The President and Finnish People: the Head of State as Linkage in a
Non-Transitional Semi-Presidential System
David Arter
From Duverger’s pioneering work onwards, there has been widespread recognition that
countries with semi-presidential constitutions operate in very different ways (Elgie 2009:
261) and that not all semi-presidential regimes are the same. Indeed, in light of the very
diversity of political practice, the debate among comparativists has increasingly centred
on the nature and utility of the semi-presidential concept as a distinct regime type.
Shugart and Carey (1992) distinguish between ‘premier-presidential’ and ‘presidentparliamentary’ variants of semi-presidentialism – based on an ordinal scaling of the
legislative and non-legislative dimensions of presidential power – whilst Roper (2002)
among others has noted the existence of sub-types within the premier-presidential subtype. Siaroff (2003: 307) goes further to argue that, whilst a semi-presidential system can
be defined conceptually, “there is no such thing as a semi-presidential system when
viewed through the prism of presidential power” (both formal and factual).
Semi-presidentialism is a hybrid regime type and so, too, is the ‘electoral authoritarian
regime’ which combines democratic and non-democratic characteristics and is located
somewhere between transitional democracies and outright authoritarian systems.
According to Ekman (2009: 7-31), post-Soviet Russia is a case of electoral
authoritarianism, although elsewhere it is categorised as a presidential-parliamentary.
(Shugart 2005) Problems of definition and classification aside, there has been widespread
recognition that the number of semi-presidential systems has grown and that semipresidentialism may have a particular salience during periods of transition from
authoritarian regimes to pluralist democracy. (Sartori 1994; Bahro, Bayerlein and Veser
1998: 201-224) Elgie and Moestrup’s (2008) edited volume, focusing on the impact of
semi-presidentialism on democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe, includes chapters
on no less than twelve countries – Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Moldava, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.
The Finnish case is interesting because of 1) the longevity of semi-presidentialism. Until
2000 Finland had the oldest semi-presidential constitution in Western Europe dating back
to 1919 (the contemporary Weimar constitution survived only until Hitler’s Third Reich).
Unlike the post-communist states of central and eastern Europe, therefore, Finland is
plainly a non-transitional semi-presidential system. 2) Until the new millennium, Finland
had a notably strong form of semi-presidentialism. Duverger (1980) ranked Finland
highest among the West European semi-presidential systems in terms of the formal
powers of the head of state and second only to France in respect of the actual exercise of
presidential power. 3) Finnish semi-presidentialism has demonstrated considerable
resilience, surviving the adoption of a new constitution in 2000 which in turn represented
the culmination of a reform process beginning in the 1980s. Moreover, a striking feature
of Finnish semi-presidentialism is the contrasting ways in which it has operated ‘parliamentary-like’ for much of the inter-war period, ‘presidential-like’ during much of
the Cold War. (Nousiainen 2000) It is not necessarily to accept his terms none the less to
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note that Siaroff (2003: 307-308) has referred to Finland as a ‘parliamentary system with
a presidential corrective’ between 1919 and 1956, a ‘parliamentary system with
presidential dominance’ between 1956 and 1994 and since 2000 as a “parliamentary
system with an essentially figurehead presidency”.
Case-studies of semi-presidentialism have tended to concentrate on three main areas.
First, they have focused on intra-executive conflict and/or the president’s relations with
the prime minister and government. Typically, Protsyk defines intra-executive conflict as
“political confrontation between president and prime minister over the control of the
executive branch of government”. (Protsyk 2006: 219) Second, they have analysed the
president’s role in the policy process. For example, Neto and Lobo (2008: 250) argue that
the policy role of the Portuguese president has never been marginalised to the point of it
becoming more exact to refer to a parliamentary system and that the strengthening in the
prime minister’s power has been more at the expense of cabinet ministers than the head
of state. They conclude that presidents have remained important in policy-making, not
least because of their use of the presidential veto and power of dissolution. (Neto and
Lobo 2008: 234-255) A third line of inquiry, albeit not confined to semi-presidential
systems, has been work seeking to assess the impact of the method of election on the
head of state in parliamentary systems with presidents. Thus, a general finding in Tavits’
wide-ranging comparative survey (Tavits 2009) is that the greater legitimacy deriving
from direct election does not betoken a greater degree of active presidential involvement
in politics and policy-making. Curiously, however, there is no mention of the Finnish
case where there was a shift from indirect to direct presidential elections in the early
1990s.
In any event, this paper concentrates not on intra-executive dynamics, the presidential
impact on policy-making or the method of electing the head of state but rather on the
somewhat neglected relationship between the presidency and the people – that is, the
linkage function of the presidency. It examines the degree of popular support for semipresidentialism and, by extension, the legitimacy of the institution of the presidency in a
long-established semi-presidential system. The starting point is the observation that since
the 2000 constitution significantly reduced the powers of the presidency, popular backing
for a strong president has grown, whilst public confidence in the presidential office has
considerably exceeded that for the government and parliament and vastly surpassed
confidence in political parties.
The study poses two central questions. The background to the first is an interview in
August 2008 with the Speaker of Parliament, Sauli Niinistö – a strong presidential
candidate in 2006 – in which he insisted that “it is of great democratic value that the
people take presidential elections so seriously. The way the institution of the presidency
is perceived – that is, the popular belief in the office – would be undermined by a
wholesale reduction in the president’s powers”. i Whilst not spelt out, Niinistö’s thrust
was clear: there would be a democratic cost involved in engineering a shift from semipresidentialism to a figurehead presidency – a cost inter alia in terms of loss of
legitimacy, diminished electoral participation and reduced trust in political institutions.
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Accordingly, the first question is: Do popular attitudes suggest that the institution of the
presidency enhances the legitimacy of the political system?
The backdrop to the second research question is evidence from extensive voter surveys in
1975 and 1991 indicating that supporters of what Elgie (2009) refers to as ‘president-like
semi-presidentialism’ – that is, those persons ready to grant the head of state still more
[albeit unspecified] power – have had a distinct socio-political profile. Pesonen and
Sänkaho (1979: 441-443) concluded on the basis of the 1975 study that politically
engaged persons and those with a high level of subjective competence were prepared to
strengthen the position of parliament whereas alienated, passive citizens wanted to vest
more power in the president. The same authors, together with Sami Borg (Pesonen,
Sänkiaho and Borg 1993: 516-518) came to a similar conclusion in the 1991 election
survey. University-educated and senior white-collar personnel strongly supported
increasing the power of the parliament whereas workers, housewives and the unemployed
favoured more power to the president. Since then, constitutional reform has reduced the
power of the president whilst the proportion of survey respondents wanting to return to
something approximating the status quo ante has been in the order of one-third.
Consequently, our second research question is: Has the social structure of support for
semi-presidentialism changed and support for a strong president broadened to
incorporate other than low status, low competence groups? Before discussing our
methods and presenting the central hypothesis, however, a contextualising section,
tracing the changing contours of semi-presidentialism since the achievement of Finnish
independence, is in order.
From Neo-Czarism Towards a Ceremonial Presidency?
Whilst the Grand Duchy of Finland in the nineteenth century has been aptly described as
an ‘internally independent state’ (Jussila 1989: 88) – it possessed an administrative
apparatus with autonomous tax-raising powers and a developed legal system – ultimate
federative, executive and legislative powers were vested in the Russian Czar. The
collapse of Czarism and the achievement of full national sovereignty in December 1917
was the prelude to the enactment of a constitution which, ironically, bestowed on the
president of the new Finnish republic many of the prerogatives previously exercised by
the Czar. The president was empowered to direct relations with foreign states, nominate
governments, introduce and ratify laws, dissolve parliament and make a wide range of
appointments (including university professors). Following the non-socialist government’s
unilateral declaration of Finnish independence, Finland descended into civil war over the
early months of 1918 (won by the White bourgeois forces) and the dual executive
enshrined in the new constitution represented a victory for the political Right, which saw
in a strong president a bulwark against the radical ramifications of a future leftistcontrolled legislature. In 1916 the Social Democrats had gained an absolute majority of
parliamentary seats, the only time to date that any party has done so.
The Czar had not played an active role in day-to-day domestic Finnish politics – his
representative was the Governor-General – and neither for the most part did the Finnish
president during the inter-war period. The prime minister led the government and the
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foreign minister assumed primary responsibility for foreign policy management. The
rules were semi-presidential but the practice was essentially that of parliamentary
government, although in the 1930s P.E.Svinhufvud used the authority of the presidential
office successfully to meet the challenge of the neo-fascist Lapua movement. Designed to
act as a counterpoise to a possible threat from the radical left, the status of the presidency
was enhanced in response to the challenge from the radical right.
The significantly greater de facto power of the presidency between the Second World
War and the early 1980s – that is, during most of the Cold War – was not the
consequence of a change in the constitutional rules. Rather, it was the product of three
primary factors: a party system that, until the mid-1960s, did not facilitate stable
government; the pivotal role of the president in promoting and maintaining amicable
relations with Moscow; and the absence until 1994 of presidential term limits, which
enabled the long-serving Urho Kekkonen (1956-81) to build up a considerable power
base. In many aspects, political practice during the later part of Kekkonen’s tenure of
office was unquestionably more ‘presidential’ than envisaged by the 1919 constitutionmakers and it was concern not to risk replicating some of the excesses of the Kekkonen
era that provided the impetus for a convoluted process of constitutional change
culminating in the adoption of a new form of government that came into force on March
1, 2000.
The 2000 constitution was enacted in circumstances very different from the Cold War.
The federative focus was now largely on the European Union (EU), which Finland joined
in 1995, rather than the (moribund) Soviet Union. The need for the personalised
resolution of crises in Finno-Soviet relations, which had been largely instrumental in
enhancing the power of the post-war presidency, was replaced by the need to adapt to
new rules and develop cross-national networks with a view to exerting influence across
the entire spectrum of Union policy. In the process, the dividing line between ‘traditional’
foreign policy and European policy became blurred.
The executive focus had shifted from periods of short-lived crisis governments during
Kekkonen’s tenure of office - governments which were in practice accountable to the
president rather than parliament - to a post-Kekkonen era marked by highly stable, broadbased coalitions. The need for presidential intervention in managing government crises,
often by appointing non-parliamentary ‘caretaker cabinets’, appeared a thing of the past.
Complementing this development there was a transition from the contingent party system
of the Cold War era, when exogenous veto players [the president and Moscow] formed
institutional barriers to office-seeking parties [at varying times, the Social Democrats,
Conservatives and populist Finnish Rural Party] to a convergent party system
distinguished by high accessibility to office and stable governments with an ‘anything
goes’ character. (Arter 2009: 221-239)
Against this backdrop, the 2000 constitution was intended to propel Finland from a semipresidential more towards a system of parliamentary government. Baldly stated, the
positions of the government and particularly the prime minister – who was charged with
the direction (co-ordination of the national preparation) of European policy – were
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strengthened at the expense of the president who could no longer determine the identity
of the prime minister and the composition of cabinets or unilaterally dissolve parliament.
Paloheimo (2003: 236) expressed the conventional wisdom: “as a result of the
parliamentarization of the Finnish constitution, the prime minister has become the
effective executive head”. Finland under the 2000 constitution none the less remains a
semi-presidential system on the basis of Elgie’s minimal definition (Elgie 2004) and
possibly too Duverger’s stipulation that the president should possess ‘quite significant
powers’. As Saraviita has noted, “almost all the president’s powers remained in the new
constitution, although they were effectively tied to prior decisions of the government or
an individual minister”.
The president no longer exercises exclusive federative powers but still directs foreign
policy, albeit in co-operation with the government (article 93) – a unique arrangement
among the EU countries (Raunio 2008: 251) - and remains Supreme Commander of the
Defence Forces. The president is no longer involved in the coalition-building process or
the nomination of prime ministers, but retains a formal involvement in the legislative
process, ratifying laws at the formal [and usually brief] ‘presidential sitting’ of the
Council of State [government] on Friday mornings. Furthermore, whilst the president no
longer appoints governments (except in the strictly formal sense), she retains executive
powers in relation to the nomination of senior ministry officials, the Governors and Board
of the Bank of Finland, the Chancellor of Justice and Finland’s EU ambassador in
Brussels. In addition, since 1994, the head of state has been directly elected in a Frenchstyle, two-round ballot and the six-year presidential term – a maximum of two
consecutive terms is permitted – has compared with the four-year term of parliament and
facilitated considerable continuity through the presidential office.
Curiously, barely a decade after the enactment of the 2000 form of government,
constitutional reform, especially in relation to the powers of the presidency, remains high
on the political agenda. A working group led by the former minister, Christoffer Taxell,
is due to report with recommendations for change in September 2009. The consensus
among the Finnish political science ‘establishment’ has broadly favoured further
‘parliamentarisation’. Advocates of abolishing the institution altogether (Wiberg 2007:
225-239) have emphasised the lack of the president’s accountability to parliament; others
(Anckar 2000: 13) have argued that since the constitutional constraints mean that the
president can never again be powerful, there is no point in persisting with direct
presidential elections. It has also been noted (Raunio and Wiberg 2008: 587) that in
practice the president concentrates on promoting foreign trade and what is left of socalled ‘traditional foreign’ policy – that is, Finland’s relations with countries outside the
EU that are not handled by the EU. Accordingly, making foreign policy direction the sole
preserve of the government would reinvigorate political practice by preventing parties
hiding behind the ‘joint management’ mantra. (Raunio 2008: 260-261)
Senior cabinet ministers have also favoured a reduction – or at very least clarification –
of the president’s powers. Tuija Brax (Greens), the minister of justice, has proposed
removing the office of Supreme Commander of the Defence Forces from the president’s
portfolio. Jyrki Katainen (Conservatives), the minister of finance, has stated that the
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compromise (Arter 1999: 62) agreed between the former prime minister Paavo Lipponen
and the former president Martti Ahtisaari (1994-2000) has facilitated the strictly
unconstitutional practice of the president (in addition to the prime minister) regularly
attending EU summit meetings. Indeed, apart from Niinistö, the Eduskunta Speaker (cited
earlier) and the present head of state, Tarja Halonen, the first female president, those
defending the existing powers of the president have come mainly, if not exclusively, from
members of the public. The basic line has been that when politicians initiate
constitutional reform in the name of parliamentarism and representative democracy, they
mean in practice the power of political parties and the consolidation of party democracy.ii
Methods and Hypothesis
On the basis of the 2006 presidential election survey, Heikki Paloheimo (2007) placed
respondents into three groups in accordance with i) their perception of the
appropriateness of the power of the president and ii) their attitude towards who should
bear primary responsibility for the direction of foreign policy. ‘Supporters of
parliamentarism’ comprised those respondents who agreed with the statement that the
direction of foreign policy should be shifted to become the remit of the prime minister
and government and disagreed with the proposition that the power of the president in the
decision-making system should be strengthened. ‘Supporters of semi-presidentialism’
were those respondents who favoured reinforcing the power of the president and opposed
transferring foreign policy direction from the president to the prime minister and
government. There was then an intermediary group.
This paper seeks to go beyond Paloheimo to distinguish supporters of two types of semipresidentialism. Supporters of Duverger-style semi-presidentialism comprise those
persons in favour of returning to the president those significant powers held under the
1919 constitution whereas supporters of status quo semi-presidentialism consist of those
persons broadly content with the current prerogatives of the president. Supporters of
parliamentarism in contrast are those who want a reduction in the present powers of the
head of state and their transference to other political actors.
Two primary data sources are used. The first is the biennial survey of Finnish Social
Values and Attitudes conducted since 1984 by the Finnish Business and Policy Forum
EVA. These provide valuable longitudinal evidence of changing attitudes towards the
overall powers of the president. Thus, since 1984 respondents have been asked whether
they agree/disagree with the statement that “the powers of the president have been
reduced too much in Finland” whilst the 2006 EVA survey solicited opinions on the
proposition that “the president’s power at the moment is too great, about right or too
little”. Clearly, whilst responses may be regarded as indicative, these two ‘power
questions’ are rather nebulous and permit only a crude approximation of the relative
support for semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism. In many ways a more useful dataset (albeit with the caveat that one poll does not necessarily make a thesis) is the state
broadcasting company YLE News’ internet panel survey on the presidency in February
2009. These data allow us to distinguish supporters of Duverger-style semipresidentialism – a head of state with “quite significant powers” – from status quo semi-
6
presidentialism – the current limited powers – and also to analyse popular perceptions of
the presidency along three power dimensions – that is, the federative, executive and
legislative.
Supporters of Duverger-style semi-presidentialism (DSSP) are presumed to be
respondents answering in the affirmative to the following seven statements (all based on
powers held by the president under the 1919 constitution), all but one taken from the
YLE survey.
Federative dimension
• “the president should direct foreign policy independently of the government”
(article 33 of the 1919 constitution)
• “ the president’s foreign policy power should be increased in order to ensure
continuity in Finland’s line” (EVA 2007-08 survey)
Executive dimension
• “the president should have the right to nominate the prime minister independently
of parliament”
• “the president should determine the composition of governments”
• “the president should have the right to dissolve parliament independently of the
government”
Legislative dimension
• “the president should have the right to introduce legislation into parliament
independently of the government”
• “the president should have the right to veto a bill passed by parliament”
Relative support for DSPP can then be analysed across all three dimensions using a
range of standard variables, among them gender, age, occupation, education, income,
region and partisan preference. Proceeding from the aforementioned work of Pesonen
and Sänkiaho (1979) and Pesonen, Sänkiaho and Borg (1993) the hypothesis tested is
that
Support for Duverger-style semi-presidentialism will vary inversely with
socio-economic position: the lower the social status, the higher the level
of support for a strong president whereas backing for parliamentarism
will rise with social class.”
The Social Structure of Semi-Presidentialism
Before addressing this hypothesis though, we need to return to our first research question,
namely do the views of the public at large suggest that the presidency as an institution
contributes to increasing the legitimacy of the political system? There is of course no
simple response and no simple measure of legitimacy. The EVA survey data, however,
do nothing to discourage the tentative conclusion that as the linkage function of political
parties has declined (Webb 2005: 633-650), the presidency has provided a not
insignificant alternative channel for connecting and mobilising the citizenry The case
could be presented in three stages. First, the desire for strong leadership could be seen as
an historic and intrinsic part of the Finnish political culture and for at least some sections
of the population the president has met that need. This authoritarian element in the
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Finnish political culture – a deference to [those in] authority - is perhaps reflected in the
fact that in the EVA surveys between 1992 and 2004, an average of 68.6 per cent of
respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that ‘Finland needs strong
leaders who can restore order, discipline and respect for proper values’. In this
connection, Matti Klinge has insisted that “we [Finns] have a natural need for a leader;
the desire to make one individual prominent. When a crisis crops up there is a need for
greater national unity and the prime minister is only the chairman of one party. It is not
enough”.iii The inference is that as a pouvoir neutre - above the clash of competing party
factions – the president has greater legitimacy than other political actors.
Second, and on this last point, the survey evidence reveals that public confidence in the
present president has surpassed that for other political institutions, particularly political
parties. In 2009 (Haavisto and Kiljunen 2009: 37), 63 per cent of Finns had ‘very much’
or ‘much’ confidence in Tarja Halonen compared with 41 per cent in the case of
parliament, 39 per cent the government, 21 per cent the EU and 14 per cent political
parties (table 1).
Table 1 here
Third, whilst many Finns are critical of the democratic process and, by implication,
experience a generally low sense of political competence, the introduction of direct
presidential elections has allowed voters a greater opportunity to influence the result than
in parliamentary elections. In the EVA surveys covering the period 1988-2009, an
average of only 20.3 per cent of respondents were in complete or partial agreement with
the proposition that ‘democracy functions so well in Finland that talk of citizens having
only poor prospects of exerting influence lacks foundation’ compared with an average of
59.3 per cent who disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement (Table 2). However,
in contrast to parliamentary elections, where the absence of party system bipolarisation
and competing alternative ‘blocs’ (as say in Sweden or Norway) has denied Finnish
voters a clear choice of governing coalitions, presidential elections, especially at the twocandidate, run-off stage, afford voters the opportunity directly to influence the result.
Significantly, since the 1980s turnout at presidential elections has been consistently
higher than in parliamentary elections. In the three presidential contests since the shift to
a French-style double ballot system in 1994 (until 1988 an electoral college system along
American lines was used), turnout at the first round of presidential voting has surpassed
turnout at the four general elections between 1995 and 2007 by an average 8.3 percentage
points and at the second round by an average 10.5 percentage points (table 3).
Tables 2 and 3 here
Presidential elections serve a variety of functions. They allow the smaller parties valuable
media coverage with which to profile their leaders and policies. An effective presidential
campaign will not prevent small-party candidates being eliminated after the first round of
voting but may lead to an electoral bonus for the party at a subsequent general or local
election. Presidential elections also challenge the candidates of the larger parties to attract
support beyond their core electorates. This is particularly so at the second round of voting
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when the field is reduced to two candidates. Third, in conflating the personal and
partisan, presidential elections generate public interest notwithstanding the reduced
powers of the head of state. If institutional legitimacy is assessed purely through the
ballot boxes, the turnout at presidential elections would reinforce the survey evidence that
there is broad popular support for the office. Moreover, in view of the widespread
disillusion with the democratic process, there appears empirical backing for Niinistö’s
claim that “it is of great democratic value that the people take presidential elections so
seriously”.
Indeed, when assessed on the two ‘power questions’ in the 2006-2007 EVA survey, there
is support for Paloheimo’s conclusion (2007: 223-224) – based on the 2006 presidential
election questionnaire – that “among the population at large [my italics], semipresidential government is at least as favoured an institutional arrangement as a
parliamentary system, possibly even more so”. As table 4 demonstrates, an average of 30
per cent of respondents held that the president had too little power – the highest rate since
the EVA surveys began – and this was over four times more than those who believed the
president had too much power. There were higher figures than the national average for
respondents in the ‘too little power’ category among blue-collar workers, senior whitecollar workers, students, pensioners and the unemployed; cohorts at either end of the age
spectrum (it was particularly high at nearly one-half among first voters); and those
supporting the Social Democrats, Left Alliance and True Finns. It cannot be assumed that
those responding that the president had too little power necessarily favoured a return to
the prerogatives the head of state possessed under the 1919 constitution – that is, they
were DSPP supporters. None the less over 90 per cent appeared satisfied with semipresidentialism at least in its existing form – namely, status quo semi-presidentialism. In
short, even with their inherent limitations, the survey data on presidential power clearly
indicate that the political elites pushing to create a ceremonial presidency are out of step
with public opinion.
Table 4 here
EVA and Paloheimo do not distinguish between types of semi-presidentialism nor do
they differentiate dimensions of presidential power. Earlier we identified a number of
questions covering the federative, executive and legislative spheres of presidential power
which, when answered in the affirmative, could reasonably be construed as indicating
backing for the restoration of the former competencies of the head of state. The results
are set out in tables 6-11. When viewed from the perspective of currently the most
controversial facet of the president’s activities, there appears strong support for an ‘article
93 presidency’ or the present situation in which the president directs foreign policy in cooperation with the government. Virtually 4:5 respondents rejected a return to an ‘article
33 presidency’ in which (as before 2000) the president has exclusive responsibility for
directing relations with foreign states. There was also strong backing for the existing
executive and legislative powers of the president. Only in relation to two questions did
support for status quo semi-presidentialism fall below three-fifths of respondents.
Fractionally under the latter figure opposed the restoration of the president’s right to
dissolve parliament without working through the government whilst, remarkably, under
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half objected to reinstating the president’s right to introduce legislation into parliament.
Overall, across the three power dimensions, however, over two-thirds (66.8 per cent)
opposed changes to the existing prerogatives of the head of state.
On the basis of the YLE survey data it would appear that only a minority of Finns favour
[a return to] DSSP, although support for it varied in relation to the three power
dimensions. Approximately one-fifth of respondents favoured an article 33-style
presidency, approaching one-third supported the president’s right to appoint the prime
minister, just over two-fifths her right to dissolve parliament and well over a half the
president’s right to introduce legislation without reference to the cabinet. It is important
not to attach too much significance to these figures, especially as in the same YLE survey
an overwhelming nine out of ten persons expressed satisfaction with the existing
arrangement in which foreign policy is conjointly managed. The average support for
DSSP across the federative, executive and legislative dimensions worked out at 31 per
cent and it is probably safe to surmise, therefore, that a minority of between one-quarter
and one-third of Finns would not be averse to returning to a presidency with the type of
“quite significant powers” that prompted Duverger to place Finland on top of the table of
semi-presidential regimes based on the constitutional powers of the head of state.
We hypothesised earlier that support for DSSP would vary inversely with socioeconomic position and that the lower the social status, the higher the level of support for
a strong president. The evidence suggests there is indeed a marked socio-political bias
among the minority of Finns supporting DSSP. As tables 6-11 demonstrate, there was
consistently above-average levels of support for increasing the federative, executive and
legislative powers of the president from those persons with only a basic schooling or
technical college training, those in blue-collar jobs and among supporters of the Social
Democrats, Left Alliance and populist True Finns. In contrast, there was on, or belowaverage levels of DSSP support from those passing the school matriculation examination,
those with further/higher education qualifications and among supporters of the two
leading non-socialist parties, the Conservatives and particularly the Centre. The ‘middle
class’ category is admittedly heterogeneous, including office personnel,
experts/consultants, those in senior management posts and entrepreneurs. Voters for the
ethno-regionalist Swedish People’s Party, the mouthpiece of the national language
minority, also registered above-average support for DSSP. But the tendency for
supporters of DSSP to derive disproportionately from those with relatively low levels of
formal education, employed in work with a relatively low socio-economic status (or
indeed those out of work) who back one of the two traditional working class parties
(Social Democrats and Left Alliance) stands out from the data.
Of the other variables, gender appears of only minor significance but there is an
interesting ‘age effect’ in relation to the legislative and several of the executive powers of
the president. Support for granting the president the right to introduce bills independently
of the cabinet and veto laws already passed by parliament declined with age – it was
highest among the under-35 age-cohorts and lowest among those over 65 years. The same
was true in respect of the president determining the composition of governments, the
differential between the youngest age-group (18-24 years) favouring the idea and the
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oldest (65-74 years) was as much as seventeen percentage points. Yet this was
emphatically not the case in relation to an ‘article 33 presidency’ since the lowest level of
support for the idea that the president should direct foreign policy, as in the 1919
constitution, came from those respondents under 35 years. In the EVA surveys,
moreover, the ‘age effect’ has tended to work in reverse: the greatest support for a
stronger president has come from the oldest age-cohorts. For example, there was a
substantially higher level of agreement than the national average from persons over 51
years for the statement that the power of the president has been reduced too much and the
same was true in relation to the proposition that the president’s foreign policy power
should be increased so as to ensure continuity in Finland’s line (table 5).
Reliable indicators of support for parliamentarism are hard to come by because the
question must signify, implicitly or explicitly, a reduction in the current powers of the
head of state. Two questions in the surveys do so. 1) ‘the president should be [remain]
Supreme Commander of the Defence Forces’ (YLE) 2) ‘the prime minister should direct
Finnish foreign policy instead of the president (EVA). On the first, there were slightly
higher-than-average levels of disagreement - that the president should remain Supreme
Commander - among academically educated persons, those over 65 years and supporters
of the two leading non-socialist parties. On the second, one-third of respondents
acquiesced in the view that the prime minister should bear exclusive responsibility for
foreign policy management, the strongest support emanating from farmers (and members
of the agricultural producers’ organisation MTK), entrepreneurs, university graduates,
Centre and Conservative voters. Responses to two questions do not provide a substantial
body of empirical support for the claim that parliamentarism rises with social status.
However, those respondents with an academic education, middle class occupation,
relatively high income and non-socialist partisanship do appear most likely to favour a
further reduction in the powers of the president.
Discussion
The survey data do not indicate that there is a strong, popular demand for a return to
Duverger-style semi-presidentialism in Finland – that is, the pre-2000 situation of a head
of state with ‘quite significant powers’. In the EVA 2006-2007 survey, just over one-third
of respondents disagreed that the powers of the president had been reduced too much –
and over one-quarter found it ‘difficult to say’ – whilst in the same EVA poll
approaching two-thirds believed that the current powers of the president are ‘about right’.
There was also a very even split (EVA 2006-2007) on strengthening the federative
powers of the president, with 31 per cent of a different view. In other words, a persuasive
case could be made for status quo semi-presidentialism in relation to grassroots’
perceptions of the powers of the president.
It is also probably safe to conclude that, whilst constitutional reform is not a high saliency
issue for most citizens – and there is a lack of systematic evidence about their knowledge
of existing constitutional arrangements – between one-third and two-fifths of Finns
appear strongly opposed to moves towards further erosion in the president’s powers.
Popular backing for a strong president has grown since the 2000 constitution and the
11
proportion of respondents stating that the president has too little power almost doubled
between the late 1980s and 2006. Between 1984 and 1990 an average of 15.8 per cent
held that the president had too little power compared with 30.3 per cent in 2006. The
latter figure was six times greater than the proportion believing that political parties had
too little power, nearly five times higher than the figure for the government and almost
twice the proportion holding that parliament had too little power. iv
We noted earlier that the minority of Finns supporting Duverger-style semipresidentialism exhibited distinct class, party and generational characteristics. There was
above-average level of support for a strong presidency among blue-collar workers and
economically marginal groups – the unemployed and pensioners – voters for left-wing
parties – the Social Democrats and Left Alliance – and, paradoxically, among the
youngest and oldest age-cohorts. Some of the left-wing bias can doubtless be explained in
terms of association with, and support for the present incumbent, Tarja Halonen, who was
the joint candidate of the Social Democrats and Left Alliance in 2006. It is ironic that,
historically the advocates of a purely parliamentary executive, the Social Democrats
currently oppose any steps further to undermine the powers of the head of state.
The higher-than-average level of support for a strengthened presidency among the older
age-groups in the EVA data can probably be understood by reference to their political
socialisation during the long years of the Kekkonen presidency. Kekkonen gained
widespread respect as a ‘crisis manager’ – especially in defusing crises in Finno-Soviet
relations – and as a ‘consensus builder’ – building broad-based governments, which
included the radical left. He also presided over a period of strong economic growth, the
transformation from a primary-based to a post-industrial economy and the development
of an advanced Scandinavian-style welfare state. For many Finns, Kekkonen’s
authoritarian-style presidency, and, in the 1970s in particular the stultifying intellectual
climate associated with ‘Finlandization’ (Arter 2008: 282-287), were far less important
than the fact that he was seen to deliver security and prosperity.
Support for DSSP among first voters and the under-35 age-cohorts in the YLE survey is
more difficult to interpret, particularly when, for the post-Kekkonen generations of
politicians, much of the impetus towards constitutional reform has derived from a
concern to avoid replicating the worst features of a Kekkonen-style presidency. Turnout
at parliamentary elections has been markedly lower among younger voters than the
national average and it could conceivably be that their higher-than-average support for
reinvesting the president with a range of former legislative and executive powers reflects
a diffuse anti-party, anti-government protest and a feeling that, with more power, the
president could achieve the simple, effective and expeditious solutions needed during a
period of deep economic recession.
The evidence of a blue-collar, low-status tendency in the support for DSSP suggests a
clear response to our research question about whether the social structural backing for
Duverger-style semi-presidentialism has expanded to incorporate a broad cross-section of
the population. This does not seem to be the case, although the extent of the class bias
should not be exaggerated. Whether assessed subjectively – self-assigned class – or on an
12
occupational basis, one-third of those in the upper middle class category in the EVA
2006-2007 survey – managing directors, senior white-collar employees etc – concurred
with the view that the power of the president had been reduced too much. There was also
marginally greater than average support for the statement in the same poll that the
president has too little power from senior white-collar staff - that is elements of the upper
middle class.
Finally when combining the proportions of those who “completely disagreed” with the
assertion that the powers of the president have been reduced too much (8.7 per cent),
those holding that the president has too much power (7.3 per cent) and those in “complete
disagreement” that the federative power of the president should be increased in order to
ensure continuity in Finland’s line (7.5 per cent), it seems fair to conclude that under 10
per cent of Finns favour a purely ceremonial presidency. The politicians and political
science establishment are out of line. There may be only minority support for Duvergerstyle semi-presidentialism but the body of the public appears to favour status quo semipresidentialism on an ‘if it ain’t broke why fix it?’ basis. The fact is that since the 2000
constitution removed many of the president’s powers, support for a strong head of state
has grown and, although strongest in, is by no longer confined to low-status, lowcompetence groups.
13
Notes
i
‘Ei siitä mitään tule’ Helsingin Sanomat 20.12.2008
On the need for an open discussion of the ground rules of parliamentarism, see Jari Peltola and Timo. J.
Tuikka, ‘Parlamentarismin peli säännöistä käytävä laaja kansalaiskeskustelu’ 16.4.2009
iii
Cited in Blåfield, V. ‘Oletteko nähneet tasavallan presidenttiä?’ Nyt-liite/Helsingin Sanomat 24/430/42009, 6-10
iv
Not only is there significant popular support for strengthening the federative role of the presidency but in
the YLE survey no les than 81 per cent of those questioned would elevate the president to direct EU policy,
albeit in co-operation with the government. ‘Suomalaiset haluavat vahvan presidentin’ YLE Uutiset/Talous
ja politiikka 6.4.2009 http://www.yle.fi
ii
14
TABLES
Table 1. ‘How much confidence do you have in the following actors?’
Present
President
Parliament
Present
Government
Environmental
Groups
National Civil
Service
Trade Unions
Citizens’
Organisations
EU
Employers’
organisations
Political Parties
Very Much
18
Much
45
Difficult to Say
12
Quite Little
15
Very Little
9
4
5
37
34
15
22
35
28
8
11
5
31
27
28
9
3
32
34
25
6
4
3
31
25
30
43
26
23
9
6
2
2
19
16
27
41
33
31
18
10
1
13
22
45
19
Adapted from Haavisto and Kiljunen 2009: 37
Table 2 ‘Democracy functions so well in Finland that the talk of citizens having only
poor prospects of exerting influence is without foundation’
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2009
Completely
Agree
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
4
4
3
Broadly
same view
18
14
13
15
15
15
17
18
21
18
20
Cannot
say
25
18
17
18
18
19
16
22
24
23
23
Somewhat
different view
36
39
41
42
41
41
43
39
38
42
41
Strongly
disagree
17
26
24
21
23
22
20
18
13
13
12
Source: EVA/Yhdyskuntatutkimus 2009: 48
15
Table 3 Turnout at Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, 1994-2007. Percentages.
1994
1995
1999
2000
2003
2006
2007
Average
Presidential 1st
Round
82.2
76.9
73.9
77.7
Presidential 2nd
Round
82.3
80.2
77.1
79.9
General Election
71.9
68.3
69.7
67.9
69.4
Table 4 ‘The President’s power at the moment is too great, about right or too little?’
Total Population
Men
Women
18-20 years
21-30 years
31-40 years
41-50 years
51-60 years
61-70 years
In Leading Positions
Senior white-collar workers
Lower white-collar workers
Blue-collar workers
Entrepreneurs
Agricultural entrepreneurs
Students
Pensioners
Unemployed
Centre
Social Democrats
Conservatives
Left Alliance
Greens
Swedish People’s Party
Christian Democrats
True Finns
Too Much About Right
7
62
10
59
4
66
4
51
3
70
5
68
8
63
6
59
12
58
8
70
10
60
6
70
4
61
6
70
17
67
3
62
11
57
8
56
10
64
4
57
15
65
2
62
5
69
0
73
8
79
10
52
Too Little
30
31
30
45
27
27
29
35
29
22
31
24
35
24
17
34
32
37
26
39
20
36
25
28
13
38
sum
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
N
1855
859
996
49
259
311
343
448
398
77
199
250
502
130
30
116
421
79
255
309
333
97
154
40
53
52
Source: EVA/Yhdyskuntatutkimus 2006-2007
16
Table 5 ‘The President’s foreign policy power should be increased in order to ensure
continuity in Finland’s line”
Agree Difficult to say Disagree sum N
Total population
34
35
31
100
1165
Men
32
30
39
100
599
Women
36
40
24
100
566
18-25 years
28
46
27
100
94
26-35 years
25
47
27
100
157
36-45 years
25
39
35
100
181
46-55 years
32
33
34
100
225
56-65 years
40
30
30
100
316
Over 65 years
46
23
31
100
156
In leading
16
32
53
100
200
positions/senior whitecollar workers
Lower white-collar
32
44
24
100
139
workers
Blue-collar workers
41
38
22
100
269
Entrepreneurs
32
29
39
100
114
Students
20
48
34
100
65
Pensioners
46
29
25
100
268
Unemployed
50
35
15
100
26
Centre
17
39
44
100
158
Conservatives
20
24
57
100
207
Social Democrats
57
29
14
100
197
Left Alliance
59
26
15
100
46
Greens
25
46
30
100
101
True Finns
44
35
21
100
71
Pro-EU
26
32
43
100
Anti-EU
42
35
23
100
Pro-NATO
19
23
58
100
Anti-NATO
42
34
24
100
Source: EVA/Yhdyskuntutkimus 2007-2008
17
Table 6. ‘The President to direct foreign policy independently of the government’
Yes
21
All respondents
Gender
Men
Women
Age
18-24
25-34
35-49
50-64
65-79
Yes
22
19
Yes
14
17
23
21
21
Class
Blue collar
Middle class
Pensioners
Others
No
79
No
78
81
No
86
83
77
79
79
Yes
26
19
21
15
sum
100
sum
100
100
sum
100
100
100
100
100
No
74
81
79
85
Education
Primary/middle school
Technical school
Student exam
College education
University education
Vote intention
Social Democrats
Conservative
Centre
Left Alliance
Swedish People’s Party
True Finns
Christian Democrats
Greens
Others
Cannot say
Will not vote
N
2011
N
1046
964
N
162
196
456
716
481
sum
100
100
100
100
Yes
32
31
15
17
13
Yes
32
14
9
34
28
31
23
12
22
20
37
No
68
69
85
83
87
No
68
86
91
66
72
69
77
88
78
80
63
N
360
813
567
190
Sum
100
100
100
100
100
Sum
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
N
231
452
248
592
488
N
330
397
340
135
69
116
62
179
18
326
38
18
Table 7 The president to nominate the prime minister independently of parliament
Yes
30
All respondents
Gender
Men
Women
Age
18-24
25-34
35-49
50-64
65-79
Yes
29
31
Yes
31
35
37
27
27
Class
Blue collar
Middle class
Pensioners
Others
No
70
No
71
69
No
69
65
63
73
73
Yes
39
29
26
28
sum
100
sum
100
100
sum
100
100
100
100
100
No
61
71
74
72
Education
Primary/middle school
Technical school
Student exam
College education
University education
Vote intention
Social Democrats
Conservative
Centre
Left Alliance
Swedish People’s Party
True Finns
Christian Democrats
Greens
Others
Cannot say
Will not vote
Yes
35
24
18
43
37
36
31
27
39
34
50
N
1046
964
n
162
196
456
716
481
sum
100
100
100
100
Yes
37
40
27
27
23
N
2011
No
63
60
73
73
77
No
65
76
82
57
62
64
69
73
61
66
50
N
360
813
567
190
Sum
100
100
100
100
100
Sum
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
N
231
452
248
592
488
N
330
397
340
135
69
116
62
179
18
326
38
19
Table 8 The president to dissolve parliament independent of the government
Yes
41
All respondents
Gender
Men
Women
Age
18-24
25-34
35-49
50-64
65-79
Yes
42
39
Yes
40
41
45
40
37
Class
Blue collar
Middle class
Pensioners
Others
No
59
No
58
61
No
60
59
55
60
63
Yes
48
40
37
33
sum
100
sum
100
100
sum
100
100
100
100
100
No
52
60
63
67
N
2011
N
1046
964
n
162
196
456
716
481
sum
100
100
100
100
Education
Primary/middle school
Technical school
Student exam
College education
University education
Yes
47
52
31
40
33
No
53
48
69
60
67
Vote intention
Social Democrats
Conservative
Centre
Left Alliance
Swedish People’s Party
True Finns
Christian Democrats
Greens
Others
Cannot say
Will not vote
Yes
45
35
23
50
41
56
36
45
57
47
58
No
55
65
77
50
59
44
64
55
43
53
42
N
360
813
567
190
Sum
100
100
100
100
100
Sum
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
N
231
452
248
592
488
N
330
397
340
135
69
116
62
179
18
326
38
20
Table 9 The President to determine the composition of governments
Yes
17
All respondents
Gender
Men
Women
Age
18-24
25-34
35-49
50-64
65-79
Yes
15
20
Yes
27
22
19
18
10
Class
Blue collar
Middle class
Pensioners
Others
No
83
No
85
80
No
73
78
81
82
90
Yes
25
17
10
23
sum
100
sum
100
100
sum
100
100
100
100
100
No
75
83
90
77
Education
Primary/middle school
Technical school
Student exam
College education
University education
Vote intention
Social Democrats
Conservative
Centre
Left Alliance
Swedish People’s Party
True Finns
Christian Democrats
Greens
Others
Cannot say
Will not vote
Yes
19
12
9
26
28
27
15
12
17
22
42
N
1046
964
n
162
196
456
716
481
sum
100
100
100
100
Yes
21
22
20
15
13
N
2011
No
79
78
80
85
87
No
81
88
91
74
72
73
85
88
83
78
58
N
360
813
567
190
Sum
100
100
100
100
100
Sum
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
N
231
452
248
592
488
N
330
397
340
135
69
116
62
179
18
326
38
21
Table 10 The President to introduce legislation into parliament independently of the
government
Yes
56
All respondents
Gender
Men
Women
Age
18-24
25-34
35-49
50-64
65-79
Yes
54
58
Yes
81
73
63
50
44
Class
Blue collar
Middle class
Pensioners
Others
No
44
No
46
42
No
19
27
37
50
58
Yes
66
55
45
71
sum
100
sum
100
100
sum
100
100
100
100
100
No
34
45
55
29
N
2011
N
1046
964
n
162
196
456
716
481
sum
100
100
100
100
Education
Primary/middle school
Technical school
Student exam
College education
University education
Yes
55
55
67
56
51
No
45
45
33
44
49
Vote intention
Social Democrats
Conservative
Centre
Left Alliance
Swedish People’s Party
True Finns
Christian Democrats
Greens
Others
Cannot say
Will not vote
Yes
55
53
45
64
66
65
54
56
65
62
68
No
45
47
55
36
34
35
46
44
35
38
32
N
360
813
567
190
Sum
100
100
100
100
100
Sum
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
N
231
452
248
592
488
N
330
397
340
135
69
116
62
179
18
326
38
22
Table 11 The President to have the right to veto a law passed by parliament
Yes
23
All respondents
Gender
Men
Women
Age
18-24
25-34
35-49
50-64
65-79
Yes
22
24
Yes
34
32
28
19
18
Class
Blue collar
Middle class
Pensioners
Others
No
77
No
78
76
No
66
68
72
81
82
Yes
32
21
18
28
sum
100
sum
100
100
sum
100
100
100
100
100
No
68
79
82
72
Yes
29
33
25
19
15
Vote intention
Social Democrats
Conservative
Centre
Left Alliance
Swedish People’s Party
True Finns
Christian Democrats
Greens
Others
Cannot say
Will not vote
Yes
30
17
9
29
37
35
26
21
30
26
37
N
1046
964
n
162
196
456
716
481
sum
100
100
100
100
Education
Primary/middle school
Technical school
Student exam
College education
University education
N
2011
No
71
67
75
81
85
No
70
83
91
71
62
65
74
79
70
74
63
N
360
813
567
190
Sum
100
100
100
100
100
Sum
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
N
231
452
248
592
488
N
330
397
340
135
69
116
62
179
18
326
38
23
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