University of Trento
School of International Studies and
Department of Humanities
Facing adversities: The EC Nine and the First Oil
Shock. Engine for Integration or step towards
disintegration?
- Elia Di Fonzo -
Going Global. The History of EC/EU External Relations. A Jean Monnet Module
on the History of European Integration (Professor Sara Lorenzini)
Elia Di Fonzo - Facing adversities: The EC Nine and the First Oil Shock.
Table of content
Introduction
3
The Yom Kippur War as an international crisis
3
The EC and its Middle-East policy
4
The oil embargo: “the best bank is a hole in the ground”
6
The inadequacy of the OECD in facing the crisis
7
Long and short term effects of the shock as foreseen by contemporaries
8
West Germany as a case study
10
The Declaration on the Middle East
11
Reactions to the Declaration and criticism to EC officials
12
Everyone is on his own: the lack of a common energy policy in the EC
14
From the Copenhagen summit to the Washington Conference
15
Conclusion
16
Bibliography
18
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Elia Di Fonzo - Facing adversities: The EC Nine and the First Oil Shock.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyse the main events that followed the Oil Crisis of
1973 within and outside the EC and to examine the dynamics of political relations
among the Nine member states. Both the policy towards the Middle East, and
towards the United States will be taken into account as they are tightly bound with
the developments that occurred within the Community itself. The failure of the
OECD1 will also be addressed, albeit briefly.
The following questions will be asked in order to try and scrutinize the evolution
of the EC during the crisis: What role did the EC Nine play in the crisis? Did they
agree on a common policy towards the Middle East? Was the Arab oil embargo
crucial in their decisional process? What plans were drawn within the community
to face the energetic crisis that was due to follow the embargo? Did they agree on
a common energy policy that could be adopted within the EC or did particular
(national) interests prevail? Lastly, did the crisis provide Europe with an engine
for Integration?
Research on this topic has been done using archival material from the Historical
Archives of the European Union as well as other primary sources, such as
interviews with contemporary witnesses. Moreover, a number of recent academic
essays have been consulted and compared with the original documents, in order to
draw a cohesive and exhaustive picture of the events examined in this paper.
The Yom Kippur War as an International crisis
On October 6th 1973, Israel was attacked by the joint forces of Syria and Egypt,
who hoped to regain the territories they had lost to the Jewish State in 1967 during
the Third Arab-Israeli War. Most probably, they aimed at achieving limited
military objectives that could be later exploited politically2. The surprise attack
occurred on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar: The Yom Kippur. Although
the attackers initially caught the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) by surprise, the
defenders were quick in turning the tide of the war, recapturing the Sinai
Peninsula and driving back the Syrian Army from the Golan Heights. During the
conflict, the Superpowers actively supported their allies through resupply efforts,
a dangerous play that risked to escalate in an open confrontation between the
1
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
D. Hellema, C. Wiebes and T. Witte, The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis. Business as Usual,
Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2004.
2
3
Elia Di Fonzo - Facing adversities: The EC Nine and the First Oil Shock.
U.S.A. and the Soviet Union. As pointed out by Gfeller3, the “Yom Kippur war
turned the Middle East into a Cold War hot spot. Both the United States and the
Soviet Union set up airlifts to resupply their allies with military equipment.”
A ceasefire was imposed on the belligerents by the UN and ultimately signed by
Egypt and Israel on October 24th, mostly because of pressures from U.S. Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger, who urged them to adopt UN resolution 339, and not to
annihilate the encircled Egyptian Third Army, an action that might have led the
Kremlin to directly intervene in the conflict. Indeed, Soviet threats prompted
Kissinger to even call for nuclear alert4, causing some friction within the Atlantic
Alliance5. The following is the text of UN Resolution 339 from 23 October 1973:
The Security Council, Referring to its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973,
1. Confirms its decision on an immediate cessation of all kinds of firing and of all military action,
and urges that the forces of the two sides be returned to the positions they occupied at the moment
the cease-fire became effective;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to take measures for immediate dispatch of United Nations
observers to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between the forces of Israel and the Arab
Republic of Egypt, using for this purpose the personnel of the United Nations now in the Middle
East and first of all the personnel now in Cairo.
Adopted at the 1748th meeting by 14 votes to none. 6
The EC and its Middle-East policy
Gfeller7, while trying to assess France’s role inside the EC, brilliantly manages to
draw a general picture of the conflicting views about the Middle East and in
particular about the conflict between the Arab states and Israel that afflicted the
Community before the Yom Kippur War. Regarding a common “Arab policy”,
she maintains that “the real shift occurred in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur
War. The Quay d'Orsay8 played an active role in drafting a joint EPC9 declaration
on the Arab-Israeli conflict. It also presented a blueprint for Euro-Arab
partnership”10. Furthermore, she adds that a key factor that drove their movements
was the fact that European countries had been left at the margins during the
3
A. Gfeller, Building a European Identity. France, the United States and the Oil shock, 19731974, New York, Berghahn Books, 2012, p.91.
4
Highest peace time alert ever: Def Con 3 (Defense Conditions).
5
A. Gfeller, Building a European Identity, p.92.
6
“UN
Resolution
339”,
23
October
1973,
available
on
line:
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/27BD226AE2CF54B9852560C500663CEE (last access:
25/09/2015).
7
A. Gfeller, Building a European Identity, 2012.
8
French Foreign Ministry.
9
European Political Cooperation.
10
A. Gfeller, Building a European Identity, p. 85.
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Elia Di Fonzo - Facing adversities: The EC Nine and the First Oil Shock.
peacemaking process. Although important, Europe was just one of the several
playgrounds in the epic Chess-game between the two Superpowers.
At the outbreak of the war, the EC Nine were sharply divided between pro-Israeli
and pro-Arab attitudes. The likelihood that the EPC would manage to devise a
common plan concerning the Middle East was thus far from plausible, the most
they could achieve being a common cease-fire appeal on the 13th of October. Not
surprisingly, this statement was not welcomed by the Arab countries, which
expected the full implementation of UN resolution 242, demanding for a complete
withdrawal from the territories occupied by Israel. It is important to stress that the
weakness of this European position was the direct consequence of division within
the EC.
On the one hand, there were The Netherlands11 and West Germany, who
displayed a “pro-Israeli outlook”12, with Denmark going in that direction as
well13, all three blaming Syria and Egypt for the outbreak of the war. On the other,
by contrast, there was France, who in the mid-1960s had strengthened its ties with
the Arab states14, and the newest member of the community, the United Kingdom,
who prioritized its oil interests. The FCO15 even strongly recommended “taking
care not to identify ourselves in any way with the Israeli war effort […] and to
express as much sympathy as possible with the Arab side.”16 Also Italy belonged
to the latter group.
11
It had developed a strong alliance with Israel and had helped it with military supplies during its
wars in 1956 and 1967 and a number of Israeli soldiers and officers had been trained in The
Netherlands in the 1960s. Moreover, during the October War, the Dutch government supplied
Israel with tank shells, spare parts, machine guns and engines for the Centurion tanks. These
supplies were loaded on Israeli transport aircrafts of the type Boeing 707, and transportation flights
begun on the 12th of October, most probably using “civil flight corridors”. Furthermore, there were
also accusations that The Netherlands had sent military experts and volunteers to fight for Israel.
See: D. Hellema, C, Wiebes and T. Witte, The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis, pp. 18-53
12
A. Gfeller, Building a European Identity, p. 88.
13
The Danish prime minister claimed that he would be “willing to defend the aggressiveness of
Israel to a large extent”. See A. Gfeller, Building a European Identity, p.94.
14
Gfeller reminds that France had bilateral agreements with the Arab governments that guaranteed
them the oil supplies they needed. There were also important commercial interests involved, with
Libya and Iraq being top clients of France’s armaments’ industry. Regarding conflicting interests
within the EC, before the oil crisis Paris had been busy trying to enhance its competitive strength
in the oil trade by implementing the ports of Le Havre, Marseille and Dunkirk with the clear aim
of challenging the role of Rotterdam as leading European port. See: D. Hellema, C, Wiebes and T.
Witte, The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis, p.77.
15
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
16
A. Gfeller, Building a European Identity, p. 94.
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Elia Di Fonzo - Facing adversities: The EC Nine and the First Oil Shock.
However, despite their differences, the EC Nine would soon take an official stand
with the situation in the Middle East and it could be argued that the pro-Arab shift
that followed was a direct result of the OAPEC’s17 oil policy.
The oil embargo: “the best bank is a hole in the ground”
Back in the 1970s Western European countries relied on imported oil to meet over
50 per cent of their energy needs18. Arab oil imports corresponded to 45% of the
EC’s energy needs in 1973, a figure that had significantly increased if compared
to the 13,4% of 1956 and the 36% of 196719. Apart from Great Britain, all EC
states had replaced coal with oil as the main source of energy. Despite this
dependence on imported oil, which was vital, Europe had not yet been able to
agree upon a common energy policy because “clash of interests between member
states had always stood in the way of such agreement”20. This means that when on
October 17th 1973 nine Arab oil-producer countries21 announced that they would
immediately increase crude oil prices by 70% and cut their production by 5%
(corresponding to 5 million barrels/day) every month until Israel had withdrawn
from the occupied territories and had recognised the rights of the Palestinians, the
EC was faced with the threat of finding itself in a potentially dangerous energetic
crisis22. A report drafted at the height of the crisis stressed that a huge problem
would also be a “clear danger of inflationary expectations gathering further
momentum”23. The report added that “it is undoubtedly the economic, social and
political consequences of the combination of a sharp acceleration of inflation with
a rather slow growth of real output that poses the most serious problems”24.
Furthermore, to worsen the situation, on the 20th of October an embargo on oil
deliveries to the U.S.A.25 was issued, The Netherlands26 following the day after in
17
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.
A. Gfeller, Building a European Identity, p. 94.
19
D. Hellema, C, Wiebes and T. Witte, The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis, p. 41.
20
Idem, p. 45.
21
Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Syria.
22
France relied on imported oil to meet 67% of her energy needs, whereas West Germany relied
on oil for 55% of its needs and Italy was dependent for 74% of its needs. See: D. Hellema, C,
Wiebes and T. Witte, The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis, p. 44 .
23
“A Preliminary Assessment of the Situation Created by the Relaxation of the Restriction on the
Supply of Oil and the Further Sharp Increase in Prices” drafted by the Permanent Delegation to
the OECD, 8 January 1974, in Historical Archives of the European Union (hereinafter HAEU),
Fond BAC-028/1980-0689.
24
Ibidem.
25
The U.S.A. relied on imported oil to meet 35% of its energy needs.
18
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Elia Di Fonzo - Facing adversities: The EC Nine and the First Oil Shock.
response to its pro-Israeli line. However, it could be argued that The Netherland
was hit by the embargo not only because of its political stance, but also because of
the importance of the port of Rotterdam. Indeed, by imposing an embargo there,
the Arab countries were putting the whole EC under pressure, given the fact that
the port was of great importance to Europe’s oil flow. This was true in particular
for West Germany and Belgium, who relied heavily on oil importations transiting
through The Netherlands. Furthermore, given its pro-Israeli stance, also Denmark
was hit by the embargo.
The inadequacy of the OECD in facing the crisis
The situation was quite different from the one that Europe had faced in 1967 with
the short embargo. Back then, the United States, who was a member of the
OECD, had been able to allocate resources to Western European countries, thus
preventing the outburst of an energy crisis. This was no longer possible in 1973,
given the huge changes in the oil market that had occurred at the beginning of the
1970s27. Indeed, producing countries had asked for higher shares in the profits of
oil companies, nationalized part of their oil industry and had started demanding
higher prices. At the same time, Western Europe, Japan and the United States had
increased their dependence on imported oil. As a consequence of these changes,
OECD officials urged European countries to adopt some measures aimed at
building up oil reserves: at least a stock sufficient for 90 days28. This need for a 90
days stock is testified in a huge number of official documents29, like the “Rapport
sur la situation des stocks dans la communaute”30, that claimed that in April 1973
there were 71 days of oil autonomy within the EC, increased to 86 by October.
The report continued by stating that in order to face the oil shortage the
governments had been forced to use part of these reserves, thus diminishing them
of about 8-10%. However, one should be cautious in analysing these figures,
because, as stressed within the report, there were no common “méthodes de
calcul”.
26
Those Arab states who had proclaimed the embargo accounted for 2/3 of Dutch’s oil imports.
See H. Türk, “The Oil Crisis of 1973 as a Challenge to Multilateral Energy Cooperation among
Western Industrialized Countries”, in Historical Social Research Vol. 39 Issue 4 (2014), pp. 209230.
28
ibidem, p. 213.
29
See: HAEU, BAC-028/1980_0689.
30
“Rapport sur la situation des stocks dans la communauté”, in HAEU, BAC-028/1980_0689
27
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Elia Di Fonzo - Facing adversities: The EC Nine and the First Oil Shock.
At the same time, plans were devised by the OECD that aimed to reduce oil
consumption in every single member country in the case of a crisis and at
establishing a system of oil sharing among OECD members. However, the latter
represented only “one of a range of efforts the consuming countries could make to
survive a future crisis scenario and reduce their dependence on Middle Eastern
oil”31. What was really important was to find new resources, to stockpile oil and
to ration consumption. Nevertheless, this common plan had not yet been activated
when the crisis started, and was presented too late, in November 1973. However,
given problems in the negotiations, no common decision was taken and it was due
to the oil companies to oversee oil rationing32.
An additional problem that hindered cooperation was provided by France and
Great Britain, who wanted to keep and ensure their privileged position and thus
avoided cooperation with the pro-Israeli United States or The Netherlands.
Additionally, single countries tried to play their own game knowing that the Arab
countries divided oil-consuming countries into three categories: hostile, neutral
and friendly and acted accordingly. This strategy used by the OAPEC, reminiscent
of the Roman divide et impera, proved to be successful in preventing the
formation of a united front. More in general, the OECD had failed in shaping a
common, shared policy that would have enabled its members to overcome the
crisis. It had been a good forum for discussion, where data and information had
been exchanged, but it had proven too weak to stand up to the Arab policy.
Moreover, the unanimity rule within the OECD had hindered decisive action to be
taken33.
Long and short term effects of the shock as foreseen by contemporaries
In an enlightening report, compiled for the EC, the Dutch commission tried to
assess the damage the above mentioned sanctions would have inflicted, pointing
out that: “Dans la situation actuelle, le deficit total de production de pétrole est
estimé, dans les milieux de l’industrie pétrolière, à 4 à 5 milions des barrels par
jour. Cela représente annuelment une perts de 200 à 250 milions de tonnes, soit
environ 10% de la consummation mondial de pétrole[…]Environ 45% du pétrole
31
H. Türk, “The Oil Crisis of 1973 as a Challenge to Multilateral Energy Cooperation among
Western Industrialized Countries”, p. 215.
32
Ibidem.
33
Ibidem.
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Elia Di Fonzo - Facing adversities: The EC Nine and the First Oil Shock.
brut déchargé aux Pays-Bas est destiné
au transit. En outre, il existe une
exportation importante de produits raffinés aux les Pays-Bas vers les pays voisins,
de sorte que, outre les Pays-Bas, ces pays sont touches par le boycott […]”34. This
interesting report continued by describing a series of measures issued by the
Dutch government aiming at reducing the consumption of energy, such as
forbidding the use of cars on Sundays, lowering heating, stockpiling oil and
similar countermeasures. It concluded by claiming that:” Une diminution
prolongée et sévère pourrait avoir des conséquences graves pour la fonction si
importante de transbordement qu’assument les Pays-Bas et en particulier
Rotterdam, et pour l'industrie de transformation de pétrole “. Indeed, in a report
about energetic issues, the “Bilan d’ Energié”35, which regarded the year 1972, the
amount of exports of oil from The Netherlands corresponded to 46% of its oil
supplies. The vast majority of these exports were directed towards EC members, a
staggering 44%.
As the quoted report above shows, these measures were a good reason for concern
within the EC, and the situation took a turn for the worse on 5 November when
OAPEC members decided to reduce their oil production to 25 per cent below their
September level of production. Having a total dependence on imported oil, Europe
now found itself in a very precarious position, as testified by a letter from Kelz to
the Secrétariat Général in Brussel expressing concerns about future fuel shortages
and urging them to take drastic measures:
“Wie wir sehen, wird den Europäern der Ölkrahnen demnächst zugedreht werden. Alles
wäre nicht so schlimm, wenn man sich nicht inzwischen nur noch auf Motorkraft
eingerichtet hätte […]Wir müssen damit rechnen, dass im nächsten Sommer und auch
schon im Frühjar nicht genug Treibstoff vorhanden sein wird, um unsere Landmaschinen
zu betreiben […] Ganz gleich ob die Leute in kalten Stuben sitzen müssen, muss sofort
dafür gesorgt werden, dass die Ölreserven für die Landwirtschaft des nächsten Jahres
gesichert werden. Außerdem muss ja auch für die Verteidigung Öl reserviert werden[…]
Es darf kein Liter Öl oder Benzin mehr verbraucht werden, wenn dies für die Erhaltung
des Lebens nicht unbedingt nötig ist.” The letter ended with a clear admonishment
foreseeing the possible course of events:”Entweder stört man sich nicht an meine Wörter
und fährt solange bis es keinen Tropfen Öl in Europa mehr gibt, oder es werden sofort
Maßregeln ergriffen, die nötig sind um eine große Hungerkatastrophe in Europa zu
Verhindern”36.
34
“Situation dans le secteur du pétrole” drafted by the Dutch delegation to the EEC, in HAEU,
Fond Emil Noël (hereinafter EN) 81, available online:
http://archives.eui.eu/en/fonds/112931?item=EN.14-04-81 (last access: 25/09/2015)
35
“Bilan d’ Energié”, in HAEU, EN-81.
36
H. Kelz, letter to the Secrétariat Général, 5 November 1973, in HAEU, BAC-028/1980_0689.
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Elia Di Fonzo - Facing adversities: The EC Nine and the First Oil Shock.
In a similarly alarming report written by Hᴓgaard for Ortoli immediately after the
decision to further cut production, huge concerns were expressed about the effects
the restrictions were having: ”A ce moment, en effet, les restrictions de fornitures
dé pétrole brut décidées par les pays arabes commenceront à affecter sensiblement
les quantités livrées en Europe, et il serà inacceptable que la Communauté soit
alors désarmée face aux perturbations graves que cette situation ne manquera pas
de susciter sur le marché”37. In other words, Europe needed to construct some
effective countermeasures because it was too exposed to the threat of precipitating
into an energy crisis.
The message that the Arab states had sent was clear: Europe had to make a clear
statement condemning Israel’s aggressive policy in the Middle East and to act
accordingly, otherwise they would have had to suffer from oil shortages and the
consequences these would have brought about. In Gfeller’s words:” OAPEC
would not lift its oil restrictions so long as pro-Israeli EC states had not
demonstrated through actions their commitment to an Arab-friendly peace
settlement in the Middle East”38.
West Germany as a case study
As already mentioned, without a common energetic policy or resources of its own
to meet its energy needs, Europe found itself in a very vulnerable position, relying
completely on imported oil as “pas une goutte de ce petrole n’etait produite en
Europe”39. West Germany was no exception, as a report40 regarding 1972 shows:
oil covered 55% of the energetic needs of the country, and 95% of that oil was
imported from countries outside of the EC. Indeed, as former Staatsminister Karl
Moersch recalled about West Germany in an interview in 199941, the situation was
quite desperate:
37
HAEU, BAC-028/1980_0689
A. Gfeller, Building a European Identity. France, the United States and the Oil shock, 19731974, New York, Berghahn Books, 2012, p.99
39
Interview with Georges Brondel, 25 February 2004, in HAEU, INT705, available online:
http://archives.eui.eu/en/oral_history/INT705 (last access: 25/09/2015)
40
“Bilan d’énergie, 1972”, in HAEU, EN-81
41
Interview with Karl Moersch, 11 June 1999, in HAEU, INT652, available online:
http://archives.eui.eu/en/oral_history/INT652 (last access: 25/09/2015)
38
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Elia Di Fonzo - Facing adversities: The EC Nine and the First Oil Shock.
”Die Ölkrise, das war ein ganz entscheidender Einschnitt für alle Aktivitäten […] Das
Erstaunliche an der Ölkrise war, dass sie nicht vorausgesehen wurde. Ich hatte in Bonn
darüber berichtet, dass sie droht. Meine Kenntnis bezog ich aus einem Zusammenstoß mit
Djallund, dem Stellvertreter von Gheddafi, bei einem Besuch in Tripolis. Er hatte mir
angedroht, dass sie als großer Ölproduzent eventuell einmal zwei Jahre lang kein Öl mehr
verkaufen würden. Sie hatten inzwischen genug Dollars in der Reserve, und dann konnten
wir mal sehen, wo wir bleiben. Wir hatten, glaube ich, damals fast 40 Prozent unseres Öls
aus Lybien bezogen […] Lybien wollte uns mittels unserer Abhängigkeit von Öl zu einer
anderen Israelpolitik zwingen. Es war vorauszusetzen, dass sie einmal das Öl als Waffe
gegen uns einsetzen wollten. Die Schlauköpfe in Deutschland, die mit der arabischen
Welt kooperierten, hatten alles mögliche untersucht, bloß nicht die wirstchaftlichen
Fragen und Abhängigkeiten.”
This interview sheds some light on the extent to which a pro-Israeli country could
be vulnerable and exposed to the threat of having its oil supplies cut off or, in the
best case scenario, drastically reduced. Furthermore, it demonstrates how
unprepared West Germany was to face an eventual oil crisis, notwithstanding the
fact that it relied heavily on imported oil to meet its energy needs. More generally,
as Gfeller42 points out, Western governments had failed in pursuing policies
aimed at effectively reducing their dependency on imported oil, or at least
reducing the suppliers’ bargaining power.
The war had moved from the sandy and hot battlefields of the Middle East to the
more intricate soil of international relations and the Arab states had a powerful
weapon at their disposal: oil.
The Declaration on the Middle East
Although the war had officially ended and peace discussions under a UN and
Soviet umbrella were under way, this did not coincide with an interruption of the
oil embargo or a change of policy by the OAPEC, which had clear aims. As
mentioned above, their resolution to cut oil production to 25 per cent below their
September level caused much concern within the EC. In such a troubled situation,
even the more pro-Israeli countries were disposed to revise their position and tend
towards a more Arab-friendly attitude43, even if that would cause frictions with
the U.S.A.
What followed has been considered to be a “historical novelty”44. On the 6th of
November 1973, for the first time in recorded history, EC states made a joint
42
A. Gfeller, Building a European Identity.
Idem, p.94
44
Idem, p.97
43
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Elia Di Fonzo - Facing adversities: The EC Nine and the First Oil Shock.
statement on a major international issue. The Declaration on the Middle East
determined a marked pro-Arab shift, at least on an official level, which was not
exempt from criticism, as we will see later. Based on UN resolutions 242 and 338,
it called for “the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has
maintained since the conflict of 1967 […] respect for the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and independence of every State in the area and their right to live in
peace within secure and recognized boundaries […] recognition that in the
establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate
rights of the Palestinians”45. The declaration concluded by emphasizing the strong
ties existing between Europe and the “littoral States of the south and east of the
Mediterranean”.
This declaration is regarded by many as a political turning point, also because the
EC Nine questioned for the first time the United Sates’ “virtual monopoly, until
then widely accepted, of Western intervention in the Middle East”46.
Reactions to the Declaration and criticism to EC officials
The pro-Arab stand implied by the Declaration was harshly criticized by many,
included the Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, who commented bitterly:” oil
for Europe rather than peace for the Middle East”47. Despite the facade provided
by their declaration however, there was still much division being endured within
the EC between pro-Arab and pro-Isaeli states. Not only was the shift towards an
Arab-friendly policy criticized by many in the higher echelons of the EC, but it
was also ill-received by a huge portion of public opinion, as testified by this letter
to the President of the political commission of the EC written by the owner of the
Ascott Import GMBH Karl Heimbrecht:
“Die Resolution wurde als Neutrale Haltung der EG verbrämt […] Durch die vorgenannte
Resolution wurde aber eindeutig eine unneutrale Stellung zum Nachteil von Israel
bezogen. Dass sich die EG nichteinmal dazu aufraffen konnte, die tapfere Haltung ihres
eigenen Mitgliedes (Niederlande) zu unterstützen, stellt für die EG kein Ruhmesblatt dar.
Durch die jetzt gefasste laue Resolution werden mögliche weitere Erpressungen (von
Arabern oder anderen) geradezu animiert”48.
45
“Joint statement by the Governments of the EEC”, 9 November 1973, available online:
http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/a08b36bc-6d29-475c-aadb0f71c59dbc3e/publishable_en.pdf (last access: 25/09/2015)
46
D. Hellema, C, Wiebes and T. Witte, The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis., p.91
47
Quoted in A. Gfeller, Building a European Identity, p.98
48
Mr. Karl Heimbrecht, letter to the EC ,7 November1973 in HAEU, BAC-028/1980_0689
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Elia Di Fonzo - Facing adversities: The EC Nine and the First Oil Shock.
Similar to this letter there is another one, written by the Executive Vice President
of the NAAFEXCO Corporation on the 5th of November:” We think that the
phenomena of The Netherlands being boycotted by the Arab Nations in terms of
oil should at least find an echo of support, both morally and economically by the
European Community. Instead, we find that each European Nation is only
thinking selfishly of its own petroleum’s welfare […] this does not speak well for
leadership qualities and it behoves the Community to thoroughly examine all of
the premises in order to show some moral courage and a unified face which can
succeed in overcoming this impasse […]”49. Also in The Netherlands public
opinion was not enthusiastic about the Declaration, the Het Patrool newspaper
claiming, “the Nine had been made the instrument of the French Middle East
policy”50.
On the other side of the Atlantic, reactions to the Declaration, and more in general
to European policy towards the Middle East, were not overly positive either.
Kissinger dismissed this change in policy as a “stampede of dissociation”51 and
complained about the lack of consultation on the part of the EC. In March 1974
Nixon lamented that “the Europeans cannot have it both ways. They cannot have
the United States’ participation and cooperation on the security front and proceed
to have confrontation and even hostility on the economic and political front”52.
These documents have been chosen because they help in understanding a few key
aspects that characterized the early stages of the oil crisis. Firstly, the pro-Arab
shift was not overly welcomed and accepted everywhere, especially in countries
with strong ties with the Jewish state. Secondly, both letters emphasize the fact
that The Netherlands were practically abandoned when the oil embargo against
them was lifted by the OAPEC. Thirdly, the United States felt as if they had been
the victims of a European attempt to outmanoeuvre them in the Middle East
policy. Last but not least, it appears very clearly the total lack of a common
energetic policy that might have helped in finding a common solution for the EC
49
Mr. John L. Suter, letter to the EC, 5 November 1973, in HAEU, BAC-028/1980_0689.
Quotation in Duco Hellema, Cees Wiebes and Toby Witte, The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis,
p.93.
51
Idem, p.93.
52
Quotation in Matthias Schulz and Thomas Schwartz, The Strained Alliance. US-European
Relations from Nixon to Carter, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.361
50
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Nine. The result of this lacking policy was the “race” for bilateral agreements and
a general encouragement of the pursuit of national interests53.
Everyone is on his own: the lack of a common energy policy in the EC.
Although the actions of the OAPEC brought about the first common declaration
of the Community on an international matter, inside the EC there was no unity.
On the contrary, lacking a common policy that might have helped overcoming the
crisis that was profiling at the horizon, each nation tried to pursue its own interest
and secure the oil supplies that were desperately needed. Moreover, it was clear
that the Declaration was not enough when in late November the oil ministers of
Algeria and Saudi Arabia came on a visit to Europe and made it clear that oil
production would return to its normal standards only if a satisfactory (to them)
settlement of the conflict could be found54. Implicitly, it was now up to Europe to
exert enough pressure on the U.S.A. in order to achieve that.
Within the European Community there was chaos and conflicting (national)
interests stood in the way of a common energy policy. It is therefore not
surprising that the crisis was characterized by a general lack of solidarity between
EC states. Hendrik Tent, former Head of Division at the DG Energy, recalled in
an interview in 201255:” I started when the first Oil Crisis of 1973-74 was fading
away slowly. And I lived through that period in The Netherlands […] The oil
crisis was still, let’s say, 'getting on' so there, what I knew from my work in The
Netherlands, what struck me was that there was no solidarity between countries.
So we had meetings between the Commission and member-states but it did not
lead to much, to be honest. It was everybody on their own and it was mainly due
to the oil companies’ to distribute oil over the various countries in a more or less
equal way. The question of course at that moment was issued in a paper, how to
become less dependent on oil and anyhow on energy; how to reduce energy
consumption. It was discussed but it had not an interest from the member-states,
and the Commission was not playing a major role.” When asked about the reason
why that was happening, he replied: “Because the member-states thought that
energy was too important to be left to the Commission and they wanted it on their
53
See A. Gfeller, Building a European Identity.
Idem, pp.99-100.
55
Interview with Hendrik Tent, 5 April 2012, in HAEU, INT278, available online:
http://archives.eui.eu/en/oral_history/INT278 (last access: 25/09/2015).
54
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Elia Di Fonzo - Facing adversities: The EC Nine and the First Oil Shock.
own. They had very different energy policies of course, if they had a policy by the
way. It was a question-mark itself. I mean, let’s say the United Kingdom had its
own oil but Italy, which had no nuclear power at all, was more dependent on oil.
So the others said ok, you cannot ask us for more oil because you should do
something about it. […] It was really everybody on its own”.
It is very important to emphasize the fact that the supply cuts encouraged every
EC member to pursuit its own interests in an attempt to secure the much-needed
oil. However, “bilateralism encouraged competition, rather than cooperation”56
and this crisis thus provided Europe with a hard challenge for integration. As
Simonet claimed during a conference in the U.S.A.57, these bilateral trades posed
a dangerous threat to the framework of international trade because, through
protectionist policies and preferential agreements aimed at ensuring the supplies
in this “scramble for oil”, it would be “Europe as the largest trading entity in the
world” to suffer the most.
From the Copenhagen Summit to the Washington Conference
As described above, there was no solidarity within the EC, and by mid-November
relations between the various members “appeared to become more acerbic than
ever”58, despite the political display of unity provided by the joint Declaration. In
particular, there was tension between The Netherlands on the one hand, and
France and Britain on the other, who opposed any measure aimed at sharing the
brunt of the oil shortage on equal terms59.
France wanted to promote a Euro-Arab Dialogue, a policy independent of the
United States60, aimed to dampen the conflicts with the littoral States, and to
develop a communal EC energy policy, regulated within an EC framework. All
these issues were discussed at the Copenhagen summit in December, at which
four Arab foreign ministers took part, calling for closer Euro-Arab ties in the
economic, cultural and technical fields61. The summit however, proved to be a
failure with regards to energy issues. There was no common energy policy drafted
56
A. Gfeller, Building a European Identity, p.118
“Address by H.Simonet at the University of Columbia”, 26 March 1974, available online:
http://aei.pitt.edu.ezp.biblio.unitn.it/12934/1/12934.pdf? (last access :25/09/2015).
58
D. Hellema, C, Wiebes and T. Witte, The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis, p.126.
59
Ibidem
60
And opposed by the United States.
61
A. Gfeller, Building a European Identity, p.100
57
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and although problems related to oil shortages were on the agenda, the member
states’ representatives could not agree on a communal approach. The policy was
opposed by France and Britain as it might have prompted the Arab countries to
extend the oil shortages and the embargo to them as well. Again, national interests
prevailed over a common EC policy.
Mainly due to differences of views within the EC, France failed to shape a
common Middle East policy independent of the U.S.A. It is true that the
Declaration on the Middle East represented a step towards a common European
foreign policy, but it did not achieve the hoped for results. If it is true that the
Copenhagen summit had prompted the Declaration on European Identity, it is
also true that it did not lead to promising results with regards to energy issues. On
the contrary, in the following weeks, “commercial rivalry”62 between the
importing countries had sharply increased. It would not be within an EC
framework, but in Washington, in February 1974 that the energy issue would be
finally dealt with. The conference, which was organised by Nixon, aimed to create
a task force (Energy Action Group) that would forge “a concerted consumer
position for a new era of petroleum consumer-producer relations”63 and devise a
common oil-sharing plan that could be activated in the event of a crisis. However,
this historical event and the developments that followed go beyond the scope of
this research and will not be discussed in this paper.
Conclusion
To conclude, it could be argued that the first oil shock and the energetic,
economic and political crisis that followed represent a turning point in the history
of Western countries, and of Europe in particular. The EC proved to be
completely unprepared to face the situation, and contrasting views and interests
within the community were an obstacle for devising and coordinating a common
energy policy. Furthermore, the race for bilateral agreements exacerbated a
situation that was already intricate and shows the lack of solidarity between
member states. The failure of a common European energy policy forced EC
countries (with the notable exception of France) to bind their future, with regards
to energy issues, to the United States in the aftermath of the Washington
62
63
D. Hellema, C, Wiebes and T. Witte, The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis., p.193.
A. Gfeller, Building a European Identity, p. 123.
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Elia Di Fonzo - Facing adversities: The EC Nine and the First Oil Shock.
Conference. In doing so, the U.S.A. reasserted its leadership over its European
allies64 after a period of tensions in Atlantic relations.
But there is also the other side of the coin: Taking Künhardt’s model of crisis as
engines of integration in European history65, one could say that the oil shock
prompted the first joint statement of the EC on an international issue, notably
through its Declaration on the Middle East. By doing so, European leaders were
laying a milestone in European Integration history, not only because they were
shaping a common policy for the future, but also because they were taking the
first steps towards a Euro-Arab dialogue.
64
Idem, p.121.
See L. Künhardt, Crisis in European Integration. Challenges and Responses, New York,
Berghahn Books, 2009.
65
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19