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Tunisia’s and Egypt’s Revolutions and Transitions to Democracy
Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy – 12th Annual Conference
George Washington University: Jack Morton Auditorium
Friday, April 15th, 8:30am – 6:30pm
On Friday, the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID) held their 12th Annual Conference
under the theme “Tunisia’s and Egypt’s Revolutions and Transitions to Democracy.” CSID President
Radwan Masmoudi opened the conference by giving special attention to discerning real and fake
stability and development in Egypt and Tunisia.
The first panel, chaired by George Washington University Visiting Scholar and Program Committee
Chair for the event, Radwan Ziadeh, was entitled “The Jasmine Revolution’ and Transition to
Democracy in Tunisia: Why and How?” Jaloul Ayed, the Tunisian Minister of Finance, opened the
panel following a brief introduction by Tunisian Ambassador Mohamed Saleh Tekaya.
Ayed began by noting Tunisia’s history as a trailblazer in the region, as well as the leaderless and
spontaneous nature of the country’s recent revolution. He then plunged into an increasingly detailed
proposal for the way forward. The frame of his argument was that in order to provide the proper
conditions for elections and lay the appropriate platform for democratic debate, the country needed
security and managed expectations. As part of providing these two exigencies, he laid out four
economic area in which action was needed: unemployment, fiscal measures, regional development and
providing for the needy. To address unemployment—which the post-revolutionary slump in tourism
has exacerbated, the government has created 25,000 new public sector jobs and absorbed 20,000
more Tunisians into the armed forces. The Hope Program provides money to recent graduates so
they have “money for cigarettes” among other necessities. The government also seeks to initiate
infrastructure projects, investment and equity funds.
While Ayed’s fiscal measures more focused on the private sector and incentives for investment, he
stressed that financial sector reform by the government was a necessary component. For instance,
there are about 200 microfinance firms in Tunisia operating without a regulatory framework.
Similarly, many private equity firms in the country are currently nothing more than “disguised banks.”
Reforming them will be necessary for providing a “professional grounds for investment. Finally, he
notes that the banks themselves must be overhauled so they can finance projects. Currently, 44% of
Tunisian banks are public, a situation Ayed finds untenable. He also recommended advancing tax
credits without audits to increase liquidity and making Tunisia a capital of Islamic finance,
which he distinguished from Islamic banking. For his last two areas of focus, Ayed proposed welfare
measures to decrease regional disparities and provide necessities. He concluded by noting that the
transitional government does not have the authority to undertake long-term structural reforms.
The panel then turned to Tunisian businessman, Mondher Ben Ayed. The first half of his presentation
focuses on the problems facing Tunisia at this current phase of the transition. The revolution, he said,
exposed Tunisia’s “security myth.” The country has less than a third of the security officers and
soldiers it popularly believed itself it had, about 30,000 in each group. Neither group, Ayed
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proclaimed, are well-trained. Consequently, Tunisia is ill-equipped to police itself or to monitor its
southern border with Libya during that country’s current crisis. Moreover, Tunisian tourism is
down, its foreign direct invest rating has gone down twice since the revolution, it has lost a chief
trading partner and employment source in Libya and has inherited the banking debts of the Ben
Ali family. Ayed stressed, however, Tunisia has strong economic fundamentals such as high literacy,
women in the work force and a vibrant middle class. If economic growth was 5% for the past four
years under corruption, he reasoned, it could potentially hit 8% in the coming years. This said, he
pleaded that Tunisia would need short-term aid to consolidate its democratic gain through 2013.
Beyond economic matters, Ayed addressed political issues toward the end of his speech and during the
Q&A. Because the Finance Minister had to leave early, and because scheduled co-panelist, Samir
Dilou of the Nahda Party could not attend, Mondher Ben Ayed was the only panelist fielding
questions. He commented on the current legitimacy crisis of the government and praised Tunisians for
keeping good faith during the transition. Administratively, he said there has been a decoupling of the
technocrats running day-to-day affairs and the reform committee charged with long-term
political change. There has also been a confiscation committee formed to deal with properties
abandoned by the Ben Ali family upon fleeing the country. He also stated that no political parties are
banned.
The next panel was entitled “The Revolution and Transition to Democracy in Egypt: Why and How?”
The panel was chaired by Abdallah Schleifer of the American University in Cairo and opened with a
presentation by Emad El-Din Shahin of Notre Dame Universtiy. In his academic presentation, Shahin
argued that the Egyptian revolution was the result of a cumulative process of a decade or more. He
traced its origins to 2000 when there was a noticeable shift in the tactics of the opposition. In this
regard he cited the presidential bid of co-panelist Saad Eddin Ibrahim and the formation of the
Kefaya movement. He also described the current uprisings as “demand-based revolutions” where the
aims of the protests intensified with time.
Ibrahim followed with a series of insider anecdotes of the transition. He noted the irony that top regime
officials now inhabit his former prison cell, block six. He shared an anecdote of foreign wife’s
congenial interactions with the Muslim Brotherhood at the protests. The Brotherhood, while
latecomers to the protests, in his assessment provided street-fighting experience that the middle class
protester who began the whole thing did not have. Schliefer added here that Egyptian soccer hooligans
also provided this service. Ibrahim also argued that the internet shutdown caused the protests to triple
in size by causing parents to search for their children, with whom they could not get in touch. He also
praised Omar Affiya who provided tactics to divide the security forces when they blocked the arteries
to Tahrir Square.
Mona Makram-Ebeid of the Egyptian Council of Trustees of the Revolution spoke about the role of
women and the secular character of the protests. She asserted that the younger generation of the
Muslim Brotherhood was more forward-looking.
Nathan Brown of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace focused his presentation on the
two largest political forces in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood and the National Democratic Party
(NDP). With regards to the former, Brown argued that popular concerns are exaggerated because the
Brotherhood had a poor showing in the 2005 elections and will not easily adjust to the new political
realities, namely operating as a political party that can take part in government. The NDP on the other
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hand was a bigger concern, not at the leadership level, but at the lower levels where the political
culture of vote buying and thuggery can be perpetuated.
Stephen Zunnis of the University of San Francisco defended the agency of Egyptian people in the
revolution by dispelling alternative explanations of the events. Based on the order and nature of events,
he dismissed the Egyptian military, the United States, the internet and leftist scholarship as causative
factors of the revolution, leaving only people power to explain it.
Stanford University’s Larry Diamond focused on the effects of electoral systems in Egypt’s
transition. Egypt is currently a highly majoritarian system which favors the local powerbrokers
of the old NDP order of which Professor Brown had spoke. Professor Diamond also pointed out that
electoral systems have a habit of perpetuating themselves since electoral reform committees are
usually composed of those vested in the status quo. He predicted the emergence of a semidemocracy (as opposed to an electoral one) with massive reserve domains of power. He recommended
political party building with a focus on proportional representation lists. Drawing from success in
Iraq, he also called for a more concerted program of civic education. Generally, inclusion should
be a goal during the political transition and a longer-term view should be taken to institution-building,
specifically the judiciary and bureaus concerned with horizontal accountability. Finally, drawing from
examples in Latin America, incremental approaches should be taken to impose civilian control of
the military.
The Q&A highlights centered on Libya. Ibrahim noted that if the democratic movement in Libya
succeeds, there will be a “critical mass” in the region. Diamond stated bluntly that the Libyan
rebels should be provided arms and training at that Egypt is uniquely situated to help.
The third panel, “The impact of the Revolutions on the Arab World - Libya, Syria, Yemen, and
Bahrain,” offered more objective updates on the continuing situations in those countries as opposed to
retrospective analysis. The exception was the presentation by Amina Rasul-Bernardo, Lead
Convener at the Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy, which compared the recent events in the
Middle East to those in the Philippines twenty years ago. Her main contention was that too much
people power can lead to instability, and that a desire to show gains may overshadow the need for
reform. Other presenters on the panel included Radwan Ziadeh, Abdallah Schleifer and Mona
Yacoubian of the United States Institute of Peace.
The penultimate panel, chaired by Daniel Brumberg of the United States Institute of Peace, was
entitled “U.S. Foreign Policy and Democracy Assistance in the Middle East after the Revolutions.”
The first speaker was Tamara Cofman Wittes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
Affairs. Wittes echoed much of what was said by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton several nights
early at the U.S.-Islamic World Conference. The events in the region busted up such ideas as the
necessity of external actors in democracy promotion, as well as the idea that intervention in the region
is either completely altruistic or self-interested. The United States acknowledges that the political
future of these states will be shaped by the people, and may include Islamist actors. Any participant in
the political process however must reject violence and commit to the rules of equality. She emphasizes
that U.S. assistance in the region is more of a mutual partnership than in the past, noting that most
Middle East Partner Initiative (MEPI) grants—the program she administers, are spent through Arab
civil society organizations. She added that rising democratic and economic powers, such as India,
Chile, South Africa and Indonesia, should step up to help the region.
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She was followed by Roland Rich, Executive Head of the Untied Nations Democracy Fund and Carl
Gershman, President of the National Endowment for Democracy, made a series of observations
comparing Egypt to Indonesia. Gershman also echoed comments made earlier in the day about the
exaggerated threat of the Muslim Brotherhood and the mutually supporting role of political reform and
economic development.
The subsequent presentations by George Washington University’s Marc Lynch and Brookings- Doha
Center’s Shadi Hamid sparked effectively evolved into a debate about the Obama administration’s
policy that continued through the Q&A. Lynch argued while it is too soon to speak of a transition to
democracy, the empowerment of publics is the touchstone event of the past few months in the regions.
Consequently, the administration was wise not to overplay U.S. leadership. Hamid, on the other
hand, pointed out that the U.S. never appears “ahead of the curb” in supporting democracy
movements in the region. Here, he contrasted the Obama administration to Bush’s push during the
2005 Arab Spring. He concluded that the Arab anger with the U.S. will always be more visceral than
with other nations because it expects more of American leadership.
Both Hamid and Lynch warned of painting too rosy a picture of the popular movements. Lynch
pointed out that foreign policy issues will ultimately return to their grievances. Hamid explored the
topic in more detail, citing his own eyewitness the xenophobic character of the protests, a University of
Maryland/Gallup poll which showed a large number of Egyptians had illiberal views regarding the sale
of alcohol and the punishment of thieves and adulterers.
In the Q&A Wittes, Lynch and Rohl offered counters to Hamid’s critique of Obama’s Middle East
foreign policy. Wittes defended U.S. policy as the power of the Egyptian and Tunisian examples is
their indigenousness. Rohl defined being “ahead of the curb” in foreign policy as following principle.
Being so in any other way, he argued, constitutes conspiracy. On this point, Hamid conceded content
should the administration simply “not be behind the curve.” Lynch took issue with Hamid’s “Bush
nostalgia,” arguing that the more forceful imposition of policy in countries such as Iraq led blowback
from which the United States reputation is still recovering.
The final panel, “Building Real and Genuine Democracies in the Middle East & North Africa,”
featured Dennis Ross, Special Assistant to the President, and senior director of the Central Region at
the National Security Council, Congressman Keith Ellison (D-MI), and Zalmay Khalilzad, Former
Representative of the United States to the United Nations. Ross reflected the White House’s position in
the same matter as Wittes did earlier in the conference, taking cues from Secretary Clinton’s Tuesday
speech. He summed up the administration’s approach as “sometimes we take a rhetorical posture, and
sometimes we act.” With regards to Bahrain, he warned that, as a general rule, continued repression
will not leave for the possibility of a political outcome. In a related remark, he chastised Iran for
attempting to exploit sectarian tensions in the region and called its taking credit for the Arab revolts as
“the height of chutzpah.” During the Q&A, Ross was questioned for his allusion to Iranian, and not
Saudi, intervention in Bahrain.
Ellison limited his talk to three broad policy recommendations for the region. He characterized U.S.
policy as being simplistic due to its preoccupation with oil, Israel and terrorism. He called for
enriching connection with the region through broader commercial ties, supporting more democratic
allies in the region and creating more public diplomatic connections. He also took a moment to
applaud CSID’s Masmoudi for his role in fostering Tunisia’s democratic transition.
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Khalilzad stressed stability in his policy-focused presentation. On the electoral front this entails
fostering a level playing field. Diplomatically, it means encouraging our “autocratic friends” to
undertake reform and remembering the regional balance of power.
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