THE CHRISTIE AFFAIR: DIPLOMACY AND
NATION-BUILDING IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY
GABRIEL DENIS
Denis 1
Table of Contents
i. Cover Page
1. Table of Contents
2. Introduction
8. Chapter One
23. Chapter Two
38. Chapter Three
54. Conclusion
57. Bibliography
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Introduction
Off the southern coast of Rio Grande do Sul in June of 1861, trouble brewed for the
peace existing between the Empire of Brazil and the United Kingdom of Great Britain. Few
might guess that the events that played out that year, perhaps more suitable in a police drama
than the annuls of a history book, could explode into a full-blown diplomatic dispute that nearly
caused war between two transatlantic allies and called into question decades of economic and
diplomatic norms between the two countries. The dispute, eventually dubbed the Christie Affair
or Questão Christie, drew from existing tensions over territorial sovereignty and slavery and
contemporary questions over the proper balance of power between European and Latin American
allied nations.
How did this affair begin? The roots of the affair stem from the wreck of a British
passenger ship, dubbed the HMS Prince of Wales, off the coast of Albardão in southern Brazil in
June of 1861. The sinking of the ship, rather than written off as an unfortunate accident, came to
occupy the attention of the British legation due to what they perceived as the wreck’s suspicious
nature. H.P. Vereker, the British consul to the province, found the sinking so suspicious that
decided to direct his findings straight to the British Foreign Minister in London, Lord Russell, on
June 25th – he explained that he took this extraordinary step due to his belief that “referring it in
the first instance to Her Majesty’s Mission at Rio de Janeiro would have caused unnecessary
delay.” 1 His suspicion stemmed from the perceived tardiness of the Brazilian authorities in
notifying him of the wreck and the state of the wreck itself upon his arrival for inspection. In his
report, Vereker noted that the crew were all dead and buried in various graves, with their
1
Consul Vereker to Lord Russell, June 25, 1861, FO 881 1140, BRAZIL: Corres. Cases of the British Barque
"Prince of Wales" and of H.M.S. "Forte", The National Archives: 1.
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belongings “cut open, and the contents taken away” – in the case of the trunks of the seamen,
“all…had been violently burst open…yet they appeared quite dry within…leading to the
suspicion that they had come safely in the boats.” 2 Of special note was Vereker’s allegation that
he spotted within the domicile of Bento Soares, the Justice of the Peace of the province, a
“beautiful edition of the Bible…and a smaller Bible…[both], as it was confessed to me, had been
taken out of the trunks.” 3 Vereker’s report of the sinking suggested that the crew, having safely
disembarked the sinking ship, were murdered upon the shore and stripped of their belongings,
some of which even ended up in official hands. This scandalous report was to provide the British
Government its casus belli in pursuing a harsh investigation of the Brazilian authorities’
response to the crisis for several years to come.
As 1861 continued on, tensions over the Prince of Wales escalated as Brazilian and
British authorities failed to find suitable answers to the questions over the wreck. After several
weeks of tense communications with the Brazilian authorities of the district, Vereker wrote to
Russell on July 5 that “instead of the bodies of the ten persons who had been wrecked from the
‘Prince of Wales’…only four were delivered up”, further deepening his suspicions that some sort
of foul play had occurred. 4 What is lacking is a detailed account on the internal reasons for why
the Brazilian authorities, either purposefully or not, would have not delivered what was asked to
Vereker – whether this was due to negligence, internal difficulties, or true culpability remains a
mystery. On the British side, however, the discrepancy was soon used to justify a deep and
stinging investigation, as Lord Russell in September ordered the Charge d’Affaires in Rio to
“lose no time in calling the serious attention of the Brazilian Government to this case.”5 The
2
Consul Vereker to the Secretary to the Board of Trade, June 25, 1861, FO 881 1140, 3.
Ibid.
4
Consul Vereker to Lord Russell, July 5, 1861, FO 881 1140, 4.
5
Earl Russell to Mr. Baille, September 6, 1861, FO 881 1140, 7.
3
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British Charge d’Affaires, Mr. Evan P.M. Baille, did not shirk on Russell’s instructions and
proceeded to pressure the Brazilian government to undertake an investigation. Writing a progress
report to Russell on November 5, Baille reported that a perpetrator of theft in the wreck, “an
Indian named Mariano”, had been caught and found to be under the employ “of Senhor Beuto
Venancio Soares, the Justice of the Peace of the district” – two others, involved both in the
robbery of the wreck and working for Bento Soares, were reported fled to Uruguay. 6 In addition
to this worrying piece of information, Baille mentioned an offer from a Rear-Admiral Warren
proposing “to send two vessels to lie off the coast of Rio Grande” and have a liaison officer
ready to work with Vereker to ascertain the truth of the matter. 7 Though Vereker would turn
down this initial offer for help by the British Navy, the Navy’s role in the investigation soon
came to exacerbate the tension over the growing crisis.
As 1862 dawned, the investigation over the Prince of Wales transformed from a
provincial affair to a central concern of the British legation in Rio. After several months without
any new developments, Russell contacted William Christie, the Ambassador to Brazil, directly
on March 14, 1862, notifying him of his decision to pressure the Brazilian Government into
paying an indemnity over the loss of the Prince of Wales and asking him to do the same“if you
are of the same opinion.” 8 Christie proved to be an eager ally of Russell in this matter. Only four
days letter, Christie informed Vereker via a note that he had informed the Brazilian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, the Marques de Abrantes, of this subject, and requested that “Admiral Warren to
send one of the gun-boats under his command to Rio Grande do Sul” in order to aid the inquiry. 9
Despite the strengthened arm of the inquiry, the investigation still faltered in the eyes of the
6
Mr. Baille to Earl Russell, November 5, 1861, FO 881 1140, 14.
Ibid.
8
Earl Russell to Mr. Christie, March 14, 1862, FO 881 1140, 24.
9
Mr. Christie to Consul Vereker, March 18, 1862, FO 881 1140, 29.
7
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British government – Christie, in a letter to Russell written in June, noted that “the Brazilian
authorities, while now showing apparently goodwill and energy in this affair, still refuse assent
to Mr. Vereker’s opinion that some of the crew were murdered.” 10 As long as this point of
contention between the Brazilians and the British continued to exist, no solution to the Prince of
Wales question appeared to be forthcoming.
Only a few days after sending this report to Russell, Christie faced the beginning of a
second major incident in the capital city of Rio de Janeiro. With great agitation, Rear Admiral
Warren reported to Christie on June 22 that “a brutal outrage was committed on three officers
belonging to Her Majesty’s ship “Forte””, one of the ships involved in the investigation. 11
According to Warren’s furious report, a Brazilian sentry had halted the three officers and, after
some altercation, arrested the three and threw them into a “filthy den in which they were
confined for some time with the lowest and worst description of prisoners” for forty hours before
being released. 12 In this case, a Brazilian report of the proceedings exists to conflict with the
official British version. The July 5 report noted that the three officers, after having consumed
“two bottles of Bordeaux wine, and half a bottle of cognac”, harassed various pedestrians, met
the confused questions of the aforementioned sentry with violent attack, and were only taken to
jail due to their “greatest resistance” to gentler methods of persuasion. 13 Despite the nearly
comedic tone of this latter incident, the British government disputed the Brazilian account with
great severity. Lord Russell, responding to both a lack of progress in the Prince of Wales inquiry
and this new controversy over the officers of the Forte, exclaimed in a July 23 letter to Christie
that it was “with great regret” and beyond belief “that the Brazilian Government will allow the
10
Mr. Christie to Earl Russell, June 17, 1862, FO 881 1140, 43.
Rear-Admiral Warrant to Mr. Christie, June 22, 1862, FO 881 1140, 150.
12
Ibid.
13
Senhor de Gama to Senhor Sinimbú, July 5, 1862, FO 881 1140, 155.
11
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ends of justice to be defeated in this case by the influence of local authorities.” 14 The impetus to
have something done, both in response to the spiraling Prince of Wales case and the burgeoning
controversy surrounding the Forte, assailed Christie in his post in Brazil. As time went on, he
took to this new role with gusto.
From August 1862 onward, the investigations and diplomatic inquiries of the previous
year formed the basis of the Christie Affair. The crisis itself can be divided into two stages: one,
beginning from the point midway in 1862 into 1863, which saw the steady breakdown of talks
between the two governments, the seizure of Brazilian ships by the British Navy, and by the
middle of 1863 the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The second
stage extends from this point until the middling months of 1865, which saw a period of indirect
diplomatic pressure between the two countries, pointed manifestoes written throughout both
British and Brazilian newspapers and dramatic pieces, and finally the shaky renegotiation of
diplomatic terms aided by the “neutral” arbitration of the Kingdom of Portugal. Though neither
side opened up armed hostilities against the other (save for the seizure of ships by Britain at the
end of 1862), the two countries fought what could be considered a diplomatic war during this
period, with agents in both countries engaged in various forms of lobbying and even espionage in
order to gain a better understanding of the capabilities of the other.
Secondary literature focusing exclusively on the Christie Affair is somewhat sparse,
though it appears in several monographs relating more broadly to Anglo-Brazilian relations.
Only one article, Richard Graham’s “A Questão Christie”, focuses specifically on the affair – in
this article, it is viewed as the end of absolute British dominance in Brazil. Alan K. Manchester
in his 1933 British Preeminence in Brazil echoes this sentiment in his own brief exploration of
14
Earl Russell to Mr. Christie, July 23, 1862, FO 881 1140, 45.
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the crisis within his larger work, while Leslie Bethell connects this idea to the broader dispute
over slavery in his 1970 The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade. Other historians have
considered the Christie Affair in relation to a separate topic – Ross G. Forman considers the
Christie Affair as a font for nationalistic fiction in Brazil and Great Britain, while Beatriz
Mamigonian considers how the Christie Affair contributed to the building of national identity in
Brazil and as a mask for internal dissent. These monographs, though occasionally limited in
scope, do give extremely useful contextual information for understanding the Christie Affair.
However, in order to fully understand the crisis, from how the British Foreign Office
justified and pursued its goals in Brazil to how the Brazilian government responded in kind, one
must dig into the diplomatic and journalistic archives related to the crisis. There are three
primary archival sources that can be consulted to understand the Christie Affair: British Foreign
Office memorandums held in the National Archives at Kew in the United Kingdom, letters
between the Brazilian government and Brazilian agents abroad in the Arquivo Histórico do
Palácio Itamaraty in Brazil, and correspondence between Portuguese diplomats and their British
and Brazilian counterparts in the Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático do Ministério dos Negócios
Estrangeiros in Portugal. The Foreign Office memorandums, containing lists of letters between
various functionaries in several foreign governments, are the most readily accessible for
understanding the crisis – they allow one to see the actual correspondence between the main
figures of the crisis at all levels of government, though are limited in often presenting the most
“Anglophilic” reading of the crisis and failing to show the Brazilian side of affairs. Brazilian
archival documents are useful in understanding how Brazilian diplomats responded to British
pressure and planned out their own responses, as well as often containing snippets from various
British and Brazilian newspapers related to developments of the crisis. However, they are also
Denis 8
limited by their Brazilian-centric viewpoint and somewhat haphazard organization. The
Portuguese archives provide a support base for the abovementioned archival sources –
Portuguese diplomats themselves only occasionally wrote to their counterparts specifically about
the Christie Affair, and many of the most important Portuguese documents can be found in the
British archives. However, many interesting journalistic excerpts are included in Portuguese
letters, and certain pieces of correspondence provide for a fascinating third viewpoint to the
crisis. These archival sources, supported by the aforementioned secondary literature, allow for
the modern scholar to gain a detailed view into the nuances of the Christie Affair.
Why would the modern scholar, however, be interested in exploring this four yearlong
incident? By examining the conduct of the British Foreign Office, on the one hand, one can gain
a better understanding of how the British Empire during this stage attempted to influence policy
in countries where it did not exercise formal dominion, and can judge whether or not its efforts
always bore fruit. On the other, by examining how the Brazilian diplomats disputed British
claims and discussed strategy with one another, dispels the myth of the pliant Latin American
country and reveals how a weaker country could resist the influence of a stronger power and
when they judged resistance to the futile. William Christie gains the dubious honor of having the
strange affair named after him, but the importance of the affair for understanding AngloBrazilian relations during the 19th century extends far beyond one person.
Chapter One
The circumstances of the Christie Affair itself, from the hubbub over the sunken Prince
of Wales to the great controversy surrounding the apparent mistreatment of the officers of the
Forte, seem rather strange without an understanding of the history of Anglo-Brazilian relations
prior to 1860. The distrust, aggression, and fearsome tension of the Christie Affair appears far
Denis 9
less like an outlier and more like a common component of Anglo-Brazilian diplomacy from 1825
onward. For Great Britain, diplomatic relations with Brazil had been based on the principles of
attaining social and economic preeminence in the country while simultaneously strangling the
slave trade therein – on the Brazilian side, relations had been based on gaining as much
diplomatic and commercial support as possible without sacrificing territorial and administrative
sovereignty. As often as they supported each other, diplomats on both sides often came into
conflict over these questions and engendered resentment on both sides of the Atlantic – this
resentment did much to create the conditions necessary for the outbreak of the Christie Affair.
The tumult of the Napoleonic Wars at the beginning of the 1800s set the stage for the
birth of Great Britain’s highly complicated diplomatic relationship with Brazil. During a period
when the Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil’s colonial master, faced increasing pressure from
Napoleon to either join his European coalition or face invasion, the British government in 1807
offered to help the Braganza Royal Family to flee from Portugal to Brazil in exchange for
remaining an ally of Britain and opening Brazil’s previously closed ports to British traders. 15 On
the continent, Portugal’s sovereignty came into question following a period of French occupation
replaced after a year by “liberation” at the hands of the British army, which used Portugal as a
springboard for attacks into French-occupied Spain. In the words of historian Gabriel Paquette,
the British general in charge of armies in the area became a “de facto viceroy” in 1808, and Dom
João of Portugal accepted British financial and military assistance in return for giving Britain
“direct political influence” into Portuguese affairs in the Kingdom itself. 16 In addition to direct
political control exerted upon the metropole by the force of arms, the British government took
15
Leslie Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade (London and New York: Cambridge University Press,
1970), 7.
16
Gabriel Paquette, Imperial Portugal in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), 91-92.
Denis 10
advantage of the precariousness of the House of Braganza to press commercial demands in
Brazil. Dom João, pressured by the agents who had spirited he and his family away to Brazil,
agreed in 1808 to allow all “friendly” nations (meaning, for the present, Great Britain) to trade at
Brazilian ports – the British Foreign Office framed a treaty two years later which granted British
traders explicit preferential trade rights. 17 British agents had sown the seeds of dominance in
Brazilian trade.
British traders came in droves after this declaration to take advantage of the newly
opened Brazil, just as the British government pressured Portugal to give these merchants
substantial privileges within the country. After the treaties signed between Britain and Portugal
in 1810, British subjects in Brazil were guaranteed “the right to Protestant worship in homes or
in churches” and even the “right to a judge conservator as they had in Portugal”, who was said to
exclusively guarantee the justice of these subjects. 18 The toleration of Protestantism, though
accepted by Portuguese and Brazilians who saw the need for European integration, engendered
anger amongst more conservative groups – indeed, one unlucky Englishman was even expelled
from the country after reportedly insulting a Catholic procession in 1810. 19 Cultural and
religious feelings aside, elements of Brazilian society also felt enmity towards the ascendant
British due to economic matters. The economic trade rights granted to the British by Dom Joao
IV led to an explosion of British commerce in Brazil – in 1808, “a nucleus of between 150 and
200 British merchants and commercial agents” assembled in Rio de Janeiro, overwhelming both
incipient Brazilian and traditional Portuguese manufacturers and sparking protests amongst these
17
Alan K. Manchester, British Preeminence in Brazil (New York: The University of North Carolina Press, 1933),
71.
18
Kirsten Schultz, Tropical Versailles: Empire, Monarchy, and the Portuguese royal court in Rio de Janeiro, 18081821 (New York: Routledge, 2001), 210.
19
Schultz, Tropical Versailles, 212.
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groups. 20A single incident does not necessarily mean that the Brazilian people were utterly
opposed to the presence of the British in their country – however, it does point to the fact that
there certainly existed points of contention in which Brazilians and British could find conflict.
At the same moment that British traders were gaining power within Brazil, British
diplomats began to pressure their Portuguese counterparts to abolish the slave trade. Great
Britain began to play the role of the paladin against the slave trade at around exactly the same
time of the beginning of the Portuguese Court’s move to Brazil – as Leslie Bethell details, the
British Parliament “after a lengthy and bitter struggle…declared illegal for British subjects…to
trade in slaves after 1 May 1808.” 21 This position would, by necessity, put it at odds with its
Portuguese ally – as the historian Robert Edgar Conrad notes, by 1808 slavery “was centuries old
in the Portuguese world, an adjunct to the class system and a major feature of the economic
system”, with the number of slaves in Brazil approaching “1,930,000, roughly half the total
population of 3,818,000.” 22 As might be expected, the weak position of the Portuguese
government following the upheaval caused by the Braganza court’s retreat to Brazil gave
abolitionist-minded British agents to make inroads for their position in their negotiations. As
early as 1808, at the same time that British diplomats were setting up new political and economic
understandings with the relocated court, the British minister in charge of setting up these
negotiations was informed that “an article dealing with the slave trade must be included” in the
treaty to delineate relations with the Portuguese in Brazil. 23 This instruction would not prove to
be empty, as this single command would make itself sorely felt in the years to come.
20
Boris and Sergio Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil, Trans. Arthur Burkel (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2014), 64-65.
21
Bethell, Abolition, ix.
22
Robert Edgar Conrad, World of Sorrow (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 1.
23
Manchester, Preeminence, 80.
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While the Napoleonic Wars continued and commercial relations with the Portuguese in
Brazil began to operate under the influence of British traders, the debate over the slave trade
raged between Lusophone and Anglophone figures. The order mentioned above was not made in
vain – in 1810, two years of negotiations between Great Britain and Portugal led to two separate
treaties, one guaranteeing maximum tariffs on British goods and the other guaranteeing “alliance
and friendship” with the clause of agreeing to find ways to gradually abolish the slave trade. 24
This declaration, however, was not immediately binding nor put a definitive end to the issue –
after all, Bethell notes that at the time “Britain had recognized the right of the Portuguese to
continue the trade within their own dominions” and dismisses the treaty as a “less than…notable
victory for the anti-slave trade cause.” 25 British efforts to make these initial condemnations more
forceful met with stiff opposition from their counterparts not just in Portugal but also in Spain –
in 1815 during the vaunted Congress of Vienna, the British delegation’s success in persuading all
nations to agree to measures “to end the African traffic by every available means” were
subverted by clauses that made it illegal to abolish said traffic with a set date or against the
“interests” of those countries. 26 Conrad notes specifically that this clause was won due to “hard
bargaining by the Portuguese delegate, aided by his Spanish colleague”, a victory to offset
Portugal’s agreement during the same year to set a future date for permanent abolition and limit
its subjects from participating in the trade north of the Equator. 27 Yet despite the convening of
several further conventions on the subject during the following few years, the Portuguese slave
trade remained stubbornly vibrant – even with the additional powers granted by a 1817
convention which strictly regulated the slave trade under a series of mixed Anglo-Portuguese
24
Bethell, Abolition, 8.
Ibid, 9.
26
Conrad, Sorrow, 57.
27
Conrad, Sorrow, 57.
25
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commissions, the actual abolition of the trade remained out of reach. 28 Despite being a major
pillar of support for the Portuguese Throne in Brazil, the British were unable to gain a decisive
abolition movement out of their ally for the time being.
As the 1820s approached, the looming break between the Kingdom of Portugal and her
Brazilian dominion gave British diplomats and traders new grounds to gain influence in Brazil.
The conflict which arose between Brazil and Portugal stemmed from, as Paquette describes, a
number of “long-term preconditions, intermediate-term precipitants, and short-term triggers”
ranging from the growth of Brazil’s infrastructural and socioeconomic sophistication during the
Portuguese court’s stay to the question of re-imposing Lisbon’s authority over Brazil following
the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. 29 In 1822, responding to calls from independenceminded Brazilians at home and in defiance of his own father and other union-minded Portuguese,
Dom Pedro the Prince Regent of Portugal declared “Independence or Death”. As historian Leslie
Bethell asserts “once independence had been declared the financial and military weakness of the
mother country was such that there was never any question of her being able to reassert her
authority over Brazil.” 30 Yet for three years, Brazil lacked the recognition of any outside power,
something that inhibited their attempt to present themselves as a sovereign nation. After three
years of intergovernmental debate, the British government elected in 1825 to support the cause
of Brazilian independence, worrying as they did that “the commercial concessions of the new
empire would be seriously lessened” if outside powers such as France or Austria were allowed to
destabilize Brazil. 31 So important in maintaining close economic relations with the new state
was that the “bungling of the Anglo-Brazilian commercial treaty” was the given reason for the
28
Manchester, Preeminence, 173.
Paquette, Imperial Portugal, 141-142.
30
Bethell, Abolition, 27.
31
Manchester, Preeminence, 198.
29
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first envoy to Brazil’s dismissal – his successor managed, in 1826, to negotiate the said treaty
guaranteeing “a maximum tariff of 15 percent of British goods.” 32 The breakup of Atlantic
empire could not stop British agents from assuring their sway over Lusophone trade.
In addition to providing British traders further grounds for expanding their operations in
Brazil, the Luso-Brazilian break allowed British abolitionists to further their cause against the
transatlantic slave trade. Immediately following Dom Pedro I’s 1822 declaration of
independence from Portugal, the British government attacked Portugal’s trade in African slaves
on a number of grounds, including that previously inviolable “transatlantic colonial interests”
which necessitated the trade were now invalid and that the illegality of trading with a territory
outside of the Portuguese Empire had been “prohibited as long aso as 1761.” 33 Furthermore,
Brazil’s aforementioned need for recognition of its newly independent status gave British
merchants increased leeway in making demands related to abolition in exchange for
acknowledging Brazil’s independence. As Conrad notes, the “prolonged resistance on the part of
Brazil” did not stop a treaty being signed in 1826 which committed “Brazil to outlaw[ing] the
importation of salves three years after the treaty’s ratification by both governments” and
included Brazil into all previously agreed-upon restrictions on the trade placed upon Portugal. 34
The 1826 treaty, which guaranteed both preferential commercial rights and a definite abolition of
the slave trade, demonstrated that Great Britain at this time was able to maintain at least the airs
of influence over the newly independent empire.
The British drive to gain commercial ascendency and the abolition of slavery, however,
caused a major headache for Brazilian officials of the period. Manchester, in his own summary
32
Paquette, Imperial Portugal, 229.
Bethell, Abolition, 28.
34
Conrad, Sorrow, 65-66.
33
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of the affair after 1830, paints a “tale of distress in which the Brazilian government was caught
between the two millstones of the inexorable pressure exerted by Great Britain to end the traffic
and the dogged determination of the Brazilian public to continue it.” 35 Manchester’s portrait
somewhat strangely portrays the government as martyrs and the entire Brazilian populace as
committed to slavery – yet at the very least, components of Brazilian society supported slavery
with gusto. This determination in part reflects the economic system of the empire during this
period – in an era prior to industrial modernization, it can be argued that “there was no viable
alternative to slave labor on large plantations.” 36 This is not to say the Brazilian government did
not attempt to cultivate a different sort of economic system during this period. From 1827 to
1850, the Brazilian government attempted repeatedly to import groups of European immigrants
to various parts of the country to work small parts of land. Yet this program failed to achieve
satisfactory results – as Brazilian historian Emilia Viotti da Costa notes, “most of the immigrants
found themselves in remote and inaccessible areas, far from market centers, and plagued by poor
soil or dense forest cover”, leading to nearly inevitable colonial disbandment. 37 As long as it was
cheaper to simply import slaves rather than train a new workforce, it was unlikely that the system
would ever shift.
By seeking to strangle the slave trade upon which Brazilian agriculture so heavily relied
and by seeking economic favors that would give them preferential economic rights in the
country, British politicians and traders sowed the seeds of furious discontent amongst various
sectors of Brazilian society. As mentioned before, Britain’s commercial treaties shaped a
Brazilian economy that relied heavily upon the import of British manufactured goods. Bethell
35
Manchester, Preeminence, 223.
Boris and Sergio Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil, 106.
37
Emilia Viotti da Costa, The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1985), 95.
36
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and historian José Muriolo de Carvalho, noting that “trade figures are notoriously difficult to
assess in this period”, declare that the absence of a Brazilian domestic manufacturing base
created an economic situation from the 1830s well into the 1840s where Brazil was “Britain’s
third largest market” throughout these years and imported around 2 to 3 million pounds worth of
goods per annum. 38 British traders, benefitting from the immense purchasing power that
economic treaties bestowed upon them, gained strong economic and social privileges within the
country – Da Costa notes that British subjects living in Brazil hurt their image significantly with
their Brazilian neighbors by oftentimes owning slaves therein. 39 Aside from true slave-owners,
British merchants in Rio and other importing houses sometimes, against the wishes of their
government, became major commercial collaborators with Brazilian slave importers – Conrad
notes that the British government was well aware by the 1840s that British merchants were
financing and supplying Brazilian slave importers en masse. 40 Ironically, therefore, some of the
economic strength that intimidated native Brazilians stemmed from the very institution that the
British government so loudly declared it would seek to eliminate. Already in the 1830s,
therefore, many Brazilians felt that British commercial and antislavery efforts instituted a
violation of their internal affairs.
On the other side of the Atlantic, however, British diplomats came to be increasingly
angry with the continuation of the transatlantic slave trade in the face of the treaty of abolition.
The failure of the British government and navy to stop various smugglers from illegally
importing slaves into Brazil from 1830 to 1845 has been detailed extensively by Leslie Bethell.
As he notes, by the end of the 1830s “a mass of evidence regarding slave landings, the
Leslie Bethell and José Muriolo de Carvalho, “1822-1850,” Ed. Leslie Bethell, Brazil: Empire and Republic,
1822-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 89.
39
Da Costa, The Brazilian Empire, 131.
40
Conrad, Sorrow, 129.
38
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individuals concerned and the location of their establishments was patiently gathered by the
British legation and by British consulates and regularly transmitted to the Brazilian authorities”
to no avail, as Brazilian officials simply ignored British complaints. 41 In the face of Brazilian
indolence, the British cabinet sent naval cruisers to patrol the Atlantic and attempt to stop the
flow of slaves into Brazil. Yet these efforts were often in vain – Bethell makes clear that the
woefully low amount of ships sent to patrol the Atlantic were hampered by “the absence of any
right to search – much less capture – most of the ships engaged in the slave trade to Brazil”
thanks to a number of treaty restrictions. 42 As the 1840s dawned, therefore, British cabinet
members devoted to abolition had many reasons to feel frustration and anger with their Brazilian
counterparts.
In addition to the question of slavery, the commercial relationship between Brazil and
Great Britain also invited tension during the 1840s. By this time, the Anglo-Brazilian
commercial treaty of 1827 began to way heavy upon the minds of various Brazilian politicians –
with an awareness that “the low duties on British goods contrasted most unfavourably with the
virtually prohibitive duties on Brazilian produce entering the British market”, a growing faction
of Brazilian politicians looked upon the looming 1842 expiration date of the treaty with favor. 43
The British were not idle in attempting to meet the growing hostility of the Brazilian government
with a new deal, sending an envoy in 1842 to attempt to renegotiate the treaty and extend British
commercial privileges – this envoy “was faced with the ill will of the ministry”, and his efforts
eventually came to naught. 44 In a surprising move, the Brazilian government in 1843 sent their
own envoy to London to negotiate a treaty of their own, which would have put equal tariffs on
41
Bethell, Abolition, 86.
Ibid, 150.
43
Bethell and Carvalho, “1822-1850”, 90.
44
Manchester, Preeminence, 291.
42
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British goods entering Brazil as Brazilian goods entering London – this more equal treaty failed
along with all British attempts to continue their previous economic favoritism. 45 The collapse of
Britain’s economic treaty gave immediate economic respite to the Brazilian government – free to
impose equal tariffs upon British goods, “government revenues increased 33 per cent from
1842/3 to 1844/5. And by 1852/3 they were double what they had been in 1842/3.” 46 This had
positive effect upon the internal development of Brazil, but created great anger within London at
a time when the failure to enforce the abolition of slavery weighed heavily upon British
diplomatic sensibilities.
In the face of failure to secure their absolute commercial dominion, British diplomats
spent the 1840s attempting to finally secure a true end to the Brazilian slave trade. The most
radical of these attempts was the 1845 Aberdeen Act, which gave the British navy the right to
seize all Brazilian vessels suspected of engaging in slave trafficking regardless of circumstance.
The British government assured their furious Brazilian counterparts that the act would only be
repealed if a new antislavery convention were signed, impossible due to their markedly opposed
views on the subject. 47 Yet the new coercive measures on the part of the British navy failed to
stem the tide of slavery – as long as the Brazilian authorities themselves failed to enact domestic
laws which would prevent the landing of slaves, “the illegal slave trade to Brazil continued to
expand throughout the late 1840s.” 48 This did not stop the British cabinet from attempting to
halt the slave trade by force, and in 1850 the British government strengthened the Aberdeen Act
by extended their searches to within Brazilian harbors. This stringent new recommendation
coincided with a series of raids across coastal Brazil, leading to a series of raids that culminated
45
Manchester, Preeminence, 293-294.
Bethell and Carvalho, “1822-1850”, 93.
47
Manchester, Preeminence, 255.
48
Bethell, Abolition, 296.
46
Denis 19
in the exchange of fire between a British warship and Brazilian fort in Paranagua – this event, in
a foreshadowing of the tumult which accompanied the seizure of Brazilian ships during the
Christie Affair, created panic throughout the region and incited angry crowds to attack British
sailors in the Brazilian capital. 49 Relations between the two countries had reached a low point.
Despite anti-British feeling amongst the British populace, the Brazilian government at
this stage finally began to act in order to curtail the slave trade. Meeting in secret “to avoid
pressure from public opinion”, the conservative cabinet drafted and enacted a strict search and
seizure law in 1850 meant to stifle the importation of slaves from Africa into Brazil. 50 The law
was not met with universal acclaim by the Brazilian public – angered by published accounts of
the heavy hand of British influence in creating the law, the liberal opposition in Brazil pilloried
the conservative government for caving to British paper, just as the conservative government
attempted to argue that the “decision to act had been a spontaneous one, not…the result of
British coercion.” 51 Some historians, including Manchester, agree with the sentiments of the
Brazilian conservatives in delivering the lion’s share of credit to abolition to the Brazilian
government itself. By his account, the ineffectiveness of British naval pressure contrasted with
the 1850 law, an “effective measure” which was executed “inexorably” by the new cabinet. 52
Bethell, in his own assessment, agrees that the 1850 curtailing of the illegal slave trade happened
due to “Brazil [having] for the first time a government with sufficient authority and power to
enforce its will”, but qualifies this claim by stating their drive to do so “sprang to a considerable
extent from British pressure.” 53 Jeffrey Needell, writing specifically about whether the British or
49
Bethell, Abolition, 331.
Manchester, Preeminence, 263.
51
Bethell, Abolition, 362.
52
Manchester, Preeminence, 264.
53
Bethell, Abolition, 341.
50
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the Brazilians deserve the most credit for the abolition of slavery, takes a middling approach.
Though the Aberdeen Act of 1845 did in fact pressure the Brazilian cabinet to set the stage for
legislation against the trade, the Brazilian cabinet “had already decided to move against the
trade” and prepared legislation as such before the most intense moments of 1850. 54 By some
degree of cooperation and conflict, Brazilian and British diplomats had reached a tense, yet
definitive, end of the Atlantic slave trade.
The end of the Atlantic traffic may appear at first to be the end of the entire affair, as
Britain and Brazil had finally reached a level of cooperation of ending the traffic. Some
historians have even presented an extremely rosy view of the period after 1850 as a golden age
of British and Brazilian cooperation. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, in their own long monograph
on British imperialism across the globe, said that the end of slavery made the Brazilian
government “even more dependent upon British support”, with British bankers flowing into
Brazil to finance small loans across the country. 55 Perhaps somewhat surprisingly given the
levels of acrimony discussed in the previous pages, Cain and Hopkins declare that, given the
experiences of various Anglophile Brazilian ministers in London, “Britain’s relations with Brazil
were cordial to the point of warmth.” 56 This rosy assessment, though strikingly dismissive of the
fury to which British and Brazilian diplomats acted with one another, is not completely without
base in terms of how close the two countries were during even the period of tense diplomatic
relations. Brazil was undoubtedly heavily connected to Great Britain economically despite any
diplomatic acrimony during the previous three decades, as historian Richard Graham notes in a
separate monograph that “in the late 1840s Britain supplied half the goods imported into Brazil”
Jeffrey Needell, “The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Historiography, Slave Agency, and Statesmanship,”
Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (November 2011): 706.
55
P.J. Cain and A. G Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000 (New York: Longman, 2001), 262.
56
Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 263.
54
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and maintained this extreme lead for several decades. 57 Yet these statistics obscure the rancor
that had developed between Great Britain and Brazil not in spite of but perhaps because of the
major economic influence the former had upon the latter, not to mention the years of diplomatic
dispute over the slave trade. Into the next decade after 1850, relations between the two countries
continued to deteriorate until a full-blown crisis had developed between the two countries.
One of the greatest issues that continued to dog the development of friendlier relations
between the countries was the persistence of the British Foreign Office in regulating the
Brazilian slave trade. British agents turned their eyes not just towards the possibility of slave
ships crossing the Atlantic but towards the emancipados, the “more than eleven thousand African
importees who were legally free but remained in a state of de facto servitude, many for the rest
of their lives, few for perhaps as long as half a century.” 58 In addition to perseverating over the
plight of these indeterminately free Africans, many members of the British government
continued to show hostility and suspicion towards Brazil in believing that they would attempt to
bring back the slave trade. The British government in 1853, for example, “decided to abandon
negotiations with Brazil” over the repealing of the Aberdeen Act specifically due to fears that a
lack of British pressure would bring back the trade. 59 On the Brazilian side, claims for damages
that occurred by the seizure and break up of Brazilian ships by the Royal Navy created a stir
throughout the 1850s and led to a series of conventions to determine damages and reparations.
So many of these claims arose during this period that, by 1860, the British government elected to
put a moratorium on hearing “any more cases…from seizures made under the Aberdeen Act until
Richard Graham, “1850-1870,” In Bethell, Empire and Republic, 132.
Conrad, Sorrow, 154.
59
Bethell, Abolition, 370.
57
58
Denis 22
further notice.” 60 Brazilian indignation met with British irritation during this period of continued
tension between the two sides.
It was this era of animosity that William Christie inherited in 1860. Christie himself
pushed against the perceived weakness of the Brazilian government in guaranteeing the rights of
the emancipados, recommending to Foreign Minister Lord Russell that the British government
“do what can be done to prevent their being again fraudulently reduced to slavery” to the point of
encouraging “a general registration of slaves in Brazil.” 61 Two years later, when Christie was
once again conferring with Russell over the slave trade in Brazil, he wrote that while there “is no
doubt whatsoever” that the slave trade had ceased, he found that “the conduct of the Brazilian
government about the free blacks is not to their honour, and is such as to throw doubts on the
singleness and purity of their motives in the abolition of the slave trade.” 62 Thus before and
during the scandals which would erupt into the Christie Affair, powerful elements of the British
government were continuing to push against the Brazilian government for greater accountability
for the cessation of the slave trade, much to Brazilian official chagrin.
From both a Brazilian and British perspective, the Christie Affair is far greater than the
sum of its parts. Nominally over two minor diplomatic intrigues, it is not impossible to trace
British mistrust of Brazilian accounts and Brazilian indignation over British interference to the
thirty year fight over economic supremacy and the struggle over the slave trade. William Christie
did not inherit a blank slate, but rather an extremely tainted compendium of ill will and discord
between nations. It would be his further aggression, and the dogged resistance of his Brazilian
counterparts, that would further deepen the crisis.
60
Manchester, Preeminence, 270.
Mr. Christie to Lord Russell, May 17 1860, FO 881 1329, BRAZIL: Corres. Cases of the British Barque "Prince
of Wales" and of H.M.S. "Forte", The National Archives: 82.
62
Mr. Christie to Lord Russell, May 3 1862, FO 881 1329, 102.
61
Denis 23
Chapter Two
By August of 1862, the drama surrounding both the sinking of the HMS Prince of Wales
and the arrest of the three British officers aboard the gunboat HMS Forte had reached enough of
a crescendo to warrant high-level discussions between the British Ambassador to Brazil and the
Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs. On the one side, the various arms of the British
government and navy continued to apply diplomatic pressure upon their Brazilian counterparts,
making it quite clear that until some redress was found for their perceived diplomatic slight they
would not allow the Brazilians any recourse. On the other, the Brazilian government in various
channels attempted to make sense of what exactly had occurred both the cases and formulate a
suitable strategy for how to assuage their transatlantic ally. By August of the next year, however,
the two sides had cut off diplomatic relations with one another, ending hopes for a short-term
negotiated peace.
Facing the increasing irritation of the British government on the side of Brazil was the
Marques de Abrantes, a man who according to Graham “conduziu-se com tal dignidade,
expressou-se com tal clareza, e foi tão sincero na sua tentativa de preservar a honra nacional
que provoca simpatias mesmo hoje em dia. [Conducted himself with such dignity, expressed
himself with such clarity, and was so sincere in his attempt to preserve [Brazil’s] national dignity
that it provokes sympathy even today].” 63 This lauding description aside, the Marques faced the
zeal of William Christie, the pugnacious British ambassador, with a degree of lyrical finesse
which, though failing to convince the British government the justice of the Brazilian position, at
least reads as a spirited defense of Brazilian national sovereignty. Christie first faced written
counterattack in a reply to a July 16 note wherein he declared that the question of the Prince of
Richard Graham, “Os Fundamentos da Ruptura de Relações Diplomáticas Entre o Brasil e A Grã Bretanha em
1863: A Questão Christie,” Revista de Historia, no. 49 (1962): 124.
63
Denis 24
Wales “cannot be satisfactorily disposed of without a thorough inquiry made in the presence of a
British officer.” 64 After a period of several days, the Marques responded on the 6th of August,
declaring that “in order to justify the Imperial Government’s refusal of this pretension of that of
Her Britannic Majesty it would be sufficient for me to observe to Mr. Christie, that to do
otherwise would be to acknowledge the impotency or unfitness of the Justices of the country.” 65
Abrantes defended the integrity of the Brazilian government in being able to exercise justice
within its own borders, asserting that action was taken as soon as word of the shipwreck reached
the central government, ending with the “the conviction of three criminals of robbery, one of
whom is in prison, and the two others contrived to escape across the neighboring frontier.” 66
Within this in mind, Abrantes acknowledged “the just foundation of the anxiety and vigilance of
Her Britannic Majesty’s Minister concerning the subject” yet, after reaffirming the determination
of the Brazilian government in exercising justice in the country, alleged that “Mr. Christie must
admit that the Imperial Government would betray their mission, and be wanting in their duty to
themselves, if they were to permit the interference of a foreign authority in the administration of
justice of the country.” 67 Negotiations between the British and Brazilian governments had only
just begun, but Abrantes’ stance made clear that the Brazilian side would emphasize the
importance of sovereign integrity over the British desire to influence the investigation.
If the Marques made clear in his response to Christie that the Brazilian government
would resist British attempts to take a direct part in the internal workings of the country,
Christie’s reply several days later reflected his deep misgivings, if not dissatisfaction, with the
Brazilian response to the crisis. In his August 14 reply to Abrantes, Christie declined to speak of
64
Mr. Christie to the Marquis de Abrantes, July 16, 1862, FO 881 1140, 57.
The Marquis de Abrantes to Mr. Christie, August 6, 1862, FO 881 1140, 60.
66
Ibid.
67
The Marquis de Abrantes to Mr. Christie, August 6, 1862, FO 881 1140, 60.
65
Denis 25
the Brazilian government with the same respectful terms his counterpart had exercised for both
parties, noting right away that the Marques’s reply would “greatly disappoint” the British
government in London due to its failure to note further proceedings against possible suspects in
the plunder of the wreck. 68 Christie, continuing his note, dismissed the news of the three arrests,
stating that he already knew of these proceedings “four months ago” due to news delivered to
him by various Brazilian ministers – further, he insinuated that the Marques’s failure to note the
dismissal of several regional ministers and officers over the incident reflected a lack of “proof of
[the Brazilian government’s] desire to do what is right in this painful question.” 69 This fierce
accusation was not the end of Christie’s vitriolic rhetoric. After discussing several delays in
investigation, as well as perceived discourtesy to British naval officers dispatched to aid the
investigation, Christie expressed dismay that “a Brazilian population was likely to forget
patriotism and humanity, and to obstruct justice, in a question involving many British
lives…because of the presence of a British naval officer in a gun boat.” 70 If the Marques de
Abrantes framed his response to the crisis as a defense of maintaining Brazilian sovereignty in
their internal affairs, William Christie framed his own country’s response as a supremacy of
international justice over petty internal disputes, even to the point of suggesting that the Brazilian
people were incapable of pursuing justice for foreigners within their own borders.
The tit-for-tat between the two ministers continued throughout the rest of August, with
neither functionary budging from his position. The Marques, in response on the 16th, dismissed
Christie’s expression of disappointment, mentioning that “the Imperial Government [is]…more
zealous in the fulfillment of its own important obligations and the requirements of justice than in
68
Mr. Christie to the Marques de Abrantes, August 14, 1862, FO 881 1140, 60.
Ibid, 61.
70
Ibid.
69
Denis 26
seeking after the good opinion of any (other) government.” 71 Further, the minister challenged
Christie’s accusation of the Brazilian people’s disavowal of justice in the face of British naval
guns, noting that though the British only sent a gunboat “the slightest sign from a powerful
nation is enough to ensure the respect it merits, and to awaken, in certain cases, the just
sympathy of other nations.” 72 The basic point was clear: Abrantes did not believe that the British
had the right to investigate a foreign nation’s own affairs, and suggested that the Brazilians had
every right to feel wary in the face of British naval power. Christie, on the 22 of the month, did
not give the Marques’s observations any weight, stating that “it passes my understanding to
comprehend how any menace could be seen in the presence of two small naval vessels…and
how any patriotism worthy of the name could be diverted by that circumstance to the shelter of
criminals charged with foul deeds, whose impunity would be the shame of Brazil.” 73
Apparently, the Marques’s declaration of considering the opinions of other nations beneath the
pursuit of its duties stung the British ambassador. At the end of his reply, after declaring that
much more had to be done to clear suspicions of murder and catch any remaining subjects,
Christie icily noted that “notwithstanding your comparative indifference to the knowledge and
appreciation by another Government of your good deeds”, it would be Abrantes’ absolute duty to
keep the British minister informed. 74 Weeks of discussion had lead to no clear resolution, and
only suggested a growing enmity between the two ministers.
The stubbornness, if not outright hostility, of each minister might seem strange without
considering the previously discussed history of the relations of Brazil and Great Britain. After
all, the above letters suggest a very clear pattern of what each man desired for his country and
71
The Marques de Abrantes to Mr. Christie, August 16, 1862, FO 881 1140, 62.
Ibid, 63.
73
Mr. Christie to the Marques de Abrantes, August 22, 1862, FO 881 1140, 65.
74
Mr. Christie to the Marques de Abrantes, August 22, 1862, FO 881 1140, 66.
72
Denis 27
believed of the other. Christie, in his remonstrations, seemed to hold little regard for the capacity
of Brazilian justice and assumed the Brazilians would simply sweep injustice under the rug if left
to their own devices. Abrantes, in his responses, painted a portrait of a hardworking country
being harassed by an overzealous overlord intent on pulling the strings of another country.
Though no man can claim to speak for an entire nation, these sentiments were not exactly unique
to either of these statesman – rather, they can be traced directly back to proceedings between the
two countries at least several decades back.
Christie’s deep suspicions with the Brazilians resound with how the British government
viewed their South American ally during the previous century, where fights over treaty
negotiations and the abolition of the slave trade poisoned relations between the two countries.
Indeed, only a few months before his active correspondence with the Marques de Abrantes
began, Christie himself wrote disparagingly of the Brazilian government to Lord Russell in a
letter concerning slavery in Brazil – while mentioning that “of the entire cessation of the Slave
Trade there is no doubt whatever”, Christie charged that he felt no “implicit confidence in the
information the Brazilian Government may furnish on the subject” and believed further British
pressure would be necessary to alleviate the plight of free blacks enslaved within Brazil. 75 This
rather aggressive sentiment, from the point of view of the British government, may not have
been entirely out of place – as numerous historians have noted, the British unsuccessfully
pressured the Brazilian empire for decades before the transatlantic slave trade ended. Christie’s
lack of faith in the sincerity of the Brazilians over slavery, therefore, may have bled into his
perception of the country as a whole, and colored his opinion to believe that only by force would
the Brazilians act in a manner befitting English justice.
75
Mr. Christie to Lord Russell, May 3, 1862, FO 881 1329, 102.
Denis 28
Christie was not the only minister acting on the basis of past assumptions – though the
evidence is lighter on the fact, it could be argued that the Marques de Abrantes responded to the
crisis based on previous dealings with the British Government. The most obvious antecedent to
the emerging diplomatic conflict was the furor that surrounded the outbreak of fire between
Brazilian and British forces near Paranagua in 1850, the year in which the British expanded their
ship seizures to within Brazilian ports. The following year, the British Ambassador James
Hudson and Brazilian Foreign Minister Paulino Jose Soares de Souza sent a series of letters
arguing with one another whether or not British cruisers had to implicit right to seize ships in
Brazilian waters. De Souza, in a long invective, claimed that the assault upon Brazilian ships and
ensuing gun battles between British ships and Brazilian forts “excited the highest feelings of
indignation in all those Brazilians who prize the honour, the dignity, and the independence of
their country.” 76 At the end of his letter, De Souza anticipated the later complaints of the
Marques de Abrantes by claiming that the policy of British ships enforcing antislavery directives
within Brazil amounted to “the right on the part of England to take possession of Brazil, and put
an end to her independence and sovereignty.” 77 After dry responses from Hudson affirming the
right of British ships to seize slave ships within Brazilian waters, De Souza harshly responded on
February 8 that “they do not possess the right, nor…ever demonstrated that they possessed it”
and that “Brazil has the right to offer resistance” to naval activity. 78 Though this exchange of
letters would eventually end inconclusively, the precedent had been set for the Brazilian
government to claim their own ability to exercise justice within their own territory, and resist
Great Britain if pushed on this point.
76
Senhor Paulino de Souza to Mr. Hudson, January 28, 1851, FO 881 1329, 29.
Senhor Paulino de Souza to Mr. Hudson, January 28, 1851, FO 881 1329 39.
78
Senhor Paulino de Souza to Mr. Hudson, Feburary 8, 1851, FO 881 1329, 42.
77
Denis 29
With the rhetorical positions of the two sides well-established, it would take a new
directive to ratchet up the tensions between Brazil and Great Britain – this directive was to
emanate from London. In response to Christie’s reports of Abrantes resistance to British
pressure, Lord Russell issued two new sets of orders to Christie on October 8. Regarding the case
of the Prince of Wales, Russell decided that the Brazilian government must acknowledge murder
was a possible factor, pursue more suspects, and pay “compensation for…the wholesale plunder
of the wreck and crew.” 79 Furthermore, Russell believed that the newer controversy surrounding
the arrest of the officers of the Forte merited attention as well, and he ordered Christie to pursue
from Brazil the dismissal of those parties who had “wronged” the officers and a “an apology
made by the Brazilian government for this outrage.” 80 Russell’s new energy and pressure upon
Christie most likely stemmed from a letter dated two days earlier from Robert Phillimore, the
Queen’s Advocate. In this letter, Phillimore suggested that apologies and investigations by the
Brazilian government were necessary for the attainment of justice, and ventured that “a
continued refusal on the part of the Brazilian government to satisfy the fair demands of Her
Majesty’s Government” would warrant reprisals against said government. 81 Mentioning that he
had come to this conclusion along with Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, Phillimore suggested
that the reprisals should take the form of “the seizure of some ship or of some portion of public
property belonging to the Brazilian empire.” 82 Since the age of the Aberdeen Act, the British
Navy had not been strangers to the seizure of Brazilian ships – this suggestion, however, was the
first time that the idea of seizing ships should be used against the Brazilian government itself
79
Earl Russell to Mr. Christie, October 8, 1862, FO 881 1140, 69.
Ibid, 170.
81
The Queen’s Advocate to Earl Russell, October 6, 1862, FO 881 1140, 68.
82
Ibid.
80
Denis 30
rather than simple pirates. If put into practice, the reprisals could seriously jeopardize the AngloBrazilian relationship.
Unfortunately for those invested in the peace of the two nations, the “continued refusal”
anticipated by Phillimore emerged from the Marques de Abrantes. In a letter to Christie sent only
a few weeks after Lord Russell sent his intructions, Abrantes did not mention at all the case of
the Forte, disputed Christie’s allegations that Brazilian ministers were lying about the case of the
Prince of Wales, and declared once again that the British government “cannot be expected…[to]
condemn or absolve acts done within the limits of its jurisdiction by an independent
government”. 83 With the refusal to budge on the part of the Marques, the British Government
entered a period of activity which Richard Graham brought the affair towards its “climax”. 84
Christie, informing Russell of Abrantes’s position on November 6, wrote that he believed “the
later note of the Marquis de Abrantes as aggravating the wrong of the Brazilian government” and
only with “fear of force” could the Brazilians be expected to act. 85 The British Navy, for its part,
was ready to deliver on this fear – Rear Admiral Warren, active in Brazil since June, assured the
Admiralty the next day that “I have accordingly made arrangements to have all the squadron in
Rio by the first week of December” if reprisals were deemed necessary. 86 A month later, all
British players appeared ready to institute the bold new plan. In a December 8 letter to Russell,
Christie once again penned that “general proceedings with the Brazilian government are most
unsatisfactory”, and noted that “fear alone will do good with them…and may teach them that her
Majesty’s Government, though patient and forbearing, will not in the end allow themselves to be
83
The Marques de Abrantes to Mr. Christie, October 20, 1862, FO 881 1140, 93.
Richard Graham, “A Questão Christie,” 382.
85
Mr. Christie to Earl Russell, November 6, 1862, FO 881 1140, 94.
86
Rear-Admiral Warren to the Secretary of the Admiralty, November 7, 1862, FO 881 1140, 95.
84
Denis 31
trifled with.” 87 Any chance to preserve peace between the two countries appeared to be rapidly
fading with the increasing certainty in London that only force could compel the Brazilians to act.
Finally, the actual reprisals occurred. Throughout the month of December, a last-ditch
round of negotiations took place between the Brazilian Government and the British Foreign
Office, unfortunately focused less on finding a compromise solution than attempting to have the
Brazilians meet British demands. Christie, at the beginning of the month, sent three letters to the
Marques, two outlining the British Government’s demands for reparations, arrests, and apologies
in the respective cases of the Prince of Wales and the Forte and one ominously declaring that it
would “cause the deepest regret to Her Majesty’s Government if the answer to either note should
preclude all hope of amicably obtaining satisfaction.” 88 After a long month of meetings, the
Marques sent back three letters in reply, categorically rejecting “the principle of responsibility
attributed” to the Brazilian government by the British and declaring it would only pay
reparations, if compelled by force, “under protest”. 89 It is rather strange that the Marques would
add this note, seemingly challenging the British Navy to take reprisals as it would be only way
that the Brazilian government would feel compelled to pay indemnities for the Prince of Wales
and respond at all to allegations of foul play in the case of the Forte. Under Christie’s orders, the
British Navy seemingly took the bait – noting in a January 8 letter to Russell that the Marques’s
reply led him to believe further communication was unnecessary, Christie stated curtly “reprisals
have been made.” 90 As a new year dawned, that which had previously been comparable to a
private feud between government officials suddenly exploded into a full-fledged crisis.
87
Mr. Christie to Earl Russell, December 8, 1862, FO 881 1140, 96.
Mr. Christie to the Marques de Abrantes, December 5, 1862, FO 881 1140, 96.
89
The Marques de Abrantes to Mr. Christie, December 29, 1862, FO 881 1140, 110.
90
Mr. Christie to Earl Russell, January 8, 1863, FO 881 1140, 102.
88
Denis 32
The dry notation of the British cabinet notes and the translated responses from the
Brazilian foreign ministry cannot do justice to the immediate effect that the seizure of Brazilian
ships by the British navy had upon the people of Brazil. Christie, in his own report to Russell,
somewhat disingenuously suggested that “there has been no disturbance of the public peace”,
even while admitting that on the 5th of January riots nearly broke out throughout Rio. 91 One
Brazilian scholar, Beatriz Gallotti Mamigonian, noted that the reprisals created immediate effect,
quoting a Times article which described “an immense sensation in the town” seeing public squares
“filled with angry people.” 92 After all, for many Brazilian citizens the seizure of ships came without
warning – previous correspondence had been between the highest echelons of either government, and
thus it would likely be a total surprise for Brazilian citizens without such knowledge. As shall be
discussed later, the Brazilian people manifested their dissatisfaction in a number of ways, pointing to
the great popular effect the reprisals had upon them.
Furthermore, certain elements of the Brazilian elite were of a mind that the sudden turn to
violence may have had a more sinister motive. Mamigonian, quoting Brazilian ministers meeting in
secret during these months, states that Paulino Soares de Souza, the former Foreign minister,
believed that “the British had in view putting pressure on Brazil to sign conventions on consular
affairs and on the new claims mixed commission.” 93 In support of this idea, Mamigonian notes that
this mixed commission, “created in 1858 to examine the claims for reparations existing since
Brazilian independence”, had been sidelined by Christie upon his arrival, apparently believing that
the Brazilian government should drop claims for reparations for ships seized during the Aberdeen
91
Mr. Christie to Earl Russell, January 8, 1863, FO 881 1140, 102.
The Times (London), February 02, 1863. Quoted in Beatriz Gallotti Mamigonian, “Building the Nation, Selecting
Memories: Vitor Meireles, the Christie Affair and Brazilian Slavery in the 1860s” (paper presented at the Gilder
Lehrman Center’s 12th Annual International Conference entitled “American Counterpoint: New Approaches to
Slavery and Abolition in Brazil,” Yale University, October 29-30, 2010), 12.
93
Mamigonian, “Building the Nation,” 13.
92
Denis 33
Act. 94 Certain elements of the Brazilian government had taken this opinion as far back as August of
1862. A letter from Francisco Inácio de Carvalho Moreira, the Brazilian Minister in London, to the
Marques de Abrantes on 8 August 1862 detailing these talks took a poor view of Mr. Christie’s
reasons for ignoring Brazilian pleas for a consideration of reparations. Moreira, after quoting
Christie’s decision for ignoring Moreira’s suggestion, asserted of his rationale: “Isto e dizer em duas
palavras, não quero! Seria mais digno do Governo Inglez dar esta simples resposta do que mandar
Mr. Christie fazer um esforço impotente e ridículo [This is to say, we don’t want to! It would be
more dignified for the British Government to give this simple response rather than have Mr. Christie
give such an impotent and ridiculous response.]” 95 Though the British ministers consistently gave
the desire to see justice done for their citizens as reasons to take reprisals, the previously mentioned
statements made by Christie to the effect of the untrustworthiness of the Brazilian government, as
well as the apparent existing hostility between him and members of the Brazilian government, may
point to underlying hostility as a reason for taking such a violent turn. In whatever case, the deed had
been done, and now the peace between the two countries was threatened.
The seizure of Brazilian ships by the British Navy, in the short-term, had the effect of forcing
the hand of the Brazilian government and attaining the concessions desired by the British
government. As the seizure of ships by the British Navy began, the Marques de Abrantes made one
final protest to his British counterpart, writing to Christie on the 31st of December that his
government “loudly and categorically protests against such violence, and so unqualifiable a use of
force.” 96 Yet his protest proved largely ineffective – after several back and forth notes confirming
the arrangements, Mr. Christie wrote back to the Marques on the 5th of January confirming the end of
ship seizures due to the latter’s agreement “to give orders to their Minister in London to pay under
Mamigonian, “Building the Nation,” 13.
Carvalho Moreira to the Marques de Abrantes, August 8, 1862, Caixa 217/3/14, Londres (Ofícios Reservados),
1862-1863 (Junho), Arquivo Histórico do Palácio Itamaraty.
96
The Marques de Abrantes to Mr. Christie, December 31, 1862, FO 881 1140, 125.
94
95
Denis 34
protest whatever sum Her Majesty’s Government may demand as compensation in the affair of the
‘Prince of Wales’”, as well as agreeing to refer the case of the Forte to a neutral arbiter for
arbitration.97 Two days later, the Marques de Abrantes informed Mr. Christie that he had sent
instructions to the Brazilian minister in London and delivered to Christie news that his sovereign,
Dom Pedro II, had chosen “His Majesty the King of Belgium, in whose wisdom and justice he has
the fullest confidence” as the arbiter for the case of the Forte. 98 Why the King of the Belgians was
chosen remains somewhat obscure – the exact reasoning for this decision is not discussed by most
historians writing on the subject, and both the British Foreign Office documents and secret
correspondence between Brazilian agents in Europe and Brazil do not dwell upon this fact. In
whatever case, the development of the affair at this point suggested the primacy of British aims, as
they had appeared to gain their short-term objective.
Yet the Marques de Abrantes’s direct orders to Carvalho Moreira suggested that the Brazilian
Government, though acquiescing to British aims, was not going to let the matter drop easily. Writing
on January 8 in a letter that was later published in official newspapers, the Marques asserted to his
subordinate that “the justice and dignity with which the Imperial Government resisted the
exaggerated pretensions of the British Legation are so completely demonstrated that it would be
undoubtedly useless to add here any considerations of that sort”, and that furthermore “the Imperial
Government has always met with the most unanimous, decided, and energetic support from the
whole population.” 99 Though this triumphant language could be written off as simple grandstanding,
the additional orders of the Marques were to cause a stir in the course of negotiations between the
two countries – the Marques wrote that “we also have the right to demand from the same
Government an indemnification for the losses resulting in the captures made by the English vessels
97
Mr. Christie to the Marques de Abrantes, January 5, 1863, FO 881 1140, 132.
The Marques de Abrantes to Mr. Christie, January 7, 1863, FO 881 1140, 135.
99
The Marques de Abrantes to Carvalho Moreira, January 8, 1863, FO 881 1140, 138.
98
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of war.” 100 The affair, rather than drawing to its conclusion, was approaching a new level of
hostility, as the Brazilian government made clear that it would not completely comply with British
orders.
For the time being, the focus of the crisis shifted from Rio to London, as discussions now
began in earnest between Carvalho Moreira and Lord Russell over both the nature of compensation
over the Prince of Wales and the emerging Brazilian demand for compensation over British reprisals.
After receiving a letter transmitting both the Marques de Abrantes orders and complaints from
Moreira, Russell responded on the Brazilian minister on February 12, promising to come up with a
just amount for compensation for the Prince of Wales, but also declaring that his government was
“unwilling to discuss the terms of protest of the Brazilian Government.” 101 This stinging closure
aside, the British minister appeared to at least pay lip service to the idea of reconciliation with the
Brazilian government, assuring Moreira that Brazil “has in so many respects a title to the friendship
of the British Government.” 102 Moreira, however, was not content to simply let the matter rest – after
being told to pay 3,200 pounds as compensation for the Prince of Wales, Moreira wrote a scathing
letter to Russell on the 25th of February in response. Within, Moreira wrote that the Brazilian
government “não reconhece por forma alguma o direito ou justiça da parte do Governo Britânico
em pretender que o Governo Imperial seja responsável pelo naufrágio da Barca ‘Prince of Wales’
[under no circumstances recognizes the right or justice on the part of the British Government to
suppose the Imperial Government be responsible for the wreck of the “Prince of Wales”].” 103 With
words that resound almost with fury, Moreira continued that, though his government agreed to pay
the £3,200 indemnity, it was only due to the “procedimentos illegaes e violencias commettidas sobre
navios Brasileiros nas agoas territoriaes do Imperio, e simples resultado da forca [illegal
100
The Marques de Abrantes to Carvalho Moreira, January 8, 1863, FO 881 1140, 138.
Earl Russell to M. Moreira, February 12, 1863, FO 881 1140, 145.
102
Ibid.
103
Carvalho Moreira to Earl Russell, February 25, 1863. Caixa 217/3/14.
101
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proceedings and violences committed against Brazilian ships in the territorial waters of the Empire,
simply the result of force]” rather than any legal right. 104 Finally, Moreira made clear that his
government would seek, as a result of British naval reprisals, “uma indemnisação pelos prejuízos
resultantes [an indemnity for the resulting damages].” 105 Now, the pressure was set from both sides
of the Atlantic, with both sides claiming damages in need of compensation.
William Christie, the man whose name would ultimately be associated with the crisis, leaves
the stage around this period. As Bethell notes in his history of the abolition of Brazilian slavery,
Christie returned to London at this time to pen “his controversial Notes on the Brazilian Questions”,
a tome which raised “many old issues including the fate of the ‘free Africans’, and the incidents
which culminated in the Brazilian blockade of 1862-3.” 106 Those who believe that Christie’s push
for action during the beginning of the crisis may have had to do with lingering ill will over Brazil’s
treatment of slaves and free Africans turn to this document – Graham, in his analysis of the book,
points to its central thesis that his actions from 1861 were to “melhorar a sorte dos “emancipados”
[aid the free Africans].” 107 It is wrong to attribute all of Britain’s bellicosity during this period to
Christie – the British correspondence reveals a willingness amongst cabinet ministers in London and
naval officers in Rio to push Brazil to the point of reprisals. Furthermore, the crisis that Christie is
now attributed to would eventually grow beyond him, only ending two years after his departure. Yet
his mark is undeniable, and the affair that now faced British and Brazilian politicians in 1863 was
undoubtedly a large measure of his doing.
The further breakdown of relations between Britain and Brazil now seemed inevitable thanks
to the steadfastness of both sides to stick to their convictions. On the British side, the response to
Moreira’s demand for reprisals was rather dry – Russell told Moreira that the seizure of Brazilian
104
Carvalho Moreira to Earl Russell, February 25, 1863. Caixa 217/3/14.
Ibid.
106
Leslie Bethell, Abolition, 384.
107
Richard Graham, “A Questão Christie,” 123.
105
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ships had been “to enforce the moderate demands of Her Majesty’s Government” and proceeded
“according to the rules of International Law, after a long period of patience and forbearance.” 108 The
British Minister simply ignored Moreira’s demand for reprisals itself entirely. 109 The next several
months were no more fruitful, with little change of attitude between the two countries until the end of
May. At the end of May, facing continued refusal on the part of Russell to consider paying
reparations for the seizure of Brazilian ships, Moreira declared in a letter sent on the 25th that it
would be the policy of his government to end diplomatic relations with Britain until some measure of
satisfaction was reached. 110 In response, Russell asserted on the 29th that the reparations “were not
dictated by any desire to offend the dignity or to make any aggression on the territories of the
Emperor of Brazil” – furthermore, he declared that Moreira’s intent to void his passport and leave the
country amounted to a “needless interruption of diplomatic relations.” 111 Whether owing to British
arrogance or Brazilian hysterics, as each side might have it, the two countries had formally broken
diplomatic ties with one another.
As June of 1863 dawned, Brazil and Great Britain lay in a very different diplomatic position
than they had a year prior. The case of the Prince of Wales, for all intents and purposes, had been
solved, as the Brazilians had paid their indemnity – in his palace in Brussels, the King of the
Belgians prepared his arbitration on the case of the Forte. Yet the Christie Affair itself had grown far
beyond its original bounds - a new cause for alarm, in the form of Brazilian demands for reparations
following Brazilian reprisals, had caused enough of a stir to break diplomatic relations between the
two countries. The erstwhile allies, intertwined since Dom Pedro I’s grito de Iparanga, now appeared
at tense crossroads. Though the affair eventually came to an end, it would only be after two years of
108
Earl Russell to Carvalho Moreira, February 28, 1863. Caixa 217/3/14.
Ibid.
110
Carvalho Moreira to Earl Russell, May 25, 1863, Caixa 217/3/15, Londres (Ofícios Reservados), 1863 (Junho)1864, Arquivo Histórico do Palácio Itamaraty.
111
Earl Russell to Carvalho Moreira, May 29, 1863, Caixa 217/3/15.
109
Denis 38
negotiations, that which revealed the nuances of semicolonial revolt and the limits of European
empire.
Chapter Three
In June of 1863, the diplomatic furor now christened as the Christie Affair had grown
into a full breakdown of communications between Great Britain and Brazil. Diplomats on both
sides vacated their stations, and passports were confiscated. The seizure of Brazilian ships,
ordered by top ministers in London and executed by William Christie in Rio, proved to be such a
controversial undertaking as to drive the Brazilian Empire to revolt against its closest European
ally. Yet, in the space of two years, relations between the two countries were repaired, and at
least in the immediate short-term business as usual restarted across the Atlantic. How ordinary
citizens and government officials in both countries understood the crisis, and ultimately found it
resolved, reflects the long and complicated history of the relationship between the two countries
and how this relationship would evolve in the future.
The period from the seizure of Brazilian ships in January of 1863 to the break of relations
six months later saw the transformation of the crisis from a mostly private argument between
diplomats to a very public affair. In Great Britain, the affair appeared in, but did not dominate,
the discourse of the press and government of the country, also failing to grab a significant hold
on broad public dialogue. Part of this was due to the fact that Great Britain, by the 1860s a global
empire prone to constant sunlight, faced many consecutive crises around the same time as the
Christie Affair. One scholar, Ross G. Forman, asserts in his analysis of transatlantic perceptions
of the affair that the “Affair received little direct literary treatment in Britain, perhaps because it
was overshadowed by the wealth of production inspired by the Indian Mutiny and events in other
Denis 39
parts of the formal empire.” 112 Indeed, a speech given by the Lords Commissioners of Queen
Victoria to the Houses of Parliament on July 28 of 1863 reveals how the dispute with Brazil,
though undoubtedly important, was but one facet of Britain’s foreign mindset during the time. In
the speech, the Commissioners deliver to the Parliament members the distressing observation
that “The Emperor of Brazil has thought fit to break off his Diplomatic Relations with Her
Majesty” only after describing, amongst other issues, developments in the American Civil War,
Greek royal succession, and reparations against Japan. 113 Therefore, the Christie Affair in Great
Britain cannot be understood as a central plank of the nation’s foreign considerations or national
development, but simply as a reference point from which British statesmen and intellectuals
considered their country’s objectives and undertakings abroad.
Yet in this capacity, the energetic nature of the British press guaranteed that the Christie
Affair would not go unnoticed – indeed, British journalists seized upon the Affair to alternatively
laud or lampoon their government’s foreign policy decisions in Brazil in relation to the slave
trade, commercialism, and general diplomacy. On the one hand, some British journalists wrote of
the affair from the perspective of the ineffectual nature of the British Foreign Office, with one
correspondent in The Saturday Review lamenting on July 4 that “the breach with Brazil might
have been avoided but for the infirmities of temper displayed by the English Foreign Office and
its representatives.” 114 Others, however, praised the British government’s unwavering resolve in
the face of Brazilian intransience, blending the diplomatic affair at the center of the dispute with
lingering questions over slavery. In a June 15 edition of The Globe and Traveler, a British
Ross G. Forman, “Harbouring discontent: British imperialism through Brazilian eyes in the Christie Affair.” In
Martin Hewitt, An Age of Equipoise? Reassessing Mid-Victorian Britain (Burlington: Ashgate, 2000), 227.
113
The Speech of the Lord Commissioners to Both Houses of Parliament, July 28, 1863, Caixa 76, Grã-Bretanha:
Legação em Londres, Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros.
114
“The Missing Message”, In The Saturday Review, July 4, 1863, Caixa 217/3/15.
112
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correspondent asserted that the breakdown of relations fit in all too well with Brazil’s “general
conduct and demeanor”, comparing Brazilian reluctance to pay reparations to being unable to get
“even one word” over the plight of emancipados in Brazil. 115 A correspondent of The Times,
writing on June 25, took a view attacking Britain and Brazil alike, mentioning that while “on the
main question the Brazilians have unquestionably been in the wrong”, it was the “curse of
‘cantankerousness’” and petty grievances between diplomats which caused the crisis to
degenerate. 116 British journalists, predicting the activity of modern historians, took the Christie
Affair as an opportunity to review their government’s activities in Brazil in relation to pursuing
moralistic goals and asserting diplomatic and economic dominance.
On the other side of the Atlantic, the Christie Affair exploded beyond journalistic and
governmental discourse into the public eye, creating a fever of indignant nationalism that
penetrated many facets of Brazilian society. Forman asserts in his own extensive study on the
subject that the Affair produced works by Brazilian journalists and artists of all stripes that
“reveal not only the Victorians’ aspirations for economic and political control over Latin
America’s largest and wealthiest nations, but also how the Victorians were perceived in a
country that they apparently dominated in commercial terms.” 117 In the same year that British
journalists were debating the merit of their statesmen’s actions in Brazil, Brazilian playwright
J.F.K. da Costa Rubim produced a play titled Os inglezes no Brasil, a satire of the incident
surrounding the HMS Forte which apparently depicted the English as “an avaricious, drinkaddled set of plunderers.” 118 Outside of theatre, poetry also became a fount for angry criticisms
of British reprisals – a periodical called O Caboclo, notable as “a short-lived weekly devoted to
“London, Monday Evening, June 15”, In The Globe and Traveler, June 15, 1863, Caixa 217/3/15.
“London, Thursday, June 25, 1865”, In The Times, June 25, 1863, Caixa 217/3/15.
117
Ross G. Forman, “Harbouring Discontent,” 227.
118
Ibid 228.
115
116
Denis 41
the Christie Affair”, published several nationalistic poems throughout its lifetime, including one
personally insulting Christie and another “threatening ‘John Bull’ in South America with
imminent death.” 119 The upper echelons of government were not immune from taking part in the
patriotic tumult – the Marquis de Abrantes himself commissioned a painting in 1863 by
renowned Brazilian painter Victor Meireles of Dom Pedro II acclaimed by a cheering crowd
“filled with people of both sexes and all classes, ages and colors”, titled aptly “Study for the
Christie Affair.” 120 Dissenting opinions against the conduct of the Brazilian government, though
quite likely extant in some form or another, are quite hard to find in the existing historiography.
One possible source of contention, absent from Brazilian newspapers and government
publications, was the anger of those disenfranchised under the current system. As Mamigonian
notes, a free man of color named Sebastião Maria faced arrest in March 1863 after being accused
of condemning the Emperor and inciting blacks to take the side of England in a possible war
between it and Brazil for the purposes of gaining freedom from servitude. 121 Even if such
allegations were false, the mere fear of such a sentiment amongst the authorities reflects the
difficulty facing the Brazilian government in calling to arms its citizens against a country whose
government crusaded against slavery. The Christie Affair and the 1863 diplomatic break did
create broad feelings of nationalism, but only amongst those Brazilians who felt represented by
their nation.
In both Brazil and Great Britain, the government received a mixture of support and
condemnation from their citizens at the beginning of the diplomatic rupture – similarly in both
cases, each government had a stake in bringing the Affair to as satisfactory of a conclusion as
Ross G. Forman, “Harbouring Discontent,” 234.
Mamigonian, “Building the Nation”, 1.
121
Ibid 15.
119
120
Denis 42
possible. In the immediate aftermath of the break in diplomatic relations, the Brazilian
Government gained the first true victory in lengthy negotiations with foreign mediators. As
mentioned in the previous section, the British and Brazilian delegations had agreed to defer
judgement over the case of the Forte to the neutral third party of the King of the Belgians. On
June 18, only a few weeks after the formal rupture of diplomatic relations, the King laid forth his
decision. Estimating that the arrested officers “did not wear the uniform of their rank” and thus
did not immediately appear to deserve “treatment different to that which would have been
applied, in similar circumstances, to other persons”, Leopold I declared that “in the mode in
which the laws of Brazil have been applied towards the English officers, there was neither
premeditation of offence, nor offence, to the British Navy.” 122 In a stroke of a pen, the court at
Brussels deflated the aims of the British Government and handed the Brazilians a significant
diplomatic victory in determining the “aggressor” of the dispute.
Reactions on both sides were quite different. The jubilance of Brazilian officials was
readily apparent – Carvalho Moreira, writing from Paris to the Marques de Abrantes on the 24th
of June, asserted that “o effeito d’este successo…[é] immenso e incalculável [the effect of this
success is immense and incalculable].” 123 Jubilantly reporting the stirring effect the decision had
upon the House of Commons, Moreira supposed to Abrantes that the decision of the King of the
Belgians would greatly support “nossa victoria moral [our moral victory].” 124 As has been
stated, Brazilian government officials interpreted the Christie Affair as part of a broader
referendum on the sovereignty of the nation. On the other hand, reaction amongst British
officials was somewhat more muted, with official statements lacking in the historiography.
122
Decision of His Majesty the King of the Belgians, June 18, 1863, Caixa 217/3/15.
Carvalho Moreira to the Marques de Abrantes, June 24, 1862, Caixa 217/3/15.
124
Ibid.
123
Denis 43
However, The Globe and Traveler emerges as a great defender of English policy in this period,
echoing sentiments that very may well have been held by Lord Russell and his allies in the
cabinet. In a July 1 issue, a correspondent of the paper hoped, in relation to the Belgian decision,
that “the elimination of this delicate element…may facilitate the resumption of diplomatic
relations for which Lord Russell in the late debate handsomely and cordially expressed his
desire.” 125 Further, the correspondent disputed the King of the Belgian’s reasoning for the
decision and crucially linked the failure of diplomacy to Brazil’s dreadful record in maintaining
treaty obligations to “the treatment of some thousands of liberated Africans…obligations which
have been habitually disregarded.” 126 The harkening back to the issue of the emancipados
supports the claim made by several historians that the Christie Affair represented a culmination
of British attempts to gain Brazilian cooperation on questions of the slave trade and commercial
and diplomatic rights in the country. Thus, the decision of the King of the Belgians did not end
the crisis but only inflamed the opinions held by both sides.
At this stage, the British and Brazilians held a strong rhetorical position – Brazil now
claimed reparations for unjustly made reprisals, while Britain reneged any guilt for compelling
Brazil to pay her debts. The possibility of a stalemate between the two countries, neither
apparently willing to give ground to the other, appeared likely. It was here that the Kingdom of
Portugal, Britain’s close ally and Brazil’s former metropole, emerged as a key player in drama.
Portuguese diplomats, since the expansion of the crisis to the level of a full-blown diplomatic
rupture, had sent word to London and Rio expressing their support for the normalization of
relations. As early as June 26, the Portuguese ambassador to Great Britain, the Conde de
Lavradio, wrote a letter to Lord Russell relaying “orders from my Government to communicate
125
126
“London, Wednesday Evening, July 1.” In The Globe and Traveler, July 1, 1863, Caixa 217/3/15.
Ibid.
Denis 44
to your Excellency…the desire which the King of Portugal felt to co-operate towards the
reconciliation of the Government of Brazil with her Britannic majesty…[and] conduce to a
speedy reconciliation of two Sovereigns the most intimate allies of Portugal.” 127 In response,
Russell took this offer with grace, replying the next day that he would “be happy to find the good
offices of Her Majesty’s faithful ally the King of Portugal successful in restoring the amicable
relations between Great Britain and Brazil.” 128 If Portugal appeared to Britain as a friendly
savior, the Brazilians reacted in a more subdued manner due to their previous interactions with
the country. In May of 1863, for example the Portuguese Foreign Minister the Duque de Loulé
wrote a scolding missive to the Brazilian government in Rio, condemning an apparent diplomatic
slight by a Brazilian diplomat against a British counterpart as one of many “manifestações de
arrogante patriotismo [manifestations of arrogant patriotism]” that would ultimately complicate
the effort to end the crisis. 129 Portuguese agents, then, showed an interest in getting involved in
the Christie Affair that may have seen mixed feelings on the two sides of the Atlantic.
The Belgians, as a disinterested third party, had been voluntarily chosen for the purposes
of arbitration – the Portuguese, however, attempted with vigor to be involved in the negotiations
as the crisis worsened. Aside from the stated desire to see two of its allies realigned, one can
infer other reasons for a vested Portuguese interest in maintaining transatlantic stability between
Brazil and Great Britain. During the period of the Christie Affair, Brazil had an extremely
important role for the Portuguese economy –Gervase Clarence-Smith points to Brazil making up
between 10 to 15 percent of Portugal’s total foreign trade during the 1860s and, especially, the
127
The Conde de Lavradio to Earl Russell, June 26, 1863, FO 881 1375, 1.
Earl Russell to the Conde de Lavradio, June 27, 1863, FO 881 1375, BRAZIL: Further Corres. Mediation of
Portugal between Great Britain and Brazil, The National Archives: 1.
129
The Duque de Loulé to the Marques de Abrantes, May 5, 1863, Caixa 206, Brasil: Legação em Rio de Janeiro,
Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros.
128
Denis 45
importance of remittances sent by both traders and “poor peasant immigrants, who entered Brazil
on an ever larger scale” in maintaining the Portuguese economy. 130 These remittances were not
an isolated phenomenon between Portugal and Brazil. In an extensive study of the nature of these
remittances, Rick Chaney estimates that while banking houses in Brazil and Portugal were
responsible for maintaining the transfer of funds between the two countries from 1860 onward,
many of these banks “had branches in London” and operated along a partially English network.
131
This system most likely depended upon the cooperation of Portuguese, English, and Brazilian
merchants and functionaries during the period – a total breakdown in diplomatic relations
between two of these partners could provoke nothing but alarm for the Portuguese government.
Therefore, the Portuguese intervention appears far less unwarranted than might be believed.
However logical from the economic standpoint the Portuguese intervention might be, that
the reactions of Britain and Brazil were not unified in their enthusiasm for the Portuguese offer
to mediate the crisis. On August 10, a correspondent of The Globe in London maintained hope
that “the mediatory efforts of the King of Portugal” would be accepted by the Brazilians. 132 Yet
this article quoted a German newspaper, written on July 26 apparently in connivance with the
Brazilian legation in Berlin, which declared that “England could not have chosen a less welcome
or influential mediator than Portugal” and further decried any further attempts at negotiation
without recognizing Brazilian claims for reparations. 133 In Brazil itself, one fascinating letter
attacking the Portuguese mediation appears in the Correio Mercantil, a Rio newspaper, on the
18th of October. Written by a certain “Brasilicus”, the letter angrily alleged that while “diversos
130
Gervase Clarence-Smith, The Third Portuguese Empire, 1825-1975: A Study in Economic Imperialism
(Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1984), 64.
131
Rick Chaney, Regional Emigration and Remittances in Developing Countries: The Portuguese Experience (New
York : Praeger, 1986), 11.
132
“Monday, August 10, 1863.” In The Globe, August 10, 1863, Caixa 217/3/15.
133
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, July 26, 1863. In The Globe, August 10, 1863, Caixa 217/3/15.
Denis 46
governos oferecerão os seus bons officios [many governments offered their good offices]” for
the resumption of diplomatic relations, but were rejected in favor of Portugal, “alliado intimo de
todos os governos inglezes [intimate ally of all English governments].” 134 Comparing the
demand to accept the mediation to blackmail, “Brasilicus” ended his diatribe by declaring “Nao
pode ser juiz em questões entre o governo brasileiro e o inglez o governo de um paiz que por
muito tempo tem sido...um amigo dedicado dos ingleses, e dedicado até o ponto do sacrifício! [A
country that has been for a long time a dedicated friend to the English, to the point of sacrifice,
cannot be fair in judging questions between the Brazilian and English governments!].” 135 Unlike
the uncontroversial acceptance of the King of the Belgian’s mediation, it would appear that
serious obstacles stood in the way of the Portuguese attempt to mediate the crisis.
Opposition on the ground towards the Portuguese did not spell the end of the country’s
role in the crisis, however. For the rest of 1863 and into 1864, organs of the Brazilian foreign
ministry deliberated over the Anglo-Portuguese proposal. To this end, a Brazilian diplomat under
Moreira’s employ, Francisco Xavier da Costa Aguiar de Andrada, met with the Conde de
Lavradio in August of 1863 to get an idea of how negotiations were proceeding between
Lavradio and the British government. Writing to the Marques de Abrantes on the 22, Andrada
noted that Lavradio had told him that Lord Palmerston, the British Prime Minister, had assured
him during a private meeting that the British government “tambem nao temos nenhum desejo de
que este estado continua [also hopes that the current crisis does not continue]” and that the
British sought “termos os mais convenientes para agradar o Brasil [the most convenient terms to
satisfy Brazil.]” 136 By default then, the Conde de Lavradio had begun serving his role – despite
Brasilicus, “Questão Anglo-Brasileiro.” In O Correio Mercantil, October 18, 1863, Caixa 206.
Ibid.
136
Francisco Xavier da Costa Aguiar de Andrada to the Marques de Abrantes, August 22, 1863, Caixa 217/3/15.
134
135
Denis 47
official breaks between the Brazilians and the British, fleeting promises of reconciliation
transmitted thanks to the actions of the lone councilor. Yet Andrada ended his letter to the
Marques with a recommendation that such advances only be taken in the circumstance that the
British government, for all of its promises, understood that “a dignidade do Governo Brasileiro é
mais remitente do que o seu orgulho [the dignity of the Brazilian Government was more
important than its pride].” 137 The Brazilian Government did not display the same animosity as
some of its citizens towards the Portuguese mediation, but certainly did not rush to accept its
proposals at this stage.
Yet, as time went on, the Brazilian Government appeared to be drawn ever closer to
accepting the Portuguese mediation outright. Evidence for this appears in a rather roundabout
fashion – on October 16, an edition of The Morning Post declared that the Emperor of Brazil
“refused the King of Portugal’s offer of his good offices…and declares, it is said, that he will be
content with nothing but an apology from the British Government.” 138 The indignation of the
Post is palpable, decrying this action while simultaneously pointing out Brazil’s request for a
loan despite “boasting that Brazil can do without” and once again comparing the current troubles
to previous fights over the abolition of the slave trade. 139 Had this article run without comment,
it would simply be another talking point. However, Andrada himself wrote to the editor of the
paper on that very day of the announcement of the refusal was false, writing that “We are
authorized to state that the statement contained in an article contributed to the Morning Post…is
in every respect incorrect.” 140 The Brazilian Government, it appeared, kept its options open,
neither immediately accepting the offer for mediation nor outright refusing it. 1863 seemed to
137
Francisco Xavier da Costa Aguiar de Andrada to the Marques de Abrantes, August 22, 1863, Caixa 217/3/15.
“Relations with Brazil.” In The Morning Post, October 16, 1863, Caixa 217/3/15.
139
Ibid.
140
Francisco Xavier da Costa Aguiar de Andrada to Mr. Macintosh, October 16, 1863, Caixa 217/3/15.
138
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hold no real end of the crisis, and on November 23 Andrada wrote to Abrantes that “esta crise
ministerial breve terá uma solução [this short ministerial crisis shall have a solution]” without
naming how it should be solved. 141 With the end of the year in sight, it almost appeared as if
Brazil and Britain, despite Portuguese efforts, would remain isolated for the foreseeable future.
The pressure to end the crisis finally compelled Brazilian statesmen to accept the
proposal for mediation the following. The Marques de Abrantes, the long-suffering champion of
Brazilian sovereignty, left office in the beginning of 1864 – his replacement, Joao Pedro Dias
Vieira, sent to the various organs of the Brazilian foreign ministry instructions on March 22
declaring “o Governo Imperial acceitado a medeação offerecida por S.M. Fidelíssima [the
acceptance by the Imperial Government of the mediation offered by the King of Portugal].” 142
Moreira wrote back to Vieira of this news on the 24 of April, writing that in his meeting with the
Conde de Lavradio he believed that the man “me merece toda confiança [deserves all my
confidence].” 143 In London, however, the news was not immediately taken to heart by the
British cabinet. Moreira, writing to Vieira in the beginning of May, lamented that meetings
between Russell and Lavradio were being consistently delayed “por causa da chamada
Conferencia para a questão da Dinamarca [because of the Conference called for the Denmark
Question].” 144 It would take several days for Lavradio to finally make inroads with the British
government, occupied with policy decisions across the world.
After several months of indecision and Brazilian quiet, Lavradio passed a memorandum
to Russell on the 27th of May. Worries amongst various Brazilian factions during the previous
few months proved to be unfounded, for the memorandum that Lavradio drafted proved to be
141
Francisco Xavier da Costa Aguiar de Andrada to the Marques de Abrantes, November 23, 1863, Caixa 217/3/15.
Carvalho Moreira to Joao Pedro Dias Vieira, April 24, 1864, Caixa 217/3/15.
143
Ibid.
144
Carvalho Moreira to Dias Vieira, May 8, 1864, Caixa 217/3/15.
142
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radically favorable for the Brazilian faction. On the one hand, Lavradio asserted to the contrast
of the official British position that “reprisals could neither be preceded nor followed by a
blockade – an act which, according to international law, can only take place after the declaration
of war, and which moreover must be previously announced.” 145 Furthermore, he asserted that
the reprisals in themselves constituted a violation of Brazilian territory, and also were made not
only to gain reparations for the Prince of Wales but also for the Forte, a case which represented
“an insult which never existed” thanks to the arbitration of Leopold I. 146 With these assertions in
mind, Lavradio judged that the best course forward would be to send a British envoy to Brazil
with a formal apology for the reprisals and the submission “to a Mixed Anglo-Brazilian
commission” claims related to the reprisals for the purposes of reparations. 147 For the second
time, a foreign mediator had spurned British aims – rather than simply declare the justice of the
British mission in Rio, Lavradio pressured the British Government to simply accept the Brazilian
demands for reprisals and thus admit to having committed wrongdoing for the past several years.
To the detriment of the Brazilian party and the hope of immediate reconciliation, the
British response was expectedly frigid. On June 6, Russell sent back a reply to Lavradio
responding to both Lavradio’s interpretation of the events and his plan of mediation. In response
to the allegation of territorial infringement, Russell stated that the “temporary use of territorial
waters of Brail was prompted solely by a consideration for the interests of the owners of the
vessels and cargoes detained, and did not arise from any desire or intention to infringe upon the
territorial rights of the Emperor of Brazil.” 148 Further, Russell alleged that the British had
145
The Conde de Lavradio to Earl Russell, May 27, 1864, FO 881 1423, BRAZIL: Papers. Renewal of Diplomatic
Relations with Brazil, The National Archives: 5.
146
The Conde de Lavradio to Earl Russell, May 27, 1864, FO 881 1423, 5.
147
Ibid 6.
148
Earl Russel to the Conde de Lavradio, June 6, 1864, FO 881 1375, 4.
Denis 50
achieved all of their goals in the dispute, having received payment for the Prince of Wales and
having dropped the case of the Forte, and thus had no hand in the breaking of relations –
therefore, it should be “the party which took the first step in the rupture”, namely Brazil, who
should send the first envoy. 149 Russell did not pay any service to the proposal of an apology,
only suggesting that British envoys would send warm regards to the Emperor upon their arrival –
the idea of reparations as well was utterly ignored. The British, it appeared, could not be moved
from their rhetorical position.
For the rest of 1864 the debate between Lavradio and Russell stagnated. Lavradio, in a
long reply in the month of September, informed Russell that in a separate communication the
Emperor of Brazil had refused to accept the British proposal without the issue of reprisals being
heard, a stance Lavradio found to be “based on sound principles of right.” 150 Attempting to
convince the minister, Lavradio implored Russell to consider the issue, asserting that failing to
bring up the issue of the reprisals was tantamount to “ignoring the principles of justice.” 151
Further, he cautioned against the continued refusal of the reestablishment of diplomatic relations
on that basis, warning that “the interruption of the diplomatic relations between Brazil and Great
Britain is extremely hurtful to the interests of the two States, whose commercial relations are
most important.” 152 Lavradio’s spirited rhetoric, nevertheless, failed to move the British
minister. On October 10, Russell wrote to Lavradio with apparent regret both that the Brazilian
Emperor “declined to accept the conditions proposed” by Britain and further regretted Lavradio’s
sympathy for his refusal. 153 In the reply, Russell shut off any discussion over the possible
149
Earl Russel to the Conde de Lavradio, June 6, 1864, FO 881 1375, 5.
The Conde de Lavradio to Earl Russell, September 17, 1864, FO 881 1375, 6.
151
Ibid 7.
152
The Conde de Lavradio to Earl Russell, September 17, 1864, FO 881 1375, 7.
153
Earl Russell to the Conde de Lavradio, October 10, 1864, FO 881 1375, 7.
150
Denis 51
illegality of the reprisals, definitively stating that “there was no difference in point of
international legality between reprisals executed in territorial waters and reprisals effected
elsewhere.” 154 In perhaps the boldest move of all, Russell simultaneously refuted Lavradio and
hinted at the strength of his country’s position by speaking of the continuingly strong scale of
trade between Great Britain and Brazil, finding that commerce had in fact “considerably
increased since the diplomatic relations between the two countries have been suspended.” 155 For
the rest of the year, Russell’s stance on this matter would not change, and Portuguese mediation,
for the time being, failed.
No end in sight appeared for the Christie Affair into 1864 – the Brazilians were
committed to the issue of reprisals just as much as the British were committed to dropping it. It
would take a major shift on the negotiating table for there to be a change in the negotiations –
this change, in fact, emanated not from Europe but from South America. At the same time that
the Brazilians cut off diplomatic relations with the British Empire and brewed in nationalistic
discontent, a great war stirred at their southern border – Uruguay, wracked by civil war after an
April 1863 rebellion of the liberal Colorados against the Conservative government, threatened
disrupt the peace of the continent. 156 Brazil, attempting to gain influence over their Southern
neighbor, lent diplomatic support to the Colorados and lent, in August of 1864, an ultimatum to
the conservative government threatening “retaliation for the alleged abuses suffered by Brazilian
subjects” in the country. 157 The ultimatum backfired – Francisco Solano Lopez, the dictator of
Paraguay (at the time a country having completed a massive military buildup), declared his
154
Earl Russell to the Conde de Lavradio, October 10, 1864, FO 881 1375, 8.
Ibid 10.
156
Leslie Bethell, The Paraguayan War, 1864-1870 (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1996), 2.
157
Ibid 3.
155
Denis 52
support for the Colorado rebellion and invaded Brazil on the 13 of December. 158 Thus, as the
Portuguese mediation stalled, Brazil found herself drawn into a war with her southern neighbor
that would prove to be a terrible conflict.
The evidence that the conflict sped up the process of the mediation is indirect, yet
convincing. In the short-term, the Brazilian army faired extremely badly against the Paraguayans
– from 1864 to 1865, the Paraguayan offensive seized nearly the entirety of the Brazilian
province of Mato Grosso, bringing the population under servitude and bringing back huge
amounts of goods and foodstuffs for the war effort. 159 To be failing in a war effort against an
immediate foe while simultaneously being at diplomatic odds with one’s closest ally could not
have felt well for diplomats in Rio. It comes as no surprise that in a letter from Andrada to Dias
Vieira on March 23 announcing the declaration of neutrality in this conflict by the British
Empire, and even more importantly, the blockade of all belligerent ports except those of the
Brazilian Empire, Andrada claimed that the British declaration was “toda em nossa favor [all in
our favor].” 160 Yet a certain level of nervousness can be detected – Andrada qualified his claim
by stating that the British declaration would be favorable only if “a omissão foi voluntario [the
omission was voluntary]” in the case of the Brazilian ports. 161 Without diplomatic
communication, this certainty could never be reached, and thus the affair would have to be
drawn to a close as soon as possible for Brazilian statesmen to feel at ease.
In the following months, the lengthy drama of the previous years finally began to wind
down. After several months of futile argumentation, Lavradio wrote to Russell on the 21st of July
158
Bethell, The Paraguayan War, 4.
Thomas L. Whigham, The Paraguayan War (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 216.
160
Andrada to Dias Vieira, March 23, 1865, Caixa 217/4/1, Londres (Ofícios Reservados), 1865, Arquivo Histórico
do Palácio Itamaraty.
161
Ibid.
159
Denis 53
that it was with “honour and great satisfaction” that he declared that the Brazilian government
“had accepted the proposition tendered by His Brittanic Majesty’s Government for its
reconciliation with the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil”, thus agreeing to drop
the demand for reparations or even an apology from the British government. 162 After years of
indecision, the conclusion of the affair came with great haste. Only a few days later, Russell
ordered the new British envoy, Mr. John Thorton, to travel to Rio de Janeiro to open
communications with the Emperor and, as a show of thanks to the Portuguese, ask the
Portuguese minister of the capital “to accompany you on the occasion in question.” 163 If there
was any doubt that the Paraguayan War now weighed heavily on the Brazilian mind, it was
dispelled by Thorton’s ensuing report. Rather than writing from Rio, Thorton wrote his report of
his progress to Russell from a military embankment off the bank of the Uruguay River on the 26
of September. Therein, he noted the “great pleasure at the renewal of relations between the two
Courts” expressed by the Emperor himself and “the utter absence of all accommodation in the
town of Uruguayana, owing to the damage done to the houses by the Paraguayans.” 164 By the
end of the year, normal relations recommenced between the two sides, one now in the depths of
major war.
Thus the Christie Affair, having dragged on for three years, ended. If one considers that,
in the entire affair, the acknowledgement of any guilt was made by Brazil in the payment “under
protest” for the loss of the Prince of Wales, it might appear ludicrous that two nations nearly
went to war and had a miniature Cold War over what amounted to a mere criminal case. Yet this
was the state of affairs engendered by the history of the two nations, long at odds over the issues
162
The Conde de Lavradio to Earl Russell, July 21, 1865, FO 881 1423, 18.
Earl Russell to Mr. Thorton, July 28, 1865, FO 881 1423, 21.
164
Mr. Thorton to Earl Russell, September 26, 1865, FO 881 1423, 26-27.
163
Denis 54
of slavery, territorial sovereignty, and the proper relationship between independent nations. The
conclusion of the affair, however, did not mean that the relationship between the two countries
remained stagnant. Indeed, the lessons of the affair would resonate in the years to follow the
productive meeting on the Uruguay River.
Conclusion
Only a few historians have attempted to draw a definitive lesson from the Christie Affair
and quantify its major effect on Anglo-Brazilian relations. One of the first was Manchester, in
his grand tome on the relationship between Brazil and Great Britain. In his eyes, the Christie
Affair was the product “almost exclusively of the perpetuation or failure of the traditional
political influence of Great Britain in Portuguese America” – by not immediately giving into
British demands, the Brazilians had proven “strong enough to sustain its revolt” and thus broken
the traditional dominance held by England over the Lusophone world. 165 This view is often
echoed by other historians, with Bethell in his own treatment directly quoting Manchester while
asserting that the affair “is usually regarded as marking a further stage in Brazil’s gradual
assertion of her independence from British political domination.” 166 A third historian, Richard
Graham, gives the affair almost hyperbolic importance, stating that the failure of Britain to
blackmail Brazil into following her meant that “os laços políticos que outrora ligavam o Brasil à
Inglaterra, finalmente, foram quebrados [the political ties which had always bound Brazil and
England finally were broken].” 167 By these accounts, the Christie Affair holds the same
resonance of importance as the revolutions of the previous century or the decolonization efforts
of the ensuing!
165
Manchester, Preeminence, 283; 284.
Bethell, Abolition, 383.
167
Graham, “A Questão Christie”, 400.
166
Denis 55
Is it right to state that the Brazilians were so triumphant in the affair? A closer look at the
outcome of the affair makes it more difficult to assert such a fact. After all, in the end the only
political change to come out of the tumult was a payment by the Brazilians to the British for the
loss of the Prince of Wales. England had indeed been rebuked for two years, but had the political
and economic capital necessary to wait for conditions that were more favorable to their aims. It
is far too much to suggest that the British could have known that the Paraguayan War would
eventually erupt and create the conditions necessary for Brazil to give up her claims, but it is not
too much to suggest that the British had far more flexibility in the arrangements than the
Brazilians ever did. Brazil only had the power to make nationalistic demands against the British
when the times suited them – in the face of foreign onslaught, they once again relied upon
favorable negotiations with their premiere diplomatic and economic ally.
The gains made by Brazil, however, were not completely negligible. It is true that the
Brazil that grew after 1865 was certainly stronger than that which accepted the pitiful terms of
the 1827. By the end of the century, it was not so nearly reliant on British manufacturers,
supplanted as such by the burgeoning industry of the United States and Germany. Yet it is
difficult to assert whether this growth was a direct offspring of the diplomatic behavior that
preceded the Christie Affair or simply a concurrent development. Perhaps had Brazilian
statesmen simply given in to British aims throughout the century, signing the treaties that had
been suggested since the 1830s, it may not have been able to have the same ability to push back
against British demands during the 1860s. This, however, is speculative, and outside the bounds
of this study.
Furthermore, there is one final aspect of the Christie Affair that cannot be forgotten – the
pervasive, background role slavery and its propagation. As letters between Christie and his
Denis 56
superiors suggest, the desire to keep the slave trade from reemerging, as well as freeing the
emancipados held by Brazilian traders, certainly drove British policy to its pugnacious state. It is
hard to fault the British for these heavy-handed actions when one considers that the territorial
“sovereignty” being infringed upon often went hand and hand with the perpetuation of this trade.
Mamigonian’s study, almost unique in pursuing this angle, supposes that Brazil’s increasingly
nationalistic rhetoric in defending against the British, as well as its submission to British aims
once the circumstances changed, all may have been to defend the institution of slavery as long as
possible. 168 British diplomats can certainly be accused of being heavy handed, if not outright
imperialistic, towards Brazil during this period – however, their motives do not always seem so
dark considering the skeletons in the Brazilian closet.
In short, the Christie Affair is far more complicated than many historians give credit. It is
at its heart a profoundly petty squabble between diplomats who plainly did not like each other,
and a referendum on abolitionism and the power of the nation to exercise territorial sovereignty.
Beginning with the loss of a passenger ship and ending with the echoing of guns over the
Uruguay River, an understanding of the Christie affair is essential to gain a perspective on the
intricate nuances of Anglo-Brazilian relations during the 19th century.
168
Mamigonian, “Building the Nation”, 28.
Denis 57
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