New Europe College
Institute for Advanced Study
Bucharest
State University of New York at Albany
Rockefeller College
Department of Political Science
Daniel Kuchler, PhD Candidate
The Grammar of
Republican Political Theory
A Critical Discussion of Arendt and Habermas
Chapter Outline
December 19, 2012
State University of New York at Albany, Rockefeller College, Department of Political Science
Milne 106
135 Western Ave.
Albany, NY 12222
[email protected]
http://www.albany.edu/~dk582569/
Chapter Outline
In this dissertation I will provide both (a) a balanced account of political theory as both political and relying on rational (or, philosophical) justi;ication and (b) a balanced account of republicanism that avoids the shortcomings of overly liberal versions of re-­‐
publican democratic theory.
I start from the assumption that the metatheoretical understanding of what consti-­‐
tutes political theory (i.e., what is political theory?) in;luences what concrete forms po-­‐
litical theory can take (for example, what is political freedom?). I will thus ;irst criticize Arendt’s concept of political theory from a Habermasian perspective. This provides me with a justi;ication for a republican political theory. Here, I will criticize both Arendt and Habermas and formulate my perspective on republicanism in contrast to both liberals and representative democrats.
Current accounts of republicanism have encountered various problems. For example, neo-­‐republican approaches (such as Pettit1) tend to con;late republicanism with liberal thought and thus reduce the concept to just another variety of liberalism.2 In contrast, I seek to recover republicanism as an egalitarian concept.
Habermas (and in his wake, also some Habermasians such as Forst3), too, encounters similar problems: even though he does not con;late the two concepts, he still attempts to ;ind a balance between liberalism and republicanism,4 partially in order to protect the individual against a ‘tyranny of the majority’. Habermas thus turns to representative 1
cf. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford University Press, USA, 2000).
Here, it might be helpful to distinguish between two different developments: (1) first, there is the inclusion of liberal tendencies into
republican theory. Although not incompatible in principle, and actually a necessary extension, if taken too far, it entails a reduction of
republicanism to yet another variation of liberalism. This cannot be done without compromising the very core of republican thought.
(2) Second, there is what could be called the “representative turn”. It denotes the introduction of representation instead of direct
citizen participation. This is, I argue, contradictory to republican thought.
3 cf. Rainer Forst, Kritik Der Rechtfertigungsverhältnisse. Perspektiven Einer Kritischen Theorie Der Politik (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 2011).
4 cf. Jürgen Habermas, “Three Normative Models of Democracy,” Constellations 1, no. 1 (1994): 1–10; Jürgen Habermas, Between
Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Polity Press Cambridge, 1996), 296.
2
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democracy for two reasons: (1) to protect individual rights and (2) due to the high com-­‐
plexity of modern societies. I agree with Habermas on both objections. Yet, this argu-­‐
ment eventually leads Habermas to argue for a parliamentary-­‐representative democ-­‐
racy. In contrast, I argue that protection of individual rights (and even group rights) only makes sense within an overall republican framework. Therefore, a balanced account of republicanism would not be a balance between republicanism and liberalism. Also, while such a balanced account would make provisions for the protection of the individ-­‐
ual, it does not necessarily lead to the institutionalization of a parliamentary-­‐
representative democracy, as advocated by Habermas.5
Arendt on the other hand, in her account of republicanism overemphasizes freedom, which she wants to defend against overly egalitarian tendencies. I however argue that Arendt’s argument is based on a fundamental misunderstanding because equality is a necessary condition for republicanism – just as is freedom. Furthermore, freedom and equality are complimentary conditions that require each other in order to function.
The dissertation is divided into two parts. In the ;irst, I will develop a conception of political theory that is derived from Arendt and Habermas but different from both (al-­‐
beit in different ways). In the second part, I will use this concept of political theory to outline a republican theory that again utilizes ideas from both thinkers but also over-­‐
comes their shortcomings.
Thus, in the ;irst part of the project, I argue that both Habermas’ and Arendt’s misun-­‐
derstandings in their respective political theories are based on a misunderstanding about the nature of political theory itself.
5
This may be a case in which a particular element (representation) has “sneaked its way into” an (at least allegedly) universal normative order.cf. Rainer Forst and Klaus Günther, “Die Herausbildung Normativer Ordnungen. Zur Idee Eines Interdisziplinären Forschungsprogramms,” in Die Herausbildung Normativer Ordnungen. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven, ed. Rainer Forst and Klaus Günther (Frankfurt am Main, 2011), 25.
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On the one hand, I will draw out Arendt’s critique of philosophy both an sich and as a foundation for political theory. I will outline a new interpretation of her thought through a discussion of her critique of various political thinkers. In my interpretation, I take a radical position: in contrast to most other commentators of Arendt’s political theory, I consider Arendt’s rejection of philosophy to be absolute. She claims that philosophy is dangerous and destructive to the political realm because it methodologically relies on the singular human being while politics was constituted by a plurality of humans acting together. I maintain that Arendt is correct to criticize philosophy of being unable to cap-­‐
ture the distinctly political-­‐dialogical aspects of politics. In order to clarify Arendt’s criticism however, I will deconstruct her rejection of philosophy into distinct criticisms that can also be thought of as prerequisites for a valid political theory.
I will go on to discuss her suggestion of story-­‐telling, narrativism, and essayism as form of political theory. Yet, while anti-­‐foundationalist, I will criticize this understanding of political theory for rejecting any form of justi;ication instead of differentiating be-­‐
tween foundationalism and justi;ication. While I argue that Arendt’s particular strength lies in republican political theory, her theory lacks a suf;icient justi;ication to constitute and legitimize what I call a Rechtsstaat. In contrast to my approach, Arendt is skeptical towards universal rights.
Following Habermas, I however argue that due to the scale and complexity of modern societies, Arendt needs some form of justi;ication to guarantee liberty. At the same time, this cannot be done anthropologically or otherwise metaphysically (In so far as Arendt does provide justi;ications, they are metaphysically rooted). I argue that such a mode of justi;ication however can be found in the concept of the Rechtsstaat. Furthermore, and even more important, the Rechtsstaat is integral to liberty because by ensuring social equality it is an enabling condition for citizenship. In this sense, the Rechtsstaat is a sub-­‐
stitute for Arendt’s private infrastructure.
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In other words, the concept of the Rechtsstaat that I put forward brings the social ques-­‐
tion in line with liberty. (In fact, even Arendt speaks of constitutions to found liberty.)
I will turn towards the Rechtsstaat as a central concept in Part II but will conclude Part I by suggesting a modi;ication of Habermas’ version of speech act theory: I maintain that Habermas correctly criticizes metaphysical justi;ications of political arguments. His approach to move justi;ication into the realm of the philosophy of language could pro-­‐
vide a solution to the resulting lack of justi;ication: it could address Arendt’s criticisms of philosophy and still serve as a mode of justi;ication for political theory. I will argue that such a justi;ication is always arbitrary to some degree but that by utilizing abstract concepts, the discussion is removed from contested issues and at least some form of jus-­‐
ti;ication can be provided.
However, when writing about political theory Habermas does not follow the conclu-­‐
sions drawn in his treatment of the philosophy of language. In fact, his preference for representative democracy is not fully warranted if one were to employ his concept of linguistic justi;ication. In other words, Habermas looks to speech act theory as an im-­‐
portant justi;ication for political thought. Yet, his philosophical account does not neces-­‐
sarily entail his concrete version of democratic theory. Because of this, by philosophical standards, his political theory would be considered speculative at best.
It is because Arendt and Habermas are ignorant of the relevance of rational-­‐
philosophical justi;ication for political theory6 – albeit in different ways – that they are mistaken about the necessity of justi;ication (Arendt) or how this justi;ication should translate into concrete political theory (Habermas). It is because of this error that their accounts of republicanism become problematic. I will thus argue for a balanced account of political theory as primarily political but also equipped with a suf;icient justi;ication 6
In order to draw out the specific character of rational justification, I will distinguish between rational justification, for example
through speech act theory, and political legitimation, such as the legitimation of a normative order (among other legitimations for
other normative orders).
Daniel Kuchler: The Grammar of Republican Political Theory – Chapter Outline
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at which can be arrived through Habermasian speech act theory. Such an account of po-­‐
litical theory would enable us to modify Habermas’ and Arendt’s respective theories in an attempt to provide a balanced account of republicanism that is aware of the rights of the individual as well as of social equality.
Based on the understanding of political theory outlined above I will suggest such a reinterpretation of republicanism. Following Habermas, I will suggest the necessity to frame a republican democracy with a Rechtsstaat. I will then develop an Arendtian con-­‐
cept of republicanism that emphasizes public and politics. However, I also criticize Ar-­‐
endt for overemphasizing freedom. By deemphasizing equality (isonomia) at the same time, Arendt undermines the Rechtsstaat.
In the end, I will present a concept that I call social republicanism: it emphasizes the interplay of freedom, direct democracy, and social equality under the condition of an in-­‐
stitutionalized normative order – the Rechtsstaat. This will acknowledge Arendt’s cri-­‐
tique of philosophy and of totalitarianism. It will further reply to Habermas’ attempt to include individual rights into republicanism and his argument that complex societies make direct democracy dif;icult. At the same time, it avoids a too liberal interpretation of republicanism.
Before discussing Habermas’ and Arendt’s concrete political theory and arguing for what I call ‘social republicanism’, I will thus develop a balanced account of political the-­‐
ory.
Part I: The Grammar Of Political Theory
Chapter 1: Arendt’s Critique of Platonic Philosophy
In this chapter I will maintain that Arendt is correct in asserting that the goal of po-­‐
litical theory cannot be the prescription of a static, universal (thus, philosophical) politi-­‐
cal order. Arendt derives this criticism largely from a speci;ic interpretation of Plato. Daniel Kuchler: The Grammar of Republican Political Theory – Chapter Outline
5
While this interpretation might be lacking (as I have shown elsewhere) 7, I maintain that Arendt’s criticism of Platonic philosophy is justi;ied: political theory is concerned with content (i.e., politics) that is political and particular in principle. It needs to be political because the methodological individualism of philosophy cannot capture certain aspects of human action, which by de;inition takes place between people. This, however, can be accounted for through a political focus because this focus entails understanding humans in-­‐the-­‐plural. For example, often, political ideas relate back to essentially contested con-­‐
cepts where the principal contestation may not be resolved. In contrast, an abstract, “philosophical” understanding would fail to account for the principled contestation and attempt to impose universal de;initions on the political space. This unitarianism, which – according to Arendt – is essential to philosophy, cannot fully capture politics. Thus, to properly describe politics, political theory must be primarily political in the sense of having the ability to capture a pluralistic sphere.8 As a consequence, Arendt rejects Pla-­‐
tonic philosophy as politically dangerous, epistemically futile and inadequate to deal with speci;ically human affairs.
It is further important to follow Arendt’s emphasis on the normative dimension of this de;inition of politics: the particularity of political concepts may not turn into uni-­‐
versality. This is what may be called an anti-­‐totalitarian9 and anti-­‐tyrannical10 normative demand. As a result, also on the normative level, political theory has to be primarily po-­‐
litical.
The central question of chapter 1 is therefore: if Arendt criticizes “philosophy”, what are the particular aspects of her criticism? Or, in other words: what concepts that she identi;ies with “philosophy”, does she criticize? This way of asking avoids the loaded 7
See for example, Daniel Kuchler, “Die Dialogisch Konstruierte Polis Und Das Problem Der Gerechtigkeit. Ein Kommentar Zu Arendts Kritik an Platons Politeia,” in Die Gerechte Stadt: Politische Gestaltbarkeit Verdichteter Räume, ed. Matthias Lemke, 1st ed.,
Staatsdiskurse 20 (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 2012), 49–72.
8 cf. Hannah Arendt, “Truth and Politics,” in The Portable Arendt, ed. Peter Baehr (New York: Penguin, 2000), 570; Hannah Arendt,
Gespräche Mit Hannah Arendt., ed. Adelbert Reif (Piper Verlag GmbH, 1982), 10.
9 cf. Hannah Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism (Schocken, 2005), 318.
10 cf. Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa Oder Vom Tätigen Leben, Neuausgabe. (Piper, 2010), 280.
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question of “politics” or “political theory” versus “philosophy” but instead assesses Ar-­‐
endt’s framework in which politics could be addressed, described and discussed.
As I will show, two of the main criticisms against “philosophy” are its normativity and its universalist claim. On Arendt's position on normativity, I disagree with Benhabib (normative gap in Arendt's work) and Villa (lack of normativity as bene;icial for display of excellence). I agree in principle with Vollrath (normativity of the political an sich), Markell (normativity implicit as some preconditions are necessary to enable politics) and Volk (political narrative that implicitly criticizes exclusion – protection of the human not an sich but as a citizen).11
However, in contrast to Vollrath, Markell, and Volk, I criticize Arendt's lack of justi;ica-­‐
tion. I begin by asking what Arendt misses regarding the question about normativity when compared to a justi;ied approach.
My preliminary answer is that there are possible constellations in which (1) the po-­‐
litical narrative is not convincing (because it itself is particular, not universal). As a re-­‐
sult, the norms implicit in the narrative cannot be justi;ied and thus not be claimed out-­‐
side the narrative context from which they originate. (However, in some cases, such near-­‐universally shared norms would be desirable.) Furthermore, (2) the political nar-­‐
rative as a principle alone cannot guarantee universal citizenship (see for example, an-­‐
cient Athens' 315,000 inhabitants vs. 25,000 citizens). Habermas makes an argument similar to this critique when he argues for individual rights. I will use this preliminary criticism of Arendt to set up the following two chapters: Does Arendt revise her criticism of practical philosophy when discussing other philo-­‐
sophical approaches in so far as to invalidate this hypothesis (chapter 2)? Does Arendt solve this problem with her concepts of judgment/imagination on the one hand and her form of essayism and narrative on the other (chapter 3)?
11
Cf. Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); Dana Villa, Arendt and Heidegger.
The Fate of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Ernst Vollrath, Grundlegung Einer Philosophischen Theorie
Des Politischen (Würzburg, 1987); Patchen Markell, “The Rule of the People: Arendt, Archê, and Democracy,” in Politics in Dark
Times: Encounters with Hannah Arendt, ed. Seyla Benhabib, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 58–82; Christian Volk, Die
Ordnung Der Freiheit. Recht Und Politik Im Denken Hannah Arendts (Baden-Baden, 2010).
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Chapter 2: Arendt’s Treatment of other Philosophers
In the second chapter, I will then evaluate Arendt’s discussion of non-­‐Platonic and post-­‐Platonic philosophers. I will show that Arendt’s criticism against Platonic philoso-­‐
phy is not limited to it but rather applies to all Western philosophical thought.
In a second step, I will turn to aspects of philosophy that Arendt considers useful for her own conception of political theory. Namely, this is Socratic dialogue, Kant’s aesthetic judgment and Jaspers’s humanist version of existentialism. Socrates, Kant and Jaspers attempt to situate the philosopher in the polis. Still, albeit partially useful, Arendt rejects all three positions in principle as they are still philosophic-­‐unitary positions. This sug-­‐
gests that Arendt’s rejection is not a matter of degree but absolute.
However, this does not mean that some aspects could not be salvaged for Arendt’s conception of political theory. For example, Arendt suggests that aesthetic judgment can serve as a model for political judgment, and as a consequence, for political theory. In chapter three, I will now describe Arendt’s model of political theory.
Chapter 3: Judgment and Essayism, or Political Theory as Narrative
In this concluding chapter on Arendt’s conception of political theory, I will outline how Arendt tries to make aesthetic judgment useful for a theory that is unphilosophical as it avoids absolutes and the forced solitude of thinking. According to Arendt, political theory – in this perspective – can only be realized through the form of narrative and es-­‐
sayism.
In the second part of chapter three, I will criticize this type of political theory for be-­‐
ing incapable of providing a suf;icient justi;ication both to establish the possibility of critique and to provide a strong basis for the normative demands of republican demo-­‐
cratic theory. This is the case, because Arendt’s narrativism-­‐as-­‐method necessarily Daniel Kuchler: The Grammar of Republican Political Theory – Chapter Outline
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makes her political theory itself a legitimizing narrative (Rechtfertigungsnarrativ).12 Ar-­‐
endt fails to fully conceptualize the narratives’ function for legitimation and possibly, reproduction of norms. Thus, because Arendt methodologically limits political theory itself to a narrative, political theory remains stuck in politics and becomes incapable of justi;ied fundamental critique.
I maintain that to guarantee both the critical dimension and academic standards to properly describe politics, political theory has to provide its particular and pluralistic political content with a method that is not necessarily particular. Thus, by claiming the entirely political nature of political theory Arendt here con;lates method and the subject to be researched. While the subject matter might make demands towards the method, I maintain that one needs to distinguish between the two. Therefore, I argue that political theory is primarily political but cannot be fully conceptualized from the vantage point of politics. Instead, politics remains its subject. Political Theory thus requires an analytical framework.
In addition, Arendt’s theory is problematic in so far as she has to set norms such as the anti-­‐tyrannical/anti-­‐totalitarian aspect of political theory metaphysically to remove them from political contestation. She has to do so because her concept of political theory lacks a level of further analytic justi;ication. Without any justi;ication and without Ar-­‐
endt’s metaphysical setting of norms, political theory itself and the anti-­‐totalitarian norms would be reduced to mere opinion.13 Without this “deeper” level of justi;ication, and without justi;ication to her republican democratic theory Arendt further misunder-­‐
stands the priority order of freedom and equality, leading to her overemphasis on free-­‐
dom: Arendt acknowledges but mistakenly deemphasizes that freedom from existential 12
Forst and Günther, “Die Herausbildung Normativer Ordnungen. Zur Idee Eines Interdisziplinären Forschungsprogramms”; Forst,
Kritik Der Rechtfertigungsverhältnisse. Perspektiven Einer Kritischen Theorie Der Politik.
13 Cf. Arendt, “Truth and Politics,” 553, 559f.
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necessity is a necessary prerequisite for political freedom.14 I will now turn to Haber-­‐
mas’ approach to philosophy in order to outline an understanding of political theory that could avoid both this problem as well as Arendt’s reliance on metaphysics.
Chapter 4: Habermas’ Interpretation of Speech Act Theory
Arendt’s rejection of philosophy – and with it, rational justi;ication – ensures the political-­‐open nature of political theory. This is necessary in order to guarantee that her framework is both anti-­‐totalitarian and able to correctly describe politics through politi-­‐
cal theory. The problem in Arendt’s rejection of philosophic justi;ication however is that it had to rely on metaphysical de;initions to provide justi;ication to the normative claim to anti-­‐totalitarianism and that it was unable to provide justi;ication to republican democratic theory. To avoid Arendt’s reliance on metaphysics, a different strategy of jus-­‐
ti;ication is necessary.15
To put it differently, only if it can rely on rational-­‐philosophic justi;ication, political theory can be emancipatory, enlightening and immunize politics against war and Shoah. Also, only if it uses philosophical conceptualization as its justi;ication, political theory can meet academic standards such as intersubjective veri;iability.
Instead of Arendt’s radical and absolute rejection of philosophy, a more moderate po-­‐
sition is adequate. In this chapter four, I will outline Habermas’ interpretation of speech act theory. I will evaluate the critical debate (Searle, Apel, several criticisms in Benhabib/Dalmayr, Kompridis, Rehg and others) and modify Habermas’ interpretation to take current developments in philosophy of language and speech act theory into ac-­‐
count. I will further evaluate in how far Habermas avoids the problems for which Arendt 14
For example, Brecht’s “Fressen kommt vor der Moral” or Maslow’s hierarchy of needs comes to mind. Similarly, Critical Security
Studies have emphasized a broad conceptualization of security as human emancipation. Arendt correctly emphasizes political
participation but misses that this cannot be reached without social participation and freedom from need.
15 On Habermas’ claim that his version of discourse theory could avoid this problem: cf. Jürgen Habermas, Moralbewußtsein Und
Kommunikatives Handeln, Erstausgabe. (Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983), 105; as well as Jürgen Habermas, Theorie Des Kommunikativen
Handelns, vol. 1, 7th ed. (Suhrkamp Verlag, 2006), 221f.
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Chapter 5: A Habermasian Conception of Political Theory
In an argument derived from Habermas’ speech act theory I will argue for an under-­‐
standing of ‘philosophical’ as “more abstract” (on a spectrum from political to philo-­‐
sophical). Understood this way, ‘philosophical’ understandings would not be able to reach universality because they would still have to rely on sets of premises that are at least potentially disputable. Yet, the more abstract the theory becomes – that is, the fur-­‐
ther the justifying premise set is removed from common political understandings, the more it approaches universality and the less political it becomes. As a consequence, I understand the political–philosophical cleavage not as binary categories but as a scale on a spectrum with never fully realized end-­‐points.
In this view, political theory should seek to resolve politically contested concepts ana-­‐
lytically and as far as possible in order to reach statements such as “Assuming a set of premises {p}, a speci;ic understanding of a concept c necessarily follows”. Yet, a set of premises {p} in political theory usually does not generate one speci;ic concept c but rather a set of possible concepts {c}. In other words, an abstract formulation opens up a spectrum of possible concrete formulations: the more abstract the premise set, the broader and more arbitrary the resulting concepts. These concepts are thus politically contested.
Furthermore, precisely because the concepts are contested, their premise set {p} is contested as well. If contestation leads to a variation of {p} into {p’} the speci;ic under-­‐
standing of {c} that followed from {p} does not follow anymore with necessity. Such an understanding of political theory as moving from the concrete into the abstract does not rule out a dialogical-­‐pluralistic nature of politics and does not incapacitate political the-­‐
ory to understand a concept of politics that is understood this way.
Following this train of thought, political theory can reach more abstract levels of premise sets than common political speech while still leaving enough room for political Daniel Kuchler: The Grammar of Republican Political Theory – Chapter Outline
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debate. However, it also can also rule out certain convictions. While a certain set of pos-­‐
sible concepts {c} follows from {p}, an alternate set of possible concepts {ac} may be ruled out if it does not follow from {p} and if one maintains that {p}.16 This means that it may be possible to rule out e.g. racist conceptualizations as inacceptable positions be-­‐
cause they con;lict with a highly abstract premise set {p} that is common-­‐sensical or mutually agreed to by all participants. Yet, acceptance of {p} does not lead to universal concepts but rather a set of concepts {c} between which the concrete choice is still de-­‐
batable. In this way, political theory can still maintain the possibility of an open dialogue in politics, and account for a plurality of existing legitimate normative orders. In other words, this would enable us to conceptually maintain a pluralist political space, while providing us with the tools to for example rule out exploitative or racist normative or-­‐
ders.
Habermas’ philosophy of language and discourse ethics is a particularly promising framework to accomplish this because it can account for both levels that are needed: on the one hand it can provide an abstract layer that can account for universal and invari-­‐
ant basic rights17 and it can account for a political layer with culturally-­‐determined, context-­‐based and differing positions within the basic rights framework. In other words, the requirement of legitimation of political normativity is itself in need of further ab-­‐
stract justi;ication. The proposed framework can account for both. (I will further discuss the implication of these ;indings for political normativity in chapter 9.)
However, Habermas’ theory, too, encounters two problems: ;irst, it remains primarily linguistic. Yet, politics – in so far Arendt is correct – focuses on acting together. Acting includes linguistic activity but is not limited to it. (Arendt is also ambiguous about this 16
If {p} is sufficiently abstract, it might be common-sensical, mutually agreed to and thus de-contested and removed from political
debate. Because {p} is very abstract, variation of concrete political concepts is great. Yet, not everything has to count as acceptable.
17 cf. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 296f.; For Habermas’ discussion of human rights see for example, Jürgen Habermas,
“Zur Legitimation Durch Menschenrechte,” in Philosophische Texte, Vol.4: Politische Theorie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag,
2009), 298–312.
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question.) Second, while his account of philosophy of language could provide a basis to political theory and justi;ication to political concepts, Habermas does not fully imple-­‐
ment it when he writes about political theory. A consequence of this is the overemphasis on parliamentary-­‐representative democracy that does not necessarily follow from his philosophy of language.
Chapter 6: Interim Conclusion on ‘Political Theory’
To summarize, political theory is thus understood to be concerned with humans in-­‐
the-­‐plural who are acting together. At the same time, political theory should rely on rational-­‐philosophic justi;ication. On the metatheoretical level, colloquially put, one could say that Arendt’s political theory needs to be amended by Habermas’ philosophy of language. I have thus used a Habermasian perspective to criticize Arendt’s meta-­‐
concept of political theory.
In this perspective, I argue, we will be able to account for a political theory that can provide a political perspective that guarantees political theory’s focus on community and acting-­‐together. We will be further able to integrate an analytic perspective into po-­‐
litical theory that can account for a movement into the ‘abstract’ that can guarantee aca-­‐
demic standards and a justi;ication of basic rights. The preference of political theory for the political dimension forecloses the possibility of unitary, stable universalisms and by this ensures that a large enough space is left open for politics. By this, political theory by de;inition avoids tyrannical unitarism. The political perspective furthermore guarantees the imperative of freedom because acting together requires the ability to act, which in turn relies on individual freedom.
In other words, we have to distinguish between content and methodological form of political theory. Regarding the content, political theory must avoid philosophical unita-­‐
rism. Yet, philosophical method may be formally employed to provide a framework to describe and analyze politics.
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This still leaves us with two questions: ;irst, we have to evaluate how Habermas’ ac-­‐
count of philosophy of language can help us understand a type of politics that is more broadly understood than just linguistic. Furthermore, because my account of political theory cannot provide ;inal justi;ication, we encounter some limitations regarding the justi;ication of political theory itself.
Regarding the ;irst problem, Habermas’ focus on language raises the question about how this could help us de;ine a political theory that is concerned with human action – a much broader concept than just human language. However, if language is understood, as it is sometimes done in the philosophy of language, as a manifestation of overall human thought and activity, then the preconditions for acting together could be similar to and just as universal as the preconditions for communication.18 In other words, Habermas’ universalization principle19 and discourse principle20 may be applied to human action as well – and not just to verbal communication.
Second, our approach leaves open the possibility to fundamental contestation: why would we even necessarily want to talk or act together? Language and action, after all could also be used to give orders and dominate others.21 This cannot be fully ruled out because this could only be done at the cost of turning the political space itself into the tyrannis against which we are trying to defend it. I however argue that we can attempt to provide justifying premise sets that are abstract enough to be mutually agreeable (for example, Habermas’ universalization principle and discourse principle) and that can le-­‐
gitimately rule out the counter argument, thereby arriving at intersubjectively shared emancipatory principles. These principles can be considered to be near-­‐justi;ied be-­‐
18
Habermas seems to hint at this possibility in Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität Und Geltung: Beiträge Zur Diskurstheorie Des Rechts
Und Des Demokratischen Rechtsstaats: Beiträge Zur Diskurstheorie Des Rechts Und Des ..., 4th ed. (Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998),
372.
19 cf. Jürgen Habermas, Christian Lenhardt, and Shierry W. Nicholsen, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (The MIT
Press, 1990), 65, 82; Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 311; Habermas, Moralbewußtsein Und Kommunikatives Handeln,
103.
20 cf. Habermas, Lenhardt, and Nicholsen, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 66–67.
21 Compare Habermas’ concept of “strategic action” in Habermas, Theorie Des Kommunikativen Handelns, 1:197f.
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cause alternative conceptions of e.g., human nature are either non-­‐common-­‐sensical or unacceptable.
Part II: The Grammar of Republicanism
The conclusions drawn from part I raise the question how such a revised notion of political theory would not only enable us to think differently about republicanism but would also seem to suggest a balanced account of republicanism as political theory. I will investigate this in the following chapters. I will ;irst outline what I consider to be the core of Habermas’ democratic theory – the combination of republicanism and liberalism in order to ensure protection of individual rights. I will then subject this to a critique from the perspective of Arendt’s republicanism understood as the rejection of the ruler-­‐
ruled distinction. The solution lies in a concept of a “Rechtsstaat” that is derived from Habermas’ theory but needs reformulation. Lastly, I will point out that Arendt, too, en-­‐
counters conceptual problems as she emphasizes freedom over equality. Therefore, in the last chapter, I will attempt to recover a concept of republicanism that recognizes its members as free and equal citizens.
Chapter 7: Habermas’ Liberal Bias – A Critique of his Parliamentarism
After outlining Habermas’ democratic and political theory, I will argue that Habermas makes an unnecessary compromise by giving in to parliamentary-­‐representative de-­‐
mocracy. This compromise is unnecessary for two reasons: ;irst, while not ruled out by his philosophy of language, possible conclusions drawn from the premise set would also include the option of a more direct democracy. In fact, direct forms of democracy seem even more warranted by his philosophy of language than representative forms. Sec-­‐
ondly, Habermas introduces representation,22 Rechtsstaatlichkeit23 and the public24 as means to protect the individual against majority and state tyranny. However, reliance on 22
cf. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 308.
cf. ibid., 298, 301, 304.
24 cf. ibid., 308, 322.
23
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representation may not be necessary as the concept of Rechtsstaatlichkeit that follows from Habermas’ universal and discourse principles may suf;iciently guarantee protec-­‐
tion of the individual. Before turning to the concept of the Rechtsstaat itself, I will now provide an Arendtian criticism of Habermas’ “representative turn”.
Chapter 8: Arendt’s Critique of Rule an sich
Some interpreters of Arendt’s thought have moved it in the proximity of parliamenta-­‐
rism as well. I however will point out that Arendt’s critique of philosophy as well as her political theory show that she rejects a distinction between rulers and ruled in principle. In fact, Arendt sees the delegation of politics to a group of experts or professionals as exactly this distinction between rulers and ruled. Representative-­‐parliamentary democ-­‐
racy delegates political power to such a group of such professionals and experts: representative-­‐parliamentary democracy does not resemble a ruler–ruled-­‐distinction – it is one. To put it differently: there is a distinct difference between the universal oppor-­‐
tunity to “run” in elections and the according opportunity for a minority (ie., the election winners) to act politically on behalf of the people (as in representative democracies) on the one hand, and the opportunity for everyone to individually and directly act in the political realm (as in direct and council democracies) on the other. In this regard, Ar-­‐
endt’s position is almost opposite to Habermas’ view.25
Arendt’s critique here highlights a de;initory problem with the concept of democracy: classic accounts defensive of modern parliamentary democracy not withstanding,26 I argue that calling both concepts – parliamentary democracy and council/direct democ-­‐
racy – “democracy” may border fallacious equivocation of two concepts that are differ-­‐
25
Breier contrasts Habermas with Arendt in passing in “Hannah Arendts Politische Wissenschaft Als Wissenschaft Von Der Welt,”
in Hannah Arendt Weitergedacht (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 46.
26 For example: Burke, Madison, de Tocqueville, Mill, Schumpeter.
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ent in principle at least as far as the ruler–ruled-­‐distinction is concerned.27 Arendt’s perspective here suggests that Habermasian legitimation of rule might not be enough.
However, Arendt does not have a ready answer to Habermas’ two objections that lead him to turn to representative democracy in the ;irst place: (1) on the one hand, tyranny of the majority and individual rights, and (2) on the other, the complexity of modern so-­‐
cieties.
I will now turn to a solution that is derived from Habermas but that still keeps open the possibility of direct democracy: the Rechtsstaat.
Chapter 9: Rechtsstaat as Basis for Republics
The Rechtsstaat has at least a triple function: (a) ;irst, it is supposed to protect the individual from the state itself and (a potential) tyranny of the majority; (b) secondly, it is supposed to create a framework in which further development towards a better soci-­‐
ety can take place (cf. Kant’s notion of enlightenment); (c) lastly, it is supposed to guar-­‐
antee the rule of law.
These three aspects may be divided into two groups: the ;irst two, [a] and [b], basi-­‐
cally describe protection of unalienable basic rights. Their justi;ication may in fact be ensured through Habermas’ universal and discourse principles. Because they are di-­‐
rectly derived from these principles, there is very little room for discussion: they are un-­‐
alienable and unchangeable. This aspect of discourse ethics is very similar to deonto-­‐
logical ethics (such as Kant’s). It also creates a limit to politics: these norms may not be 27
At the very least, Arendt’s criticism of rule would entail the introduction of direct-democratic elements that would have to reduce
the importance of government and representative organs greatly. David Held, in an argument that is partially derived from Arendt,
suggests that “If individuals and peoples are to be free and equal in determining the conditions of their own existence there must be
an array of social spheres […] which allow their members control of the resources at their disposal without direct interference from
political agencies or other third parties.” (David Held, “Democracy: From City-states to a Cosmopolitan Order?,” Political Studies
XL, no. Special Issue (1992): 35.) Held’s (and Arendt’s) model is a significantly and distinctively qualitatively different from the election of a parliamentary and governmental elite.
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The third aspect, [c] rule of law, manifests itself in the commitment to law legislated by the community. It may be changed by the community and may be different in differ-­‐
ent communities. Yet, community decisions are not above the law and are themselves subject to the universal and unalienable basic rights. This aspect of the Rechtsstaat could be understood as an answer to the critique by neo-­‐virtue ethics (cf. for example, MacIn-­‐
tyre, After Virtue). At the same time, it acknowledges the particularity of different nor-­‐
mative cultures, and the critique of universalism suggested by Forst/Günther.29
It is important to note that Habermas’ discourse ethics can provide justi;ication to both levels – [a, b] unalienable basic rights and [c] culturally determined rights. How-­‐
ever, Forst/Günther emphasize the necessity to avoid universalisms:
Die einzige idealistische Versuchung, der nachzugeben wir uns erlauben, besteht in der zu überprüfenden Vermutung, dass auch noch so einseitige und parteiliche normative Ansprüche gleichzeitig von einem Ver-­‐
langen nach Rechtfertigung getragen sind, das auf Prozeduren einer wie schwach auch immer begründ-­‐
eten rationalen Überzeugungsbildung unter Gleichen zielt.30
Yet, in an extension of this argument, I maintain that both (1) the requirement of le-­‐
gitimation of any given normative order and (2) the requirement of the possibility of pluralism of normative orders are justi;ied – and require justi;ication – through Haber-­‐
masian discourse ethics. Thus, Habermas’ theory is much more normatively loaded than it seems at ;irst: instead of just a right to political legitimation, Habermas provides the tools for and shows the limits of rational justi;ication.31 Any normative order that is to be legitimate has to provide the basic conditions for discourse – including a quite far-­‐
reaching universal recognition of other humans as equals (isonomia).
I therefore distinguish between near-­‐justi;ied principles (full rational justi;ication can probably not be reached beyond doubt) that provide basic conditions for legitimate normative orders. A normative order is thus legitimate if and only if it (a) ful;ills the 29
Forst and Günther, “Die Herausbildung Normativer Ordnungen. Zur Idee Eines Interdisziplinären Forschungsprogramms,” 25.
Rainer Forst and Klaus Günther, “Innenansichten: Über Die Dynamik Normativer Konflikte. Jürgen Habermas’ Philosophie Im
Lichte Eines Aktuellen Forschungsprogramms,” Forschung Frankfurt, no. 2 (2009): 25.
31 It is thus necessary to differentiate between legitimation and justification.
30
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structural criteria of the justi;ied principles (such as isonomia) and (b) it is considered to be legitimate (Weber). No individual normative order can be justi;ied in a rational-­‐
philosophic sense; it can only be legitimate. A Habermasian approach can provide the justi;ication framework and by acknowledging its limits at the same time, can account for political legitimation.
I argue that the institution of the Rechtsstaat as an enabling condition for both justi;i-­‐
cation and legitimation can by itself guarantee both the protection of the individual and the framework for further societal development. To ensure these basic conditions of open discourse and politics it is not necessary to arbitrarily introduce a representative system. The fact that contemporary democracies have to rely on parliamentary systems to guarantee the protection of the individual and a progressive legal framework consti-­‐
tutes a naturalistic fallacy and thus does not prove the necessity of representative insti-­‐
tutions. Instead, I argue that the ruler–ruled-­‐division that is at the core of representative systems is part of the problem (as suggested by Arendt) 32 and cannot be part of the so-­‐
lution. In order to draw out this last point, I will then turn to Arendt’s concept of repub-­‐
licanism.
Chapter 10: Arendt – Freedom and Dialogical Politics as Core of
Republicanism
I will use Arendt’s concept of republicanism to show that republican democratic the-­‐
ory requires more than just legitimation of rule. Instead, Arendt is correct to focus on public politics; the emphasis of politics as interwoven with freedom and the ability to act together.33 This forms the basis for a concept of republicanism that can be immu-­‐
nized against a principal af;irmation of the state as the institutionalized rule of humans over humans. I argue that republicanism, rightly understood, requires rediscovering its 32
cf. Arendt, Vita Activa Oder Vom Tätigen Leben, 281.
Hannah Arendt, Denken Ohne Geländer: Texte Und Briefe, 4th ed. (Piper, 2010), 181; cf. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition,
1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 1998), 141.
33
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direct democratic roots. Following Arendt’s argument, I will highlight ‘freedom’ and ‘dia-­‐
logical politics’ as key republican features.
However, Arendt misunderstands the priority order of freedom and equality when she criticizes equality as detrimental to freedom. This is so, because she misunderstands the concepts themselves. It is indeed correct that both are political concepts, but – and Arendt misses this point – both require suf;icient analytic justi;ication. This misunder-­‐
standing leads to an overemphasis of freedom in Arendt’s political theory.
According to our previous argument, the central condition for a republic that is pro-­‐
tective of the individual has to be the Rechtsstaat. The central conditions of Rechtsstaat-­
lichkeit however are both freedom and the condition of equality. Still, the Rechtsstaat has also to reproduce both freedom and equality, as it would otherwise undermine its own foundation. Arendt’s emphasis on freedom at the cost of equality34 would prove detri-­‐
mental to the Rechtsstaat and, in the long term, to freedom (as the Rechtsstaat’s prod-­‐
uct) as well. Rather, as we will see in the following chapter, socio-­‐economic equality is the basis for both citizenship and mutually enjoyed freedom.
I argue that Arendt’s overemphasis of freedom, albeit in a different way, puts her in the proximity of liberal republican conceptions. Due to her conceptual error that has its roots in the lack of proper conceptual justi;ication (as shown in Part I as well as chapter 9), Arendt fails to fully overcome a liberal conception of politics. I will further argue that both freedom and equality would be best understood as political concepts as outlined by Marshall and preconditions for and results of a political community as suggested by Rousseau.
34
cf. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin, 1977), 49ff.
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Chapter 11: Republicanism as Equal Membership
Understanding republicanism through a political perspective and by utilizing rational-­‐philosophic justi;ication will enable us in the end to arrive at a more balanced account of republicanism. In this last chapter, I will argue that it would be bene;icial to uncover the Rousseauian tradition of republicanism. I will argue that what needs to be emphasized is not individual freedom or representative institutions but rather common membership in a society. This common membership and mutually enjoyed freedom can only be based on social equality.35 Any notion of freedom can only be derived from the rights each individual has acquired as an equal member of society.
In an extension of an argument made by Peter Breiner, I will argue that direct democ-­‐
racy and equality are ‘essentially expansive concepts’. I will argue that my weak account of analytic justi;ication of political concepts that leaves them open to political contesta-­‐
tion in principle (as outlined in part I) is compatible with Breiner’s argument that equal-­‐
ity “is best understood as expansive rather than in need of analytical speci;ication and careful delimitation”.36 Understanding direct democracy and equality as essentially ex-­‐
pansive concepts will enable us to understand these concepts as never fully achieved without a “political resting spot”.37 We will be further able to understand what I call so-­
cial republicanism as open to political contestation and as a key feature of the political realm.
Following this train of thought, I will argue that the Rechtsstaat is a necessary back-­‐
ground condition for the development of both direct democracy and equality to unfold. As a result, I will introduce a concept of social republicanism as the convergence of the essentially expansive concepts of freedom, direct democracy, and social equality under the condition of the Rechtsstaat.
35
cf. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “On the Social Contract,” in The Basic Political Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 170.
Peter Breiner, “Contextualizing Political Equality: Political Equality as an Essentially Expansive Concept” (presented at the WPSA
Annual Meeting, Vancouver, BA, 2009), 28.
37 Ibid., 31.
36
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I argue that this answers Habermas’ attempt to combine individual rights with repub-­‐
lican theory. It also answers Arendt’s criticism of philosophy: by including a preference for the political, it always includes the imperative of freedom against potentially totali-­‐
tarian philosophy. This is the case because if politics is understood as acting together it has to demand freedom as the ability to act in the ;irst place. Also, I argue that my con-­‐
cept of social republicanism offers a viable alternative to concepts of liberal republican-­‐
ism while avoiding loosing essential elements of republicanism as such.
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Cited Works
Arendt, Hannah. Denken Ohne Geländer: Texte Und Briefe. 4th ed. Piper, 2010.
———. Essays in Understanding, 1930-­1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism. Schocken, 2005.
———. Gespräche Mit Hannah Arendt. Edited by Adelbert Reif. Piper Verlag GmbH, 1982.
———. On Revolution. New York: Penguin, 1977.
———. The Human Condition. 1st ed. University Of Chicago Press, 1998.
———. “Truth and Politics.” In The Portable Arendt, edited by Peter Baehr, 545–575. New York: Penguin, 2000.
———. Vita Activa Oder Vom Tätigen Leben. Neuausgabe. Piper, 2010.
Benhabib, Seyla. The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt. Rowman & Little;ield, 2003.
Breier, Karl-­‐Heinz. “Hannah Arendts Politische Wissenschaft Als Wissenschaft Von Der Welt.” In Hannah Arendt Weitergedacht, 39–54. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ru-­‐
precht, 2008.
Breiner, Peter. “Contextualizing Political Equality: Political Equality as an Essentially Ex-­‐
pansive Concept”. Vancouver, BA, 2009.
Forst, Rainer, and Klaus Günther. “Die Herausbildung Normativer Ordnungen. Zur Idee Eines Interdisziplinären Forschungsprogramms.” In Die Herausbildung Norma-­
tiver Ordnungen. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven, edited by Rainer Forst and Klaus Günther. Frankfurt am Main, 2011.
———. “Innenansichten: Über Die Dynamik Normativer Kon;likte. Jürgen Habermas’ Philosophie Im Lichte Eines Aktuellen Forschungsprogramms.” Forschung Frank-­
furt, no. 2 (2009): 23–27.
Forst, Rainer. Kritik Der Rechtfertigungsverhältnisse. Perspektiven Einer Kritischen Theo-­
rie Der Politik. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2011.
Habermas, Jürgen. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Polity Press Cambridge, 1996.
———. Faktizität Und Geltung: Beiträge Zur Diskurstheorie Des Rechts Und Des Demok-­
ratischen Rechtsstaats: Beiträge Zur Diskurstheorie Des Rechts Und Des ... 4th ed. Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998.
Habermas, Jürgen, Christian Lenhardt, and Shierry W. Nicholsen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. The MIT Press, 1990.
Habermas, Jürgen. Moralbewußtsein Und Kommunikatives Handeln. Erstausgabe. Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983.
———. Theorie Des Kommunikativen Handelns. Vol. 1. 2 vols. 7th ed. Suhrkamp Verlag, 2006.
———. “Three Normative Models of Democracy.” Constellations 1, no. 1 (1994): 1–10.
———. “Zur Legitimation Durch Menschenrechte.” In Philosophische Texte, Vol.4: Poli-­
tische Theorie, 298–312. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2009.
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Held, David. “Democracy: From City-­‐states to a Cosmopolitan Order?” Political Studies XL, no. Special Issue (1992): 10–39.
Kuchler, Daniel. “Die Dialogisch Konstruierte Polis Und Das Problem Der Gerechtigkeit. Ein Kommentar Zu Arendts Kritik an Platons Politeia.” In Die Gerechte Stadt: Poli-­
tische Gestaltbarkeit Verdichteter Räume, edited by Matthias Lemke, 49–72. 1st ed. Staatsdiskurse 20. Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 2012.
Markell, Patchen. “The Rule of the People: Arendt, Archê, and Democracy.” In Politics in Dark Times: Encounters with Hannah Arendt, edited by Seyla Benhabib, 58–82. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Pettit, Philip. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford University Press, USA, 2000.
Rousseau, Jean-­‐Jacques. “On the Social Contract.” In The Basic Political Writings, 141–
227. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987.
Villa, Dana. Arendt and Heidegger. The Fate of the Political. Princeton: Princeton Univer-­‐
sity Press, 1995.
Volk, Christian. Die Ordnung Der Freiheit. Recht Und Politik Im Denken Hannah Arendts. Baden-­‐Baden, 2010.
Vollrath, Ernst. Grundlegung Einer Philosophischen Theorie Des Politischen. Würzburg, 1987.
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Chapter Overview
Part I: The Grammar Of Political Theory
1. Arendt’s Critique of Platonic Philosophy
2. Arendt’s Treatment of Other Philosophers
3. Judgment and Essayism, Or Political Theory as Narrative
4. Habermas’ Interpretation of Speech Act Theory
5. A Habermasian Conception of Political Theory
6. Interim Conclusion on ‘Political Theory’
Part II: The Grammar of Republicanism
7. Habermas’ Liberal Bias – A Critique of his Parliamentarism
8. Arendt’s Critique of Rule an sich
9. Rechtsstaat as Basis for Republics
10. Arendt – Freedom and Dialogical Politics
11. Republicanism as Equal Membership
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