Helen Coburn Ryan
[1239893]
2013
Fugitives and Filibusters: The Origins of
the Sapodilla Cayes Sovereignty Dispute
This dissertation is submitted as part of a MA degree in Geopolitics, Territory
and Security at King’s College London.
1
For my family
2
Abstract: In
the nineteenth century Great Britain claimed the Sapodilla Cayes in the Bay of
Honduras as part of the colony of British Honduras. In 1873, the Honduran military sailed to
one of these islands and arrested two men, sparking an as-yet unresolved sovereignty dispute
over the islands. How can this be explained? The two countries had a long history of both
conflict and cooperation, resulting in a treaty regarding the sovereignty of several islands in the
Bay in 1859. It is possible that the conflict over the Sapodilla Cayes is a product of some
confusion or ambiguity in the states’ formal relationship. However, it is also possible that the
dispute was the result of local, not national political forces. This paper attempts to explain the
initial conflict through an examination of historic and immediate political circumstances which
shaped the two states’ positions in the Bay of Honduras.
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Table of Contents
Dedication……………………………………………………………………………..1
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………..2
List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………3
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………....4
Britain and Great Power Politics in Central America, 1638-1862…………………..11
The Anglo-Spanish Rivalry: Economic and Military Competition ……………………...11
The Anglo-American Rivalry: Territorial Annexation and Transoceanic Travel………....13
Central American Politics……………………………………………………………17
Filibustering: The Creation of Myths, Symbols and Allegiances…………………….....17
The Internal Affairs of the Republic of Honduras…………………………………....20
The Bay of Honduras, May-August, 1873…………………………………………..23
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………...30
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………35
Appendix…………………………………………………………………………….39
List of Figures
Figure One: Part of A Chart of the Bay of Honduras, &c…………………………………………….4
Figure Two: Part of A Map of part of Yucatan, or of that part of the Eastern Shore within the Bay of
Honduras allotted to Great Britain for the cutting of logwood, in consequence of the Convention signed
with Spain on the 14th July, 1786. By a Bay-man. [Inset: Map of Mosquitia or the Mosquito Shore…7
Figure Three: Part of A Chart of the Bay of Honduras, &c…………………………………………..19
Figure Four: Part of The Bay of Honduras. By Thos. Jefferys, Geographer to His Majesty, London.
Corrected and improved in 1800……………………………………………………………………….26
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In 1873 Honduran officials on board the sloop Mobile arrested two men off the coast of
Nicholas Bay in the Bay of Honduras. The two men, Luis Elias and Magín Serra, fled the
Honduran port of Omoa to escape growing political tension in the town.
The Honduran
government was facing a number of internal and external crises which had immediate
consequences for the state’s littoral. The incident is significant because Great Britain claimed
sovereignty over the island as part of the Sapodilla Cayes and the arrests sparked a dispute over
that archipelago (Figure 1).Though the Sapodilla Cayes conflict has remained unresolved for one
hundred and forty years relatively little has been written on the topic, or on the events
surrounding the original incident.
Figure 1, part of (Purdy and Allen, 1825)
One of the few pieces on the dispute is an article by Tim Hudson and J. Burr (1986). On
the topic of the initial incursion, Hudson and Burr remain relatively vague. The work is an
overview of the dispute and, while it does mention crisis in the Bay of Honduras, this is not its
focus. Instead, the authors describe the evolution of the conflict. The British claimed the Cayes
as part of British Honduras. This colony, now Belize, was subject to other territorial disputes. In
5
particular, Hudson and Burr draw particular attention to this dispute’s relationship to the larger,
more intense conflict with Guatemala. They also mention Honduran ‘irredentist’ claims that the
Sapodillas are part of the Bay Islands. The Islands were ceded to Honduras by Britain in 1859,
though the Cayes relationship to them at that time is far from clear. It would seem that this
argument was first asserted after 1873.
There is a near-comparable dearth of information on the Honduran crisis of 1873.
Honduras is one of the least researched parts of Central America, particularly its history prior to
the influx of North American fruit companies in the early twentieth century (Euraque, 1996). As
a consequence, there is still a great deal to learn about its historical relationships to Central
America and to Great Britain. Very little is written about the events of the summer of 1873.
Wayne Clegern devoted five pages to them in his book on British Honduras (Clegern, 1967, pp.
54-59). In it he summarized the break-down of law and order in the Bay. Honduras was the
‘sick man of Central America’ (Clegern, 1967, p. 174 n56). The Liberal and Conservative
parties had been fighting to control all of the Central American Republics and this struggle
became violent after 1871. The incursion into the Sapodilla Cayes took place in the middle of
what was essentially a collapse of internal order in Honduras. In the port of Omoa, this collapse
resulted in riots during which the British Consulate was attacked and its flag desecrated. The
British responded by bombarding the town until its Comandante, General Ricardo Streber,
apologized. Streber had initially ordered the arrests in Sapodilla as well, so there are numerous
connections to be uncovered between British and Honduran elites in the Bay of Honduras.
Questions therefore remain on the subject of the 1873 incursion. The Republic of
Honduras challenged Great Britain’s authority over the islands. How and why did this happen?
The two states had a pre-existing agreement regarding some islands in the Bay but this was
clearly insufficient to prevent this conflict. This paper is concerned with the disparity between
formal power relationships and the politics of the day which led to the dispute. While there is
not a great deal of existing literature on the dispute itself, there is a wealth of information on
related, broader subjects which help inform this specific discussion. These subjects include the
geopolitical debates regarding the significance of island sovereignty disputes, as well as
historical analysis of nineteenth century Central American politics. Through a study of these
works in addition to the available primary documents, an evaluation of the origins of Sapodilla
Cayes dispute can be made.
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Discussions of island sovereignty disputes often focus on the status of conflicts today. In
these instances, geopolitical and legal experts tend to use the histories of disputes to explain
contemporary circumstances (Smith and Thomas, 1998). In modern geopolitics, islands can
have a substantial impact on maritime boundary delimitations, the grant of concessions to
explore for natural resources, and military strategy. Yet there can also be more symbolic and
political aspects to these disputes (Till, 1996). Some states use them as theaters in which they
vent historical grievances, and galvanize public support. Such disputes are often discussed as the
product of national trends in political thought and inter-state rivalries, but they can be equally
indicative of sub-national and local political forces. As they are sites of both practical and
ideological conflict, it is unsurprising that the nature and intensity of these disputes can evolve
over time. To understand what forces were at work in creating the Sapodilla Cayes conflict, it is
consequently important to have a firm conception of nineteenth century politics.
Much of the literature on Central American politics can be categorized by the political
participants. For instance, there is a great deal written on Britain’s rivalries with Spain and the
United States. This is essential to understanding Britain’s historical position in the Bay of
Honduras (Naylor, 1989). Great Britain did not expand very far into Central America. Instead,
its bases were on the eastern littoral, in present day Belize, along the Mosquito Coast of
Nicaragua and Honduras, and the Bay Islands (Figure 2). William Sorsby argued that the threat
of British expansion, in particular from the Mosquito Shore, informed Spain’s determination to
push Britain out of eastern Central America (Sorsby, 1969). Troy Floyd on the other hand,
emphasized the relative isolation of this part of the isthmus (Floyd, 1967). The British initially
settled in the extreme southern portion of the Yucatan peninsula and gradually spread down into
Mosquito. These areas were never under direct Spanish control, a fact which made the processes
of nation-building and political centralization difficult for the Central American states after
independence (Dozier, 1985).
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Figure 2, part of (Faden, 1787)
The Anglo-American rivalry dominated Central American politics in the second half of
the nineteenth century and often had repercussions for other states. The United States’ primary
concern was transcontinental travel, an ambition which eventually led to the construction of the
Panama Canal (Humphreys, 1961). Much like Spain, America was strongly against Britain’s
perceived attempts to formally colonize any part of Central America. There is a debate among
academics regarding Britain’s intentions in the region (Naylor, 1989). Britain’s interest in the
Mosquito Shore and Bay Islands waned after it lost thirteen of its North American colonies in
1783 but was revived some fifty years later. This renewed attention seemed to point to imperial
8
ambitions, at least according to the American officials in Central America (Dozier, 1985).
Sorsby argued that Britain had indeed wanted to annex parts of Honduras and Nicaragua in the
late eighteenth century, so this was not a new charged laid against the British Empire (Sorsby,
1969). However, authors such as David Waddell and Robert Smith also point out the imperfect
nature of the information on which both the U.S. and Britain had to rely to make policy decisions
(Waddell, 1985; Smith, 1985). Both states believed the other intended to seize exclusive control
over territory in Central America, giving jurisdiction over all proposed transoceanic
transportation routes to one state and denying the other entirely. In this context, Britain’s
aggressive imperialist policies can be seen as a kind of defensive maneuvering. For instance,
tension between the two escalated in the mid-nineteenth century due to Britain’s control over the
mouth of the San Juan River in Nicaragua, the terminus of a proposed canal. Once both sides
committed to shared responsibility for any canal projects in the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty the
tension eased (Dobson, 1973). Canals and railroads are only tangentially related to the dispute
over the Cayes, but the relationship that the Treaty engendered between the United States and
Great Britain is directly relevant to Britain’s position in the Bay of Honduras. Furthermore,
these treaties are a potential means of explaining the causes of the dispute.
While this research is invaluable to assessing the origins of the Sapodilla Cayes dispute, a
major issue with some of these secondary sources is their dated interpretation of the facts
(Kaimowitz, 1996). Many of the political issues of the day might be seen in a new light through
research today. A prime example of this is the change in historiography on the subject of
filibusters. One indirect way Americans attempted to influence political outcomes in Central
America to arm themselves and fight in other states’ wars, which became known as filibustering.
These campaigns quickly became an important part of Central America’s interactions with its
northern neighbors, and some of the men intent on destabilizing politics in the Bay of Honduras
in 1873 were declared filibusters by the government, so it is important to understand who these
mercenaries were and what they did. Much of the older work on this topic, for instance William
O. Scroggs’ book, Filibusters and Financiers (1969), is extremely sympathetic to the aims of the
American filibusters. First published in 1916, Scroggs’ book continues to be one of the most
cited works in English on this topic. Nevertheless, Scroggs’ assessment of the benefits of
filibustering and his antiquated views on race must be acknowledged and treated with caution.
Walker’s filibustering campaign has been the subject of a great deal of nationalist literature (Cea,
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1992). Other work emphasized the link between American filibustering and later, Cold War
interventions (Aguilar Piedra, 2005). While it is no doubt invaluable to understand this
continuity, it has the unfortunate effect from this paper’s perspective of de-emphasizing the
unique circumstances of the nineteenth century. Most recent scholarship has attempted to
present the phenomenon in a more balanced and nuanced manner (Brannstrom, 1995; Brown,
1980). America never denounced the filibusters, even if it never endorsed them either. The
campaigns, as Brown argued, were a way to indirectly pressure Central American governments.
Another area which has seen substantial revision is the literature on Central American
political parties. The history of the Liberals and Conservatives not just in Honduras but in
Central America as a whole is essential to contextualizing the breakdown of political discourse
which occurred in 1873. Traditionally, parties were seen as monolithic structures across the
isthmus (Waddell, 1957). This was possible because both the Liberal and Conservative parties
were formed and alternated power during the first years of independence, when all of Central
America was the Federal Republic of Central America. The two parties continued to govern
even after the federation broke apart into its constituent parts. In Honduras the parties’ names
changed but the essential divisions remained intact until the twentieth century (Leonard, 2011).
Recent scholarship has challenged this interpretation, largely due to more academics examining
the processes of economic change in the region (Kaimowitz, 1996). In particular, scholars have
challenged the idea that Central American political parties maintained a strict hierarchy, or
ideological rigidity (Arriola, 1993). In fact, recent scholarship has proven that politics were far
more fissured than older work allowed. For instance, there were local political and economic
networks which often superseded elites’ ties to their central governments (Brignoli, 1994). In
Honduras this meant politics at the periphery often took on characteristics distinct from those
found in the politics of the capital. While overall the trend may have been American support of
Liberals and British support of Conservatives, the lack of political cohesion in Honduras allowed
individuals to play significant roles in shaping events, alliances, and policies at the local levels
(Soluri, 2005). This means that in assessing politics in the Bay of Honduras, attention must be
paid to local as well as national circumstances.
There is therefore a great deal of scholarship from which to draw. This work can
contextualize and inform an interpretation of the primary sources which relate to the events of
1873. This paper relies on treaties and declarations, dating as far back as 1763 which outline
10
Britain’s formal relationship to its Central American neighbors in the Bay of Honduras. These
agreements were often meant to settle particular quarrels but nevertheless shaped relationships
long after these clashes had been resolved. In contrast to these formal, structured relationships
are the ones outlined in the official reports, correspondences, and depositions kept at the National
Archives at Kew Gardens, London, and filed under CO 123/153 and FO 39/35. They will be
cited in this paper as ‘Official Correspondences’ or ‘Signed Testimonies’. These documents
were written in 1873 by officials around the Bay of Honduras, like the Lieutenant Governor of
British Honduras, William Cairns, and the British Consuls in Central America. The dispatches
also contain copies of letters sent from the Guatemalan legate to London, P.R. Negrete, and the
sworn testimony of Manuel Cabral, who witnessed the arrests. Reliance on British sources is
problematic. Their authors represented the interests of the British Empire, which calls their
objectivity into question. While the point of the dispatches was to explain the dispute to the
Colonial Office, the sources’ inherent bias in favor of Britain means this paper must be viewed
as an explanation of the origins of the Sapodilla Cayes dispute from the perspective of the British
Colonial Office.
Very few American sources have been consulted. The U.S. Consul was ill for most of
the second half of 1873, but Consul A.C. Prindle did report on politics in the Bay earlier in the
year. Those consulted were taken from microfilm Roll 4, T334, held in the U.S. National
Archives in College Park, Maryland. In addition, there were the recollections of General
Ricardo Streber, which provides an interesting rebuttal to some of the claims put forward by the
English-speaking sources. In the late 1930s, the Geographic and Historic Society of Honduras
published General Streber’s serialized account of the events of the summer of 1873 (Streber,
1938-1940). Streber had been sent to restore order to the Bay area. In his essay, Streber went to
great lengths to exonerate himself, placing the blame for the lawlessness of the time on enemies
of the government, and on the British for aiding them. While the general was a central figure in
the Bay of Honduras at the time, his account must be treated with caution. In addition to being
published sixty five years after the fact, Streber had a clear reason to order the facts to suit his
narrative. Streber was criticized for the riots and subsequent shelling of Omoa, and his account
is a straightforward vindication of his actions at the time. His personal stake in assigning blame
means that this account cannot be taken at face value.
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This paper seeks to contextualize the first-hand accounts of the Honduran arrests in the
Cayes. The existing academic work will inform this interpretation by emphasizing a multiscalar
approach. Great power politics, inter-state rivalries, and local interests along the Bay will all be
examined to understand the origins of this dispute. The aim is to explain the political
circumstances which enabled a Honduran general to order arrests to be made in the Sapodilla
Cayes through the lens of mostly British officials at the time. To do this, this paper will first
examine Britain’s historical position in the Bay of Honduras and the treaties this position
engendered. After evaluating these formal relationships and their impact on the Sapodilla Cayes,
it will turn to explore Central American politics and the events of 1873 in greater detail. The
paper will end by evaluating each part’s relative weight in creating the conflict.
Britain and Great Power Politics in Central America, 1638-1862
British pirates and privateers had been using the extreme southern portion of the Yucatan
peninsula as a base for their illicit activities since the seventeenth century, eventually expanding
their commercial ventures to include logging dyewood (Floyd, 1967). From these settlements
along the Belize River, the settlers gradually pushed southward, setting up communities along
the Mosquito Coast and islands nearby. Spain claimed the entirety of the Americas but was
unable to sustain a sufficient presence in eastern Central America to drive the British away
permanently. Instead, the eastern littoral became a contested space, which saw violence flair up
whenever peace between the two empires broke down. Two common themes emerged, which
defined Britain’s relationship to the Spanish Empire in Central America, and which continued to
shape its position in the region after Spain’s hegemony collapsed.
The Anglo-Spanish Rivalry: Economic and Military Competition
The first issue to emerge was Britain’s economic position. Although the Belize
settlements maintained close trading and military connections to those in Mosquito, the two
communities developed distinct characteristics. The Belize settlements were primarily focused
on logging and trade (Floyd, 1967). This did not mean there was no violence in that area; the
loggers were often subject to attack from Spanish forces in northern Yucatan. However, the
Spanish Empire was largely situated in the western portions of the isthmus and integrated into
the Pacific trade networks, leaving the eastern littoral open to other kinds of exploitation. The
Belize settlers were granted rights of usufruct to log dyewood in 1763, which were eventually
expanded to allow the logging of mahogany (Mendoza, 1948). This lent their presence a veneer
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of legality (Naylor, 1989). When the Spanish left Central America, the British assumed legal
control over this area and had a stronger claim to it than any other part of the region. This
control over the Belize settlements the British eventually translated into a healthy trading system.
Throughout the second half of the seventeenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries,
mahogany propelled the growth of the Belize settlements. Commerce allowed the port of Belize
to become the only deep water port between Mexico and Panama, and an important link between
Central America and Europe (Weaver and Sabido, 1997). Exclusive control over this entrepot
allowed British merchants to establish connections with their Honduran, Guatemala, and
Nicaraguan colleagues (Floyd, 1967).
In the 1850s Central American states began serious efforts to build ports that could draw
trade away from Belize. The British remained important trading partners to some throughout the
entire nineteenth century, but a large number of Central Americans balked at the preponderance
of their economic power. This raises the second and more obvious theme. Britain had always
been suspected of harboring imperialist ambitions (Sorsby, 1969). One way the Empire
defended itself against this accusation while preserving its influence was to rule by proxy. The
British Mosquito Shore communities were not afforded legal protection. Rather, Britain
proclaimed the head of the largest indigenous group, the Miskito, ‘king’ and the Mosquito
Kingdom a protectorate of Great Britain (Naylor, 1989). Spain objected to this, and the settlers
had to rely on the British navy for protection against Spanish raids.
This alliance with the Miskito, and with another important, related tribe, the Sambo, was
arguably the most important factor in the successes and failures of these communities (Dawson,
1998). Throughout the eighteenth century, European politics was characterized by shifting
alliances between the great powers, and war (Szabo, 2008). This spilled over into their colonies,
as each state hoped that their enemies would become overstretched, expending too many
resources defending their peripheries to seriously compete in Europe. British settlers and their
Miskito and Sambo allies carried out attacks on Spanish outposts in the hinterland, and trafficked
contraband into and out of Spanish Central America (Naylor, 1989). For its part, the Spanish
were poorly equipped to contest the British presence with military force (Floyd, 1967). Spain
fought strenuously against Britain’s presence in Mosquito, not only because it viewed Britain’s
settlements as illegal occupation but because they were such effective centers of anti-Spanish
operations. Furthermore, the littoral was an obvious and exploitable weak spot in the Empire. In
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1779 Spain launched a major operation against the Belize logging settlements, capturing several
dozen men and holding them prisoner in Havana, Cuba (Karnes, 1961). Britain threatened a fullscale invasion through Honduras unless the men were freed and even sailed warships up to the
coast. Despite their tenacity in choosing to remain in Mosquito there was no concerted British
effort to colonize the region (Dawson, 1998). Spain may have been unable to drive the settlers
out entirely, but the British were unable to transform their toehold on the coast into anything
more substantial. The American Revolution had serious ramifications for Britain in Central
America. The war cost the Empire considerably, and by threatening to declare war, Spain finally
forced Britain to make concessions regarding the Mosquito Coast (Dobson, 1973). In 1786,
Britain agreed to evacuate the Mosquito Kingdom in exchange for the right to log dyewood and
mahogany around Belize (quoted in full in Sorsby, 1969, p325-329). Belize was more important
economically, and Britain was not in a position to continue fighting Spain through Mosquito.
The cost of remaining on the Coast would have been war with the Spanish Empire and the
potential loss of the Belize settlements (Floyd, 1967).
This protection of the logging trade was important because it demonstrated Britain’s
priorities. When it was possible, Britain took advantage of its connection with eastern Central
America to strike against Spain and expand its sphere of influence into the center of the isthmus.
When this became too costly, Britain forwent this advantage. Britain returned to the Mosquito
Coast in the early nineteenth century and found that relatively little had changed in the interim.
These eastern lowlands were, and remain, sparsely populated. Moreover, it is unsuitable for the
historic economic staples of Spanish Central America, raising livestock and mining silver
(Euraque, 1996). This increased the difficulty of persuading many people to settle in the region.
Little headway was made in bringing the Mosquito Coast under direct Spanish control even after
the British left. Furthermore, through the port of Belize and its trade networks, Britain retained
its influence in the Bay of Honduras (Naylor, 1989). In fact, Britain was the most important state
to Latin America’s struggle for independence apart from the nascent American countries and the
Iberian empires themselves (Dozier, 1985). While it would be inaccurate to suggest Britain was
in favor of any colony breaking away from any empire it was nevertheless the first to recognize
these new states, and its policy of free trade made it an important market for Central American
commodities (Waddell, 1985).
The Anglo-American Rivalry: Territorial Annexation and Transoceanic Travel
14
In the late nineteenth century the British Empire was reaching its global zenith but found
this hegemony to be challenged in the Americas (Szabo, 2008). In 1823 the United States had
issued the Monroe Doctrine, a declaration of policy towards Latin America (Monroe, 1823). In
it, the U.S. declared its intention to preserve the Americas’ independence, and allow no foreign
power to colonize or otherwise rule any part of Latin America. While the U.S. did not initially
take an active interest in its southern neighbors, circumstances changed in the mid-nineteenth
century (Naylor, 1960). This new American interest would lead directly to the treaties Britain
would sign with Honduras and other Central American states, supposedly clarifying its position
in the Bay of Honduras. How the states arrived at these treaties and why they did not simplify
political interaction is crucial to understanding the origins of the Sapodilla Cayes conflict.
First and foremost, Britain’s military potential once again became a central factor in its
relations to its American rival (Woodward, 1985). This was due to America’s territorial
expansion between 1823 and 1850. In particular, the discovery of gold in California in 1848
forced the government in Washington D.C. to take a more active interest in its neighbors to the
south and west. The drive to the Pacific created the need for a shorter, safer route west. It was a
product of the popular and powerful concept of ‘Manifest Destiny’ in which the United States
was deemed to be entitled to the breadth of the North American continent (Woodward, 1985).
The details of these are only relevant to this discussion insofar as they altered Great Britain’s
relationship to Central America. The U.S. attempted to both curb Britain’s influence in the
region and promote its own through both formal and informal channels (Naylor, 1989). It began
exploring the feasibility of building trans-isthmian railroads and canals and found its progress
blocked by Great Britain. Britain controlled what was considered best route across the
Americas, a canal connecting to the San Juan River in Nicaragua, through the revived Mosquito
Kingdom. Another potential route was through Honduras, and the American Consul negotiated a
treaty allowing the U.S. to build such a canal through Honduras to the Gulf of Fonseca in the
Pacific in 1849 (Dozier, 1985). Fearing this would destabilize the Mosquito Kingdom, the
British Consul ordered the navy to occupy El Tigre Island in the Gulf of Fonseca. The fleet was
quickly forced to back down, but the Honduran canal project failed as well. The two consuls had
both overstepped their official authority, forcing their central governments to intervene and
resolve the growing dispute peacefully (Naylor, 1960). Neither side wanted the other to gain
15
exclusive control over the proposed transit routes but the El Tigre Island incident convinced the
two states that a formal arrangement had to be reached.
It was done through the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850. The two states agreed to joint
responsibility for any canal project, to universal access of this hypothetical canal, and to refrain
from colonizing any territory in Latin America (Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 1850). The precise
meaning of this last clause was the subject of intense debate throughout the rest of the decade
(Hansard, 1856). Britain immediately secured a note of understanding in which both states
agreed that the Treaty did not apply to the Belize settlements, demonstrating the persistence of
two features of Britain’s involvement in Central America. As in its negotiations with the
Spanish Empire, Britain was quick to secure an explicit exception for the Belize settlements,
ensuring its continued presence in the Bay of Honduras and continuing its emphasis on economic
opportunity (Dozier, 1985).
Equally, for the Americans, like the Spanish one hundred years
earlier, a British presence in Honduras and Nicaragua implied the threat of territorial annexation.
Even as it supported trade and commerce throughout the Bay area, there remained significant
opposition to Britain’s presence. This is a way to explain that Britain was a threat to some and
an ally to others.
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty made plain America’s opposition to the expansion of
Britain’s sphere of influence on the isthmus. Further, the U.S sought to actively roll Britain back
whenever possible (Waddell, 1957). In the 1850s the British attempted to formally annex the
Bay Islands off the North Coast of Honduras, an act which worried the Americans as much as the
Hondurans. The Islands would be extremely important to any planned canal projects, due to
their geographic location. British settlers had periodically attempted to settle the Islands
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century, and though they had periodically been forced
to flee by the Spanish, no other state had ever established a significant presence there (Davidson,
1974). When the British proposed the Bay Islands become a full colony in 1853, the United
States viewed it as a violation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. They attempted to force Britain off
the Bay Islands through a treaty which was never ratified.
The British fulfilled the spirit of this treaty by concluding separate negotiations with the
Nicaraguans to cede control over the Mosquito Coast and the Hondurans over islands in the Bay
(Dozier, 1985). In 1859, Britain agreed to cede the Bay Islands and several other features to
Honduras. In exchange, the Empire was granted freedom of action in the Belize settlements
16
(Bay Islands Treaty, 1859). Hondurans would eventually claim that this treaty implicitly
included the Sapodilla Cayes, though they were not mentioned by name in the document. To be
included they would have to be considered part of another named archipelago. Despite the later
arguments over names, the Cayes continued to function as British territory between the treaty’s
implementation and 1873.
Most of the Sapodilla Cayes were, and remain, uninhabited, though their waters were
used extensively for fishing. They also fell within the maritime limits of the Belize settlements
claimed by Britain as early as 1836 (Grey, Official Correspondence, 23 November, 1836). That
year Britain formally declared its right to govern that territory, and clarified the boundaries of its
jurisdiction. Britain claimed all the waters up to the ‘meridian of easternmost part of Lighthouse
Reef’ (Grey, Official Correspondence, 23 November, 1836, p22). The Reef lies at
approximately 17°15'00" N 87°30'00" W, while the Cayes lie at approximately 16°08′46″N
88°16′52″W, well to the west of the declared boundary. As part of British Honduras, the
Sapodilla Cayes would be exempt from the promises and obligations Britain had made in the
1850s.
Confusion over the terms of these treaties is not sufficient explanation for why the
Hondurans sailed to the Nicholas Cay and arrested two men. Britain had developed a peculiar
position in the Bay of Honduras in the decades leading up to the Sapodilla Cayes incident. By
the end of 1862 it had gained one legitimate colony at the expense of its stake in Mosquitia and
the Bay Islands. While it continued to play an important role in the economy of the Bay of
Honduras, Britain was viewed with suspicion by other powers. Spain and the United States were
primarily concerned with preventing Great Britain’s expansion into mainland Central America.
Britain was willing to forgo the possibility of annexation in return for the recognition of the
Belize settlements, but through its actions against Spain and the U.S., it had gained a reputation
as an opportunistic power. Britain’s desire to continue trading through Belize and the other
states’ apprehension over its possible territorial ambitions shaped Britain’s relationship to
Central America. This relationship was formalized in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and the 1859
treaty with Honduras. These documents do not seem to explicitly support Honduras’ claims to
the Sapodilla Cayes. However, the treaties do explain some of the ambiguity in Britain’s
position in the Bay of Honduras. Britain had been constrained by these treaties, and it had
accepted states’ objections to additional territorial annexation. Britain’s actions show a trend of
17
accepting a restriction on its direct and political influence in exchange for recognition of its
rights over British Honduras. Rolling Britain back was a priority for the U.S. and the Central
American republics. It was not, however a universal goal. There were groups along the Bay that
maintained close connections to the British. While these points may explain why Britain was
vulnerable in Central America, it does not explain why the dispute over the Sapodilla Cayes
began in 1873, or why the Hondurans entered into those waters. These questions cannot be
answered without examining the Central American republics.
Central American Politics
The discussion so far has focused on the diplomatic aspects of the Anglo-American
rivalry, without much thought to how this affected the people of Central America. However,
treaties were not the only product of these states’ maneuverings in the region. In fact, the two
great powers attempted to exert influence over Latin America through a variety of formal and
informal channels. The internal politics of the five Central American republics could not be
ignored, even if significant decisions could be made without their input. The treaties Great
Britain concluded with the United States and Honduras may have shaped its own internal
policies and attitudes towards the region, but other events would have an important impact on
how Central American states viewed and acted towards Britain. Britain may have been only
tangentially involved in some of these events; others would be the result of sustained interaction
between the Empire and the Central American republics. They would all have direct
consequences for Britain in the Bay of Honduras in 1873.
Filibustering: The Creation of Myths, Symbols and Allegiances
Perhaps the most infamous way a foreign power attempted to gain control over
independent Central America was through filibustering. Filibusters, or freebooters, are irregular
soldiers who engage in military action on foreign soil without the consent of their home
government (May, 2002). Though the term has been used to describe mercenaries since the
nineteenth century, the best known filibusters were those operating in Latin America before the
American Civil War. The majority of these men were American citizens, though a few were
impoverished French aristocrats and exiled Latin Americans (Brown, 1980). Individuals joined
the filibustering campaigns for any number of reasons, but these expeditions tended to have
common aims. In brief, antebellum American filibusters were inclined to be pro-slavery, and
imperialists (Schoonover, 1991). How they came to have an effect on Central America is best
18
illustrated by the exploits of William Walker, whose Nicaraguan campaign would create a lasting
impression in the collective memory of Central Americans. Walker was born in Tennessee, a
slave-holding state, and moved to California at the start of the gold rush (Rosengarten, 1976).
His position towards Central America is illustrated by his justification for his first expedition to
Baja California, which Walker claimed was a campaign to rescue America’s frontier ‘from the
cruelties of savage war’ committed by marauding Apache Indians (Walker, 1971, p. 21).
Citizens of the United States were barred by law from fighting against states at peace with the
U.S., and America had committed itself to the ideals of the Monroe Doctrine, so this idea did not
receive official support. Nevertheless, Walker was able to organize expeditions to Baja
California before turning to Nicaragua in 1854.
Nicaragua was in the middle of a civil war between the Liberal or Democratic Party, and
the Conservatives, or Legitimists (Karnes, 1961). The Liberals invited Walker to assist them in
their fight against the Conservatives. To get around the United States’ neutrality laws, Walker
called his company of sixty mercenaries ‘colonists’, who were immediately granted the right to
bear arms in defense of the Liberal regime upon reaching Nicaragua in early 1855 (Brown,
1980). By October Walker had defeated the Conservatives and was in effective control of the
country. Initially, he ruled through a puppet regime but declared himself President after rigging
an election the following year. In the meantime, Walker legalized slavery in Nicaragua, and
attempted to seize control of the Accessory Transit Company, owned by the American railroad
tycoon, Cornelius Vanderbilt (Bancroft, 1887). This turned American investors away from
Walker’s regime, and gave new support to his enemies in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Honduras
(May, 2002). Costa Rica and Honduras attacked Nicaragua simultaneously, and were later
joined by Guatemalan and Salvadorian forces, which surrounded Walker’s troops in December,
1856. Walker surrendered to the U.S. Navy in May, 1857 and was repatriated, only to be caught
attempting to return to Nicaragua six months later.
The war against Walker’s regime took on the status of a national myth in Central
America, one which spoke to the bravery and tenacity of the individual states as well as the
region as a whole (Aguilar Piedra, 2005). Filibusters like William Walker were an enemy of
Central America, and the fact that the Nicaraguan Liberals invited his mercenaries into their
homeland was overwhelmed by nationalist rhetoric which concentrated on Walker’s defeat (Cea,
1992). However, the Nicaragua campaign was not Walker’s last. Bay Islanders invited him to
19
establish an English-speaking government, independent from Honduras in 1860 (Leonard, 2011).
The invitation was extended after Britain agreed to cede sovereignty of the Islands to the
Republic of Honduras, when the Bay Islanders were hoping to forestall that agreement coming
into effect. Walker established a base in Trujillo, a city in mainland Honduras directly south
from the Bay Islands (Figure 3). Here he was caught by the British navy, and turned over to the
Honduran government. While the Bay Islanders were vehemently opposed to their absorption
into Honduras, Britain itself was committed to that decision, and stood to lose significantly if it
failed (Rosengarten, 1976). Walker’s government would threaten trade in the Bay of Honduras
and destabilize politics along the littoral. Moreover, the Bay Islands were important to most
plans for transoceanic canals, as they sat close to the proposed Atlantic termini of the Honduran
and Nicaraguan routes.
Figure 3, part of (Purdy and Allen, 1825)
The effects of Walker’s filibustering campaigns can be seen at the regional, national, and
local levels (Aguilar Piedra, 2005). Out of the states’ military action against Walker’s regime
emerged an image of a unified Central America, bonded though war (Cea, 1992). The ‘guerra
20
nacional’ or ‘national war’, became a kind of foundation myth for those Central Americans who
wanted to revive the federation (Brown, 1980). Each state decorated its own national heroes; to
this day Hondurans are sometimes called ‘Catrachos’, a corruption of ‘Xatruch’, the name of the
Honduran general in charge of the anti-Walker army (Ramirez, 2004). At the same time, the
enemy took on a particular definition. The filibuster was anti-government, and an enemy to all
Central Americans (Van Severen, 1962). Nevertheless, these images did not capture the
complexity of politics at the sub-national level. Nowhere was this better demonstrated than in
the newly acquired territory of the Bay Islands. The Bay Islanders were not enthusiastic citizens,
and their machinations against the central Honduran government threatened to destabilize the
Bay of Honduras. For them, the danger lay not with the filibusters but with the Central
American governments. This opposition is indicative of a greater feature of Honduran politics at
the time; the struggle for centralization. The filibustering episode is not only illustrative of this
but would come to hold its own importance in 1873.
The Internal Affairs of the Republic of Honduras
That the United States and Great Britain were so heavily involved in the political affairs
of the Central American republics should not lead to the impression that Central American elites
lacked agency. It is true that various political and economic elite factions were supported by and
allied with the U.S. and Britain but their actions had serious consequences independent of these
powers as well. Politics in the Bay of Honduras in 1873 was shaped by previous developments
in the port towns of littoral Honduras, in that nation’s capital cities, and in its relationship to its
neighbors and to Great Britain.
Honduras was originally part of the United Provinces of Central America, but was also
the first state to break apart from the federation in 1838. From that time, Honduras faced a series
of challenges to its attempts at nation-building (Karnes, 1961). The political elite of the
federation was relatively small but quite divided over issues such as economic reform and the
role of the Catholic Church in politics (Leonard, 2011). Broadly speaking, the Liberals believed
in an economy based on agricultural exports, in stripping the Church of its many privileges, and
in strengthening the power of the individual provinces (Arriola, 1993). The Conservatives
favored the traditional industries of tobacco, cattle and mining, and it was through these
industries that some forged close connections to British traders. Many Conservatives also sought
to bring peripheries under closer central control, and were frequently closely allied to the
21
Catholic Church. They were often from aristocratic families. However, individuals’ alliances
could and often did vary considerably based on locality and circumstance (Kaimowitz, 1996).
Honduras did not have a cohesive polity, nor a centrally administered political system in
1873, meaning that events in the Bay of Honduras were the product of local alliances and
policies as much as they were that of national and international politics (Brignoli, 1994). There
were several historical and geographical reasons for this (Euraque, 1996). The eastern littoral
had always been distinct from the rest of Honduras, and its isolation remained an issue for the
state throughout the nineteenth century. Additionally, the entirety of Honduras was
economically weak and sparsely populated. The state’s long-established industries were not
sufficient to sustain its growth in the nineteenth century, and politicians looked for new ways to
integrate Honduras into global markets. Two thirds of the population lived in the two major
cities, Comayagua and Tegucigalpa, and their immediate environs (Leonard, 2011). The
remaining third, approximately fifty thousand people, lived in remote and scattered villages
across the rest of the country. Centralization was impeded on a very basic level from the very
early days of independence when the statesmen failed to create a functioning capital. The rift
between Conservatives and Liberals was already so wide in 1838, the two parties could not agree
on a capital city. As a compromise, the politicians declared both Comayagua and Tegucigalpa to
be capitals, but failed to work out an effective way to split time and administrative functions
between the two cities (Bancroft, 1887). Consequently, the capital changed only when one party
fell from power.
Further obstructing the state’s consolidation was interference from other countries.
Britain’s involvement in the Mosquito Coast and Bay Islands was an obvious and long-standing
problem, but Britain also played an important role in the development of the littoral’s economy
(Euraque, 1996). On one hand, this was accomplished primarily through the settlement of
British citizens along the coast, and their participation in the Caribbean trade networks, which
did not offer much opportunity to native Hondurans. On the other, in the second half of the
nineteenth century, eastern Honduras was well situated to enter into the global economy by
growing and exporting fresh fruit, notably bananas. The central Honduran government had very
little to do with this earliest stage of agriculture exportation; the banana farming industry began
on the Bay Islands before shifting to the Sula Valley on the mainland (Soluri, 2005). A railroad
was planned between Comayagua and Puerto Cortés on the North Coast (also called Puerto de
22
Caballos), and construction began in 1868. However, this did not have an immediate impact on
relations between the North Coast and the sometime-capital. This trade was instead bolstered
after 1870 by increased demand from the United States (Posas, 1993). Relations between the
Bay of Honduras plantations and American markets grew quickly, further drawing that area
away from the politics of central Honduras. Honduras’ position was not helped by the fact that it
took considerably less time to travel from the Atlantic coast to New Orleans, Louisiana than to
Tegucigalpa (Soluri, 2005). Honduras was open to influence from not only Great Britain and the
United States but other Central American states. Part of this was a legacy of the Central
American federation. The pool of political elites was quite small and both the Liberals and
Conservatives in every state habitually filled government positions with fellow party members
regardless of their nationality (Clegern, 1966). This blurred the concept of territorial integrity, as
it meant that state boundaries did not define the territorial extent of politicians’ loyalties.
Therefore, while parts of Honduras were creating connections to the Caribbean and North
America, other parts were closely allied with other Central American states.
Despite its name, the Republic of Honduras was not particularly democratic. There were
property requirements to vote and hold office (Leonard, 2011). Between 1839 and 1900 the
country had sixty-four presidents, several juntas, and five different constitutions (Anderson,
1982). The two political parties were ideologically opposed to one another as the reforms
proposed by the Liberals would have severely curtailed the privileges and economic advantages
enjoyed by the Conservative base. The antagonism between the two became extremely bitter by
the 1860s. At that time the Liberal president enacted a series of reforms which, among other
things, disenfranchised the Catholic Church from political affairs (Leonard, 2011). When the
Conservatives regained power they repealed these reforms and Honduras slid into instability as
over the next decade successive regimes failed to expend any effort in reconciling the two sides.
While this was occurring within Honduras, Liberals were mounting an ascendancy across the rest
of Central America (Clegern, 1966).
Guatemala grew to become the strongest Central American state under the leadership of
Justo Rufino Barrios, a Liberal general turned president. One of Barrios’ stated aims was to
restore the federation, and though he failed in this, Barrios was nevertheless extremely active in
the affairs of neighboring states (Arriola, 1993). Concerned with the ramifications if Honduran
politics collapsed totally, Barrios was instrumental in Honduran presidential politics between
23
1871 and 1873. Liberal Cielos Arias served as President of Honduras until 1872, when it
became clear Arias would not provide the stability the country required. At this stage the
political process had all but entirely broken down. Barrios began supporting Pociano Leiva as a
rival to Arias (Leonard, 2011). At the end of 1872, Leiva and his supporters left Honduras for
Nicaragua, and began their assault on Arias’ regime. The fight lasted until November of the
following year when Leiva defeated Arias and became President.
As it had been in the eighteenth century and earlier in the nineteenth, Honduras was once
again both a point of contact and conflict between foreign and native powers. Some of its
experiences with the greater region resulted in closer connections. For instance, in fighting the
filibusters Honduras helped create a particular image of Central America and of its enemies. In
this way connections were made between the Central American states and opinion was fortified
against foreign powers. However, this idea was not universally accepted across the state, and
resistance was most obvious in the Bay of Honduras. Moreover, filibustering was not the only
experience which shaped Honduras in the middle of the century. Other forces were preventing
the country from consolidating into a unified polity, if not actively drawing political loyalties
away from the center. These included the United States and Great Britain, which built trading
networks that involved the Honduran coast but left out significant portions of the population.
They also included political elites, whose loyalties were often either locally determined or
extended far beyond their state’s borders. There was still a powerful ideological tendency
towards federation among some politicians, which justified their interference in Honduran
politics. At the same time, the state remained economically weak, and swung violently between
Liberal reforms and Conservative backlash. Therefore, while Honduras was certainly
experiencing significant upheaval of its own making, it was also a site of intense competition
between other groups, at both the national and local levels. While this meant the Republic was
subject to foreign interference, it also meant that these other states could be considerably affected
by events within Honduras. It is therefore not surprising that when a group of Conservatives
attempted to upset the Liberals control of Central America, they chose to launch their campaign
from the Bay of Honduras.
The Bay of Honduras, May-August, 1873
The initial Sapodilla Cayes dispute took place in the middle of the escalating conflict
between the Liberals and Conservatives, and their Guatemalan, American, and British
24
supporters. Several things need to be established before any assessment can be made regarding
its place in this dispute, including a detailed summary of events in the Bay of Honduras in the
months preceding the incursion, an understanding of which Honduran and British officials were
in the Bay and why they were present, and an account of the arrest and seizure itself. From this
an evaluation of the causes of this incident can be made.
Enrique Palacios was a Guatemalan and a former Conservative politician who fled his
country in 1872 after a failed coup (Corbett, Official Correspondence, 31 May, 1873). Early the
next year, Palacios outfitted a steamship, the General Sherman, and set about recruiting a force
to overthrow the Liberals in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Throughout the first half of
the year, Arias was beset by Leiva in the south and Palacios in the east. The Central American
governments, including the pro-federation President Barrios, declared Palacios to be a filibuster
and requested the British to assist in his capture (Negrete, Translated Official Correspondence,
30 July, 1873). The men of the General Sherman spent this time recruiting fighters and scouting
the coastline in the Bay of Honduras; the Central American republics all lacked vessels capable
of seizing the steamship. The British government declined to arrest Palacios but it did embargo
munitions his group had purchased and stored at the port of Belize (Prindle, Official
Correspondence, 8 February, 1873). The man the Hondurans sent to the region to restore order,
General Ricardo Streber, believed the British were tacitly, and in some cases openly, supporting
the filibusters. The Central American republics were also frustrated by Britain’s lack of
cooperation; in their correspondences with the British Colonial Office, the Guatemalan legation
goes out of its way to equate Palacios with William Walker, and argued it was Britain’s duty as a
neutral state to assist Honduras (Negrete, Translated Official Correspondence, 30 July, 1873).
The British did not accept this as a condition of their neutrality. Some officials even
expressed doubt over the term ‘filibuster’, arguing that the situation more closely resembled a
civil war (Corbett, Official Correspondence, 31 July, 1873). Meanwhile, the General Sherman
continued harassing the Honduran coast. Palacios seized several of the Bay Islands and set up a
base in Trujillo, the site of Walker’s last stand (Corbett, Official Correspondence, 20 June,
1873). He attempted to take the town of Omoa and its fort, San Fernando, once in May and
again in July. While he failed in this, Palacios did successfully seize Puerto Cortéz, the Atlantic
terminus for the railroad then under construction. Throughout all of this the filibusters worked to
keep the merchants on their side, with some success (Clegern, 1967). In his fight for Omoa,
25
Palacios blockaded that port, but diverted trade through Puerto Cortéz. Furthermore, Streber
claimed to have seen Palacios in the company of both top railroad employees and men like
Frederic Debrot, British Vice Consul at Omoa, and one of the town’s wealthiest men.
Omoa, by virtue of its location, was closely linked to British trading networks (Figure 4).
The Spanish had attempted to build the port up at the end of the eighteenth century in an effort to
draw trade away from Belize, but this plan failed. Rather, it became a stop on the way to Belize
or the Bay Islands and in the middle of the nineteenth century, home to the American and British
Vice-Consuls, Charles Follin and Frederic Debrot (Anon., 1873). These two men amassed
substantial fortunes through logging and trading contracts along the Bay. Debrot earned the
sobriquet the ‘Merchant Prince of Spanish Honduras’ for his ostentatious displays of wealth
(Clegern, 1967, p. 56). Debrot and Follin were part of a very small community of wealthy
merchants who exercised considerable power in Omoa and around the Bay of Honduras. This
group consisted mostly, but not entirely, of foreign businessmen. Two close associates of Debrot
in Omoa were Luis Elias and Magín Serra, the Vice Consul of Spain and the Portuguese Consul,
respectively. Streber claimed these men developed close connections with Palacios, but this has
not been substantiated (Streber, April, 1939). Omoa’s elites were, in many ways, far closer to
Belize and other British towns than they were to the Honduran capitals. This generated a great
deal of discontent among the less fortunate inhabitants of the town. Debrot’s conspicuous
consumption combined with the merchants’ monopoly of trade in the region were sources of
grievance and fueled a strong undercurrent of anti-British sentiment among some citizens.
Anti-Liberal opinion was also on the rise, stirred up by Palacios’ arrival. Discontentment with
the Honduran regime could be found at all levels of public life, including among the officers in
charge of the fort, San Fernando. When Streber first arrived, the fort’s Comandante, Mariano
Alvarez, was attempting to forestall a rebellion against the Liberal regime (Streber, February,
1939). The leader of the rebellion was a fellow officer, Lt. Colonel Betancourt, who was in
contact with Palacios and his supporters in Puerto Cortés and Trujillo.
26
Figure 4 part of (Jefferys, 1800)
Streber was a young war hero, who had distinguished himself in battles in El Salvador
and Nicaragua before tackling the trouble in the Bay (Streber, December, 1938). The surge in
violence in the region, as well as Streber’s orders to restore peace were part of the continuing
struggle over political centralization which had been made explicit a decade earlier by William
Walker. The fractured nature of Honduras was a crucial aspect of this. Even as trade with the
U.S and Caribbean was picking up, and a railroad was being built connecting the North Coast
with the hinterland, Honduras was under attack from Leiva on its southern border with
Nicaragua, and Palacios in Trujillo. As in previous conflicts, the inhabitants of the Bay were
divided in their loyalties.
Streber, then, left the southern battlefields for a town with deeply divided loyalties.
When the General assumed control of San Fernando, he allowed Betancourt and his supporters to
flee to Trujillo. Shortly thereafter, Palacios declared a blockade against Omoa, diverting all
trade through Puerto Cortés. Into this stalemate sailed Sir Lambton Loraine, captain of the
British frigate, the HMS Niobe (Corbett, Official Correspondence, 30 July, 1873). It is around
27
this point that confusion over the details of these events emerges. For instance, there is a minor
question regarding the date of the arrests. Elias and Serra wrote a letter to Lt. Governor Cairns
on the day of their arrests, and dated it 4 June, 1873 (Elias and Serra, Letter, 4 June, 1873).
However, other documents reporting the arrests, including sworn testimony from Manuel Cabral,
state the men were detained on 4 July (Cabral, Sworn Testimony, 14 July, 1873). Moreover,
Cairns sent his dispatches regarding the incident in the middle of July, noting he still had
questions regarding the incursion and how best to respond (Cairns, Official Correspondence, 15
July, 1873). This suggests the dispatches were sent in the immediate aftermath of the arrests,
and, therefore, that the July date is the correct one.
On 4 July, 1873, the Mobile picked up Luis Elias and Magín Serra. The two men had
fled Omoa at the end of the previous month to escape the fight over San Fernando (Elias and
Serra, Letter, 4 June, 1873). Streber, however, claimed they were arrested for attempting to join
Palacios.
‘They (Serra and Elias) abandoned their houses without good reason and situated themselves in the
Sapodilla islands, the last, to get into contact with the invaders and to lend them their services… the hostility
expressed by Messrs. Serra and Elias against the cause of the Honduran Government grew every day
encouraged by Belize, I proceeded against them…’ (Streber, May, 1939, pp. 757-756).1
The General stated that the threat presented by Palacios superseded other considerations, such as
jurisdiction over the Cayes; Streber was fighting the filibusters and that required decisive action.
Manuel Cabral witnessed the arrests and had an entirely different interpretation of events
(Cabral, Sworn Testimony, 14 July 1873). He stated he and Elias saw the sloop, flying the
Honduran flag, approach and anchor just off Nicholas Cay, where Cabral resided. The two men
went aboard to learn the latest news from Omoa but were instead surprised by armed soldiers
who immediately placed Elias under arrest (Cabral, Copied Testimony, 1873). They then
demanded Serra and landed a party to detain the Consul. When the soldiers returned with Serra,
Cabral and the prisoners asked to see the orders for their arrests but were told the command had
been verbal. Cabral summarized it as ordering the soldiers to search the Sapodilla Cayes for
anyone in communication with Trujillo or the Bay Islands. If any such person was found they
were to be arrested and shot. Cabral stated he informed the commanding officer, Colonel Lubin,
The quote in Spanish: ‘abandonaron sus casas sin motive plausible y fueron a situarse a las islas de Zapotillos, los
últimos, para ponerse en comunicacion con los invasores y prestarles sus servicios…criceindo cada día la hostilidad
que fomentaban desde Belice los expresados senores Serra y Elias contra la causa del Gobierno de Honduras,
procedí contra ellos…’
1
28
that the Cayes were British. Later, the Hondurans produced a copy of the orders, which were
turned over to Loraine (Loraine, Official Correspondence, 16 July, 1873). The Mobile then
sailed north, away from Omoa (Cabral, Sworn Testimony 14 July, 1873). They were rescued by
the General Sherman sometime later.
Lieutenant Governor Cairns and Captain Loraine discussed the incident over July to
decide on a course of action (Cairns, Loraine, Official Correspondences, 13-16 July, 1873). Of
central importance to their debate was the Mobile’s distance from shore and the accountability of
the Honduran government. While Britain ostensibly claimed all the waters surrounding the
Sapodilla Cayes, Cairns felt it would be best to establish that the arrests took place within the
Cayes territorial sea, within three miles of the coast (Cairns, Official Correspondence, 15 July,
1873). The accountability of the Honduran government was a far more open-ended question.
The country’s instability meant it was difficult to determine who held power, how much, and
where. Furthermore, the Bay’s isolation from central Honduras made it difficult to determine
how much support Streber’s action had from his government.
The issue of individual responsibility is something Loraine faced as well. He had
considerable freedom in his responses to the events of that summer. The government, both in
Belize and London, were only able to review his actions after the fact and retroactively support
or condemn them. Largely, Loraine enjoyed support from his civilian superiors. For instance,
Streber and the Central American governments wrote to complain about Loraine’s refusal to
arrest Palacios and his decision to act as a ‘mediator’ between the Conservative and Streber
(Corbett, Official Correspondence, 13 September, 1873). Loraine’s understanding of Britain’s
neutrality was accepted by the Colonial Office (Corbett, Official Correspondence, 30 July,
1873). The British government also supported Loraine in his decision on 19 August, 1873 to
bombard Omoa, a potentially grave decision which had the unintended consequence of shifting
Britain’s focus away from the Sapodilla Cayes.
In his Vindicación, Streber makes his distaste for Captain Loraine and other British
officials well known (Streber, 1938-1940). He stated that Loraine, Debrot and the top railroad
employees at Puerto Cortés were in league with Palacios, facilitating his filibustering (Streber,
February, 1939). It is, however, impossible to know from this account when this animosity
developed. The British were primarily concerned with the violence between Streber and
Palacios that was engulfing the Bay and with the riots which were breaking out in Omoa
29
(Loraine, Official Correspondence, 13 July, 1873). Further, while many British officials were
not entirely comfortable using the term ‘filibuster’ it does appear that they worried over Palacios’
campaign, suggesting he ‘might unduly favor the priestly party’ (Corbett, Official
Correspondence, 31 July, 1873, p 4). It is certainly possible Streber and Loraine opposed one
another as early as June, 1873, it is also possible that events of late July and early August colored
Streber’s recollection.
Streber was not in physical possession of San Fernando for part of July because he was
attempting to trap Palacios, and as a consequence, order was not well enforced in the town of
Omoa. As Streber went out of his way to argue, in many ways this is understandable (Streber,
September, 1939). There was a civilian police force in the port, and Streber’s orders were to
capture Palacios, not govern Omoa. In contrast to this it must be said that British officials at the
time did not trust Streber or his ability to command (Corbett, Official Correspondence, 13
September, 1873). Whatever Streber’s personal involvement, the townspeople reacted to the
rebellion, recapture, and blockade of Omoa by rioting. On 18 August these riots exclusively
targeted the homes and businesses of the merchant elite, including those of Frederic Debrot.
Unfortunately, the rioters trespassed on the British Consulate, destroyed state papers and
desecrated the British flag (Bain, Official Correspondence, 27 August, 1873).
Loraine, still patrolling the Bay, handled this crisis as well. He demanded an apology for
insulting the British flag, either from the Government or from Streber personally if he took
responsibility for those events (Bain, Official Correspondence, 27 August, 1873). The General
refused, and in response the Niobe bombarded San Fernando de Omoa for fourteen hours on 1920 August, after which Streber issued an apology (Clegern, 1967). Streber offered a different
explanation for the August bombardment, saying there were ‘immediate and concurrent sources
of the Niobe’s aggression that highlight the Captain’s grave responsibility in that act of
inexcusable violence (Streber, September, 1939, pp. 820-821).2 The riots and subsequent
shelling are significant because they mark the nadir of Britain and Honduras’ relationship in
1873. There was a clear escalation of tension between the two states as a result of the LiberalConservative dispute. Viewed in this light, the incursion into the Sapodilla Cayes increased the
animosity between the two sides.
The quote in Spanish: ‘hay otros de inmediata procedencia y concurrentes a la agresión del <<Niobe>> que hacen
resultar la grave responsabilidad contraída por el Capitán en aquel acto de inexcusable violencia.’
2
30
Several events could be seen to have opened the conflict, including Britain’s refusal to
arrest Palacios, and the apparent connections between the filibuster, the railroad employees, and
the foreign merchants. Further, there was the credible threat that Palacios would attack Omoa,
and that certain individuals including Serra, Elias, and Debrot might act as a fifth column during
this fight. Palacios did attack Omoa in July, after Elias and Serra were arrested and although his
forces were repulsed, the incident did show that Streber was in a precarious position in San
Fernando. The fragility of Streber’s authority actually extended beyond his immediate struggle
with Palacios. Loraine and Cairns had a long discussion regarding who to blame for the
incursion (Cairns, Official Correspondence, 15 July, 1873). Loraine pointed out that although
the Mobile flew the Honduran flag that was no way indicative of the political situation in that
country. It may have not been entirely clear to British officials at the time how much power
Streber actually held.
Conclusion
The incursion which prompted the island sovereignty dispute was caused by the power
struggle between Liberals and Conservatives, but there were many underlying factors which
contributed to the incident as well. To understand these, it makes sense to break down the
dispute into immediate and long-term factors.
The two men arrested, Luis Elias and Magín Serra, were caught up in the fight between
Conservative outlaws and forces loyal to the Liberal Honduran government in the Bay of
Honduras. Palacios’ campaign was directly responsible for sending Streber and Loraine to the
Bay of Honduras and for Serra and Elias leaving Omoa. Several points can be made about Elias
and Serra’s position in the Bay of Honduras, and about this battle more generally. The two men
were prominent members of Omoa’s merchant class, and had connections to both British and
Honduran officials. Their Conservative connections, to Betancourt in Omoa, and to Palacios in
Trujillo, made them a threat to General Streber’s mission in the Bay of Honduras. The threat
posed by Enrique Palacios and his group was quite acute. His vessel, the General Sherman, was
well-armed and capable of out running every Central American navy. Further, it was clear that
Palacios had designs on Omoa, and was supported by wealthy businessmen in other towns along
the North Coast. Capturing the two men was therefore entirely in keeping with Streber’s mission
in the Bay, to stop Palacios from undermining the Honduran government. As Streber wrote in
31
1939, his primary concern was to stop Elias and Serra; the consequences were subordinate to this
necessity (Streber, April, 1939).
There was, however, a more symbolic aspect to this campaign as well. As soon as he
began raiding the Honduran littoral, Palacios was immediately branded a ‘filibuster’ by every
Central American government. This unity against filibustering was reminiscent of the region’s
recent fight against William Walker. Additional elements of Walker’s campaign echoed in
Palacios’. The Honduran town of Trujillo played an important role in both crusades, and both
were attempts to overthrow governments by military force. While Walker’s purpose was
imperialistic and Palacios’ was anti-reformist, both shared connections to economic interests.
Walker was concerned with the slave-based economy of the southern United States and Palacios
was supported by mercantile groups on the North Coast. Furthermore, Palacios named his vessel
the General Sherman, after the American Unionist general who famously razed Atlanta in the
American Civil War eight years earlier. The image of a filibuster which had been solidified in
the fight against Walker as a foreign enemy of not just the Republic of Honduras but of Central
America could easily be used to describe Palacios with only minor changes. ‘Filibuster’ was a
loaded term with specific meaning in Honduras at that time, particularly in the Bay of Honduras,
which as a region had not been entirely anti-Walker. By naming Palacios one, the Liberals were
recalling the unity of purpose that ostensibly characterized the fight against William Walker and
defining the conflict against the Conservatives and their supporters.
While the politics of Central America played an obvious and important role in bringing
Streber’s men into the Sapodilla Cayes, the undercurrent of anti-British sentiment which
persisted at the time should not be ignored. Honduras was not solely responsible for creating this
dispute; Britain directly and indirectly contributed to the conflict as well. That is to say, it is
significant that the arrests occurred in British waters. Britain’s unpopularity was most clearly
manifest in the destruction of the British consulate in August, but it was also a factor in the
Sapodilla Cayes incursion. Moreover, this attitude was based on legitimate grievances. Serra
and Elias were close associates of the British Vice-Consul Frederic Debrot, the Merchant Prince
of Spanish Honduras. Debrot was the best known British merchant in Omoa, but he was only
one of a long line of British traders that dominated trade in the Bay of Honduras and along the
state’s coast since the eighteenth century. Not only were these foreign businessmen assisting
32
Palacios’ crusade against the Honduran government, but their own government in Belize had
refused to put an end to it by seizing the General Sherman.
While this situation was troublesome for Honduras, Britain was under no obligation to
act; its interest lay with the safety of its citizens and their ability to conduct business in the Bay
of Honduras. Great Britain’s priorities shifted over the summer of 1873. The ConservativeLiberal conflict did not directly affect the British government in Belize but the Honduran ship
that entered into British territory and seized a vessel and two men did. Streber himself implied
that he either knew the Cayes to be outside Honduran jurisdiction, or did not care which country
claimed them. This is a serious judgment because he justified the incursion after the fact by
stating Britain was in league with Palacios. In other words, for Streber British ire was to be
expected in his battle against the Conservative filibusters. Moreover, the incident was important
not just because of Serra and Elias’ connection to Palacios, but because the incursion represented
an intensification of the animosity between the two sides. Britain had not arrested Palacios but
had embargoed some munitions. Britain allowed Palacios to continue harassing the Honduran
littoral, and Elias and Serra were able to find shelter in the Sapodilla Cayes which Britain
claimed. Lastly, Britain used its superior naval technology to bombard San Fernando de Omoa.
The connection to Palacios was clearly only a part of the issue for the British government.
Finally, there was the formal relationship between the two states, which despite having
concluded an agreement fourteen years earlier, was far from clear-cut. A great deal of this is due
to the amount of autonomy individuals were afforded, particularly in the Bay of Honduras.
Streber was the highest ranking Liberal military officer in the North Coast at the time, and was
often unable to communicate with his government. Moreover, it was not entirely clear how
much authority that government actually held, since it was beset from all sides by several
different factions. Streber was operating in a region which had a history of isolation and a
tradition of looking outward across the Bay for economic and military alliances, rather than
inward towards the hinterland. On the littoral, foreign government officials were able to amass
substantial wealth and merchants were able to support armed campaigns against legitimate
governments. Sir Lambton Loraine, who was able to maintain regular communication with
Belize, was still in charge of the only British frigate in the Bay. This afforded him a great deal of
power which he displayed by shelling Omoa. It is therefore difficult to establish how much of
33
what occurred was official government policy and how much was undertaken on these men’s
own initiative.
However, the relationship that did exist between the two states was equally ambiguous.
Looking only at the treaties which the states signed, it does not appear that this should be the
case. British Honduras had a definite maritime boundary dating as far back as 1836 which
included the Sapodilla Cayes. In every treaty it had signed since that date clarifying or limiting
its role in Central America, Britain made sure to secure clear exceptions for the territory of
British Honduras. This protection of the Belize settlements and Britain’s economic position
dates back to the time of the Spanish Empire. The treaty signed with Honduras did not conflict
with these long-standing policies. Britain agreed to cede sovereignty over a number of islands to
Honduras and those islands were listed by name. The Sapodilla Cayes were not mentioned in
this treaty, so it is not immediately clear why Honduras would stake a claim to them. Instead,
this can be explained by Britain’s relationship to the United States. The U.S. was committed to
curbing Britain’s influence in the region. Further, Britain allowed this to preserve its hold over
British Honduras and the chance to cooperate with America on any future transoceanic canal
projects. The United States’ fear of British aggression was partly the result of its own ambitions
for Central America, but it was also related to Britain’s multiple wars with Spain in the
eighteenth century. Great Britain had a history of opportunistic attacks against mainland Central
America. Its more recent maneuverings to formally colonize the Bay Islands suggested that
Britain continued to harbor colonial aspirations for the rest of the isthmus as well. Combined,
these factors meant that Britain’s ambitions in the region would always be questioned. In this
way, the treaties themselves and their conditions were less important than the political
atmosphere they generated. Great Britain was a potential threat to the sovereignty of Central
American states and had a record of protecting its commercial interests above other
considerations. In the politics of the day, this meant Britain’s attitude towards the Honduran
government was suspect. It also meant that Honduran claims to the Sapodilla Cayes, while
legally weak, might not be dismissed immediately by the United States. Honduras’ position in
this dispute was therefore stronger than the terms of the 1859 treaty would imply. Nevertheless,
it is clear that local and immediate circumstances played a larger role than great power
diplomacy.
34
This raises an interesting point regarding island sovereignty disputes in general. In
popular representations they tend to be examined through the lens of national or continental
politics. States, global economic trends, and past conflict are often used to explain disputes.
However, this may not be true of all cases, or at every state of a dispute’s development. The
Sapodilla Cayes conflict was the result of the imbrication of local, national, and regional political
disputes, and of individual exploits and legal ambiguity. The resulting sovereignty dispute may
not share the intensity or threat of violence of many other current conflicts, but it is nevertheless
an important exemplification of the history of the Bay of Honduras. The disputes origins were
far from straight forward, and speak more to the political uncertainties of the time than any
ambiguity in the relevant treaties. The incursion in 1873 was a product of its time, and an
indicator of contemporary attitudes and circumstances.
35
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Appendix