaganda and to deter
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Doctrinal Foundations of Public Affairs
Roles
Complicating a joint force commander's ability to
provide accurate information to internal and external
audiences is the tempo of military operations,
operations security concerns and the number and
variety of other information sources competing for
the attention of the populace. This is done all while
keeping pace with the media and other sources as
they release their perspective on usually sensational
and emotional events (JP 3-61 p. I-1).
In order to support mission objectives, the following
are roles of PAOs and their staffs:
Provide Trusted Counsel to Leaders
This core competency includes anticipating and
advising commanders on the possible impact of
military operations and activities within the public
information realm. This also includes preparing
commanders to communicate with audiences through
the media and other methods of communication, as
well as analyzing and interpreting the information
environment, monitoring domestic and foreign public
understanding, and providing lessons learned from
the past (JP 3-61, p. I-4).
Enhance Morale and Readiness
PA activities enable military personnel and their
family members to better understand their roles by
explaining how policies, programs, and operations
affect them. Uncertainty and concern regarding living
conditions in the operational area and at home, the
duration of separation, the potential for lack of daily
communications between family members, and many
other factors impact morale and readiness at home
and within the unit. PA activities can help alleviate
some of these issues (JP 3-61, p. I-5, 6).
● PA activities can also counter adversary
propaganda efforts and address incomplete or
misinformed media reports, thus reducing the stress
and uncertainty felt by service members and their
families.
● Additionally, as media interest expands to include
“human interest stories,” military personnel and family
members can expect the media to cover the impact
of military operations on their lives and livelihood,
to include their daily activities. Family members,
including spouses and children, may be approached for
interviews. This will have a direct and indirect impact
on morale.
● PA’s ability to assist service members and their
families in understanding how to deal with the media
and to assist in providing relevant and responsive
information on topical issues requires planning
and resources and should be incorporated into the
command’s planning efforts.
Foster Public Trust and Support
Effective PA supports a strong national defense by
building public trust and understanding for the military’s
contribution to national security. PA gives the American
public the information needed to understand military
roles and missions. This understanding is critical
to sustaining American public support for military
operations (JP 3-61, p. I-6).
Create Global Understanding
Commanders should employ PA in concert with other
information capabilities to develop and implement
communication strategies that inform audiences about
the impact of U.S. military operations. Making these
audiences aware of U.S. military capabilities and U.S.
resolve to employ them can enhance support from allies
and friendly countries (JP 3-61, p. I-6); this is a unique
skill-set public affairs professionals bring to the table.
Support Command Strategy
The synchronization of actions, images, and words
leads to the successful execution of command
strategy. PA can provide a continuous flow of credible,
reliable, timely, and accurate information and imagery
to internal and external audiences. This capability
allows PA to help deter efforts to diminish national will,
degrade morale, and turn world opinion against friendly
operations (JP 3-61, p. I-6).
● PA must be engaged in operational planning, have
access to open source reports and relevant intelligence,
understand common adversary propaganda techniques,
and be very aggressive in anticipating adversary
propaganda—putting accurate information out first so
that friendly forces gain the initiative and remain the
preferred source of information.
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Doctrinal Foundations of Public Affairs
Roles (continued)
● Gaining and maintaining the information initiative in
a conflict can help discredit and undermine adversary
propaganda.
● The first side that presents the information sets the
context and frames the public debate.
● It is extremely important to get accurate information
and imagery out first—even information that portrays
DOD in a negative manner. This helps disarm the
adversary’s propaganda and defeats attempts by
the adversary to use these mistakes against friendly
forces.
● Credibility must be maintained. PA professionals
require the knowledge, skills, resources, capabilities,
and authority to rapidly release information, in
accordance with DOD policy and guidance, to various
publics to effectively support the command strategy.
Deter Adversaries
The credible threat of counteraction is a deterrent to
adversary action. PA assists combatant commanders
in planning deterrence efforts and disseminates
information and imagery to convey to the adversary
possible countermeasures, potentially avoiding the
need to use force (JP 3-61, p. I-6).
● PA works to clearly communicate U.S. military goals
and objectives, what we expect the adversary to do to
satisfy international concerns, why the U.S. concern
is important, and what the U.S. intends to do if the
adversary refuses to comply. Additionally, adversary
propaganda frequently targets the resolve of the
American public.
● PA’s counterpropaganda efforts are aimed at
informing the American public of this threat and
affirming its trust in and resolve with the armed forces.
PA activities may involve highlighting the military’s
deployment preparations, activities, and force projection
to show the domestic, multinational, and adversary
public what the commander is actually doing to prepare
for conflict.
● When adversaries are not deterred from conflict,
information about U.S. capabilities and resolve may
still shape the adversary’s planning and actions in a
manner beneficial to the U.S.
Photo courtesy of www.navyreserve.com
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Doctrinal Foundations of Public Affairs
Comparisons
It is not an accident that the military public
communication field is called public affairs, not public
relations. The reasoning goes back to the 1913
Gillett Amendment (Broom, p. 16). It stipulates that
federal agencies cannot spend money for “publicity
or propaganda purposes designed to support or
defeat legislation pending before the Congress.”
The amendment also says that if a federal agency
requests to spend money for publicity, it must be
specifically authorized by Congress.
Civilian public relations, on the other hand, is the
management function that establishes and maintains
mutually beneficial relationships between an
organization and the publics on whom its success or
failure depends (Broom).
The following is a summary of civilian public relations
specialties:
Publicity
Information from an outside source that is used by
the media because the information has news value. It
is an uncontrolled method of placing messages in the
media because the source does not pay the media
for placement (EPR, p. 11).
Advertising
Information placed in the media by an identified
sponsor that pays for the time or space. It is a
controlled method of placing messages in the media
(EPR, p. 13).
*Note the distinction between controlled and
uncontrolled above.
Press agentry
Creates newsworthy stories and events to attract
media attention and to gain public notice (EPR, p.
15).
Public affairs (civilian)
Is a specialized part of public relations that builds
and maintains governmental and local stakeholder
relations to influence public policy (EPR, p. 17).
Issues management
The proactive process of anticipating, identifying,
evaluating and responding to public policy issues that
affect organizations’ relationships with their publics
(EPR, p. 20).
Lobbying
A specialized part of public relations that builds and
maintains relationships with government primarily for
the purpose of influencing legislation and regulation
(EPR, p. 18).
Investor relations
A specialized part of corporate public relations that
builds and maintains mutually beneficial relationships
with shareholders and others in the financial community
to maximize market value (EPR, p. 21).
Internal relations
The specialized part of public relations that builds
and maintains mutually beneficial relationships
between managers and the employees on whom the
organization’s success depends (EPR, p. 10).
Similarities
Outlined in your textbook Effective Public Relations are
many similarities between PA and PR (note: list not allinclusive). Both public affairs and public relations:
● Conduct planned & sustained programs
● Counsel management on new policies, procedures
and actions mutually beneficial to the organization and
its publics
● Deal with relationships between organizations and its
publics
● Engage in publicity
● Engage in community relations
● Adjust policies, procedures and actions found to be in
conflict with public interest and organizational survival
● Monitor opinions, attitudes and behaviors inside and
outside the organization
● Produce specific changes in awareness, opinions,
attitudes and behaviors inside and outside the
organization
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Comparisons (continued)
Differences
The fundamental differences that exist are based
on the very nature of working for the military, as
opposed to a profit-motivated industry or even a
private, non-profit organization.
The military has an obligation to keep the American
people informed and limits its ability to restrict the
distribution of information only in those cases of
national security, operational security, and in those
situations where other federal laws and regulations
apply (DOD Principles of Information).
Photo courtesy of usarmy.vo.llnwd.net
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Conclusion
Now you have a baseline of PA's roles and functions.
You should have a sense for how some of what we
do today is based on significant historical events
and have an idea of what your counterparts in the
private sector will be working on as you move forward
to learn more about the PA profession. With this
knowledge and background you will be better able to
help your command and your service communicate.
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References and Additional Resources
Air Force Instruction 35-101 (2005), Public Affairs Policies and Procedures.
Army Regulation 360-1 (2000).
Aukofer, F., & Lawrence, W. (1995). America’s Team - The Odd Couple: A Report on the Relationship Between
the Media and the Military. Nashville, TN: The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center
Broom, G. (2009). Effective Public Relations (10th ed.) Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall
Clarke, T. (2006). Lipstick on a Pig: Winning in the No-Spin Ear by Someone Who Knows the Game. New York:
Free Press (Simon & Schuster).
Commandant Instruction M5728.2D (2008), Coast Guard Public Affairs.
Field Manual 46-1-1 (2000), Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.
Gulf War. Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desert_Shield_and_Storm#Highway_of_Death
Hoffman, F. (1989). Review of Panama Pool Deployment (Hoffman Report).
Joint Publication 1-02 (as amended through 2011) Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms
Joint Publication 3-61 (2010). Public Affairs
Marine Corps War Fighting Publication 3-33.3 (2010), Marine Corps Public Affairs.
Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) on Embedding Media During Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). SECDEF WASHINGTON DC 101900Z FEB 03.
Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5720.44C (2010), Navy Public Affairs Policy and Regulation.
U.S. Invasion of Panama (2000, Dec.). Armed Conflict Events Database. Retrieved from http://www.onwar.com/
aced/data/papa/panamaus1989.htm
U.S. Navy Public Affairs Tactics Manual (2011)
Venable, B. (2002). The Army and the Media. Military Review, January-February
Terry, J. (1997). Press Access to Combatant Operations in the Post-Peacekeeping Era. Military Law Review 154
Guth, D. & Marsh, C. (2012). Public Relations: A Values-Driven Approach. (5th ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
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