DETECTION, MODELING, AND ASSESSMENT OF RADIOLOGICAL
CONDITIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF A RADIOLOGICAL
PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM
______________
A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
San Diego State University
_______________
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science
in
Radiological Health Physics
_______________
by
Kimberly Denise Alston
Fall 2012
iii
Copyright © 2012
by
Kimberly Denise Alston
All Rights Reserved
iv
DEDICATION
This thesis is dedicated to my daughter, Sidney. You have been such a source of
inspiration, strength, and motivation for me and I love and appreciate you for it.
v
ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
Detection, Modeling, and Assessment of Radiological Conditions: An Analysis of
A Radiological Preparedness Program
by
Kimberly Denise Alston
Master of Science in Radiological Health Physics
San Diego State University, 2012
The constant potential exists for a radiological or nuclear emergency to occur
anywhere in the Nation. There are numerous local, State, and Federal assets available to
respond to small- and large-scale emergencies but without certain elements any radiological
preparedness plan is ineffective. National preparedness starts at the top; Presidential Policy
Directive 8 (PPD-8) was released emphasizing the importance of taking an "All-of-Nation"
approach to addressing threats and hazards to the Nation. Combining important emergency
management principles with detection, plume modeling, and assessment capabilities of
radiological conditions, communities can prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover
from a variety of radiological disasters.
Steps have been taken since the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina to
improve the security and resiliency of the Nation. The emergency preparedness cycle guides
agencies at all levels of government in their efforts to meet the standards set forth in PPD-8
and its supplemental guidance. This thesis examines a variety of homeland security,
emergency response, and technical nuclear/radiological references with the purpose of
applying this guidance to enhance the local preventive radiological/nuclear detection
capabilities of San Diego County and its surrounding area. During the analysis of these
references, a common theme addressed by the authors was the need to improve detection,
plume modeling, and assessment of radiological conditions in radiation preparedness
programs at all levels of government. San Diego State University is taking a proactive
approach in improving this capability by: (1) providing technical educational opportunities,
(2) subject matter expertise, (3) equipment and (4) assessment tools to the local and/or
regional response community in the context of the current National Preparedness framework.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
ABSTRACT ...............................................................................................................................v
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................... ix
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................x
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................... xii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................. xviii
CHAPTER
1
INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................1 National Preparedness Goal (NPG) .........................................................................3 National Preparedness System (NPS) ......................................................................4 Radiological Preparedness .......................................................................................6 2
NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS MISSION AREAS ....................................................8 Prevent .....................................................................................................................8 Protect ....................................................................................................................10 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) .........................................................10 Transportation Security Administration (TSA) ...............................................11 Mitigation...............................................................................................................13 Hazard Assessment ..........................................................................................14 Hazard Identification .......................................................................................21 Response ................................................................................................................25 Local Response ................................................................................................26 State Response .................................................................................................38 Federal Response .............................................................................................38 International Response .....................................................................................40 Recover ..................................................................................................................41 3
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CYCLE ...............................................................44 Planning .................................................................................................................45 Nuclear Power and RDD Planning Strategies .................................................46 vii
Incident Phases of Radiological Material Release Emergencies .....................52 Organizing/Equipping ............................................................................................55 Organizing........................................................................................................55 Equipping .........................................................................................................61 Training ..................................................................................................................71 Exercises ................................................................................................................77 Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program ....................................78 National Level Exercises .................................................................................78 Evaluating/Improving ............................................................................................80 4
DETECTION, MODELING, AND ASSESSMENT...................................................81 Detection ................................................................................................................81 Portable Detection ............................................................................................82 Transportable Lab Equipment..........................................................................85 Standoff Detectors ...........................................................................................85 Wide Area Detectors ........................................................................................86 Portal Monitors ................................................................................................87 Radiological Air Sampling ..............................................................................87 Plume Modeling Services and Tools .....................................................................89 HotSpot Health Physics Code ..........................................................................91 National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) ...........................95 InterAgency Modeling Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC) ...............98 Medical and Technical Assessment Tools .............................................................99 Medical Assessment.........................................................................................99 Technical Assessment ....................................................................................106 5
SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY’S EFFORTS IN RADIOLOGICAL
PREPAREDNESS .....................................................................................................116 Graduate Program in Homeland Security ............................................................117 Radiological Health Physics Degree Program .....................................................118 SDSU the Way Ahead .........................................................................................118 Courses and Equipment .................................................................................119 Plume Modeling and Assessment ..................................................................119 Laboratory Capabilities ..................................................................................121 viii
Reachback Support ........................................................................................122 6
CONCLUSIONS........................................................................................................124 REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................126 APPENDICES
A ADDITIONAL REFERENCE INFORMATION ......................................................135 B SAMPLE OUTPUT PRODUCTS FROM MODELING TOOLS.............................143 ix
LIST OF TABLES
PAGE
Table 1. Summary of HSPD-8 and PPD-8 and Their Major Components ................................2 Table 2. National Preparedness Mission Areas and Core Capabilities ......................................9 Table 3. Most Likely Materials Used in RDDs .......................................................................18 Table 4. Analysis of Radiation Devices and Their Effects ......................................................19 Table 5. Nuclear Material of Concern and Significant Quantities..........................................24 Table 6. Radiation Safety Zone Recommendations by NCRP and CRCPD ...........................27 Table 7. EPA Protective Action Guide Dose Guidelines for Emergency Workers .................31 Table 8. Categories of Medical and Radiological Triage ........................................................35 Table 9. Protective Action Guidelines for Use in a Radiological Emergency in the
Early and Intermediate Phases .....................................................................................51 Table 10. Groups and Subgroups used in Operational Guidance ............................................53 Table 11. Possible Federal Coordinating and Cooperating Agencies for a
Radiological Incident ...................................................................................................61 Table 12. PPE Recommendations for Radiation Emergencies ................................................67 Table 13. National Planning Scenarios for Radiological Attacks............................................79 Table 14. Radionuclides of Concern to be Included in the CDC Urine Screening
System ........................................................................................................................101 Table 15. Summary of Plume Modeling and Assessment Software Progams .......................122 Table 16. Core Capabilities and Target Capabilities Crosswalk ..........................................136 Table 17. Levels of Personal Protective Equipment per OSHA Regulation .........................138 Table 18. Specific PPE Selection Matrix for Radiation Emergencies ...................................140 Table 19. Subsyndromes of Acute Radiation Syndrome .......................................................141 x
LIST OF FIGURES
PAGE
Figure 1. Organization of the national preparedness doctrine. ..................................................5 Figure 2. TSA layers of security between terrorists and passengers in U.S. transit .................... systems. .......................................................................................................................12 Figure 3. Types of ionizing radiation and appropriate shielding material. .............................23 Figure 4. Radiation protection principles: time, distance, and shielding .................................29 Figure 5. Calculation of stay-times for first responders based on radiation zones and
EPA PAGs. .................................................................................................................33 Figure 6. FEMA Emergency Preparedness Cycle. ..................................................................44 Figure 7. Approximate emergency planning zones around San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station. ......................................................................................................47 Figure 8. Keyhole plume pattern used in the NRC evacuation plan. .......................................49 Figure 9. Summary of exposure pathways and protective actions...........................................54 Figure 10. Sample ICS organization chart for radiation emergency. ......................................58 Figure 11. Flow of communication from local to state government during an
emergency. ...................................................................................................................59 Figure 12. U.S. Army AN/PDR-77 radiation detector with alpha, beta, and gamma
radiation probes. ...........................................................................................................83 Figure 13. Standoff detectors mounted on a vehicle (left) and a trailer (right). ......................86 Figure 14. Backpack wide area detectors can be used to search for radioactive sources
in large areas. ...............................................................................................................86
Figure 15. Fixed EPA RadNet monitor (left) and deployable monitor (right). .......................89 Figure 16. HotSpot Health Physics Code atmospheric models and special purpose
programs. .....................................................................................................................92 Figure 17. RDD contours based on PAGs for public evacuation at San Diego State
University.....................................................................................................................93 Figure 18. Part 1 of the HotSpot output table. .........................................................................94 Figure 19. HotSpot output table Part 2 displaying TEDE data. ..............................................95 Figure 20. Dicentric chromosomes result from the abnormal fusion of two
chromosome pieces, each of which includes a centromere................................. ......102 Figure 21. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office reachback support flowchart. ......................110 xi
Figure 22. Radionuclide Mixture Manager window to input scenario source
information. ................................................................................................................113 Figure 23. TurboFRMAC applications window. ...................................................................114 Figure 24. Partial Worker Turn-Back Limit report. ...............................................................115 Figure 25. Contour plots produced from MCNPX data. ........................................................150 xii
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATIONS AND
ACRONYMS
NAME
AAR
AEC
AEL
AFRAT
AFRRI
ALARA
AMS
ANL
ANSI
ARG
BNL
BRAC
CAS
CBL
CBRN
CBRNE
After-Action Report
Atomic Energy Commission
Authorized Equipment List
Armed Forces Radiation Assessment Team
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute
As Low as Reasonably Achievable
DOE Aerial Measuring System
Argonne National Laboratory
American National Standards Institute
DOE Accident Response Group
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Base Realignment and Closure
Comprehensive Assessment System
ORISE Cytogenetic Biodosimetry Laboratoty
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear and
Explosives
Center for Disease Control and Prevention
CBRNE Enhanced Response Package
Cubic Feet per Minute
Code of Federal Regulations
Committee on Homeland and National Security
Clinical Laboratory Improvements Amendments
Consequence Management Response Team
Consequence Management Response Team
Commercial off the Shelf
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide
National Guard Civil Support Team
Cadmium Zinc Telluride
Dose Conversion Factors
Department of Homeland Security
Derived Ingestion Levels
Defense Nuclear Weapons School
CDC
CERFP
CFM
CFR
CHNS
CLIA
CMRT
CMRT
COTS
CPG
CST
CZT
DCF
DHS
DIL
DNWS
xiii
ABBREVIATIONS AND
ACRONYMS
NAME
DOD
DODD
DOE
DOT
DRL
DTPA
DTRA
DTRIAC
IAEA
Department of Defense
Department of Defense Directive
Department of Energy
Department of Transportation
Derived Response Levels
Diethylentriamene Pentaacetate
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Defense Threat Reduction Information Analysis
Center
Defense Threat Reduction University
Electromagnetic Radiation
Emergency Management Accreditation Program
Emergency Management Institute
DHS Environmental Measurements Laboratory
Environmental Monitoring System
Environmental Protection Agency
Electronic Personal Dosimeters
Emergency Planning Zones
Environmental Radiation Ambient Measurement
System
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Food and Drug Administration
Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Radiological Monitoring Assessment Center
Government Accounting Office
Geiger-Mueller detector
Hazardous Materials
High Enriched Uranium
Department of Health and Human Services
Homeland Security Graduate program
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8
InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization
and Interoperability
International Atomic Energy Agency
IC
Incident Commander
DTRU
EM
EMAP
EMI
EML
EMS
EPA
EPD
EPZ
ERAMS
FBI
FDA
FDRC
FEMA
FRMAC
GAO
GM
HAZMAT
HEU
HHS
HSEC
HSEEP
HSPD-8
IAB
xiv
ABBREVIATIONS AND
ACRONYMS
NAME
IMAAC
Interagency Monitoring and Atmospheric Assessment
Center
Improvised Nuclear Device
Integrated Weapons of Mass Destruction Toolkit
IWMDT Consequence Assessment application
Joint Analysis Center
Potassium Iodide
Lanthanum Bromide
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Local Disaster Recover Managers
Low Enriched Uranium
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Laboratory Response Network
Monte-Carlo N-particle eXtended
Medical Effects of Ionizing Radiation
Memorandum of Understanding
Mobile Training Team
Sodium Iodide
National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center
National Air and Radiation Environmental
Laboratory
National Council for Radiation Protection
Nuclear Emergency Response Plan
Non-governmental Organizations
National Level Exercise
DOE National Nuclear Security Administration
Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material
National Preparedness Directorate
National Preparedness Goal
National Preparedness System
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Response Framework
NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex
National Response System
National Training and Education Division
Noble Training Facility
Oak Ridge Associated Universities
IND
IWMDT
IWMDT CA
JAC
KI
LaBr3
LANL
LDRM
LEU
LLNL
LRN
MCNPX
MEIR
MOU
MTT
NaI
NARAC
NAREL
NCRP
NERP
NGO
NLE
NNSA
NORM
NPD
NPG
NPS
NRC
NRF
NRIA
NRS
NTED
NTF
ORAU
xv
ABBREVIATIONS AND
ACRONYMS
NAME
ORISE
ORNL
OSHA
OSL
PAG
PHEMCE
Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Optical Stimulated Luminescence
Protective Action Guides
Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures
Enterprise
Pasteurized Milk Network
Planning, Organizing, Equipping, Training, and
Exercise
Presidential Policy Directive-8
Personal Protective Equipment
Preventive Radiological/Nuclear Detection
Polyvinyl Toluene
Radioactive Material
Radiological Advisory Medical Team
Radiation Alert Network
PMN
POETE
PPD-8
PPE
PRND
PVT
RAM
RAMT
RAN
RAP
RDD
REAC/TS
RED
REPP
RERT
RESRAD
RHP
RIID
RSF
RSO
SA
SAVER
SDGE
SDRC
SDSU
SEL
SNM
SNS
DOE Radiological Assistance Program
Radiological Dispersal Device
Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
Radiation Exposure Device
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program
EPA Radiation Emergency Response Team
RESidual RADioactivity
Radiological Health Physics Graduate program
Radioisotope Identification Device
Recovery Support Functions
Radiation Safety Officer
Situational Awareness
System Assessment and Validation for Emergency
Responders Program
San Diego Gas and Electric
State or Tribal Disaster Recovery Coordinators
San Diego State University
Standardized Equipment List
Special Nuclear Material
U.S. Strategic National Stockpile
xvi
ABBREVIATIONS AND
ACRONYMS
NAME
SONGS
SPHL
SPR
TCL
TCS
TCSWG
TEDE
TENORM
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
State Public Health Laboratory
State Preparedness Report
Target Capabilities List
Technical Capability Standards
Technical Capability Standard Working Group
Total Effective Dose Equivalent
Technological Enhanced Naturally Occurring
Radioactive Material
Training and Exercise Plan
TurboFRMAC
Thermoluminescent Dosimeters
Three-Mile Island
Top Officials
Transportation Security Administration
Tritium Surveillance System
Tabletop Exercise
United Kingdom
Urine Screening System
Universal Task List
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response teams
World Health Organization
Weapons of Mass Destruction
TEP
TF
TLD
TMI
TOPOFF
TSA
TSS
TTX
UK
URS
UTL
VIPR
WHO
WMD
xvii
RADIATION TERMS AND UNITS
TERM or UNIT
ABREVIATION
Becquerel
Bq
gigabecquerel
Curies
GBq
Ci
millicuries
Roentgen
mCi
R
Rad
rad
Gray
Gy
Rem
rem
Sievert
Sv
kilo
k
DEFINITION
A measure of activity of a radioactive material
(radioactive isotope) in the International System (SI) of
units. One Becquerel = 1 disintegration/second
1 x 109 Bq
A measure of activity of a radioactive material
(radioactive isotope) commonly used in the United
States and some other countries. One curie = 3.7 x 1010
Bq
1 Ci = 37 GBq
1000 mCi = 1 Ci
A measure of exposure (absorbed dose) due to gamma
and X-rays emitted by a radioactive material in air
commonly used in the United States.
Rad = radiation absorbed dose. A rad is the amount of
radiation energy absorbed in some material, and can
refer to any type of radiation, For X-rays and gamma
radiation, one Roentgen = 0.88 rad or ~1 rad
A Gray is the amount of radiation energy absorbed in
some material, can refer to any type of radiation, and is
equal to the absorption of one joule per gram of
material. One Gray = 100 rads for X-rays and gamma
rays. This is the International System (SI) unit for
measuring absorbed radiation
Rem = some say stands for roentgen equivalent man. A
rem is the amount of radiation energy absorbed by
human tissue and takes into account the effective
biological damage of the radiation. Rads can be
converted to rems by multiplying by a quality factor
which is unique to the type of radiation. Unit used
commonly in the United States.
A Sievert is the amount of radiation energy absorbed by
human tissue and takes into account the effective
biological damage of the radiation. Grays can be
converted to Sieverts by multiplying by a quality factor
which is unique to the type of radiation. One sievert =
100 rem. International System (SI) of units.
1 x 103
xviii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to acknowledge my thesis committee, Dr. Patrick Papin, Dr. Robert
Nelson, and Dr. Eric Frost. Thank you all for your time, advice, and guidance throughout this
process. I am grateful for the opportunity to merge the two subjects that I am interested and
apply them in my current and future career endeavors. I would also like to acknowledge Dr.
Usha Sinha, the Chair of the Department of Physics for her hard work in achieving CAMPEP
accreditation of the Master of Radiological Health Physics program. Thanks go out to Mr.
Jeff Iles and the other members of the informal RHP meeting team. I enjoyed working with
all of you.
Thanks to the United States Army Medical Department (AMEDD) for accepting me
into the Long Term Health Education and Training (LTHET) Program and allowing me to
complete this program at San Diego State University. Special thanks to Colonel Casmere
Taylor, my preceptor and mentor.
Lastly, but not least, I would like to acknowledge my family and friends that have
supported me and motivated me along the way. I appreciate each and every one of you.
1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The current focus of National Preparedness is "...strengthening the security and
resilience of the United States"1:1 in a systematic manner. Presidential Policy Directive-8
(PPD-8), dated 30 March 2011 and signed by President Barack Obama was released
addressing the state of National Preparedness and addressing 21st century threats to the
Nation. The document directs the development of a National Preparedness Goal (NPG or
Goal) and a National Preparedness System (NPS) that allows us a Nation to achieve that
goal.1 PPD-8 reminds us that preparedness is the responsibility of the entire Nation, from the
top level of government down to the individual, including all other organizations and
communities in between. The Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act (PKEMRA) of 2006
mandated the development of national policies to direct preparedness activities for the
various threats to the Nation; the goal being the reduction or prevention of potentially
devastating consequences.2 PPD-8 and its supporting documents supersede and update
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8); the directives are similar in some
ways and both take a capabilities based planning approach. Table 1 provides a summary1,2 of
the respective components of HSPD-8 and PPD-8.
HSPD-8 was released by the Bush Administration in 2003 outlining the role of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and establishing the standards for National
Preparedness.2,3 Many of the directives in HSPD-8 were in effect prior to PKEMRA but were
right in line with the intent of the Act when it was developed.2 The National Preparedness
Guidelines were the basis of HSPD-8 and included four critical components; these guidelines
replaced the Interim National Preparedness Goal, released in 2005. The four critical
components of the National Preparedness Guidelines were: (1) the National Preparedness
Vision, (2) the National Planning Scenarios (referred to as the Scenarios), (3) the Universal
Task List (UTL), and (4) the Target Capabilities List (TCL) released in 2007.3 The National
Preparedness Vision and the UTL have been completely replaced by the new National
Preparedness System created by PPD-8. Neither the 15 Scenarios nor the TCL were directly
2
Table 1. Summary of HSPD-8 and PPD-8 and Their Major Components
PPD-8
National Preparedness Goal
"All-of-Nation" approach
Core
Capabilities List and
Capabilities
Capability Targets
In general, a combination of
National Planning
National Preparedness
plans, policies, procedures,
Frameworks in conjunction
System
training, and capabilities at
with additional supporting
all levels of government to
documents, reports, and
accomplish the Vision.
plans to accomplish the Goal.
No specific plan
Draft National Prevention
Prevention Mission
Framework
No specific plan
Draft National Protection
Protection Mission
Framework
Not included in HSPD-8
Draft National Mitigation
Mitigation Mission
Framework
National Response
National Response
Response Mission
Framework
Framework
No specific plan
National Disaster Recovery
Recovery Mission
Framework
National Planning Scenarios
None Specified
Planning Scenarios
Balanced National Scorecard
National Preparedness
Evaluation
Report
Source: Department of Homeland Security, Presidential Policy Directive-8, (Washington
DC, 2011). <http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1215444247124.shtm> and J.T. Brown,
Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the National Preparedness System: Background and
Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service Report No. R40273, 2011.
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42073.pdf>
End-State Objective
HSPD-8
National Preparedness Vision
"All-hazards" approach
UTL and TCL
addressed in PPD-8; however, PPD-8 identifies supporting capabilities required to
accomplish the Goal and the Scenarios continue to be used in training, planning, and
exercises.
The TCL was used as a method of program evaluation for Federal, State, and local
agencies to apply for DHS grant funding. The TCL described 37 capabilities required to
accomplish four (rather than five) mission areas, Prevent, Protect, Respond, and Recover.4
TCLs were used to assess preparedness levels of federal, state, local, and tribal jurisdictions
and were created by the stakeholders of these jurisdictions in cooperation with
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and members of the private sector. Taking a
“Consensus of the Community” approach, members of these communities were able to
3
identify what actions are important to Prevent, Protect, Respond, and Recover to all-hazard
scenarios.4 The capabilities in the TCL, under PPD-8 have been mapped to the core
capabilities defined in the NPG to ease the transition for all agencies and organizations.
NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL (NPG)
Success as described by the NPG is: “A secure and resilient Nation with the
capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate,
respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.”5:1 It is
essentially the specific end which will be accomplished through ways and means delineated
in the National Preparedness System (NPS). The five mission areas5 as outlined in the Goal
will be discussed in depth in Chapter 2 relative to their application to a nuclear or
radiological threat or hazard:





Preventing, avoiding, or stopping a threatened or an actual act of terrorism.
Protecting our citizens, residents, visitors, and assets against the greatest threats and
hazards in a manner that allows our interests, aspirations, and way of life to thrive.
Mitigating the loss of life and property by lessening the impact of future disasters.
Responding quickly to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet
basic human needs in the aftermath of a catastrophic incident.
Recovering through a focus on the timely restoration, strengthening, and
revitalization of infrastructure, housing, and a sustainable economy, as well as the
health, social, cultural, historic, and environmental fabric of communities affected by
a catastrophic incident.
The Core Capabilities that support the NPG were developed by the planning factors
and the Strategic National Risk Assessment used to identify the greatest risks and hazards
that pose a threat to the nation’s security. Capability targets are the metrics used to assess the
current status of preparedness at all levels of government in addition to any shortfalls. The
current set of capabilities allows for the addition of Mitigation as a mission area and greater
focus on Prevention and Preparedness activities.5 Table 16 in Appendix A presents the
mapping of the existing TCL to the new core capabilities of the NPG.6 Some capabilities on
the TCL do not map to the core capabilities and all 37 Target Capabilities were mapped to
only one core capability.6 There also may be more than one target capability mapped to each
core capability. Justification for the mapping system used and more in-depth information can
be found in the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) crosswalk guidance
document.6
4
NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM (NPS)
The National Preparedness System (NPS) is composed of six actions that are intended
for use by members of every community to achieve preparedness in conjunction with the
NPG:7






Identifying and assessing risks
Estimating capability requirements
Building or sustaining capabilities
Developing and implementing plans to deliver those capabilities
Validating and monitoring progress made towards achieving the National
Preparedness Goal
Reviewing and updating efforts to promote continuous improvement
Development and updating of frameworks to support the Goal is a critical part of the
NPS. Five frameworks are in their draft versions or being updated including the existing
National Response Framework and recently released National Disaster Response Framework.
Three other frameworks are in development for Prevention, Protection, and Mitigation
strategies. The NPS also includes: (1) the Campaign to Build and Sustain Preparedness, (2)
the National Training and Education System, (3) the National Exercise Program, and (4) the
Remedial Action Management Program.2,7
An existing component of National Preparedness doctrine that falls under the
National Preparedness System is the National Response Framework (NRF). The NRF guides
the Nation’s response to any and all hazards identified as a possible threat to the Nation’s
homeland security.8 The NRF replaced the National Response Plan in 2008 and is currently
under revision to include updated procedures. The NRF core document is supported by (1)
Emergency Support Functional Annexes, (2) Support Annexes, (3) Incident Annexes, and (4)
Partner Guides. Roles and responsibilities of organizations and their response in emergencies
are addressed in the NRF.
There are 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESF) that organize the functions and
roles of government agencies, NGOs, private sector, and volunteer organizations during a
disaster response.8 A radiological event, accidental or intentional, will require the activation
of the majority if not all of the ESFs depending on the severity of the incident.
The ESFs are:8

ESF #1: Transportation
5














ESF #2: Communications
ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering
ESF #4: Firefighting
ESF #5: Emergency Management
ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services
ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support
ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
ESF #9: Search and Rescue
ESF #10:Oil and Hazardous Material Response
ESF #11:Agriculture and Natural Resources
ESF #12:Energy
ESF #13:Public Safety and Security
ESF #14:Long-Term Community Recovery
ESF #15:External Affairs
NRF support annexes provide guidance about support functions during a disaster and
incident annexes are specific to a particular type of response. The NRF Nuclear/Radiological
Incident Annex (NRIA) guides the federal response to a nuclear or radiological incident,
either intentional or unintentional.9 Figure 1 is a diagram of the current National
Preparedness doctrine structure supporting PPD-8.
National Protection Framework
(Draft)
NPG
National Preventiion Framework
(Draft)
PPD‐8
NPS
National Mitigation Framework
(Draft)
National Preparedness
Report (NPR)
Campaign to Build and Sustain Preparedness
National
Response
Framework (Draft update)
National Disaster Recovery Framework
Figure 1. Organization of the national preparedness doctrine.
6
RADIOLOGICAL PREPAREDNESS
Now that the Nation’s plan to address modern hazards has been laid out, there must
be an understanding of what a hazard is. A hazard as defined by “Introduction to Emergency
Management,” is “…a source of danger that may or may not lead to an emergency or
disaster.”10:29 Hazards are divided into several categories:5





Natural hazards, including hurricanes, earthquakes, tornados, wildfires, and floods.
Human and animal infectious diseases, including those previously undiscovered.
Technological and accidental hazards, such as dam failures or chemical substance
spills or releases.
Conventional terrorist attacks or attacks by terrorist organizations using weapons of
mass destruction (WMD).
Cyber attacks which can also have cascading hazards such as power grid failures or
financial system failures.
The purpose of this thesis is to provide students, emergency planners/responders, and
radiation professionals with a consolidated document outlining the key elements of a
radiological preparedness program in the context of the current National Preparedness
framework. There is an abundance of information available for agencies and individuals
planning for and responding to a radiological emergency. This paper is not a technical guide
and does not re-create the federal regulations or guidelines that have been published. The
author's intent is that the thesis serves as an introduction to inspire further research to
enhance Preventive Radiological/Nuclear Detection (PRND) capabilities, combining
emergency management, organizational structure, and radiological/nuclear principles. It is
the assumption of the author that the reader has a basic understanding of radiation and
emergency management principles.
This thesis addresses the components of a comprehensive radiological preparedness
program in which the radiological hazard can arise from several different scenarios, either
accidental or intentional. Detection, plume modeling, and dose assessment capabilities are
integral components of any radiological preparedness program. The author believes that all
members of a local community should participate in the development of a cohesive
preparedness program thereby taking full advantage of the strengths of each entity resulting
in a seamless response regardless of the size of the radiological incident.
7
Chapter 2 discusses the five National Preparedness Mission Goals and provides
examples and discussion of how different levels of government agencies have complied with
the directives outlined in PPD-8. Chapter 3 discusses the Emergency Preparedness Cycle as a
vital component to planning, response, and recovery activities. Chapter 4 identifies detection,
modeling, and assessment as three requirements of any radiological preparedness program
and provides a discussion of each. San Diego State University's efforts in supporting national
preparedness are found in Chapter 5. Conclusions are found in Chapter 6, followed by
additional reference information and sample output products from two software modeling
tools in the Appendices.
8
CHAPTER 2
NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS MISSION AREAS
In order to support the all-of-Nation vision for the NPG, all communities must
prepare for a variety of different hazards. The five mission areas are supported by core
capabilities that allow agencies to assess both their capacity and vulnerabilities in their
preparedness. Core capabilities include capability targets (rather than target capabilities) for
which measurement methods will be developed. Achieving the core capabilities and capability
targets will involve the entire Nation, and in the case of radiological emergencies, subject matter
experts in the community should take a lead role in advising emergency management
professionals on how to Prevent, Protect, Mitigate, Respond to, and Recover from these
incidents.
Planning, Public Information and Warning, and Operational Coordination are the
three core capabilities addressed in all five mission areas.5 Several other core capabilities are
listed under more than one mission area, for example, prevention and protection share
several of the same core capabilities. Table 2 provides a summary5 of the mission goals and
the core capabilities required to achieve them. More detailed definitions of the core
capabilities and capability targets can be found in the National Preparedness Goal document.
PREVENT
Of the five mission areas, Prevention is primarily focused on avoiding, preventing, or
stopping a threatened or actual act of terrorism whereas the other four core capabilities are
concerned with man-made, natural, or terrorist threats and hazards that put the Nation at
risk.5 In addition to immense efforts by the intelligence community, the widespread use of
radiation detection systems being deployed in the United States and throughout the world at
borders, ports, airports and metal processing facilities is a key part of the PRND program.
The purpose of PRND applications is to detect illicit radioactive material that could be part
of a nuclear or radiological attack plan or operation. PRND detectors also are important in
detecting health and/or safety hazards, such as radiation contaminated foodstuffs and orphan
sources or other radioactive contamination in scrap streams.
9
Table 2. National Preparedness Mission Areas and Core Capabilities
Prevention
Forensics and
attribution
Intelligence and
information
sharing
Interdiction and
disruption
Screening,
search, and
detection
Protection
Mitigation
Response
PLANNING
PUBLIC INFORMATION AND WARNING
OPERATIONAL COORDINATION
Access control
Community
Critical
and identity
resilience
transportation
verification
Intelligence and
Long-term
Environmental
information
vulnerability
response/health
sharing
reduction
and safety
Interdiction and
Risk and disaster
Fatality
disruption
resilience
management
assessment
services
Screening, search,
Threats and
Infrastructure
and detection
hazard
systems
identification
Cybersecurity
Mass care services
Physical
protective
measures
Supply chain
integrity and
security
Risk management
for protection
programs and
activities
Recover
Economic
recovery
Health and social
services
Housing
Infrastructure
systems
Natural and
cultural resources
Mass search and
rescue operations
On-scene security
and protection
Operational
communications
Public and private
services and
resources
Public health and
medical services
Situational
assessment
Source: Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal (Washington DC,
2011). <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/prepared/npg.pdf>
Agencies that receive funding from DHS Preparedness Grant are encouraged to work
closely with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to “ensure that their programs
are efficiently integrated into current and future national efforts and that they are able to
leverage existing capabilities, best practices, and lessons learned from previous efforts.”11:1
The DNDO PRND program focuses on increasing the detection capabilities of organizations
10
at four key locations: (1) land borders, (2) maritime, (3) aviation, and (4) domestic interior.11
In addition to providing support and reference information, including equipment test reports,
to participating agencies, the DNDO program provides funding for the acquisition of
detection equipment, training, and exercises.
PRND information is provided to members of the response community through the
PRND Community of Interest (COI) portal.11 The portal encourages improved
communication between DNDO and the PRND community and provides a forum for
responders to share information, lessons learned, and best practices. Access to the portal is
approved on a “need to know” basis for federal, state, and local emergency response
professionals that intend to enhance the PRND capability of their organization.
PROTECT
Protection includes capabilities to safeguard the Nation against acts of terrorism and
man-made or natural disasters.5 Protection activities focus on actions that protect the
Nation’s residents, visitors, critical assets, systems, and networks against the greatest risks to
our Nation in a manner that allows our interests, aspirations, and way of life to thrive.5 Specific
activities to accomplish this mission include:
1. Critical infrastructure protection
2. Cybersecurity
3. Border security
4. Immigration security
5. Protection of key leadership and events
6. Maritime security
7. Transportation security
8. Defense of agriculture and food
9. Defense against WMD threats
10. Health security
Two agencies with major roles in the protection of the Nation against radiation threats
and hazards in conjunction with the DHS are the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
Transportation Security Administration.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has the overall responsibility of
protecting the public from hazard associated with nuclear materials.12 Since 9/11, the NRC
11
has taken steps to improve the control and security of the RAM and nuclear facilities that it
regulates. For nuclear facilities, these actions include analyses of structural integrity of
buildings against terrorist actions using aircraft and a variety of other attack methods.
Increased security procedures include the following:12,13








Ordered plant owners to sharply increase physical security programs to defend
against a more challenging adversarial threat.
Required more restrictive site access controls for all personnel.
Enhanced communication and liaison with the Intelligence Community.
Ordered plant owners to improve their capability to respond to events involving
explosions or fires.
Enhanced readiness of security organizations by strengthening training and
qualifications programs for plant security forces.
Required vehicle checks at greater stand-off distances.
Enhanced force-on-force exercises to provide a more realistic test of plant capabilities
to defend against an adversary force.
Improved liaison with Federal, State, and local agencies responsible for protection of
the national critical infrastructure through integrated response training.
Increased security and controls were mandated for organizations with industrial,
academic, and medical radioactive material licenses authorized by the NRC for RAM above
an activity level of concern. In order to reduce the risk of unauthorized use of these sources,
additional precautions were mandated for the possession and shipment of this RAM such
as:12,13





Control of access to sources.
Background checks for ancillary employees and employees employed for less than
three years.
Escorting service providers in the performance of their duties.
Strict guidance on notification procedures in the event of an attempted theft, sabotage,
or diversion of RAM.
Communication and notification procedures.
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
Composed of 50,000 employees, the TSA is responsible for the protection of the
nation’s airports, railways, and subways.14 TSA provides security officers, air marshals,
inspectors, and management officials who protect the nation's transportation systems. Most
travelers are familiar with the passenger screening systems and checkpoints at airports but
there are many other layers of security that TSA uses. As seen in Figure 2, there are 21 layers
of security in the path of the terrorist to the passenger.15 The most visible layers are the
12
Figure 2. TSA layers of security between terrorists and passengers in U.S.
transit systems. Source: Transportation Security Administration, Layers
of Security (n.d.). <http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/index.shtm>.
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response teams (VIPR) and the technology used at the
checkpoints and baggage screening areas. As stated previously, TSA is not only responsible
for airport security. VIPR was created and deployed after the 2004 Madrid train bombings to
provide visible security for train systems. These teams are comprised of federal air marshals,
security officers, security inspectors, behavior detection officers, and explosive detection
canine teams and are used to supplement existing security and law enforcement operations to
13
provide detection and deterrence resources. VIPR teams are also being used as additional
security for other forms of mass transit such as ferries. Technology plays an important role in
TSA's security operation. Some technological systems currently being used by TSA to
improve protection of the nation are:








Paperless Boarding Pass--Enables the downloading of boarding passes on cell phones
improving the ability to detect false boarding passes.
Biometrics--Enables the verification of individuals by fingerprints or retinal scanning
at airports and harbors, provides access control for important facilities.
Bottle Liquids Scanners--Detects a wide range of explosive materials in liquids and
gels that can be used for nefarious purposes.
CastScope--Allows TSA to screen casts and prosthetics. This technology was
deployed to airports near military hospitals or rehabilitation facilities that serve
amputees. CastScope uses x-ray backscatter technology to provide an image and
determine if there is any threat present in prosthesis, casts, braces, or heavy bandages.
Explosive Detection System--Technology that screens two million pieces of checked
or carry-on baggage daily.
Explosives Trace Detection--Small, flexible, and nimble. This technology tests for
traces of explosives.
Threat Image Projection--Constantly trains and updates Transportation Security
Officers on potential threats using images of guns and explosives projected onto
baggage imagery, checking their awareness and ability to detect threats in baggage.
The network also allows the most current intelligence and emerging hazards to be
disseminated in a timely manner.
Imaging Technology--More than 700 imaging technology units are in use at 180
airports nationally. This technology allows Transportation Security Officers to
identify threats on passengers quickly in order to protect other passengers and crew.
MITIGATION
Mitigation includes those capabilities necessary to reduce loss of life and property by
lessening the impact of disasters.5 Mitigation also requires an analysis and understanding of
the threats and hazards that, in turn, feed into the assessment of risk and disaster resilience in
the community.
Hazard assessment and identification are essential parts of mitigation because it gives
emergency planners and idea of what they are trying to mitigate.10 Floods, wildfires, and
earthquakes are typical hazards that have been identified by mapping resources. Planners use
design and construction of buildings, land use, financial incentives and insurance programs
as mitigation tools. Recently added to the NPG, mitigation provides a long-term benefit but
isn’t as attractive as planning or response activities. Many mitigation strategies cost large
14
sums of money, making it unattractive to communities that are already in financial trouble.
Mitigation works best from the bottom up so that local communities inform successive levels
of government of the threats and hazards that they have identified based on risk-assessment.
Hazard Assessment
There are several types of radiological incidents which all fall within one of two
major categories; either accidental or an act of terrorism. Generally, greater regulatory
control, safeguards, and security accompany larger quantities of radioactive materials, which
pose a greater potential threat to human health and the environment. These efforts aim to
prevent accidents and terrorism involving these sources. The most common nuclear or
radiological incidents are due to loss, theft, or mismanagement of relatively small radioactive
sources or technologically enhanced naturally occurring radioactive material (TENORM),
where some exposure of individuals or dispersal into the environment occurs. These are
handled at the local level with occasional federal assistance. In 2005, Grotto estimated that
10 million radioactive sources exist worldwide; several hundred have high enough activity to
qualify as a significant threat.16 The widespread availability makes it difficult to keep
accountability of them all. Most of them are used for legitimate purposes but in some
locations, security is not as stringent as here in the U.S.
Virtually any facility or industrial practice (including transportation of materials) may
be vulnerable to a deliberate act, such as terrorism, or an accident of some sort that could
release radioactive material, including a fire. Major fixed facilities, such as federal nuclear
weapons facilities, commercial nuclear fuel cycle facilities, and industries such as radiation
source and radiopharmaceutical manufacturers pose a risk of accidents and could also be
breached in an act of terrorism.9
ACCIDENTAL RADIATION INCIDENTS
Possible accidental radiation incidents can occur during radioactive material transport
or at a nuclear facility. In 2005, three million legitimate Department of Transportation (DOT)
regulated radioactive material packages were shipped in the U.S.17 Radioactive shipments in
the U.S. are placed in the following categories:


Industrial isotopes
Nuclear medicine isotopes
15



Nuclear fuel cycle materials
Nuclear waste
Government (Department of Defense/Department of Energy) movements
Medical radioisotopes are the largest number of radioactive shipments (about two
million in 2005) but 60Co as an industrial isotope represents the largest quantity of
radioactivity in shipments.17 The number of radioactive shipments in the U.S. on a daily basis
provides ample opportunity for transportation accidents that will require emergency response
to some degree. Not only are transportation accidents possible but as will be discussed later,
false alarms or alarms that require technical support in determining their cause are also
common in commerce.
The core of a nuclear reactor contains large amounts of highly radioactive material.
Hazards from a nuclear facility accident the accidental release of several types of
radioisotopes into the environment or leaking into the soil or groundwater. The isotopes of
greatest health concern are the radioiodines, primarily 131I. 137Cs is also released along with
lesser amounts of other radionuclides.18 This release may cause the public to breathe
contaminated air and radioactive particles that could be deposited on the ground, in water, or
on property and agricultural crops. In addition, food and dairy animals could graze on
contaminated pasture, passing on the contamination to consumers through milk and meat.
The site emergency plan will be activated at the beginning of the release addressing what
protective actions will be implemented to protect the public.
TERRORIST INCIDENTS
Terrorism is defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as “the unlawful
use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”19
Spangler, as cited in “Sport Venue Security: Planning and Preparedness for
Terrorist-Related Incidents” says that the two objectives of terrorism are: “...inflicting the
maximum amount of humiliation and publicizing the terrorists’ cause to the widest audience
possible.”20:6
In 2009, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the FBI released a Joint
Homeland Security Note reminding the nation that sport and entertainment venues are still
16
potential targets of terrorist activity.21 These venues can also be used for graduations,
concerts, political or social events which may provide an even bigger target for terrorists.
U.S. ports are another potential target of terrorism.16,22 Attacks at ports not only result
in injury and death but also an interruption in business and harbor operations resulting in a
disruption in worldwide trade flow.16,22 Take for example, the Long Beach-Los Angeles
harbors in California. Together, they are the third largest port in the world.22 In the vicinity of
the harbors is a myriad of businesses and facilities. Dispersed across the harbors are oil
refineries, business offices, and storage facilities visited daily by many people for work or
deliveries. The harbors are surrounded by heavily populated cities and parks, highways,
roads, and bridges. An attack on any port will create chaos and greatly damage the economy
and stability in the region.
Radiological terrorism is a viable method of achieving the two goals of terrorism
listed above. The public venue and ports make great targets for terrorist attacks because of
the challenges faced in securing these facilities considering their size and flow of people.
Radiological terrorism involves some type of device used to spread contamination or expose
people unknowingly to some type of radiation.
TYPES OF RADIOLOGICAL/NUCLEAR
DEVICES
Three types of devices are: (1) Radiological Dispersal Devices, (2) Radiological
Exposure Devices, and (3) Nuclear Weapons/Improvised Nuclear Devices.
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)
An RDD is a device that spreads RAM with malicious intent. Most often, RDDs are
defined as devices that use conventional explosives to spread radioactive material into the
environment and therefore are often referred to as “dirty bombs”. However, RDDs can also
include dispersal of RAM by crop-duster or aerosol.23,24 The harm caused by an RDD
outside of physical damage is principally contamination and denial of use of the
contaminated area, perhaps for many years. The financial costs to the nation associated with
an effective RDD could also be very significant, in addition to the psychological effects
produced by public fear of radiation.
17
These devices are highly publicized and dirty bomb threats are commonly used in
radiological training exercises. RDDs are considered a more likely threat than a nuclear
weapon for two main reasons. First, the availability of radioactive material that can be used
for dispersion can be acquired from radioactive waste or the loss/theft of sources commonly
used for medical, research, or industrial purposes. The problem lies in accountability of
millions of sources that exist worldwide. Less developed countries may lack strict
regulations governing radioactive sources making it easier for terrorist organizations or lone
actors to acquire them and incorporate them into an RDD. From 1997 to 2005, the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has collected more than 10,000 orphaned or
unwanted sources, representing over two-thirds of the at-risk sources predicted through
2010.16 The U.S. Off-Site Source Recovery Project ensures that these sources are safe and
secure in Department of Energy (DOE) facilities.16 Second, the expertise and skill required to
create an RDD is not on the same scale as that required for a nuclear device.25 Pair some
radioactive material with conventional explosives and a crude RDD device has been created.
The psychological effect caused by a smaller device with weaker RAM would still be
damaging to a population based on the publc's innate fear of radiation.
The amount of injury or human deaths and infrastructure damage attributed to the
device will depend on the type and amount of radioactive material, in addition to the amount
of explosive used. It is generally accepted by the response community that the number of
human casualties caused by a radiological release is relatively small; the effects of the
explosive will be much greater. The size of the RDD necessary to cause significant radiation
casualties would also require a lot of shielding, making it difficult to transport the weapon to
its target location. One study found that the amount of radioactive material to contaminate
230 square kilometers (88.8 square miles) would require about 140 kilograms (308 pounds)
of lead shielding.25 In addition, the amount of radioactivity that must be used in a device of
this sort would probably cause injury and possibly death to those that build the device. It is
important to remember however, that those that intend to use the device for terrorist purposes
may not be deterred by death.25
The intentional contamination of food or water can take place with the use of a RDD.
Deliberate contamination can occur either at points of contamination away from the target
point of consumption affecting large amounts of people with small amounts of radioactivity
18
or closer to the target affecting smaller amount of people with larger amounts of food or
water consumed.
Studies suggest that typical radioactive sources used in the development of an RDD
range in activity from millicuries (mCi) to tens of kilocuries (kCi). They are typically25
penetrating gamma emitters like 137Cs, 60Co, and 192Ir; alpha emitters like 226Ra and 241Am;
and beta emitters like 90Sr. Table 3 summarizes the most likely types of radioactive material
that maybe used in RDDs and some of their respective characteristics.26
Table 3. Most Likely Materials Used in RDDs
Nuclide Primary Radiation
Type (Half-Life)
90
Sr
Beta (28.6y)
Ceramic (SrTiO3)
Salt (CsCl)
238
Pu
Beta + Ba-137m
Gamma (30.17y)
Beta, gamma
(5.27y)
Alpha (87.75y)
241
Am
Alpha (432.2y)
252
Cf
Alpha (2.64y)
192
Ir
226
Ra
Beta, gamma
(74.02d)
Alpha (1600y)
137
60
Cs
Co
Primary Form
Metal
Ceramic (PuO2)
Pressed ceramic
powder (AmO2)
Ceramic (Cf2O4)
Metal
Salt (RaSO4)
Size of Source
for Calculation
in Ci (GBq)
300,000
(1.11x107)
200,000
(7.4x106)
300,000
(1.11x107)
300,000
(4.92x106)
20
(7.4x102)
20
7.4x102
1,000
3.7x104
100
3.7x103
Application that Forms
the Basis for Size of
Source
Large radioisotopic
thermal generator (RTG)
Irradiator
Irradiator
RTG used for the Cassini
Saturn space probe
Single well logging
source
Several neutron
radiography or welllogging sources
Multiple industrial
radiography units
Old medical therapy
sources
Source: Public Health Emergency, Radiological Dispersal Device Playbook (2011).
<http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/planning/playbooks/rdd/Pages/default.aspx>
Radiation Exposure Device (RED)
A Radiation Exposure Device, or RED, consists of a large quantity of radioactive
material clandestinely placed to expose people to ionizing radiation. It is usually a sealed
source or RAM in enclosed container to expose unsuspecting people and doesn’t pose a
threat of contamination unless the sealed source is leaking. Table 4 provides an analysis of
radiation devices and their effects on the population.26
19
Table 4. Analysis of Radiation Devices and Their Effects
Type
Radiological
Exposure
Device
Food or
Water
Isotope Physical Dispersal Construct Early Psych.
Form
Method
Difficulty Deaths Effect
Economic
Effect
60
Co
Cs
137
137
Cs
Pu
60
Co
238
60
Metal,
Salt
None
L
Maybe
M
L
Salt
Solution
Dissolve
L
H
M
High
Explosive
(HE)
HE
Sprayer
M
FoodYes
Water No
No
M/H
M
M
No
H
H
HE
Sprayer
M/H
Maybe
H
H
Co
Metal
Co
Ceramic
238
Pu
137
Salt,
Cs
Non60
Metal,
Co
respirable
60
Ceramic,
Co
Aerosol
238
Solution
Pu
RDD
90
Sr
Salt,
Respirable
137
Cs
Metal,
Aerosol
60
Co
Solution
RDD
a
H, M, L - High, Medium, Low
Fragment
RDD
60
Source: Public Health Emergency, Radiological Dispersal Device Playbook (2011).
<http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/planning/playbooks/rdd/Pages/default.aspx>
Nuclear Weapon/Improvised Nuclear
Device
Of greatest concern to U.S. security is the potential for a terrorist attack using a
nuclear weapon. A nuclear device could originate directly from a nuclear State, 27,28 be
modified from pre-existing weapons components (referred to as an Improvised Nuclear
Device or IND), or be fashioned by terrorists from the basic fissile nuclear materials,235U, or
239
Pu, also called special nuclear material (SNM).
Even a small nuclear detonation in an urban area may result in over 100,000 fatalities
(and many more injured), massive infrastructure damage, and thousands of square kilometers
of contaminated land. The hazard assessment predicts a single low yield device created from
stolen nuclear weapon material or fissile material. National planning scenarios use a
10 kiloton (kT) device for nuclear planning guidance.28 The three main concerns in a nuclear
explosion are the blast effects, thermal effects, and the ionizing radiation that is released after
the explosion.27-30
20
Blast effects. The blast is the most significant effect of a nuclear explosion. About a
half of the device’s energy is dissipated by the blast and its thermal energy.30 As the fire
bomb expands after the explosion it generates a pressure wave as it moves away from ground
zero (the location of the explosion). This pressure wave produces immediate injuries (internal
bodily damage, ruptured eardrums, intestinal rupture, and intestinal hemorrhaging) as people
are exposed to the high pressure and winds greater than 150 miles/hour.23
Thermal effects. One-third of the device’s energy is released as thermal energy in
two stages. The first stage is the interaction of the blast wave with the fireball; the second is
the most powerful stage that causes infrared radiation burns and burned retinas, leading to
blindness. These injuries can be sustained by those within a few miles for the blast.30 Fires
are also a concern from the thermal pulse igniting flammable materials in nearby buildings,
gas lines, or ruptured fuel tanks.
Ionizing radiation effects. The fission process in a nuclear device creates all types of
ionizing radiation: (1) alpha particles, (2) beta particles, (3) gamma rays, and (4) neutrons. As
the fireball cools, particles of dust and debris enclose the radioactive fission products that
have been created during the fission process and form what is called “radioactive fallout.”
Fallout is composed of neutron activated isotopes and products (made radioactive in the
process), nuclear material that did not fission, as well as pieces of the bomb casing and the
device. In the majority of cases, this fallout can be internalized through ingestion or
inhalation and if enough alpha and beta radiation has been internalized it may cause internal
damage resulting in sickness or death. External exposure is also caused by beta radiation
(causing beta burns on the surface of the skin if not removed in a timely manner) and wholebody gamma radiation. Over 300 radioisotope fission products are created in the process
having half-lives from a fraction of a second to months or years.23 A nuclear device may
result in contamination that starts 10 to 20 miles out from ground zero but decreases as the
shorter-lived radioisotopes decay.28,29
FALSE ALARMS
It is also necessary to understand that false alarms or false positives are possible when
screening for radioactive weapons and material during transit. False positives can become
21
commonplace as legitimate healthcare and industrial devices that contain radioactive material
are transported nationwide. With over 600 U.S. ports monitoring more than 300,000 vehicles,
2500 aircraft and 600 ships, the unnecessary investigation of multiple false alarms during
transit can take up valuable time, money, and other resources that proper technical training
and analysis can easily alleviate.31 Some of the circumstances that can trigger alarms and an
emergency response but aren’t of an illicit nature are listed below:





Naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM), including technologically
enhanced NORM (TENORM). TENORM is produced when naturally occurring
radioactive materials are concentrated or exposed as a result of activities such as
uranium mining or sewage sludge treatment. These types of radioactive materials are
frequently encountered in streams of commerce.
Legitimate radioactive materials shipments involving industrial, medical or scientific
radiation sources.
Medical radioisotopes (radiopharmaceuticals) in shipments, radiopharmaceutical
patients, or in waste shipments.
Self-luminescent items such as clocks and dials employing radium-based paints (often
shipped as souvenirs and antiques).
Detection equipment malfunction, detector interferences and human error can also
cause detection alarms.
Hazard Identification
Radiation is produced by the liberation of energy during the process a nucleus
undergoes to become stable. Radiation is either non-ionizing (radiation that does not possess
enough energy to ionize atoms) or ionizing (radiation with enough energy to ionize atoms).
In this discussion we are only concerned with ionizing radiation which includes certain
electromagnetic (EM) radiations and particulate radiation. EM radiation includes ultraviolet
and visible light, x rays and gamma rays; particulate radiation is alpha and beta particles and
neutrons. Alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons are the types of particulate and
EM radiation discussed in this paper.
ALPHA PARTICLES
Alpha particles are nuclei of helium atoms. Made up of two neutrons and two protons,
they carry a charge of +2. Alpha particles generally carry more energy than gamma rays or
beta particles, and deposit that energy very quickly while passing through tissue. Alpha
particles can be stopped by a thin layer of light material, such as a sheet of paper, and cannot
penetrate the outer, dead layer of skin. Therefore, they are harmless outside the body. When
22
alpha-emitting atoms are internalized through ingestion or inhalation, however, they are
especially damaging because they transfer relatively large amounts of ionizing energy to
living cells. A single alpha particle is able to kill, on average, three to four cells due to this
energy transfer.22
BETA PARTICLES
Beta particles are emitted from the nucleus of an atom and are essentially energetic
electrons. They are 7344 times less massive than alpha particles but are penetrating enough
to cause damage to the outer layer of skin.23 Beta paticles are less damaging inside the body
because they are less massive but can still cause major internal damage depending on the
dose received. They can be shielded with plastic or thin sheets of metal and therefore the
hazard from beta particles can be reduced by increasing distance or using shielding.
GAMMA RAYS
As mentioned above, gamma rays are not a form of particulate radiation but rather,
EM radiation. They are also emitted from the nucleus of an atom and are the most
penetrating form of radiation. Traveling at the speed of light (186,000 miles per second),
gamma radiation requires thick shielding to stop it.23 While these characteristics make
gamma radiation sound the most hazardous to the body, it isn’t. Because it requires thick,
dense, shielding to stop it, it also is the least interactive form of radiation inside the body.
Gamma rays are able to do damage from outside the body, as opposed to alpha particles
which are harmless outside of the body. The emission of gamma rays often follows the other
types of radioactive decay and is the easiest to detect. Each gamma ray has a specific energy
which serves as a "fingerprint" to a specific radioisotope and is the basis for the usage of
radioisotope identification devices. See Figure 3 for a diagram of alpha, beta, and gamma
radiation characteristics and the shielding material required to protect against them.32
23
Figure 3. Types of ionizing radiation and appropriate shielding material. Source:
Radiation Event Medical Management, Types of Ionizing Radiation, Adapted from
presentation "Emergency Department Management of Radiation Casualties" (Health
Physics Society, 2004), (2011). <http://www.remm.nlm.gov/ionizingrads.htm>.
NEUTRONS
Neutrons are another type of particulate radiation that originates from the nucleus of
an atom. Unlike alpha and beta radiation, neutrons are uncharged and cause up to twenty
times as much damage to tissue in the body as gamma radiation of comparable energy can.30
They have approximately the same mass as a proton and are the key radioactive particles in
nuclear fission. Used to make nuclear weapons and devices, special nuclear material (SNM)
is defined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as “[p]lutonium, uranium-233, or
uranium enriched in the isotopes uranium-233 or uranium-235.”33 SNM includes some fissile
material where their absorption of a low-energy (also called slow or thermal) neutron may
cause them to fission: 233U, 235U, and 239Pu.
These isotopes, in significant quantities can be the primary ingredients of nuclear
explosives. Low-enriched uranium (LEU) can be concentrated enough to make highly
enriched uranium (HEU) which is the most common and primary ingredient of an atomic
bomb.27 Fissionable materials34 are also of concern because they are capable of fissioning
after capturing either high-energy (fast) or slow neutrons. 238U is considered fissionable
because it must absorb a high-energy neutron in order to reach the critical energy necessary
to induce fission. The terms were once used interchangeably but fissile material is now
considered a subset of fissionable material. A third type of material is fertile material which
24
can be transformed into fissile material after irradiation in a nuclear reactor. The two primary
fertile materials are 232Th and 238U which are converted to 233U and 239Pu, respectively after
capturing a neutron.35
Significant quantities are of concern to radiological professionals because a
significant quantity of SNM defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is
“The approximate quantity of nuclear material in respect of which, taking into account any
conversion process involved, the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device
cannot be excluded.”36:19 SNM and their respective significant quantities, if applicable, have
been summarized37 in Table 5.
Table 5. Nuclear Material of Concern and Significant Quantities
Type of Material
IAEA Significant
Quantity
Highly Enriched Uraniuma (HEU, 235U): Higher concentration of
25 kg (55 lb)
235
U than natural uranium, with some 238U remaining. Used in
nuclear weapons and some nuclear reactor fuel.
233
8 kg (18 lb)
U: Could be used to make a nuclear explosive device.
238
235
Natural Uranium: Mostly U with less than 1 percent U. Found
in some dirt, rocks, and ceramic tiles. Ore processed into “yellow
cake” powder and then into uranium hexafluoride (UF6), a highly
corrosive gas.
Depleted Uranium (DU): Primarily 238U with most 235U removed.
Found in industrial counter-weights, shielding in radiography
cameras, some military ammunition, and some tank armor.
8 kg (18 lb)
Plutonium: Primarily 239Pu. Emits neutron radiation due to 240Pu
impurity. Used in nuclear weapons and some nuclear reactor fuel.
Neptunium-237 (237Np): Could be used to make a nuclear explosive
device.
a
Several categories of HEU: < 20% is considered low-enriched uranium; 20-80% is technically
HEU or medium enriched and can be used in reactor fuel; > 90% is considered weapons grade
uranium that can be used for nuclear devices.
Source: Department of Homeland Security, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Radiation Quick
Reference Guide CTOS0001V2.1009 (2009).
<http://ctosnnsa.org/vtra/physicalThreats/CTOS0001V2.1009_DNDO_Quick_Guide_Ref.pdf>
EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL EXPOSURE
Radiological exposure can be either internal or external. Additional sources of
exposure are internal and external contamination. External radiation exposure occurs when a
person is near a radiation source. External exposure does not make a person radioactive. An
example of this is x-ray machines which stop producing radiation when turned off, therefore
25
a person having x-rays taken are only exposed when the machine is actively producing x-ray
radiation.
Internal radiation exposure can be intentional as in the case of cancer radiotherapy
implants using sealed radioactive sources or radioiodine therapy for thyroid cancer. Internal
radiation exposure is caused by the internalization of radioactive particles through inhalation,
ingestion, and to a lesser extent, through open wounds. As mentioned in the section on the
types of radiation, alpha radiation is the most dangerous type of radiation when internalized.
During an emergency where RAM is released into the environment, intentionally or
by accident, care should be taken not to breathe particles when removing clothing over the
head or entering dusty radiation zones because the possibility of external contamination
exists. Holding one’s breath while removing contaminated clothing over the head will reduce
the possibility of breathing radioactive particles. External radioactive contamination results
when loose particles of radioactive material settle on surfaces, skin, or clothing. Internal
contamination may result if these loose particles are inhaled, ingested, or lodged in an open
wound. External contamination can easily be distributed as loose particles of radioactive
material (dust), and therefore people that are contaminate should be decontaminated as
quickly as possible to minimize contamination spread. However, the level of radioactive
contamination on any individual is unlikely to pose a health risk to other individuals.
RESPONSE
Response includes those capabilities necessary to save lives, protect property and the
environment, and meet basic human needs after an incident has occurred.5 These capabilities
are focused on ensuring that the Nation is able to directly respond to any threat or hazard,
restore basic services and community functionality, establishing a safe and secure
environment, and supporting the transition to recovery. The NRF provides national guidance
on the response procedures for levels of all government, NGOs, and private sector
organizations. It serves as a continuity document during times of turnover, ensuring that
agencies still comply with national established procedures for an all-hazards response.
26
Local Response
According to the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex (NRIA), radiological
incidents should be handled at the lowest level possible.9 As the capabilities at each level are
exceeded, and the incident grows in complexity and size, the response also grows in size. The
range of professionals involved in protecting and responding to radiological and nuclear
threats have expanded. A comprehensive nationwide preparedness program now shares what
was once the responsibility of specialized military units with local first responders, state, and
federal agencies.
A terrorist incident immediately calls for federal technical, law enforcement, medical,
and other supporting agencies as required.29 Local agencies rarely have the technical assets,
manpower, and expertise necessary to successfully manage a large-scale emergency incident
involving radioactive materials. Many functions need to be addressed during an emergency,
ranging from medical and public health tasks to performing a situational assessment and
ensuring control of the incident. The Incident Command System (ICS) is used to manage
personnel, equipment, and other resources to ensure the completion of these tasks. The ICS is
discussed further in Chapter 3.
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
Situational awareness is the most critical task that an IC can perform. Situational
awareness allows the IC to monitor all of his or her resources and ensure a competent
response to the incident. A capable IC is a key part of an effective response. It is even more
challenging in a CBRNE incident because the IC usually is not a technical expert in the type
of hazard that he or she is required to manage so they are required to process, comprehend,
and make decisions with the information they receive on the ground at the incident site.
Sometimes, just by performing a visual assessment of the area possible hazards are
immediately identified resulting in a quicker response (e.g. identifying radiation placards or
labels).
ESTABLISH SECURE AND CONTROLLED
AREAS
Various agencies have provided recommendations and guidance for areas that are
called radiation zones, boundaries, and/or controlled areas.38 The size and nature of the
27
incident will dictate what radiation zones need to be established. Table 6 summarizes the
Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD) and the National Council for
Radiation Protection (NCRP) guidance for establishing radiation control zones.26 NCRP
Report No. 165 offers the following advice for initial on-scene actions after the detonation of
an RDD before detection equipment is available:24:45
For an RDD, an initial hot zone boundary should be established ~1,600 feet (500
m) in all directions from the point of dispersion until measurements are made. If it
is known that the source used in the incident had an activity <10,000 Ci (370
TBq), then the initial hot zone boundary can be established at a radius of ~800
feet (250 m). Decisions should not be based on the perceived wind direction,
especially in an urban setting in which the wind field can be very complex.
Projections with environmental models will not provide accurate predictions of
consequences on a distance scale of ~1,600 feet (500 m). Adjust the location of
the hot zone boundary as radiation measurements become available. This
boundary definition is appropriate for both alpha and beta and gamma emitting
radionuclides.
Table 6. Radiation Safety Zone Recommendations by NCRP and CRCPD
NCRP
CRCPD
Zone Designations
Initial Evacuation
Zone
Exposure Levels
Dangerous Radiation
Zone
> 10 R/h
(> 0.1 Sv/h)
Hot Zone
> 10 mR/h but
≤ 10 R/h
(> 0.1 mSv/h but
< 0.1 Sv/h)
Cold Zone
Outdoor exposure
rates
< 10 mR/h
(< 0.1 mSv/h)
Initial Evacuation
Zone
Activities
Evacuate 500 meters (1600 feet)
in radius centered on the
explosion center for sources ≥
10,000 Ci, 250 meters (800 feet)
for sources ≤ 10,000 Ci
Actions should be restricted to
time-sensitive, mission critical
activities such as life saving.
Appropriate actions for this area
are to: evacuate members of the
public, isolate the area, minimize
time each emergency worker
spends inside the area, ensure that
workers follow appropriate
personal protection guidelines
This is the area where the incident
command post and other support
functions are located.
Evacuate 500 meters in radius
centered on the explosion center
(1650 feet or approximately 2.5
city blocks).
(table continues)
28
Table 6. (continued)
Zone Designations
Extreme Caution
Radiation Zone
Exposure Levels
≥ 10 R/h
High Radiation Zone
1 R/h
Medium Radiation
Zone
100 mR/h (0.1 R/h)
Activities
Actions restricted to live-saving
activities.
Total accumulated stay time for
first 12 hours: minutes to hours.
Access restricted to authorized
personnel performing critical
tasks: firefighting, medical
assistance, rescue, extrication,
other time-sensitive activities.
CRCPD
Access restricted to authorized
personnel entering the "High
Radiation Zone" to perform
critical tasks such as saving of
lives and property. Serves as a
buffer zone/transition area
between the "High and Low
Radiation Zones."
Low Radiation Zone
≤ 10 mR/h
Access restricted to essential
individuals.
Initial decontamination of first
responders should occur near the
outer boundary of this area.
Source: Public Health Emergency, Radiological Dispersal Device Playbook (2011).
<http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/planning/playbooks/rdd/Pages/default.aspx>
Using radiation protection principles, radiation professionals are able to identify and
establish controlled areas, boundaries, or zones that will keep the responders’ and the
public’s external exposure to radiation As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). The
three rules of radiation protection for minimizing external radiation exposure from a radiation
source are: (1) reduce time, (2) increase distance and (3) use shielding (see Figure 4).39
Preventing internal exposure or contamination requires additional precautions.


Time - The less time you spend near the radiation source, the lower the exposure will
be.
Distance - The greater the distance from the source, the less the exposure will be.
Radiation exposure decreases with distance according to the inverse-square law. For
example, doubling the distance from a radiation source will decrease the exposure by
a factor of four (two squared).
29
Figure 4. Radiation protection principles: time, distance,
and shielding. Source: Radiation Event Medical
Management, Factors that Decrease Radiation from
Exposure - Illustration (2011).
<http://www.remm.nlm.gov/timedoseshield.htm>.

Shielding - External exposure to radiation can be partially blocked by the use of
shielding. Traditionally, shielding is made of lead or concrete. However, in an
emergency staying behind vehicles, buildings, or other objects will also decrease
exposure.
ESTABLISHING OPERATIONAL DOSE LIMITS
The IC at any emergency response event is responsible for ensuring the safety of his
or her emergency workers. A safety officer is usually identified to perform this task and
assess what additional hazards pose a risk to workers at the site. In a radiological emergency,
30
the local area Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) will play a key role in making
recommendations on worker safety with respect to radiation hazards. Operational guidelines
can be different than normal occupational dose limits of five rem (0.5 Sievert) per year.28 A
rem is a unit of absorbed dose that takes into account the different biological effect of
ionizing radiations in tissue (also called equivalent dose). The same amount of absorbed dose
of different types of radiation produces different biological damage. The units of rem and
Sievert are the units in the traditional and SI systems for expressing equivalent dose;
1 rem = 0.01 Sievert (Sv); 1 Sv = 100 rem.28
Depending on the nature of an emergency, operational dose limits can be raised by
the IC in consultation with the local Public Health Officer and RSO if necessary to save life
or protect critical property. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action
Guide (PAG) also provides guidelines for emergency workers; dose limits26 are summarized
in Table 7. Once operational dose limits have been established, worker stay-times are
calculated using the radiation protection principles discussed in the previous section. These
times are based on preliminary measurements of contamination and exposure rate. Common
units of exposure rate are milliroentgens per hour (mR/hr) or roentgens per hour (R/hr).24
Using time, distance, shielding, and some form of dosimetry (a personal detector that
monitors an individual’s exposure to radiation), the RSO can suggest a time limit that will
keep emergency worker’s radiation dose under the pre-established operational dose limits.
It is imperative for emergency responders to keep track of their external radiation
dose equivalent for their safety and the safety of others to radiological incidents. Dosimetry
is the method used for personnel monitoring. Thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) or
another type of dosimeter are used prior to entering a radiation site to initiate a legal dose of
record to be placed in the worker’s medical record at the conclusion of the mission. Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 20.2106 mandates that records be maintained
for all workers’ occupational, emergency, or special planned doses.40 External dosimetry is
required in these circumstances for all workers that: (1) have the potential to receive in one
year from external sources 10% of the annual occupational dose limit of five rem, or (2)
individuals entering a high radiation area (an area in which individuals may receive a dose
equivalent in excess of five millirem in one hour at 30 centimeters (cm) from the source)
31
Table 7. EPA Protective Action Guide Dose Guidelines for Emergency Workers
Total Effective Dose
Equivalent (TEDE)
Guidelinea
5 rem (0.05 Sv)b
10 rem (0.1 Sv)
Activity
Conditions
All occupational exposures.
All reasonably achievable actions
have been taken to minimize dose.
All appropriate actions and controls
have been implemented; however,
exceeding 5 rem (0.05 Sv) is
unavoidable.
Protecting valuable property
necessary for public welfare
(e.g., a power plant).
Responders have been fully
informed of the risks of exposures
they may experience. Dose > 5 rem
(0.05 Sv) is on a voluntary basis.
25 rem (0.25 Sv)
> 25 rem
Live-saving or protection of
large populations. It is highly
unlikely that doses would reach
this level in an RDD incident;
however, worker doses higher
than 25 rem (0.25 Sv) are
conceivable in a catastrophic
incident such as an IND
incident.
Appropriate respiratory protection
and other personal protection is
provided and used. Monitoring
available to project or measure
dose.
All appropriate actions and controls
have been implemented; however,
exceeding 5 rem (0.05 Sv) is
unavoidable. Responders have been
fully informed of the risks of
exposures they may experience.
Appropriate respiratory protection
and other personal protection are
provided and used. Monitoring
available to project or measure
dose.
Live-saving activities or
protection of large populations
when an emergency worker
volunteers for the mission and is
fully aware of the risks involved.
a
Total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) is the sum of the effective dose equivalent from external
radiation exposure and the committed effective dose equivalent from internal radiation exposure.
b
In the intermediate and late phases, standard worker protections, including the 5 rem occupational
dose limit would normally apply.
Source: Public Health Emergency, Radiological Dispersal Device Playbook (2011).
<http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/planning/playbooks/rdd/Pages/default.aspx>
or very high radiation area (an area in which individuals may receive in excess of 500 rads in
one hour at 1 meter (m) from the source).40 A rad is a unit of absorbed dose of ionizing
radiation in matter that does not take into account the biological effect that different types of
radiation have in human tissue. The rad is the traditional unit for absorbed dose and the Gray
is the SI unit where 100 rad = 1 Gray (Gy) or 1 rad = 0.01 Gy.28
32
Workers should be trained in the capabilities and limitations of the dosimetry system
they are using. For example, there is a difference between TLDs which passively record
radiation exposure to be read at a laboratory at a later date, and Electronic Personnel
Dosimeters (EPDs) which can alert the user at certain pre-set dose or dose rate levels in
addition to recording total dose. EPDs do not provide a legal dose of record, however; this is
a planning consideration that should be addressed in a jurisdiction’s radiation response plan
which may involve a combination of both types of dosimetry. Training should also address
the type of radiation that the dosimeter measures. Not all dosimeters measure neutron dose,
so this is vital information to know if one is working in a neutron-rich environment.
Figure 5 illustrates recommended radiation zones26 and how stay-times can be
calculated based on EPA worker dose guidelines. Radiation response zones are based on the
dose rates measured at the scene. The shape and location of the zones will be a result of
weather conditions and ground topography; the zones in Figure 5 are simplified drawings.
Exposure or dose rates measured with detection instruments will help define the amount of
time people can spend in a particular location; units of exposure and dose rate are rad/hr or
rem/hr. Established by the EPA, permitted total dose for responders is five rem. Radiation
doses to personnel above above 25 rem may be cause for concern.26 Note that the Incident
Command Center is located outside the radiation zone and that as the incident progresses, the
dose rates measured will diminish, perimeters will change, and stay-times will lengthen.
ROLE AND REQUIREMENTS OF FIRST
RESPONDERS
Typically, the first responders to show up in emergency situations are local first
responders. The primary challenge facing first responders is identifying the nature of an
emergency. First responders need to be able to communicate what was released; the quantity
of the material released; where it is going; who is at risk; and how to respond. In order to
respond to a radiological/nuclear event first responders need timely and accurate information.
Two tools of first responders are:41 (1) detection equipment that can identify and confirm the
presence of radioactive material by triggering signals or alarms when certain sensitivity and
33
Figure 5. Calculation of stay-times for first responders based on radiation zones and
EPA PAGs. Source: Public Health Emergency, Radiological Dispersal Device Playbook
(2011).<http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/planning/playbooks/rdd/Pages/default.aspx>.
specificity parameters are reached and (2) information from plume models that track airborne
dispersion of CBRN materials and define the area of contamination.
Primary and Secondary Screening
Radiation detector use in emergency response is divided into primary and secondary
screening phases.41 During primary screening, an individual uses equipment that provides an
initial alert for the presence of radiation. This equipment might be as small as an EPD worn
on the belt, or a large portal device for commercial-vehicle monitoring. In addition to
providing an alert to the presence of radiation, the device can provide the operator with an
indication of the radiation intensity. Primary screening devices will typically not, however,
provide the operator with an indication of the type of material present or the legitimacy of the
source.
A secondary screening device may be necessary to accurately adjudicate an alarm.
These devices are capable of analyzing the radiation spectrum from the material in question
to determine its type. All radioactive materials emit unique radiation energies that can be
34
assessed to distinguish one radionuclide from another. Secondary screening devices provide
this level of technical resolution and should be accessible when adjudicating a detection
event. Even secondary screening devices will not necessarily provide conclusive evidence
that the radioactive material present is intended for an illicit purpose. If further assessment of
a radioactive alarm is required, local and state agencies can access additional technical and
operational support through the organizational structure that is discussed in Chapter 4.
Emergency Medical Treatment
First and foremost it must be understood that contamination by radioactive material
does not preclude a victim from receiving medical treatment. Live-saving and medical
treatment always takes precedence because the amount of contamination an individual may
have on them does not pose a significant threat to medical professionals. Secondly,
emergency medical vehicles should not refuse transport due to contamination concerns. If
necessary, vehicle surfaces can be wrapped with plastic wrap or protected by taping down
absorbent paper.
Triage, or sorting, uses ethical and management algorithms to save the most lives
while providing supportive care to those that are expected to perish. There are several
different systems of triage in use by civilian and military agencies and organizations and
emergency responders will use whatever system they are familiar with. There is a difference
between medical triage and radiological triage when assessing a victim. Radiation casualties
may also have combined injuries such as burns or other physical injuries compounding the
injury the victim has suffered and making triage and treatment more difficult. Table 8
summarizes the elements of medical and radiological triage.42
DECEASED PERSONS
During the early phase of a radiation emergency, life-saving operations are first
priority. However, plans should be made to direct fatality management operations as
circumstances dictate. Depending on the size of the event, fatalities can quite possibly
overwhelm the capacity of the local medical examiner/coroner. Additional locations may
need to be identified to serve as a temporary holding sites or morgues until processing of the
remains can be completed. In addition, a registry should be created as identifications of
35
Table 8. Categories of Medical and Radiological Triage
Medical Triage
Immediate: Slightly injured
Radiological Triage
Exposed, contaminated, and injured:
Requires medical and radiological evaluation,
transportation to a medical facility, and
decontamination
Urgent: Victim is at risk for poor outcome Exposed and contaminated, but not injured:
if treatment or transport is delayed
Requires decontamination and radiological
and medical evaluation
Delayed: No risk to life or limb is care is
Not contaminated but injured: Requires
not immediately given
medical attention and transportation to a
medical facility
Expectant: Victim is not expected to
Not contaminated and not injured (concerned
survive long enough to reach a higher level citizens): May need transport to a reception
of care without adversely affecting higher center and guidance on follow-up actions
priority patients. Supportive care is
recommended
Source: Radiation Event Medical Management, Triage Guidelines (2011).
<http://www.remm.nlm.gov/radtriage.htm#rad>
fatalities are made in anticipation of the overwhelming amount of inquiries that will be
received regarding the status of missing family members.
Contaminated remains pose an additional challenge for medical personnel because
contamination control is always important in limiting the consequences of a radiological
incident. Decisions will need to be made on how to accomplish the control of contamination
while maintaining respect for human remains. Plans must include preparation for how to
handle family members that request the contaminated remains of their loved ones because of
religious or cultural beliefs. Efficient and timely handling of this operation will instill a sense
of control and organization in the community during a difficult time.
DECONTAMINATION AND CONTAMINATION
CONTROL
Decontamination and contamination control is a labor intensive task when responding
to a radiological incident. Decontamination of the public, first responders, equipment and
vehicles will require large numbers of personnel and other resources. Contamination control
is important in order to minimize the spread of contamination in the area. Spreading
36
contamination will counteract any decontamination operation underway thereby increasing
the size of the area that require clean-up.
Radiological decontamination is never the priority in life-saving situations but when
time permits, decontamination should be performed as soon as possible to alleviate anxiety,
reduce the amount of exposure that an individual receives externally or by internalization of
external contamination, and to prevent contamination of uncontaminated individuals,
equipment and facilities. Aside from individual contamination, facilities and equipment may
require decontamination depending on the type of radiological incident.
The removal of outer-garments and washing of hair and skin removes about 90% of
contamination.30 Removing external contamination is important because the safety of
emergency responders, medical personnel, and support staff is of great concern to the IC.
Depending on the size of the incident, decontamination may be accomplished in the cold
zone at the incident site. Decontamination showers in tents with sections for ambulatory and
non-ambulatory patients and privacy curtains may suffice. A larger scale incident may
require initial decontamination with wet wipes or hand cleaner, and then transport to an
established decontamination center or home for a shower if the situation dictates. Area
decontamination centers can then be opened to provide screening and decontamination
services for those in high-risk areas or to provide information, guidance, and screening to
those that have performed self-decontamination and request it.
Responders must also recognize that many people that are contaminated may leave
the incident site either unknowingly or intentionally. Decontamination at hospitals should be
discouraged for uninjured individuals but hospitals should implement their radiation response
plans as soon as they are notified of the incident. Ideally, they will establish a
decontamination site away from the emergency department in order to intercept potentially
contaminated individuals prior to them entering the facility.
Considerations in the decontamination of facilities or the environment are different
for nuclear fallout or RAM released in an RDD. Particles formed in a nuclear blast are much
bigger and resistant to chemical decontamination because the oxides formed in the blast are
similar to the glaze on pottery.23 RDDs produce much finer particles in aerosol or liquid
form. Depending on the type of radionuclide used, the particles may have an affinity for
37
building, rooftop, or concrete surfaces; this will make the removal of these particulates much
more complicated. Cesium is one such nuclide that can get trapped in sand and porous
materials like concrete, making the removal process with water ineffective. Therefore,
another method of removal will have to be used for decontamination.
There are no established contamination levels at which patients are “clean” if they are
below and "dirty" if they are over. NCRP Report No. 165 recommends decontamination of
skin or clothing when exposure readings are >0.1 mR/hr at a distance of 10 cm. Surface
contamination activity units are given in disintegrations per minute per unit area (dpm/cm2)
and SI units becquerels per unit area (bq/cm2). When surface contamination levels are
> 600,000 (dpm)/cm2 for beta and gamma or > 60,000 dpm/cm2 for alpha surface
contamination levels then decontamination is also recommended.24
Decisions regarding decontamination levels for buildings, roads, or other
infrastructure have to be made because chances are, all of the contamination will never be
removed. There are no established “clean” values because this would prevent flexibility in
the local, state, or federal government’s recovery plan for cleanup after a radiological
incident. The EPA provides recommendations and assistance to local, state, and other federal
agencies in the cleanup and recovery process but overall, the decision rests with the
responsible officials in the jurisdiction where the incident occurred. This decision must take
into account public response and economic recovery.
VOLUNTEER MANAGEMENT
Planning assumptions should consider the fact that local and state agencies will be
responsible for the response efforts for a few days before significant federal assets arrive.
There may be some local radiation professionals available to assist in population monitoring,
decontamination, and survey activities but depending on the size of the incident, manpower
may be a key limitation as to the successfulness of the operation. Radiation professional
volunteers and other personnel resources from all over the country can be identified through
www.citizencorps.com or www.medicalreservecorps.gov.28 These websites provide access to
community volunteers that can assist in public health and emergency management operations
to augment local and state agencies as needed. Community radiation professionals and their
specialties should be identified, encouraged to register, and have their credentials verified
38
and updated regularly so that agencies can make use of their skill set during a radiation
emergency.
State Response
The National Guard’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Teams
(CST) are state assets that can provide assistance within a few hours to the IC prior to the
arrival of federal assets. Each team consists of 22 members of the Army or Air National
Guard whose mission is to support civil authorities in the assessment of a CBRNE incident
site. They provide identification of the hazard, limited laboratory capabilities, and an
enhanced communication package, as well as facilitating the arrival of other military assets if
required. An additional asset is the CBRNE Enhanced Response Package (CERFP) that
comes with trained Soldiers and Airmen that integrate into the local NIMS with the
capability to perform search and rescue, patient decontamination, medical triage and
treatment and other tasks as needed.43 Other state response teams may be available through
the state public health department.
Federal Response
The federal response to nuclear and radiological emergencies will most likely be led
by the Department of Energy (DOE) or DOD, or a combination of the two.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
The DOE possesses a host of radiological and nuclear response assets that can be
activated or deployed at the request of the DHS.44 In addition to its defense, nonproliferation,
nuclear security, and Naval Reactors programs, the DOE National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) has many response assets. These assets provide technical expertise
as requested on knowledge of nuclear and radiological devices, detection equipment and
support operations. The NNSA may be called on to respond to a state or Lead Federal
Agency (LFA) request for assistance by deploying a Radiological Assistance Program (RAP)
team. If the situation requires more assistance than RAP can provide, upon request NNSA
will activate a FRMAC which is discussed in Chapter 4. The assets are:44

Aerial Measuring System (AMS) – AMS provides aerial measurement to characterize
ground-deposited radiation, computer analysis of aerial measurements, and equipment
39






to locate lost radioactive sources, conduct aerial surveys, or map large areas of
contamination.
Accident Response Group (ARG) – The ARG response element is comprised of
scientists, technical specialists, crisis managers, and equipment ready for short-notice
dispatch to the scene of a U.S. nuclear weapon accident.
National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) – NARAC is a computerbased emergency preparedness and response predictive capability. NARAC provides
real-time computer predictions of the atmospheric transport of material from
radioactive release and is discussed further in Chapter 4.
Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) – FRMAC is an
interagency entity that coordinates federal offsite radiological monitoring and
assessment activities for nuclear accidents or incidents and provides a single report to
the LFA and state government.
Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) – RAP provides advice and radiological
assistance for incidents involving radioactive materials that pose a threat to public
health and safety or the environment. RAP can provide field deployable teams of
heath physics professionals equipped to conduct radiological search, monitoring, and
assessment activities.
Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) – REAC/TS
provides medical advice, specialized training, and onsite assistance for the treatment
of all types of radiation exposure accidents and is discussed more in Chapters 3 and 4.
Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST) – NEST provides technical assistance to a
LFA to deal with incidents, including terrorist threats, which involve the use of
nuclear materials. NEST has been structured to address threats by domestic and
foreign terrorists that may have the will and means to employ weapons of mass
destruction. NEST assists in the identification, characterization, rendering safe, and
final disposition of any nuclear weapon or radioactive device.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3150.08 states that the DOD will provide
support to the DOE or other federal agency when a nuclear or radiological incident requires a
federal response.45 There are several military assets available to assist in the response by
providing medical, radiological survey and monitoring, and hazard assessment capabilities if
requested.
The Air Force maintains the Armed Forces Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT)
which provides hazard assessment information based on the radiological incident. The
mobile team is tailorable to the incident and travels with an environmental laboratory and
bioassay analysis capability.46
The Army’s Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT) provides medical
assistance to military combatant commanders but also to civilian hospitals and response
40
teams as mandated. The RAMT mission includes: (1) assessment of the radiation hazard, (2)
providing recommendation to the IC or other responsible official, on contamination control,
radiation exposure risks, and protective action guidelines, and (3) providing radiological
medical, decontamination, and patient management support to other response teams and local
hospitals.46
The Medical Radiobiology Assessment Team (MRAT) is maintained by the Armed
Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) in Bethesda, Maryland. The team provides
medical advice on decontamination of wounds, the use of radioprotective drugs, and
personnel decontamination.46
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
(EPA) RADIATION EMERGENCY RESPONSE
TEAM (RERT)
Staffed by the EPA's National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory
(NAREL) and its Radiation and Indoor Environments National Laboratory, the RERT
provides monitoring and assessment services both at the labs and at the response site, if
needed.47 During radiological emergencies involving materials regulated or owned by
another federal agency, EPA actively supports the Department of Homeland Security, the
Coordinating Federal Agency, and the affected state and local governments by:





Conducting environmental monitoring, sampling, and data analysis.
Assessing the national impact of any release on public health and the environment
through the Agency's RadNet System, discussed in Chapter 4.
Providing technical advice on containment and cleanup of the radiological
contamination.
Assisting in site restoration and recovery.
EPA provides guidance to first responders on protecting people, resources, and the
environment from radiation exposure through its Protective Action Guides (PAG).
International Response
The World Health Organization (WHO) has established the Response and Assistance
Network (RANET) designed to: (1) provide international assistance when requested, (2)
ensure the consistency of international emergency response procedures, (3) and encourage
the sharing of information and lessons learned in the international community. The concept
of the network is to minimize the actual or potential consequences to health, property, or the
41
environment of a nuclear or radiological accident or emergency that exceeds its members’
capabilities. Subject matter experts worldwide provide assistance and advice to nations in
need.48
The Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) REAC/TS became a
member of RANET in 2009 and is currently the only deployable asset as a collective group.
REAC/TS is respected worldwide for its experience in the medical management of and
response to radiation incidents and its response capabilities.49
RECOVER
Recovery addresses the capabilities necessary to assist communities affected by an
incident in recovering effectively.5 Restoring, strengthening, and revitalizing the
infrastructure, housing, economy, and cultural fabric of the communities affected by an
incident are important for returning to a sense of normalcy. This mission goal is the least
developed of the five. Resources are concentrated on the response effort, leaving a hole in
existing plans for recovering from a radiological or nuclear attack. This is evident by the fact
that in 94 RDD or nuclear attack scenarios exercised from 2003 to 2009, only three included
a recovery component.50
The recovery process requires communities and the government to work together to
make decisions that will affect everyone in the disaster area. The decisions must address how
to return stability and normalcy to the area while determining how to reduce future
vulnerability. The best example of this process is the continuous recovery from Hurricane
Katrina. Recovery often involves rebuilding infrastructure and homes, replacing property,
and resuming the status of businesses and employment.10 At the conclusion of the recovery
process, it is estimated that $100 billion will have been spent because of the devastation that
Hurricane Katrina inflicted on U.S. citizens.10 Another example is the effect the attacks had
on New York City; in 2005 the city was estimated to have lost $82.8-$94.8 billion in gross
product. This estimation was caused by the impact the attacks had on the immediate area but
also the cessation of financial activities in lower Manhattan for several days. Recovery
efforts, led by the federal government, occur upon the presidential declaration of a national
disaster under the Robert T. Stafford Act. The Stafford Act outlines the process by which
42
local communities and states request federal assistance for disasters that overwhelm their
capabilities.
Chapter 2 introduced two locations that are considered potential terrorist targets, the
public venue and ports. Los Angeles and Long Beach harbors combined traffic in
14.2 million 20-foot unit equivalent containers annually with a value of about $295 billion.22
In addition to the physical consequences of a small, medium, or large attack, the economic
consequences would be many. Short (15 days), medium (120 days), or long-term (1 year)
closures of the ports would occur because of: (1) concerns of dock workers regarding
returning to work, (2) concerns of shippers about delivering goods to the harbors, and (3)
extensive procedures related to decontamination activities. These closures would result in a
loss of revenue of $130 million to $100 billion.22 Secondary economic impacts are the costs
of evacuations, damage to property, and loss of business caused by residual radiation
concerns.22 The Center for Homeland Security and Defense, as cited by Grotto, estimates that
after 45 days, "the U.S. economy would collapse into an unprecedented depression due to a
severe energy crisis, widespread shortages and rampant price gouging by the energy
industry."17:3
The magnitude of an IND or RDD cleanup operation poses additional challenges and
highlights limitations in federal capabilities to complete laboratory analysis and cleanup
activities in at timely manner. These limitations include: “(1) characterizing the full extent of
areas contaminated with radioactive materials, (2) completing laboratory validation of
contaminated areas and levels of cleanup after applying decontamination approaches, and (3)
removing and disposing of radioactive debris and waste.”50:16
The NDRF was published in 2011 and replaces ESF #14 Long-Term Community
Recovery.51 The framework addresses leadership and organizational roles, planning
guidance, and other issues necessary coordinate community recovery after a disaster.
Introducing four new recovery concepts allows recovery to integrate into the pre- and
post-disaster planning process while providing a productive and scalable effort. The
incorporation of these new concepts provides more oversight and encourages direct
communication between all levels of government with respect to response coordination
before and after a disaster. The four new concepts are:51
43




Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator (FDRC)
State or Tribal Disaster Recovery Coordinators (SDRC or TDRC)
Local Disaster Recovery Managers (LDRM)
Recovery Support Functions (RSFs)
These concepts in conjunction with the information in the NDRF seek to meet the
conditions of a successful recovery. Recognizing that success for a community may not mean
returning to pre-disaster conditions, the recovery process aims to: (1) overcome the various
impacts of the disaster on the community, (2) reestablish the economic and social base of the
community (3) reducing the vulnerability of the community while enabling the community to
prepare, respond, bounce back from the consequences of a disaster.51
44
CHAPTER 3
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CYCLE
Developed by FEMA’s National Preparedness Directorate, the Emergency
Preparedness Cycle is a cyclical process that begins with planning for the likely hazards that
the nation, state, or local community are at risk from and working its way to evaluating and
improving upon methods used during a particular emergency (see Figure 6).10,52
Figure 6. FEMA Emergency Preparedness Cycle.
Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency,
Preparedness (2010).
<http://www.fema.gov/prepared/>.
The cycle not only applies to Federal preparedness but also State and local
preparedness to include businesses, NGOs, and individuals. Using the POETE cycle, national
preparedness can be achieved through the building and sustainment of specific capabilities as
outlined in the NPG. As shown in the figure above and discussed further in this chapter, the
five major components of the cycle are:5,23, 52





Planning
Organizing/Equipping
Training
Exercising
Evaluating/Improving
45
PLANNING
Planning is the first step in the preparedness process that involves the development of
plans to respond efficiently and effectively to the risks that have been identified as a
plausible threat or hazard. Because of limited funding, jurisdictions create all-hazards
emergency plans but focus their efforts on what hazards are considered to be the most likely.
For example, Florida concentrates on evacuation, California on earthquake and wildfire
plans, and the mid-western states develop plans on actions to take during tornadoes. Lack of
funding is also the reason that comprehensive radiological preparedness plans take a backseat
to plans that prepare for recurrent threats. It is difficult to justify allocating resources to
develop a thorough plan for an event that may never occur.
However, in order for planning to work, formalized plans must be in place before a
radiological event occurs. The intent of planning is to identify the capabilities,
vulnerabilities, and shortages of a jurisdiction in the event of an emergency. Assignment of
responsibilities, identification of outside resources and the processes for requesting these
resources are also determined and worked out. Planning also devises courses of action for
specific scenarios and addresses issues such as the implementation of protective action
guidance for people and the environment. In any significant emergency, federal response
assets should not be expected for at least 24 hours. Local and state agencies should plan to be
the primary response agencies for the first three days.28
Chapter 2 identified the different types of radiological hazards that exist; the most
likely threat at this time is a radiation accident involving radioactive materials or at a nuclear
facility. Other threats that may be planned for are the release of radioactive material by a
RDD or the detonation of an IND. These scenarios are commonly used in major exercise
scenarios and have been standardized in the National Planning Scenario document discussed
in Chapter 4. Radiation planning guidance for all levels of government is available from
FEMA in their Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual (REPP) and
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101, Developing and Maintaining Emergency
Operations Plans.
46
Nuclear Power and RDD Planning Strategies
Nuclear power facilities employ many strategies to minimize the potential impact of
radiation releases on the public's health and the environment. These strategies are developed
after performing risk assessments and planning for the possible threats to the facility. There
are 104 licensed commercial nuclear power reactors in 31 states in the United States.53 At
these 65 different sites the NRC and FEMA share the responsibility for public protection and
emergency preparedness. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) established in 1979 as a
response to the Three-Mile Island (TMI) accident identified FEMA as the agency responsible
for off-site emergency preparedness supported by the NRC.53 The NRC has the statutory
responsibility for radiological health and safety of the public with respect to onsite
preparedness and overall responsibility for emergency preparedness in and outside of the
facility. FEMA reviews the plans for offsite preparedness and the NRC reviews plans for
onsite planning. There are several components of emergency plans for nuclear facilities.
Emergency planning zones, emergency classifications, protective actions, and evacuation or
sheltering plans are common to all nuclear facility emergency plans.53
EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONES
Two planning zones are identified around nuclear power facilities for the protection
of the surrounding communities: (1) the Emergency Planning Zone, and (2) the Ingestion
Pathway Zone. Sometimes, as found in the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS)
Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (NERP) there is a third zone called the Public Education
Zone.54 The Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone or EPZ, is an approximate 10 mile
radius around the plant and is defined for the plume exposure pathway. Plans in this zone are
developed to protect people, property and the environment in that zone from inhaling or
ingesting radioactive contamination. The Ingestion Pathway Zone is an approximate 50 mile
radius around a nuclear plant; these plans are focused on mitigating the effects of radioactive
contamination on agriculture, food processing and distribution. NERP and NRC Public
Education Zones have been established in the State of California requiring that residents at a
distance of about 10-20 miles away from the plant be supplied with educational materials
designed to inform the public about nuclear power plant operations, including telephone
directory guidance, and informed of the plant’s radiation emergency preparedness plans.
47
Evacuation usually does not occur at this distance and in the SONGS plan, the zone has been
established out to a 35 mile radius from the plant.54 See Figure 7 for an example of the three
emergency planning zones surrounding SONGS.
Figure 7. Approximate emergency planning zones around San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station.
EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION
The Emergency Classification system for nuclear power plants indicates the current
level of risk to the public. The system uses four emergency classifications listed below in
order of increasing severity and mandates actions that must be taken by the plant at the time
of the classification.53


Notification of Unusual Event -- Under this category, events are in process or have
occurred which indicate potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. There
is no threat to the public at this time but requires notification to offsite authorities
within 15 minutes at the time of the classification. No release of radioactive material
requiring offsite response or monitoring is expected unless further degradation
occurs.
Alert -- If an alert is declared, events are in process or have occurred that involve an
actual or potential substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant. Any
releases of radioactive material from the plant are expected to be limited to a small
fraction of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) protective action guides
(PAGs). There is little or no threat to public safety. Conditions could escalate in the
48


event of operator error or equipment failure. An alert requires notification by plant
operator of offsite authorities within 15 minutes. Communications with the plant
operator thereafter are on a regular basis until such time as plant conditions stabilize.
Site Area Emergency -- A site area emergency involves events in process or which
have occurred that result in actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed
for protection of the public. Any releases of radioactive material are not expected to
exceed the EPA PAGs except near the site boundary.
General Emergency -- A general emergency involves actual or imminent substantial
core damage or melting of reactor fuel with the potential for loss of containment
integrity. Radioactive releases during a general emergency can reasonably be
expected to exceed the EPA PAGs for more than the immediate site area.
EPA PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR NUCLEAR
FACILITIES
Protective actions during an emergency at a nuclear power plant include evacuation
of the public versus shelter-in-place and the use of Potassium Iodide (KI). Depending on
several factors, citizens may be evacuated to prevent their exposure to radiation released in
the environment. Instead of evacuation, decision-makers may decide to implement
shelter-in-place procedures for the public and supplement this decision with KI, if necessary.
The EPA published a manual on protective actions for the most likely nuclear
incidents. In 1982 by federal regulation, the EPA was assigned the responsibilities to (1)
establish Protective Action Guides (PAGs), (2) prepare guidance on implementing PAGs,
including recommendations on protective actions, (3) develop and promulgate guidance to
State and local governments on the preparation of emergency response plans, and (4)
develop, implement, and present training programs for state and local officials on PAGs and
protective actions, radiation dose assessment, and decision making.55 The PAG manual
addressed the first two responsibilities; a PAG is a projected dose to an individual from the
release of radioactive material. By implementing specific actions recommended in the
manual this dose can be avoided. The 1992 version of the PAG manual is undergoing a
revision and the draft revision was published in the 2006 Federal Register.26 PAGs are
intended for use in any radiation emergency except nuclear war but do not include much latephase guidance:55



Nuclear power plant incident
Contaminated materials incident
Research facility incident
49



Transportation accident involving radioactive materials
Radiological Dispersal Device or Dirty Bombs
Improvised Nuclear Devices
Evacuation
Wind direction is a major factor in determining whether the entire ten mile radius
EPZ should be evacuated or just parts of it. The NRC uses a keyhole plume pattern that
illustrates how the radioactive material released expands at the point of release and then
becomes less concentrated as it moves with wind. In a General Emergency, a two-mile radius
around the plant is immediately evacuated along with residents up to five miles directly
downwind and to the left and right of the projected path.53 The keyhole pattern as illustrated
in Figure 8 accounts for shifts in wind direction and changes in the plume pathway.53
Figure 8. Keyhole plume pattern used in the NRC evacuation
plan. Source: Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Backgrounder on Emergency Preparedness at Nuclear Power
Plants (2009). <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/fact-sheets/emerg-plan-prep-nuc-power-bg.html>.
Evacuation immediately after the detonation of a nuclear device is not recommended
in a study by Wein, Choi, and Denuit.56 There are two types of evacuation that must be
considered when assessing what is best for the protection of the people. Immediate
self-evacuation (evacuation by vehicle or on foot) may not be the best option if it will cause
the population to receive greater exposure to radiation in the environment.56 Delayed
50
evacuation may be a better option after sheltering for a certain amount of time to reduce the
amount of exposure to the population. The study uses the 10-kT Nuclear Device National
Planning Scenario to assess which protection action is a better choice.
Shelter-in-Place
Sheltering-in-place refers to the protecting action requiring people to remain at the
location where they are at the time of the radiation release. Locations may be the home,
school, place of work or any other location that provides protection from radiation exposure
and contamination. As the situation progresses, additional guidance will be released by
public officials as to when the public can return home if they are located elsewhere. A
decision to shelter-in-place may be made when the radioactive release is expected to be
short-term or controlled by the nuclear plant.
Potassium Iodide
The use of KI as an additional protective action often used in conjunction with
evacuation or shelter-in-place as an additional protection. The effectiveness of KI is
increased when it is taken within an appropriate amount of time and in the correct dosage. KI
is used to block the uptake of radioactive iodines (most commonly 131I) by the thyroid gland
if taken appropriately. KI is only useful against radioactive iodine; it is not useful against any
other radionuclides that may be released during an emergency at a nuclear facility, nor is it
effective against external exposure.
The use of KI was incorporated into NRC regulations in January 2001 and then later
that year the FDA issued guidance on the use of the drug. As of 2005, of the 35 sites with
nuclear power plants, 21 have KI programs for residents in the ten mile radius Plume
Exposure EPZ; 20 state programs are supplied by the NRC, one, Illinois, instituted its own
program.53
DHS PROTECTIVE GUIDANCE AFTER AN
RDD OR IND ATTACK
The EPA issued guidance in 1992 for protective actions following a nuclear incident.
This manual was applied to other radiological emergencies, including terrorism, in the
absence of other federal guidance. FEMA released "Planning Guidance for Protection and
51
Recovery Following Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device
(IND) Incidents," in the Federal Register in 2008.26,57 This guidance was intended to assist
agencies at all levels of government to plan for an RDD or IND incident and included
guidance for late-phase actions. The development of this guidance was directed by a senior
level federal working group, chaired by DHS and outlines a process to implement the
recommendations in the guidance, discuss existing operational guidelines, and encourages
the use of these guidelines in planning for these events. These guidelines will be included
without changes into the final version of the updated version of the EPA PAGs.57 See Table 9
for a summary of protective actions26 to be taken in the early and intermediate phases.
Table 9. Protective Action Guidelines for Use in a Radiological Emergency in the Early
and Intermediate Phases
Phase
Early
Intermediate
Protective Actions
Sheltering-in-place or evacuation of the
public. Should normally begin at 1 rem
(0.01 Sv); take whichever action (or
combination of actions) results in the
lowest exposure for the majority of the
population. Sheltering may begin at
lower levels, if advantageous.
Administration of prophylactic drugs
potassium iodide; administration of other
prophylactic or decorporation agents
Relocation of the public
Protective Action Guide
1 to 5 rem (0.01-0.05 Sv)
a
projected dose
5 rem (0.05 Sv) projected dose
to child’s thyroid
2 rem (0.02 Sv) projected dose
first year; subsequent years, 0.5
rem/yr (0.005 Sv/yr) projected
dosea
Food interdiction
0.5 rem (0.005 Sv) projected
dose, or 5 rem (0.05 Sv) to any
individual organ or tissue in the
first year, whichever is limiting
Drinking water interdiction
0.5 rem (0.005 Sv) projected
dose in the first year
a
Total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) is the sum of the effective dose equivalent from external
radiation exposure and the committed effective dose equivalent from internal radiation exposure.
Source: Public Health Emergency, Radiological Dispersal Device Playbook (2011).
<http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/planning/playbooks/rdd/Pages/default.aspx>
OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES
The Operational Guidelines, created by the Operational Guidelines Task Group
(OGT) were developed to support the PAGs for RDDs and INDs released by FEMA in 2008.
52
The guidelines are organized into seven groups according to their incident phase of
application; early, intermediate, or late phase.58 A software tool, RESRAD-RDD was
designed as a companion tool to facilitate the implementation of the guidelines. At this stage,
the operational guidelines and RESRAD-RDD are in trial phase for use by agencies during
planning, training, and exercise scenarios. The operational guidelines manual and
RESRAD-RDD software can be accessed at the DOE Office of Health, Safety, and Security
website: http://ogcms.energy.gov/review.html.58
EPA PAGs and Emergency Worker Guidelines are based on total dose which may
present a problem during the early phase of an incident because it is not easy to readily
measure an individual's dose. There are also other decisions that must be made in the
beginning of an incident where responders might appreciate some guidance. The need existed
for operational measurements of radiation levels that could be related to the PAGs to
decrease the amount of time required to make decision regarding the need for protective
actions. The operational guidelines were developed to provide emergency workers and the IC
pre-calculated levels of radioactivity or radionuclide concentrations in various media that can
be measured in the field and compared to the PAGs. The EPA and Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) have issued guidance levels for water and food, (e.g. derived
intervention levels [DILs]) and derived response levels [DRLs] from the Federal
Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) for generic cases. The
operational guidelines serve to address expected cases such as whether to evacuate or shelter
and other situations such as access to critical infrastructures like roads and medical facilities,
as well as restoration of power, water, and sewer facilities.58 The seven groups58 that are
addressed in the operational guidelines are listed in Table 10.
Incident Phases of Radiological Material Release
Emergencies
A radiological emergency that involves release of RAM is divided into three phases:
(1) Early, (2) Intermediate, and (3) Late phases.26,28,29,58 Figure 9 is a summary of the three
incident phases and their respective protective actions.
53
Table 10. Groups and Subgroups used in Operational Guidance
A
Groups
Access control during emergency response operations
B
Early-phase protective action
C
Relocation from different areas and critical
infrastructure utilization in relocation areas
D
Temporary access to relocation areas for essential
activities
E
Transportation and access routes
F
Release of property from radiologically controlled
areas
G
Food consumption
Subgroups
Life- and property-saving
measures
Emergency worker demarcation
Evacuation
Sheltering
Residential Areas
Commercial and industrial areas
Other areas, such as parks and
monuments
Critical transport facilities
Water and sewer facilities
Power and fuel facilities
Worker access to businesses for
essential actions
Public access to residences for
retrieval of property, pets, records
Bridges
Streets and thoroughfares
Sidewalks and walkways
Personal property, except wastes
Waste
Hazardous waste
Real property, such as lands and
buildings
Early-phase food guidelines
Early-phase soil guidelines
Intermediate-phase soil guidelines
Intermediate-to late-phase soil
guidelines
Source: Department of Energy, Preliminary Report on Operational Guidelines Developed for
Use in Emergency Preparedness and Response to a Radiological Dispersal Device Incident,
Office of Health, Safety, and Security Operational Guidelines Task Group Report No. HS001, (Washington DC, 2009.)
EARLY PHASE
The early phase is the period beginning at the initiation of a radioactive material
release and possibly extending to a few days later. During this period, deposition of airborne
materials has ceased and enough information has become available to permit reliable
decisions about the need for longer term protection. During the early phase of an incident
radiation dose may accrue both from airborne and deposited radioactive materials. For
54
Figure 9. Summary of exposure pathways and protective actions. Source:
Department of Energy, Preliminary Report on Operational Guidelines Developed for
Use in Emergency Preparedness and Response to a Radiological Dispersal Device
Incident, Office of Health, Safety, and Security Operational Guidelines Task Group
Report No. HS-001, 2009.
planning purposes, it is convenient to assume that the early phase will last four days. After
this time, exposure to the radioactive material released can be addressed through other
protective actions, such as relocation, if necessary. The early phase may be considerably
55
shorter in the case of an RDD where the amount of material released and amount of damage
done is much less than in a nuclear device.
In general, the early phase is the period during the release of radioactive material,
regardless of the type of device. The first exposure pathway from an airborne release of
radioactive material will often be direct exposure to an overhead plume of radioactive
material carried by winds so it is critical that dose projection is performed for communities
downwind during this phase to protect the public from unnecessary exposure.
INTERMEDIATE PHASE
The intermediate phase begins when the release is over and the cloud of
contamination has settled. All rescue efforts have ended by the start of the intermediate
phase. Significant federal assets will begin to arrive to augment local responders in response
and recovery activities.
LATE PHASE
In the late phase, radioactive material has been incorporated into the environment. An
environmental sampling plan is developed to direct sampling and monitoring activities in
order to define the contamination zone. Evacuation and food/water interdiction will occur at
this stage to protect the public in the long-term. This phase ends when all restrictions are
lifted.
ORGANIZING/EQUIPPING
Limitations of a radiological preparedness program lie with the organization of
agencies and people that will respond to an emergency and the availability of equipment
necessary to respond to that emergency.
Organizing
Organizational expertise is essential in bringing the correct assets to any radiation
alarm, which includes equipment operations knowledge and data interpretation capability.
56
NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM (NIMS) AND THE INCIDENT
COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS)
Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-5, charged the Secretary of
Homeland Security with primary responsibility for domestic incident management. President
Bush directed the development of an incident management system for agencies nationwide to
respond to and recover from emergencies small and large in a cohesive manner. This system
was authorized in 2004 and named the National Incident Management System (NIMS).59
Incident management refers to how incidents are managed across all homeland security
activities.
The Incident Command System (ICS) is used at all levels of government to facilitate
a systematic response to any size disaster. It eliminates redundancy, communication
problems, and issues regarding leadership thereby reducing response time. The first ICS was
developed after the 1970 wildfires in California because of the reasons listed above. It was
named FIRESCOPE.59 In the mid 1970’s some form or another of the ICS was adopted by
several different response agencies in California. Variations of the ICS were used for the next
three decades until the integration of FIRESCOPE methods as a subcomponent of NIMS.59
The NIMS ICS is now a systematic process providing guidance for agencies on how to use
resources and personnel.10 It can be used at any level of incident: (1) single jurisdiction or
agency (RAM accident), (2) single jurisdiction with multiple agency support (e.g. an RDD
incident), or (3) multijurisdictional and multiagency support (e.g. nuclear device incident).23
The key principles of the NIMS ICS are:




Use of common terminology across all agencies
A unified command structure
Resource management
Action planning
The five major management systems within the ICS are:10


Command section--develops, directs, and maintains communication and collaboration
with the agencies on site, working with the local officials, public, and media to
provide current information on the incident. The command section includes a safety
officer, liaison officer, and legal officer.
Operations section--handles the tactical operations, coordinates, organizes, and
directs all resources to the incident site.
57



Planning section--provides information to the command section to develop an action
plan and accomplish its objectives.
Logistics section--provides personnel, equipment, and support for the command
center. They coordinate all of the services involved in the response.
Finance section--responsible for accounting for funds used during the response and
recovery phases of the incident.
Under a Unified Command (the command organization used for multiagency
response), all of the agencies integrate into one response management system even though
each agency maintains its own authority, responsibility, and accountability.10 At the
beginning of an incident, and depending on the size of the emergency, the IC is usually a fire
or law enforcement official. As the response grows in size, they may be replaced by a federal
official, such as the FBI in a terrorist case, or someone with specific training and knowledge
about the specific threat.
The ICS is an expandable structure based on the size of the incident; however, the
backbone of the structure is consistent. Positions are activated and deactivated upon necessity
and one area of necessity is the technical specialists. Some may think that radiation experts
would take IC of a radiation emergency; this is not the case. As shown in Figure 10, radiation
professionals are either placed in the operations, planning, or medical section depending on
their expertise.60,61 Response teams will be placed in the operations section while radiation
medical response teams will most likely work under operations with a liaison officer in the
medical section of the command section. It is also possible to set up a Technical Unit within
the General Staff (Planning, Logistics, Operations, and Finance) to coordinate and manage
large volumes of environmental samples or analytical data from certain incidents such as
radiological hazards.60,61
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Local emergency responders (police, fire, emergency medical services) are usually
the first to detect and/or arrive on-scene at an emergency. Their priorities are to rescue the
injured, suppress fires, and secure the area in an effort to restore order to the situation.10 They
are also the last to leave from the incident while determining how to recover from the effects
of the threat or hazard. Local governments are closest to those impacted by incidents, and
have always had the lead in response and recovery. The local senior elected or appointed
58
Command
(IC or UC)
Liaison Officer
Legal Officer
Safety Officer
Public
Information
Officer
Medical Officer
Finance/Admin
Cost
Operations
Firefighting
Planning
Logistics
Resources
Food
Time
Contamination
Control
Situation
Facilities
Compensation
Rad Survey and
Monitoring
Documentation
Medical
Procurement
Law
Enforcement
Technical
Specialists
Supply
Emergency
Medial Services
Demobilization
Communications
Ground Support
Figure 10. Sample ICS organization chart for radiation emergency. Source:
Department of Defense, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures Manual DOD
3150.08-M, (Department of Defense, Washington DC, 2009).
official (usually the mayor but possibly the city or county manager) is responsible for
ensuring the public safety and welfare of his or her residents. In today’s world, senior
59
officials and their emergency managers build the foundation for an effective response. They
organize and integrate their capabilities and resources with neighboring jurisdictions, the
state, NGOs, and the private sector. Local governments (city or county) base their
Emergency Operations Centers at pre-established locations where agencies coordinate their
response. The initial IC will be assumed by a local emergency response official (e.g. fire or
law enforcement).
STATE GOVERNMENT
Same as local governments, states have responsibility for the public health and
welfare of the people in their jurisdiction. Once notified through the State Emergency
Operations Center, (see Figure 11) states are responsible for coordinating resources and
capabilities throughout the state and obtaining resources and capabilities from other states.
Once it is clear that their resources will be overwhelmed, or that they do not possess the
resources to adequately handle the emergency, states can request support from other states
through mutual aid agreements or federal assistance through the Stafford Act. “The Stafford
Act authorizes the President to provide financial and other assistance to State and local
governments, certain private nonprofit organizations, and individuals to support response,
recovery, and mitigation efforts following Presidential emergency or major disaster
declarations.”60:4
Incident Command
Local Emergency Operations Center
State Emergency Operations Center
Figure 11. Flow of communication from local to state government during an
emergency.
60
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The role of the federal government has evolved dramatically since 9/11.62 The
government used to concern itself with responding to the use of foreign military weapons
against its cities and states; this led to the development of the U.S. Civil Defense program.
After the end of the Cold War, the focus of the Nation was shifted to preparing for natural
disasters.62 Many plans have been developed over the years identifying the roles and
responsibilities of the local, state, and federal government in the event of a disaster or
emergency. Per the Stafford Act, governors can request support and resources from the
federal government. Federal agencies will most likely be the first responders to incidents that
occur on federal property, and the response will be coordinated with state and local
responders, businesses in the private sector, and NGOs.
On the federal level, agencies are assigned as coordinating and cooperating agencies.
The role of the coordinating agency is to lead the federal response. In a radiological
emergency DHS may assume overall responsibility for coordination of the federal response,
while the cooperating agencies are responsible for supporting DHS in this effort. Cooperating
Agencies support the accident management effort by providing expertise in appropriate
functional areas. The coordinating agencies “…own, have custody of, authorize, regulate, or
are otherwise assigned responsibility for the nuclear/radioactive material, facility, or activity
involved in the incident.9:7 These federal agencies have nuclear/radiological authorities,
technical expertise, and/or assets for responding to the unique characteristics of
nuclear/radiological incidents that are not otherwise described in the NRF.”9
For example, in a domestic accident involving nuclear weapons, the Department of
Defense (DOD) is the coordinating agency. They will coordinate with other agencies to
respond to the accident. Table 11 lists the possible coordinating and cooperating agencies9 as
written in the NRF NRIA. The coordinating agency will depend on the type of incident,
therefore the supporting agencies are also incident specific.9
61
Table 11. Possible Federal Coordinating and Cooperating Agencies for a Radiological
Incident
Coordinating Agencies
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Homeland Security
Environmental Protection Agency
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Cooperating Agencies
Department of Agriculture
Department of Energy
Department of Homeland Security
Department of the Interior
Department of Labor
Department of Veterans Affairs
Department of State
Department of Commerce
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Housing and Urban
Development
Department of Justice
Department of Transportation
Environmental Protection Agency
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
American Red Cross
Source: Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework
Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex (Washington DC, 2008).
<http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf_nuclearradiologicalincidentannex.pdf>
Equipping
In a 2008 Government Accounting Office (GAO) report on Homeland Security, it
was concluded that first responders do not have the capabilities to accurately and quickly
identify what, when, where, and how much chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
(CBRN) materials are released in the U.S. urban areas, accidentally or by terrorists.63 The
report titled, “First Responders’ Ability to Detect and Model Hazardous Releases in Urban
Areas Is Significantly Limited,” lists the main shortfall in detection equipment as the
inability and unavailability of specific equipment that can be used to measure the dispersal of
RAM in the environment. Another concern was that no governmental agency is tasked with
developing, testing, or certifying a piece of equipment that can carry out this task.63
At the end of 2007, out of 39 standards that had been adopted by DHS for CBRN
equipment, only four pertained to radiological/nuclear prevention and interdiction equipment.
The rest addressed respirators and other personal protective equipment (PPE).63 To clarify,
the DHS is responsible for testing and evaluating commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
62
equipment and providing recommendations to the emergency responder community through
the System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders Program (SAVER) and
the Graduated Rad/Nuc Detector Evaluation and Reporting (GRaDER) program. The
evaluators in the program recommend detection equipment used by first responders rather
than assessment and analytical equipment such as that used to predict atmospheric
dispersion.
DHS, through FEMA supports local and state agencies’ preparedness programs in
the form of non-disaster grant funding to enhance the capacity of state and local emergency
responders to prevent, respond to, and recover from a WMD terrorism incident involving
CBRNE devices and cyber attacks. In 2012, DHS will provide over $1.1 billion in funding
for the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) and Emergency Management
Performance Grants (EMPG).11
The equipment eligible for purchase by DHS grant money must comply with the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards developed for portable radiation and
nuclear detection equipment. The ANSI N42 series standards combine performance
standards requirements with homeland security applications in order to standardize detection
elements of a PRND program.11
Information about DHS grants, equipment standards, testing, certifications, and
recommendations is provided in FEMA Responder Knowledge Base (RKB). The on-line
resource provides these services for emergency medical services, law enforcement,
communications, campus safety, and fire, and emergency management agencies. Users can
access the DHS SAVER and GRaDER programs which provide first responders with
information and recommendations about detection, personal protection, medical, and
decontamination equipment which will all be necessary in a radiological or nuclear
emergency. DHS Authorized Equipment Lists (AEL) and InterAgency Board for Equipment
Standardization and Interoperability (IAB) Standardized Equipment List recommendations
(SEL) can also be accessed through this site for use in purchasing equipment that will be
used for emergencies and training exercises.
63
DHS SAVER PROGRAM
The DHS SAVER program was established in 1994 by FEMA. It was transferred to
the DHS Science and Technology directorate in 2009. Its purpose has remained the same
through the years; the SAVER program provides emergency responders with information
about equipment that they can use to make knowledgeable purchase decisions.64 The
equipment that the SAVER program experts test is from the DHS AEL. According to the
Program Manager, 30 to 40 products are tested annually totally 400 products since the
beginning of the program and 800 published reports.64 The majority of this equipment is
outside the realm of radiation detection however; this still seems to be an area that needs to
be addressed.
DHS GRADER PROGRAM
The Graduated Rad/Nuc Detector Evaluation and Reporting (GRaDER) Program is
administered by the DNDO. The DNDO was mandated by Congress to set Technical
Capability Standards (TCSs) and implement a test and evaluation program for preventive
radiological/nuclear (Rad/Nuc) detection equipment in the United States.11 The GRaDER
Program evaluates COTS Rad/Nuc detection equipment against national consensus standards
adopted by the Department of Homeland Security and TCSs. This program aims to support
local, state, and federal agencies in identifying radiation detection products that comply with
standards and satisfy Homeland Security mission requirements.
The first TCS was released in 2011 and is titled, “Technical Capability Standards for
Handheld Instruments.” This standard is intended to serve as a supplement to the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI) N42.34 and in the future DNDO plans to coordinate with
ANSI to ensure that future TCSs and ANSI N42 standards are consistent.65 TCSs are
developed by the Technical Capability Standard Working Group (TCSWG). The working
group includes representatives from nine federal agencies that use radiation detection
equipment regularly:65




DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
64




Department of Energy (DOE) and several national laboratories (Los Alamos National
Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Savannah River National Laboratory,
Sandia National Laboratory, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’
Security Affairs
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
DETECTION EQUIPMENT
The National Science and Technology Council Committee on Homeland and National
Security (CHNS), Subcommittee on Standards, submitted a report with six overarching goals
that will improve the consistency and interoperability of the CBRNE response community.
The six goals call for the coordination, establishment, and promotion of new and existing
CBRNE standards for the use of equipment and standard operating procedures.66 The May
2011 report titled, “A National Strategy for CBRNE Standards” promotes the use of CBRNE
detection equipment as part of a complete CBRNE response plan. Goals 2 and 3 encourage
the development of CBRNE equipment performance standards, to include interoperability
(the ability of detectors to communicate with each other), for federal, state, and local
communities.66 These goals recognize the importance of standardization of equipment
nationwide for use in situations where hazardous materials may be present. CBRNE
emergencies will generally require the assistance of state and federal teams, assets, and
equipment sets. Nationwide standardization will ensure interoperability as well as a
“common language” throughout the technical and response community which results in a
speedier and more systematic response to CBRNE hazards. With respect to radiological
hazards, equipment is needed to protect response personnel and the public, detect and
identify the radioactive material, and to assess the extent of the contamination, if any, to aid
in cleanup operations.
The CHNS suggests that there are three requirements for effective equipment
performance standards. They must be realistic, achievable, and verified against test methods
appropriate for their use. Equipment must be effective, suitable for its purpose, and durable:66


Effectiveness (e.g., response time, operating range, sensitivity, specificity,
breakthrough time, and environmental effects);
Suitability (e.g., reliability, availability, maintainability, affordability,
interoperability, and manpower and personal integration); and
65

Survivability (e.g., safety, utility following exposure, and ruggedness).
Authorized Equipment List (AEL) and
Standardized Equipment List (SEL)
In an effort to standardize equipment nationwide, the DHS published the AEL and the
IAB published the SEL. The two lists are quite similar in that they do not provide specific
equipment information for agencies to purchase but instead they provide general product
information for the responder community. The major difference in the lists is the purpose for
which they were created.
The AEL was created by the DHS to identify what types of equipment can be
purchased under the 12 major DHS grant programs.67 The IAB that publishes the SEL is
comprised of senior emergency management officials and federal representatives that meet
triannually to discuss additions to the list. The list includes important features and operating
considerations in addition to general product information.68 The 2010 edition incorporates an
“all-hazards” SEL, but maintains its past emphasis on CBRNE events. The SEL does not
discuss DHS requirements or grants and is purely a voluntary guide for the response
community but it does promote the goals of interoperability and standardization as proposed
in the National Strategy for CBRNE Standards.
Both lists are available on FEMA’s Responder Knowledge Base website as separate
interactive documents or as one integrated document that consolidates both lists.
Conveniently, the lists use the same numbering system for the product information. The AEL
and SEL contain 21 categories of equipment as listed below, several of which are pertinent to
a successful radiation preparedness program:67,68
1. Personal Protective Equipment
2. Explosive Device Mitigation and Remediation Equipment
3. Operational and Search & Rescue Equipment
4. Information Technology
5. CyberSecurity Enhancement Equipment
6. Interoperable Communications Equipment
7. Detection
8. Decontamination
9. Medical
10. Power
11. Reference Materials
12. Incident Response Vehicles
66
13. Terrorism Incident Prevention Equipment
14. Physical Security Enhancement Equipment
15. Inspection and Screening Systems
16. Reserved in SEL, Animals and Plants in AEL only
17. CBRNE Prevention and Response Watercraft
18. CBRNE Aviation Equipment
19. CBRNE Logistical Support Equipment
20. Intervention Equipment
21. Other Authorized Equipment
Personal Protection Equipment (PPE)
PPE selection by response agencies must come after a thorough hazard and risk
assessment has been completed. Physical hazards must also be taken into consideration as
well as CBRNE or industrial hazards. The threat from a toxic chemical and in some cases a
biological hazard can be much more severe than that from a radiological hazard. Some levels
of PPE are sufficient for all types of hazards, some levels may be considered “overkill” if
there is little to no risk of coming into contact with a more severe hazard. Determining the
appropriate level of PPE instills confidence in the responders and saves money at the same
time. If disposable paper suits are suitable for response, there is no reason to purchase totally
encapsulated level A gear. The AEL and SEL provide thorough guidance on proper selection
of PPE. Tables 17 and 18 in Appendix A lists the characteristics of the four levels of PPE as
defined by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and a specific
selection matrix for the determination of requisite PPE for response to an RDD based on
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) recommendations. See Table
12 for a summary of PPE level recommendations69 for use by emergency workers in
radiation emergencies.
Decontamination
Decontamination is the removal of radioactive particles (contamination) from
something (or someone) back to its normal background radiation level. It is important to note
the difference between chemical or biological and radiological decontamination; chemical
and biological decontamination should be performed immediately, radiological
decontamination does not require immediacy.
67
Table 12. PPE Recommendations for Radiation Emergencies
Radiation Emergency
Radiation plus chemical and/or biological hazard:
"combined hazard" event
Radiation only event with high risk of contamination (and
non-radiation hazards have been excluded) e.g. (RDD)
Radiation only event with high risk of exposure (and nonradiation hazards have been excluded), (e.g. RED)
Recommended PPE for First
Responders
Before combined hazard(s) are well
characterized first responders should be
instructed to wear Level A ensembles
that protect against anticipated
(potentially multiple) hazards.
After combined hazards are confirmed,
first responders should be instructed to
wear PPE ensembles that protect against
identified hazards, may be able to
downgrade to Level B
Level C PPE usually provides sufficient
respiratory and dermal protection
PPE confers no protection against high
energy, highly penetrating forms of
ionizing radiation. Factors that help
decrease radiation dose from exposure:
Minimizing time spent near a radiation
source, maximizing distance from a
radiation source, and increasing the
physical shielding between a person and
a radiation source.
Source: Radiation Event Medical Management, Personal Protection Equipment Overview
(2011). <http://www.remm.nlm.gov/radiation_ppe.htm>
Three types of decontamination according to the SEL are:68



Individual decontamination which contains personal decontamination items.
Active decontamination equipment is used to decontaminate individuals and
equipment.
Post-decontamination equipment is used after active decontamination.
Decontamination plans should include measures for training and use of
decontamination equipment. Individual decontamination equipment includes individual
decontamination kits which may consist of wet wipes, plastic bags for placing personal items
in and printed instructions for self-decontamination. Active decontamination requires
equipment necessary to set up decontamination corridors:69




Tents
Lighting
Water and air heaters
Privacy curtains
68



Showers
Non-ambulatory roller system
Decontamination solutions for personnel and equipment
The most common, effective, and least expensive decontamination solution for
radiological contamination is mild soap and water. This is an excellent decontamination
solution for skin and hair, and works well on most smooth, nonporous surfaces. Commercial
solutions may work better than plain soap on metal isotopes and isotopes bound to metal
because EDTA is the active ingredient. A “homemade” EDTA solution may be made by
adding 1% EDTA to a soap and water solution.30,70 Other methods of decontamination of
radionuclides are physical removal by vacuuming or brushing off, and using an acid
wash.30,70
Casualties that have been contaminated by both chemical and radiological agents
should be treated immediately for the chemical hazard. Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs),
toxic industrial materials (TIMs) or chemical warfare agents may complicate the
decontamination process. TICs/TIMs can be found in industrial or maintenance facilities or
general storage areas and may be in solid, liquid, or gaseous form. Chemical warfare agents
include: (1) nerve agents such as sarin (GB), tabun (GA), soman (GD), cyclosarin (GF), and
VX, (2) blister agents such as sulfur mustard (H and HD), nitrogen mustard (HN), and (3)
vesicants such as lewisite (L).70 Chemical agents are used to kill, injure, or incapacitate
people in warfare or terrorist activities and are usually in liquid or vaporous form. These
agents attack the organs in the body and prevents them for operating normally resulting in
disabling or lethal effects.70 For this reason, decontamination of chemical agents must be
performed as soon as possible; radioactive decontamination is secondary.
Chemical decontaminants are used to neutralize CBRN contaminants. Oxidizers like
supertropical bleach, or STB (chlorinated lime with 30% available chlorine), hydrogen
peroxide, and calcium hypochlorite are suitable for decontaminating chemical agents. Strong
bases and microemulsions can also be employed for the removal of certain chemical
contaminants.70 It is important to note that many of these decontaminants may have health
effects that should be taken into account when decontaminating people.
Lastly, post decontamination equipment includes items such as cadaver bags,
disposable blankets, and clothing. Portal monitors are useful for screening individuals for
69
radioactive contamination in a mass casualty situation. More information can be found on the
DHS’ recommendations for CBRNE decontamination equipment in the 2007 Draft Guide
103-06 titled, “Guide for the Selection of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and
Explosive Decontamination Equipment for Emergency First Responders.”70
Medical
Identifying medical countermeasures for all CBRN agents are the responsibility of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). With the help of DHS, HHS performs a
risk assessment to identify which risks are most likely and what the effects would be to the
nation if these attacks were to occur. After this analysis, HHS works with private industry to
develop adequate amounts of medical countermeasures that will prevent or mitigate potential
health effects from CBRN agents. This program became especially important in 2001 during
the anthrax scare.71
The Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE) was
instituted by HHS in 2006 to provide recommendations to the Secretary of HHS on priorities,
development, and acquisition of these countermeasures. The Enterprise is made up of
representatives from various HHS agencies and offices, DHS, DOD, and others whose
responsibilities also include developing strategies for distribution of medications, medical
supplies, and equipment held in the U.S. Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). There have
been some concerns however, as to whether or not HHS is performing its duty of developing
and acquiring medical countermeasures and so, the GAO published a report addressing these
concerns.71
The report, titled, “Improvements Needed for Acquiring Medical Countermeasures to
Threats from Terrorism and Other Sources” concluded that HHS needs to do three things to
improve the Nation’s preparedness with respect to Health Preparedness, (1) update its
development and acquisition plan, (2) provide budget priorities, and (3) manage the
implementation of these plans internally.71
The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) was originally called the National
Pharmaceutical System (NPS) when it was authorized by Congress in 1998 by the CDC to
address the threat of chemical and biological agents. At that time it was used for drugs and
vaccines for these particular threats but has since expanded to include equipment and other
70
medical supplies. In 2003, the program was transferred to the DHS and HHS for oversight
and renamed the Strategic National Stockpile.
The SNS supplements and resupplies state and local public health agencies after their
supplies have been exhausted in the event of a national emergency anywhere and at anytime
within the U.S. Requests can also be made before an emergency occurs if intelligence
indicates a credible threat may occur that will overwhelm local or state agencies. SNS
packages are released and coordinated by HHS and CDC but local and state agencies are
responsible for planning to receive and distribute the supplies on their own. Supplies can
arrive in the form of 12-hour push packs (packages designed to arrive within 12 hours) or as
managed inventories. The following is a list of some of the items available in the SNS:72,73









Broad-spectrum oral and intravenous antibiotics
Other medicines for emergency conditions
IV fluids and fluid administration kits
Airway equipment
Bandages
Managed inventories maintained by specific vendors or manufacturers, or the SNS
Vaccines
Antitoxins (e.g., Botulinum)
Ventilators
Radiation specific medical countermeasures included in the SNS are: (1) chelating
agents, Zinc- or Calcium-Diethylentriamene Pentaacetate (DTPA), (2) Prussian Blue, (3)
Growth Factors/Cytokines for White Blood Cells and (4) Potassium Iodide (KI). Once a
physician determines that the amount of internal contamination warrants the use of medical
countermeasures, these drugs can be used to speed up and facilitate the elimination of the
radioactive material. KI and Growth factors are not used as treatment to eliminate RAM from
the body.74
Several methods exist that can be used to remove RAM from the body. Radionuclides
that are in the gastrointestinal tract can be excreted in the stool rather than being absorbed
using laxatives, purgatives, or enemas.74 Dilution with oral fluids in concert with diuretics is
a useful and simple method for the excretion of tritium.30,74 Chelating agents are useful for
eliminating internal contamination of radioactive metals such as plutonium, americium, and
curium from the body. Chelating agents should not be used for uranium or neptunium. It is
important to note that within the first 24 hours, Ca-DTPA is 10 times more effective than
71
Zn-DTPA; after one day, they are equally effective. These agents work by binding to foreign
radioactive material or poisons in the body so that they can be excreted from the body;
therefore reducing the amount of time the RAM spends in the body.30,74
Prussian Blue has been used since the 1960s to treat people who have been internally
contaminated with radioactive cesium (mainly 137Cs) and Thallium (mainly 201Tl). Prussian
Blue helps speed up the removal of cesium and thallium from the body by reducing their
biological half-life (the amount of time it takes the radioisotope to decrease its amount by
half in the body) from 110 days to ~30 days and from eight days to three days, respectively.75
Because Prussian Blue reduces the time that radioactive cesium and thallium stay in the
body, it helps limit the amount of time the body is exposed to radiation. Prussian Blue traps
the metallic radioisotopes in the intestines and keeps them from being re-absorbed by the
body. The radioactive materials then move through the intestines and are excreted in stool.
See Chapter 2 for a discussion on the use of Potassium Iodide (KI), a blocking agent,
prevent the uptake of radioiodines by the thyroid. Mobilizing agents such as propylthiouracil
or methimazole are also used to reduce the uptake of radioiodine by the thyroid.30 Cytokines
are used to shorten the duration of time that a person’s white blood cell count is abnormally
low due to exposure to an excessive amount of radiation exposure. Whole-body exposure of
>200 rem (2 Gray) or a significant partial body dose of >200 rem is the threshold at which
treatment should be initiated.30
TRAINING
Training of first responders is necessary to ensure that the proper response is affected
during an emergency. However, first responders are not the only members of the emergency
management team that need training. Public officials, emergency managers, medical
professionals, and anyone that has a role in providing support during an emergency should
receive training at some level. There are several agencies that provide radiological training
either on-line or in resident courses.
Training is useful for the beginning of a PRND mission or to enhance existing
capabilities. Important topics in radiological training for those that are responding to a
radiological hazard include understanding detection equipments’ functions, their limitations,
and appropriate protocols for assessing whether identified radioactive material is benign or a
72
threat. Training is available at all levels of government for emergency managers and
responders, medical professionals, radiation professionals, and members of the private sector
and NGOs.
FEDERAL TRAINING AGENCIES
Several federal government agencies provide training to members of all levels of
government on radiation response, emergency management, and medical treatment of
radiation casualties. DHS, CDC, DOD, and DOE provide courses for a variety of
emergencies.
Federal Emergency Management Agency
FEMA’s National Preparedness Directorate (NPD) offers course on all-hazards
emergency response and emergency management for federal, state, and local as well as some
private sector and volunteer agencies. The NPD includes the: (1) Center for Domestic
Preparedness (CDP), (2) Emergency Management Institute (EMI), and (3) the National
Training and Education Division (NTED).76
The CDP is the nation’s only federally chartered training center for weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) civilian response. The CDP is located in Anniston, Alabama on Fort
McClellan, an Army installation that used to house the U.S. Army Chemical School that was
closed during the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) transition. The Center provides
responders with the tools to effectively protect against, prevent, respond to, and recover from
CBRNE emergencies. The Noble Training Facility (NTF), formerly Noble Army Hospital, is
part of the CDP and is used to train and educate responders on health and medical response
in disaster situations. The NTF is the only hospital facility that provides this type of training
in the nation.76
The Emergency Management Institute (EMI) provides emergency management
training to agencies at all levels of government. Training more than two million people
annually, EMI provides in residence and offsite training as well as technology based training
modules for use by government, private sector, volunteer agencies and NGOs. EMI training
supports the National Preparedness doctrine and the NIMS; some modules are mandatory for
certain emergency management and response positions.
73
The National Training and Education Division (NTED) offers more than 150 courses
to primarily state and local level first responders to help build the critical skills needed to
function efficiently in mass consequence events. Instruction in ten professional disciplines is
offered at the awareness, performance, management, and planning levels. Courses are
provided by direct training (in-residence or by MTT) or indirectly (train-the trainer), by
web-based methods or as conference or seminars. Subjects range from WMD terrorism to
citizen preparedness and public works.76
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office offers PRND classroom and hands-on
training on types and use of radiation detection equipment and the use of technical reachback
support (discussed in Chapter 4). The audience for these one-to-five day classes includes law
enforcement, fire, hazardous materials (HAZMAT), and emergency medical responder
agencies. The DNDO has developed standardized training material and offers assistance to
state and local agencies in the development of their respective PRND programs.41
Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention
The CDC provides a wealth of training courses and resources for medical and public
health professionals on-line to help develop plans for response. Information about patient
management, dose guidelines, fatality management, medical countermeasures and media
communication products are free for use.77 They also have an on-line learning network called
CDC TRAIN that gives public health professionals access to a variety of public health
products and training, as well as a method to track completed training courses all in one
location.
Oak Ridge Associated Universities
Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) is a consortium of 105 Ph.D. granting
universities partnered with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to develop scientific
initiatives, improve national preparedness, and strengthen public trust.78 There are a slew of
training programs and courses offered through this partnership that includes universities,
national laboratories, and other organizations.
74
Oak Ridge Institute for Science and
Education
Managed by ORAU for the DOE, ORISE was established in 1992 as an official DOE
institute. In supporting the DOE mission, ORISE is a leader in science and research and also
aims to improve the Nation’s preparedness through collaboration with other national
laboratories, industry, and academic institutions.79 One of the most valuable training
programs available through ORISE is the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training
Site (REAC/TS). Staff and faculty at this facility have demonstrated expertise related to the
medical management of radiation accidents since 1976. This facility provides training to
medical providers, health physicists and emergency responders on topics of preparedness and
response during a radiological emergency. ORISE is also well known in the international
community for its emergency response capability and as one of three biodosimetry
laboratories maintained in the U.S.79
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DTRA through its Defense Threat Reduction University (DTRU) serves as the DOD
executive agent for nuclear weapons training. DTRU has three components, (1) the Defense
Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS), the Defense Threat Reduction Information Analysis
Center (DTRIAC), and Publications and Strategic Studies. Located at Kirtland Air Force
Base (AFB), the Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS) offers 39 courses and 15
outreach modules on nuclear weapons, nuclear and radiological incidents incident command
and response as well as training on radioactive plume modeling software.80 The school offers
four methods of instruction: (1) on-site, (2) distance learning, (3) outreach modules, and (4)
mobile training teams (MTT), although the majority of courses are provided in-residence.
LOCAL TRAINING
Technical training should be supplemented by local jurisdictions with additional
hands-on training to reinforce the didactic training taken on-line or in a resident course. In
fact, regular refresher training for local responders is recommended in order to maintain the
level of knowledge necessary to react in a confident, orderly fashion before technical experts
arrive, sometimes days after the emergency has occurred. Training will be necessary to
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ensure that individuals involved understand how to operate detection equipment and are
aware of the protocols for detection as well as adjudicating alarms.
If additional radiation or nuclear training is desired, local academic institutions may
provide classroom instruction. In regions surrounding nuclear power facilities individual
courses for degree or certificate programs in radiation protection or health physics related
topics might be available for individuals that have an interest in more information than what
is provided in short courses.
TRAINING FOR MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS
Medical providers will often be the first to identify small-scale radiation events as
patients come into their emergency rooms complaining of symptoms of acute radiation
exposure that are common to a myriad of other illnesses; nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. In a
large-scale event, medical professionals will still be among the first to see radiation casualties
and must be trained to manage the event effectively. Clinicians need to be prepared to
manage (1) victims brought in by transport or as walk-ins, (2) patients that require follow-up
treatment, and (3) concerned citizens (used to be referred to as worried-well), and (4) others
with concerns and questions about radiation.
Other than isolated radiation incidents, radiation emergencies occur so rarely that
medical professionals do not have much experience in the treatment of radiation casualties.71
There are a number of organizations that provide medical training courses to medical
professionals. Effective training programs for clinicians should include, at a minimum,
information on:








Radiation Basics
Biological effects of ionizing radiation
Triage
Signs and symptoms of acute radiation syndrome
Use of medical countermeasures
Decontamination and contamination control
Psychosocial effects
Biodosimetry and bioassay
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Armed Forces Radiobiology Research
Institute
The Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) offers a 2 ½ day long
on-site course that trains medical professionals and emergency responders, civilian and
military, in health physics, biological effects of radiation, medical/health effects, and
psychological effects. The Medical Effects of Ionizing Radiation (MEIR) course addresses
radiological and nuclear incidents on and off the battlefield.81
REAC/TS
ORISE REAC/TS regularly teaches courses to clinicians on radiation medicine at a
basic or advanced level on the diagnosis and treatment of radiation injuries.
RISK COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC
INFORMATION
Aside from the physical damage caused, public fear of radiation is another reason
why a radiological or nuclear device poses such a challenge for emergency response
personnel. Counteracting the entertainment value of mutants and monsters and misreporting
by the media is a challenge for radiation professionals attempting to ease the fears and calm a
panicked population during a radiological emergency, whether accidental or intentional. In
the early phase of any incident, the dissemination of accurate information is critical in
mitigating the damage and injury that could be caused during an incident. Nuclear
emergencies are legitimately called weapons of mass destruction but RDDs or REDs are
considered “weapons of mass disruption” because their impact, outside of the relatively small
radius of damage and injury, is mostly psychological given that the public is unable to detect
radiation on their own. This important distinction is one that only about half of the general
public knows or understands.82
Pre-incident information is also important for educating the public of emergency
plans and procedures associated with the radiological hazards and risks that have been
identified as the most likely. The Public Education Zone around SONGS is an ideal example
of this program. Planning also includes developing message templates such as the ones
NCRP Report No. 165 recommends for RDD or IND incidents. There are several templates
available on the internet but it is important for the user to adapt them to the current
77
circumstances and ensure that the information being disseminated is accurate. Those
responsible for risk communication and public information should be trained in dealing with
the public and the media. Their purpose is to provide accurate, timely, and truthful
information at the same time instilling a sense of calm and control in the public. It is
important to reassure the population that federal, state, and local government agencies and
personnel are maintaining control of the situation and have a plan to address the emergency.
Addressing the media and the public should also be practiced and exercised in radiological or
nuclear exercises regularly.
The Center for Risk Communication (CRC) recommends keeping information at four
grade levels below the average audience grade level and be brief and concise. Dr. Vincent
Covello, the Center director says to aim for no more than 27 words for print media, and nine
seconds for television.83 Risk communication is a science based application that takes
training to develop answers to high-stress and immediate questions and issues developed by
stakeholders of a myriad of events. Successful radiation risk communication occurs because
of anticipation, preparation, and practice.82 An example of an unsuccessful risk
communication event occurred during the accident at Chernobyl. According to Benjamin, the
messages disseminated to the public were littered with technical terms of radiation dose and
exposure followed by little to no explanation;82 this clearly violates one of the key principles
of risk communication, simplicity.
The process of communicating radiation risk and educating first responders should
include the factors listed below as explained by Benjamin:82
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
The hazardousness of the material.
Its quantity.
The probability of release.
The dispersion of the hazard.
The population exposed.
Organism uptake.
Response of officials to the hazard before, during, and after release.
EXERCISES
Training and exercises go hand-in-hand. Exercises are conducted to test and validate
plans and capabilities and ensure that personnel remain proficient. Similar to training, a
78
successful exercise program requires participation from the whole community. The success
of the National Preparedness System requires active participation from all levels of
government. Exercising of radiological emergency plans is essential because emergency
responders rarely have experience in radiological emergencies because of their rare
occurrence; therefore exercises give agencies a method of determining the efficiency of the
plan. Exercises include: (1) drills, (2) tabletop exercises (TTX), (3) functional exercises, and
(4) full-scale exercises:10




Drills exercise a single function or operation and are controlled and supervised.
Tabletop exercises occur in a controlled environment and allow agencies to practice
the activation of different parts of the emergency response plan.
Functional exercises use simulated events to test the agencies’ abilities to respond
with a full range of activities.
Full-scale exercises involve several levels of players that respond to a scenario in as
close to a real-world fashion as possible. The exercise incorporates real-time,
necessary equipment and all organizations identified in the plan.
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) is a capabilities
and performance-based exercise program that provides a standardized methodology and
terminology for exercise design, development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement
planning. HSEEP constitutes a national standard for all exercises and FEMA requires HSEEP
compliance for grant eligibility.10 Four performance requirements are outlined in HSEEP
policy. Organizations/agencies are required to:




Conduct annual training and exercise workshop and maintain a multi-year training
and exercise plan (TEP).
Plan and conduct exercises in accordance with HSEEP guidelines.
Develop and submit an After-Action Report (AAR).
Track and implement corrective action identified in the AAR.
National Level Exercises
The National Level Exercise Program (NLE) is an annual full-scale exercise that
spans states, regions, and international borders. Formerly called TOPOFF (Top Officials), the
first exercise was held in 2000 to test the Nation’s response to a biological attack in
Colorado. The NLE is managed by the DHS National Exercise Program whose mission is to
support organizations in making objective assessments of their capabilities so that strengths
and areas for improvement are identified, corrected, and shared as appropriate prior to a real
79
incident. TOPOFF 2 was conducted in May 2003 and tested a radiological attack in
Washington State and a biological attack in Illinois. TOPOFF 4 conducted in October 2007
exercised response to radiological attacks in Oregon, Arizona, Guam, and Washington, D.C.
NLE 2009 concentrated on the prevention of a terrorist attack across the country over two
months (July and August) and NLE 2010 tested response to the detonation of a nuclear
device.10
In addition to the Target Capabilities List, the 2007 National Preparedness Guidelines
were also supported by the National Planning Scenarios. This list of 15 scenarios includes
two nuclear or radioactive material attacks; the rest are chemical, biological, natural disaster,
conventional explosive, and cyber-attack related.84 These scenarios are used to guide training
exercises from the National to local level and for planning purposes. Scenario 1 is a 10-kT
IND, Scenario 11 is an RDD. The estimated consequences84 of both scenarios are
summarized in Table 13.
Table 13. National Planning Scenarios for Radiological Attacks
Consequences
Casualties
Infrastructure Damage
Evacuation/Displaced
Persons
Contamination
Scenario 1
10-kiloton Improvised
Nuclear Device
Hundreds of thousands
Total damages within a few
miles radius
Several hundreds of thousands
sheltered-in-place
>1 million self-evacuate
Contamination of a few
thousand square miles
~Hundreds of billions dollars
No
Scenario 11
Radiological Dispersal Device
Several hundred fatalities and
injuries; 20,000 contaminated
Immediate vicinity of the
explosion
Tens of thousands sheltered in
shelters or in place
Hundreds of thousands selfevacuate
~ 36 city blocks
Economic Impact
~Billions of dollars
Potential for Multiple
Yes
Events
Recovery Timeline
Years
Months to years
Source: Department of Homeland Security, National Planning Scenarios (Washington DC,
2006)
80
EVALUATING/IMPROVING
In order to refine emergency operations plans, After-Action and Improvement
Reports are an essential part of the preparedness cycle.10 Aside from a local evaluation
process, there are several official programs that emergency management agencies can use to
ensure that their programs are on track and improving over time. It is necessary for agencies
to have a standard to measure their capabilities against rather than continuing to develop
plans, purchase equipment, and conducting exercise without knowing what the target
measure is for success or a state of preparedness.
After-Action Reports (AARs) identify issues, provide a discussion on the issue and
then suggest a recommendation that will help the agency to alleviate the issue. There is
usually a regulated standard or procedure that is attached to the issue identified by the
federal, state, or local government as an area that needs to be addressed and maintained.
There are several programs that an agency can use to evaluate their level of preparedness:10




Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) evaluates emergency
preparedness for state, territorial, or local agencies according to a peer-reviewed
Emergency Management Standard. For a fee, independent reviewers will determine if
the organization is eligible for accreditation.
The State Preparedness Report (SPR) requires state-level emergency management
disaster preparedness organizations to submit an annual report to report on their allhazards disaster preparedness programs and indicate how they will increase Statewide
preparedness.
The Target Capabilities List (TCL) introduced in Chapter 1 was a means for agencies
to address federally identified capabilities for responding to various hazards rather
than developing their own. The TCL served as a foundation document for federal,
state, and local agencies to reference in achieving and supporting national
preparedness. Core capabilities have now replaced the TCL but serve the same
purpose.
The Comprehensive Assessment System (CAS) identifies shortfalls and issues in the
homeland security program relative to resource allocation and the performance of
certain all-hazards capabilities for agencies at all levels of government. The program
determines if agencies are in compliance with the NPS, NIMS, and other plans. It is a
FEMA administered program that is intended to be a central repository for national
preparedness data in the future.
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CHAPTER 4
DETECTION, MODELING, AND ASSESSMENT
DETECTION
There are several requirements for a useful radiation detection device. It is important
to remember that no single device can detect all kinds of radiation and there is no one device
that is useful in all situations. These instruments must be able to identify the presence of
radiation:85




In the environment
On the surface of people or objects
Inside people
Received by people as exposure
Some detection devices provide real-time information to users, enabling
first-responders, RSOs, IC, and technical support agencies to make decisions based on
measurements taken at the incident site. Decisions such as whether or not to evacuate the
public in the area, where to locate control areas, and stay-times for responders rely heavily on
accurate readings by personnel on the ground. Other devices collect radiation exposure
and/or material passively. These devices require laboratory analysis to provide data and
information back to decision-makers. In addition to using detectors and monitors for the
active detection of the presence of radiation, radiation detectors and monitors are important
in demonstrating the absence of elevated levels of radiation. This is especially important
when disseminating public information and in the ongoing struggle that radiation
professionals face with respect to changing public opinion about some facets of radiation use.
Section seven of the AEL and SEL discussed in Chapter 3 lists detection equipment
based on type of hazard and the mode of use.67,68 This section is structured to show detection
equipment based on both the type of expected hazard, in this case, radiological/nuclear and
the anticipated mode of use (Portable, Transportable Lab Equipment, and Standoff). The
modes of use for radiation detection are categorized into:
82



Portable--human-portable for mobile operations in the field. The instrument is light
enough to be carried or worn by an emergency responder and operated by one
individual.
Transportable Lab Equipment--transportable for mobile operations in the field but
generally requiring a trained technical operator as well as extensive labor.
Standoff Detector Systems--equipment specifically designed to monitor the
presence of radiological/nuclear material at a standoff distance of 50 feet and specify
the type and location of radiation sources, while maintaining sufficient energy
resolution and sensitivity to discriminate between normally-occurring radioactive
materials, background and potential threats.
Portable Detection
Four types of portable radiological detection equipment are recommended by several
national PRND agencies: (1) personal radiation dosimeters, (2) handheld survey meters, (3)
ionization chambers, and (4) radiation identification devices.85
PERSONAL RADIATION DOSIMETERS
Dosimeters are small radiation monitoring device worn by persons entering
environments that may contain radiation. They are integral to a personnel dosimetry program
because they measure a worker’s external radiation dose. Some devices can be configured to
detect gamma and neutron radiation. Personal radiation dosimeters (PRDs) can be classified
as film badges, Thermoluminescent Dosimeters (TLDs) Optical Stimulated Luminescence
(OSL), self-reading dosimeters, and EPDs. Film badges, TLDs, and OSLs do not provide
information in real-time, but they can detect prior radiation exposure of an individual or
group if the device was worn at the time of exposure. Self-reading personal dosimeters can
provide real time information about exposure. EPDs alert the wearer when they are in the
presence of radiation levels above a definable threshold either triggering further investigation
or forcing evacuation of the environment for the worker’s safety. Because of the capability of
EPDs to detect gamma and neutron radiation (if purchased with the capability), its small size
(about the size of a cell phone), ability to set a threshold alarm, and ease of use, EPDs are
ideal for use by first responders.
Not only are dosimeters used to detect radiation in the environment but they are also
used to monitor and record the amount of radiation dose that an individual receives in a given
period of time. EPDs allow the used to set pre-determined total dose limits as well as
83
turn-back dose rate limits, assisting the IC or RSO in incorporating radiation protection
principles into the operation and keeping the doses to emergency workers ALARA.
HANDHELD SURVEY METERS
The second type of radiation detector that is suggested for use is a handheld survey
meter that measures radiation in real-time such as Geiger-Mueller (GM) meters or
scintillation detectors with various probes that allows for detection of alpha, beta,
beta/gamma, and neutron radiation. These meters give readings in counts and with some
calculation can give the user an idea of the amount of contamination which may be present in
the area. Scintillation detectors use some type of scintillating material (i.e. sodium iodide, or
NaI) to measure the amount of gamma radiation present in the environment.57,85 Figure 12
shows the U.S. Army's standard radiation detector and its various probes to measure
different types of radiation.
Figure 12. U.S. Army AN/PDR-77 radiation detector with alpha, beta, and gamma
radiation probes.
IONIZATION CHAMBERS
Ionization chambers represent another category of handheld survey meter that
measure levels of penetrating, ionizing radiation in the environment and may be used to
84
determine whether it is safe to enter an area and, if so, for how long. These meters provide
real-time exposure rate readings (e.g., R/hr or mR/hr). First responders should also maintain
an inventory of these detectors as they are useful in establishing radiation zones.57,85
RADIOISOTOPE IDENTIFICATION DEVICE
(RIID)
Radioisotope Identification Devices use crystals such as: (1) sodium iodide, (2)
cadmium zinc telluride (CZT), (3) lanthanum bromide (LaBr3), and (4) germanium to
identify radionuclides. RIIDs can detect and localize radiation sources (although some
detectors are too cumbersome to carry around for an extended period of time), identify
specific radioisotopes and store radiation energy spectra for subsequent transmission and
analysis. Once the identification has been made, the radionuclide can be classified according
pre-installed libraries allowing users to classify the indicated isotope as NORM, medical,
industrial or SNM.
These devices are secondary screening devices and will be used after primary
screening determines that an identification and further information is required. The gamma
rays emitted from the sample are converted into a signal corresponding to a gamma peak
energy that is recorded by the device. After a pre-established sample time has elapsed, all of
the signals are plotted into what is called an energy spectrum. The peak energies with the
most abundant number of counts are matched to a radionuclide in the device library. The
usefulness and effectiveness of RIIDs are measured by their resolution and sensitivity;
determined by the size and type of detector material. Resolution is the ability of the detector
to distinguish between two different gamma ray peaks; thus, a detector with 1% resolution is
superior to a detector with 5% resolution. Sensitivity describes how well the incoming
gamma rays are detected therefore fixing the length of time necessary to count a sample for
an accurate identification.86
Scintillator materials like NaI produce light pulses consistent with the energy of the
gamma ray emitted by the sample. The light pulses are first converted to electrical pulses and
then to a gamma ray spectrum by a multi-channel analyzer. Scintillator materials are less
expensive and easier to use but typically have lower resolution than semiconductor materials.
85
Semiconductor materials such as germanium detect gamma rays from the sample and
create a current in the detector that increases with higher gamma ray energy. Germanium
detectors have the best resolution of both detector types but can be bulky, expensive, and
difficult to maintain. These detectors must be cooled with liquid nitrogen and have a built-in
cooling system for operation.
Both types of detectors may include neutron detection capabilities adding to their
usefulness in identifying SNM. They also have a dose rate capability that alarms at
pre-determined thresholds to alert users to the presence radiation exposure levels of concern.
One limitation of these devices is inaccurate identification of radioisotopes due to shielding
of material or the effects of temperature changes in the environment.85,86
The handheld RIID, usually using a NaI crystal is a good tool for first responders as it
is light and can provide a variety of useful information with a limited amount of training. The
more efficient (and bigger) detector that uses germanium is better for use in a stationary, lowbackground area where the sample is brought to it. The bulkier detectors are not ideal for use
as survey devices intended to locate and detect smaller sources. Once a sample has been
located however, it is appropriate to use the higher efficiency RIID to generate a gamma ray
spectrum for analysis by local radiation professionals or to be sent to technical reachback
assets.
Transportable Lab Equipment
In the transportable lab equipment class, a High-Sensitivity Radionuclide Detector
that uses a high purity crystal such as germanium for better resolution and identification is
recommended.67,68 These detectors are not generally used for search and detection. Once
sources are identified, a higher resolution gamma ray spectrum can be obtained by using this
equipment.
Standoff Detectors
Detectors that can detect gamma/neutron radiation at a stand-off distance of at least
50 feet and specify the type and location of radiation sources, while maintaining sufficient
energy resolution and sensitivity to discriminate between normally-occurring radioactive
86
materials, background and potential threats are called standoff detectors.67,68 Figure 13 shows
standoff detectors used for military radiation detection applications.87
Figure 13. Standoff detectors mounted on a vehicle (left) and a
trailer (right). Source: 20th Support Command (CBRNE),
"Nuclear Disablement Team Information Brief," 2010.
Wide Area Detectors
Wide area or personal radiation detection devices provide an alarm based on
detection, but do not quantify dose-rate. This typical vehicle mounted or backpack-style
detector incorporates both gamma and neutron sensors. Some have radionuclide
identification capability and are capable of distinguishing between NORM and man-made
sources. Backpack wide area detectors as shown in Figure 14 are used for detection and
identifying the general location of sources in large areas.
Figure 14. Backpack wide area detectors can be used to
search for radioactive sources in large areas.
87
Such systems may be used in either covert or overt operational mode generally to
help search for threat materials. They generally use large volumes of gamma-sensitive
detectors (e.g. Polyvinyl Toluene (PVT) or NaI and arrays of 3He proportional counters for
neutron detection. They can be mounted in a vehicle (e.g., truck, boat, or aerial platform), on
a trailer or some other method of transport. Wide area detectors can be used for area
surveillance, search, or other temporary deployments.67,68
Portal Monitors
Portal monitors are large, usually stationary detectors typically composed of PVT for gamma
detection and 3He for neutron detection. By virtue of their size, these devices are much more
sensitive than handheld detectors. The portal monitor can be susceptible to nuisance alarms
and, like all passive radiation detection technologies, may have difficulty in detecting
shielded nuclear and radiological material. Newer versions of portal monitors also provide
limited nuclide identification capabilities.
The Center for American Progress estimates that in 2005 more than 470 radiation
portal monitors have been deployed to key ports in the U.S. at a cost of $300 million.17 This
increased detection capability had enhanced the ability of ports to detect illicit radioactive or
nuclear sources, unless they are shielded heavily with lead.17 Portable portal monitors may
also be used to survey large numbers of people in a mass decontamination operation.40 They
are designed to detect low activities of radioactive material so they are ideal for
contamination screening.
Radiological Air Sampling
Radiological air sampling has come to the forefront with the recent events
surrounding the major damage to Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant. Environmental
monitoring is not a new phenomenon, in fact, as discussed in the next section the EPA has
performed environmental monitoring for over 50 years. Regulations have become more
stringent for radioactive air sampling and monitoring in order to assure the safety of the
public.88 Environmental surveillance is one form of radioactive monitoring that is used to
ensure and demonstrate the compliance of nuclear facilities with regulations or the safety of
the public from environmental radiation levels. The EPA's monitoring system is discussed in
88
the next section but some states, research, and academic institutions have established their
own monitoring stations for research, education, and environmental health purposes.
The earlier version of RadNet was setup as an early alert system for radiation fallout
because of aboveground nuclear testing. 80 tests were performed by the U.S., Great Britain,
and the Soviet Union in the decade between 1945 and 1955. The Radiation Alert Network
(RAN) was instituted in 1956 and in 1959, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) was charged with the responsibility of monitoring radioactive fallout and
environmental radiation by Executive Order. Additional monitoring programs were also
authorized to monitor the continuous aboveground testing by the U.S., the Soviet Union,
Great Britain, France, and the People’s Republic of China up until China’s last test in 1980.89
These additional programs added in the 1960s include the Pasteurized Milk Network
(PMN) to monitor fallout in the food chain and the Tritium Surveillance System (TSS) used
to monitor precipitation and tritium concentrations in rivers downstream from nuclear
facilities. Both systems were added to the RAN and renamed the Environmental Radiation
Ambient Monitoring System (ERAMS) in 1973. At the time of the restructuring, the PMN
had 63 sampling stations; TSS had 68 drinking water stations and 39 surface water stations
after it expanded to include the monitoring of drinking water. After the creation of ERAMs,
the data from these systems began to be published in Environmental Radiation Data reports,
leading to the electronic recording of the data in 1979.89
In 1970, a reorganization plan moved radiation monitoring capabilities to the EPA
where it remains. 2005 brought about the renaming of ERAMS to RadNet to better reflect its
new mission. The new mission included geographic coverage in order to provide better
support to emergency responders. RadNet and its predecessors have been used since the
1950s to track and provide international data on nuclear weapons testing and nuclear
accidents. The system regularly collects air, precipitation, drinking water, and milk samples
for analysis of radioactivity. The data is available for public review on the EPA website.
Environmental radiation trends are published quarterly in the U.S. EPA National Air and
NAREL quarterly report entitled Environmental Radiation Data.89
There are over 200 monitoring stations in all 50 states and the U.S. territories. The
89
100 permanent air stations continuously monitor (with the exception of maintenance
downtime) for beta and gamma radiation in near real-time or collected on filters at the rate of
60 cubic feet per minute (CFM); humans breathe at a rate of 20 CFM.89 Reports are sent to
NAREL hourly for analysis. There are also 40 deployable air monitoring systems that can be
sent nationwide if the need arises. Pictures of both fixed and deployable monitors are shown
in Figure 15. Routine practice establishes background levels of radioactivity in the
environment. The monitors also detect and display abnormal levels of radioactivity in the
environment to aid in rapid decision-making for the protection of the public. Filters from the
air monitors are sent to NAREL twice weekly for additional laboratory analysis and to
double-check the results as a form of quality control. NAREL also performs testing of milk,
water, and precipitation samples nationwide.89
Figure 15. Fixed EPA RadNet
monitor (left) and deployable
monitor (right). Source:
Environmental Protection Agency,
RadNet (2012).
<http://www.epa.gov/radnet/>.
PLUME MODELING SERVICES AND TOOLS
Information from plume models is intended to help inform first responders about the
extent of a contaminated area. This information is acquired by analysis of the models’
mathematical and computer equations and incorporation of field data. A comprehensive
model takes into account the material released, local topography, and meteorological data,
such as temperature, humidity, wind velocity, and other weather conditions, and continually
refines predictions with field data.
90
Plume modeling is one tool that emergency personnel and decision makers have in
making informed decisions about protection of the population and environment. The GAO
found in a 2008 report that “More than 6 years after the events of September 11, 2001, local
first responders do not have tools that can accurately and quickly identify the release of
CBRN material in an urban environment.”63:4 While there are numerous hazardous material
release plume modeling programs available, the majority of them are not for urban areas. The
programs that have been developed for urban areas are still problematic and vary
significantly in their results.
These models were generally not made for homeland security or emergency response
applications but that is exactly what they are being used for. The National Resource Council
in GAO report 08-180, conducted a study of 29 modeling software programs and found that
none of the models had all four characteristics that would be useful to first responders: “(1)
confidence estimates for the predicted dosages, (2) accommodation of urban and complex
topography, (3) short execution time for the response phase, and (4) accurate if slower times
for preparedness and recovery.”63:31 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)
modeling experts concluded that misinterpretation of modeling results is a key issue facing
first responders when applying non-urban modeling software to urban situations.63 Other
issues discovered by the GAO were: (1) that as conflicting models are provided to first
responders from state and federal agencies, confusion ensues which delays decisions such as
evacuation of the public, (2) the coordinating center for federal plume models was having
difficulty keeping track of modeling requests and the information that was provided as
input.63 Nevertheless, responders have to use what is available and these programs either use
Gaussian or Lagrangian plume models to predict atmospheric dispersion of radioactive
material.
Gaussian plume or puff models, widely used since the 1940s, can be run quickly and
easily by non-technical users. They typically use only a single constant wind velocity and
selectable stability class to characterize turbulence diffusion.63 Due to their simplicity, they
are only reliable for near surface releases and relatively short ranges.63 The Gaussian model
should be recognized as a starting place for analyses until more sophisticated assessments
can be made using accurate meteorological data and radiological measurements.
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Lagrangian models (puff and particle) provide more detailed resolution of boundary
layer processes and dispersion. Puff models represent plumes by a sequence of puffs, each of
which is transported at a wind speed and direction determined by the winds at its center of
mass. Lagrangian particle models use Monte Carlo methods to simulate the dispersion of
fluid marker particles. These models can capture plume arrival and departure times and peak
concentrations.63
HotSpot Health Physics Code
HotSpot is a simple plume modeling tool that uses the Gaussian plume model to
calculate the amount of airborne radioactive material dispersed after several different
selectable scenarios.90,91 This tool is useful for first responders because it offers results
quickly, can be loaded onto a laptop, and requires minimal user input.90 Considering that first
responders are mainly concerned with who is at risk and what the hazardous material is,
HotSpot is ideal for use in the early phase of a radiological incident until further information
is gathered and radiation professionals can be brought in to provide technical guidance and
liaison with reachback support organizations. Meteorological data, source term information,
actual dose rate measurements, and population density will provide a more accurate
assessment of the radiological hazard but this information is usually not readily available in
the early phase of a radiological emergency.
Emergency preparedness requires a fast and adequate means of generating an initial
assessment of an actual or scheduled atmospheric release. Overly sophisticated and data
intensive models seldom provide useful and timely information in emergencies involving the
release or potential release of radioactive material into the atmosphere. Emergency planners
and responders are usually interested in worst-case scenarios, such as “Where is the plume
going?” and “What kind of doses will citizens receive if the plume makes its way to a
populated community?” Unless specific accident scenarios are accurately detailed and proven
to be reliable, large modeling errors are possible. Such errors render the use of large,
complex, and time consuming models no more accurate than using a simple Gaussian model.
HotSpot is a simple tool that produces results quickly that help first responders make
decisions in the early phase of an emergency. Many assumptions can be made until
measurements are made and forwarded to a reachback asset for a more detailed prediction
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and plume model. Some understanding of radiation terms and units is required to interpret
the results and local radiation professionals can assist with this task. Loaded on a laptop
computer, HotSpot can be accessed at the site or local reachback assets can provide a quick
plume model if requested to guide early decision making. HotSpot offers ten different
atmospheric dispersion models and three special purpose programs as seen in the user
interface window92 in Figure 16.
Figure 16. HotSpot Health Physics Code atmospheric models and special purpose
programs. Source: S. Homann, computer code HotSpot Version 2.07.2. (Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, 2011).
Using a sample scenario of 2500 Ci of 137Cs dispersed on the soccer and track field at
San Diego State University (SDSU), Figure 17 is a sample output contour plot from the
HotSpot General Explosion model.92 This plot was overlaid on Google Earth but the plots
can be generated on a generic scale or an uploaded map. The input parameters are:





100 pounds of TNT used in the RDD
Wind is coming from the west at 1.0 meter per second (2.2 mph)
Contour values are 1, 2, and 5 rem Total Effective Dose Equivalent (sum of internal
and external dose)
Exposure time is 1 day
Defaults are selected for the remaining input parameters
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Table 9 in Chapter 3 summarizes the protective action dose limits for the public. The
contour plots in Figure 17 would be used to determine if evacuation or sheltering in place is
required for protection of the public. EPA and DHS PAGs recommend evacuation of citizens
that will receive one rem of dose. In this scenario, evacuation would be recommended up to a
distance of 0.30 kilometers. This area of SDSU holds no potential of residents that will
remain in the area for 100% of the time so evacuation is not necessary, however, this area
plus an additional buffer zone managed by law enforcement would be secured and controlled
from public access.
WIND 2.2
0.3 km
Figure 17. RDD contours based on PAGs for public evacuation at San Diego State
University. Source: S. Homann, computer code HotSpot Version 2.07.2. (Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, 2011).
Figure 18 is the HotSpot output table in Windows Notepad.92 The top half of the table
supplies information such as the input parameters and the distance at which the maximum
94
Figure 18. Part 1 of the HotSpot output table. Source: S. Homann, computer code
HotSpot Version 2.07.2. (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2006).
Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) occurs. The TEDE is the sum of the external (deepdose equivalent) and internal doses (committed effective dose) received. Worst case scenario,
one would receive 100 rem in dose (the maximum TEDE) if they remained within 0.01 km of
the blast for an entire 24 hours. The output table also provides information about blast injury
distances based on the quantity of explosive used in the detonation. Using assumptions about
the amount of explosion from the circumstances of the blast (i.e. backpack or car bomb), first
responders can estimate the physical casualties and damage caused by the explosion.
95
Using the second half of the HotSpot output table,92 Figure 19, the RSO and IC can
develop appropriate stay-times for first responders at the incident site. Table 7 on page 31
lists occupational dose limits for emergency workers. Take for example, the five rem dose
limit for workers. Assuming that appropriate PPE is available to prevent internal
contamination, an emergency worker can remain within a 0.03 km radius for 45 hours. This
number is obtained by using the following equation, Dose limit (rem) ÷ Dose rate (rem/hr) =
Stay-Time (hrs). Dividing the 5 rem occupational dose limit by the 0.11 rem/hr dose rate
results in 45 hours. A stay-time of 87 hours within a 0.1 km radius is obtained using the same
calculation.
Figure 19. HotSpot Output Table Part 2 displaying TEDE data. Source: S. Homann,
computer code HotSpot Version 2.07.2. (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
2011).
National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center
(NARAC)
NARAC is a national asset located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(LLNL) that can be accessed by local and state agencies to predict and map relatively smallscale dispersal of hazardous material in the environment that doesn't require the activation of
96
the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). Historically,
NARAC was used to provide assessments of the consequences of the TMI and Chernobyl
accidents. To achieve its goal of providing near real-time products, NARAC uses and is
supported by numerous databases. The databases that support NARAC models are: (1)
weather and meteorological data, (2) population density, and (3) dose and source information
about radiological/nuclear material.93,94
Users of NARAC must be sponsored by one of three primary sponsoring agencies:
(1) The DOE’s NNSA Office of Emergency Response, (2) the DHS Interagency Modeling
and Atmospheric Assessment Center, or (3) U.S. Naval Reactor Program. Over 40 DOE and
DOD facilities use NARAC products and services.93,94 NARAC’s products are used for
estimating dose and predicting health effects to support local, state, and federal
decision-makers. If a radiological incident is significant enough to require the activation of
the FRMAC (discussed in Chapter 4) for prolonged radiological monitoring and sampling,
data and measurements are transmitted from the FRMAC to NARAC in order to update
plume model predictions with real-time data.
NARAC provides Web and iClient end-user tools that allow remote access to the
NARAC Central System. The NARAC Web is a secure web site that permits remoteusers to
input simple release scenarios, automatically run NARAC models, and view and manage the
results of model runs. The iClient is a more sophisticated desktop application that provides
NARAC reachback capability and stand-alone operation using local models on a remote
system. It was designed using Java and web-based technology to provide a platform
independent tool for deployed emergency response analysts. The iClient is designed for
subject matter experts, whereas the NARAC Web is targeted at a wider audience and allows
them to download consequence management products. The NARAC Web has been used very
successfully in major exercises, such as the Top Officials exercise series, to quickly share
model and measurement based products describing hazard areas with multiple local, state and
federal agencies.93,94
Dose limit contour maps indicating locations where protective actions should be
initiated, geographic reference data, and displays of meteorological observations are
generated by NARAC. These products combined with reports and tables on plume
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information, assumptions, and background information supporting calculations can be
incorporated into incident management consequence reports. Radioactive dose is calculated
from model-computed air and ground contamination values, using dose conversion factor
databases provided by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). These factors were
published by the EPA for internal 50-year committed dose from inhalation and are a function
of radionuclide, chemical form, and particle size. The factors are derived from the
International Commission on Radiological Protections (ICRP) Publication-30 lung model
and methodologies for internal dose. Optionally, inhalation dose conversion factors, based on
the ICRP-66 lung model and ICRP 60/70 series methodologies published by the EPA can be
used. Dose conversion factors published by EPA are used for external dose from ground or
air immersion exposure.93,94
Combined with several meteorological models, NARAC uses a 3-D Lagrangian
Monte Carlo stochastic model for regional to global scale atmospheric dispersion. “The
NARAC 3-D dispersion model, the Lagrangian Operational Dispersion Integrator (LODI),
simulates the processes of mean wind advection, turbulent diffusion, radioactive decay, firstorder chemical reactions, wet deposition, gravitational settling, dry deposition, and
buoyant/momentum plume rise.”93.94
NARAC staff consists of experts on operational meteorology, atmospheric science,
chemistry, numerical modeling, geographical information systems, health physics, industrial
hygiene, computer science, engineering and computer systems, in addition to research and
development staff.93,94 A 24-hour on-call staff is maintained to respond to emergencies,
initiating technical support until the atmospheric release has ended, the hazardous areas are
identified, measurements have been integrated into models, and long term assessment has
been completed.93 The staff is centrally located but may also be deployed to a location if
necessary. A NARAC liaison may also be deployed to the Federal Radiological Monitoring
and Assessment Center (FRMAC) if prolonged NARAC assistance will be required to
facilitate and coordinate information flow.
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InterAgency Modeling Atmospheric Assessment
Center (IMAAC)
The DHS interagency working group, IMAAC, was formed in 2004 to coordinate
plume modeling predictions and serve as the single source of hazard prediction and plume
modeling products. Eight agencies are represented in the working group when the IMAAC is
activated with the NARAC serving as the interim host. The intent of this center is to
eliminate contradictory plume models developed and released by different agencies when
requested by local and state agencies. IMAAC products represent the Federal position of the
consequences of atmospheric dispersions of hazardous releases that can be disseminated to
other levels of government and used as necessary during an incident that has activated
Federal support.94
IMAAC provides subject matter experts to help responders in understanding the
nature of, and the consequences associated with, significant atmospheric releases of nuclear,
radiological, chemical, or biological material. Using a centralized atmospheric dispersion
modeling system, the IMAAC can readily estimate the downwind effects from these sources
and distribute products electronically through several mechanisms, including the IMAAC
Web. Users of IMAAC Web have the ability to access and download consequence
management products. Some NARAC Web users are also able to run simulations using the
NARAC modeling system with the ability to share the results with other IMAAC web
users.94
Dadosky, in his 2010 master's thesis titled, “Interagency Modeling Atmospheric
Assessment Center Local Jurisdiction: IMAAC Operations Framework,” found that none of
the ten fire departments that he surveyed about their familiarization with IMAAC had ever
heard of the Center.95 Instead, they rely on one of 140 other dispersion modeling programs
that have been deemed deficient by the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorological
Service and Supporting Research (OFCM) GAO 08-180.90 This is troubling for two reasons:
(1) these deficient models drive the local and state decision-making process and (2) the goldstandard IMAAC can only be accessed with the activation of Federal response. Dadosky
believes that to be effective, IMAAC must be accessed as soon as possible to assist first
responders in making sound decisions to protect the health and safety of the public.95
99
The IMAAC is a collaboration of several federal agencies involved in emergency
response and homeland security activities:







Department of Commerce’s (DOC)
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Department of Defense (DoD)
Department of Energy (DOE)
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
MEDICAL AND TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT TOOLS
Several medical and technical tools are available and used by emergency
management, response, and medical professionals to assess the amount of biological,
physical, and environmental damage caused by a particular hazard or emergency.
Medical Assessment
The rapid assessment of individuals that may have been accidentally or intentionally
exposed to significant amounts of radiation is vital to prevent the manifestation of acute
radiation syndrome (ARS) by providing the appropriate treatment, if necessary. ARS is
caused by irradiation of the majority of the body by a high dose of radiation in a short period
of time. See Table 19 in Appendix B for characteristics of ARS subsyndromes. Cases of ARS
would be seen during a nuclear incident and fewer cases may arise during an RDD explosion.
Rarely, individuals end up in medical facilities with ARS symptoms because of accidents or
as in the case of the Russian Federal Service agent, Alexander Litivenko, radiation poisoning.
Assassinated in 2006, Litivenko was the first 210Po induced ARS fatality. Medical
professionals and health physicists use bioassays and biodosimetry data for dose assessments
in patients because the quantity of radiation dose received is not immediately evident.
BIOASSAY
Bioassays are used to assess to what extent a person has internalized radioactive
contamination. The two methods of bioassay are direct (in vivo) and indirect (in vitro). Direct
bioassay involves whole-body counting or lung counting using a detector that can detect the
gamma radiation emitted from internalized radionuclides.24 Indirect bioassays use body
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excreta as samples for laboratory analysis. Bioassays can: (1) determine the type of
radionuclide internalized, (2) give an estimation of the amount and how it was distributed in
the body, and (3) provide absorbed dose information to medical and radiation professionals.
This information will direct the course of action for treatment if it is necessary to facilitate
the elimination of the material from the body. If treatment is initiated, additional bioassays
are used to determine how effectively the treatment is working. This form of treatment is
called decorporation therapy and was discussed in Chapter 3.
Treatment is much more effective if begun as soon as possible after intake. However,
in a large-scale radiation incident it is highly unlikely that bioassay analysis will be available
for all victims in the early phase of the incident. NCRP Report No. 165 suggests the strategy
of performing bioassays on a small number of people that have been exposed and applying
the same treatment strategy to those with similar exposure circumstances.24 In vivo and in
vitro bioassays require the availability of laboratory equipment and analysis that is not
always found in local hospitals. Local medical and research facilities or colleges and
universities with radiation safety programs may have these resources in-house or at least
have access to them. Nuclear facilities are also a resource for these capabilities. The locations
of these resources should be identified and the method of accessing these resources should be
laid out in emergency plans and practiced in drills and exercises.
Laboratory analysis for a significant number of samples in the current state of
laboratory preparedness will present a problem. A 24-hour urine sample for each individual
is required for analysis, usually resulting in about a half-gallon of urine. Once the sample is
received (which may take days to weeks), the turnaround time for results averages between
three days to three weeks; in an emergency situation this will delay treatment decisions by
medical professionals required to make decisions on radiation treatment within one day to 21
days after exposure.96,97 In 2007, labs had the capability of processing 20 samples per day.97
This rate of analysis is unacceptable for an event where high volume samples are being
submitted for assessment. The CDC is developing a Urine Screening System (URS) that will
reduce the turnaround time for results to 24 hours or less.96,97 The URS also aims to develop
scientific methods to measure 15 radionuclides in addition to the current seven that they can
detect in human urine (see Table 14).98 In 2010, the APHL found that only 15 state
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Table 14. Radionuclides of Concern to be Included in the CDC Urine Screening System
Radionuclides of Concern
Primary Emissions
Uranium (U-235 and U-238), Strontium
Alpha and Beta
Thorium, Plutonium (Pu-238 and Pu-239)
Americium, Californium, Neptunium
Phosphorous, Curium, Polonium
Cesium, Cobalt (Co-57 and Co-60)
Gamma Rays
Iodine (I-125 and I-131), Technetium-99
Selenium, Molybdenum, Iridium
Source: Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Grand Rounds (2010).
<http://www.cdc.gov/about/grand-rounds/archives/2010/download/GR-031810.pdf>
laboratories had the capability to provide radionuclide analysis on human samples; of those
15 labs, 75% could only provide analysis for uranium.98
BIODOSIMETRY
Biodosimetry, or biological dosimetry, is used to calculate an individual’s radiation
dose based on an assessment of signs and symptoms and blood tests to determine the effect
of the exposure on white blood cell counts. By taking note of the amount of time between
exposure and the onset of the first symptoms (usually vomiting), a complete blood count
(CBC) paying special attention to the white blood cell count, or assays of lymphocyte
cytogenetics (the most accurate method), medical professionals can make a determination of
radiation exposure received by the public or emergency responders.24,30,99
The lethal dose for causing death in 50% of the exposed population (LD50) within 60
days is between 300 and 450 rad (3 to 4.5 Gy) or 250 to 500 rad according to the CDC.24
Medical treatment may be able to double this range so the threshold value for medical
treatment initiation is a whole body dose of > 200 rad (2 Gy). In addition, the LD50 value
may be reduced for individuals in poor health or with compounded injuries. Nausea,
vomiting, and diarrhea, and fatigue will manifest in victims that have received doses in the
range of 200 to 500 rad (2 to 5 Gy).24
A qualified radiation cytogenetic laboratory is the definitive determination of dose
assessment. Chromosome aberrations may appear in lymphocytes after a significant dose of
radiation resulting in chromosomes with two centromeres caused by misrepair and abnormal
chromosome replication (See Figure 20).99 Dicentric chromosome assays performed by a
102
Figure 20. Dicentric chromosomes result from the abnormal fusion of two
chromosome pieces, each of which includes a centromere. Source:
Radiation Event Medical Management, About Dicentric Chromosome
Assays. <http://www.remm.nlm.gov/aboutdicentrics.htm>.
qualified radiation laboratory provides a count of dicentric chromosomes in addition to an
estimated radiation dose. Three laboratory facilities qualified to perform these assays are the
(1) AFFRI in Bethesda, Maryland and the (2) Oak Ridge Institute of Science and Technology
(ORISE), REAC/TS, Cytogenetic Biodosimetry Laboratory located in Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, and (3) the Center for Emergency Response and Preparedness New Haven Health
Radiological Emergency Response Biodosimetry Laboratory in Connecticut.100 These labs
can be used to provide state, regional, or national assistance in the event of large-scale
radiological emergency.
Surveys on the radiation preparedness of the nation’s medical and public health
laboratories are consistent in the fact that there have been improvements made since 2007 in
the federal estimate that it would take more than four years to screen 100,000 people for
radiation exposure and six years to test environmental samples from a large-scale
radiological emergency.96 However, there are still significant gaps in capabilities that provide
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great opportunities for existing bioresearch laboratories to support the nation’s radiological
preparedness mission.
Biodosimetry Assessment Tool
The Biodosimetry Assessment Tool (BAT) was developed by AFRRI to manage
radiation casualties in civilian and military radiation incidents. The software tool (distributed
by compact disc) is designed to provide health care professionals with reference information
to include clinical signs and symptoms and a method for collecting, integrating, and
archiving data from the exposed population immediately after a mass casualty radiation
incident. Templates allow data to be easily compared with standard dose responses and
display diagnostic information in a concise format. The tool includes an interactive human
body map that makes documentation of dosimeter location, locations of erythema and other
pertinent information pertinent to the received dose easier to display. The program also
archives information for later use.30,101
World Health Organization (WHO)
BioDoseNet
The World Health Organization (WHO) conducted a survey of biodosimetry
laboratory capabilities in 2007 and their capabilities to respond to a radiation incident with
mass casualties. Results found that a few regions and nations needed to develop a network
capability but other than this lack of coordination, there is a significant capability worldwide.
The WHO BioDoseNet is a global network of laboratories that will provide assistance to
individual laboratories that are overwhelmed during a radiation emergency. Representatives
from 28 countries and 40 biodosimetry laboratories attended the first consultation meeting in
New Hampshire in 2008.102
The ORISE Cytogenetic Biodosimetry Laboratory (CBL) is a member of BioDoseNet
and participates in regular national and international training exercises in which they evaluate
the radiation dose that irradiated blood samples received to simulate blood samples drawn
from radiation casualties.103
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PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORY
CAPABILITIES
Public health laboratories are vital to the preparedness and response capabilities of the
Nation. The radiation assessment components of these organizations will serve as a critical
asset of the local and state government, in addition to federal laboratory capabilities. The
assassination of Alexander Litvinenko by the internalization of a lethal amount of 210Po led to
lessons learned by the U.K. and U.S. health departments. The CDC was the U.S. Public
Health point of contact for American citizens that may have been exposed to the radionuclide
in the UK. The CDC was asked to identify additional U.S. laboratories that could perform
radionuclide testing for polonium. Out of the additional 12 federal and commercial radiation
laboratories that were contacted, only one (a commercial lab) had an active protocol for
performing the test and was certified by Clinical Laboratory Improvements Amendments
(CLIA) to do so. Normal processing time for samples is 30 days, the lab decreased analysis
time to seven days for this incident.104,105
Laboratory activities have focused more on biological hazard identification and
threats than chemical and radiological hazards combined. Of the 3482 clinical,
environmental, and food specimen samples submitted to state laboratories in 2011, only
seven, or 0.002%, were analyzed for a radiological hazard 580 were analyzed for a chemical
threat (0.17%); 2,994 (85%) samples were tested for biological threats, and 1447 (41%)
were analyzed for other threats.105 Note that some samples were tested for multiple threats.
The disparity between radiological analysis and biological/chemical analysis is
understandable, however, laboratories are still required to be able to perform radiological
testing and therefore the lack of familiarization with testing procedures may present a
challenge in a major radiological incident where hundreds or thousands of clinical,
environmental, or food samples are sent to these laboratories for analysis. The UK poisoning
case illustrated this challenge as 33,000 people were thought to have been exposed to 210Po
and 700 people were screened for contamination in the UK alone. This event overwhelmed
public health capabilities where radioactive material was intended for one person.105
In 2003, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) conducted an
assessment of state laboratories’ level of preparedness to respond to emergencies; the
conclusion was that there were major shortfalls in preparedness capabilities. Another
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assessment was performed in 2010 with a shift to all-hazards preparedness by the National
Alliance for Radiation Readiness, or the Alliance. Members of the Alliance include the CDC,
the CSTE, and other public health associations and organizations.106 Their purpose is to
“increase awareness and understanding of the varied public health responsibilities related to
radiation emergencies and to improve communication across the divergent communities
responsible for preparedness and response.”105 The 2010 assessment was based on the 2003
survey but added specific questions about radiation emergencies. Conclusions from the
survey indicated that there is still room for major improvement in the area of radiation
preparedness at state public health labs.106
Less than half of the states that responded acknowledged having a state response
plan; the survey discovered that in order to respond to radiation emergencies, full-time
employees are usually reassigned into emergency response roles even without appropriate
training. There is a difference in staffing between states with nuclear power plants and those
without, therefore their response and laboratory capabilities are usually more advanced than
those of other states. One of the most shocking statistics in the survey indicates a decrease in
preparedness in the 2010 survey when compared to the 2003 survey. In 2003, 43% of states
reported the lack of the capability to apply health physics analysis to an acute radiation
incident; in 2010, the percentage rose to 73%.106 In 2003 there was no, or minimal planning
for crisis-phase epidemiology in 46% of respondents; in 2010 the number was 70%.106
According to the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL), in 2010, nearly
all State Public Health labs (SPHL) were unable to perform radionuclide testing on human
samples (usually urine). A lack of funding and personnel trained in radiochemistry and other
radiation related activities was and remains the cause of this critical shortfall in capabilities;
on average, state labs have less than two trained staff members for radiation operations and
there were no staff members trained to test clinical samples. No labs had a high resolution
radiation detector (e.g. high purity germanium detector) and only five labs had any type of
radiation detector that could measure radionuclides to any degree.96
With respect to environmental sample testing, the APHL 2009 All-Hazards
Laboratory Preparedness report (98% response rate) found that 27% percent of laboratories
reported the ability to measure radionuclides in clinical specimens; 6% reported that another
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state agency or department accepted and analyzed these samples via a radioanalytical
method.98 The 2011 Radiation Capabilities Survey of public health, environmental, and
agricultural laboratories (76% response rate) found that 60% reported the ability to test
environmental samples, such as air, soil, or surface water, for radiation; 48% reported the
ability to test non-milk food samples; 47% reported the ability to test milk and 56% reported
sending data for drinking water to the EPA.105 Clearly, there is room for improvement in
radiation planning and preparedness.
In 2007, the CDC testified before Congress that capabilities for their radiation
laboratories need to be enhanced in order to directly participate in the nation’s response to a
radiation disaster. They continue to seek funding for the development of the CDC Urine
Screening System (URS) discussed in the next section and for inclusion of a radiological
component into the current Laboratory Response Network (LRN). The proposed LRN-R,
would identify five state laboratories to supplement the CDC in the event of a radiological
disaster. Using the URS, the six labs would have an enhanced capability to provide rapid data
and results to decision-makers and medical professionals.96,104
Technical Assessment
Commonly referred to as reachback support, technical support is used to determine if
a radiation detector alarm is caused by a threat or non-threat.17 While reachback assets do not
make recommendations about response actions, the products of an alarm adjudication can
help decision makers in making a graded response (i.e. evacuation vs. shelter in place). The
State Radiological Health Officer is usually the first level of reachback for local responders.
If local and state assets need assistance in determining the cause of a detector alarm, the next
two levels of assistance are Regional and National level assistance available through the
partnership of the DNDO and several national laboratories.107 The goals of reachback support
are to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Provide expert support to detector sites.
Assist operators in resolving detection events.
Interpret detector data and spectra.
Troubleshoot detector issues and performance as part of data interpretation.
Alarm coordination with larger community.
Provide radiological situational awareness to stakeholders as appropriate.
Assess multiple alarms within broader context.
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8. Correlate detector signatures from multiple sites/layers.
9. Change detection of radiation signature from same vehicle at multiple detection sites.
10. Track vehicles/radiation sources when they intersect multiple detector sites.
11. Detector System Improvement.
12. Collect NORM data for continuous algorithm refinement, trending, and quality
assurance.
13. Maintain signatures database for expert analysis.
JOINT ANALYSIS CENTER (JAC)
The DNDO recognizes that the ability to adjudicate every alarm successfully is
limited. One reason the JAC was established was to facilitate assistance to state and local
radiation experts by radiation professionals in the federal government that have access to
additional resources. (e.g. intelligence related to nuclear weapons material and design).
Alarm adjudication requires a method of transmitting the data collected after a secondary
screening process to an organization that is capable of receiving that data and then
performing the analysis in a timely manner. Data are collected in electronic files and sent via
e-mail through a desktop or wireless laptop computer. Individuals providing data collection,
transmission, and analytical support must have training and experience in the study of
radiation spectra. Health physicists and physicists are ideal scientific disciplines for both the
transmission process as well as the analysis process.107,108
In addition to coordinating the technical assessment of data on a regional level, the
JAC coordinates a rapid assessment in the context of nuclear smuggling trends and threats,
intelligence, and law enforcement information regarding terrorist groups and activities on the
national level. As stated earlier, the JAC does not make decisions for local or state officials
but rather provides information and recommendations as to whether the incident involves
legitimate transportation of RAM or may indicate something else such as a licensing
violation, criminal activity, or nuclear terrorism.107,108
Contacting the JAC is of benefit to state and local officials because JAC watch
officers, have 24 hours a day/7 days a week access to experts with a wide range of nuclear
and radiation expertise. Many of these alarms requiring technical assistance come from
border crossings, ports, airports, or other heavy traffic areas. For this reason, DNDO experts
work to minimize the impact on the legitimate movement of people and goods by providing
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timely responses to all requests for technical assistance and detection alarm adjudication. The
typical response time from the JAC back to a state or local agency is one hour.108
REGIONAL REACHBACK SUPPORT
Activation of regional technical assistance occurs with a request, usually by a phone
call, from a state or local official requesting assistance to adjudicate a detection alarm. The
caller sends the radiation spectral data and event information by fax or email to the center.
The spectral data will be forwarded to the appropriate regional reachback spectroscopists, if
possible, for technical analysis while the JAC performs its own analysis on the event
information. Spectroscopists will attempt to identify isotopes present in the sample and
determine threat potential. The JAC verifies licensing data and if appropriate, ties relevant
intelligence to the event at which time a threat analysis will be made. If the alarm is
adjudicated to be a threat or there is still not enough information to make a determination, the
event will be elevated up to national reachback for further analysis, and state or local official
will be notified that their request has been forwarded. If the event is adjudicated to be a nonthreat, the JAC will contact the state or local official and report that information.107
Only two regions have regional assets, the Southeast region uses the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory (ORNL) in Tennessee and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina,
and the Northeast region uses the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) in New York, and
the DHS Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) in New York City.108 More
regional sites will be established as more states acquire radiological or nuclear detection
equipment. The Midwest, Southwest, and Northwest regions will be provided Regional
Reachback capabilities using six additional national laboratories under the DNDO program.
Funding for 20 spectroscopists was provided by DNDO to facilitate this program as an
additional duty outside of their primary jobs.108
Using current employees (health physicists, scientists, and radiation measurement
technicians) from the national laboratories, the regional reachback program’s capabilities
were improved by providing training in areas such as understanding radiological and nuclear
terrorist threats, sources of NORM, and RAM commonly used for medical or industrial
purposes. They also receive technical training on radiation detection equipment including the
proper use of equipment, and common equipment failure and error codes.
109
NATIONAL REACHBACK SUPPORT
National reachback efforts focus on the nuclear threat. Experts are highly trained in
such technical areas as special nuclear material (SNM), the design of nuclear weapons, and
nuclear smuggling and terrorism. Three national laboratories participate in the National
Reachback program: (1) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in California, (2)
Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) in New Mexico and California, and (3) Los Alamos
National Laboratory (LANL) in New Mexico. Results of technical reachback analysis from
regional and national reachback are provided by DNDO to the requesting officials aiding
them in determining how to respond to the event.108
This response may involve other federal agencies such as the FBI especially if the
incident is of a terrorist nature. In these cases, the FBI is the lead agency and will coordinate
the response and the investigation. If the alarm is because of the illegal transport of nuclear
material without the proper license, it will be handled by state or local as a violation.108
After an event concludes, the responding laboratory issues an initial report to the
JAC, which details information such as the date and time of the event, name of the
spectroscopists or scientist conducting the analysis, location of the event, reachback
activation method, event summary, and analysis results. Within 36 hours of an event’s
conclusion, the responding laboratory provides the JAC’s Information and Analysis team
with a detailed after action report for trend analysis and archiving. Figure 21 summarizes the
typical flow associated with a radiation detection alarm adjudication effort.108
FEDERAL RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING
ASSESSMENT CENTER (FRMAC)
The Federal Radiological Monitoring Assessment Center (FRMAC) is a DOE NNSA
asset that coordinates all radiological monitoring and assessment activities in response to a
significant radiological or nuclear incident. The deployment of FRMAC can be requested
through the DHS in support of local or state government assistance or by a coordinating
agency request. FRMAC response consists of the deployment of a Consequence Management
Response Team (CMRT) with wheels up within four hours of notification. These Phase I
teams can arrive within six to ten hours anywhere in the U.S. The team provides technical
110
Figure 21. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office reachback support flowchart. Source:
Department of Homeland Security, DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress
in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols OIG-08-19, (Office of
Inspector General, Washington DC, 2007).
<http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_08-19_Dec07.pdf>.
and management support to the IC until the arrival of a Phase II CMRT with additional
interagency personnel.
The central FRMAC is organized within two to three days after notification and
continues to support the local and state government with the monitoring and assessment plan
developed in conjunction with the teams on the ground. The FRMAC is eventually
transferred to the EPA to continue long-term monitoring activities. The FRMAC is scalable
depending on the size of the incident ranging from 60 to 500 professionals with knowledge in
radiation monitoring, atmospheric transport, radiological analysis and dose assessment and
medical treatment of radiation casualties.109
The initial monitoring activities are focused on the protection of the public and the
investigation of the circumstances of the radiological release. Monitoring continues until a
thorough assessment of the area is completed; monitoring results that show an immediate
threat to public health are immediately reported to the LFA. All raw data coming into the
111
FRMAC from field teams is quickly reviewed and given to the LFA and state
representatives. Afterwards, the raw data is processed, evaluated and summarized, and
approved for distribution outside the FRMAC. This evaluated technical information is given
officially to the LFA and state at the same time to facilitate decision making.109
The Assessment Division of FRMAC serves as the integration center for all incoming
radiological information to the center. It also serves as the point of dissemination for all
products pertaining to the Federal response. Products released by FRMAC provide data
interpretation in terms of PAG guidelines. These results enable decision-makers to make
public health decision about evacuation, sheltering, and food and water controls in a timely
manner.109 Survey and monitoring data is stored in FRMAC databases and transmitted
electronically to NARAC to be incorporated into plume modeling products.110
The FRMAC Assessment Manual guides the radiological assessment process in the
FRMAC. The objectives of the manual are to: (1) provide technical basis for assessment and
the TurboFRMAC software package, (2) document the assessment process, (3) train health
physicists to use FRMAC, and (4) provide a federal consensus on radiological assessment
techniques and methods. Available freely on the internet, the manual is organized into three
volumes and is for use by trained FRMAC assessment scientists in addressing the early and
intermediate phases of a radiological release. Multiple agencies with radiological analysis
responsibility have come to a consensus on technical guidance in the manual defaulting to
International Commission of Radiation Protection (ICRP) values for internal dosimetry. The
volumes are organized as follows:111



Volume 1 – contains the scientific and technical basis for assessment calculations.
This volume is separated into five sections that address: (1) plume phase
calculations, (2) emergency worker and population protections, (3) ingestion pathway
analysis and (4) sample management.
Volume 2 – contains analyses of pre-assessed scenarios. The seven scenarios are the
most likely to occur nuclear and radiological accidents incidents.
Volume 3 – contains FRMAC administrative data and addresses assessment
activities.
TURBOFRMAC
As part of the mission to support the NNSA Nuclear Incident Response Program and
the Department of Homeland Security, NNSA released Turbo-FRMAC (TF), a software tool
112
that allows first responders and consequence managers to quickly and accurately assess
actions required during a radiological event. The software condenses the three volumes and
more than 500 pages of FRMAC Assessment Manual guidance into a useful set of input
panels that are user friendly and intuitive to use. The software provides crisis and
consequence managers estimates of the near- and long-term radiological effects to the
surrounding population, as well as guidance on dealing with supporting infrastructure such as
drinking water, food streams, and personal protection guidance for the public. Incorporating
field samples, the automated software can be used to answer important questions about
whether or not federal limits for radiation dose have been exceeded and how long emergency
workers can remain in a contaminated area.
The basis of FRMAC assessment is to convert PAGs into measurable Derived
Response Levels (DRLs) for air, water, and soil, and Derived Ingestion Levels (DILs) for
food, milk, and crops using Dose Conversion Factors (DRFs). Predictive values for DRLs
and DILs are available for calculation in TF in addition to worker protection guidelines. TF
results answer the question, does the public need to be evacuated because of the radiation
levels in the environment? Based on the PAGs, if the dose exceeds the value for the early
phase, then the answer is yes; if the dose does not exceed the PAG value, then no. TF
software is divided into three applications:112



The Radionuclide Viewer – provides reference information regarding decay
properties for radionuclides in addition to dose coefficients in accordance with ICRP
60 values.
The Radionuclide Mixture Manager – allows the user to input the type of
radionuclide that is used in the incident. Figure 22 shows the user interface window112
that includes the pre-set nuclear and radiological incident scenarios as well as a
selection for a general mixture based on user inputs.
Turbo FRMAC – provides the user selections to determine DRLs, DILs, or worker
protection guidelines, all based on PAGs pre-defined112 as shown in Figure 23. The
mixture created in the Radionuclide Mixture Manager or an outside source file is
imported into TF as the basis of the calculations. Once data has been imported,
sample data has been added, if available, and the analyst has been selected, results are
generated that can be used to brief responsible officials on recommendations for
safety and health of workers and the public.
113
Figure 22. Radionuclide Mixture Manager window to input scenario source
information. Source: Sandia National Laboratories, computer code TurboFRMAC
software version, (SNL, 2011).
Figure 24 displays worker turn-back limits based on the detonation of a 2500 Ci 137Cs
in an RDD.112 Using the data in the table, suggested turn-back dose and exposure rate limits
for all purposes are 4.820 rem and 0.6 R/hr respectively for a whole body dose. The limits
increase as the significance of the response increases (e.g. saving life or property). A full
Derived Response Level report can be found in Appendix B.
114
Figure 23. TurboFRMAC applications window. Source: Sandia National Laboratories,
computer code TurboFRMAC software version, (SNL, 2011).
115
Figure 24. Partial Worker Turn-Back Limit report. Source:
Sandia National Laboratories, computer code TurboFRMAC
software version, (SNL, 2011).
116
CHAPTER 5
SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY’S EFFORTS IN
RADIOLOGICAL PREPAREDNESS
San Diego County possesses many characteristics that make it an attractive target for
terrorist operations. The County is also located an hour from a nuclear power facility, which
would mean devastating consequences for citizens residing in the area in the event of a
significant accident. San Diego State University has taken on the challenge of not only
training future emergency managers, homeland security, and radiation professionals but also
providing technical support and assessment capabilities to assist local emergency response
agencies in training, exercising, and planning for potential radiological emergencies.
DHS identified sports and entertainment venues as high-risk targets for terrorist
activities. Terrorists look for high visibility targets that will bring publicity to their cause.
Attacks on locations with high traffic and commerce flow are also attractive as targets
because the economic disruption would be massive blows to the financial stability of the
area, resulting in a damaging domino effect to all aspects of the community. San Diego can
check both of these blocks of the list. Qualcomm Stadium is the home of a professional
football team, the San Diego Chargers, and holds other entertainment events regularly; Petco
Park is the home of the San Diego Padres, and is located in the heart of downtown San
Diego. There are several colleges and universities in the county that have their own sports
arenas, stadiums, and theates holding events throughout the year.
San Diego and its surrounding areas is one of the top five tourist vacation spots in the
U.S. Tourism is the third largest industry in San Diego, resulting in $7 billion annually from
visitors alone.113 This industry results in $16 billion of economic impact for the region, thus a
large part of San Diego’s income.113 The Port of San Diego oversees two cargo and one
cruise ship terminal, 17 public parks, the Harbor Police department, and a host of wildlife
reserves and businesses around the San Diego Bay.114 San Onofre Nuclear Generating
Station, owned by Southern California Edison, the City of Riverside, and San Diego Gas and
117
Electric (SDGE), houses two reactor units that provide energy to power 1.4 million average
homes annually.115 The center of San Diego is an hour away from the facility and an accident
at, or even an intentional attack on this facility will affect the surrounding communities in
ways that include psychological, economic, and physical consequences. In addition, San
Diego has several ports of entry to Mexico that in 2011, saw over 24,678,000 passenger,
cargo vehicle, and train crossings.116
San Diego offers plenty of characteristics that make it a plausible target for a terrorist
attack. One of these characteristics is its proximity to Los Angeles and Long Beach counties.
These locations make attractive targets for terrorists for the same reasons that San Diego
does. A radiological attack or accident in southern California would be devastating not only
to San Diego and surrounding counties, as well as the State of California.
San Diego State University (SDSU) understands the importance of San Diego to the
State and the Nation’s economic health and therefore has placed great emphasis on homeland
security and emergency preparedness. College of Sciences graduate programs in Homeland
Security (HSEC) and Radiological Health Physics (RHP) are available to instruct future
emergency managers, homeland security, and radiation professionals on procedures for
planning for and managing, detecting, modeling, and assessing conditions in the event of a
radiological emergency. These programs have a working relationship that when combined
will make SDSU a leader in radiation preparedness for San Diego and its surrounding areas.
GRADUATE PROGRAM IN HOMELAND SECURITY
The HSEC program offers courses in terrorism, emergency preparedness and
response, science and technology and a wide variety of electives and foreign study
opportunities. The program has built partnerships with public, private sector, and government
agencies at all levels to address border security, bioterrorism, critical infrastructure, and
science and technology issues.117 In addition to the wealth of knowledge and experience of
the instructors, another asset the HSEC program uses to support preparedness at all levels is
the Visualization Center (Viz Center or VizLab).
The Viz Center serves as a centralized location at SDSU that provides real-time
information of interest to homeland security professionals and assisting in operational needs
with decision-making support tools for the range of possible emerging disasters. The Viz
118
Center uses visualization technologies to organize and disseminate information to the
community, region, State, Nation, and world in a timely and effective manner. Specializing
in providing imagery and geospatial data to interested parties, the Viz Center comes with its
own set of capabilities, complementing the technical expertise of its users.118
RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH PHYSICS DEGREE PROGRAM
After 12 years in operation and funding by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),
the SDSU Radiological Health Physics program was separated from the Master of Science
degree in Physics in 1972. At the time, providing radiation professionals educated in
radiation physics, dosimetry, and protection was essential for the operation of power reactor
facilities. For over 40 years, SDSU has provided more health physics professionals than any
other academic institution in California thus making it an obvious radiation resource for
agencies in the area.119
Courses offered cover topics such as radiation biology, nuclear instrumentation, and
radiological and nuclear physics. RHP have a wide variety of knowledge, experience, and
specializations that present a comprehensive basis for training new and seasoned radiation
professionals in medical and health physics applications.
SDSU THE WAY AHEAD
As the previous four chapters have pointed out, the security of the Nation requires a
collaboration of assets from all aspects of society. There are clear delineated responsibilities
of all levels of government but what about untapped resources in local communities? SDSU
has led the way in producing homeland security and radiation professionals. University
radiation professionals are often sought out by the media to provide risk communication
information when public concerns arise over SONGS or other environmental radiation
monitoring issues. The university possesses and is in the process of acquiring many assets
that can provide technical support to and assist local and regional decision-makers in critical
decisions prior to the arrival of federal assets.
The university is already involved in numerous DHS programs and through the
collaboration of the Homeland Security and Radiological Health Physics programs plans to
create a “Nuclear Detection Instrumentation Technology Division.”120 This division will
119
integrate students from both programs; broadening the knowledge base of HSEC and RHP
students, and training them in developing and testing nuclear detection equipment and
methods used in emergency nuclear power operations and radiological terrorism attacks.120
Courses and Equipment
In 2012, the RHP was awarded funding by the NRC to develop a new course that
covers environmental radiation monitoring, plume modeling software tools, and risk
communication methods. This course will incorporate on-line learning tools with
in-residence laboratory sessions, adding to the diversity of coursework required for the
Master of Science in Radiological Health Physics degree. Equipment for this course will
include a fixed air sampler similar to the EPA RadNet system. The desired outcome of using
this system involves tying the SDSU air sampler into the EPA RadNet system improving the
radiation monitoring capability of San Diego County. The RHP program also intends to
purchase portable air samplers for deployment in and around San Diego to areas that may be
of interest for research, training, or real-world purposes.120
The RHP program radiation equipment inventory currently includes: (1) GM,
(2) ionization meters, (3) proportional counters, and (4) spectroscopy equipment. These
detectors will also be used in conjunction with new air sampling equipment that will be
acquired for the new course.
Plume Modeling and Assessment
There are several software tools that SDSU intends to train students on for use in
estimating radiation dose and providing information quickly to local emergency responders.
These tools can be used to make quick decisions regarding evacuation and setting worker’s
occupational dose limits or during the recovery phase when determining clean levels for
contaminated areas. These tools require an understanding of radiation basics, radiation
dosimetry, and regulatory requirements for the protection of the public and
occupational/emergency workers. HotSpot and TurboFRMAC have been discussed in the
previous chapters. MCNPX, IWMDT, and RESRAD are three other tools that can be used to
enhance the local area's preparedness.
120
Monte-Carlo N-particle eXtended (MCNPX) is a radiation transport program used to
model all types of radiation at all energies interacting with all medias. MCNPX 2.7.0 is the
current version of the software tool that was first released in 2008. MCNP, the basis of
MCNPX is probably the most commonly used radiation transport software in physics
applications. Used in many radiation transport modeling simulations, this tool has been
applied in medical physics, defense, health physics and outer space, and nuclear
applications.121,122 This modeling tool can be modified with plume or terrain data and
provides critical information during all phases of a radiological emergency. During the 2010
California Full-Scale Exercise, SDSU was able to provide radiation modeling services to
officials that later determined this to be a significant gap in the current capabilities of San
Diego response to radiation emergencies. See Appendix B for the MCNPX contour plot
created from MCNPX data.
The university is also working with DTRA to acquire another plume modeling tool
called the Integrated Weapons of Mass Destruction Toolkit (IWMDT) Consequence
Assessment (CA) application. The IWMDT combines the tools necessary for hazardous
material release plume modeling to include geospatial information and near-real time
weather data and allows analysts to share detailed information with responsible officials
during an emergency. CA is used to model CBRN hazard atmospheric releases and their
effects on civilian and military populations. Using local terrain effects and real-time weather,
CA plots airborne activity concentrations and internal and external dose estimates to predict
human biological effects.101 IWMDT as a system can also be provided as a stand-alone
virtual machine which is the mode by which SDSU is working to acquire the program. The
university will manage the tool and provide access to local response agencies for planning,
exercise, and real-world scenarios.
RESRAD, or RESidual RADioactivity, is a set of computer software programs
designed by Argonne National Laboratory to assist in the assessment of an area that has been
contaminated by radioactive material and what its effect is on people and their health. The
software helps to answer the following three questions: (1) how might the site be used in the
future?, (2) how will the materials move through the environment and come into contact with
people?, and (3) what will the resulting dose be? These calculations can be quite complex so
RESRAD was developed in 1989 to help radiation professionals answer these questions. An
121
exposure scenario is chosen from a possible set of behaviors and activities; the most
vulnerable being a resident farmer that grows food and collects water from a contaminated
site. A total lifetime dose can be calculated from a given amount of internalized radionuclide
activity or external radiation exposure allowing the prediction of the dose received by an
individual over a period of 100,000 years. RESRAD takes into account the exposure
pathways described in the EPA PAGs and recent versions have included the ability to
calculate dose to children instead of only the 154 pound, 5'7" reference man in past
versions.123 This software is free and in the public domain. Other codes in the set address
radiation dose, risk, clean-up criteria for buildings, personal property and other locations.
The inclusion of this software in the SDSU modeling toolkit is important for two
reasons: (1) decisions on recovery actions and levels of radioactivity that a jurisdiction
considers "clean" is a local function, and (2) this software has been approved by the
government in making regulatory decisions. If a radiological emergency was to occur in the
San Diego area that resulted in widespread contamination, local officials would need
guidance on clean-up actions and contamination levels. Familiarity and knowledge in the
operation of this software would undoubtedly make SDSU an integral part of the clean-up
and recovery process.123 Table 15 summarizes some characteristics of four software tools
that will benefit the local response community in the event of a radiological emergency.
The HSEC Viz Center is the ideal location to apply these tools for training, exercises,
and real world scenarios. The Center is used for classes and events that benefit from the
operations center type organization of the room, providing access for multiple computer
terminals and projection screens that facilitate the visualization of data for analysis.
Laboratory Capabilities
This paper briefly discussed the lack of nationwide laboratory capabilities for
detecting radiation in environmental and human samples and the importance of early
detection and dose assessment in radiation casualties. SDSU’s RHP program offers a whole
body counting system that can provide important information to health physicists and
medical professionals regarding the amount of RAM that a radiation casualty has internalized
during an accidental or intentional release. This system uses a NaI detector to detect gamma
122
Table 15. Summary of Plume Modeling and Assessment Software Progams
HotSpot
TurboFRMAC
MCNPX
RESRAD
Time
Required to
Produce
Results
Few minutes
Hours
Data
dependent
Phase of Use
Products
Early
Plume model/dose
assessments
Early/Intermediate
Plume model
prediction
Late
Dose
assessments
Training
Required
Proponent
Access to
National
Reachback
Basic radiation
terms
LLNL
Yes, files can be
imported into
NARAC
15 Minutes to one hour
depending on stage of
incident and what is
being input (e.g. actual
measurements or
assumptions)
Early/Intermediate
Dose
assessments/worker
dose limit
recommendations
Intermediate
Advanced
Advanced
LANL
No
ANL
Yes
SNL
Yes, can be imported
into FRMAC products
radiation emitted from the body. In the event of a mass casualty emergency, public health
officials will need access to as many bioassay and biodosimetry tools as possible. SDSU can
be a critical asset in the early detection of significant internal radiation dose resulting in early
and appropriate medical treatment to many radiation casualties.
Reachback Support
SDSU's combination of subject matter expertise and technical resources serves as a
local asset to emergency responders in San Diego County. Several SDSU faculty have
personal knowledge and familiarity with the SONGS facility, others are leaders in the
Homeland Security frontlines. Both the RHP and Homeland Security graduate programs
provide a wealth of knowledge that can be accessed by local, regional, and even state
response organizations during any radiological emergency, accidental or intentional. The
RHP's soon-to-be enhanced detection, modeling, and assessment capabilities will further
support the university's standing as a leader in training competent radiation professionals to
serve in the homeland security, nuclear power, or health physics industries. SDSU currently
participates and provides work products to local agencies during small- and large-scale
exercises, cultivating a working relationship with those that will be first on the scene during
any radiation emergency.
123
This is a valuable relationship that should result in the smooth integration of SDSU
subject matter experts into an advisory and consultative role, providing analysis of technical
data, and consultative services to decision-makers until additional support has arrived two to
three days later. Advanced level reachback support agencies will be sending information to
and receiving information from the local emergency operations center (EOC); placing a
liaison in the EOC that can speak the same language provides a major advantage in the
accuracy and speed of information flow. The San Diego County Health Physicist will have
overwhelming responsibilities during a radiation emergency; a SDSU radiation professional
would be an ideal choice to serve as an LNO, share some of the technical work, and provide
access to SDSU's Viz Center and RHP laboratory capabilities.
124
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis is not to serve as a complete guide for building a
radiological preparedness program but rather to provide a broad overview of the components
that are necessary to comply with the National Preparedness Goal and framework. In order to
understand the objectives and capabilities that an organization must possess to successfully
support the Nation in preventing, protecting against, mitigating the effects of, responding to,
and recovering from a radiological incident, there must be a basic understanding of how the
pieces of the national doctrine fit together.
The Nation has made great strides and is more resilient than ever since the 9/11
terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina in developing preparedness, response, and recovery
strategies. There are still existing gaps in radiological emergency preparedness because a
large-scale event has yet to occur. It is difficult for emergency management and response
agencies to train for a hypothetical scenario adding elements of realism that do not interfere
with day-to-day operations.
Local responders are the first line of defense against a radiological emergency,
intentional or accidental. They must identify and work with radiation professionals in the
community to present a cohesive defense and protect the safety and health of the public. To
do this, local agencies need to ensure that their detection, plume modeling, and technical
reachback methods are clear, understood, and formalized. San Diego emergency response
agencies can reach out to San Diego State University (SDSU) and take advantage of this
resource prior to a radiological emergency. SDSU can provide rapid analysis and assessment
of data, reducing the chance of misinterpretation by non-technical specialists. Local radiation
professionals can also be used to facilitate the flow of technical information to advanced
levels of reachback support in an emergency. When included in planning and training, they
can ensure accuracy and realism of information and scenarios.
An additional plan in the future for SDSU's radiological preparedness capability may
be to work with the University of California at San Diego's (UCSD) Health System
125
Cytogenetic Laboratory. This lab currently specializes in chromosome analysis of cancer
specimens. If, in the future, SDSU and UCSD worked together to expand the capability of
this laboratory into certified radiation biodosimetry cytogenetic analysis, San Diego would
possess the only laboratory west of Tennessee with this capability; making this area a much
needed asset for the Nation's preparedness to significant radiological emergencies.
A coordinated approach between all levels of government, the private sector, and
non-private sector organizations is required for a successful radiological preparedness and
response plan. Preparation involves appropriate detection equipment, predicting the impact of
a radioactive plume by modeling its atmospheric dispersion, or using technical reachback to
quickly adjudicate a radioactive alarm. This can be accomplished by engaging all of the
stakeholders of a community and ensuring that information, training, and plans remain
current and consistent with the Nation’s goals of keeping the homeland safe.
126
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135
APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL REFERENCE INFORMATION
136
Additional reference information is provided in Tables 16-19. Table 16 provides a
Core Capabilities and Target Capabilities Crosswalk;6 Tables 17 and 18 provide more
information on PPE classification and selection,124,125 and Table 19 provides characteristics
of ARS.126
Table 16. Core Capabilities and Target Capabilities Crosswalk
Mission Goal
Prevention, Protection
Mitigation, Response,
and Recovery
Prevention, Protection,
Mitigation, Response,
and Recovery
Prevention, Protection,
Mitigation, Response,
and Recovery
Prevention
Prevention and
Protection
Prevention and
Protection
Prevention and
Protection
Protection
Core Capabilities
Planning
Target Capabilities List
Planning
Operational Coordination
Emergency Operations Center
Management
Public Information and Warning
Emergency Public Information and
Warning
Forensics and Attribution
Intelligence and Information
Sharing
Screening, Search, and Detection
None
Information Gathering and
Recognition of Indicators and
Warnings
Counter-terror Investigation and
Law Enforcement
CBRNE Detection
Access Control and Identity
None
Interdiction and Disruption
Verification
Protection
Protection
Protection
Protection
Cybersecurity
Physical Protective Measures
Risk Management for Protection
Programs and Activities
Supply Chain Integrity and Security
Mitigation
Community Resilience
Mitigation
Mitigation
Long-term Vulnerability Reduction
Risk and Disaster Resilience
Assessment
Mitigation
Response
Threats and Hazard Identification
Critical Transportation
None
Infrastructure Protection
Risk Management
Food and Agriculture Safety and
Defense
Animal Disease Emergency
Support
Community Preparedness and
Participation
None
None
None
Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-inPlace
(table continues)
137
Table 16. (continued)
Mission Goal
Response
Core Capabilities
Environmental Response/Health
and Safety
Response
Response
Fatality Management
Mass Care Services
Response
Mass Search and Rescue
Operations
On-Scene Security and Protection
Response
Response
Response
Operational Communications
Public and Private Services and
Resources
Response
Public Health and Medical Services
Response
Response and
Recovery
Situational Assessment
Infrastructure Systems
Recovery
Economic Recovery
Recovery
Recovery
Recovery
Health and Social Services
Housing
Natural and Cultural Resources
Target Capabilities List
Environmental Health
Responder Safety and Health
WMD and Hazardous Materials
Response and Decontamination
Fatality Management
Mass Care (Shelter, Feeding, and
Related Services)
Search and Rescue (Land-based)
Emergency Public Safety and
Security Response
Explosive Device Response
Operations
Communications
Critical Resource Logistics and
Distribution
Fire Incident Response Support
Volunteer Management and
Donations
Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital
Treatment
Epidemiological Surveillance and
Investigation
Isolation and Quarantine
Laboratory Testing
Mass Prophylaxis
Medical Supplies Management and
Distribution
Medical Surge
None
Restoration of Lifelines
Structural Damage Assessment
Economic and Community
Recovery
None
None
None
Source: Department of Homeland Security, Crosswalk of Target Capabilities to Core
Capabilities (Washington DC, 2011). <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/prepared/crosswalk.pdf>
138
Table 17. Levels of Personal Protective Equipment per OSHA Regulation
Type of
LEVEL A
Protection
Respiratory Positive-pressure, full-
Clothing
face piece selfcontained breathing
apparatus (SCBA)
or Positive pressure
supplied air respirator
(SAR) with SCBA-type
auxiliary escape
respirator
Totally encapsulating
chemical- and vaporprotective suit
Chemical-resistant
inner suit (e.g., Tyvek
coveralls) or Long
underwear
Gloves
Inner and outer
chemical-resistant
gloves
Boots
Chemical-resistant
boots, with steel toe
and shank
LEVEL B
Positive-pressure,
full-face SCBA or
Positive pressure SAR
with SCBA-type
auxiliary escape
respirator
LEVEL C
LEVEL D
Full-face or halfmask, negative
pressure air
purifying respirator
(APR)
Escape Mask
Escape Mask
Hooded chemicalresistant clothing
Hooded chemicalresistant clothing
Overalls and longsleeved jacket or
Coveralls
Overalls
Water-repellent
surgical gowns
or coveralls or
Scrub suits
Chemical-resistant
inner suit (e.g.,
Tyvek coveralls)
Safety glasses,
face shield or
goggles
Face shield and
Hard hat
Hard hat
Inner and outer
chemical-resistant
gloves
Surgical gloves
Double gloving
with frequent
changes of outer
pair to reduce
spread of
contamination to
other providers,
other parts of the
patient.
Chemicalresistant boots,
with steel toe
and shank or
Disposable,
chemicalresistant outer
boot covers
Chemical-resistant inner
suit (e.g., Tyvek
coveralls)
Face shield and Hard hat
(worn under suit)
Inner and outer
chemical-resistant gloves
Chemical-resistant boots,
with steel toe and shank
or Disposable, chemicalresistant outer boot
covers
Chemical-resistant
boots, with steel toe
and shank or
Disposable,
chemical-resistant
outer boot covers
(table continues)
139
Table 17. (continued)
Advantages
LEVEL A
LEVEL B
Maximum available
skin, respiratory,
eye protection
High level of protection
Less restriction of
mobility than Level A
PPE
LEVEL C
Increased mobility as
compared to Level A
or Level B PPE
Much less physical,
psychological stress
Extended operation
time without air supply
limitations
No fit testing required
for hooded respirators
Disadvantages
Shortest length of
time in a protective
garment due to heat,
other physical and
psychological
stressors, limited air
supply
Restricted mobility
May exceed
protection level
necessary for
healthcare workers
working in
healthcare facilities
Requires highest
level of ongoing
training
Suit acclimatization
and medical
monitoring
Compared to Level A
PPE:
Requires same degree
of user training and
medical monitoring
Equipment has same
sustainability issues
LEVEL D
Provides
sufficient level
of protection
when work
operations
preclude
splashes,
immersion, or
potential for
unexpected
inhalation or
contact with
hazardous
levels of
chemicals
Cannot be used
when airborne hazard
concentrations are
immediately dangerous
to life and health or in
low oxygen
environments
Offers the
minimum
protection
against
infectious
agents or
contaminants
Requirements: user
enrollment in medical
monitoring program
and fit testing of
respirators before they
are issued and worn
Requires
regular
surveillance
for radiation
contamination
Ongoing competencybased training and
exercise
Equipment
procurement
and ongoing
maintenance
Staff members
to conduct
frequent selfsurveys or to
be surveyed by
co-workers to
identify
possible
contamination
Presence of a safety
officer during wearing
of PPE
Source: Radiation Event Medical Management, PPE Classification System (2011).
<http://www.remm.nlm.gov/ppe_classification.htm>
140
Table 18. Specific PPE Selection Matrix for Radiation Emergencies
PPE Type
Dermal
Respiratory
Recommended
Equipment
Bunker gear
("turnout gear)
NIOSH
certified CBRN
SCBA
NIOSH
certified PAPRs
and APRs
Protection Offered
Guidance
Protects against internal
and external
contamination
Does not protect against
external radiation exposure
from high energy, highly
penetrating ionizing
radiation
Dosimetry should be issued
as part of PPE
Highest level of protection Incident commanders may
permit the use of other
NIOSH approved respirators
when certified CBRN
respiratory protection is not
available
Environmental sampling
data may allow the
downgrade of PPE level
Powered Air Purifying
Respirators (PAPRs) and
Air Purifying Respirators
(APRs) with P-100 or
HEPA filter:
Minimum acceptable level
of respiratory protection
Protects against inhalation
of radioactive particles
only (no chemical or
biological agents)
Source: Occupational Safety and Health Administration, OSHA/NIOSH Interim Guidance
PPE Selection Matrix: Radiological Dispersal Devices (2006).
<http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/emergencypreparedness/cbrnmatrix/radiological.html>
141
Table 19. Subsyndromes of Acute Radiation Syndrome
Name of
Subsyndrome
Hematopoietic
(Bone Marrow)
Dosea
Prodromal
Stage
> 70 rads
(> 0.7 Gy)
Symptoms are
anorexia,
nausea and
vomiting.
(mild
symptoms
may occur as Onset occurs 1
low as 0.3 Gy hour to 2 days
after exposure.
or 30 rads)
Stage lasts for
minutes to
days.
Latent Stage
Manifest
Illness Stage
Recovery
Stem cells in
bone marrow
are dying,
although
patient may
appear and
feel well.
Symptoms
are anorexia,
fever, and
malaise.
In most
cases, bone
marrow cells
will begin to
repopulate
the marrow.
Stage lasts 1
to 6 weeks.
Drop in all
blood cell
counts occurs
for several
weeks.
Primary
cause of
death is
infection and
hemorrhage.
Survival
decreases
with
increasing
dose.
Most deaths
occur within
a few months
after
exposure.
There
should be
full recovery
for a large
percentage
of
individuals
from a few
weeks up to
two years
after
exposure.
Death may
occur in
some
individuals
at 120 rads
(1.2 Gy)
The
LD50/60b is
about 250 to
500 rads
(2.5 to 5 Gy)
(table continues)
142
Table 19. (continued)
Name of
Subsyndrome
Gastrointestinal
(GI)
Dosea
> 1000 rads
(> 10 Gy)
(some
symptoms
may occur as
low as 6 Gy
or 600 rads)
Prodromal
Stage
Latent Stage
Manifest
Illness Stage
Recovery
Symptoms are
anorexia,
severe nausea,
vomiting,
cramps, and
diarrhea.
Stem cells in
bone marrow
and cells
lining GI tract
are dying,
although
patient may
appear and
feel well.
Symptoms are
malaise,
anorexia,
severe
diarrhea,
fever,
dehydration,
and electrolyte
imbalance.
The LD100c
is about
1000 rads
(10 Gy).
Stage lasts
less than 1
week.
Death is due
to infection,
dehydration,
and electrolyte
imbalance,
occurs within
2 weeks.
Symptoms are
return of
watery
diarrhea,
convulsions,
and coma.
Onset occurs
within a few
hours after
exposure.
Stage lasts
about 2 days.
Cardiovascular
(CV)/Central
Nervous System
(CNS)
> 5000 rads
(50 Gy)
(some
symptoms
may occur as
low as 20 Gy
or 2000 rads)
Symptoms are
extreme
nervousness
and confusion;
severe nausea,
vomiting, and
watery
diarrhea; loss
of
consciousness;
and burning
sensations of
the skin.
Patient may
return to
partial
functionality.
Stage may last
for hours but
often is less.
No recovery
is expected.
Onset occurs 5
to 6 hours
after exposure.
Death occurs
within 3 days
of exposure.
Onset occurs
within minutes
of exposure.
Stage lasts for
minutes to
hours.
a
The absorbed doses quoted here are “gamma equivalent” values. Neutrons or protons generally
produce the same effects as gamma, beta, or X-rays but at lower doses. If the patient has been exposed
to neutrons or protons, consult radiation experts on how to interpret the dose.
b
The LD50/60 is the dose necessary to kill 50% of the exposed population in 60 days.
c
The LD100 is the dose necessary to kill 100% of the exposed population.
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Acute Radiation Syndrome: A Fact Sheet for
Physicians (2006). <http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/arsphysicianfactsheet.asp>
143
APPENDIX B
SAMPLE OUTPUT PRODUCTS FROM
MODELING TOOLS
144
TURBOFRMAC
This section includes a sample Derived Response Levels (DRLs) TurboFRMAC
report. This report was generated using a 2500 Ci 137Cs source. Results from this report are
used to calculate worker stay-times, whether evacuation protocols should be initiated, and
whether food or water intervention may be necessary. Comparing these results to DHS, FDA,
and EPA regulations or Operational Guidelines charts, decision-makers can make informed
decisions on protective actions for the public and their workers.
145
146
147
148
149
MCNPX PRODUCT
Using MCNPX and another modeling tool, SDSU was able to provide a visual picture
to responsible officials in the 2010 California Full-Scale Golden Guardian exercise of where
a one Ci 137Cs and 60Co mixed source would deposit particulates around California State
University-San Marcos' soccer and track field. The results from the simulation provided the
raw data which was then used to create a visual product as seen in Figure 25:127



Source distribution (yellow) 150 meter radius from ground zero
2 mR/hr 510 meter radius (red)
background level 1015 meter radius (green)
150
Figure 25. Contour plots produced from MCNPX data. Source: P. Papin, B. Welty, K.
Spero, and R. Nelson, "Golden Guardian 2010: Multi-Agency Full Scale Exercise
involving RDDs. Presented at the 55th Annual Meeting of the Health Physics Society,
(San Diego State University, Salt Lake City, Utah, 2010).