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DETERRENCE-FINITE OR INFINITE?
America's Big Question-mark in Defence
I
New York
T is held in many high offices that the deterrent power of
the U.S. Strategic Air Command is alone responsible for
preventing the outbreak of a third world war. No aggressor,
it is contended, dares initiate a general war. To do so would
ensure the destruction of the aggressor's homeland in massive
retaliatory raids by S.A.C.'s huge fleet of jet-powered aircraft.
That S.A.C bombers, each capable of delivering a thermonuclear warhead over long ranges, constitute a major offensive
force is doubted by few; but whether or not an awareness of
such a force has deterred (or is deterring) potential aggressors
is the subject of much conjecture. Be that as it may, the world
has so far been spared the frightful consequences of an all-out
nuclear war; and if this simple fact is even in a small degree
due to the existence of S.A.C., then all mankind owes a vote
of thanks to the U.S. Air Force.
Of great interest to the world, therefore, is the news that
America is considering changing her long-standing policy of
deterrence through "massive retaliation"—the policy that may
or may not be keeping the peace. Currently being debated in
the U.S. are two radically different concepts of defence. One
school of thought would adopt the idea of "finite" deterrence,
or the maintaining of retaliatory forces somewhat inferior to the
aggressor's offensive strength. The other group supports the
theory of "infinite" deterrence. Advocates of this viewpoint hold
that war can be averted only as long as the U.S. possesses overwhelming retaliatory forces. Legitimate arguments have been
voiced in support of each policy. These will be discussed later.
Two related conditions have prompted America to review her
defence policy. One is a military consideration; the other is
economic.
To the U.S., the potential aggressor is the Soviet Union.
Considerable alarm has been expressed over the forthcoming
introduction of ICBMs into the inventory of the U.S.S.R.'s
armed forces. Certain intelligence reports estimate that Russia
will have 100 such missiles tactically deployed in 1960. The
same sources report that no fewer than 500 ICBMs will be in
place the following year, while appraisals for 1962 and 1963 have
ranged as high as 1,000 and 1,500 respectively. A figure of 2,000
missiles has been cited for 1964. As proved to be the case with
earlier estimates of Soviet jet-bomber production for the 19581960 period (in the spring of 1956 General Curtis LeMay told
Congress that by 1959 Russia would have twice as many longrange bombers as the U.S.), there are reasons for believing that
By DONALD A. IMGRAM
today's estimates of Russian ICBM production are somewhat
exaggerated. But if they are indeed correct, America (and the
entire free world) will be faced with her gravest threat since
the beginning of the Cold War.
How best to counter this threat is the question now being
debated. Before the evolution of the ICBM, American defences
were attuned to deterring attacks by the U.S.S.R.'s fleet of subsonic bombers. To counter this threat the U.S. produced a large
(500-plus) force of B-52s. A reasonably high percentage of these
aircraft were armed and kept aloft at all times. Another group
was maintained in a high state of readiness on the ground, and
only a small proportion of the total fleet was to be unavailable for
action at any one time. It was expected that America's extensive
airborne and ground-based detection system would give several
hours' warning before an impending enemy attack. A majority
of the S.A.C. aircraft could therefore take off and be well on their
way towards delivering a retaliatory blow before a single bomb
was exploded on the U.S. mainland. This was the policy of
massive retaliation—simply the possession of an ability to drop
more bombs on the enemy than he could drop on you—and the
key to its proper functioning was a warning time of several hours.
So long as the U.S. could have more bombers in the air (before
war began) than could the potential aggressor, there were reasonable grounds for believing that an enemy would dare not attack
her. And if he did attack, the superior American force could
destroy the Soviet Union. In a sense, massive retaliation is akin
to infinite deterrence.
The emergence of the ICBM, however, necessitated a revision
of such strategy. Since the total flight-time of a long-range
ballistic missile is of the order of half an hour, it is clear that
the amount of warning that could be expected before ICBMs
fell on their targets would be only about 15 minutes. To provide
defence against a massed ICBM raid presents a formidable problem. No longer does it appear practical to have a retaliatory
force on its way before the enemy blow is struck.
Aircraft on the ground, despite their high state of readiness,
could probably not be launched in large numbers in 15 minutes.
Keeping sizeable numbers of aircraft—a much larger total than
heretofore—aloft at all times would require the expenditure of
astronomical sums of money. Initial estimates of fuel, maintenance and other costs of sustaining a large airborne fleet of B-52s
appear prohibitive, and it is unlikely that S.A.C. will attempt it
(recent news reports have suggested that they would definitely
not do so). Instead, it is probable that the Command will keep