Rational Intentions: A Unified Account
John Brunero
University of Missouri, St. Louis
Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress II, UC-Boulder
(4484 words)
Philosophers writing about the rationality of an agent's intentions often understand
rationality in one of two ways. According to one way, rational intentions are those
intentions an agent has along with beliefs whose truth would provide sufficient reason for
having those intentions. This understanding of rationality is often associated with the
work of Derek Parfit, from whom I'll borrow an example to illustrate the idea: if one
falsely believes the hotel is on fire and intends to jump into the canal, the intention to
jump into the canal is rational, since were the belief true – that is, were the hotel on fire –
one would have sufficient reason to intend to jump into the canal.1 On this understanding
of rationality, when one has no false beliefs, the intentions it is rational for one to have
are just those one has sufficient reason to have. For instance, when one knows that the
hotel is on fire, it is rational, and one has sufficient reason, to intend to jump into the
canal.
According to a second way of understanding the rationality of intentions, rational
intentions are those intentions that do not violate any of the requirements of practical
rationality. Some of the often-discussed requirements of practical rationality include,
very roughly, the requirement to have consistent intentions, the requirement to intend
what one believes to be a necessary means to one's ends, and the requirement to have
those intentions one believes one ought to have.
An intention (or combination of
intentions, or combination of one intention with the absence of another) is said to be
irrational just when one's having it violates one of these requirements of practical
1
rationality. Much philosophical attention has recently been given to the task of coming
up with precise formulations of these requirements, and there has been much debate, in
particular, over the logical scope of "requires" as it figures in those formulations.2
Despite the prominence of each of these ways of understanding the rationality of
intentions, there has been little discussion of how they are related, especially regarding
the question of whether the second way can be explained in terms of the first: can we
explain rational requirements, such as the rational requirements of intention consistency
and means-ends coherence, by considering beliefs whose truth would give us reasons? In
this paper, I'll argue that we can, and that there are some philosophical advantages to
doing so.
§1. The Unified Account
I'll start by briefly explaining in greater detail each of these two understandings of
rationality, and then I'll set forth my account of how the two understandings can be
unified – an account that I will call, unimaginatively, "The Unified Account."
On the first understanding of rationality, rational intentions are intentions held
alongside beliefs whose truth would give us sufficient reason for having those intentions.
But how, on this understanding of rationality, can we account for certain intentions being
required by rationality?
A plausible suggestion, made by Derek Parfit, is that an
intention is rationally required just when one holds beliefs whose truth would give one
decisive reason for having that intention. Parfit writes:
Though reasons are provided by the facts, what it would be rational for us to do
depends on our beliefs. Suppose that we have some set of beliefs, and that what
2
we believe would, if it were true, give us reasons to act in some way. To save
words, I shall call these beliefs whose truth would give us reasons. In most
cases3, some possible act of ours would be rational when we have beliefs whose
truth would give us sufficient reasons to act in this way, rationally required, or
what we ought rationally to do, when these reasons would be decisive...4
On this suggestion, an intention is not merely rational, but also rationally required, when
one has beliefs whose truth would provide not merely sufficient reason5, but also decisive
reason6, to have the intention. Consider some examples. Suppose Andy believes the
hotel is on fire and that there are two equally good escape routes, A and B. Andy's
beliefs are such that their truth would provide him with sufficient reason for intending to
take A and sufficient reason for intending to take B. And, so, it is rational for him to
intend to take A and rational for him to intend to take B. (But it's not rationally required
that Andy intend to take A; he is rationally permitted to intend to take B instead.) Now
suppose Brenna believes that the hotel is on fire and that there is only one safe way out,
A. Her beliefs are such that their truth would provide her with decisive reason to intend
to take A, and, so, it is rationally required that she intend to take A.
Let's now turn to the second understanding of rational intentions, according to
which rational intentions are those intentions that do not violate any of the requirements
of rationality. I'll give some formulations of those requirements of rationality, using
brackets to indicate the logical scope of "requires" in each, and parentheses around the
contents of the beliefs to help with readability:
Intention Consistency (IC): If you believe that (if you will x, you will not y), then
rationality requires that [if you intend to x, then you not intend to y].
3
Means-Ends Coherence (ME): If you believe that (if you will x, then you will
intend to y), then rationality requires that [if you intend to x, then you intend to
y.]7
Believed Decisive Reason (BDR): If you believe that (you have decisive reason to
intend to x), then rationality requires that [you intend to x].8
If these formulations of the rational requirements on intentions are correct, we can see
how to present a Unified Account, according to which these rational requirements would
be part of a more general understanding of rationality according to which rationality is
understood in terms of beliefs whose truth provide reasons. Consider IC. According to
the Unified Account, the belief in the antecedent is one whose truth would provide one
with decisive reason to either not intend to x or not intend to y. So, if one has this belief,
then one is rationally required to either not intend to x or not intend to y. Consider ME.
According to the Unified Account, the belief in the antecedent is one whose truth would
provide one with decisive reason to either not intend to x or intend to y. So, if one has
this belief, then one is rationally required to either not intend to x or intend to y. Lastly,
consider BDR. According to the Unified Account, the belief in the antecedent is one
whose truth would (trivially) provide one with decisive reason to intend to x. So, if one
has this belief, then one is rationally required to intend to x. In this way, the Unified
Account explains these rational requirements as part of the more general understanding of
rationality according to which rationality is understood in terms of beliefs whose truth
provide reasons.
However, these formulations of the requirements of rationality -- IC, ME and
BDR -- should be understood to be prima facie rational requirements (in Ross's sense of
4
"prima facie"9) for if they were understood as all-things-considered rational requirements,
they would be false. Suppose you believe that by taking a certain drug you'll put on a
convincing display of insanity that would certainly frustrate the efforts of some criminal
who is attempting to coerce you, and this would lead the criminal to leave you alone, but
a known side-effect of the insanity-inducing drug is that you will have inconsistent
intentions.10 In that case, all-things-considered, you are rationally required to take the
drug. And it's not true that, all-things-considered, you are rationally required to avoid
having inconsistent intentions.
So, if we understood IC as an all-things-considered
rational requirement, it would be false.11
Additionally, as Michael Bratman points out, there could be "cases of rational
triage in which, given limits of time and attention, one must focus on some proper subset
of threatened violations."12 In such cases, it would be false to say that, for every
threatened violation of IC, one is all-things-considered rationally required to avoid having
inconsistent intentions in that case.
So, we must understand these rational requirements as prima facie requirements.
One advantage of the Unified Account is that it can easily accommodate this fact since
the Unified Account considers the reasons that would be provided by the truth of one's
beliefs. Consider IC. We could say that were one's belief that (if one will x, one will not
y) true, one would have a reason to either not intend to x or not intend to y, and if one has
no other beliefs whose truth would provide a reason which outweighs this reason (such as
a belief that having inconsistent intentions is necessary to deter a criminal, or a belief that
in this situation of rational triage other rational conflicts must be dealt with first) then that
reason would be decisive.
5
So, the Unified Account's explanation of IC is not committed to the strong claim
that the truth of one's belief that (if one will x, one will not y) would provide a decisive
reason to either not intend to x or not intend to y. Rather, it is committed to the weaker
claim that the truth of this belief would provide a reason to either not intend to x or not
intend to y. But even this weaker claim might be controversial. The remainder of the
paper will be devoted to providing a defense of this claim, and the similar Reasons
Claims to which the Unified Account is committed for each rational requirement:
IC-Reasons Claim: If (if one will x, one will not y), then one has a reason to either
not intend to x or not intend to y.
ME-Reasons Claim: If (if one will x, one will intend to y), then one has a reason
to either not intend to x or intend to y.
BDR-Reasons Claim: If one has decisive reason to x, then one has a reason to x.
I won't discuss the last of these three claims since it isn't controversial as it is trivially
true. However, the first two are controversial, and I'll spend the remainder of the paper
setting out a defense of them, the IC-Reasons Claim in §2 and the ME-Reasons Claim in
§3.
§2. The Intention Consistency Reasons Claim
According to the Unified Account's explanation of IC, the fact that one cannot both x and
y provides one with a reason -- usually decisive -- to either not intend to x or not intend to
y. I'll argue for this Reasons Claim by showing how the supposed reason here is quite
similar to the more familiar reasons one has not to intend to x when x-ing is impossible.
6
Consider a case where you intend to x when x-ing is impossible. Suppose you
intend to attend a philosophy conference in Paris on September 2 that, unbeknownst to
you, has been cancelled. In that case, you have a reason not to intend to attend the
conference, and that reason is that you cannot attend.13 In other words, the fact that you
cannot attend is a consideration counting against your intending to attend the conference.
How can we explain why this fact is a consideration counting against your
intending to attend the conference? One usual way of proceeding is not open to us here.
Usually, we can explain why a fact is a reason not to intend to x by showing how that fact
is a reason not to x. (For instance, we can explain why the fact that the hotel is on fire is
a reason not to intend to run into it by showing how the fact that the hotel is on fire is a
reason not to run into it.) But, in this case, attending the conference is impossible, and
because of this, it seems doubtful that there are reasons for and against attending the
conference.
First of all, if there were such reasons, there would be no point in considering or
mentioning them; there's no point in considering or mentioning the pros and cons of one's
attending (except perhaps as a merely theoretical exercise) if one cannot attend. But it
would be odd for an entire set of reasons to be such that there's no point in considering or
mentioning them.
Second, there are certain widely accepted principles concerning the relationship
between oughts and possibility that, if extended to reasons, would pose difficulties for the
claim that there are reasons to attend the conference, and reasons not to attend the
conference, when attending is impossible. For instance, many philosophers accept a
version of an "ought implies can" principle. But, as some have argued, there are also
7
good grounds for a "reasons implies can" principle.14 If this is right, then there are no
reasons for doing something impossible, like attending the conference. Additionally,
many philosophers accept a version of a "possibility of error constraint" on normative
principles, according to which, if one ought to x, then one could fail to x. 15 Suppose we
extend this "possibility of error constraint" to reasons, and say that if there is a reason to
x, then one could fail to x. From this it would follow (since one couldn't fail to not attend
the conference) that it's not the case that there is a reason to not attend the conference. In
summary, if these principles concerning oughts and possibility can be appropriately
extended to reasons, we get the conclusion that there are no reasons to attend the
conference and no reasons not to attend.
Third, the fact that x-ing is impossible seems to provide one with a state-given,
and not an object-given, reason against intending to x. As the distinction is usually
understood, object-given reasons for intentions are provided by facts about the object of
one's intentions, while state-given reasons are provided by facts about one's having that
intention.16 More precisely, object-given reasons for intentions are provided by facts
about what would occur were one's intentions successfully executed. Suppose you intend
to travel to Boulder. Object-given reasons to travel to Boulder are provided by facts
about what would occur were your intention successfully executed: were you to travel to
Boulder, you would enjoy it there, you would thereby keep your promise to be there, etc.,
and these facts are reasons for you to intend to travel to Boulder. State-given reasons to
intend to travel to Boulder, in contrast, would be given by facts about your having the
intention to travel to Boulder. Perhaps having this intention makes you happy. That's a
reason to have the intention. But it is not based on considering what would occur were
8
your intention successfully executed. Rather, it's based simply on consideration of the
benefits of your having that intention. The reason one has against intending to x when xing is impossible is clearly a state-given reason: we are considering the costs of your
having that intention, and not considering some bad consequence that would occur were
(as is impossible) your intention realized.
These three considerations suggest that in our search for an explanation of why
the fact that x is impossible is a reason not to intend to x, we cannot take the usual route
where we explain why a fact is a reason not to intend to x by showing how that fact is a
reason not to x.
I'll suggest another explanation, which I'll call "the State-Given
Explanation." According to the State-Given Explanation, the reason not to intend to x
when x-ing is impossible is a state-given reason, and the explanation of this reason looks
towards the costs involved in one's having this intention.
According to the State-Given Explanation, there are costs in planning for, and
planning around, an intention that cannot be realized. When I intend to attend the
conference in Paris that has been cancelled, I'll likely waste time and energy making
further sub-plans for attending the conference (perhaps making arrangements for travel
and accommodations) and further plans around my being at the conference (perhaps
arranging to meet an old friend for lunch in Paris after the conference). It takes time and
energy to make such plans, and there are likely to be costs involved in undoing them.
Perhaps I'll have to pay a fee in changing the travel bookings, and perhaps my friend's
expectations and plans would be disappointed and disrupted.
Of course, it's true that one could intend to attend the conference without
incurring any such costs.
Perhaps, due to forgetfulness, my intention to attend the
9
conference doesn't lead to any further planning, and no such costs are incurred.
However, so long as one's intention creates a risk of incurring such costs, one has a
reason not to so intend. (Similarly, so long as the hotel's being on fire creates a risk of
one being harmed in some way, one has a reason to exit the building. The fact that it is
possible to stay in the burning hotel and not be harmed doesn't falsify the claim that one
has a reason to leave.) Given the characteristic role that intentions play in our planning, it
seems reasonable to think that intending to attend the conference at least creates a risk of
further planning costs.17 That is the State-Given Explanation of why the fact that x-ing is
impossible is a reason not to intend to x.
The next step in the argument is to show that the reason alleged by the ICReasons Claim is relevantly similar to the reason not to intend to x when x-ing is
impossible. The first similarity is that some fact about impossibility provides a reason:
the fact that one cannot both x and y provides a reason to not both intend to x and intend
to y.
And, as above, it seems unlikely that we'll be able to provide the usual
explanation of why one has a reason to not both intend to x and intend to y. Usually, we
could show how some fact is a reason to not both intend to x and intend to y by showing
how that fact is a reason to not both x and y; for instance, by pointing out what's wrong
with drinking and driving, we can show how one has a reason to not both intend to drink
and intend to drive (at the same time). But, in our case, it's impossible to both x and y,
and so it's doubtful that there are reasons to not both x and y.
And this similarity suggests that a State-Given Explanation would be appropriate:
we can note that the fact that one cannot both x and y provides a state-given reason to not
10
both intend to x and intend to y, and we explain this state-given reason by looking at the
risks of incurring planning costs. Suppose I intend to attend a philosophy conference in
Paris on April 20 and I intend to attend a philosophy conference in New York on April
20. In having these intentions, there's a risk that I'll plan for and around both of these
conferences, perhaps making travel arrangements, or planning to meet up with friends in
both cities. It takes time and energy to make such plans, and there are likely to be costs
involved in undoing them, which I'll have to do. I can avoid such costs by not both
intending to attend the Paris conference and intending to attend the New York
conference. That explains why I have a reason to either not intend to attend the New
York conference or not intend to attend the Paris conference.
In summary, I've argued for the IC-Reasons Claim by showing how the reason
alleged to exist in that case is relevantly similar to the reasons one has not to intend to x
when x-ing is impossible.18
I've also suggested that we could give a State-Given
Explanation of both of these reasons -- an explanation which looks towards the risks of
incurring planning costs.
§3. The Means-Ends Coherence Reasons Claim
Let's start with an example of someone who is instrumentally irrational: Joe intends to
buy a pack of cigarettes, believes that he'll do so only if he intends to buy a pack, but
doesn't intend to buy a pack. Joe violates our requirement ME above. Now let's assume
that Joe's belief -- that he'll smoke only if he intends to buy a pack -- is true. It follows
from the Unified Account that Joe has a reason to either not intend to smoke or intend to
buy a pack. What is Joe's reason? The fact that he cannot smoke without intending to
11
buy a pack. Why is this a reason?
Because having the combination of intending to
smoke without buying a pack is quite similar to intending something impossible: in both
cases, one's intention will not be realized, and, as I noted in the previous section,
intentions involve a risk of planning costs.
On the Unified Account, Joe has a reason -- assume it's decisive -- to either not
intend to smoke or intend to buy a pack. This is compatible with the claim that Joe ought
not to intend to smoke and ought not to intend to buy a pack.19 All we are saying here is
that the combination of intending to smoke and not intending to buy a pack is a
combination that Joe has decisive reason not to have. Nothing follows about which
particular way Joe should escape from having this prohibited combination.
But there is a problem for the Unified Account recently presented by Kieran
Setiya.20 Setiya's primary target is John Broome's early work on rationality. However,
the problem he articulates is also a problem for the Unified Account. I'll call the problem
"the Problem of Unmodifiable Intentions."
Let's suppose that Joe is unable to modify his intention to smoke. As Setiya
describes him, there is no decision he could make that would affect his intention to
smoke.21 Now, according to the Unified Account, Joe ought (or, equivalently, has
decisive reason) to either not intend to smoke or intend to buy a pack. But since Joe
cannot modify his intention to smoke, the only way he can come to do what he ought to
do is by intending to buy a pack. Setiya argues that the conclusion that Joe ought to
intend to buy a pack would follow from a plausible transmission-of-oughts principle,
which he labels
12
Transmission: If you ought to do E, all things considered, and doing M is a
necessary means to doing E, you ought to do M, all things considered, too.22
Here, E would be "either not intending to smoke or intending to buy a pack" and the
necessary means M would be "intending to buy a pack". It thus follows that Joe ought to
intend to buy a pack.
It doesn't seem as though we could respond to this argument by accepting the
conclusion that Joe ought to intend to buy a pack of cigarettes.
Nor do we have
principled grounds for rejecting Transmission, which seems to hold across a broad range
of cases, even cases where E is disjunctive.23
So, if it's false that Joe ought to intend to buy a pack, and Transmission is a sound
principle, then, by modus tollens, we should conclude that it's false that Joe ought to
either intend to buy a pack or not intend to smoke. But the Unified Account entails that
Joe ought to either intend to buy a pack or not intend to smoke. So, we should conclude
that the Unified Account is false.
How should we respond to this objection? I think we should reply by saying that
the requirement ME doesn't apply to Joe. This strategy might initially seem wildly
implausible. After all, surely when Joe fails to intend to buy a pack he is means-ends
incoherent, and when he comes to intend to buy a pack, he comes to be means-ends
coherent. However, we should keep in mind that ME is one particular formulation of
means-ends coherence. I am going to suggest that while ME doesn't apply to Joe, there is
a better formulation of means-ends coherence that does apply to him. Before presenting
that new formulation, I'll start with some observations of how one could be rational with
regard to one's ends even when one cannot modify them.
13
Let's first suppose one cannot modify one's ends but one doesn't know this.
Although one cannot modify one's ends, one can nonetheless try to modify them in some
way -- perhaps by deciding not to smoke. After repeated failed attempts, one might
become aware that there is no way to modify the intention to smoke. Does it now follow
that the only way one could rationally proceed is by coming to intend to buy a pack? No.
One could instead seek to restrain the influence of one's unmodifiable intention. Joe
might, for instance, seek to avoid situations in which he might be inclined to buy
cigarettes, or make sure that he does not form those other intentions (those that are within
his control) that would help him realize his intention to smoke; in other words, he could
rationally respond by restraining the influence of his intention to smoke.24
In light of these observations, we should reformulate means-ends coherence as
follows:
Revised Means-Ends Coherence (RME): If you believe that (if you will x, then
you will intend to y), then rationality requires that [if you intend to x, then you
intend to y], unless you cannot modify your intention to x and don't know this, in
which case rationality requires that [if you don't try to modify your intention to x,
then intend to y], and unless you cannot modify your intention to x and know this,
in which case rationality requires that [if you don't restrain the influence of your
intention to x, then you intend to y.]
The revised formulation is able to take into account the intuitively rational ways of
responding to a state of means-ends incoherence mentioned above. Since in all the
relevant circumstances (when you can modify your intention, when you can't but don't
know it, and when you can't and know it), RME presents a disjunctive requirement, we
14
have no trouble understanding it along the lines suggested by the Unified Account.
Proponents of the Unified Account can say that this requirement applies to Joe without it
following, by Transmission, that he ought to buy a pack.
§4. Conclusion
In summary, I've here presented a way of unifying two approaches to the rationality of
intentions, and presented some initial defense of the controversial Reasons Claims to
which the Unified Account is committed. I'm not sure whether the Unified Account is
ultimately correct, but it seems to be an idea in the theory of reasons and rationality worth
exploring further.
15
References
Bratman, Michael (1987) Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Bratman, Michael (2009) "Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self-Governance" Ethics
199: 411-443.
Broome, John (2000) "Normative Requirements" in Jonathan Dancy, ed. Normativity.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Broome, John (2007) "Wide or Narrow Scope?" Mind 116: 359-370.
Broome, John (2007b) "Is Rationality Normative?" Disputatio 2: 161-178.
Brunero, John (forthcoming) "The Scope of Rational Requirements" Philosophical
Quarterly.
Kolodny, Niko (2005) "Why be Rational?" Mind 114: 509-163.
Kolodny, Niko (2007) "State or Process Requirements?" Mind 116: 371-385.
Lavin, Doug (2004) "Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error" Ethics 114: 424-457.
Parfit, Derek (1984) Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parfit, Derek (1997) "Reason and Motivation" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
71: 99-130.
Parfit, Derek (2001) "Rationality and Reasons" in Exploring Practical Philosophy: From
Action to Values, ed. Dan Egonsson, Bjorn Peterson, Jonas Josefsson, and Toni
Ronnow-Rasmussen. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Parfit, Derek (forthcoming) On What Matters. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Toni Ronnon-Rasmussen (2004) "The Strike of the Demon: On
Fitting Pro-attitudes and Value" Ethics 114: 391-423.
Ross, W.D (1930) The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Schroeder, Mark (2004) "The Scope of Instrumental Reason" Philosophical Perspectives
18: 337-364.
Setiya, Kieran (2007) "Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason" Ethics 117: 649-673.
Smith, Michael (1995) "Internal Reasons" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
55: 109-131.
Streumer, Bart (2007) "Reasons and Possibility" Philosophical Studies 136: 351-384.
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16
Notes
1
Parfit 1997, p. 99.
See, for instance, Broome 2000, Schroeder 2004, Kolodny 2005, §1, Broome 2007,
Kolodny 2007, and Brunero forthcoming.
3
Parfit includes the "in most cases" qualification here because he does not think this
claim is true of our normative beliefs, including our beliefs about what we have decisive
reason to do. See, for instance, the discussion of Scarlet in Parfit, forthcoming, §5.
Discussion of Parfit's concerns here would take us too far afield.
4
Parfit, forthcoming, §1. Parfit, in this passage, is concerned with the rationality of acts,
not intentions to act. But intentions to act would inherit the rationality of acts: if it is
rationally required that Brenna exit by the fire escape -- suppose she believes it's the only
way out of a burning building -- it would also be rationally required that she intend to exit
by the fire escape (since her decisive reasons for exiting by the fire escape would also be
decisive reasons for her intending to exit by the fire escape, were the hotel on fire and the
fire escape the only safe way out).
5
The term "sufficient reason" is used in two different ways within the literature on
practical reasons. According to the more common usage, which is the one employed
here, to have (merely) sufficient reason to x is for x -ing to be permitted, but not required
by the relevant reasons. On this usage, when one has sufficient reason to x, and one does
not x, one need not be acting as one ought not to act. Consider an example: when you
have two equally good choices on the dinner menu, option A and option B, which are
clearly better than any other menu option, you have sufficient reason to order A and
sufficient reason to order B. If you do not order B, because you order A instead, it's not
the case that you are acting as you ought not to act. However, according to a less
common usage of "sufficient reason", for there to be sufficient reason to x is for there to
be some consideration that is sufficient to make it the case that one ought to x. (See
Broome 2007b, p. 163, for an example of this usage of "sufficient reason".) Here, when
one has sufficient reason to x, and one does not x, necessarily, one is acting as one ought
not to act. I will not be using "sufficient reason" this way in this paper.
6
There are two ways there could be decisive reason for one to x. There could be some
consideration that constitutes a decisive reason for one to x. For instance, the fact that
Annie is Carl's daughter constitutes a decisive reason for Carl to care about Annie's wellbeing, and so there is decisive reason for Carl to care about Annie's well-being. Or, there
could be a set of reasons to x which is decisive even though no member of that set is a
decisive reason to x. For instance, there could be two reasons for me to go out to the
concert tonight: my friends will be there, and the music will be excellent. But I could
also stay at home and read tonight. It may be that neither one of these two reasons to go
out, by itself, would tip the scales in favor of going out, but together they do so. So, these
two reasons constitute a set of reasons to go out which is decisive even though no
member of that set is a decisive reason to go out. (Similarly, one could have sufficient
reason to x because there is some reason that constitutes a sufficient reason to x or
because there is some set of reasons to x which would be sufficient -- that is, which
would permit but not require x-ing -- even though no member of that set is a sufficient
reason to x.)
2
17
7
The relevant belief in ME is "if you will x, then you will intend to y," and not "if you
will x, then you will y," in order to avoid the problem of necessary foreseen side-effects.
Suppose I believe, plausibly, that if I travel to London, I'll make use of a mode of
transportation that emits carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. If the antecedent of ME
were to read "If you believe that if you will x, then you will y..." then it would follow
from ME that rationality requires that I intend to make use of a mode of transportation
that emits carbon dioxide into the atmosphere or not intend to travel to London. But
rationality doesn't require this. Rationality does require, however, that if I believe that I'll
travel to London only if I have a certain intention (say, an intention to buy an airplane
ticket to London) then I have that intention or not intend to travel to London. Our
formulation of ME accommodates this point.
8
There are debates about how wide the scope of 'requires' should be in the formulations
of these requirements, particularly whether the formulations should include the relevant
beliefs within the scope of 'requires.' See my note 2 above. I'll assume these
formulations are correct, but will not argue for them, since that is too large a task for this
paper. However, these formulations, I think, are the right kind to interest philosophers
who are attracted to the idea of understanding rationality in terms of beliefs whose truth
provide reasons -- for two reasons. First, such philosophers do not generally place the
relevant beliefs within the scope of "requires." For instance, in the example of Brenna
above, one wouldn't say that she is rationally required to either intend to take exit A or
not believe that exit A is the only way to escape the burning hotel; rather, she is simply
rationally required to intend to take exit A. Second, from the point of view of such
philosophers, wide-scope formulations which include the relevant beliefs within the
scope of 'requires' would seem peculiar. Consider, for instance, (Wide-IC): Rationality
requires that [if you believe (if you will x, you will not y), and you intend to x, then you
not intend to y]. Someone who stands in violation of Wide-IC could come to comply
with it in three ways: by not intending to x, by not intending to y, or by not believing (if
one will x, one will not y). But, critics have objected, this last way does seem to be a
rational response to having inconsistent intentions; it seems, rather, to involve selfdeception or wishful thinking. (For related 'symmetry' objections to wide-scope
formulations, see Schroeder 2004, especially pp. 339-340 and 346-347, who objects to a
similar wide-scope variation on ME, and Kolodny 2005 pp. 514-542, who objects to a
similar wide-scope variation on BDR). Those attracted to first understanding of
rationality would, I think, agree with these critics: while it seems right to say that the
belief that (if one will x, one will not y), if true, would provide one with decisive reason
to either not intend to x or not intend to y, it seems peculiar to say that the belief that (if
one will x, one will not y), if true, would provide one with decisive reason to either not
intend to x or not intend to y or not believe that (if one will x, one will not y.) For it
would be peculiar indeed to say that the truth of a belief would provide one with a reason
not to have that belief or revise one's intentions. Such considerations, I think, would
incline such philosophers towards IC over Wide-IC, and towards the formulations given
here over their wider-scoped counterparts.
9
The distinction between all-things-considered rational requirements and prima facie
rational requirements is meant to parallel Ross's distinction between all-things-considered
obligations and prima facie obligations. See Ross (1930), Ch. 2. Many writers now call
18
Rossian prima facie obligations "pro tanto obligations" to avoid conveying the idea that
that outweighed obligations are "merely apparent" obligations.
10
The example here is a borrowed from Parfit's Schelling's Case. See Parfit 1984, pp.
12-13.
11
Perhaps we could also consider a variation on a far-fetched example from Broome:
suppose that you believe that your having inconsistent intentions would prevent a terrible
war. In that case, you are all-thing-considered rationally required to have those
inconsistent intentions. So, you are not all-things-considered rationally required to avoid
having inconsistent intentions. See Broome 2007b: 163-4.
12
Bratman 2009, p. 413, fn. 7.
13
It might be true, as some have argued, that in coming to believe it is impossible for you
to attend the meeting, you no longer intend to attend the meeting, since intending to x
requires believing x is possible, or, at least, not believing x is impossible. See for
instance, Wallace 2001, p. 20-26. But it is nonetheless true that prior to coming to have
this belief, you had a reason not to intend to attend the meeting, and when you came to
not intend to attend the meeting, you came to comply with this reason.
14
Struemer 2007.
15
For a discussion which helpfully distinguishes several versions of this thesis, see Lavin
2004.
16
See Parfit 2001. This distinction is usually discussed in the context of the wrong kind
of reason problem for fitting attitude theories of value. See especially Rabinowicz and
Ronnon-Rasmussen 2004.
17
For a detailed and influential discussion of the relationship between intentions and
agential planning, see Bratman 1987.
18
Also, we should note the reason one has not to intend to x when x-ing is impossible
will usually be decisive. For if it were not decisive, there would be a weightier reason to
intend to x. But since x-ing is impossible, by a 'reasons implies can' principle, there
would be no object-given reasons to intend to x. And there would be weightier stategiven reasons to intend to x only in the bizarre situations mentioned above in §1.
19
See Broome 2000.
20
Setiya 2007.
21
Setiya 2007, pp. 660-1. Setiya writes: "So long as there is no decision that would
affect my intention to smoke, or my belief about the means to smoking, there is nothing I
can do to change these attitudes." He asks us to "suppose that my intention to smoke is
sufficiently robust that even if I decided not to smoke, the resulting conflict of intentions
would be resolved in its favor: I would still intend to smoke"(661). I'll assume in this
paper that Setiya is right in claiming that this is a plausible description of a way an
agent's psychology might be, and that the norms of rationality, including means-ends
coherence, would apply to this agent and specifically to his unmodifiable intention to
smoke.
22
Setiya 2007, pp. 656 and 660. Setiya's formulation has "should" where I have "ought
to." But nothing hinges on this.
23
To take one example, suppose the building is on fire and I ought to either exit out the
front or out the back. But suppose I can't exit out the front. It follows from Transmission
that I ought to exit out the back, which is the only way I can do what I ought to do.
19
24
The basic idea here should be familiar from other discussions of other umodifiable
attitudes, especially unmodifiable emotions and unmodifiable desires. Consider one
lesson of Michael Smith's discussion of Gary Watson's famous example of the angry
squash player who is unable to modify his anger. See Smith 1995 and Watson 1975, p.
210. The squash player knows that if he goes up to his opponent after losing the match to
shake his hand, he's likely to smash him with the racket, and so he decides to leave
immediately instead. Though he cannot modify his anger, he can seek to restrain its
influence. Similarly, the alcoholic who cannot modify his strong desire for drink can still
seek to restrain its influence, by, for instance, taking the long way home that avoids
passing by bars or liquor stores.
20