Language vitality and paths to revival:
contrasting cases of Azerbaijani and Kazakh*
WILLIAM FIERMAN
Abstract
fcf*
Russian Imperial and subsequent Soviet policies resulted in the Russian language acquiring a very important role in education and the workplace in
both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The extent of the penetration of the Russian language was shaped by the unique constellation of factors for each
republic, including geographic, historical, demographic, and political moments. Even in the Soviet era, however, the titular language maintained a
much larger domain of use in Azerbaijan's cities than it did in cities of Ka*zakhstan. Since 1991, the status of the titular language in both countries
has risen and its domains broadened, though only in Azerbaijan does the titular language clearly enjoy a status superior to Russian in urban educational institutions and in the workplace. The difference in the situations in
the two countries is due both to the inertia of factors already in place during
the Soviet era, as well as to changing environment in the respective countries since their independence, including policies of their leadership.
Introduction
In the late Soviet era, language issues were a major focus for individuals
groups seeking more autonomy within the Soviet framework as well
those seeking outright independence. As Moscow's control over the
periphery weakened, the relevance of language to political change became
especially clear in the Baltic republics, where the supreme Soviets, the
official state legislative bodies, most directly challenged Moscow. They
Passed their own republic language laws and insisted that these held pre£edence over any all-Union legislation. Even in republics whose political
.leadership confronted Moscow less boldly, language was often also high
,on the political agenda. This was evident, for example, in early 1987 in
Kazakhstan: In December 1986, disturbances had erupted there after
;°165-2516/09/0198-0075
I®/ Walter de Gruyter
/«/'/. J. Soc. Lang. 198 (2009), pp. 75-J04
DOI 10.1515/IJSL.2009.028
76
W, Fierman
Moscow installed Gennadii Kolbin as the replacement for republic party
first secretary Dinniukhammed Kunaev. Local sensitivities were especially offended by the imposition of an ethnic Russian from outside the
republic to the position long held by the former Kazakh incumbent. Just
months after Kolbin's accession to republic party leader, Kazakhstan's
party and government announced new policies to improve Kazakh language instruction (Fierrnan 1998; OHepwan 2005). The high political salience of language manifested itself in a different way in Azerbaijan,
where members of the titular nationality widely viewed the weak Azerbaijani language skills of Abdurrahman Vezirov, the republic communist
party first secretary, as evidence of his unsuitability to lead his people
(Aida Huseynova p.c.).
Until 1991, Moscow was directly involved in determining language policy in every corner of the USSR. This radically changed upon the USSR's
collapse. No longer were the former republics subject to supervision or
control from a hierarchically organized and Russian-dominated Communist Party and state apparatus.1 The language policies which the newly
independent states began to devise were extremely important as symbols
articulating official perspectives about identities their regimes were to foster. The policies, however, were important not merely as symbols; they
would also have a profound impact on access to education, economic
and social mobility, migration, economic development, and relations
with the outside world.
The Leninist-Stalinist concept of nations, which had fundamentally
shaped the context of language planning in the USSR, continued as a major, though not explicit, element in the post-Soviet states. According to
this concept, individuals constituting a nation have a shared economic
life and psychological make-up as manifest in a community of culture, as
well as a shared territory and language.2 A corollary to this is that each
nation ('Haipia') has its own territory that is "home" to its "titular"
group; this corollary, widely accepted in the popular conscioiisness ol
Soviet citizens, implied that each titular territory delimited the "home domain" of each group's language. This belief survives in the post-Soviet
states, and nationalists throughout the Commonwealth of Independent
States and the Baltic countries often justify the promotion of the titular
language on the basis that it is somehow associated with the particular
piece of land within a particular state's borders.
As elsewhere, the belief in the link of language, territory, and ethnic
group persists in the two former Soviet republics that are the focus ot
this article, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. This article will explore some
of the differences in language status in these two former Soviet republic*
(now independent states). Although many languages are spoken in boil"1
Language vitality
77
of these countries, this article will focus on only two languages in each,
Russian and the titular language. In particular, this article will examine
the relative status of these languages in the fields of education and the
workplace. Because in most rural areas the titular language is much
stronger than Russian, the analysis will focus on urban areas.3 The article
[will trace the rise of Russian's status in the Soviet era in both the Azerbai[ jan SSR and Kazakh SSR; in so doing, it will demonstrate that despite
'.Azerbaijani's loss of status to Russian, Azerbaijani remained in a much
more secure position than Kazakh. After exploring these dynamics, the
article will look at language status in the post-Soviet era and argue that
whereas Azerbaijani's path to a dominant role has been fairly smooth,
Kazakh's progress has encountered serious problems.4
Before proceeding I should draw attention to the particular, admittedly
^historical, way in which I will be using the terms "Kazakhstan," "Ka;.zakhs," "Azerbaijan," and "Azerbaijanis." Unless otherwise noted, I
r will be using "Kazakhstan" and "Azerbaijan" to refer to the territory of
today's "Republic of Kazakhstan" and "Republic of Azerbaijan." Unless
. explicitly stated, "Azerbaijan" will not be used to refer to "southern
F Azerbaijan," which is a region of Iran. Even in the course of the twentieth century, the particular territory encompassed by "Kazakhstan" and
^"Azerbaijan" has changed. For most of my analysis, however, this is not
important, and the use of the shorthand outlined just above will greatly
streamline the prose. In analogous fashion, for simplicity's sake I will be
referring to the ancestors of individuals who today consider themselves
ethnic "Kazakhs" or "Azerbaijanis" as "Kazakhs" and "Azerbaijanis."5
Geography, history, and pre-independence demography
ii t,
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, as "union republics" of the USSR, both enjoyed privileged status in the Soviet administrative hierarchy. Despite the
great differences between the two republics, union republic status meant
that the titular languages of both received much greater support from
Moscow than languages of groups which had only "autonomous oblasts," "autonomous raions," or other inferior level territorial units.6
-Along with demography, a combination of interrelated geographic and
historical factors has shaped the dynamics of language status in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. A look at a map shows that Kazakhstan "meets"
Russia in a dramatically different way than Azerbaijan. The former country shares a frontier of over 4000 miles with Russia, most of it without
any natural geographic barriers. Kazakh and Russian nationalists ad,vance contradictory claims to territory based on settlement and claims of
78
W. Fierman
land use by "their own" ancestors. Despite their disagreement, nationalists on both sides recognize that over the last two to three centuries
the Russian-Kazakh encounter has taken place over an enormous and
mostly open geographic expanse. Furthermore, by the time of Russia's
advance into territories inhabited by Kazakhs — and this is true whether
one speaks of borders preferred by Russian or Kazakh nationalists — the
large majority of the population on the Russian side of the border consisted of ethnic Russians.
In terms of land borders, Azerbaijan (unlike Kazakhstan) is separated
from Russia by the formidable Caucasus Mountains. Furthermore, as
Russia expanded into the region south of the mountains, primarily in the
early nineteenth century, the territories between Russia and the Azerbaijani khanates were relatively insulated by lands inhabited by a patchwork
of non-Slavic peoples. This "isolation" was, of course, substantially attenuated by the Caspian Sea, which served as an alternate route of Russian access to Azerbaijan.
Furthermore, at least through the nineteenth century, Russia's political
and cultural influence in Azerbaijan was balanced or outweighed by Iran.
Referring to the entire territory from "the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains along the Caspian Sea to the Iranian Plateau" (i.e., both
"northern" and "southern" Iran), Tadeusz Swietochowski (1995) notes
that from ancient times onward, "Azerbaijan usually shared its history
with Iran." At least since the eighteenth century, no powerful analogous
competitor for Russia existed in the case of Kazakhstan,
Differences between Russian Imperial policy in the south Caucasus and
the Kazakh steppe profoundly affected respective Kazakh and Azerbaijani receptivity to subjugation by Russia and to Russian culture and
language. In particular, Riissia's efforts in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century to instill Kazakh intellectuals with anti-Tatar feelings
appear to have encouraged Kazakhs to accept Russian rule as an alternative to possible domination by Tatars (Kreindler 1983; Lazzerini 1994).
Lands traditionally inhabited by Kazakhs were entirely under Russian
control by the late nineteenth century. This was not true of Azerbaijanis:
those living on lands that today constitute the Republic of Azerbaijan
had ethnic and linguistic bonds with those living in "southern Azerbaijan," i.e., a region of northwestern Iran. In the late years of the Russian
Empire and in the Soviet era, the ethnic Azerbaijani population in
"southern Azerbaijan" substantially exceeded that in Russian/Sovietcontrolled territory. Indeed, this remains true today in the era of the
independent Republic of Azerbaijan, Irridenta and diaspora Kazakh populations have lived and today live in territories neighboring Kazakhstan;
however, they have been scattered among neighbors on all sides; further-
vitality
79
I more, more than half of those residing in what are today neighboring
j. independent countries live in what were once other Soviet republics —
'mostly Uzbekistan and Russia. During Soviet history — a critical period
; for language development — these populations were not separated by an
{ international frontier from co-ethnics in the titular homeland. Furthermore, they often used the school textbooks from Kazakhstan and even
pursued higher education there.7
:$ Aside from their linguistic links with co-ethnics in Iran, Azerbaijanis'
closest linguistic ties are with Turks of Anatolia.8 Given Russian and So! viet fears of pan-Turkism and the central place of Turkey in this ideology,
this is an important fact that distinguishes Azerbaijan from Kazakhstan.
Although the standard Kazakh language may be as close to Kyrgyz and
Karakalpak as Azerbaijani is to Turkish, Kyrgyz and Karakalpak are
spoken by relatively small populations, and in the Soviet era these populations lived overwhelmingly inside the USSR. Unlike Turkish, spoken in
a 'country that Soviet leaders viewed with suspicion, neither the Kyrgyz
j nor Karakalpak language was associated with a "dangerous linguistic
f neighbor."
jfe In discussing twentieth century Azerbaijan, including languages spoken
there, it is critical to note the intertwined fates of Azerbaijanis and Arme\s as well as the conflicts between these groups. This has no doubt also
been aggravated by Azerbaijanis' close linguistic and intellectual ties with
Turkey. In twentieth-century Imperial Russia and under Soviet power
until the late Gorbachev era, Armenians constituted a substantial population both in Azerbaijan's cities — especially Baku — and in Nagorno. Karabagh; in the latter territory they constituted the majority. War be. tween Azerbaijan and Armenia erupted in 1988 largely over this territory.
5' The result of the war was a de facto separation of Nagorno-Karabagh
from Azerbaijan and a large flow of refugees and displaced persons: Armenians fled from Baku and other cities in Azerbaijan; and Azerbaijanis
fled from Armenia, Nagorno-Karabagh, and other territories of the Azerbaijan SSR that Armenia occupied. In the last decades of Soviet power all
the way up to the hostilities between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, the
J size of Azerbaijan's Armenian population rivaled that of the Russian
population: in 1959, Russians comprised 13.6% of the total and Armenians 12.0% fflCV 1962a); in 1989, both were about 5.6% (Dunlop et al.
1993: 1099).
''The departure of Azerbaijan's Armenians and the loss of Azerbaijani
control over Nagorno-Karabagh meant the virtual end of the Armenian
language in territory administered from Baku; beyond this, however, because the overwhelming majority of Azerbaijan's urban Armenians spoke
Russian either as a first or second language,9 Armenians' departure also
80
Language vitality 81
W. Fierman
meant a decline in the proportion of Russian speakers in the population.
The Azerbaijani refugees and displaced persons arriving in Azerbaijan's
cities were primarily rural inhabitants; because they generally spoke poor
Russian, their arrival increased the share of urban inhabitants with weak
Russian skills. No analogous violent conflict in Kazakhstan spurred the
kind of demographic changes that occurred in Azerbaijan. Germans
were the only non-Slavic minority ethnic group in Kazakhstan in modern
times whose share of the population approached the magnitude of Armenians in Azerbaijan. Although their departure has not been as complete
as the exodus of Armenians from Azerbaijan, most Germans have left
Kazakhstan. However, as one of the ethnic groups deported to Central
Asia by Stalin, the Germans, unlike the Armenians, were in no way rivals
for elite positions in Kazakhstan's urban areas in the way that Armenians
had been in Azerbaijan.
Another important difference between Azerbaijan and Kazahstan is
their very different roles as regional centers for language planning in the
Soviet Union, especially in the early years. Azerbaijan was the clear
leader in the latinization of the 1920s. Baku, furthermore, hosted the
Ail-Union Turcological Congress in 1926 where the Latin script was
formally adopted; and for the years 1928-1931, Baku, as home to the
AH-Union Committee of the New Turkic Alphabet, was a hub for Soviet
language-planning activity. Many Azerbaijanis played important roles
in this work. By contrast, Kazakh language planners were never at the
forefront of language planning for the entire region; in this regard, Kazakhstan was something of a backwater.
Although language planners in Kazakhstan appear not to have actively
participated in regional language planning, the Kazakh language underwent major corpus development during the Soviet era. In Kazakhstan.
as elsewhere, the Soviet regime allowed and at times encouraged a great
volume of scholarly linguistic work and corpus development. Despite the
fact that (as will be described below) the titular language was restricted
to very limited domains in urban areas in the late Soviet era, scholars
produced an impressive set of research,10 including the 10-volume /(low
TiniHty TycinfiipMe cwfliri [Explanatory Dictionary of the Kazakh Language] published between 1974 and 1986. The twelve-volume K,a3ciK,
Coeem 3HifUKjionednstcbi [Kazakh Soviet Encyclopedia], which came out
between 1972 and 1978, is also evidence of the achievements of corpus
language planning in the Soviet era. In similar fashion, between 1976
and 1987, the ten volume Azsrbaycan Sovet Ensiklopediyasi [Azerbaijan
Soviet Encyclopedia] appeared. Unlike in the case of Kazakh, however,
for Azerbaijani a large number of specialized dictionaries were issued, especially at the end of the 1950s and beyond. These included dictionaries
Overall population
composition Azerbaijan,
Overall population
composition Azerbaijan,
1926
1989
5.6%
_Azerb.,
. Azerb.,
82.7%
62.1%
9.5%
Overall population
composition Azerbaijan,
Other,
1939
Overall population
composition Azerbaijan,
«.u
Other,1999
13.0%_
Azerb.,
58.4%
16.5%
Azerb.,
90.6%
Overall population
composition Azerbaijan,
Other,
1959
6.9%.
Azerb.,
67.5%
| Figure 1. Overall population composition for Azerbaijan
1999
1926. 1939, 1959, 1989, and
, in such diverse fields as botany, zoology, economics, chemistry, astronomy, architecture, law, music, petroleum and gas deposits, and various
; fields of medicine. Numerous multi-volume Russian-Azerbaijani dictioInaries became available, and a four-volume explanatory dictionary of
r Azerbaijani was published between 1966 and 1987.H
Demography is one of the critical factors that has shaped language
'status in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (see Figures 1 through 6). Kazakhs
' .became a minority in Kazakhstan, whereas Azerbaijanis maintained a
\d majority in their republic. Among the major reasons for Kazakhs'
82
W. Fierman
Language vitality
Overall population
composition Kazakhstan,
1939
Ger,, Olher'
Overall population
composition Kazakhstan,
Urban Population
Composition Azerbaijan,
1926
83
Urban Population
Composition Azerbaijan,
1959
Other,
LAzerb.,
' 51.3%
_
RUSS.,
40,0%
i
•1&'-'"*
i
27.0%
Overall population
composition Kazakhstan,
Other,
12.0%.
<
1959
Overall population
composition Kazakhstan,
2004
Gar., Oth8r-
Urban Population
Composition Azerbaijan,
1939
Other,
13iB%
RUS8.,.X^ggj
24.9%
Urban Population
Composition Azerbaijan,
1989
Armen.,.
Other,.
7.8%
Russ
-?gg^
9.8%
Russ.,
42.7%
27.3%
&$$*•
Figure 3.
\:
Kaz.,
,39,7%
Figure 2.
_
if*
'1
2"*"
Overall population
composition Kazakhstan,
1989
Other,
Ger., 11.3%,
5.8%. _
7f*ffff^fmJI*f
57.2%
Overall population composition for Kazakhstan
2004
1939, 1959, 1989, 1999, ami
weak demographic position were the deaths and mass departure during
collectivization, sedentarization, and the resultant famine. Furthermore,
large waves of Slavic immigrants came to Kazakhstan, many as laborers
in Kazakhstan's factories and mines, and others as farmers during
Khrushchev's virgin lands campaign. Kazakhstan also became a dumping
ground for "undesirables," some dispatched to the republic to work in its
prison labor camps, others as members of "deported peoples."
These and other shocks radically changed the ethnic composition
of Kazakhstan and the linguistic environment in the republic: at the
Russ
42.5%
tV&S&»SS
\?ltfyl%»lb»*>%
"f^J'ff'fS'fl'fi'
-i>ft.»i*.jfr
76.7%
Urban population composition for Azerbaijan — 1926, 1939, 1959, and 1989
beginning of the twentieth century Kazakhs comprised about 75% of
Kazakhstan's population and were still about 60% in 1920; by the mid11930s, however, they were outnumbered by Russians. (According to
I'some estimates, Slavs had comprised under 15% in 1900 and about 30%
in 1920.) The data of the 1939 census purport that Kazakhs comprised
|37.8% of the population, Russians 40.0%, and Ukrainians 10.7%. Thus,
;in 1939, the Slavic population already exceeded half of Kazakhstan's
'total population. The share of Russians and Ukrainians still comprised
£ about 51% in 1959. By that time, though, the share of Kazakhs had fallen
jo only about 30%.13
The situation varied considerably from oblast to oblast. Even in 1989,
',by which time the proportion of Kazakhs in the republic had again recov; ered substantially, Kazakhs still comprised less than 20% of the population in three of Kazakhstan's seventeen oblasts (Qaraghandy, Qostanay,
f.and North Kazakhstan), and between 20% and 25% in four others (Pavar, East Kazakhstan, Kokshetau, and Alrnaty city).14 In all of these
|cases, the large majority of the non-Kazakh population was Slavic; with
the exception of Almaty (then the capital city), all of these oblasts are
, located in Kazakhstan's north, east, and central regions.15
84
Language vitality
W. Fierman
Urban Population
Composition Kazakhstan,
1939
G
Other,
Kaz,,
0.8%.
H.8SL.
Urban Population
Composition Kazakhstan,
1999
,-21.9%
43.2%
*
>
Gar.,
15.2%_
_16.7%
Armen.,_ x:xxxwiB8^ra
14.7%
^^SSA^
Russ.,_
42.5%
41.1%
Urban Population
Composition Kazakhstan,
1959
Older,
Kaz.,
Capita) Population
Composition Baku, 1989
Other,
7.5%
Armen.,_
10.0%
Ukr.,
8.0%"
Russ.,
57,7%
Capital Population
Composition Baku, 1939
85
Urban Population
Composition Kazakhstan,
2004
Other,
9.6%,
Capital Population
Composition Baku, 1959
16.5%
66.0%
Capital Population
Composition Baku, 2001
Armsn., Other,
0.0%4 ,5.5%
Russ.,
3.0%.
7-3%
.«««-
Russ.,
57.6%
Urban Population
Composition Kazakhstan,
Other,
Gar..
5.0%
10.8%
Ukr.,
82%
&&£&
m**f**'m'\•
51.3%
Figure 4.
Urban population composition for Kazakhstan — 1939, 1959, 1989, 1999, ami
2004
For our purposes here it is especially important to note that the Slavs
who arrived in Kazakhstan settled largely in urban areas and that therefore, despite a sizeable rural-to-urban migration of Kazakhs, the large
majority of inhabitants in most of Kazakhstan's towns (which experienced rapid growth in the mid- and late-Soviet era) consisted of Slavs.1'1
In 1939, Kazakhs accounted for only 21.9% of the urban Kazakh SSR
population; they were greatly outnumbered by Russians (57.7%); together
with Ukrainians, Slavs accounted for just under two-thirds of the total
urban Kazakh SSR population (Bcecoioanaw nepennw, 1939 ro^a 1992:
Figure 5. Capital population composition for Baku — 1939, 1959, 1989, and200J12
N-
-.75-76). By 1959 the Kazakh urban share had fallen further, to 16.7%.
;This meant that in cities and towns Russians outnumbered them by a ratio of more than three to one. In the republic capital, Almaty, the Kazakh
share was under 9% (UCY 1962c: 164, 172).
\-f Even in 1989, by which time Kazakhs had grown to 26.7% of the republic urban population, Russians, comprising 51.3%, still outnumbered
Kazakhs almost two to one (FocyaapCTBeHUMH KOMHTCT CCCP no craTuc''THKe n.d.: 300). In the "capitals" of five oblasts (i.e., oblast centers), Ka:zakhs accounted for under 15% of the population.17
?»! Azerbaijanis, unlike Kazakhs, never became a minority in their titular
.republic. Their share in Azerbaijan's population dropped between 1926
'and 1939, but only modestly, from only 62.1% to 58.4%. The other two
major groups were Russians (9.5% and 16.5% — 1926 and 1939, respectively) and Armenians (slightly over 12% in both years) (BcecoiosHasi
i 1939 roma 1992: 71; KOSJIOB 1975). By 1959, however, ethnic Azerbaijanis
already constituted over 67.7% of their republic's inhabitants (LICY
;i962b: 134).
^ Although, like Kazakhs, they were a minority in urban areas, unlike
Kazakhs they were a large presence: In 1926 Azerbaijanis accounted for
86
W. Fierman
-;!
Capital Population
Composition Almaty, 1939
Other,
9.6%,
Ukr.,
7.2%.
f>>&
Capital Population
Composition Almaty, 1959
Russ., .^tfW&ftJ?
45.2%
l
'
Capita) Population
Composition Almaty, 2004
3.
Ger.,
0.8%
12.5%
40.2%
Capital Population
Composition Almaty, 1989
Other,
Ger.,
Figure 6.
12.5%
Kaz.,
22.5%
Capital population composition for Almaty — J030, 70J0, Y059, 7009, and 2004
37.6% of the Azerbaijan SSR's urban inhabitants (Bcecoiosnan nepenucb
nacejienun 1926 zoda 1928-1929), this fell only slightly, to 36.7%, in the
1939 census (Bcecoioanaa nepenncb 1939 ro^a 1992: 71).18 In the capital
city their presence in 1939 was somewhat weaker — only 29.2%, as compared to 42.5% for Russians and 14.7% for Armenians (1992: 71). By
1959, when Azerbaijanis already accounted for 51.3% of the Azerbaijan
SSR urban population, they constituted only 32.9% of the capital's inhabitants (LJCy 1962b: 140). This picture, however, is in stark contrast to
Language status in education and the workplace in the Soviet era
As we begin to look at status of Azerbaijani and Kazakh in their "home"
republics during the Soviet era, it is worth noting that generally Soviet
nationality policy was more lenient in the Caucasus than elsewhere. This
general tendency applied to language policy in particular. Thus, although
from the mid-1930s onward the Communist Party promoted Russian lan.''guage throughout the USSR, it was less aggressive in Azerbaijan, Arme'nia, and Georgia. The relative leniency is also evident in the Union republic constitutions adopted in 1978: only those of Armenia, Georgia,
and Azerbaijan retained reference to the titular language as the republic
state language. This concession was apparently made in response to demonstrations that erupted in Tbilisi after publication of the draft constitution that omitted reference to Georgian's special status. This is significant,
.among other reasons, because it demonstrated that the Moscow leadership had to consider local sensibilities very carefully in pursuing language
policy in the south Caucasus. Furthermore, the fact that all three republic
constitutions (but none in other republics) granted the concession, demonstrates that the Soviet leadership was obliged to balance or coordinate
policies in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. A concession in only one
or two of the republics without the other(s) would have been problematic.
*^<The respective positions of the titular language in Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan during the mid- and late-Soviet era are inextricably linked to
popular attitudes. Qualitative accounts suggest that urban Kazakhs often
grew up feeling that the Kazakh language had no future; among other
things this may have reflected views of their Slavic (and russified Kazakh)
neighbors who viewed Kazakh with derision. The analogous tendency
was much less pronounced in Azerbaijan. Reminiscing in 1989, the KaUakh writer Baqytzhan Momyshuly recounts his attitude in childhood
| .to the opening of the Kazakh-language boarding school in Almaty: he
.thought the institution was for culturally backward children and those
with disabilities. Momyshuly reports that in the Soviet era many Kazakh
;
Other,
87
; the situation in Kazakhstan where, as noted above, Kazakhs comprised
under 17% of the total urban population and under 9% in the capital
"city. Furthermore, although, as noted above, Kazakhs had increased to
26.7% of the Kazakh SSR urban population in 1989, by that tune Azerbaijanis had grown to 76.7% in Azerbaijan SSR cities (CTaTHCTHHecKHH
KOMHTer CHT 1992: 127-135). Although the share of Azerbaijanis in the
capital was only 66.0%, this is still far above the Kazakh share of their
capital city's inhabitants, 22.5% (Dunlop et al. 1993: 1099, 1100).
Capita) Population
Composition Almaty, 1999
Kaz.,
^11.1%
72.1%
Language vitality
88
W. Fierman
parents who had themselves experienced difficulties due to poor Russian
sent their offspring to Russian schools because they saw no prospects for
their native tongue. The result was that, "We, these children, did not
understand our mother tongue, and even when we did understand it,
we considered it rather shameful to respond in Kazakh." Moreover,
Baqytzhan Momyshuly recalls, he and most children like him began to
look down on adults whose Russian skills were inferior to their own
(MoMtnuynw 1989).
Perhaps among a rather narrow stratum of urban ethnic Azerbaijanis
in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, the attractive opportunities for
social and political advancement associated with Russian also fostered
negative attitudes toward the Azerbaijani language. However, there is no
evidence that such an outlook was nearly as widespread in Azerbaijan as
in Kazakhstan.
This contrast in attitudes toward the "national" language in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan is also reflected in the fact that a number of the
most famous Kazakh writers of "nationalist" works composed in Russian. This applies to one of the most famous Kazakh literati of the late
Soviet period, Olzhas Suleimenov, as well as such writers as Rollan Seisenbaev, Bakhtzhan Kanapiyanov, and Bulat Dzhandarbekov. As one Kazakh journalist recently noted, in the 1970s Suleimenov was the key figure
who opened career doors for other Kazakh writers (Kerre6eK 2006).19 Although a number of prominent Azerbaijani Soviet-era writers also wrote
in Russian — e.g., Rustam Ibrahimbeyov, Magsud Ibrahimbeyov, and
Natig Rasulzade — their compositions by and large were not about problems related to Azerbaijani history or national consciousness.20
The relative status of titular languages in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
is clearly reflected in the language of education. Education, of coiirse, is
both a cause as well as a result of language prestige: the availability of education in a language contributes to the prestige of the language; at the
same time, the prestige of a language also contributes to demand for education in it. In the case of Kazakh, a large share of titular nationality children in urban areas attended Russian-medium classes. Most cities had
few if any Kazakh-medium schools. In the case of Almaty, then capital
city with a population of hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs, only two
schools provided Kazakh-medium instruction.21 Although no precise
data are available for the mid- to late-1980s on the proportion of urban
ethnic Kazakh pupils who studied in the Russian medium, almost certainly it was substantially more than half: in the 1990/91 school year (by
which time there had been something of a "boom" in Kazakh-medium
education),22 about 49% of Kazakh urban pupils were still in Russianmedium classes.
Language vitality
89
\k I have been unable to obtain analogous data for urban schools in Azerbaijan, but it is obvious that the picture was radically different. In the
1960/61 school year, 68.5% of all (i.e., both urban and rural) school pupils in Azerbaijan attended Azerbaijani-medium classes. This figure was
slightly higher than the 67.5% share of ethnic Azerbaijanis in the entire
republic population in the 1959 census. Similarly, the share of all pupils
'in Azerbaijan's primary and secondary schools in 1978/79 (82.5%) was
higher than the share of Azerbaijanis in the republic in the 1979 census
(78.1%) (AcnanoB 1989: 52-62; Data from the Soviet Census 1980).23
Even allowing for larger families among Azerbaijanis than Russians and
Armenians, such a high share of enrollment for rural and urban areas
combined would have been impossible if at least a majority of Azerbaijani urban children did not study in the Azerbaijani medium. The strong
position of Azerbaijani in schools is confirmed by the data for Baku,
^Azerbaijan's capital. There, where in 1986-1987 ethnic Azerbaijanis comprised approximately 66% of the city's population, about 44% of school
pupils of all ethnic groups were educated in Azerbaijani (Dunlop et al.
1993; Azerbaijan Ministry of Education 2007).
Despite the dominance of the Azerbaijani language in urban education,
\n schools and Russian tracks of mixed schools in Azerbaijan were
••as a rule better equipped with books and technical facilities than Azerbaijani schools. Furthermore, the Azerbaijani language was often not taught
as a serious subject in the Russian tracks and schools (Garibova in this
issue). This was certainly also the case in Kazakhstan; unlike most cities
of Kazakhstan, however, Azerbaijani urban areas had a large share of titular nationality population; the urban environment provided all pupils —
including those who attended Russian schools — many opportirnities to
'encounter the titular nationality and the titular language in public life.
Both in Azerbaijan as well as in Kazakhstan, Russian language was an
^obligatory subject in the primary and secondary school curriculum. On
paper this had been true since 1938, when the Soviet government and the
Communist Party adopted a decree ('nocTaHOBJiemie') mandating that all
non-Russian schools in the USSR include Russian in the curriculum
(Simon 1991: 150). However, it was only in the Brezhnev era and years
immediately after that the campaign for Russian-language instruction
reached its height. The Party and state adopted a decree in 1978, "On
measures for further improving the study and teaching of the Russian
language in the Union Republics," which was followed by another joint
decree in 1983, "On further measures for improving the study of the Russian language" in the same spirit; a school reform in 1984 called for additional measures to "insure a mastery of Russian by all secondary school
graduates" (Kieindler 1991: 220).
90
Language vitality
W. Fierman
As in primary and secondary education, in higher education Kazakh's
status was also inferior to Azerbaijani's. Because in many fields Kazakhlanguage higher education was (justifiably) viewed as inferior to that in
Russian, even many graduates of Kazakh secondary schools chose Russian tracks in universities and institutes. In the 1989/90 academic year,
only 17.9% of all students enrolled in Kazakhstan's higher educational
institutions studied in Kazakh-language groups. Even among ethnic
Kazakh students, only 32.7% were in such groups (Xacair^jiw 1992: 185).
Given the efforts starting in 1987 to raise the status of Kazakh in higher
education, it is certain that Russian was even more dominant in the 1970s
and early 1980s than these data indicate for 1989.
Many of the students in Kazakh tracks in higher education in the late
Soviet era were on trajectories to become teachers in rural schools. This
was especially true of those in pedagogical institutes; however, some
Kazakh-track university students in such fields as mathematics or sciences
were also preparing for careers in rural schools. In parallel fashion,
Kazakh tracks in journalism also prepared rural youth, many of whom
came from and would return to the village upon completion. The same
applied to Kazakh institute students in specialties related to agriculture
and livestock-raising. Still others, in petroleum engineering, intended to
pursue careers in the west of Kazakhstan, where there were high concentrations of Kazakh speakers. Unlike those in agriculture or livestockrelated specialties, who might attend all classes in Kazakh, "Kazakhtrack" students in technical specialties such as petroleum engineering or
medicine would study for the first two or two and a half years in Kazakh
(covering general education subjects); specialized technical courses, taken
during the second half of institute studies, were generally in Russian. Finally, history and philology faculties at Kazakhstan universities also had
Kazakh tracks; at least in the case of the premier university of Kazakhstan, Kazakh State University, admission was very competitive and prestigious.
Unlike in Kazakhstan, in the late Soviet era Azerbaijan's higher education operated primarily in the titular language. This was partly due to
the fact that the overwhelming majority of all higher education students
in the republic were ethnic Azerbaijanis. For example, at the beginning
of the 1980s, they comprised 76%. Among them, only about one-fifth
studied in Russian-language sectors (AaepSajpKaHCKHi* JISBIK B ctjiepe
1982: 3S-39).24 The proportion of students in Azerbaijani-language sectors varied considerably from institution to institution. The Pedagogical
Institute, though it was located in Baku, prepared cadre primarily for
schools outside the capital. This institute had no Russian track. In Azerbaijan State University, approximately 70% were in the Azerbaijani sec-
91
«tors. By contrast, the figure in the Petrochemical Institute was only about
I- 50%, and in somefakultets of that institute all instruction was in Russian
f (1982: 39).
|f Higher education textbooks in the titular language were a problem in
both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Few textbooks appeared in Kazakh:
in 1966, the number published was 32 (across all higher education disciplines; ^eumpneB 1976: 147). It appears that many more titles appeared
in Azerbaijani, where publication of higher education textbooks greatly expanded already in the mid-1950s (AsepOazuKancKHM HSHK B ccjjepe 1982: 38).
^Nevertheless, even in Azerbaijan the quality and range of subjects were
l reportedly a serious problem at the beginning of the 1980s (1982: 40).25
;v$ Russian occupied an important role in the urban workplace in both
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Indeed, Russian was a prerequisite for anyone aspiring to official positions in the government, especially in urban
areas. Even in Azerbaijan, many members of the titular nationality were
more comfortable in Russian than "their own" national language, and
they worked among non-Azerbaijanis who did not know Azerbaijani.
Furthermore, it was also common practice for Azerbaijanis communi' eating with each other in the workplace to shift into Russian if nonAzerbaijanis were present. Nevertheless, inasmuch as already in 1970,
Azerbaijanis — overwhelmingly Azerbaijani speakers — comprised over
60% of the republic urban population, Azerbaijani was frequently used in
urban work settings.
la In Kazakhstan, on the other hand, in the 1970s and 1980s, Russian was
the overwhelming language of communication in the urban workplace.
Above all this was because Kazakhs were usually a small minority in
urban factories and urban offices. Furthermore, most urban Kazakhs
had at least some Russian skills, while their Russian colleagues rarely
knew much, if any, Kazakh.26 Although asymmetrical bilingualism in
.the urban workplace was the rule in both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan,
the demographic composition of Azerbaijan's cities meant that the titular
language was spoken by a much larger share of the population 'than in
Kazakhstan. Parallel to the pattern in Azerbaijan, Kazakhs speaking in
the urban workplace generally shifted to Russian if non-Kazakhs were
present. Because of Russian dominance in the urban workplace, it appears Kazakh was little used.
4. The post-Soviet era
f As is clear from the above discussion, during the Soviet era the titular
1 language in urban areas in Kazakhstan lost much more ground than the
92
W. Fierman
titular language in Azerbaijan. Since independence, the domains of both
Azerbaijani and Kazakh have expanded in their respective countries.
Nevertheless, Azerbaijani continues to be in a much stronger position
than Kazakh. In Azerbaijan, Russian today might be described as "first
among the minority languages," and one which is especially valued by
the elite who place a higher value on it as a lingua franca and source of
cultural exposure (Garibova in this issue); however, even in the capital
city, Azerbaijani is clearly the dominant language. On the other hand, in
most Kazakhstan cities, Russian continues to eclipse Kazakh. The difference in language status in the two countries is reflected in their respective
laws. Russian has no official status in Azerbaijan that makes it superior
to any of that country's other minority languages. In contrast, both Kazakhstan's constitution (adopted in 1995) and the Law on Languages
(adopted in 1997) give Russian a role that towers over other minority
tongues. Both of these documents explicitly state that Russian "is officially used on a par with Kazakh in state organizations and organs of local self-government ['caMoynpaBnemie']" (3aKOH 1997; KoHcnrryuHfl 1995).
Although the similarities and differences in language status in the two
countries reflect processes already evident in the last decades of Soviet
rule, various contextual factors, including the political paths chosen by
the leaders of post-Soviet Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, have also affected
language status. Leaders in both countries have emphasized the state language as a major symbol of their independent countries' identity. This
carries relatively few risks for legitimacy in Azerbaijan, where the large
majority of the population is ethnic Azerbaijani and speaks the Azerbaijani language. The situation is different in much more ethnically diverse
Kazakhstan. There, although President Nazarbayev has also proclaimed
that all fellow citizens (regardless of ethnicity) should learn Kazakh, he
has also frequently emphasized Kazakhstan's multi-ethnic and multiconfessional nature, and stressed that Russian will continue to play a major role in the country.27
As in previous eras, geography and especially demography have
continued to have a profound impact on language status in independent Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Most importantly, Azerbaijan has had
much less to worry about in terms of minorities on the border with Russia
seeking autonomy to determine their own language policy, let alone calling for unification with Russia. True, it appears that on occasion Russia
has supported aspirations articulated by some Azerbaijani Lezgins who
seek more autonomy from Baku or demand arrangements that would allow them to join Lezgin co-ethnics inside Daghestan (i.e., in Russia).3*
The Lezgins, however, constitute only a few percent of Azerbaijan's population. Furthermore, Russia likely tempers its policies towards the Lez-
Language vitality
93
!• gins, since any change in promotion of Lezgin interests might profoundly
' affect demands by other ethnic groups elsewhere inside Russia.
f>.. Unlike the small minority ethnic group straddling the RussianAzerbaijani border, in the case of Kazakhstan the minority is Russians.
Even before Kazakhstan's independence, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn provoked a vehement response among Kazakhs when he issued a treatise in
effect urging secession of northern and eastern regions from Kazakhstan
and incorporation into Russia. In the same spirit, in the early years of independence vocal groups of Russians inside Kazakhstan demanded more
linguistic rights, sometimes with vague threats couched in rhetoric implying that their territories might be better off as part of the giant neighbor
to the north (Commercio 2004). This, along with the ethnic Russian and
linguistic dominance in Kazakhstan's north and east, has no doubt moderated linguistic "nationalization" in that country.
^ .Despite this important difference, in both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan
| demographic changes since the late 1980s have increased the share of the
titular group, and thus benefited the titular languages. Azerbaijan's ethnic
^ minorities, which constituted about 17% of the population in 1989, had
'declined to under 10% by 1999 (Umudlu 2001). Much of this was a result
'of the departure from Azerbaijan's cities of Russians and Armenians.
Whereas, as noted above, both Russians and Armenians comprised 5.6%
Azerbaijan's population in 1989, by 1999 they had declined — in the
territory still under Baku's administration — to 1.8% and less than 0.5%,
respectively.29 Azerbaijan's ethnic composition also became more monoethnic due to the arrival in Azerbaijan of Azerbaijanis fleeing Armenia
and Armenian-occupied territories. The refugees and displaced persons
have settled primarily in Baku and other major urban areas. A report
from 2001 purports that almost 88% of the population of Baku — which
accounts for around half of Azerbaijan's urban population — consists of
Azerbaijanis (Umudlu 2001).
& Though Kazakhstan remains far less mono-ethnic than Azerbaijan, it
has also experienced a dramatic shift in population over the last twenty
years. Non-Kazakhs accounted for slightly over 60% of the country's
population in 1989; today there are probably about 40%.30 The shift has
been particularly stark in urban areas where, as noted above, in 1989 Ka'zakhs were outnumbered by Russians almost two to one. Just a decade
Jater, in 1999, Kazakhs outnumbered Russians: members of the titular
nationality (who had accounted for under 27% of urban residents in
[1989) already comprised 43.2%; Russians (who had accounted for over
(51% in 1989) had declined to 41.1% (ArencrBO Pecny6uHKn KasaxcraH no
' c T H K e 2000: 15). As of 2004 the urban population in Kazakhstan
.Was 48.5% Kazakh and 37.0% Russian (AreHcruo PecnySjiHKH Kaaaxcran
94
W. Fierman
no craTHCTHKe 2004: 18). Numerous factors have accounted for this shift.
The emigration of many of Kazakhstan's Russians and other Slavs is one
of the primary reasons for this. Also important are the Kazakh birth rate,
which substantially exceeds the Slavic birthrate, and the urban-to-rural
migration of Kazakhs, especially to Almaty and the new capital, Astana.
In addition, Kazakhs have arrived in Kazakhstan from other countries,
partly in response to an official government program to encourage migration of Kazakhs to "their historical homeland."31
The demographic change has been reflected in changes in the language
of education in Kazakhstan's urban schools. As of 1990, fewer than 17%
of Kazakhstan's urban children were being educated in the Kazakh medium; by 2004 the share was over 46% (Fierman 2006: 106). The change
in urban medium of education, however, was not merely a function of
change in ethnic composition of Kazakhstan's cities. Rather, it also reflected the larger share of ethnic Kazakh parents sending their children
to Kazakh-medium schools or classes. In 1990 the share of urban Kazakh
children educated in Kazakh was about 51%; by 1999, it had grown to
over 72%. (For urban and rural areas combined, the increase was from
about 66% to 81%.) The overwhelming majority of Kazakhstan's pupils
not educated in Kazakh was studying in classes taught in Russian. This
was still the case of approximately two-fifths of all urban pupils in 1999.
including over a quarter of all ethnic Kazakh urban pupils (2006: 107).
The picture was radically different in Azerbaijan, where as of the 2004/
05 academic year, even in urban areas over 93% of all school pupils (i.e.,
not just ethnic Azerbaijanis) were attending Azerbaijani-medium classes
(Education 2005: 69). Given that a miniscule number of non-Azerbaijanis
attend Azerbaijani-medium classes and given that non-Azerbaijanis comprise at least some of the remaining 7% of school pupils, it is clear thai
well over 90% of Azerbaijanis study in Azerbaijani-medium classes. Disaggregated data on language of education for Azerbaijan's urban areas as
a whole are unavailable. However, the overwhelmingly dominant position of Azerbaijani in urban primary and secondary education is evident
from the fact that as of 2005, approximately 84% of Baku's primary and
secondary school pupils studied in Azerbaijani-medium classes (Azerbaijani Ministry of Education 2007).
While the role of Russian as medium of instruction for primary and
secondary education in Azerbaijan is clearly inferior to its role in Kazakhstan, it still maintains a significant place: according to the Azerbaijan
Ministry of Education (2007), Russian continues to be at least one of the
languages of instruction in over 350 schools.32 Furthermore, some ethnic
Azerbaijani parents still choose Russian-medium classes based on a perception that the quality of education in them is superior.
Language vitality
95
The difference in status of Azerbaijani and Kazakh is equally clear in
•the case of higher education. In Azerbaijan's higher education, Russian
> clearly plays only a secondary role. According to unofficial data from the
[Azerbaijani Ministry of Education (2007), at least 80% of Azerbaijan's
j higher education students today study in Azerbaijani.33
P, The picture in Kazakhstan is very different: the majority of higher edu[ication is still in Russian. During the 2002/03, 2003/04, and 2004/05 academic years, the proportion of students receiving their training in Kazakh
! ranged between 32% and 40%,34 though in 2006/07 it increased to almost
|44%.35 The share of ethnic Kazakh students among higher education stu; dents is, of course, much higher than this, perhaps as high as 70%. If so,
; this would suggest that a third of Kazakh higher education students are
|still in Russian-language divisions.36
liiy Not surprising, in light of the discussion above, the Azerbaijani lan. guage is the dominant language of the workplace throughout Azerbaijan,
• including in cities. The use of Russian has rapidly declined. It is used for
\l communications in the workplace among individuals who know
i Russian, and is used for communications with other countries of the
CIS. For other formal work functions, however, Russian has almost dis^appeared.
- Approximately one year after Azerbaijan's independence, in December
U992, Azerbaijan's parliament passed a "Law on the State Language"
Iwhich set out areas where "Turkic" (i.e., Azerbaijani) was to be used.
|These included sessions of parliament, publications of state organs, activ"ities of state enterprises, and the armed forces (Law of Republic 1992).
^According to several informants resident in Azerbaijan at the time, the
'shift from Russian to Azerbaijani proceeded rapidly in the official work
(of urban offices. In some instances, the poor Azerbaijani skills of employ|ees delayed or slowed full implementation, but all available evidence suggests that by the middle of the decade, Azerbaijani had largely displaced
^Russian in, office work throughout the country. Some employees who had
weak or no Azerbaijani skills emigrated; some also moved to jobs that
did not require Azerbaijani skills. Many others, however, enrolled in
Bourses to improve their language skills to the level required for their
employment. This was especially true in the case of Russian-language,'dominant ('pyccKoaatraHHe') ethnic Azerbaijanis who, nevertheless, often
knew the everyday conversational language.
| One interesting "wrinkle" in the introduction of Azerbaijani in the
^workplace was the alphabet shift back to Latin letters that was decreed
immediately after the collapse of the USSR. Initially the shift progressed rather slowly, and only in June 2001 did President Heydar
Aliyev sign a decree mandating use of Latin letters for Azerbaijani,
96
Language vitality 97
W. Fierman
including in all official governmental offices, the press, and on publicsigns (YKOS npesnaeHTa 2001).
Although Kazakh's expansion in the workplace lags far behind Azerbaijani's, it is unquestionably used much more today than a decade or
two ago. Naturally, the highest level of use of Kazakh in the urban workplace is in those cities where Kazakhs are in the majority, in particular
Kazakhstan's south and west. Elsewhere, though, Russian continues to
dominate in many domains of public urban life. Although the government of Kazakhstan has greater leverage in promoting the use of Kazakh
in government institutions than in other public settings, the articulated
policy has been ambiguous, and at least until recently "kazakhization1'
has progressed slowly.
Even before independence, Kazakhstan had drawn up a plan for shifting government office work throughout the republic within five years
from Russian to Kazakh; this was supposed to apply even to oblasts
with small Kazakh minorities and large Slavic majorities (KasaxcmancKax
npaeda 1990). This plan represented a breathtakingly unrealistic assessment of what could be accomplished. Indeed, little progress occurred during the next decade. In an apparent attempt to remedy the situation, the
Kazakhstan government adopted a postanovlenie in 1998 "On broadening
the spheres of use of the state language in state organs" (nocTanoBJienHC
npaBHTentcTBa 1999; 200-202). This document, however, also failed to
spark much action: a new state program adopted in 2001, "On the functioning and development of languages for 2001-2010," explained that
progress to date in shifting to Kazakh had remained limited primarily to
the translation of documents; the usual practice was still to produce documents in Russian and then translate them into Kazakh (FocyitapcTBeHHaji
nporpaMMa 2001).
Following the adoption of this program, individual oblasts began
announcing their shifts of office work ('.aenonpOHSBoacrBo') to Kazakh.
The first shift supposedly occurred in Qyzylorda, where Kazakhs comprise about 95% of the population. By the beginning of 2005, four other
oblasts had followed Qyzylorda's lead, and plans were in place for all
government internal office work throughout the country to be shifted
to Kazakh by 2008.37 As the end of 2007 approached, however, a "Concept paper on expanding the spheres of functioning of the state language
and raising its competitiveness for 2007-2010" noted that "even in regions with an overwhelming majority of Kazakh population" the indicators of office work in Kazakh were "not positive;" and in central government organs "only 20% to 30% of documents" were being prepared in
Kazakh.38
The problems in shifting to Kazakh even in government work vividly
illustrate the vast difference between the linguistic environment in
, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. In February 2005, a review of language of
office work ('icttcypriay/nejionpoHaBOACTBo')in Atyrau Oblast (on paper,
. one of the first to shift) revealed that only about 15% of the documents
circulated ('icpKar afinanwM') were in Kazakh (Ic KaFas^apbin 2005). As
; the chair of Kazakhstan's Committee on Languages noted in an inter• view in late 2006, some oblasts had approached the shift to Kazakh just
nominally" ('tJjopMajibno'): they created translation departments that
| "rubber stamped" Kazakh translations of Russian originals; in fact, as
the disclosed, rarely did anyone read or use the Kazakh text (AniJmBHT
• 'nayHHoro noaxoAa 2006). A comprehensive assessment of the real state
\f affairs is exceedingly difficult, among other reasons because of multi* pie and contradictory deadlines for shifting government office work to
!t Kazakh.39
\\t officials have pointed to Kazakhstan's central government apparatus as one of the primary reasons for the sluggish shift. They allege
\t because much of the correspondence and paperwork sent from the
capital is in Russian, it is easiest to use that language (Ic wawpbiH
2005). At lower levels (raion or towns) in predominantly Kazakh areas
'of Kazakhstan, Kazakh appears to be used substantially more than at
the oblast level or above.
;,:' The slow progress of linguistic kazakhization in government offices
is reflective of the policy established by Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev, who has urged patience in the shift to Kazakh. Speaking in the
late summer of 2004, he said, "It is precisely the Russian language which
unites our nation ['namm*] and it will take time for the Kazakh language
to begin to fulfill this unifying role" (npesiweHT Kaaaxcrana 2007). A similar message was delivered by a Kazakhstan Constitutional Council postanovlenie issued in response to an inquiry from a group of deputies who
asked for a clarification of the meaning of the Constitution regarding use
of language in government. Although the postanovlenie indicated that the
^Constitution should not be interpreted as making Russian a "second state
language," it also emphasized that the Constitution does mandate equality ('paBCHCTBo') in the use of Kazakh and Russian in state organizations
and organs of local self-government (B rocopranax 2007).
'/•' Space does not permit an exploration of office work outside of state institutions. However, based on first-hand observation and numerous interviews in spring 2007 in five cities of Kazakhstan, it appears that on the
whole, the success of kazakhization of office work in private enterprises
in urban areas of the country with large non-Kazakh populations is even
less than in state institutions.
;
98
W. Fierman
5.
Conclusion
Language vitality
As has been illustrated above, Russian Imperial and subsequent Soviet
policies resulted in the Russian language acquiring a very important role
in education and the workplace in both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The
extent of the penetration of the Russian language was shaped by the
unique constellation of factors for each republic, including geographic,
historical, demographic, and political moments. Even in the Soviet era,
however, the titular language maintained a much larger domain of use in
Azerbaijan's cities than it did in cities of Kazakhkstan. Since 1991, the
status of the titular language in both countries has risen and its domains
broadened, though only in Azerbaijan does the titular language clearly
enjoy a status superior to Russian in urban educational institutions and
in the workplace. The difference in the situations in the two countries is
due both to the inertia of factors already in place during the Soviet era,
and to the changing environment in the respective countries since their
independence, including policies of their leadership.
Indiana University
Correspondence address: [email protected]
Notes
An unusually large number of colleagues and friends have helped me in collecting data
for this article. 1 am especially grateful to Jala Garibova for her assistance in gathering
critical information from Azerbaijan. I would also like to express particular thanks to
Aida Huseynova of Baku, as well as Eleonora Suleymenova and Aigul Kazhenova of
Almaty. The views expressed here, however, are my own, and I take full responsibility
for any factual errors or errors of interpretation.
This did not mean, of course, that the new states could ignore pressure from other
countries, especially Russia.
This foundation is provided in Stalin's (1913) treatise MapKcusM u iiatitioHcuibubtii
eonpoc 'Marxism and the national question'.
The major exception to this statement is certain rural areas of northern and central
Kazakhstan.
4. Although this article focuses on questions of language status, it should be noted thai
Russian language had a major influence on language corpus in the case of Azerbaijani
and Kazakh, as well as all other languages spoken in the USSR.
This use is particularly problematic in the case of "Azerbaijanis" since until the twentieth century "Azerbaijanis" identified themselves as "Turks" (distinguishing themselves
from Persian speakers); indeed, in Iran today both they and non-Azerbaijani Iranians
still often use this term in the same way. Furthermore, in the early twentieth century
Russians referred to "Azerbaijanis" living in the Russian Empire as "Tatars."
99
For a discussion of administrative status correlated with language of instruction in
schools, see Anderson and Silver (1984).
The major country outside the USSR where Kazakhs lived was China, followed by
Mongolia. According to one estimate, around the time of independence 1.27 million
Kazakhs lived in China, and 150,000 in Mongolia. At about the same time, 850,000
Kazakhs were said to live in Uzbekistan, 655,000 in Russia, and another 89,000 in
Turkmenistan (XacaiLVJifci 1992: 266-268).
Here "Azerbaijanis" refers to those both in northern and southern Azerbaijan.
According to the 1989 census, over 77% of urban Armenians in Azerbaijan spoke
Russian, including approximately 20% who even for census purposes declared it their
"mother tongue" (rbcKOMcrar Mmosit 1989 z.\.
For more information on this, see, for example, Pcaetunue maaxcmzo si3biK03Hanun
(1980).
For a list of some of these, see AsepdaudoicancKo-pyccKitu cnoeapb e 4-x moAiax (Baity:
Saw, 1986), TOM 1, crp. 25-28. The explanatory dictionary, Azwbaycan Dilinin Izahh
Liigdti (2000) was published by the AzSSR Academy of Sciences.
Data for Figures 1 through 6 are taken from the following sources: data for 1926:
BcecoiosHon nepenucb nacenmim 1926 ^o^a (1928-1929); data for 1939: Bcecoiosnaji
nepemicb 1939 roaa (1992: 71, 75, 76); data for 1959: LtCY (1962b: 134, 136, 140;
1962c: 164, 172); data for 1989: rocyKapcTueHHtiH KOMHTBT CCCP no crarHCTHKe (n.d.:
296, 300, 320, 484, 486, 502); data for 1999: (Kazakhstan) AreiicrBo PecnySjiHKH Kasaxcran no crarHCTHKe (2000: 6, 15, 178), (Azerbaijan) Umudlu (2001); data for 2004:
ArencTBO Pecny6nHKH Kaaaxcrau no cranicTHKe (2004: 6-7).
For a variety of reasons, estimates vary considerably on the ethnic composition of
Kazakhstan in the early twentieth century. It is obvious, however, that in this period
Kazakhs still constituted a majority of Kazakhstan's population, while Russians and
other Slavs a sizeable but rapidly growing minority. For some of this discussion, see
ActuiSeKOB H A. E. Farmes (1991) and TSTIMOB (1992), in particular pp. 50-58. For careful analysis of data available at the time, see Sheehy (1987).
Reflecting the Russian orthography, the common English spelling of the city's name
in the Soviet era was "Alma-Ata." 1 have unified the spelling in this article, spelling it
everywhere except in certain bibliographic items "Almaty."
Almaty city was not part of any oblast, but formally it was not an oblast; however, it
was treated much like an oblast, reporting as oblasts did to the republic level administration.
Large numbers of Slavs also settled in certain rural areas of Kazakhstan, in particular
during the Virgin Lands campaign.
According to Xacaayjiti (1992: 148-158), the shares were 8.6% in Petropavlovsk, 8.9%
in Qostanay, 10.6% in Oskemen, 12.6% in Qaraghandy, 14.7% in Pavlodar, and 18.8%
in Kokshetau. In Almaty city, Kazakhs comprised 22.5%. Slightly different figures are
provided in the newspaper Ana mini 11 October 1990.
In 1939, the number of Russians (almost 36%) was practically equal to the number of
Azerbaijanis; Armenians constituted another almost 15%.
5K9Jieji KerreSeK, whose article is devoted primarily to criticizing Suleymenov's alleged
Russophile tendencies, nevertheless recognizes that in the 1970s the famous author
served as the "passport" for Kazakh writers.
The writer Chingiz Huseynov is something of an exception, since he did write about
sensitive issues related to nationality in Russian. However, Huseynov studied and then
spent his entire literary career in Moscow; he was not a fixture in the Azerbaijan literary scene like the Kazakh "national" writers who composed in Russian.
100
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
W. Fierman
One of the schools in Kazakhstan was a boarding school attended largely by children
from other parts of the republic. The other (School No. 12) was largely for local children. Although on the whole Kazakh-language education was popularly regarded as
inferior, School Number 12 had a very strong reputation and many families of the cultural and political elite sent their children to this institution. Given its limited capacity.
this school could serve only a small fraction of children living in Almaty. The Kazakh
population of the city in 1979 was 147,000 (16.5% of the total); by 1989 it was 251,000
(22.5% of the total) (fbcKOMCTar Hmozu 1989^: 320).
Without data for number of pupils, it is impossible to identify the magnitude of the
boom. However, data for number of schools for 1988 and 1990 are available. In 19SX
there were 181 schools in urban areas with only Kazakh-medium instruction; by 1990
the number had grown to 268. Likewise, in 1988 there had been 242 schools with more
than one language of instruction; by 1990 the number had grown to 411. (The number
for "mixed" schools also includes a small number of schools where the "mix" of languages did not include Kazakh, and might have been, for example, Russian and Uzbek
or Russian and Uyghur.)
A small number of non-Azerbaijanis studied in the Azerbaijani medium; moreover.
Azerbaijanis constituted more of the school-age population than the 67.5% population
of all ages.
The calculation is based on the report in this source that 76% of students in Azerbaijan's higher educational institutions were ethnic Azerbaijanis, and that over 60% of the
students in these institutions were in Azerbaijani sectors.
Despite the clear picture of a much stronger role for Azerbaijani than Kazakh in
education in respective republics, it is puzzling that per capita book production in the
titular language for members of the titular nationality was substantially higher in
Kazakhstan than in Azerbaijan in 1980. At a time that Kazakhstan's Kazakh population was about 12% higher than the number of Azerbaijanis in Azerbaijan, the number
of books published in Kazakh in the Kazkh SSR was about 45% higher than the number of books published in Azerbaijani in the Azerbaijan SSR. Even if a larger share of
Kazakhstan's Kazakh-language books were destined for use in Kazakh irridenta communities of Uzbekistan, Russia, and Turkmenistan, it does explain this discrepane>
(Uenamb CCCP 1981: 140-142).
In 1989, only about 1% of Kazakhstan's urban non-Kazakhs claimed fluency in Kazakh. At the same time, almost 78% of Kazakhs in urban areas claimed a mastery ul
Russian (rbcKOMcraT Hmo^ll 1989 .?.: 296, 300). Among the employed population the
share was undoubtedly even higher.
For example, see his comments of 9 April 2007 ("flpesHfleHT ...").
Official Azerbaijan government data indicates Lezgins comprise about 2% of the country's population (Umudlu 2001).
Official Azerbaijani data show that 1.5% of the country's population was Armenian
in 1999. This appears to include Nagorno-Karabagh. The Minorities at Risk assessment at the University of Maryland estimates that only 30,000 Armenians lived in
parts of Azerbaijan administered from Baku (Minorities 2004). Even in 1989, one-third
of Azerbaijan's Armenians had resided in Nagorno-Karabagh (Dunlop et al. 1993:
1099).
In 2004 non-Kazakhs comprised less than 43% of the population; over the previous
four years the non-Kazakh population had decreased by approximately 3% (AreH. PK"
no CTarHCTHKe,Zfei/02pfl0. eoiceaodmm 2004: 18).
Indeed, because the economic scene in Kazakhstan is more favorable than in other
Central Asian countries, some individuals of mixed heritage in such countries a>
Language vitality
"ji
32.
f-.
('
:,'
33.
! 35.
!.;37.
X
;'•' 38.
V
39.
101
Uzbekistan who were registered as Uzbeks or members of other nationalities have
changed their ethnic category in order to take advantage of this program.
In 2006/07, Russian was the only medium of instruction in 19 schools; in 333 schools
it was one of two languages of instruction (the other being Azerbaijaini); one other
school with Russian also had tracks in Azerbaijani and Georgian (Azerbaijan Ministry
of Education 2007).
Ministry of Education officials informally gave two imprecise estimates. One was "approximately 10% in Russian" and the other was "80% to 90%" in Azerbaijani. Although a very small number of higher educational students may be studying in other
languages such as English or Turkish, this is almost certainly a negligible number.
Data for admissions to the Azerbaijan University of Languages may be representative:
for the 2007/08 academic year, over 82% of the students admitted were to study in the
Azerbaijani sector.
According to data gathered from different sources, in 2002/03 the share was 36%; in
2003/04 it was 32%; and in 2004/05 it was 40%. Data for 2002/03 are from CaptiH
(2004), for 2003/04 from Ry&cenGi (2004), and for 2004/05 from an e-mail sent by S.
Ispusinova of the Kazakhstan Ministry of Education dated 12 March 2005. Much
of the increase since 1989, of course, is related to the growth in the share of ethnic
Kazakhs among students in institutions of higher education.
The figure of 43.95% was cited by KyprancKaji (2007). What these figures do not tell,
however, is that even in Kazakh groups, instructors frequently resort to the use of
Russian, and it is common to use Russian textbooks because not all of them exist in
Kazakh.
No comprehensive data are available on language of higher education in Kazakhstan.
The estimate of 70% is based on the fact that Kazakhs comprise 60% of the country's
entire population and (because of the relatively high Kazakh birthrate) a higher share
among youth. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that a substantial share of
Kazakhstan's Slavic youth who enter higher education go to institutions in Russia.
The other four oblasts are Atyrau, Manghystau, Zhambyl, and South Kazakhstan
(96aiK3piMOB 2005).
This concept paper was an official document approved by the government of Kazakhstan on 21 November 2007 ("KoHuenuHsi..." 2007).
For an expose of the situation in Qaraghandy Oblast, see 5K-V-M6arajiHYJibi (2007).
K,
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