behaviour guidelines
in changing Armenian society
CULTURE, VALUES, BELIEFS:
BEHAVIOUR GUIDELINES IN CHANGING
ARMENIAN SOCIETY
NARINE KHACHATRYAN, SONA MANUSYAN
AND
ASTGHIK SEROBYAN
NVARD GRIGORYAN
ANNA HAKOBJANYAN
Yerevan-2014
UDC 316.6
Approved for publication by the Scientific Council of the Faculty of
Philosophy and Psychology, Yerevan State University
Khachatryan N., Manusyan S., Serobyan A., Grigoryan N., Hakobjanyan A.
Culture, values, beliefs: behaviour guidelines in changing Armenian society.
Yerevan, 2014: 140 pages.
The book is based on a socio-psychological analysis of values, beliefs, and certain behaviour
patterns formed against the backdrop of current socio-cultural changes in Armenian society.
The authors trust that the problem analysis and the findings presented herein will be of interest
to scholars and students of social science as well as policymakers.
ISBN 978-9939-0-0997-1
© Academic Swiss Caucasus Net (ASCN), 2014
© Yerevan State University, YSU, 2014
© Khachatryan N., 2014, Manusyan S., 2014,
Serobyan A., 2014, Grigoryan N., 2014, Hakobjanyan A., 2014
This study was conducted with the support of the Academic Swiss Caucasus Net
(ASCN). ASCN is a programme aimed at promoting the social sciences and
humanities in the South Caucasus (primarily Georgia and Armenia). Its different
activities foster the emergence of a new generation of talented scholars. Promising
junior researchers receive support through research projects, capacity-building training
and scholarships. The programme emphasizes the advancement of individuals who,
thanks to their ASCN experience, become better integrated in international academic
networks. The ASCN programme is coordinated and operated by the Interfaculty
Institute for Central and Eastern Europe (IICEE) at the University of Fribourg
(Switzerland). It was initiated and is supported by Gebert Rüf Stiftung.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the opinions of Gebert Rüf Stiftung and the University of Fribourg.
The research project ‘Values, Beliefs, and Social Behaviour:
Dynamics and Specifics in Modern Armenian Society’ was
conducted by a research team of the Chair of Personality
Psychology of Yerevan State University during the 2011-2013
period.
Research Team
Narine Khachatryan, Associate Professor, PhD in Psychology
Sona Manusyan, Assistant Professor, PhD in Psychology
Astghik Serobyab, PhD student
Nvard Grigoryan, PhD student
Anna Hakobjanyan, PhD student
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am first of all grateful to the Academic Swiss Caucasus Net (ASCN), without
whose support this research would not be possible. I would also like to thank the
international experts from the ASCN for their advice and recommendations in
conducting the study and preparing this publication.
I also appreciate the support of the Yerevan State University (YSU)
administration and the dean of YSU Philosophy and Psychology Faculty, Aleksan
Baghdasaryan.
I am especially grateful to YSU Philosophy and Psychology Faculty professors
Svetlana Harutyunyan, David Amiryan, and Naira Mkrtchyan, as well as all the other
colleagues who have helped with their valuable advice. I also appreciate the voluntary
participation of our students in this research.
I express my deep gratitude to the specialists who conducted the focus groups
and interviews, including the members of Socioscope NGO, as well as the research
participants for their time and opinions. I also want to thank all those people in the
regions who helped us to organise the process of survey and focus groups.
Finally, I want to express my gratitude to the research team—the staff members
of the YSU Chair of Personality Psychology and Personality and Social Context Lab
Sona Manusyan, Astghik Serobyan, Nvard Grigoryan, and Anna Hakobjanyan, as well
as to volunteering participants Anush Mkrtchyan and Meri Grigoryan for the
interesting and creative work that we performed together.
Narine Khachatryan
Research Team Leader
CONTENT
FOREWORD.................................................................................................................9
CHAPTER 1
CULTURE AS A VARIABLE OF SOCIAL PROCESSES
Discrepancies in Conceptual Definitions of Culture: Theoretical and Practical
Aspects.....................................................................................................................12
Social Change and Culture: Parallel and Converging Paths....................................18
CHAPTER 2
SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO STUDYING CULTURAL
VARIABILITY
Quantification of Cultural Syndromes: From One-Dimensionality to
Multidimensionality.................................................................................................25
The Formation of Cultural Syndromes: Combining the Multilevel and
Dynamic-Situational Approaches............................................................................31
CHAPTER 3
VALUE ORIENTATIONS, BELIEFS, AND BEHAVIOUR ATTITUDES IN
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SPHERES: STUDY RESULTS IN
ARMENIA
Overview of Political and Economic Developments in Armenia: Background
Analysis....................................................................................................................35
Research Methodology............................................................................................40
Value Orientations in Armenia: Comparative Analysis by Region, Gender,
and Age.....................................................................................................................46
Main Conclusions....................................................................................................53
Cultural Aspects of Social Axioms: Results of Factor Analysis ............................54
Findings of the Social Axioms Survey in Armenia...........................................54
Development of the Armenian Questionnaire of Social Axioms......................57
Values and Beliefs Predicting Political and Economic Behaviour:
Results of Regression Analysis................................................................................61
Political Behaviour Patterns and Attitudes.....................................................62
Economic Behaviour Patterns and Attitudes...................................................68
Main Conclusions............................................................................................75
Guidelines for Economic and Political Behaviour in Armenia:
Qualitative Analysis......................................................................................................76
Ambiguity in the Rules of the Game and a Sense of Uncertainty ..................77
Mistrust............................................................................................................81
Low Predictability of the Future and Uncertainty in Perspective...................84
Social Injustice Belief.......................................................................................85
Family as a Point of Departure and Reference ...............................................87
Double Determination Theories of Well-Being................................................89
Economic Self-Efficacy ....................................................................................93
Universalist Beliefs of Entrepreneurs...............................................................94
Importance of Fate (Fortune) ..........................................................................96
Lack of Ideological Basis in Political Behaviour.............................................97
Personalised Perception of Politics..................................................................99
Fear of the New and Scepticism of Change.....................................................100
Growing Civil Consciousness and Reflexive Judgements................................102
CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................104
REFERENCES...........................................................................................................107
APPENDICES............................................................................................................115
Appendix 1. Questionnaires..........................................................................................115
Appendix 2. Theoretical model of relations among motivational types of
values……………………………………………………………………………….....123
Appendix 3. Comparative Percentages of Political Behaviour Indicators.....................124
Appendix 4. Comparative Percentages of Economic Behaviour Indicators..................133
FOREWORD
Today’s Armenian reality is reminiscent of a mosaic in which it is difficult to grasp a
clear portrait of society. Armenian society is discussed extensively and described in
differing ways: there are divergent and contradictory discourses on the country—from
extreme nationalist to radical constructivist views. Despite differences in emphasis or
interpretation, common concerns exist: much of the social analysis (whether in
sociology, cultural studies or economics) reveals particular problems in the value
system of society. The formation and transformation of the value system are
influenced by a number of domestic and external socio-political and cultural factors,
which are visibly reflected in the beliefs of the youth—the segment of society that is
the most sensitive to changes.
The culture—or the accepted practices and mindsets in a society—influences
the economic and political structure and processes. Change is accompanied by inertial
elements of cultural resistance and reproduction. Needless to say, the modernisation
process is not linear; rather, it has been known to be an asymmetric and volatile
process affected by sociocultural experiences of society resulting in unique manifesttations in various countries. Moreover, change is not tantamount to development.
Placing Armenian society in a particular conceptual framework is difficult because
some areas are developing, whereas others are ‘thrown back’ relative to past
experience. What description is appropriate? Is this a developing, transforming,
transitioning, modernising, or post-Soviet society, or would we need another
description? Rather than attempting to classify this society, this paper examines the
substantive traits of the belief-value system in present-day Armenia. Social change is
the result of not only political and economic macro-change but also its reflection in
society’s consciousness and behaviour, thus revealing a psychological dimension.
Social change is manifested in and through the beliefs, actions, and relationships of
individuals.
This study does not aspire to cover the entire spectrum of issues related to social
change. The goal was to understand the socio-psychological profile of an individual
who is constructing his or her ‘private’ reality in the economic and political reality of
modern Armenia. This research is an attempt to produce an interconnected and
9
dynamic picture of value orientations, beliefs, and behaviour trends from the
standpoint of their individual bearer.
The book is based on the results of the ASCN-funded research project ‘Values,
Beliefs, and Social Behaviour: Dynamics and Specifics in Modern Armenian Society’
conducted in 2011-2013.
This study contains theoretical and research parts. The theoretical part consists
of two chapters. The first chapter, titled ‘Culture as a Variable of Social Processes’,
seeks answers to conceptual questions regarding the role of culture in social change
processes, the interconnection between a country’s culture and its political and
economic systems, and whether culture should be viewed as a determinant or as an
outcome of social processes. The first chapter focuses on the conceptual definitions of
culture, with particular emphasis on divergent interpretations of culture in the
scientific and public discourse. The first chapter also examines the interconnection
between the cultural value system and social change in a sequential and
interdependent process in which the key traits of sociocultural change have been
identified.
The second chapter, titled ‘Socio-psychological Approaches to Studying
Cultural Variability’, was aimed at analysing the various approaches in psychology
that may be employed to define and study the psychological dimensions of cultural
change. The strengths and limitations of the dimensional approach were analysed in
the context of the individualism-collectivism cultural syndromes. The different ways
of studying cultural syndromes in cross-cultural and cultural psychology were
examined, with a focus on the latest trends. In our theoretical analysis, we also showed
that modern studies of cultural syndromes are not confined to the dimensional
approach, and multilevel and dynamic-situational models are also applied in these
studies to reveal the dynamic nature of cultural syndromes.
The third chapter, titled ‘Value Orientations, Beliefs, and Behaviour Attitudes in
Political and Economic Spheres: Results of a Study in Armenia’, presents the findings
of the research. The chapter opens with the background analysis of the recent politicaleconomic developments in Armenia, combining external evaluations from the
perspective of global development and local assessments of internal developments.
The second section of the chapter presents the research methodology. The goal
of the research was to study value orientations and beliefs against the backdrop of
sociocultural change occurring in Armenia as well as their influence on political and
economic behaviour. A theoretical model of the interconnection of socio-psychological and socio-cultural factors of behaviour regulation was developed as the choice
of methodology and for the interpretation of the findings of the survey. This section
also presents the research methods and instruments. The third section presents the
results of the survey of value orientations, including the differences between the
capital city and the regions, as well as gender and age group specificities. The fourth
10
section presents the results of the factor analysis of social axioms, which assists in
developing an understanding of the specificities of intracultural beliefs in Armenian
society. The fifth section presents the results of the regression analysis, which helps to
capture the value orientations and beliefs that influence political and economic
behaviours and attitudes. This section also discusses how specific indicators of
political and economic behaviour are manifested in different demographic groups. The
sixth section contains the findings of the qualitative survey and analyses the valuenormative and belief guidelines of economic and political behaviour.
The book concludes by underlining the main findings of the study, including the
value orientations, beliefs, and political and economic behaviour patterns that are
typical of Armenian society today.
The authors trust that the problem analysis and the findings presented herein
will be of interest to scholars and students of social sciences as well as policymakers.
11
CHAPTER 1
CULTURE AS A VARIABLE OF SOCIAL PROCESSES
Discrepancies in Conceptual Definitions of Culture:
Theoretical and Practical Aspects
Culture is discussed in the current public and academic discourse as an important
variable for understanding society’s macro (economic and political) and micro (sociopsychological) processes. Comprehending the function of culture becomes more
important in the context of modernising societies involving a conflict between the
culturally delineated and historically shaped social order embedded in tradition and the
global social order resting on the open-society model.
Cultural studies have relied on a variety of methodological principles. Hence,
definitions of culture are diverse and even contradictory at times. Studies of
sociocultural change in recent decades have further complicated the definition and
understanding of culture1.
Despite the conceptual differences, the shared opinion is that culture is not
invariant and is changing, albeit slowly. The contemporary scientific interpretation of
culture refers to the changing nature of culture founded upon the principle of
historicity. This premise is virtually unquestioned. A more contentious issue relates to
the universal versus local nature of culture—whether and to what extent development
patterns of different cultures are similar or unique in terms of their underlying
historical-cultural processes. This discussion began in the early 20th century and
remains relevant to this day, albeit with different emphases.
1
For different definitions of culture, see the discussions, for example, in the following works:
Sewell, William H., Jr. 1999. The Concept(s) of Culture. In: Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn
Hunt (eds.) Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture. (pp.
35-61) Berkeley: University of California Press; Ly, Anh 2006. The (F)utility of a Culture
Concept? Conceptualizations of ‘Culture’ From Evolutionism to Post-Modernism, NEXUS 19,
185-211.
12
In cultural anthropology, there are two scholarly traditions pertaining to this
matter—the theory of social evolutionism and the theory of historical particularism—
which considerably influenced subsequent studies of culture and society.
Drawing an analogy with species evolution patterns, proponents of social
evolutionism believed that societies and cultural forms change from more simple to
more complex forms of civilisation (for example, the transition from animism to
polytheism, followed by monotheism). In parallel, human behaviour is also changing,
from instinctive to learned behaviour, in line with the linearity of history (Morgan
(1877) 2010; Tylor (1873) 2010). This strictly evolutionary approach now has more
historical significance; however, being supplemented with Marxism theory, it has
influenced subsequent approaches explaining social progress. The new approaches
(such as cultural materialism and cultural ecology) view culture as a means of
adapting to the environment and efficiently utilising resources (White (1959) 2010).
According to these views, societies differ in terms of their cultural capital for materialtechnical and social progress. Such approaches overcome the idea of the linear
development of societies, instead substantiating the principle of nonlinear, variative
development conditioned by a society’s productivity, technical advancement, and
natural conditions (Steward 1990).
The proponents of historical particularism believe that each culture is formed in
specific social and geographic conditions through adaptation mechanisms and as a
result of historical events (Stocking 1966; Goodenough 1996). Each culture can be
considered equally self-sufficient in terms of meeting the needs of its members, and in
this sense, each culture strives to maintain its integrity. This school of thought implies
that there are no objective criteria for ranking cultures and revealing an evolutionary
development path and that each culture should be understood on its own merits in the
context of its specific history. This notion is the principle of cultural relativism, which
has left an important intellectual legacy for the theory of anthropology. In cultural
relativism, change is explained through the diffusion and acculturation of cultural
patterns as a result of intercultural exchanges.
This concept led to the development of other approaches to studying culture,
which primarily examined specific cultural configurations (such as patterns of cultural
traits, types or areas) (Benedict 1997; Mead 1988; Benedict (1934) 2010; Mead (1928)
2010). The application of the principle of cultural relativism essentially turns culture
into a variable that must be considered in understanding current sociocultural
processes.
These two opposite approaches to the culture phenomenon have brought about
corresponding methodologies, which are known as etic and emic studies. However,
these contradictions are no longer as acute, as contemporary research has reconciled
them.
13
Another significant area of understanding culture is associated with the
influence of functionalism. Rather than discussing the development, diffusion, or
historicity of cultures, these approaches addressed the functions of cultural artefacts in
meeting the basis needs of members of society (Malinowski 1998) and maintaining the
structure of social relations (Radcliffe-Brown 2001). Culture is viewed as a
comprehensive system with a structure that has the function of self-regulating and
maintaining a balance in the social system. Based on this concept, culture is studied
through different cultural institutions and their functions (such as family, religion,
education, law, and economic systems). This approach began to view culture in close
connection with society, facilitating empirical and applied research. As functionalism
addressed the dynamic processes of social development, these principles evolved in
idiosyncratic paths in future concepts based on either evolutionism or cultural
relativism and even succeeded in moderating the antagonism between them.
In more contemporary approaches to the study of culture, the focus has shifted
from cultural artefacts (material and ideal) to the peculiarities of how the bearers of
such culture perceive and comprehend such artefacts, create symbolic meaning or
transmit them through social practices. Such studies primarily develop symbolicinterpretative (Geertz 1973), post-structuralist (Bourdieu 2005), and cognitive
approaches (Bruner 1977; D'Andrade 1984). Based on a combination of various
contemporary interpretations of culture, certain features can be identified for
understanding culture:
 Culture is expressed in learned behaviour patterns (forms) and cognitions.
 Culture exists in and through material and ideological (spiritual) artefacts, and
in this sense, it is intentional.
 Culture is a symbolic and semantic space that is conventionally shared by the
members of a particular society.
 Culture is expressed through formal and informal practices embedded in
cultural and social institutions.
Without dwelling on each of these interpretations and recognising the
methodological peculiarities of each approach, it would suffice to say that these
interpretations prioritise not the cultural artefacts per se but rather the context in which
they are created and the symbols through which they are objectified. For example, a
study could focus on the culture-specific structure of thought and language, beliefs,
cognitive schemes, and processes, social practices, conventional behaviours, and the
prevailing explanations of their meaning. These approaches implicitly contain the
psychological dimension of understanding culture as well because the subject becomes
important in the process of creating cultural artefacts. Culture is no longer an objective
reality that can be understood post factum; it exists in the subject’s cognitive process,
it is expressed as a result of the mutual interaction between the subject and the social
structure, and it should be studied by examining these interaction mechanisms. For
14
example, Lizardo, summarising his analysis and understanding of Bourdieu’s works,
concludes that ‘<…> our conceptualisation of how individuals become skillful
members of a culture must be consistent with a psychological (bottom-up) account of
learning and conceptual development’ (2011: 6).
The inclusion of the psychological dimension in the understanding of culture
allows the adoption of a new approach to the issue of the universal versus local nature
of culture and understanding the level at which to seek universality and the level at
which to seek difference and variation (Norenzanyan and Heine 2005). The
perspective of socio-cultural psychology allows for studying cultural processes at the
level of the individual bearer; this psychological analysis is not an end in itself but
rather is aimed at gaining an in-depth understanding of the social, cultural, and group
phenomena reflected in the beliefs and behaviours of individuals. The macro-process
measurement indicators cannot fully explain the social processes because by the time
they ‘reach behaviour’, they lose their causal force as a result of a number of other
factors that occur in the middle. Thus, cultural psychology allows for refinements and
adjustments of the highly generic judgements regarding cross-cultural differences and
for observations of multiplicity, tensions, and asymmetries in cultural change. In
particular, the sociocultural-psychological approach relies on the assumption that
individuals and their ‘social worlds’ are inseparable and mutually constitutive (Heine
2008; Markus and Kitayama 1991; Shweder 1990) and that the existing value-belief
system forms institutions and everyday practices that subsequently create
preconditions or ‘cultural affordance’ for the manifestation and reinforcement of such
values (Kitayama 2002). Thus, the socio-cultural psychological approach is based on
the belief that people and their social reality are interdependent and should thus be
analysed in combination. According to Shweder, the aim of cultural psychology ‘is to
imaginatively conceive of subject-dependent object (intentional world) and objectdependent subject (intentional person) interpenetrating each other’s identities <….>’
(Shweder 1990: 25).
In his analysis of the role of cultural psychology in contemporary social studies,
Valsiner (2012) concludes that it provides a novel view of how the macro and micro
levels of the social system interact. According to him, an important role between these
two levels is played by ‘<…> the agent – the acting, feeling, and thinking human
being who is always within a context while moving beyond the very same context by
one’s own goal-oriented actions’ (Valsiner 2012: 10).
Modern-day interpretations of culture include historical, social, and
psychological dimensions, enabling different conceptual definitions of culture. This
diversity of definitions and approaches partly results from the plurality of
contemporary scientific thought but is, to a greater extent, a result of the complexity of
the object itself (i.e., culture).
15
With regard to the practical aspect of culture, culture studies are no longer ‘pure
knowledge’ in the beginning of the 21st century. According to the more contemporary,
post-modernist, and post-structuralist interpretation, the shift of the interpretation
focus from historicity to the subject and the social mechanisms of reproducing cultural
forms (such as stratification and power) enable examination from policy perspective as
well (Bourdieu 2005). Applied cultural studies and the implementation of their results
in public policy are gaining importance. Culture is being studied from the perspectives
of economic, political, civic, gender, human development, well-being, and other social
processes.
In recent decades, culture has become a legitimate object of study and
discussion to obtain a better understanding of global political-economic processes and
good governance. Experience has shown that social change and modernisation policies
in developing nations do not necessarily yield the same results for all: some countries
are changing more rapidly than others. To explain this phenomenon, specialists have
focused their attention on culture. Many studies have been initiated with the aim of
understanding the differences in cultures and cultural values between countries.
Against the background of globalisation issues, there is a renewed discussion of the
principle of cultural relativism, which prevailed in the 20th century and explained the
role of cultures in social development. The question is whether ‘culture matters’
(Harrison and Huntington 2000), whether culture supports social progress, and what
should be the underlying values for building social institutions to achieve progress in
developing nations. With respect to the first question, there is clearly a consensus:
culture plays an important role in social change. However, there are different opinions
regarding the second question.
As a project of modernisation, globalisation politics dictates its path. The
transnational political, economic, and nongovernmental organisations created for this
purpose are pursuing the dissemination of universal values deemed typical of
‘Western’ civilisation, such as respect for fundamental human freedoms, freedom of
expression, equality, tolerance, and trust in others. The justification is that democracy
and a competitive economy can be built only on the basis of these values and that
these are the only sociocultural conditions under which social progress, modernisation,
increased well-being, human potential development, and a safe and secure social life
can be promoted. Many comparative social studies have confirmed that democratic
and economic development differences between countries result from the level of
development of the aforementioned values. However, other views maintain that the
West has specific practices in building social institutions, practices, and beliefs that
are not necessarily universal (Huntington 1996).
In social studies, proponents of the anthropological focus criticise the
universality effect of modernisation, stating that history is not only ‘temporal or
chronological but also spatial and relational’ (Sakai, 1989; 106, cited by Featherstone
16
(1995: 88)), while ‘the prioritisation of time over space has been a central feature of
theories of modernity’ (Featherstone 1995: 87). Such counterarguments substantiate
the idea that many forms of modernity differing from the Western model of modernity
may emerge, depending on the cultural peculiarities of a country. There has also been
criticism of the use of social development measurements and criteria typical of
advanced Western capitalism for gauging progress in other countries. Shweder (2000),
for example, who considers himself a cultural pluralist, asserts that social progress
does not necessarily mean that all countries must transform their cultures to achieve
the living standards of the West, as the cultural comparison intrudes into morality
domain and leads to inequality. He questions the belief that a country’s economic and
technical development should be an indicator of its social development. Instead, this
researcher believes that well-being and economic development can be reached without
losing the cultural peculiarities. Furthermore, in his prognosis of the global processes,
he is convinced that ‘if economic growth is contingent on accepting the deep or thick
aspects of Western culture <…> , then cultures will not converge and will not develop
economically because their sense of identity will supersede their desire for material
wealth’ (ibid. 171).
Thus, the two aforementioned opposing approaches imply the formation of
policies based on global versus local cultures. During times of social transformation or
change, culture simply becomes a political category (Wedeen 2002; Wright 1998)2
that predetermines the policy-making discourse in various areas. Thus, the procultural discourse is viewed in different ways: some view culture as a precondition of
the creation of various political and social institutions, while others believe that it
results from the operation of such institutions. However, the pro-cultural discourse of
policies contains a discrepancy in terms of the relationship between global and local
cultures. The institutionalisation of multiculturalism, for example, is a form of procultural policy. That particular discourse is based on the idea of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, which implies some evening, i.e., it is a system of institutional
relations created on the basis of universal values in which the peculiarities of local
cultures may be left to the sidelines.
The post-cultural policy discourse has also emerged in recent years. This
discourse focuses on ever-evolving forms of self-expression (which may be diverse
and not necessarily associated with ethno-cultural belonging) rather than the
dominating global or local culture. An example of post-cultural policy is identity
politics, which is a bottom-up approach that stems from groups of individuals with
different life experiences rather than from the dominant culture. This discourse is also
2 For analyses related to this issue, refer to discussions, for example, in the following works:
Wright, Susan 1998. The politization of culture. Anthropoly Today, 14 (1), 7-15; Wedeen,
Lisa 2002. Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science. American Political
Science Review, 96(4), 713-728.
17
based on the idea of human rights and fundamental freedoms. To this end, the postcultural discourse enables understanding not only the differences between cultures but
also the differences within a culture.
We believe that policies that are conducive to social change, whether they are
pro-cultural or post-cultural, have different meanings, significance, and expressions
for different countries. Although criticism of the post-modernist or post-cultural
discourse represents culture as a tool of power represented in the form of history, one
must observe that generalised cultural forms are embedded in various areas of human
life as formal or informal rules of behaviour. In this sense, processes and conditions
facilitating social change ‘are as cultural as political and economic’ (Coombe 1991:
198). This perspective opens a field of rather extensive research to understand the
local dynamics typical of developing countries and the ways in which their sociocultural practices are made sense of in response to global political-economic
processes.
Social Change and Culture:
Parallel and Converging Paths
A substantial body of literature on social change has been produced since the 1970s.
According to the scientific analysis, social change can have various sources, from
information technology to production, market development, demographic change,
political processes, ideological struggle, civic/social movements, and other sources.
There have also been studies into the reasons, vectors, nature, duration, and
mechanisms of implementing social change. It is commonly believed that social
change has an influence when the structure of social relationships changes, expressed
as changes in institutional and everyday practices and behaviour models.
Embracing all aspects of social life, from everyday consciousness to
government institutions, social change requires interdisciplinary research. Regardless
of the methodological scope and sector, culture, especially in its value dimension, has
become a core notion for defining the meaning of social change. The value dimension
is in turn viewed in middle-level theories in close connection with social and political
institutions.
Welzel et al. (2003) describe the social change syndrome with three important
components: socioeconomic development (the expansion of people’s choice), the
transition from values of security to values of self-expression, and democratisation as
the protection of rights. The authors believe that the findings of the World Value
Survey (WVS) confirm the interconnection between these three processes and their
universal nature. In fact, post-materialist values secure the connection between
socioeconomic development and democratisation. The value surveys conducted in the
18
framework of modernisation theory show that the formation of values is influenced by
a country’s contextual factors, which define and confine the conditions of modern life.
Those factors are essentially economic and political spheres in which normative
guidelines and behaviour intentions are formed. For example, when security and
survival are high on the political agenda, material needs become central, and people’s
priorities are shaped around personal and social security and stability. Inglehart and
Welzel (2005) maintain that a social context that enables sufficient individual
resources and possibilities for an economic, political, and social network expands
choice and raises the value of autonomy, which is in contrast with authoritarian values.
These studies are consistent, and in a sense, they overlap with the findings of
Schwartz’s (2006a: 149-153) studies of cultural values. Schwartz also shows that
value orientations are sensitive to social structure, socio-economic processes, political
system and ideologies: such orientations reflect but also shape these elements (2006a,
2008, 2009). His research also shows that the capitalist economic system is more
competitive in those countries that place great emphasis on values of mastery and less
emphasis on harmony (Schwartz 2008: 60). Egalitarianism and autonomy are typical
of democratic states and these values negatively correlate with corruption; however,
embeddedness and hierarchy, for example, show a positive correlation with corruption
(ibid. 59). The need for ingroup integrity and interest may lead to mistrust in state
institutions, thereby reinforcing the values of embeddedness and hierarchy and
discouraging the values of egalitarianism and autonomy. Thus, cultural value
orientations are at the basis of the structural organisation of society; they provide both
guidance and justification of the actions of the actors building the social institutions.
Social institutions, in turn, reciprocally influence culture: when these institutions
succeed, the cultural value orientations that are consistent with their practices are
reinforced and strengthened (ibid. 55).
Changes in value orientations may, however, be retrograde depending on the
degree of socioeconomic development. According to the WVS, societal developments
in post-Soviet countries prove these patterns: societies that have transitioned to
security values were primarily post-Soviet countries, and it was their response to the
collapse of social, economic, and political systems (Inglehart and Baker 2000).
Inglehart and Baker (2000) conclude that an increased level of life security is an
important mechanism for value change, but such change can be observed only on an
intergenerational level. Thus, the WVS shows that although value changes are
possible, they occur rather slowly.
The fact that social change has a cultural dimension has been explicitly noted by
a number of authors (Hofstede et al. 2010; Pejovich 1999; Schwartz 2009; Vagoner et
al. 2012). However, the focus is primarily on the relative stability of value
orientations, and at times, there is even scepticism towards profound value-cultural
transformations. In a section of their book with the very telling title ‘Culture Change:
19
Changing Practices, Stable Values’, Hofstede et al. (2010) write that there is much in
society that will not change simply because of technological advances: ‘If young
Turks drink Coca-Cola, this does not necessarily affect their attitudes towards
authority <…>. In some respects, young Turks differ from old Turks, just as young
Americans differ from old Americans’ (19). Based on the same logic, these
researchers emphasise that in the field of values, i.e., fundamental feelings about life
and other people, a young Turk differs from a young American as much as an old Turk
differs from an old American. Picturing culture as an onion with layers that has values
at its core, Hofstede asserts that such (intergenerational) differences concern the
surface of culture (symbols, heroes, fashion, and consumption forms). The authors
believe that there is still ‘no evidence that the values of the present-day generations in
different countries are converging’ (ibid: 19). In the same spirit, Schwartz (2008)
sceptically poses the following question: ‘Travellers find blue jeans, hamburgers, and
rock bands in almost every country they visit. But do such changes also reflect change
in the normative value orientations that underlie the functioning of societal
institutions, the orientations that provide the basic cultural press to which people are
exposed?’ (ibid: 46).
This analysis shows that values represent the deepest layer of culture. Values
are stable because they are a result of early socialisation (Hofstede et al. 2010). Hence,
cultural change may be rapid at the level of practices, i.e., the visible, surface elements
of culture; the layers of culture that are acquired in later stages in life are more
volatile. Cultural values are stable insofar as they are related to the ethnic value
system. Therefore, ‘they should be considered given facts, as hard as a country’s
geographical position or its weather’ (Hofstede et al. 2010: 20).
Thus, the puzzle is that although cultural change cannot occur without changes
in values, values are stable despite changes in culture. This logic apparently loses sight
of the fact that a generation socialising during a transition period can internalise the
plurality of life and the uncertainty of values. Hence, it is no longer clear what remains
stable. This puzzle is partially solved when layers are viewed not only in culture as a
whole but also in the different generational groups, each of which, using Hofstede’s
analogy, has its ‘onion’. This view may help to explain why social change can be
observed in the form of generational dynamics, i.e., how the value priorities of young
people differ from those of other generations.
To understand the nature of value changes, it is not sufficient to examine
generational differences due to the effect of the economic and political systems of
society. The modern approach is that societies are examined in terms of their
dynamics. Special attention is devoted to social processes that support or hinder social
integration, especially in transition societies. To this end, social change is viewed as a
permanent, often unpredictable process without a particular ending. Many researchers
believe that social change cannot be labelled as good or bad per se; similarly, such
20
change does not always move in one direction, and this direction should not
necessarily be identified with improvement. Social change depends on cultural,
historical, and social circumstances and, as such, is less predictable (Wagoner et al.
2012). Social change occurs in a preassigned cultural environment in a coherent
framework of ready schemes for the meaning making, interpreting, and symbolising of
social practices (Sztompka 1996). Beyond clashing with culture, social processes may
have areas that are discrepant with social structures and functions inherited from the
previous order.
Beliefs that are formed as a result of existing communication opportunities and
that are based on cultural values may be functional (i.e., may assist in grasping the
meaning of change) or may be dysfunctional (i.e., may hinder the adequate
understanding, internalisation, and cultural ‘domestication’ of new ideas and realities).
The simultaneous presence of different and often inconsistent effects does not allow
an individual to rapidly develop flexible belief-value schemes that would be suitable
for interpreting any situation. Therefore, there is asymmetry of practices and
ideological change, just as there is asymmetry between social processes and culture or
between everyday and institutional practices.
In search of stability under uncertainty, the circles of trust often shrink in
transition countries, and social behaviour is guided by belonging to a more predictable
and trusted primary group, such as family or friends. In this sense, many observations
from this study are not purely Armenian but rather are variations of the patterns of
social behaviour of individuals in many post-Soviet countries. Based on their study of
Moldovan young people’s views of citizenship, Abbot et al. (2010) maintain that a
prolonged economic and political crisis has alienated youth from political, economic,
and social relationships, although they are socially integrated within networks of
family and friends, which is how they gain a sense of belonging in Moldovan society.
This situation has created a peculiar sense of citizenship, whereby youth consider
themselves to be loyal to the nation rather than to the state as a formal system. A close
parallel can be drawn between this situation and Armenian reality. In another study
concerning political participation and trust in political institutions in Eastern Europe,
the authors conclude, based on empirical data, that political participation declines in
the case of strong family ties and that this decline is mediated by low trust in
institutions. (Alesina and Giuliano 2009: 9).
Thus, social and cultural processes influence one another in a number of ways.
These processes cause change, especially in the outer layers of culture (lifestyle,
practices, and beliefs), challenging cultural integrity. However, culture and the ‘old
ethos’ can be a factor restricting social change, predetermining the level and substance
of change occurring in the country. This situation is related to the disproportionate
change in formal and informal institutions in the country. In his discussion of the
relationship between culture and economic institutions, Pejovich (1999) defines
21
informal rules (underlying informal institutions) as the non-material elements of
culture, such as traditions, values, beliefs, and other behaviour norms, and emphasises
that these elements are stable and reinforced by the test of survival that they have
passed and are not, therefore, policy variables. They change primarily by erosion,
which is a slow process (Pejovich 1999: 172).
Different theories have conceptually analysed these expressions of intracultural
asymmetries. The ‘cultural lag’ theory (Ougburn 1922)3 is one of the classical
theories, according to which change in one sphere of society is not followed by
proportionate changes in other spheres, which disrupts the equilibrium in society and
increases societal tension and frustration. According to theory, this mismatch is more
evident when the material culture (technologies) changes more rapidly, while the nonmaterial culture in society (social and political institutions and their underlying value
system) responds to new realities more slowly.
The disruption of equilibrium within society is presently also interpreted as a
cultural trauma. Sztompka (2001) reviews various causes and types of cultural trauma,
stating that it can occur on the boundary between culture and practice because of the
need to adapt to new events or changes or can occur within culture itself, often
because of the need to redefine the past. Such change can be considered traumatic for
a culture insofar as such change disrupts the social organisation of life and the stability
of the social order as well as endangers the basic value system of the culture.
Interestingly, however, Sztompka (2001) further writes that the degree of sensitivity
and receptiveness to cultural traumas varies among different groups of a society;
hence, the types of reactions to such changes are also varied. This reality explains the
internal dynamic of social change and, as a result, the potential evolution of social
processes.
Sztompka (2001) notes that culture, with its value-normative and belief
components, acts as an environment in which social change occurs. At the same time,
however, culture is also the object of such change. This twofold understanding of
culture explains the disproportionate nature of cultural change. In this sense, cultural
change does not directly follow social change; rather, social change is a challenge for
cultural change. True cultural change can occur only when society has a traumatic
cultural experience and seeks new ways of overcoming it. This experience of society
is another mechanism of cultural value transformation or change along with the
reinforcement of value orientations as a result of intergenerational change. Tension
within society, instability, and attempts at overcoming uncertainty that are primarily
based on inherited cultural resources create opportunities for transforming cultural
values. Effective or ineffective strategies of overcoming uncertainty may be reinforced
3
See Encyclopedia Britannica: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/425785/WilliamFielding-Ogburn.
22
and subsequently reproduced through socialisation, thus creating a foundation for new
cultural forms.
Thus, social change and change in the cultural value system can be explained
through the principle of reciprocal determinism, whereby at least three determining
factors exist: culture (value-normative and belief determinants reproduced through
social institutions and practices), agents (individuals, structures, groups, and social
movements that bear certain ideas), and the political and socioeconomic system. The
reciprocity of these factors explains the concurrent and multidirectional—rather than
successive and linear—dynamic of social change. The reciprocal effects of culture and
the political-economic system were discussed earlier in this section. However, the
agency of autonomous subjects also has an effect on this relationship, as such subjects
are quite flexible to new experiences and can act as intermediary links. Hence, an
agent’s actions within this reciprocity (which are even more effective when there is
collective agency) can cause social change and value system dynamics. However, it is
important to understand which agents will become influential as a mediator for
transmitting the new cultural experience to the public at large. In transition countries,
for example, where the economic-political conditions are unfavourable and there is
growing appreciation of the need for change, there may be demand for
institutionalising the values of equality. The bottom-up transformative effect becomes
more active when the force of the top-down effect is no longer sufficient after a certain
point. Thus, according to Schwartz’s (2008) observation, cultural orientations change
in response to the changing power relations between different groups of society. In
other words, groups with greater resources have a greater imprint on the general value
system of society. An argument in favour of this perspective is that the discussion of
the value system of society typically implies the value orientations of the dominant
groups as reinforced by the social structure rather than the ‘average’ of values of
different layers of society.
Thus, the understanding of socio-cultural changes that rests on the principle of
reciprocal determinism of different factors enables an explanation of the processual
nature of these changes. In this sense, the predictability or unpredictability of social
change can be examined through the disruption of ties between related processes.
Summing this part of the discussion, the following main features of sociocultural change can be identified:
 Sociocultural change includes institutional (including political and economic)
change as well as change in everyday practices, which are mutually
reinforcing.
 The old social order no longer works, but it is not gone completely; thus, the
old and new processes and features are layered upon one another.
 As a process, sociocultural change is lengthy, asymmetric, and heterochronous: the scale, pace, and substance of its influence on various layers of
23





society (generational, socioeconomic, educational, and others) and various
institutions are varied.
Sociocultural change includes both spontaneous processes and organised
action aimed at implementing change.
Sociocultural change bears the effect of the cultural foundation of a
transforming society and in turn alters this foundation. Social change has a
specific course in each country and often encounters restrictions, especially in
connection with the limited flexibility of the subjective culture (namely, the
value system).
Sociocultural change is influenced by interconnected global and local factors
and processes, as a result of which it is not necessarily linear and is not very
predictable.
Sociocultural change is not an impersonal process: it is composed of
individuals and groups that have agency, customs, and preferences. Such
individuals and groups not only bear but also implement such change and the
accompanying new meanings and articulations. Social change is accompanied
by the emotional, cognitive, and behavioural-intentional problems of
individuals, as well as clashes between them (e.g., revising old behaviour
schemes and mindset, losing the sense of security).
Cultural change is not merely changes occurring in culture.
24
CHAPTER 2
SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO STUDYING
CULTURAL VARIABILITY
Quantification of Cultural Syndromes:
from One-Dimensionality to Multidimensionality
Recent decades have witnessed the emergence of a strong tradition of intercultural
studies aimed at comparing cultural similarities and differences between countries.
The most common approach is the dimensional approach, which seeks to identify
cultural variability on the basis of certain cultural dimensions (examples of these
dimensions are ‘cultural syndromes’ or ‘cultural values’). According to Hofstede
(2001), the tradition of studying cultural dimensions has evolved in anthropological,
sociological, and psychological research, which is why differences and similarities
have been studied at different levels—at the level of culture, society, and individuals.
Early examples of such dimensions were the five ‘behaviour patterns’ proposed
by Parsons and Shils (Hofstede 2011), the ‘value orientations’ proposed by Kluckhohn
and Strodtbeck (Hills 2002), and the high- and low-context cultures proposed by E.
Hall (Hofstede 2011). In the beginning, however, these typologies were not
empirically confirmed, and it was not clear at which level they characterised
societies—the levels of culture or social institutions or individuals. This approach was
subsequently often used in empirical research in which cultural dimensions were
viewed as general sets of different traits. These sets are measured by their expression
on the continuum and explain the most typical forms of individual and group
behaviour in society.
Hofstede’s (1980; 2001) works were quite significant in this respect: he studied
IBM employees in 53 countries and developed four and subsequently five value
dimensions (individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity, power distance,
avoidance of uncertainty, and long-term/short-term orientation). Among them, studies
25
of the individualism-collectivism (I-C)4 cultural dimensions became quite popular.
Therefore, this part of the book examines some findings of the research using I-C
dimensions, with a view of identifying the methodological limitations and
perspectives of studying cultural syndromes.
In his review of the I-C dimensions in the context of the modernisation of
countries, Hofstede (1991) notes that individualism develops in industrial and
urbanised countries with a high quality of life, whereas collectivism is manifested in
traditional and poorer societies and rural communities. Thus, the classical breakdown
of societies into ‘actual societies’ (Gesellshaft), where relationships are impersonal
and social institutions play a greater role, and ‘communities’ (Gemeinschaft), where
relationships are direct and regulated by tradition, can also been considered at the
cultural level. The modernisation of societies facilitates the emergence of a complex
social structure and social stratification that result in the formation of a society of
individuals who have internalised the ideas and values of ‘modernised’’ individualism
(Inkeles 1978; Wezlel 2007). Individualism implies a special form of social order that
is aimed at the formation of autonomous and self-sufficient individuals. Individualism
also implies tolerance towards other lifestyles and new experiences, which is
important in a complex social structure in which social cohesion is acquired by
following institutionalised rules of behaviour rather than by virtue of tradition. Thus,
the cultural dimensions, namely, the tradition of studying I-C, were largely related to
the modernisation of societies. Presumably, this convention is the reason that the
dimension of collectivism was originally studied as the opposite pole of individualism.
According to Hofstede’s (1991) definition, individualism is typical of societies
in which the links between individuals are loose and not interdependent, and
individuals are expected to control their behaviour and care for their families.
Collectivism is typical of societies in which the individual is a part of strong groups
from birth, which protect the individual throughout his/her life in return for his/her
unquestionable loyalty (ibid: 51).
The analysis of various I-C studies shows that these cultural dimensions have
been examined at the level of countries and cultures (Hofstede 1980; 2001; Triandis
1990; Schwartz 2006a; 2007) as well as individual behaviour (Hui 1988; Matsumoto
1997; Triandis 1995; 2001a; Schwartz 2006b).
Country-level studies are aimed at revealing the I-C link with social
characteristics such as social capital, well-being, trust, and political and economic
systems. According to some studies, I-C is linked with a country’s economic wellbeing and development. According to Hofstede (2001), there is a clear correlation
between individualism and per capita GDP. In another study, the value dimensions
developed by Hofstede were compared with the global innovation index of countries.
Henceforth in the text, the abbreviation ‘I-C’ will be used to denote the individualism-collectivism
dimension.
4
26
The results showed that power distance is negatively correlated while individualism is
directly correlated with the innovation index (Rinne et al. 2012).
Triandis (1993; 1994; 1996; 2001b) suggests using the notion of ‘cultural
syndrome’ when comparing cultures. He defines a cultural syndrome as ‘a pattern of
shared attitudes, beliefs, categorizations, self-definitions, norms, roles definitions, and
values that is organized around a theme that can be identified among those who speak
a particular language, during a specific historic period, and in a definable geographic
region’ (Triandis 1996: 408). This understanding of the problem of cultural
dimensions opened up new horizons for their study at the individual level.
At the individual level, I-C cultural syndrome studies have focused on selfdescriptions and various personal factors, such as motivation, self-construals, selfregulation, and traits. For instance, there has been much research into the links
between self-construals and cultural dimensions. Research by Triandis (1989), for
instance, has shown that the more complex a culture is, the more salient is the private
or public self. The more individualism is expressed, the more the private self is
manifested. Greater the collectivism, regulation of relationships and external threats
are associated with greater salience of the collective self (ibid). Markus and Kitayama
(1991) distinguish between independent self-construal5 for individuals formed in
Western culture and interdependent self-construal for those formed in Eastern culture.
Comparing various studies, the authors assert that these modes of the self
predetermine people’s perceptions of and attitudes towards themselves and others and
influence their cognition, emotions, and motivations (Markus and Kitayama 1991).
Kagitçibasi (2005) distinguishes relatedness, which is formed on the basis of a family
model implying emotional and material attachment, and autonomy, which is formed
on the basis of a family model implying emotional and material independence. Other
studies also show the I-C link with personal traits. Individualism, for example, is
associated with higher self-esteem and optimism (Kitayama et al. 1997) as well as
subjective well-being (Diener et al. 1995).
Parallel studies of cultural syndromes at the country and individual levels are
guided by the logic that the cultural dimensions that are typical of society can explain
an individual’s behaviour pattern as a one-way influence.
Although individuals with ideocentric character are more common in
individualistic cultures while those with allocentric character are more common in
collectivist cultures (Triandis and Suh 2002), society is not homogenous in this respect
at the intracultural level. Individualistic cultures, which emphasise self-direction, also
exhibit high levels of mutual trust, social collaboration, and cohesion, although these
behaviour models could be deemed typical of collectivist values. Similarly, aspirations
of competition and achievement, which are more typical of individualism, may be
5
Self-construal refers to the set of self-definitions, according to which the self is defined
independently of others or interdependently with others.
27
encountered in collectivist cultures. Various studies have shown that behaviours that
are typical of individualism or collectivism may be expressed depending on the
situation or the social context. For example, competition, which is a behaviour typical
of individualism, may be expressed when people are struggling for material interests
in a situation of scarce economic resources (Yu and Yang 1994). A one-dimensional IC model would have made it difficult to construe the situation in Armenian society:
depending on the area of life, there are examples of both individualism (e.g.,
difficulties of mobilisation, tough competition) and collectivism (e.g., dependency of
the individual’s behaviour on public opinion, discouragement of self-direction).
As I-C cultural syndromes are also drawn from intracultural comparisons, it can
be concluded that they are orthogonal, i.e., statistically independent on one another
(Rhee et al. 1996). Moreover, not all studies necessarily confirm the mutually
exclusive nature of individualism and collectivism.
This discussion raises another methodological issue related to the onedimensional or multidimensional nature of the I-C construct. Studies by Triandis
(1995; 2001a) have shown that collectivism and individualism can be examined
through multidimensional models. One of the multidimensional models proposed by
includes the horizontal and vertical types of I-C in which forms of power and
relationship structures are combined with the main features of I-C. One of the studies
shows that the opposite of individualism is not collectivism but is actually
authoritarianism, which implies a hierarchical nature of power in relationships
(Gelfand et al. 1996). Another study shows that the horizontal and vertical dimensions
of individualism and collectivism explain sociopolitical attitudes and beliefs better
than merely individualism and collectivism (Strunk and Chang 1999). To study
multidimensional models of the I-C construct, Triandis suggests combining the etic
and emic approaches to explaining collectivism and individualism. A pertinent
example is the local study conducted in Estonia that identified different patterns of
collectivism through a comparison of eight various socio-demographic groups (Realo
et al. 1997).
The multidimensional nature of the I-C construct raises another question: are
specific individual-level behaviours corresponding to specific cultural syndromes
determined directly by the manifestation of I-C at the cultural level? Researchers state
that the causality between the cultural and individual levels is difficult to identify and
that conclusions are drawn by combining the results of various studies. A study of
behaviours of deception during negotiations, for example, has shown that deception is
positively correlated with country-level collectivism, whereas allocentric attitudes at
the individual level (which is the typical individual behaviour pattern in a collectivist
culture) are negatively correlated with deception (Triandis et al. 2001). Another study
has shown that the prevalence of individualism is positively correlated with social
capital in intra- and cross-cultural comparisons (Allik and Realo 2004). However,
28
other studies showed that social capital is positively correlated with distinct attributes
of individualism and collectivism. The authors conclude that ‘the relationship between
individualism-collectivism and social capital are likely to be far more faceted at the
individual level when compared to culture level findings’ (Beilmann and Realo 2012:
213). Another telling example is the study of the correlation between corruption and
collectivism. In countries with high levels of collectivism, corruption is perceived to
be high, according to the international index. The only exception is Singapore, which
is a country with a collectivist culture that reports low levels of corruption. This
precedent caused researchers to separate the country-level study of corruption from the
individual level. Using the manipulative variable of deception in family and
organisation scenarios, the authors show that deception in a family’s interests is
determined by vertical individualism, namely, competition and the desire to be the
first (Li et al. 2006). The conclusion was that in collectivist cultures, people are more
self-centred in terms of defending the interests of their own groups (e.g., in the context
of Singapore); therefore, obvious individualistic traits can be observed even in
collectivist cultures.
Thus, the results of this study and many other studies show that the countrylevel patterns identified between study variables are not necessarily confirmed at the
level of studying individuals (Ostroff 1993). Many researchers believe that the cultural
and individual levels of I-C should be distinguished based on both conceptual and
research considerations (Hofstede 2001; Kagitçibasi 1997; Triandis and Suh 2002;
Smith and Schwartz 1997) to allow understanding the multidimensional and divergent
nature of cultural syndromes manifested within a culture. To this end, Smith (2002)
recalls certain dimensions of Schwartz’s value survey at the cultural and individual
levels (Smith 2002; 2004).
Schwartz views cultural values both as ideals that individuals strive to achieve
and as normative behaviour guidelines that individuals should follow. From this
perspective, ‘culture is external to the individual; it is not a psychological variable.
<…> The value orientations that are the central aspect of societal culture <…>
influences the minds of individual people but are not located in the mind’ (Schwartz
2011: 470). Thus, Schwartz emphasises that cultural values are expressed indirectly
through various institutional practices (economic, educational, and political) and social
practices (e.g., upbringing, relationships, leisure, entertainment). Culture, with its
prevailing values, influences beliefs, practices, goals, and mindset by presenting social
expectations to people during their socialisation. In psychological terms, the cultural
pressure refers to the primes that individuals encounter more or less frequently in their
daily life, the primes towards which they consciously or unconsciously focus their
attention. However, Schwartz believes that cultural and individual values have various
sources: cultural values are formed out of the need to preserve and develop society,
29
whereas individual values are borne from the biological and social needs of
individuals. Thus, Schwartz relies on the functionalist interpretation of values.
Schwartz (2006; 2011) identifies three problems in relationships with the social
structure. The first problem is the nature and boundaries of the individual-group
relationship. The second problem is the guarantee of socially responsible behaviour.
The third problem is the regulation of people’s relationship with the environment
(natural and social). In line with these problems, Schwartz identifies the following
bipolar cultural dimensions:
1. Intellectual and Affective Autonomy (including values such as
broadmindedness, curiosity, and pleasure) and Embeddedness (including
values such as social order, obedience, and respect for traditions)
2. Egalitarianism (including values such as social justice and equality) and
Hierarchy (including values such as authority and humility)
3. Harmony (including values such as unity with nature and world peace) and
Mastery (including values such as ambition and daring)
Individual-level values are basic and trans-situational because they are based on
universal human needs. While based on universal human needs, the expression or
priority of certain value orientations in different groups depends on culture (Schwartz
2006b).
The continuum of the 10 values developed can be viewed as being organised
along two bipolar dimensions: (1) Self-enhancement values (power and achievement)
that encourage and legitimise the pursuit of one’s own interests oppose Selftranscendence values (universalism and benevolence) that emphasise concern for the
welfare of others, and (2) values of Openness (self-direction and stimulation) that
welcome change and encourage the pursuit of new ideas and experience oppose
Conservative values (security, tradition, and conformity) that emphasise maintaining
the status quo and avoiding threats; furthermore, hedonism values share elements of
openness and self-enhancement (Schwartz 1996, 2006b, 2011). The circular structure
of values relation is presented in Appendix 2.
The two-level model of value dimensions proposed by Schwartz (2011) has
some advantages over other approaches to studying cultural dimensions. This model,
which was developed through multidimensional scaling analysis of data from more
than 250 samples, allows for explanation of the possibilities for multiple ties among
cultural values, individual values, beliefs, and practices (Schwartz 2011)6. Moreover,
at the individual level, the value dimension model allows for observing zones of
congruency and tension between values. In this manner, the model allows for
6
For details, see Schwartz, Shalom 2011. In: Fons J. R. van de Vijver, Athanasios Chasiotis,
Seger M. Breugelmans (eds.) Values: Cultural and Individual. Fundamental Questions in
Cross-Cultural Psychology. (pp. 463-493). New York: Cambridge University press.
30
analysing the correlations between values at specific levels or between levels. Hence,
the theory can be widely used for studying different value orientations.
The Formation of Cultural Syndromes:
Combining the Multilevel and Dynamic-Situational Approaches
In addition to the dimensional approach, contemporary socio-psychological study of
cultural syndromes includes approaches aimed at identifying the dynamic mechanisms
of cultural change. Many researchers have concluded that the dimensional approach to
cultural syndromes, which emerged in the context of cross-cultural psychology, does
not allow for studying the dynamic nature of the relationship between individuals and
the socio-cultural environment. Cross-country comparisons provide statistical
evidence that there are differences in cultural syndromes between various cultural
groups and that the sociocultural environment and the individual’s psychological
structure are interconnected. These comparative studies help to understand the value
basis of constructing the social system and can be used as a means of interpretation,
but they cannot help to explain how certain cultural patterns of behaviour are formed.
However, the patterns identified through cross-cultural studies revealed a new
arena for analysing the cultural syndromes. For example, societies are perceived as
more homogenous in terms of their cultural syndromes than when they are studied
locally, within a culture. Alternatively, the multidimensionality of cultural syndromes
is more at the individual level than at the country level. It became necessary to make
sense of the cultural syndromes in a dynamic process of interaction between levels
rather than at a particular discrete level. Many studies rely on multilevel effect models
in which culture is examined not only at the micro- and macro-levels but also at
different meso-levels (such as the level of group and organisational culture). These
models enable studying the vertical processes, i.e., the top-down effect of macrocultural processes with the bottom-up effect of behavioural change. One example is
the proposed model for combining the structural and dynamic dimensions of the
multilevel model of culture (Erez and Gati 2004). This model suggests studying the
consistency of close levels because they overlap. Top-down change occurs through
adaptation. Reciprocally, bottom-up behaviour change influences the formation of
behavioural norms and cultural traits as a result of interaction (ibid. 591). Such
multilevel models are clearly a step ahead of the comparative country- and individuallevel studies of behaviour but still fail to explain the socio-psychological mechanisms
through which such cultural change occurs.
Cultural psychology has developed models explaining the mutual effect and
construction between culture and the individual. According to Valsiner (2003), crosscultural psychology relies more on the premise that individuals or groups ‘belong to
the culture’, i.e., a certain value system accepted in that culture. Cultural psychology
31
relies on the premise that culture ‘belongs to all individuals’, as ‘culture is functioning
within the intra-psychological systems of each person’ (ibid: 4).
Markus and Hamedani (2007) attempt to classify and analyse various
approaches to studying the interdependence between the socio-cultural systems and
self-systems that have emerged in cultural psychology. This study focuses on the
socio-psychological mechanisms of direct influence to explain how cultural
syndromes penetrate into the self-system and are reflected in behaviour. The authors
highlight different framing and constructive mechanisms, such as interactions,
cognitions, and situational factors with cues.
One of the models developed along these lines that is deemed more
comprehensive and able to include the aforementioned influence mechanisms is
labelled by Oyserman and colleagues as the ‘situated cognition model’ (Oyserman and
Lee 2007; Oyserman and Sorensen 2009).
According to this model, cultural syndromes influence a particular situation
when the cues that are typical of a cultural syndrome are present and significant in a
given situation. To examine the actual influence, Oyserman (2009) distinguishes two
elements of his model: a situation as the external reality of the direct influence and
self-construals as the direct internal reality. When a cultural syndrome (such as
collectivism) is institutionally acceptable and accessible and cued in a particular
situation, its influence on the individual is immediately observed. The individual
mentally constructs and recognises the meaning represented by a situation. According
to Oyserman (2009), universal cultural traits are encountered when certain situations
have the same semantic load (for example, warfare triggers senses of collectivism and
honour) (ibid: 29). Many manipulative studies, which have modelled certain cued
situations for triggering specific behaviour attitudes, have confirmed the functionality
of this model (Oyserman et al. 1998; Oyserman and Lee 2008).
Research by the proponents of this model has concluded that differences
between societies should be understood by the ways in which a syndrome is presented,
cued, and reinforced rather than by the mere existence or manifestation of specific
cultural syndromes. Thus, societies differ in terms of which cultural syndromes are
manifested in specific environments and situations, how frequently, and with what
meaning load (Oyserman 2009: 27).
It is difficult to characterise societies by a comprehensive culture or cultural
syndromes or by differences within society (such as subcultural differences or
differences between socio-demographic groups). Such cultural syndromes are diverse
within the same society, but they are not always discrete; rather, they are often
overlapping or even conflicting.
The different approaches analysed thus far could be summarised by examining
the following integrative model of cultural variability. Oyserman and her colleagues
(2002) discuss the social processes (distal, proximal, and situational) through which
32
culture influences and is internalised by the individual (Oyzerman et al. 2002).
Elaborating on this integrative model, Oyserman and Uskul (2008) discusses the
multilayered influence of culture in terms of social-and individual-level consequences.
Figure 1 below presents the adapted version of the model with a chart showing the
individual-level consequences.
Social Structural Culture
(Educational, Legal, Economic
Systems and Institutions)
Distal Culture
(History,
Language,
Religion)
Social Situational Culture
(Family Socialisation,
Everyday Face-to-Face
Interaction)
Situation as
Subjectively
Construed
IndividualLevel
Consequences
(Self-concept,
Cognition,
Affect,
Behavior)
Individually Internalised
Culture (e.g., Valuing
Independence, Valuing
Social Connection)
Evolution, Natural and
Sexual Selection and
Adaptation, and Environmental Ecology
Figure 2.1. Culture as a multilevel process influencing individual-level outcomes (Oyzerman
Uskul, 2008: 149)
The primary factors of cultural influence are the environmental conditions
(geography, ecological conditions, and availability of natural resources) that influence
the distal culture (history, language, and religion) and the value system internalised by
the individual. Distal culture, which is formed based on the historicity of a country,
influences on the formation of the social structure culture (the legal, economic, and
educational systems and institutions), the social situational culture (the peculiarities of
children’s socialisation and relationships in the family, school, and workplace), and
the internalised culture (value orientations). At this level of influences, the authors
assert that the distal culture and the value system have traits of both individualism and
collectivism. Although the aforementioned three influences of the distal culture
directly bear consequences at the social level (e.g., in the form of social coherence,
equity, trust, tolerance, gender equality, and egalitarianism-authoritarianism), the
effect of cultural syndromes at the individual level is mediated by subjective
construals. At the individual level, for example, the consequences of the I-C effect are
manifested not through values, as the latter are only I-C markers, but rather through
33
individual psychological traits and conditions (self-esteem, practices, cognitions,
affects, and motivations). The latter are formed through situated cognition, which is
based on prevailing attitudes and values. The authors label the effect at this level as
the proximal path of culture influence (Oyzerman and Uskul 2008: 148-150).
This multilevel model of interdependence among culture, society, and the
individual as well as the concept of the distal and proximal influence of culture allows
us to explain and identify the multidimensionality and variability of cultural
syndromes. Moreover, this model explain the issue of cultural heterogeneity and the
divergence in and between different levels of society (social processes and group and
individual behaviour), which is more visible against the backdrop of the current social
transformation.
Cultural syndromes are not independent from social reality. The latter is
characterised by fluctuations. Hence, this fact should be considered when studying the
variability of culture. Studies of cultural variability at the individual micro-level
should combine the manifestations of cultural syndromes with situational factors and
individual intentionality.
34
CHAPTER 3
VALUE ORIENTATIONS, BELIEFS, AND BEHAVIOUR ATTITUDES
IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SPHERES:
STUDY RESULTS IN ARMENIA
Overview of Political and Economic Developments in Armenia:
Background Analysis
After gaining independence, Armenia, similar to many other post-Soviet countries,
confronted serious economic difficulties that affected the country’s future social
development. The emerging challenges of building a new political system and
relations have yet to be overcome. By acceding to global political and economic
unions and projects, Armenia undertook various international commitments that
implied institutional changes towards democratisation as well as revised standards in
social life. While the declared documents regulate many areas of public life in line
with democratic principles, the real picture often differs.
To make sense of the socio-political and socio-economic framework that
emerged in the country under the transformation process, both macro- and microindicators must be examined, combining external assessments in view of global
development and local assessments of domestic developments.
According to the democratic development study of the Freedom House, which
yields the aggregate index of democracy based on expert assessments primarily
addressing the former Socialist countries7, the overall average score is 5.36 for
Armenia in 2012. Armenia is therefore assessed as a semi-consolidated authoritarian
regime8. Among the seven specific indicators of the overall average score (electoral
process, civil society, independent media, national democratic governance, local
democratic governance, judicial framework and independence, and corruption), civil
society is the only indicator that has scored relatively high, which is considered typical
7
8
See Nations in Transit 2013: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit.
See http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2013/armenia.
35
of a slightly more advanced systems—the ‘hybrid’ regimes. The average score
comparison over the years shows that the level of democracy declined in 2008 but
slightly improved from 2012 onwards. Armenia’s score is somewhat better than the
average score of the Eurasian nations, is lower than that of neighbouring Georgia and
exceeds that of Azerbaijan.
According to another study assessing the transformation of political and
economic processes9, Armenia still has limited possibilities for advancing democracy
and a market economy. According to 2012 data, Armenia’s index was 5.56, ranking
66th among 128 countries10. The Transformation Index is measured on the basis of two
separate indices: political and economic transformations. Political transformation is
primarily viewed as the quality of democratisation, and economic transformation is the
transformation to a market economy. Armenia’s Democracy Index is 5.25 (ranking
73rd among 128 countries); thus, the country’s political system can be considered a
moderate autocracy. Of the five indicators comprising the index, Stateness receives
the highest score, while indicators such as the Stability of Democratic Institutions,
Political Participation, and the Rule of Law (especially subindicators such as the
separation of powers, independent judiciary, and the prosecution of abuse of office)
score far lower. The Market Economy Status Index is 5.93 for Armenia, placing
Armenia in 55th place. The market economy of Armenia is assessed as a system with
functional flaws. Of the eight indicators of this index, the Private Property indicator
scores relatively higher, while Economic Performance and the Level of
Socioeconomic Development and Organization of the Market and Competition (both
of which are key to equal opportunities), especially the anti-monopoly policy
subindicator of the latter, have low scores.
This study also produces an index of the effective management of the
transformation process by the authorities and civil society actors. For Armenia, this
Management Index is 4.70, making the country 74th among 128 countries, i.e., a
country with an average level of efficiency of management. Among the indicators
used to compile this index, the highest is International Cooperation, and the lowest are
Consensus-Building between various politicians11 and Steering Capability.
In terms of trends in these indicators in recent years, the Transformation Index
has declined quite considerably. In 2008, Armenia was ranked 41st, with a particularly
significant change in Democracy Status: in 2008, Armenia ranked 65th, which made it
a defective democracy. The effective Governance and Market Economy indices have
also declined.
9
See Transformation Index BTI, 2012: http://www.bti-project.org/ueber-das-projekt/goals/
index.nc.
10
Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012—Armenia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann
Stiftung, 2012.
11
In 2011, for example, the government adopted new electoral legislation but failed to account
for the proposals of the opposition parties.
36
The aforementioned results indicate at least two peculiarities. First, despite the
varying degrees of effectiveness of different segments of economic and political
systems, the overall system does not reach the threshold of real democratisation. The
impression is that goals have been set, but the functional mechanisms for achieving
them have not been clarified or appreciated by the key actors. The second observation
concerns the dynamic trend: the democratisation process was somewhat derailed in
2008 in both political and economic terms. This change was apparently due to the
rising of the people around the 2008 presidential elections and the ensuing political
crisis, when those in power used their leverage to quell the political unrest and
toughened their actions. The period coincided with the world economic crisis, and the
Armenian economy declined in 2009.
The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom has ranked Armenia’s
economic system as moderately free in recent years.12 Although many of the indicators
derived for Armenia point to quite favourable conditions for the formation of a free
economy, the scores are rather low for the Rule of Law subindicators, such as property
rights and freedom from corruption13, even lower than the average of countries that
ranked lower overall. Such scores are typical of countries in which the economy is not
free. The research shows that the rule of law indicator has the greatest influence on the
increase in per capita GDP, regardless of other factors and the overall index of
economic freedom14.
Clearly, the foregoing and many other studies (particularly ‘Doing Business’ Armenia 2013)15 show that the economic processes are more favourable than the
political processes (e.g., property registration, trading across borders, business startup
conditions, resolving insolvency), but the aforementioned drawbacks of the public
administration system obstruct economic liberalisation.
It is understandable that the political and economic processes of Armenia in
recent years have not contributed to the development of civil society and have even
undermined it, primarily because of the lack of the rule of law as well as the existing
schemes for circumventing the law, such as corruption. Economic and political
systems are intertwined and are not transparent. The judiciary is not free. The starting
conditions for economic competition are not equal for everyone, despite the relevant
12
Miller, Terry, Kim R. Holmes & Edwin J. Feulner 2013. Index of Economic Freedom
(Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2013):
http://www.heritage.org/index
13
The score for this component is derived primarily from Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).
14
See Kim, Anthony B. Advancing Freedom: The Path to Greater Development and Progress:
http://www.heritage.org/index/book/chapter-2#fn-1.
15
See Doing Business 2013: Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises.
Washington, DC: World Bank Group. DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-9615-5. License: Creative
Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0.
37
legislative provisions. Under these circumstances, the influence of civic institutions is
negligible.
It is worrisome that this situation has persisted since Armenia’s early
independence. The situation not only severely affects the public mood but also more
profoundly influences the layer of beliefs and values. People live and function under
social injustice and unpredictable turns in social life, with an increasing prevalence of
mutual mistrust and intolerance, as well as the short-term planning of actions and
situational adaptive behaviours. Because of these and other factors, social capital
indicators also remain low16. Social collaboration is still not based on shared interests
(e.g., professional, humanistic, civic) but rather is limited to nepotistic ties and
mutually advantageous (often materialist) relationships.
Cross-national value surveys also assist in understanding the economic-political
fabric in its ties with the value orientations in society. Armenia participated in the
World Value Survey (WVS) in 1997 and 2010 as well as in the European Value Study
(EVS) in 2008, which uses the same methodology as the WVS. Armenia is still
mapped on the WVS website on the basis of the 1997 data, according to which it has
an average position on the axis of traditional vs. secular- rational values and is more
inclined towards survival values on the survival vs. self-expression axis17. A
comparison of the 1997 WVS and 2008 EVS data using the same indicators shows
that traditional and survival values have remained unaffected in many areas relative to
1997 and have even become more evident in some areas. Namely, there is a rather
obvious change in indicators such as children’s rearing and traditional family values,
the sense of national pride and the increased role of religion, lower interpersonal rust,
low tolerance of sexual and religious minorities, and a preference for economic and
physical security over life quality and the freedom of self-expression. Survival values
are becoming stronger because of the imperfect political and economic framework and
are orienting individuals who attempt to achieve some predictability in ever-changing
life. Many surveys have shown that the economy declined in post-Soviet countries and
even underwent an ‘archaic regress’ in some sectors (Poghosyan 2009: 6), which was
also manifested in the public consciousness. The analysis of WVS shows that ‘most
societies that show retrograde movement are ex-Soviet countries reacting to the
collapse of their economic, social, and political systems <…> bringing growing
misery, distrust, rejection of out-groups, xenophobia, and authoritarian nationalism’
(Inglehart et al. 2000: 41).
To summarise and complete the overview, several groups of factors are
identified here as ‘parts’ of the reality that contribute to the formation of the valuebelief sphere in present-day Armenia.
16
According to the Legatum Prosperity Index based on 2012 data, Armenia was ranked 129th
on the social capital sub-index: http://www.prosperity.com/#!/country/ARM
17
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54
38
 Deficit in the Rule of Law and Enforcement. The overview of the situation
clearly highlights this factor as a ‘red thread’ through all areas of public life, causing
additional problems in both economic and political fields and taking the form of
normative and value uncertainty in the public consciousness, thus leading to
perceptions of social injustice.
 Economic Issues. It is a well-known fact that the country’s economic system is
far from perfect, and the aforementioned different indicators of economic development
reflect numerous obstacles to access to equal economic opportunities, which further
widen the gap in living standards between different segments of the population. This
picture is rather evident when comparing the capital city with the regions.
 Political Realities. The overview of the situation and the assessment of the
experts outline a number of components of public life that considerably affect the
value-belief sphere. The continuing failure of the institution of elections is considered
a fundamental determinant of the ensuing failure of all other social processes as well
as citizens’ attitude towards them. Attempts at changing the political situation are not
sustained and fail to result in any qualitative change, instead remaining as occasional,
episodic outbreaks of protest. The public at large does not believe that a genuine
political process can unfold. Neither the government nor the opposition enjoy the trust
of the public at large, often because of the ‘invisibility’ of articulate ideologies and
clear plans of action.
 Historical Experience. The value-belief framework is also shaped by elements
of the Soviet legacy that affect both mentality and behaviours. The formation of civic
positions and state-citizen relations is also hindered by the lack of statehood
experience, which is considered a historical factor with deeper roots and earlier
origins.
 Context of International Relations. Today, Armenian citizens have again
become concerned about situating themselves in a certain framework of values in the
context of the debated international orientation of Armenia. The choice of a political
vector and ‘the big partner’ (the ‘significant other’ of the culture in psychological
terms) is associated with economic and political opportunities and with desirable and
undesirable alternatives of value orientation. The intense discussion of the ‘Europe
versus Russia’ topic is a case in point.
 Cultural Resistance. Social change and westernisation trends are accompanied
by signs of cultural resistance. The discourses on social changes include diametrically
different perceptions and speculations of what is ‘Armenian’, ‘national’, or ‘civil’.
Thus, the country’s own culture is both the object of change (the revised, criticised
element) and a factor restraining change.
 Civil Unrest and New Media. In the last few years, especially since 2008,
there has been an increase in acts of social protest and advocacy initiatives. The need
to revise values is an essential component of the civic demand discourse and agenda.
39
This trend, however, has not become the prevailing mood in society; it remains at the
level of certain groups and subcultures. Various advocacy groups are largely active
within the new media space (social networks), which enable self-expression and
organisation, but only or primarily within its own domain. Thus, some civic processes
are occurring, but their effect remains difficult to measure. An increase in their role
and scope in the future could contribute to change, including changes in the values and
beliefs of society.
Research Methodology
The research is aimed at studying the value orientations and beliefs of society
against the backdrop of the socio-cultural change occurring in Armenia as well as their
role in political and economic behaviour. The analysis is particularly focused on the
following research issues:
 What are the specificities of the basic value orientations typical of various
segments of society?
 What are the substantial features of beliefs about social life in Armenian
society?
 What are the economic and political attitudes and behavioural patterns of
Armenian citizens, and which values and beliefs predict them?
Based on the premises of socio-cultural psychology, a theoretical model of
regulation of social behaviour was developed to demonstrate the reciprocity of
internalised values and beliefs and the cultural values prevailing in society and socioeconomic processes.
The proposed model served as a basis for developing the survey methodology
and for interpreting the findings. The model enables observing the individual as the
object and subject of interaction in socio-cultural reality and studying the ties between
socio-psychological and socio-cultural factors through which the individual’s
behaviour is self-regulated in line with changing social realities.
40
Values
Culture
Beliefs
Learned Experience
Social Practices
Behaviour Patterns and
Attitudes
Political and Economic
Processes
Figure 3.1. Reciprocity model of socio-psychological and socio-cultural factors regulating social
behaviour
According to this theoretical model, socio-psychological variables
predetermining social behaviour are presented at three levels.
The first level represents values as normative principles guiding behaviour.
Values predetermine the behaviour of individuals in line with the prevalent cultural
values in society. Values are relatively stable and difficult to change because they are
formed during primary socialisation. For the purposes of this research, the study of
values is based on Schwartz’s theory of basic human values (2006b). These values
differ in the underlying core motivation, relate to the individual’s desired goals and
serve as guides for behaviour.
The second level represents beliefs as guiding representations of various
phenomena and aspects of life. Beliefs are also quite stable, as they are formed on the
basis of values. However, values are more flexible to change because they are formed
as a result of consolidating one’s own and others’ experiences and may be revised
during secondary socialisation. The study of beliefs is based on the concept of social
axioms (Leung et al. 2002; Leung and Bond 2004). ‘Social axioms are generalised
beliefs about people, social groups, social institutions, the physical environment, or
the spiritual world as well as about events and phenomena in the social world. These
generalised beliefs are encoded in the form of an assertion about the relationship
between two entities or concepts’ (Leung et al. 2002: 289).
The third level represents behaviour patterns, which are the sets and intentions
of acting in a certain manner. Formed under the influence of values and beliefs,
behaviour patterns and attitudes are directly responsive to the socio-economic and
socio-cultural processes occurring in society; hence, they are more flexible to change
than other regulators of behaviour are. This research specifically addressed social
behaviour patterns as attitudes (sets) and intentions to act in the economic and
political/civic domains.
41
Methods
The study was based on both quantitative (survey) and qualitative (focus groups and
interviews) methods as two separate research components.
1. Survey18
The survey battery included the following instruments (see Appendix 1).
Patterns of Political and Economic Behaviour Questionnaire
This questionnaire consists of 18 items and subitems that reveal political and
economic behaviour intentions and preferences. The respondent must choose from
among the proposed options or express the degree of his/her agreement with them.
The political behaviour items are grouped into the following indicators:
1) Concern for Political Issues (items 1, 2 (subitems 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3) and 3
(subitems 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3)
2) Voting (participation in elections, motives, and willingness) (items 4 (subitems 4.1 and 4.2), 5, 6, 7, and 8)
3) Political/Civic activity (item 9 with subitems 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, and 9.4)
4) Subjective Prognosis of the Political Situation (item 10)
The questions related to economic behaviour are grouped into the following
blocks:
1) Concern for Economic Issues (items 11, 12 (subitem 12.1) and 13 (subitems
13.1, 13.2, and 13.3)
2) Economic Risk and Obtaining Loans (items 14 (with subitems 14.1 and 14.2)
and 15)
3) Economic Well-being (external or internal reference) (item 16 with subitems
16.1 and 16.2)
4) Subjective Prognosis of Country’s and Family’s Economic State (items 17 and
18)
Social Axioms Survey
This instrument consists of two distinct blocks. The first block presents the
original short version (39 questions)19 of the Social Axioms Survey20, which reveals
the following five dimensions of social axioms.
18
The survey was conducted during the period of June-November 2012.
This short version of the questionnaire was adapted in frames of cross-cultural research
collaboration with Prof. Michael Wu of the Chinese National Academy of Sciences.
20
http://personal.cityu.edu.hk/~mgkleung/sa.htm 19
42
Social cynicism represents a negative view of human nature, especially as it is
easily corrupted by power; a biased view against some groups of people; a mistrust of
social institutions; and a disregard for ethical means for achieving an end.
Social complexity suggests that there are no rigid rules but rather that there are
multiple ways of achieving a given outcome and that apparent inconsistency in human
behaviour is common.
Reward for application represents a general belief that effort, knowledge,
careful planning, and the investment of other personal resources will lead to positive
results and help avoid negative outcomes.
Religiosity asserts the existence of supernatural forces and the beneficial
functions of religious belief.
Fate control represents a belief that life events are predetermined and that there
are ways for people to influence these outcomes.
The second block presents a questionnaire developed by us for this study (37
items; see section on page 58 of this chapter for details regarding how the
questionnaire was developed).
Respondents assess each statement in both questionnaires on a 5-point scale (5
indicating ‘strongly believe’ and 1 indicating ‘strongly disbelieve’). Factor analysis
was applied to the data yielded.
Schwartz Values Survey (SVS)21
The questionnaire includes 57 values that measure 10 basic values. The values
are presented in two lists. The first list includes 30 values that are formulated as nouns
(concepts) showing an individual's desirable goals. The values in the second list (27
items) are phrased as adjectives (qualities) that show desirable ways of acting. The
respondents rate the importance of each of the values from both lists on a 9-point scale
(‘7’ points indicating ‘a guiding principle in my life’, ‘0’ indicating ‘not important’,
and ‘ -1’ indicating ‘opposed to my values’). The mean is calculated for each of the 10
values, which are then ranked accordingly.
The 10 scales of values are the following:
Self-Direction. Defining goal: independent thought and choice of action,
creating, and exploring.
Stimulation. Defining goal: excitement, novelty, and challenge in life.
Hedonism. Defining goal: pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself.
Hedonism includes elements from the values of openness to change and selfenhancement.
Achievement. Defining goal: personal success through the demonstration of
competence according to social standards.
21
In 2010, the questionnaire was adapted in agreement and in collaboration with the author,
Prof. Sh. Schwartz, in line with the requirements of the cross-cultural study of values.
43
Power. Defining goal: social status and prestige, control or dominance over
people and resources.
Security. Defining goal: safety, harmony, and stability of society, of
relationships, and of the self.
Conformity. Defining goal: restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely
to upset or harm others and to violate social expectations or norms.
Tradition. Defining goal: respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs
and ideas that one's culture or religion provides.
Benevolence. Defining goal: preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with
whom one is in frequent personal contact (the ‘in-group’).
Universalism. Defining goal: understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and
protection for the welfare of all people and for nature.
Sample
A quota sample was designed on the basis of the proportions of population
distribution by age, gender, and location22. The sample comprised 803 respondents
aged between 18 and 65 from the capital city of Yerevan and four marzes23. The
sampling margin of error was 4.55%, with a 99% percent confidence interval. Shirak,
Syunik, Armavir, and Vayotz Dzor marzes were selected on the basis of the following
criteria:
 Population: the regions with the largest population and the smallest population
were selected.
 Economic situation of the region: unemployment and the production rate.
 Geographic position of the regions and their distance from the capital city
(northern, central, and southern).
In each marz, the survey was conducted in one urban and two to three rural
settlements.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present the age and gender composition and sizes of the
samples of the four regions and the City of Yerevan.
Gender
Table 3.1. Sample size by gender
Yerevan
Marzes
Total
Male
152 (40.8%)
221 (59.2%)
373
Female
173 (40.2%)
257 (59.8%)
430
325
478
803
Total
22
Data from the website of the National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia
(www.armstat.am) were used for compiling the sample.
23
Armenian regional units are called marzes. 44
Gender
Table 3.2. Sample size by age
Yerevan
Marzes
Total
18-29
98 (40.6%)
146 (59.4%)
244
30-41
87 (38.6%)
141 (61.4%)
228
42-53
82 (43.0%)
111 (57.0%)
193
54-65
58 (42.4%)
80 (57.6%)
138
Total
325
478
803
2. Focus Groups
Focus groups were conducted with young adults aged 20 to 29 (with
proportionate gender representation). Each group comprised 10 to 12 participants. 6
focus groups were conducted in Yerevan and 8 in the four marzes (2 focus groups per
marz).
The discussion focused on the following theme categories.
Economic Behaviour: Perceptions of well-being, economic paternalism and
independence beliefs, economic achievement aspirations, earning and incomeincreasing behaviours, and financial and business risk experience and readiness.
Political Behaviour: General interest in political and civic matters, motivation
and beliefs underlying (non)participation in elections and political/civil activism and
engagement (petitions, protests, demonstrations, and expression of opinions in the
mass media, including online media), experiences of interaction with government and
political entities, and motivations for political/civil membership and activity.
3. Interviews
Interviews were conducted with political and economic experts, politicians
(party representatives), and entrepreneurs working in small and medium-sized
businesses24.
Expert interviews were conducted with three political and three economic
analysts. Five interviews were conducted with politicians representing the following
parties/alliances: the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA), the Prosperous Armenia
Party (PAP), ARF Dashnaktzutyun, the Armenian National Congress (ANC), and the
Heritage Party. Interviews were also conducted with four entrepreneurs from Yerevan
and four regional farmers.
The interviews with experts and sector practitioners were structured around the
following questions: overview of political or economic developments of the country
and the prevailing values, beliefs, motivations, and factors underlying political and
24
The names of the interview participants, including the experts, are not mentioned in the text
citations in view of confidentiality and impartiality concerns.
45
economic decisions and behaviour (of both actors and citizens). A specific block of
questions was designed for politicians and entrepreneurs to present their sectorspecific experience.
Value Orientations in Armenia:
Comparative Analysis by Region, Gender, and Age
The value preferences within Armenian culture are both illustrated for the surveyed
sample as a whole and distinctly analysed by region, gender, and age.
Table 3.3 presents the means for 10 basic values and their respective rankings in
the overall sample. Conservative values such as conformity and security are
predominant, which imply trends of maintaining social order and stability in
relationships and refraining from actions that contradict social expectations.
Benevolence, which is the need for attachment with the primary group and manifests
in actions for the well-being of others, also ranks high. According to studies by
Schwartz (1996; 2006b), these values are primarily oriented towards the group and, as
such, have a social focus. The joint emergence of greater values of conformity and
benevolence shows behavioural preference to maintain close relationships by
complying with normative behaviour and expectations. The concurrently high values
of conformity and security indicate a desire to maintain stability, order, and harmony
in relationships. These findings are consistent with our society’s appreciation of
maintaining relationships with family and relatives.
Table 3.3.* Value preferences for the overall sample (N=802)
M
5.15
3.69
5.09
4.53
4.55
3.31
3.22
4.98
3.58
5.03
VALUES
Conformity
Tradition
Benevolence
Universalism
Self-Direction
Stimulation
Hedonism
Achievement
Power
Security
SD
.98
1.20
.89
.97
1.01
1.57
1.64
.97
1.23
.87
R
1
7
2
6
5
9
10
4
8
3
α
.48
.56
.66
.72
.56
.62
.64
.46
.51
.45
*
In this and subsequent tables, the symbols shall have the following meanings: M: medium
value, SD: standard deviation, R: ranking, and α: Cronbach’s alpha.
46
Achievements and self-direction, which are individualistic values aimed at one’s
own success and augmenting one’s own personal potential, have scored medium
rankings. However, these values have different motivational bases. The value of
achievement is primarily aimed at the intention to generate tangible results and
success, which would satisfy the human need for self-enhancement, whereas selfdirection is primarily aimed at augmenting one’s own potential by means of acquiring
new experience, which meets the human need for self-development. Of medium value
is also universalism based on concerns for equality and justice. Interestingly, although
tradition is a conservative value, it ranks rather low in comparison with other
conservative values, such as conformity and security. Power, stimulation, and
hedonism did not rank as important priorities.
As the author of the theory asserts, the results for each sample should be
analysed by combining them with a pan-cultural analysis of values (Schwartz 2001;
2006b). For instance, according to the results of the pan-cultural analysis, the value
priorities are expressed in the following sequence: the three high-ranked values are
benevolence, self-direction, and universalism. Medium values are assigned to security,
conformity, hedonism, and achievements. Power, stimulation, and tradition are
generally considered to have lower ranks. The comparison of the survey findings with
the pan-cultural picture of value priorities shows the following differences: selfdirection and universalism, which indicate values of openness to change and selftranscendence, respectively, have a medium priority, whereas security and conformity,
which are conservative values and are essentially opposed to the values of acquiring
new experience, have a high priority. The other difference is that hedonism is a low
priority rather than a medium priority.
Thus, the Armenian sample is more characterised by values with social focus,
such as values of affiliation with one’s own group and maintaining relationships,
which safeguards cohesion, adaptation, and reduced uncertainty. Less characteristic
are the values underlining individualism, such as the desire to overcome challenges,
the significance of sensation and life satisfaction. This medium (rather than low)
manifestation of self-direction, achievement, and universalism appears to indicate that
such values can grow in either a competitive environment or a transforming social
environment that requires the formation of civic positions. The weak expression of
hedonism in the sample may be explained by the cultural pressing of conservative
values and perhaps by socially desirable responding; hence, the ranking of hedonism
by the survey respondents may be affected by its lack of ‘encouragement’ as a value.
To capture the value change trends and dynamics, a comparative analysis of the
value priorities was conducted for the samples of the capital city and the regions,
followed by an analysis by gender and age.
Table 3.4 below shows no major differences in the value priorities between
Yerevan and the marzes. The only significant difference is that for the Yerevan
47
sample, achievement acquires greater importance and security shows lesser
importance. These findings suggest that an urban lifestyle reveals opportunities and
fosters competition. Furthermore, the capital city is more sensitive to attitude changes
under social transformations, whereas livelihood is based increasingly more on
competition rather than on the collaboration scheme that remains more typical of the
regions. In Armenia, the urban lifestyle is actually reduced to life in the capital city,
which explains the lack of individualistic focus and the predominance of conservative
values in regional towns (which actually do not offer a typical urban lifestyle).
Table 3.4. Comparative picture of value preferences in Yerevan and regions (marzes)
VALUES
Conformity
Tradition
Benevolence
Universalism
Self-Direction
Stimulation
Hedonism
Achievement
Power
Security
M
5.05
3.45
5.08
4.45
4.61
3.11
3.24
5.04
3.44
4.96
Yerevan
SD
.96
1.15
.86
.95
.93
1.54
1.56
.89
1.26
.91
R
2
7
1
6
5
10
9
3
8
4
M
5.21
3.86
5.10
4.58
4.50
3.45
3.21
4.95
3.66
5.09
Marzes
SD
.98
1.21
.92
.98
1.06
1.57
1.70
1.03
1.21
.84
R
1
7
2
5
6
9
10
4
8
3
The comparison of Yerevan and the regions by gender showed no differences
in value priorities between males and females in the regions, although there were some
differences in the value priorities between males and females in the capital city (see
Table 3.5, page 50). The values of conformity, benevolence, and security remain
priorities for both women and men in the regions. The situation differs for women and
men in the capital city: benevolence remains important for women and men in the
capital city, but the value of conformity is markedly different from the regions. In
Yerevan, this value is less of a priority for women but still a priority for men.
Achievement, which is generally important for the Yerevan sample, is the most
prioritised value for women in the capital city, but it ranks as the third highest value
priority for men. This finding may be observed because the modern gender equality
discourse is more active and accessible in Yerevan than in the regions. In everyday
life, women encounter more specific challenges in terms of combining family and
career roles and consequently in their aspirations. This result requires further
examination from the perspective of changing gender perceptions.
The comparison of the four age groups between Yerevan and the regions more
clearly indicates the existing differences in dynamics between value priority trends
(see Table 3.6, page 51). With respect to the first three most important values
48
(benevolence, conformity, and security), which ranked high for the sample as a whole,
two of them—benevolence and conformity—remain important for all age groups in
both Yerevan and the regions. This finding indicates that the preference for normative
behaviour for maintaining close relations is a key motivator. These values and the
value of security remain important for people of middle age and those above middle
age (above 40) in the capital city as well as for people above 30 in the regions. For the
younger (18 to 29) age groups in both the capital city and the regions as well as for
those above the middle age line (under 42 years old) in the capital city, achievement,
which is aimed at self-enhancement, becomes important in addition to maintaining
close relationships. Interestingly, self-direction, as a trend of accepting new
experience, becomes quite visible among young people in the capital city.
Thus, the differing value priorities of young adults reflect the natural agespecific need for achievement and self-enhancement, on the one hand, and the valuenormative changes occurring in society, on the other hand. The challenges related to
self-enhancement and self-direction are more salient in the capital city, with peculiar
social changes occurring there. Hence, the findings suggest that value priorities change
more slowly in the regions, with a ‘lag’ of one generation.
49
50
5.14
3.34
5.13
4.41
4.66
3.21
3.32
5.00
3.64
4.92
Tradition
Benevolence
Universalism
Self-Direction
Stimulation
Hedonism
Achievement
Power
Security
M
Conformity
VALUES
.97
1.24
.83
1.52
1.58
.94
.97
.83
1.04
.91
SD
Male
4
7
3
9
10
5
6
2
8
1
R
4.99
3.27
5.07
3.17
3.02
4.57
4.49
5.04
3.54
4.98
M
Yerevan
.85
1.25
.94
1.59
1.50
.92
.92
.89
1.23
1.00
SD
female
3
8
1
9
10
5
6
2
7
4
R
5.13
3.78
4.88
3.43
3.74
4.60
4.49
5.01
3.72
5.14
M
.84
1.26
.99
1.70
1.47
.99
1.00
.98
1.19
1.03
SD
male
2
7
4
10
8
5
6
3
9
1
R
5.05
3.57
5.01
3.03
3.21
4.41
4.66
5.18
3.98
5.28
M
Marzes
.84
1.15
1.05
1.68
1.61
1.11
.97
.85
1.22
.94
SD
female
Table 3.5. Comparative picture of value preferences between men and women in Yerevan and marzes
3
8
4
10
9
6
5
2
7
1
R
51
5.30 .80
3.64 1.36 8 3.23 1.28 10 3.72 1.17 7 3.05 1.01 8 3.66 1.36 9 3.69 1.11
4.67 .95
Achievement
Power
Security
5 4.89 .97
1 4.91 .95
4 5.26 .75
3 5.09 .92
1 5.10 .82
4 4.72 .78
3 5.13 .98
3 4.90 .93
4 5.00 .99
4 5.09 .80
2 4.99 1.04
5 4.44 1.03
5 4.42 1.04 6 4.55 .95
1 5.00 .83
6 4.37 1.01 6 4.73 .97
5 4.48 .87
2 5.22 .82
3.71 1.60 7 3.43 1.49 7 2.88 1.45 9 2.70 1.48 9 3.69 1.58 8 3.22 1.64 10 2.84 1.63 10 2.88 1.82 10
5 4.51 .88
6 4.69 .89
2 5.21 .86
5
3
3 5.25 .71
1
8 3.56 1.11 8
4 4.98 1.01 4
9 3.16 1.61 9
6 4.35 1.10 6
5 4.73 .93
2 5.14 .97
4
3
5.21 .85
2
3.74 1.21 8
4.74 1.06 5
3.18 1.56 9
4.48 1.03 6
4.75 .96
5.21 .86
4.22 1.11 7
1
R
Hedonism
SD
5.31 .99
M
3.61 1.46 9 3.32 1.66 8 2.79 1.44 10 2.43 1.29 10 3.93 1.45 7 3.37 1.53
4 4.57 .94
2 4.93 .84
7 3.73 1.18 7
2
SD R
Stimulation
M
1 5.21 .91
R
4.89 .85
SD
Self-Direction
M
IV
(54-65)
4.25 1.00 6 4.42 .94
SD R
III
(42-53)
Universalism
M
2 5.10 1.08 1 5.29 .94
SD R
II
(30-41)
5.00 .88
M
3 5.11 .80
SD R
I
(18-29)
Benevolence
M
1 5.18 .94
SD R
IV
(54-65)
3.19 1.23 10 3.31 1.02 9 3.72 1.09 8 3.69 1.14 7 3.60 1.30 10 4.00 1.12
M
III
(42-53)
Tradition
SD R
II
(30-41)
4.90 1.04 3 5.05 .10
M
I
(18-29)
Marzes
Conformity
VALUES
Yerevan
Table 3.6. Comparative picture of value preferences between different age groups in Yerevan and marzes
The dynamic trends of values are analysed according to the structure of
dynamic relations between values proposed by Schwartz (Schwartz 2006b), which can
be used to analyse the zones of conflict (also known as tension) between value
priorities (see Appendix 2). According to the theory of basic values, values are in
conflict when their underlying motivations conflict. A motivational conflict may
contribute to behaviour change by opting for passive or active strategies. In both cases,
an individual attempts to restore the integrity and coherence of self-experience. An
active strategy enables reconsidering behaviour and changing value priorities. In this
case, the tension contributes to active search behaviour and the achievement of
positive outcomes for the individual. In case of a passive strategy, the choice of value
priorities is primarily made with the aim of eliminating psychological discomfort.
Active or passive choices are made on the basis of the motivations underlying the
values examined here. Studies show that self-enhancement and conservative values are
based on the avoidance of threat and self-protection, whereas the values of selftranscendence and openness to new experiences are anchored in self-development and
achievement (Schwartz 2006b). To this end, it would be interesting to examine the
possible tensions between the motivations underlying the values in our sample.
We sought to identify tension between contradicting values that have both
scored high for our sample, thus disregarding those with medium priority.
Benevolence, which has a social focus and is also aimed at self-transcendence, is in
polarity in terms of the underlying motivation with achievement, which has an
individualistic focus and is aimed at self-enhancement. Such a conflict between values
is more pronounced in the case of young adults (in both the capital city and in the
regions) and the residents of the capital city. In other words, when making choices,
young adults (as well as men and women socialised in the capital city) encounter a
contradiction between the motivation to be caring and helping towards their close ones
and the motivation to be a competent member of society to achieve individual success.
For our sample, conformity was also a high-priority value, which further exacerbates
the conflict between these values because individuals, along with the desire to help
close ones, also attach importance to acting in a manner that is consistent with norms
and expectations for maintaining harmony in their relationships. In modern society,
expectations for self-fulfilment, competition, and information flows, and opportunities
for self-actualisation cause young adults to develop ego-centred and individualistic
motivations of self-enhancement. The same holds particularly true for women: the
picture of gender roles and expectations is gradually changing towards egalitarian
attitudes, and women’s need for self-fulfilment and self-enhancement is growing.
Some tension can also be observed between the value priorities of young adults
socialised in the capital city. As noted previously, this age group, in contrast with all
the other age groups, has marked self-direction—the motivating intention to act freely
and to acquire new experience. Self-direction, as an individualistic value of being
open to new experience, is the opposite of conformity—a socially focused conservative
52
value. That is, when attempting to solve life problems or make choices, young adults
living in cities adopting an urban lifestyle currently face a clash between their
motivation to behave in accordance with the expectations of their close ones and the
motivation to act freely and to express their own thoughts, ideas, and creative
aspirations. For young adults, the motivation to be self-directed in their thoughts and
actions conflicts with the general environment that bears more conservative values.
However, priorities in social life do not contribute to self-direction because given the
prevailing feelings of social inequity, double standards, and uncertainty, free conduct
aimed at self-development may undermine one’s own security and well-being and that
of close ones. Under these circumstances, behaviour that is guided by self-direction
becomes increasingly more necessary but also more difficult.
Thus, the analysis of value priorities shows that despite prevailing conservative
and group-oriented values in society, the value priorities of certain groups are tending
to change in view of age, generation, and local (capital city/regional) culture. The selfenhancement values expressed among women in the capital city and young adults in
particular can be regarded as dynamic changes in value priorities occurring against the
backdrop of social transformation.
Main Conclusions
The comparative analysis of value orientations in Yerevan and the marzes by
gender and age groups reveals the following dynamic trends in values:
 For the Yerevan sample, there is a clear difference between the respondents
under and above 40 years of age in terms of the primacy of values with individual or
social focus. For individuals over 40, normative behaviour that meets expectations is
important, as it contributes to stability in behaviour and relationships. For those under
40, the values of achievement and personal success are also important. In the regional
sample, self-enhancement, a value with individual focus, is marked only among
younger adults (under 30). In various age groups above 30, there are no sharp
differences, and conservative values and values oriented towards the primary group
are prevalent. The comparative results in value preferences in capital and marzes
indicate that value change is slower in the regions, with a lag of one generation.
 The differences in value preferences are more pronounced between women in
the capital city and in the regions. The behaviour of women in the capital city focuses
more on achievements, whereas women in the regions demonstrate more normative
conservative behaviour.
 There are discrepancies in the value preferences of young people both in the
capital city and in the regions as well as of women and men in the capital. Conflict
zones are found between the affiliation with one’s own group, normative behaviour,
and achievement values. Such intra-individual conflicts are rather pronounced among
women in the capital city. Furthermore, there is a visible motivational conflict
53
between conservative values and the values of openness to new experience among
young adults in the capital city.
Cultural Aspects of Social Axioms:
Results of Factor Analysis
To understand how social beliefs are manifested in Armenian culture, the study was
conducted in two directions using a combination of etic and emic approaches. The
Social Axioms Survey was conducted for revealing the five-factor structure of social
axioms (39-item version). For drawing typical beliefs consistent with the Armenian
socio-cultural context the questionnaire comprising 37 items was developed and
included in the survey too.
The Social Axioms Survey was conducted in two phases. The sample for the
pilot survey included 187 respondents aged 18 to 72, with different levels of education
(Mage=33.6, SD=12.92, with male respondents constituting 27% of the sample). The
items for the two instruments were revised through this pilot phase, and some
questions were excluded from the Armenian-language instrument. In the main phase,
data from 796 respondents (Mage=38.6, SD=13.58, with male respondents constituting
46% of the sample) were collected, and a factor analysis was conducted. Principal
component analysis was chosen as the Extraction method for the factor analysis, and
Varimax was chosen as the Rotation method.
Findings of the Social Axioms Survey in Armenia
A confirmatory factor analysis yielded the five-component structure of the original
questionnaire. Only 36 of 39 items produced a five-factor structure that accounted for
37% of the variance25. The factor loads are presented in Table 3.7.
The factor analysis confirms the five-factor structure of the original Social
Axioms Survey for the Armenian sample. However, significant differences emerged
for certain factors.
1. The religiosity factor, including all seven of its items, was fully yielded.
2. The reward for application factor was also yielded, but only 8 of the 9 items
compose this factor for our sample.
3. For the fate control factor, 5 of the 6 items composed a factor, and one
question came here from the reward for application factor (‘Failure is the beginning
of success’). The combination of these items in the Fate Control factor shows that
25
Two of this items concern the Social Complexity factor, and one concerns Fate Control
factor.
54
failure and success take turns and are perceived as regular patterns of life, in contrast
with the universal structure derived from the cross-cultural analysis, in which human
effort is considered essential in overcoming failure.
4. For the social cynicism factor, seven of the 11 items compose the factor for
the Armenian sample, and one item was added from the social complexity factor
(‘There is usually only one way to solve a problem’). It is noteworthy that in the
original questionnaire, this item is a reverse question in social complexity, whereas for
the Armenian sample, it is a direct question that joins the social cynicism factor. This
difference could be explained by the fact that in social life, the judgement that
alternatives do not exist is connected with pessimism and mistrust.
5. Unlike other factors, the social complexity factor was not yielded fully. Only
3 of its 6 items (‘People may have opposite behaviour on different occasions’,
‘Human behaviour changes with the social context’, and ‘One’s behaviours may be
contrary to his or her true feelings’) were included in the factor. Another 4 items were
added from the social cynicism factor (‘Kind-hearted people are easily bullied’, ‘The
various social institutions in society are biased towards the rich’, ‘Power and status
make people arrogant’, and ‘People deeply in love are usually blind’). A combination
of these items clearly shows that difficulty and uncertainty of situation, the complexity
of human nature and inconsistency in behaviour create mistrust in others and can
eventually even be assessed as immoral behaviour or as a pattern of unfair life26.
The confirmatory factor analysis shows that the universal structure of the social
axioms generally ‘works’ with the Armenian sample. The only exception is the social
complexity factor, which overlaps with social cynicism. Thus, for the Armenian
sample, the social cynicism factor is divided between two factors that have the
following difference: the factor that includes only questions of Social cynicism reflects
pessimistic and nihilistic positions to positive change in life in general, whereas the
combined social complexity and cynicism factor expresses primarily scepticism
towards human and institutional actions under the uncertainty and complexity of
social reality.
26
As this factor is equally composed of two factors, the combined name ‘difficulty of social life
and cynicism’ will be used in subsequent analysis to avoid suggesting a new name for this
factor.
55
Table 3.7. Factor structure of social axioms for the Armenian sample.
Social axioms items
R
Belief in a religion helps one understand the
meaning of life.
Belief in a religion makes people good citizens.
Religious people are more likely to maintain
moral standards.
Religious faith contributes to good mental health.
Religion makes people escape from reality.
Religious beliefs lead to unscientific thinking.
There is a supreme being controlling the universe.
It is rare to see a happy ending in real life.
There is usually only one way to solve a problem.
Young people are impulsive and unreliable.
To care about societal affairs only brings trouble
for yourself.
Kind-hearted people usually suffer losses.
Powerful people tend to exploit others.
People will stop working hard after they secure a
comfortable life.
Old people are a heavy burden on society.
Knowledge is necessary for success.
One will succeed if he/she really tries.
Adversity can be overcome by effort.
Hard-working people will achieve more in the
end.
Every problem has a solution.
Competition brings about progress.
Caution helps avoid mistakes.
One who does not know how to plan his or her
future will eventually fail.
People may have opposite behaviour on different
occasions.
Kind-hearted people are easily bullied.
SC
RA
SC/
Cyn
FC
.765
.761
.699
.680
-.456
-.445
.424
.586
.561
.534
.513
.481
.468
.458
.440
.645
.640
.611
.569
.551
.488
.469
.383
.574
.540

Items that have factor loads above .36 are introduced in the Table 3.7.
R: Religiosity, SC: Social cynicism, RA: Reward for Application, SC/Cyn: Social
complexity/cynicism, and FC: Fate control. 
56
Human behaviour changes with the social
context.
The various social institutions in society are
biased towards the rich.
Power and status make people arrogant.
One’s behaviours may be contrary to his or her
true feelings.
People deeply in love are usually blind.
There are many ways for people to predict what
will happen in the future.
Failure is the beginning of success.
Good luck follows if one survives a disaster.
Individual characteristics, such as appearance and
birthday, affect one’s fate.
Fate determines one’s successes and failures.
Most disasters can be predicted.
.521
.495
.469
.385
.374
.563
.531
.523
.413
.391
.368
Development of the Armenian Questionnaire of Social Axioms
The Armenian-language questionnaire of social axioms was developed in several
phases. During the first phase, common Armenian proverbs were collected and
semantically analysed, followed by beliefs about different spheres of life derived on
the basis of incomplete sentences. A total of 250 Armenian folk proverbs and folk
proverbs of other nations that are used among Armenians were submitted to content
analysis using Ghanalanyan’s ‘Aratsani’ (Ghanalanyan 1960) and Ohanyan’s
‘Aratsani, Armenian Folk Proverbs’ (Ohanyan 2009) as sources of collection. The
meanings derived from the primary analysis were grouped by categories (themes). As
a result, some proverbs that had a unique meaning and were not included in the
distinct categories were eliminated from the research. The remaining 180 proverbs
underwent a secondary analysis. Eventually, six categories were identified for the
following domains of life: cognition, human nature, work, relations, the relationship
between the individual and society, and supernatural powers.
Incomplete sentences (a total of 28) were prepared according to the
aforementioned spheres of life, which the respondent had to complete by expressing
his or her belief. A content analysis of the results of 120 questionnaires was
performed. The resulting content was grouped by domains of life and the thematic
focus of beliefs expressed therein (for instance, the following topics were identified in
the domain of work: means for subsistence, means for well-being, a condition of self57
expression and self-development, a social duty, contribution to social development,
and a condition for feeling adequate)27.
During the second phase, the analysis of the results of the completed unfinished
sentences was followed by the development of statement items in line with the
identified spheres and themes (initially, a total of 80). Based on the pilot results, the
number of items was reduced to 3728.
Based on exploratory factor analysis, only 28 of the 37 questions composed the
five-factor structure (see the factor loads in Table 3.8). The resulting factor structure
explains 38% of the data variance.
Below are the social axiom factors that were yielded:
1. Agency: beliefs that emphasise faith in human abilities and the fact that a
human being can, if he wants, change and make a positive contribution to his and
others’ lives (for example, ‘One can change many things in his/her life if there is the
wish to do so’).
2. Fortune: beliefs that emphasise the role of chance and circumstances in a
person’s success (for example, ‘One should have luck in order to succeed’).
3. Individual-society tension: beliefs that emphasise that society limits the
individual and that the individual acts primarily in his/her own interests (for example,
‘Society suppresses individuality’).
4. Pessimism: beliefs that deny the potential of positive change, and various
realities are evaluated from negative and sceptical positions (for example, ‘Bad is
found in life more than good is’).
5. Social harmony and humanism: beliefs that emphasise the sense of harmony
and cohesion between the individual and the environment as well as humanism and
the belief that life phenomena are interconnected by continuity and reciprocity (for
example, ‘Anything a person does has an influence on all of humanity’).
27
Because the results of the preliminary stage of developing the Armenian instrument of social
axioms have had an auxiliary role in this research project, it is not practical to present them
here in their full analytical scope. The authors are preparing separate articles based on the
results of the qualitative analysis of beliefs derived from the content of proverbs and
incomplete sentences.
28
The questionnaire was reduced in the following manner: items with repetitive meaning and
items that did not show a normal distribution were removed.
58
Table 3.8. The factor structure of ‘culture-specific’ social axioms.
Social axioms items
A
One can change many things in his/her life if
there is the wish to do so.
A person who is good at figuring out the
character of people around him or her will act
effectively.
All people are the masters of their own fate.
If they wish, people can make the world better.
A kind-hearted person is always appreciated in
society.
People are appreciated by their deeds.
One can become a better person if society helps
him/her.
One should have luck in order to succeed.
Success will find a person.
The future is predetermined from above.
Important events are the result of chance.
Success depends on life circumstances.
Society suppresses individuality.
Society always restricts people.
People always act according to their personal
interests.
Life circumstances change humans.
Power determines one’s place in society.
One will not find his/her place in life if he/she is
uneducated.
Bad is found in life more than good is.
Even real friendship is forgotten with time.
Living in this world means suffering.
One can only rely on him/herself in times of
trouble.
Anything a person does has an influence on all of
humanity.
F
I-ST
P
SHar/
Hum
.680
.608
.590
.584
.506
.493
.462
.647
.615
.598
.547
.537
.740
.592
.500
.471
.389
.591
.548
.540
.465
.449
.575

Items that have factor loads above .36 are introduced in the Table 3.8.
A: Agency, F: Fortune, I-ST: Individual-society tension, P: Pessimism, and SHar/Hum:
Social harmony and humanism. 
59
.543
A person is like his/her environment.
Society gives a person the opportunity to be
happy.
All people are similar regardless of their
nationalities.
Regardless of the type of relationship, one should
accept imperfections in others.
If somebody does not have a job, they should not
feel accomplished.
.511
.508
.453
.378
Based on the yielded factor structure, the beliefs typically found among
Armenians can be characterised by the following aspects. First, there are two
somewhat conflicting beliefs concerning agency and success: the individual is
considered important as an agent of change, but some beliefs emphasise the role of
supra-individual factors and random chance in one’s success. In the context of the
relationship between the individual and the world, world phenomena are perceived
holistically, and beliefs are based on absolute and universal values. Meanwhile, there
are pessimistic positions, denials of positive change, and negativist prognoses. In the
individual-society relationship, the beliefs emphasise tension in societal relations.
A correlation analysis of the social axiom factors yielded from two
questionnaires was applied to understand the beliefs typical of the social-cultural
context in Armenian society. Table 3.9 presents the correlations.
Table 3.9. Correlations between factors of social axioms.
Reward for
Application
Religiosity
Fate
Control
Social
Social Complexity/
Cynicism
Cynicism
Agency
.493**
.108*
.222**
.047
.252**
Fortune
.053
.175**
.394**
.404**
.249**
Individual-Society
Tension
.171**
-.014
.164**
.536**
.315**
Pessimism
.124*
.010
.124*
.384**
.421**
Social Harmony and
Humanism
.363**
.167**
.271**
.178**
.246**
P*≤ .01; P**≤ .001
The Table 3.9 shows many direct correlations. Each correlation can be studied
separately to identify interesting trends of correlation between beliefs. However, with
the research goal in mind, the analysis here focuses only on the highest correlation
coefficients with a 0.1 critical value for each factor.
60
 Agency and social harmony and humanism are correlated with reward for
applications. The shared semantic load of these beliefs is that human actions have
natural consequences. The semantic analysis of composing items also reveals
differences: the reward for applications factor reflects the pragmatic consequences of
human actions, which is emphasised little within the two other beliefs.
 Fortune is correlated with fate control and social cynicism. The semantic
analysis shows that within fortune, the role of chance and destiny is emphasised more
than within fate control. The strong correlation between fortune and social cynicism
may initially appear surprising, but it can be interpreted in the following manner:
individuals with greater scepticism towards social realities are likely to increasingly
rely on external forces in interpreting their behaviour and reality.
 The individual-society tension factor is correlated with social cynicism, which
indicates that there is tension, mistrust, and scepticism in societal relations. One may
assume that such beliefs reinforce the marginalisation of the individual from societal
processes while emphasising competitive attitudes that overlook the public interest.
 Pessimism is correlated with the social cynicism and social
complexity/cynicism factors. These links show that the pessimistic and sceptical mood
grows as social life becomes increasingly uncertain and complicated.
Thus, the correlational and semantic analyses of the factors show that although
beliefs that are typical of the Armenian culture are similar to the universal social
axioms, there are still country-specific trends. The structure of beliefs derived on the
basis of the Armenian-language instrument provides a space and plot for future
research. The substantive analysis of these beliefs would have special value for
understanding the societal processes by discussing them in conjunction with other
socio-cultural and socio-psychological variables.
Values and Beliefs Predicting Political and Economic Behaviour:
Results of Regression Analysis
The third component of the research focuses on the influence of value orientations and
beliefs on the political and economic behaviour attitudes of Armenian citizens. To this
end, a stepwise multiple regression analysis was applied for the interval scales, and
binomial logistic regression was used for the nominal scales. All the characteristics
defining political and economic behaviour were viewed as dependent variables. The
predictor variables were demographic data (age, gender, and place of residence) in the
first phase, 10 basic values in the second phase and social axioms in the third phase.
The regression analysis results calculated for each combined indicator of
political and economic behaviour are presented in Tables 3.10 (pages 66-67) and 3.11
61
(pages 73-74). The comparative percentages of each subindicator are presented in
Appendices 3 and 4 (only the histograms that showed statistically significant
correlations with demographic variables are included).
Political Behaviour Patterns and Attitudes
Concern for Political Issues in Armenia
The regression analysis model derived for political interest shows that concern
for political issues depends on gender, age, and place of residence. Men, older
persons, and regional residents are more interested in political matters than women,
younger persons, and Yerevan residents (see Appendix 3, Figures 3.1-3.4, 3.7-3.12).
The same regression model shows that concern for the political issues in the
country depends on the combination of a number of values and beliefs. With regard to
values, self-direction (independent thought and action), universalism (care for the
equality and welfare of all people), and achievement (the aspiration to attain personal
success) lead to increased interest in political issues among Armenians. Given the
motives underlying self-direction and universalism values, these values can be
assumed to be important guidelines for the formation of civic positions. With respect
to the role of the value of achievement in interest in political matters among
Armenians, such interest turns into conduct aimed at self-enhancement. Thus, a person
may pursue not only civic but also self-centered goals when expressing opinions on
political/civic matters. The value of benevolence, which reflects the preserving and
enhancing of the welfare of in-group members, has a negative effect on interest in
political issues. As family security and ties with relatives are highly appreciated in
Armenian society, the aforementioned reverse effect can be interpreted as implication
that interest in political matters may undermine the harmony and stability of ties with
one’s immediate and extended family.
Thus, at the level of values, interest in political matters is regulated by different
motives. Research results indicate that in addition to self-direction and universalism,
interest in political matters is also reflected in values concerning the relationship
between the individual and the referent group (achievements and benevolence).
Because the achievement value has a positive effect and the value of benevolence has
negative effect on interest in civic matters, it can be assumed that the ‘tension’
between such values causes political interest to have an often covert or passive nature.
To shed more light on this picture, let us refer to the survey responses that did not
undergo regression analysis. For instance, when asked about the reasons for discussing
political matters with family, friends, or colleagues, the respondents most frequently
chose the following response: ‘As a citizen, I am concerned about the political issues
in the country’. However, when asked about their typical involvement in such
discussions, approximately 50 to 60 percent of the respondents stated that they ‘don't
62
initiate but participate in discussions’, and 20 to 30 percent claimed that they ‘are not
active but listen to other's opinions’ (see Appendix 3, Figures 3.5, 3.6). The analysis of
these additional questions supports the conclusion that interest in political matters is
conditioned by conflicts within the value system that prevent people from presenting
their civic positions openly and responsibly.
There are also conflicts at the level of beliefs predicting political interest. For
example, social cynicism, as the lack of faith and trust, reduces interest in political
matters, whereas the belief in reward for application increases such interest. People’s
beliefs reflect the judgement that interest in political matters is a source of concern and
is a thankless occupation as well as the universal belief that no results can be expected
without making an effort.
Voting
The regression analysis model derived for the attitude towards voting shows
that the extent of participation is affected primarily by age, followed by the place of
residence. Older persons and those living in the regions more actively participate in
elections than younger people and those living in Yerevan (see Appendix 3, Figures
3.13-3.19). Other studies also show that demographic features can influence the
propensity to participate in elections. For example, people living in rural areas are
more likely to participate in elections than those living in an urban culture. Studies
also show that adults begin to participate in elections more actively during middle
age29.
The regression analysis results show that values do not have a statistically
significant effect on the decision to participate in elections. According to the same
regression model, the following beliefs can potentially influence people’s decisions to
vote. The beliefs of Agency and Social harmony and humanism have a positive
influence. According to the correlation analysis, these two beliefs are positively
correlated with the social axiom of Reward for application. Some responses have been
analysed to understand the nature of this correlation. When asked which beliefs
formed the basis for the decision to vote, the respondents most frequently
(approximately 50 percent) indicated that ‘I express my opinion as a citizen’ (see
Appendix 3, Table 3.1). Many people, especially those in the regions, believed that
their ‘vote matters in elections’. At first sight, these responses may be perceived as
indicating a civic position, but they are actually often declarative. A closer
examination of other responses shows that few respondents have stated that they ‘go
to vote for the candidate/party with which they sympathise’. This response is more
29
For peculiarities of political behavior conditioned by other demographic indicators, see
Krosnick, Jon A., Penny S. Visser & Joshua Harder 2010. The Psychological Underpinnings
of Political Behavior. In: Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert, Gardner Lindzey (eds.) Handbook
of Social Psychology, Vol. 2 (pp. 1288-1342). John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
63
concrete and objectified. Naturally, the following question arises: if the voter does not
like any of the candidates or parties, then whom he or she can trust, and how does he
or she come to the decision that his or her vote matters? Thus, individuals appreciate
their participation in elections, without a clear vision of what each political force
proposes or what is right.
According to the regression analysis, the intention to participate in elections is
predicted by another belief: social cynicism has a reverse effect on people’s decision
to participate in elections. Such a negative correlation is natural: a person who has
mistrust or other negative attitudes towards various social realities is likely to refuse to
vote. The responses to the additional questions that were used to identify the reasons
for not participating in elections in Armenia were also analysed (see Appendix 3,
Table 3.2). When asked about the beliefs that cause them to not participate in
elections, the respondents most frequently indicated that ‘there is no one whom I can
trust’. This response was rather frequent from middle-aged and older respondents in
Yerevan. Another frequent response was that they ‘do not believe that elections will
change anything’: this response was more common in the regions and among
individuals older than middle age in Yerevan. The less frequent was the ‘I do not have
any preferred political party’ response, which, unlike the other responses, can be
considered a more objective belief reflecting a civic position. Another belief was also
consistent with social cynicism in affecting the decision to vote. The frequent response
was the behaviour attitude ‘I participate so that my vote is not used’, which appears to
be a position of participating in elections, but in terms of the core belief, it is actually
an expression of nihilism and scepticism towards elections as an institution.
Political/Civic Activity
To study the attitudes of political/civic activity, regression models were
constructed for four distinct indicators:
1) Participation in petitions, sit-ins, and demonstrations
2) Attempts to contact any public official or party representative (to raise a
public/community issue or to express an opinion)
3) Expression of an opinion regarding political/civic issues in the mass media
4) Expression of an opinion regarding political/civic issues in online media,
including social networks
The regression analysis shows that participation in political demonstrations and
assemblies and attempts to contact public officials or party representative are predicted
by gender and place of residence, while the expression of opinions in the mass media
is determined by age, and the expression of opinions in social media is a matter of age
and gender. Thus, men are more likely than women to participate in political
demonstrations or assemblies or to attempt to contact public officials. Moreover,
attempts at contacting public officials are more frequent in the regions than in
64
Yerevan. Young people are more likely than the other age groups to express their
opinions in mass media and social networks (Appendix 3, Figures 3.20-3.24).
According to the same regression models, values and beliefs have the following
predictive effect. The value of self-direction is a predictor for all four of the behaviour
patterns of political activity. However, for the expression of opinions in social or other
online media, benevolence joins the aforementioned value of self-direction, although
benevolence actually reduces rather than amplifies the extent of political/civic activity.
Clearly, for all forms of political/civic activity, the value of self-direction and free
expression is a key individual factor. Our findings also confirm some of the findings
from Schwartz’s research (2006b) showing that the values of openness to new
experience, including the value of self-direction, predict political activity.
Among the social axioms, social cynicism negatively affects virtually all forms
of political/civic activity examined (signing petitions, participating in demonstrations,
attempting to contact public officials, and expressing opinions in the media). The
results of the research also show that religiosity is a predictor of expressing opinions
in mass media.
Subjective Prognosis of Political Situation
The regression analysis model for the subjective prognoses of the country’s
likely political developments shows that the place of residence influences optimistic or
pessimistic evaluations: the respondents in Yerevan were more prone to pessimistic
prognosis than other respondents.
The values, as estimated in the regression analysis, do not have a statistically
significant bearing on the optimistic or pessimistic prognoses of the political situation,
but beliefs can predict this prognosis. Beliefs such as social cynicism and social
complexity/cynicism are correlated with more pessimistic prognoses, whereas beliefs
such as fate control, religiosity, and agency are predictors of optimistic prognoses.
Naturally, the lack of trust contributes to the formation of negative political
prognoses. However, in addition to scepticism and the lack of trust, perceptions of the
complexity of social life, uncertainty, and the diversity of social reality also contribute
to pessimistic prognoses. Optimistic prognoses are correlated with belief in agency as
well as belief in the effect of supernatural and superhuman forces. Their positive
influence on political prognoses can be viewed more as an expression of faith and
hope in the future—a general belief that ‘things will be fine at the end’ (not only in
political terms). Thus, in our opinion, the positive predictive force of these beliefs for
optimistic political perceptions is primarily of a protective and compensatory nature.
65
66
P*≤.05; P**≤.01; P***≤.001
F change
R
2
Religiosity
8.143**
.094
6.393**
.061
4.786*
.054
.078*
7.344**
.124
-.097*
-.103**
Social cynicism
-.093*
.154***
.190***
-.052*
-.194***
Expression of an
opinion
regarding
political/civic issues
in online media,
social networks
.207***
.159***
-.100**
Expression of an opinion regarding political/civic issues in the
mass media
Self-Direction
.103**
-.111**
Attempts to contact any
public official or party representative
-.091*
-.155***
Participation in petitions, sit-ins, and demonstrations
Political/civic activity
Benevolence
Place of residence
Gender
Age
3.10a.
Table 3.10. Hierarchical multiple regression: predictors of political behaviour attitudes
67
-.086*
.073*
.095*
.068*
-.143***
Benevolence
Universalism
Self-direction
Achievements
Social cynicism
P*≤.05; P**≤.01; P***≤.001
F change
R
6.368**
3.887*
5.255*
.071
.076*
Social harmony and humanism
.132
.086*
.066*
Agency
.104
.078*
Religiosity
2
.091*
Fate control
-.139***
-.140***
Subjective Prognosis of
Political Situation
-.114**
-.096**
.130***
.327***
Voting
Social complexity/Social cynicism
.089*
.103**
Place of residence
Reward for application
-.155***
Concern for Political
Issues
.175***
Gender
Age
3.10b.
Economic Behaviour Patterns and Attitudes
Concern for Economic Issues in Armenia
The regression model developed for studying the concern for economic issues
shows that the extent of interest in the country’s or community’s economic affairs
depends on the place of residence, gender, and age. Men, older individuals, and
residents in the regions are more interested in economic matters than women, younger
people, and the residents of Yerevan (see Appendix 4, Figures 4.1-4.10).
The regression analysis further shows that interest in economic matters
increases with the value of self-direction and decreases with benevolence. Thus, the
motivation for initiative, the freedom of actions, and the acquisition of new experience
are determinants of interest in the economic issues of the country. However,
attachment to one’s own group and enhancing its welfare do not contribute to
engagement in economic issues.
Social axioms such as agency and social harmony and humanism also generate
increased interest in economic matters, whereas social cynicism has a reverse effect. It
is thus natural that belief in an individual’s abilities and universal patterns of life
increases human activity and social engagement, including interest in the country’s
economic affairs, whereas the underestimation of such regularities and the lack of trust
lead to lower levels of interest.
The predictive role of the combination of values and beliefs in economic
interest can be drawn from the responses to additional questions regarding the reasons
for people’s interest in economic affairs (see Appendix 4, Table 4.1). When asked
what motivates them to discuss economic matters with friends or relatives, a
significant percentage of the respondents stated that they ‘merely wanted to share
financial issues and concerns’. A smaller but still significant percentage of the
respondents stated that they wanted ‘to determine how to manage their expenditures’.
These responses imply a more passive interest in view of the preventive behaviour
strategy, unlike the more active, risky strategy of promotion that implies behaviour
focused on financial gain, such as ‘saving and increasing income’ or ‘accessing
loans’. These responses were relatively less common in the sample.
Economic Risk and Obtaining Loans
The readiness to enter into a loan transaction or to undertake economic risk was
studied through the following three indicators, for which distinct regression analysis
models were implied:
1) Readiness to obtain a loan to improve living conditions (house renovation
or acquisition or the acquisition of household appliances or a car)
68
2) Readiness to obtain a loan to start one’s own business
3) Readiness to undertake economic risk (to start a business) in the near
future.
Although the percentage results for the entire sample show that people are
generally not likely to obtain a loan, the regression analysis revealed some differences
between the groups.
The regression analysis model shows that the readiness to obtain a loan to
improve living conditions is dependent on age: younger people are more likely than
older people to obtain a loan to improve their living conditions (see Appendix 4,
Figure 4.11).
The regression analysis also shows that power (i.e., the motivation to acquire
social status and exercising control through such status) is an important value for this
behaviour to be expressed. Therefore, one can conclude that the improvement of living
conditions (for example, the desire to have a nice house or car) is motivated by the
need for self-enhancement rather than by hedonism and comfort. Self-enhancement is
rather important in a competitive environment and is accompanied by feelings of
tension and the desire to prevent threats.
According to the regression analysis, the axiom of social harmony and
humanism is significantly correlated with the readiness to obtain a loan to improve
living conditions. As this factor is strongly correlated with the factor of reward for
application, one may conclude that a positive, harmonic affiliation with the
environment, which is a precondition of basic trust, contributes to the desire to assume
risks to attain improved living conditions.
The regression analysis shows that the likelihood of obtaining a loan to start
one’s own business depends not only on age but also on gender and place of residence.
Younger people, men, and the residents of the regions are more willing to access loans
for their initiatives (see Appendix 4, Figures 4.12 and 4.13). The regression analysis of
values shows that the likelihood of obtaining a loan is contingent upon the value of
stimulation, which shows that the initiative to start a business meets people’s need to
boost activity through new experiences.
The regression analysis of beliefs also shows that the axioms of fate control and
reward for application underpin people’s intention to enter into a loan transaction for
starting a business. Interestingly, initiative is driven by the belief in reward for
application as well as the belief in the influence of supernatural factors.
The regression model for the intention to assume economic risk (to start one’s
own business) in the future also confirmed its correlation with gender, age, and place
of residence. Once again, young people, men, and the residents of the regions more
frequently report an intention to assume economic risk in the near future (see
Appendix 4, Figures 4.14 and 4.15). Interestingly, the intention to assume economic
risk and to start a business is stronger in the regions than in the capital city, although
economic opportunities may be greater in the capital city. One possible explanation for
69
this finding is that the people in regions assume economic risk for purposes of survival
rather than to increase their income because the living standards are lower in the
regions and occupations are difficult to find, causing people to assume economic risk
in view of ‘the absence of any other options’.
The regression model also shows that the value of tradition does not contribute
to assuming economic risks, unlike the value of power. In other words, conservative
and self-enhancement trends of behaviour conflict in the process of assuming
economic risk. With regard to the beliefs, religiosity and agency can determine the
likelihood of assuming risks, whereas social complexity/cynicism has a reverse effect.
Once again, it becomes clear that people who intend to assume economic risk
rely on themselves and on superhuman forces, while scepticism and mistrust towards
social institutions negatively affects economic initiative and risk taking. Two
behaviour patterns are possible under this combination of beliefs. By assuming
economic risk, people may rely on fortune and God’s will, thus overlooking potential
difficulties and failing to assess risks. However, beliefs in agency, combined with
social cynicism, can cause an individual taking an economic risk to circumvent
institutional rules and to promote the business through a network of ‘relatives and
friends’, thereby relying on the innermost circle of trust.
Economic Well-being
The attitude towards economic well-being was derived from two distinct
attitudes that rely on external (the economic situation in the country) and internal (selfsufficiency and individual efforts) factors of well-being.
The regression model developed for the attitude that well-being is contingent
upon the country’s economic situation shows that such attitude depends on age and
gender. This attitude strengthens with age and is more typical of women (see Appendix
4, Figure 4.16). According to the regression analysis, the values of tradition and
power are negative predictors for this position. The regression analysis further shows
that the axiom of reward for application negatively affects this position, whereas the
individual-society tension affects the position positively.
The regression model for ‘well-being depends on one’s efforts’ shows that this
position is more typical of younger people and men (see Appendix 4, Figure 4.17).
This position of economic independence increases with the expression of reward for
application and decreases with individual-society tension.
Thus, the greater an individual’s tension with Armenian society, the more the
individual connects his or her well-being with the state’s economic development and
prosperity, failing to appreciate his or her personal role and responsibility in
improving well-being. However, when an individual believes that his or her efforts
will generate results, his or her sense of personal responsibility for his or her own
70
well-being grows, and he or she does not place hope on the economic situation in the
country.
The negative relationship of the values of tradition and power with the mindset
that well-being depends on the economic situation of the country and its lack of
significant correlation with economic independence could indicate that these values
underpin some other behaviour attitude related to the achievement of individual wellbeing. The regulation of behaviour according to tradition and power acquired through
public image resembles the vertical collectivism described by Triandis (Triandis
2001a): an individual associates his or her economic well-being with the reference
group (clan or extended family), where relations are regulated by tradition and the
principle of hierarchic power, which resembles a pattern of economic paternalism.
Subjective Prognosis of the Country’s Economic State
The regression analysis shows that the place of residence influences changes in
the perception of the country’s economic situation. The residents of the regions are
more likely to make optimistic prognoses than those of the capital city (see Appendix
4, Figure 4.18).
Given that the regions are economically not developed and that standards of
living are low, it would be interesting to examine the reasons for these differences.
The regression analysis also shows that the value of benevolence is a predictive
factor for the positive subjective prognosis of the economic situation: in other words,
dependence on relatives and close ones contributes to an optimistic position regarding
the country’s economic development.
With regard to the beliefs, Social cynicism and the individual-society tension
make people more likely to be pessimistic, whereas fate control and agency are likely
to make people more optimistic when assessing developments in the country’s
economy.
The comparison of all the independent variables on the basis of the results of the
regression analysis supports the conclusion that optimistic attitudes regarding the
country’s economic development are manifested primarily through experiences of
hope based on simple human and universal patterns. Pessimistic prognoses are
determined by the growth of social tension. This finding explains the more optimistic
prognosis in the regions. Social tension is not as acutely manifested in the regions as
in the capital city, which has a more complex social structure and more uncertain
institutional rules of social behaviour and real ‘rules of the game’.
Subjective Prognosis of the Family’s Economic State
The regression analysis of the findings related to the prognosis regarding one’s
family’s economic situation in the near future shows that although the place of
residence remains a predicting factor, age is also relevant. Both the residents of the
71
regions and younger people are more likely to have optimistic prognoses of their
economic situation compared with the other groups (see Appendix 4, Figure 4.19).
The regression analysis of values does not reveal any significant correlations.
However, the regression analysis of beliefs shows that Social cynicism leads to a more
pessimistic prognosis of one’s family’s economic situation, whereas reward for
application supports a more optimistic prognosis.
Interestingly, the comparative percentages of the results of subjective prognoses
of the country’s and the family’s economic situation show that people tend to have
more optimistic prognoses of their family’s economic situation while being more
pessimistic about the country’s economic situation.
72
73
-.091*
.103**
-.140**
Benevolence
Self-direction
Social cynicism
P*≤.05; P**≤.01; P***≤.001
F change
R
2
Social Harmony and humanity
4.038*
.117
.077*
.109**
Agency
5.316*
.076
-.109**
.112**
Fate control
Individual-society tension
-.150***
.069*
.113**
Subjective Prognosis of
the Country's Economic
State
Social complexity/Cynicism
.077*
.165***
Place of residence
Reward for application
.168***
-.123**
Concern for Economic
Issues
7.066**
.065
.094*
-.103**
.087*
Subjective Prognosis of
the Family's Economic
State
-.176***
Table 3.11. Hierarchical multiple regression: predictors of economic behaviour attitudes
Age
Gender
3.11a.
74
.077*
.061
4.299*
.104**
.084
Economic Well-being
Country condition
.032***
.436***
-.176*
-.286***
-.405**
.430***
.073
4.257*
.076*
.082*
.095*
.083
.450***
-.453***
.133
6.369**
.128**
.121**
-.089*
.096*
Assuming economic risks in
the next five years
-.168***
-.137**
.096*
-.140**
Individual efforts
-.026**
-.812***
Economic Risk and Obtaining loans
Obtaining a loan to
Obtaining a loan to start a
improve living conditions
business
-.221***
-.080*
-.084*
.155***
Cox & Snell pseudo R2
P*≤.05; P**≤.01; P***≤.001
Age
Gender
Tradition
Power
Reward for application
Individual-society tension
Age
Gender
Place of residence
Tradition
Stimulation
Power
Reward for application
Social complexity/Cynicism
Fate control
Religiosity
Agency
Social harmony and humanism
R2
F change
3.11c.
3.11b.
Main conclusions
The regression analysis results enable identification of the predictive force of
various value orientations and beliefs for the political and economic behaviour of
Armenians:
 Individualistic values, such as appreciation of freedom of expression and
freedom of action, are important predictors of interest in political issues and active
citizenship. The importance of affiliation with the group and enhancement of the
welfare of group members negatively predicts people’s interest in political matters and
political/civic activity. Given that benevolence and conformity were both highly
ranked in the sample (demonstrating the strong close ties with an inner circle), the
negative effect of benevolence on political activity perhaps results from the perception
that political engagement may endanger the stability and harmony of interpersonal
relations. Similar findings of certain studies support this conclusion. For example, the
more an individual trusts his or her family as a source of security and opportunities,
the lower his or her civic engagement and political participation. According to the
same survey, there is also a negative correlation between family bonds and trust in
social institutions (Alesina and Giuliano 2009).
 Faith in human abilities and the belief that human efforts will be duly
rewarded increase interest in political matters and the desire to vote. Scepticism of
social realities and the lack of trust in social institutions and in human nature are
predictors of decreased interest in political matters, voting, and civic/political activity.
 Interest in political matters and participation in elections are rather
pronounced among older people and residents of the marzes, whereas political/civic
activity is especially prevalent among younger people who use the mass media,
including online media. The residents of the marzes prefer direct contacts as their
means of political/civic activity. This trend is rather prevalent among older
respondents and among the respondents from marzes.
 People in Yerevan have a more negative prognosis of political developments
in Armenia in the near future compared with the people in marzes. This negative
prognoses result from the perception that life is difficult and uncertain as well as from
higher levels of mistrust. Optimistic prognoses are predicted by religious faith, belief
in the control of fate, and belief in individual abilities.
 The appreciation of freedom of expression and action as well as the
acquisition of new experience are key predictors of interest in economic issues. The
appreciation of affiliation with a group and enhancement of well-being negatively
affect people’s interest in economic matters. As noted earlier, benevolence and
conformity together proved to be rather salient, demonstrating the importance of
strong close ties with one’s own group. Here as well, interest in economic matters and
activity could be perceived as threats to the stability and harmony of interpersonal
relations. Interest in economic issues is stronger among older people, men, and
75
residents of the regions. Interest in economic issues is more prevalent among older
people, men, and residents of the marzes.
 Readiness to undertake economic risks and obtain loans is predicted by the
individualistic values of power and stimulation. Economic risk is also dependent on
beliefs in agency and supra-personal beliefs (such as religiousness and destiny), while
the lack of trust in social institutions and the difficulty of social life negatively affect
behaviours that are focused on people’s well-being. Such behaviour trends are more
prevalent among young people, men, and residents of the marzes.
 In terms of their well-being, people rely on the country’s economic situation
when the dominant perception is the tension between society and individuals. Such a
behaviour pattern grows with age and is more popular among women. However, when
an individual believes that efforts will be rewarded, the position that agency is critical
to economic well-being is increased. This behaviour pattern is more prevalent among
young people and men.
 The appreciation of affiliation with one’s own group and beliefs in destiny and
in agency contribute to optimistic attitudes, whereas social cynicism and scepticism
cause people to feel pessimistic about their prognosis of changes in the country’s
economy. Such attitudes are more common among the residents of the regions. The
prognosis of own family’s economic situation is also negatively affected by social
cynicism. The belief that an individual’s efforts will be rewarded contributes to
optimistic attitudes in this regard. Such attitudes are also found more markedly in the
marzes and among young adults.
Guidelines of Economic and Political Behaviour in Armenia:
Qualitative Analysis
Economic and political spheres are intertwined and interacting. These spheres are both
the context and the factors for human relationships and actions occurring at the micro
level. As illustrated earlier in the book, social behaviour trends are interconnected with
a set of values and beliefs. The latter are affected by certain challenges in present-day
Armenia: some are simply emerging in response to the new reality, whereas others are
the legacy of the past socio-political and historical-cultural experience and can also be
employed for everyday interpretations or justifications of modernity.
This chapter is devoted to the analysis of the qualitative component of the
survey, which is based on the focus groups and semi-structured questionnaires (see the
Methodology section for details). A number of questions could be considered here,
such as how and through what judgements people make sense of reality and their
actions therein, what values and beliefs drive their choices and decisions(especially
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political and economic choices), and how such beliefs and actions relate to the
present-day reality in terms of reproducing or changing the latter.
The analysis is presented through several thematic blocks grouped by their
common underlying beliefs. The boundaries between thematic groups are, of course,
relative, as they are interconnected by the ‘chain reactions’ or common factors that
produce them. The same guiding belief or attitude often emerged in the discussion of
different topics, and likewise, several beliefs can be observed behind the same
behaviour). For example, young people’s discussions of well-being reflected their
beliefs of mistrust in government, trust in their own abilities, and appreciation of
family. By contrast, mistrust, as a core attitude, was the red threat appearing across a
number of sectors and themes discussed. The analysis of the material further shows
similarities and interconnection between the main belief complexes related to political
and economic spheres. The beliefs that are specific to either of these two spheres are
analysed in distinct blocks.
Ambiguity in the Rules of the Game and a Sense of Uncertainty
The most common perception of social life that emerged in the focus group
discussions of both economic and political issues was the difference between written
and unwritten rules, or, in other words, uncertainty of the rules of the game in various
walks of public life. Uncertainty in the rules of the game is both a professional
assessment and an everyday perception.
‘The law and reality coexist as parallel realities in our country. They do not intersect’.
(economic analyst)
‘The problems in towns are mostly due to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the
written and unwritten laws’. (young man from Shirak)
This finding is legitimate because written rules are normally more fragile,
whereas informal rules (culture, tradition, and stereotypical behaviour) are more viable
in a stage of social transformation. In today’s society, unwritten rules have several
layers: they are affected by certain cultural peculiarities (such as close family ties) as
well as by the historical-political experience, including the Soviet-era legacy,
uncertainty arising from the current transformations, and the insufficient experience of
statehood, all of which lead to low trust in formal institutions among Armenians.
‘As the formal institutions were never owned by Armenians but were always imposed by
one or another empire, the Armenians always treated them as something external. This
trend is manifested in the last 20 years, too <...>. We keep trying to circumvent them by
reverting to informal institutions, which is why informal rules have become more
decisive in our life’. (economic analyst)
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Although the young people surveyed often reported their desire and need to live
by the rule of law in a country where life is regulated by clear rules, they often
expressed the belief that the laws are still—or should be—circumvented in Armenia.
‘I personally have everything here, but I am leaving the country... for a country that
lives by laws’. (young woman from Armavir)
‘Those creating the laws think of making such a law that can be circumvented. That is
how it is done in Armenia’. (young woman from Vayotz Dzor)
Although the rules are circumvented with a view of personal gain, the desired
outcome is not necessarily achieved.
‘Our laws outright prohibit transactions in foreign currency. Bank contracts nicely
refer to the Armenian dram, but you verbally strike a deal with them in advance and
borrow dollars. At the moment, I am losing 60 drams for every dollar’. (young man
from Armavir)
Another manifestation of the duality of the rules is the difference in
government-proclaimed and actual policies, which exacerbates the uncertainty. As
neatly put by one of the interviewed experts, this difference is three-fold: the
declarations of politicians often do not match the law, while actual practice does not
match either the laws or the political rhetoric. The idea underlying the accepted norm
is not sufficiently interpreted or conceived by either those enacting or those enforcing
it. Here, when the law is truly ineffective, the underlying idea or value that should
have been ‘introduced’ with the enacted law is also ineffective.
‘Read the official information. They say, ‘The three-month collection rate must be
achieved’. If our country is a market economy, then how can you set a collection rate
for the taxman? The tax revenue should be a factor of market activity’. (political
analyst)
Examples of inadequate internalisation of the idea can be found not only in the
dual application of laws but also in the dual exercise of rights. For example, many
inhabitants of the regions who participate in rallies bend rather than exercise their
political rights because they are actually driven by individualistic or other situational
motivations.
‘When they take us to a rally, we say, ‘hey, let’s go to that rally’. But why do we go? To
stand there together, so that we go out as soon as it’s over. I never cared what the rally
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was for. To me, a rally has a totally different meaning. Otherwise, it would be
meaningless’. (young woman from Armavir)
As many processes and rules are perceived as ‘window dressing’, people find it
legitimate and reasonable to use them as a pretext for acting on other motivations.
Furthermore, formal and informal rules are ambiguous each in turn. The
legislative framework is fluid, and formal rules are frequently revised. Both experts
and entrepreneurs have identified this ambiguity as a challenge.
‘When starting a business, people try to think long term, not just two months from now.
In our country, though, ‘the rules of the game’ change every month for ordinary people.
Over 30 legislative initiatives are enacted annually, and procedures are frequently
changed, affecting a large number of people who are trying to operate lawfully’.
(economic analyst)
‘Our small and medium-sized business entities are tired of following the legal changes
<...>. As a consequence, businesses have to give bribes because they ultimately don’t
know what is right’. (economic analyst)
This discussion reminds us of Sh. Schwartz’s point that institutional practices
reinforce and spread their underlying values. Restated in this context, the ambiguity of
the normative values underlying the institutional functioning reinforces ambiguous
behaviour and circumvention as a means of coping with this uncertainty.
Thus, formal laws do not function as behaviour guidelines. Informal rules (i.e.,
the socio-cultural ‘adjustments’) are not unequivocal either, as culture is no longer
homogenous and is undergoing changes. Thus, under uncertainty and perceived scarce
resources, it is difficult to determine which orientations prevail among the belief of an
ordinary Armenian: are they the mutual assistance, community affiliation, face saving,
shame, and a number of other collectivist values deemed inherent to the Armenian
culture, or are they values with a narrow individual focus and at times even actions at
the expense or to the detriment of others. Not coincidentally, some young respondents
(especially those representing the marzes) spoke of the mentality of ‘villagers’ largely
in positive terms, whereas others (especially farmers engaged in business or labour
relations with villagers) highlighted their negative attitudes in interpersonal
relationships.
The manifestation of normative uncertainty in political behaviour has its own
features, the most typical of which appears to be the absence of clear guidelines for
political behaviour, as reflected in both expert assessments and the judgements of
young adults. The senior generation continue, by inertia, to perceive politics along the
lines of the previous system, whereas the younger generation have yet to develop a
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clear vision of politics, although there are some signs that the values underlying
political behaviour are germinating within them.
‘We do not believe whatever we hear. We do not believe that anything can be changed.
In our consciousness, there are no duties or rights: there is a gap between politics and
daily life’. (young man from Yerevan)
‘You talk to a citizen about laws, but he believes what the neighbours and the friends
tell him. He is 99 percent sure that it is right, no matter how hard you try to show him
that the law provides otherwise. He heard about ‘getting a boost’ from someone, got all
inspired, and it matters much more to him than exploring what the law says about it’.
(young man from Shirak)
In politics as in economics, there is a need but not yet a demand for genuine
processes and clarity. Young people complain about both the absence of laws and the
existing laws. The laws on paper are often perceived as being aimed against people or
as being overly restrictive or flawed. One plausible explanation for this attitude is the
mistrust of the law-making process and the institutions and actors adopting the laws,
rather than the abstract negative attitudes towards laws in general. Against the
background of common mistrust of formal rules, informal rules (or as Kitayama calls
them, ‘cultural affordances’) continue to guide behaviour despite criticism.
From a psychological perspective, it is important to note that individuals are
still not ready to act in accordance with the law, even when the law is present and
clear. Individuals respond to the complexity of social life through situational or
habitual behaviour (‘doing it the way I am used to’), both of which often imply
sidestepping the law. Such individuals think of laws as theoretically correct but fail to
recognise its practical benefits for their lives.
This situation, coupled with the lack of legal awareness, causes many people
(such as entrepreneurs conducting business or citizens voting) to continue acting
dually—at times following the laws, at times resorting to the ‘good old’ bribes and
‘fraternal’ deals. In politics, people continue to focus on the real process and to
complain about the imperfection of institutions (especially electoral institution), often
remaining passive in concrete situations or pursuing short-term goals aiming for the
least self-harm or the most self-benefit. An additional justification is the widespread
belief that ‘nothing will change, no matter what’. Albeit reluctantly, people have
accepted this duality and the rule that formal rules should be sidestepped. The ‘public
convention’ is that laws cannot be taken literally, and lawmakers also appear to have
adopted this belief.
In any event, the surveyed young people, entrepreneurs, politicians, and experts
reported a type of dynamic process: people are beginning to appeal, challenge, and cite
the law in confrontation with the establishment. Enforcing the law is the process and
outcome of a difficult struggle experienced by either a citizen or an official, depending
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on the area. Meanwhile, normative uncertainty in the economic field is resolved in
favour of informal rules, whereas political behaviour is largely limited to formal
participation.
Mistrust
‘One can never really have trust in anything in our country; you are right’. These are
the words of a focus group participant from the capital city, echoing a fellow
respondent’s statement about mistrust. The postulate of absolute mistrust is ubiquitous
among young people, which is why this section begins with this quote. Mistrust is a
problem reflected in virtually all representations of social life. The mistrust trend is
exacerbated by the normative uncertainty discussed above. ‘When someone starts a
business or even plans other activities, they start predicting the behaviour of others
around. And when there is no common ground of rules of the game, the circles of trust
start to shrink rapidly’, states an economic analyst.
Mistrust is tied to feelings of insecurity and instability: it is a feeling and an
attitude, on the basis of which people act or choose inaction.
‘There is also a problem of security, as no one is there to protect you. You could well be
accused of something and then imprisoned, even if you’re innocent’. (young man from
Yerevan)
Young men feel vulnerable to arbitrariness by various institutions, especially
law enforcement agencies. Young men may encounter high risk and aggressiveness in
the environment more frequently than others in their daily life.
Mistrust is demonstrated in various types of economic, political/civic, and
everyday relationships. The focus group discussions and interviews reveal a problem
of mistrust in relations between individuals and institutions as well as in interpersonal
and individual-group relationships. Hence, mistrust has several levels and dimensions.
One particular manifestation of mistrust can be observed in the relations between the
state and business entities.
‘There are distinct sides - the state and the taxpayer <…>. One might see them as
conflicting sides. They try to take it away from you, while you try not to give away’.
(economic analyst)
‘The role of a nation’s tax agency should be about helping the businesses ‘to swim in
the water, not to make them drown’. One should not constantly control and pressure
businesses and treat them with mistrust. You are not there to control crooks. I think it’s
the post-Soviet legacy’. (entrepreneur from Yerevan)
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Entrepreneurs in turn tend to mistrust their peers; they often prefer to organise
all the links of their business chain rather than entrusting and delegating any link to a
professional entity. This tendency hinders business development.
‘Our economy is very primitive in technological terms. People who grow and want to
export vegetables prefer to build their own transportation network. When you ask
them why, they say they cannot trust others to deliver or distribute their produce. As a
consequence, they become fragmented, unsophisticated, do-it-all businesses’.
(economic analyst)
Many forms of everyday economic behaviour indicate antagonistic relations,
which may be a consequence of unyielding mistrust, whereby the state and the
individual perceive one another as mutually impeding. The situation can be illustrated
by the following example: many buyers do not demand a cash receipt when the seller
fails to issue one; however, in principle, hidden sales revenues of businesses harm
them (especially when they are public sector employees). However, people continue to
psychologically identify with law-circumventing entrepreneurs, helping them in the
struggle against government entities that otherwise should have been the middle link
regulating their economic relations. The economic interests of the individual and the
state are perceived as mutually exclusive or at least divergent.
The antagonism between the government and citizens appears to entail
distanced relations between the individual and society at the micro-level, thus
becoming interpersonal mistrust. This individual position of alienation from the public
further fuels the legitimacy of the pursuit of individual interest.
‘The village and even the village mayor lack a communal, civic way of thinking. As
long as he is doing well, he does not care whether the state may fall apart and drown
in debt, whether or not the village will develop’. (farmer from Armavir)
The mutual perceptions of villagers and urban dwellers provide another
example of the distance and communication gap between the individual and society,
which is especially manifested in the form of tension in economic relationships.
‘They overfertilise the land, which makes the produce larger, but then, it’s toxic, not
good at all. They bring it to the city, and unaware citizens see the large size and buy
it. But the villager does not care what the produce will do to the person. As long as it
sells <…> One of them even told me once that even if it kills the citizens, he does not
care, as long as his produce sells’. (farmer from Armavir)
‘I am sure that even if I give him a thousand dollars a month, he will continue to steal.
It does not matter how much they earn. If I pay more, it will not necessarily improve
performance either’. (farmer from Armavir)
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The problem highlighted by the aforementioned farmers is not entirely new, as
such attitudes emerged back in Soviet times, when it was psychologically justified to
misappropriate the assets of the state—that is, of ‘the other’. In the modern private
market economy, the ‘other’ city dweller appears to have replaced the ‘other’ state in
the mind of the villager. The villagers’ belief that their life is more difficult than that
of city dwellers and the improper social care by the state further legitimise the conduct
aimed at improving their economic status.
In political behaviour, this mistrust is manifested in the form of distancing from
the state. The state (both as a system and as the functioning of specific institutions), at
least in citizens’ perceptions, complicates rather than regulates the lives of individuals.
‘Today, I cannot say that I am or you are the Armenian state because we all know that it
would be untrue. The state is the government, and we know what the government is
like’. (young woman from Shirak)
This situation is exacerbated by the conduct and discourses by political entities
as reflected in the media, which reinforce the respective attitudes of individual
citizens.
‘Unfortunately, political entities often see themselves in an antagonistic relationship
with the state, and this holds true not only for the opposition. Politicians in power
frequently feel themselves to be independent of the state. When a parliament member,
whoever he may be, says that nothing depends on him and he cannot change anything, it
is an excuse that directly undermines the image of legislative power... In Armenia, many
politicians think that having power only means being in executive power’.
(politician/public official)
Mistrust is also fuelled by the lack of predictability of political decisions and the
regular frustration of citizens regarding the possibility of participating in political
decision making through elections. Some young people semantically differentiate
between the notions of ‘state’ and ‘government’, but for many of them, the meanings
of these notions are identical. The negative discourse regarding the state, when the
latter is perceived as identical to the government, affects the discourse regarding the
state as homeland, introducing negative connotations into the perception of the latter
as well.
‘I definitely see myself outside of Armenia. I love my fatherland. Armenia is a great
place. But I am disgusted by the state’. (young man from Vayotz Dzor)
‘I know many smart people that are not in Armenia today. They left for the simple
reason that they believe this country sucks the blood of clever people. Clever people are
not allowed to live, to work, and to excel’. (young woman from Shirak)
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The antagonism between the state and the self does not itself demotivate actual
electoral behaviour. However, many young people view the election itself as a
conscious demonstration of this antagonism—a symbolic act of confronting the
system and showing their dissent as well as an opportunity for occasional
participation. However, there is reluctance to participate in other forms of political
conduct, such as demonstrations and protests, which is subjectively justified by the
direct influence of mistrust and scepticism. The latter affect both political and civil
behaviour. Many young people not only are reluctant to engage personally but are also
inclined to criticise activists. They are sceptical of either the objectives pursued by the
activists (the integrity or public significance of such objectives) or the final result of
their action (i.e., the likelihood of positive change).
‘The current environmental movements—Teghut or Jermuk—are not worth a penny for
me, and they will never succeed because our environmentalists are now in the pursuit of
grants, and they do all of this just to make money’. (young man from Armavir)
‘They are doing nothing bad, just good, but still, it is not going to change much’.
(young woman from Yerevan)
Ultimately, different segments of youth reproduce or overcome prevalent
mistrust in various ways or to varying degrees. However, there are two prevalent
trends, approach (personal engagement, action, or acceptance of a situation) and
withdrawal (self-distancing from political and civil processes as well as nihilism).
Reasoning in favour of alienation is most prevalent among youth: non-engagement is
frequently justified by indifference, lack of perceived benefits, feelings of insecurity,
mistrust, or all of the above. This distinction is relative, as any individual may think of
both engagement and alienation as rational. As the sphere is unstable, the beliefs used
to make sense of it are also psychologically unstable.
The duality of the rules of the game and mistrust are apparently more generic
syndromes that entail a number of other perceptions and beliefs, such as low
predictability of the future, uncertainty in perspective, social injustice, fear of the new,
and reliance on self and family.
Low Predictability of the Future and Uncertainty in Perspective
The perceived absence of perspective is natural against the backdrop of uncertainty
and instability. Young people are uncertain in their outlook in terms of both short- and
long-term plans. This belief concerns the low predictability of life in Armenia rather
than of life in general. The difficulty of predicting the near future is combined with a
negative prognosis of the future of the country.
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‘Everyone in Armenia, not just young people, is living in the present day’. (young
woman from Yerevan)
‘We are now waiting for September to see what new surprises our department holds for
us and whether our ‘poor pay’ will remain unchanged or get cut’. (woman from
Armavir)
‘In the morning, when a young person opens his/her eyes, he/she should already know
their plans for the day and not have to get up and make up a plan. One must have
something specific to do, a plan. That is not the case here’. (young man from Shirak)
In economic life, uncertainty is overcome by finding reliable acquaintances,
friends, or intermediaries in the relevant institutions as well as by building networks of
such persons. This trend is quite evident in the field of conducting business, when
securing an informal network precedes the starting of a private business. This attitude
was reported by both the farmers and the capital city and focus group youth when
referring to what they would do before starting a business. These individuals
frequently stated that ‘it is not worth starting anything unless you have a person of
your own in the system’, because ‘otherwise, the taxman will come over and start
abusing you’.
In judgements about political life, the sense of unpredictability is manifested as
a negative expectation or as scepticism in the spirit of ‘who knows who is coming
next’, and specific behaviours of overcoming uncertainty are replaced by a prevailing
trend of self-distancing from the process, as discussed within the previous topic. Of
course, a frequent assertion is that ‘we know who is going to get elected’, but this type
of predictability does not lead to better predictability in one’s own life.
Social Injustice Belief
A key aspect of the aforementioned duality of the rules of the game is that these rules
are segmented rather than consistent for everyone. In the judgements of young people,
this aspect is reflected in the beliefs of inequality and injustice.
‘Something will change when everyone plays on the same playground, and the only
difference is, say, that one plays football better than the other’. (entrepreneur from
Yerevan)
Injustice is reported as a problem in reference to both the respondents’ own
issues and issues for the general public (but especially vulnerable groups). The sense
of injustice is a result of one’s own experience and is observed in the milieu. Young
people particularly tend to perceive injustice in their primary areas of activity:
education and the labour market. Young people often claim that the relationship in the
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country is one of ‘the strong and the weak’, exacerbated by scepticism regarding the
possibility of excelling in the country on one’s own or on account of one’s intellect.
Instead, the respondents, especially those in the regions, tend to believe that success in
the country is determined by position, status and nepotistic-cronyistic relations.
Although the analysis below shows that this pessimism is balanced with a belief in
self-efficacy, the latter is a generic belief about life rather than the means of success in
one’s fatherland.
‘The traffic police stop me, but not the Mercedes that broke the rules in front of me. It is
the very same discrimination as the inability to find a job without knowing someone;
they will tell you that there are no vacancies, or if they do hire you, they will fire you
after a week. But if someone else comes, someone who knows someone or has money,
they will invite them and tell them the vacancy is exactly right for them’. (young man
from Shirak)
‘I am most concerned about injustice in education and employment and, above all,
about the indifference towards persons with disabilities and war veterans. People are
not appreciated’. (young man from Yerevan)
‘I started to think about leaving after encountering injustice in different places with
different people’. (young woman from Yerevan)
Despite the dissatisfaction with the ‘uneven rules of the game’, young people
attempt to gain a position of strength by finding a crony or by employing other means
(money or involvement in political parties) to further their objectives (such as finding
a job or circumventing certain laws while conducting business). In other words,
although they dislike and become frustrated with the existing socio-political structure,
young people largely choose to accept and replicate this structure to meet their own
needs and maintain the status quo. Unsurprisingly, the more likely behaviour driven
by the belief in social injustice is the aspiration to achieve a privileged position in an
unfair game rather than attempts to solve problems by complying with the law.
Therefore, the behaviours and beliefs caused by inequality further reinforce that very
inequality.
This picture is consistent with some findings of the study of social axioms,
which constitute another component of the present study. A combination of beliefs
such as social cynicism and agency as well as the identification of tension between
individuals and society further demonstrates that individuals, while believing in the
possibility of excelling through their own activity, see such possibility outside of
social institutions or groups or even in conflict with them.
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Family as a Point of Departure and Reference
Against the backdrop of the uncertainty discussed above and its various aspects,
family (i.e., the closest circle of trust and the space of ‘us’) becomes the only stable
guiding line. Under a deficit of confidence, the predictable environment is reduced to
immediate family and closest social circles (friends and relatives). Despite ‘good civic
wishes’, people tend to replicate clan- and neighbourhood-type approaches to making
concrete decisions. In the judgements of young people, family is important in a
number of ways: it is perceived as the value of utmost importance, as an argument for
any action, as a primary concern, and as the motivation or facilitator of goals
achievement. The notion of family has primacy in young people’s opinions regarding
different walks of life in both the regions and Yerevan. Below are some illustrative
quotes.
‘Of course, family is the most important value’. (young man from Yerevan)
‘If the family has social problems, you think that you are capable of working and
earning the money, but you don’t have to earn if the family doesn’t have such
problems’. (young man from Syunik)
‘To me, well-being is above all the health and positive energy of my family and my close
ones’. (young woman from Yerevan)
Thus, family is reflected in a wide spectrum of topics, such as subjective
definitions of well-being, motivation for employment and income generation, political
activity or the lack thereof, and individual success criteria. As family is a value that is
not questioned, it is often used as an excuse in dilemma situations. For instance, the
well-being of family or future children is often cited by young people as a potential
reason for emigrating. The culture presumably does not approve of individual motives
as sufficient justification for one’s decisions. As a consequence, young people who
have not yet formed a family often make the following statement: ‘I would not like my
children to live here tomorrow’.
Thus, family is both a starting point and a point of reference. In Armenian
society, the family focus is reinforced by tradition, while current social life adds to
such reliance through instability and narrowed circles of trust. Young people begin
expressing needs and behaviours of self-focus and individuation. In this mixture,
family somehow becomes the ‘extended self’, which combines self-interest attitudes
and expectations of significant others.
Family focus is a combination of the current socio-political reality and the
cultural foundation, which is a psychologically understandable adaptive strategy, as
undesirable as it may be from the perspective of public interests and coexistence.
Economic competition under rough capitalism is justified by the culturally acceptable
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appreciation of the welfare of one’s inner circle and family. In such a country, the
sense of competition is essentially based on the legitimacy of preferring one’s family
(friends and relatives, in wider terms) over vague perceptions of public interest. The
individual-society tension that was derived earlier and discussed as a belief is
expressed in the form of a conflict between individual interests and public interests in
both economic and political behaviour, where individual interests are largely restated
as family interests. This tension is best illustrated by the following quote concerning a
formally stated agricultural development plan, which is eventually adapted to family
interests.
‘In the framework of making low-cost agricultural machinery accessible to the
cooperatives, they lowered the cooperation membership threshold to 14 farmers. As a
consequence, many families and extended families purchased machinery under the
disguise of a cooperative and left it at home, unused. It did not contribute to
development and did not serve the public’. (farmer from Armavir)
In this example, economic cooperation was bent rather than promoted,
essentially being used for family-clan priorities. The public space is not perceived as
the shared space but rather as a place from which one can take assets home to the
family.
Although young people theoretically recognise the importance of public
interests and the need to overcome the narrow mentality, they continue to bear this
way of thinking. The legacy of Soviet beliefs, whereby one’s own interests cannot
match those of the state, is another factor in undervaluing public interests. Thus,
family is a cultural factor that assigns norms or the circumvention of norms for
economic and political behaviour. However, the primacy of family is based on not
only culture and tradition (as is often claimed by the young people) but also on
universal psychological mechanisms as well as hybrid mindsets and practices formed
through the capitalist and socialist systems. This dual basis may explain why the
competition that is already noticeable in Armenian society remains at the interpersonal
level, failing to lead to the expected outcome of social progress.
The foregoing can be more easily visualised in economic behaviour. However,
in political behaviour, given the absence of specific political beliefs and ideologies,
family also becomes a primary guideline. Some political experts and politicians tend
to believe that the family focus is a negative consequence of the lack of political
culture, whereas other experts view it as a negative factor that inherently hinders the
formation of a culture of political behaviour.
‘All values exist in society, but the family value is dominant. This value can and largely
does influence the political field. In many cases, it hinders the formation of statehood as
a value. Family, friendship, and reputation are all about the family. If the family father,
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for instance, calls and says that such and such is the such and such of our relative and
we must vote for him, it is not even discussed <...>. The words of informal
neighbourhood authorities work in the same way. Of course, the situation is changing in
recent years, but the mechanism still works, more in the rural communities and less in
the larger towns’. (politician)
The role of family in political behaviour can be perceived in a narrow sense
(close relatives) or in a wider sense (extended family, clan, or other close ones). The
family factor can influence political behaviour in different ways through active and
passive attitudes. Young people (especially those in the regions) may vote as
instructed by their extended family or may take the initiative to engage in political
parties or electoral campaigns to secure income for their family or to support a
neighbourhood friend or a relative who is a candidate. Despite the negative label
attached to politics in society and the low level of political engagement, such
indifference is overcome when there is a family or friendship interest. For this reason,
perhaps, political involvement has more often been interpreted as a means of ‘taking
care of business’ or helping a candidate rather than as undertaking an ideological or
civic commitment.
In sum, the family focus is more salient in economic behaviour. Political
behaviour, especially that of young people in the capital city, is driven by a number of
other situational and individualistic determinants.
Double Determination Theories of Well-Being
Young people make balanced statements about well-being, recalling its material and
non-material elements as well as its individual and supra-individual elements. The lay
theories of the essence and achievement of well-being could be called two-factor
theories and are discussed in several bipolar dimensions.
Material and non-material dimensions. Young people in both the capital city
and the regions underline the decisive role of the non-material dimension in their
subjective definition of well-being. Material well-being is often perceived as necessary
but insufficient and by some even as an unnecessary and insufficient precondition.
Individuals frequently cite such indicators of material well-being as financial
independence from parents’ family (especially girls), sufficient wealth to secure
physical comfort, the ability to possess unnecessary items, and other factors. Reported
elements of non-material well-being include the possibility of having and interacting
with a circle of friends, satisfaction with family life and professional employment, the
well-being of the close ones, certainty regarding the future, and the ability to
experience well-being as an internal state of mind (satisfaction with one’s current
status, appreciation, and building relationships). Some have reported the absence of a
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direct link between material and subjective well-being. Moreover, young people often
use the material aspect to define what well-being is not about. Below are a few
examples that help to understand the semantics described here.
‘Well-being is not about a fancy house and car <...>. Not everything is measured in
money. Some people are very rich but unhappy. You can never buy happiness. This is
very important to understand’. (young man from Armavir)
‘To me, well-being is about living a satisfied life with friends, family, and work, i.e., the
creation of an environment where you can freely express yourself’. (young woman from
Yerevan)
‘If you want to, for example, make your child happy, it is nowadays associated with
money; you want to take the child to a little cafe, but you don’t have the money’. (young
woman from Armavir)
Subjective (individual) and objective (supra-individual) dimensions. In this pair,
the subjective element is appreciated more, as understood from a number of
perspectives: (a) its achievement depends on the person, (b) its definition and the
criterion of the feeling of well-being are also subjective, and (c) it is an ever-growing
notion that grows after reaching the next level of well-being and should thus be
contained/restrained by will.
‘I think that people are very greedy: the more you give them, the more they will want.
Every new achievement is first perceived with enthusiasm, and then it becomes
ordinary’ .(young man from Armavir)
‘Living a good life is relative. For instance, those that have a lot of money think that life
will be good when they can travel abroad for a vacation once a month. For people like
me, life is good when I have the smallest things that I need to feel secure, because when
I look around, many don’t even have a house. Now, if I were to complain about my life,
they would have the right to complain about not having a life at all’. (young woman
from Armavir)
Among the supra-individual criteria, the appreciation of public well-being as a
precondition for individual well-being is of particular interest. With regard to the
differences between the capital city and the regions, this belief is more common
among the regional youth.
‘There are so many humanists, aren’t there? Mandela and many others. People feel that
if their peers are not feeling well, it will psychologically affect them. If your peers have
problems, for instance, if their roof is leaking, then you aren’t living well either’.
(young man from Shirak)
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‘Well-being should be universal. A businessman in a developed country is different from
a businessman in our country: you see that your own well-being here does not solve
problems, and you cannot consider yourself really well off’. (entrepreneur from
Yerevan)
One particular aspect of this supra-individual, contextual view of well-being is
living in one’s fatherland as a precondition: it shows that young people’s migration
intentions, while widespread, do not necessarily have positive connotations, and there
is an ambivalent emotional attitude. Migration is considered critical to material wellbeing, but non-material well-being could be endangered when one is away from one’s
fatherland.
‘You may be able to achieve socio-economic well-being by living in a foreign country
with greater opportunities, but if you are not in your own country, you are about 50
percent incomplete’. (young woman from Armavir)
Independence from the family (financial autonomy) vs. connection with the
family (investment). In either case, family is an important aspect of perceptions of
well-being. One’s own financial activity is also important for everyone. The nuance is
that some young people define individual well-being on the basis of independence
from family, whereas others focus on the family’s well-being and appreciate their
investment therein. Young women in the capital city are developing autonomy as a
component of well-being. The ability to help family and friends is more emphasised in
the regions than in the capital city. Being separate, pursuing one’s own interests, and
having personal time and space are more important in the capital city than in the
regions. Interesting entertainment and pastimes are also considered important in the
regions, but collective pastimes are dominant. High levels of economic activity are
also desired by young women in the regions, who often articulate goals of starting a
business, but the justification is related to finding interesting work and helping the
family rather than being independent from their family.
‘I would like a salary that would allow me to organise my life so that I would not
depend too much on my parents’. (young man from Yerevan)
‘I would like to have enough money to rent an apartment’. (young woman from
Yerevan)
‘According to the old mentality, girls are supposed to cook and do work around the
house. For this girl, well-being is about having a rich husband who will secure a
kilogram of tomatoes and a kilogram of cucumbers and the like every day, so that she
can stay at home and happily cook meals. According to the modern mentality, a girl
would like to have a job and do her own shopping. To me, the second mentality of wellbeing is more important’. (young woman from Yerevan)
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‘I, for example, feel better when I earn my salary and help my parents with even 200
drams. Although I am a student and have homework, I would not sleep at night, but I
would dedicate two hours a day to tutoring children in order to make some money’.
(young woman from Syunik)
According to the quantitative survey of values, self-direction is more
widespread among young people in Yerevan than in the regions. The focus groups
also confirmed this difference.
Present and future dimensions of well-being. Certainty regarding the future is an
important measure of well-being in the capital city, especially among female
respondents. Young people express two types of somewhat inconsistent wishes:
saving for the future and current spending. These two tendencies are based on the
seemingly different values of security and an emerging individualistic focus.
‘With my lifestyle, 300 to 400 thousand drams would be enough to visit pubs, buy
clothes, and pay rent’. (young woman from Yerevan)
‘Certainty of the future is important for me as well, so that my resources are enough not
only for living through the month, i.e., satisfying the most basic needs, but also creating
something new’. (young woman from Yerevan)
‘I should have a job and an opportunity for continuous education rather than just to get
an education once and for good. I should be able take private classes somewhere.
That’s what well-being is to me’. (young woman from Shirak)
Personal and non-personal factors of achieving well-being. Some young people
believe that well-being can be achieved through will, and others believe that it is
possible through the state, the country’s socio-economic situation, society, or other
people. A widespread belief of individuals in the regions is that good employment
cannot be found, good education cannot be received, and a position cannot be
achieved without knowing someone or paying a bribe. In any case, most young people
view well-being as a combination of two groups of factors in which the agency
component prevails.
‘What matters here is the situation in the state. You might be a warehouse guard, for
instance, but be able to feed your family’. (young man from Syunik)
‘If a person is motivated and has set a goal, then he will achieve it, and nothing can get
in the way’. (young man from Yerevan)
‘I think that the country’s socio-economic situation and the person’s individual
aspirations are directly correlated. But, in my opinion, the individual factor prevails’.
(young woman from Armavir)
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The factor of state-individual tension also affects beliefs related to the
achievement of well-being. Young people do not expect the state framework to
provide special care that would be typical of classical paternalism; rather, they expect
the state simply to avoid creating obstacles. With faith in one’s own agency and the
unfavourable macro-environment, the individual takes initiatives despite rather than
because of the social structure.
Another belief is that achieving welfare is difficult in Armenia. It is deemed
possible but extremely time- and energy-consuming. Earning the money needed for
well-being is associated with dishonesty, whereas earning it honestly is associated
with excessively hard work, suffering, and deprivation from family and friends. If
measured rationally, the required effort is inefficient compared with the reward
possible in another country with the same level of effort. This factor also contributes
to the choice of emigration, despite the emotional preference for remaining in the
country.
‘If I am going to achieve the same elsewhere more quickly, why should I not leave?’.
(young man from Yerevan)
In sum, young people generally have a positive yet balanced attitude towards
material well-being.: they appreciate it as a means rather than as a goal. Few people
view well-being through a purely materialist lens. Hence, there is a need to moderate
the frequently articulated judgements about the current young generation being highly
materialistic. The trend of ‘dematerialising’ well-being is especially typical of young
people living in the regions, particularly young men.
Economic Self-Efficacy
This term is introduced to characterise young people’s overall trust in the ability to
achieve economic success through their own efforts. The section above highlighted a
number of factors that can potentially limit or demotivate an individual’s economic
activity, such as the unfavourable socio-political and legal framework, the fluid rules
of the business game, beliefs about social injustice, general mistrust in institutions and
groups, and cultural limitations related to experimenting and implementing something
new. Nonetheless, young people have demonstrated optimism and readiness to be
economically active and to make an effort to achieve well-being. Both young men and
young women, especially those in the regions, have a clear desire to conduct business
as a means of achieving autonomy and self-development, helping relatives, and
accomplishing other goals. When asked what they would do if additional money
became available, many young people stated they would prefer to start a business and
‘turn the money around’ in different ways. In fact, young people’s readiness to
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conduct business is overly high given their current level of economic and legal
competence.
Economic self-efficacy is based on a number of judgements. The most important
considerations include the need to be active and feel ownership in their lives, the
appreciation of personal goals, and the belief in rewards for efforts and abilities. A
particular example of the latter is the belief that qualified specialists and professional
work are valued.30
‘A good specialist will always find his/her place. Regardless of profession, if you are
good, you will get a new job invitation two hours after you quit the previous one’.
(young man from Yerevan)
‘We mentioned a lot of problems in the city, but I am personally sure that if I set a goal,
even it contradicts the laws of our state and many such things, I will definitely achieve
my goal’. (young woman from Shirak)
Thus, a problematic and uncertain environment may both undermine and
promote business initiatives. Young people who agree to a game without clear rules
acquire additional opportunities and confidence to act.
However, the belief of self-efficacy does not extend to young people’s political
behaviour. This is somewhat natural: economic activity is related to daily life more
directly than political activity is. However, this finding also indicates that the positions
of self-efficacy and of being an actor have yet to be developed or comprehensively
appreciated by young people.
Universalist Beliefs of Entrepreneurs
The problems of values and beliefs in the economic sphere that were noted by the
experts and focus group participants are also applicable to entrepreneurs. In business
activities, entrepreneurs experience mistrust, mutual negative attitudes (vis-à-vis the
state and consumers), normative uncertainty, and a number of other problems as
tangible experience and take all of these into account in their activity. However,
discussions with entrepreneurs revealed the beliefs and behaviours that are
autonomous with respect to the socio-cultural, legal, and political context and that
contribute to progress and results despite this context. For the purposes of this survey,
we have labelled them universalist beliefs and behaviours.
Such beliefs include the appreciation of will and effort, the individual
determination of success and failure, the appreciation of development and the social
30
In parallel, some young people, especially those in the regions, state that education is not
appreciated and that success can be reached by means of force and cronyism. However, these
beliefs were not prevalent.
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commitment to contribute to development (not only of one’s own business but also of
society as a whole), self-development and self-improvement, patience, maintenance of
optimism, caring for business as a standalone value and part of life, devotion, building
positive relationships, and honesty. To illustrate this point, below are some comments
by entrepreneurs operating in Yerevan.
‘I know from experience that a person is capable and, under objective circumstances,
would be able to reap the results of investment and the way he/she treats his/her work.
Business is like educating a child: it requires investment, dedication, and creativity’.
‘If sales are not going right, I ask only myself and my staff what happened. We must
look for the reason within rather than blame the rain, the sun, the snow and the like’.
‘Business well-being is not about maximising profits in the short run. It is about the
constant growth of the business. My philosophy of life is that people must continuously
develop’.
Interestingly, the dominant motivations for conducting business transcend
individual focus and are pro-social (i.e., overcoming egocentric motivations and
focusing on others), intrinsic, and process- and substance-oriented. The initial
motivators for starting a business are related to becoming independent, embarking on
an important endeavour or addressing the situational necessity of assuming
responsibility rather than achieving immediate financial gain.
‘If you try just for yourself, nothing will come of it. You are making an effort for your
customers’. (entrepreneur, Yerevan)
‘Business means bidding farewell to quiet life and free time. Big bucks should not be
expected. There are places for it in Armenia and perhaps any country, but one should
not get involved there’. (entrepreneur, Yerevan)
Thus, the analysis of the universalist beliefs of entrepreneurs allows for
balancing and supplementing the understanding of the limits and potential of an
individual’s economic behaviour, beyond the local reality and the everyday
judgements of young people. Furthermore, many of the elements of their beliefs could
serve as models for improving the efficacy of any social behaviour. This circumstance,
coupled with the fact that financial-economic behaviour is more flexible than other
forms of social behaviour, means that sensitization of citizens and the promotion of
participatory behaviours could be best achieved by improving the forms and
awareness of economic behaviour. A comment from a businessman from Yerevan
illustrates this situation well: ‘I think that political behaviour should decline and
economic behaviour should prevail in society because we live by it, and we spend
most of our time doing it. Activities related to economic behaviour should be
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intensified. Economic competence should be taught as a part of education. Practical
and simple economics can be taught as early as at school’.
Importance of Fate (Fortune)
The belief in the importance of fate also motivates economic activity and generally
influences the perception of various aspects of life. As life is not very predictable,
reliance on fortune can be helpful for making sense of events and phenomena that
cannot be explained by individual or objective factors in a sufficient or
psychologically favourable manner. Many young people consider fate to be important
for economic success, thereby circumventing the following rational dilemma: ‘does it
depend on me or the state?’
‘It’s not even one’s brains; it’s fate. For example, there was this man who stood next to
my brother in a market in Russia. When the taxman came, one out of ten shops had to be
closed down, and every time, they would close down this same man’s shop. He was
smart, as he had gotten to that point. But if he has no fortune, and if they are going to
close it down, what is the point of being clever?’ (young man from Syunik)
‘Fate is important. Everyone aboard the Titanic was healthy and smart, but they had no
fortune. What could they do?’ (young woman from Syunik)
Generally, reliance on fortune and irrational beliefs and behaviours are
especially typical of the economic activity of villagers for a number of reasons.
Villagers are more likely to borrow loans to ensure that ‘the land does not stay idle’
and that ‘the neighbour does not blame me for not working’ as well as for a number of
other reasons, such as the need to repay older loans. However, agriculture per se is
‘lacking calculations’ and is often unprofitable. Villagers often have inertia and are
conservative, which causes them to continue performing their work without using
modern methods of agriculture. Villagers are not likely to invest in risk-reducing
measures. Their economic literacy is not sufficient, either. Furthermore, villagers do
not feel protected or supported by the state; therefore, they must find other means of
support. In addition, there is an objective aspect of the unpredictability of agriculture
as a result of the weather and other factors. In this sense, the irrational notion of
‘fortune’ has its own rationality. This belief helps to rationalise negative outcomes and
to accept the situation, albeit passively.
‘Agriculture is so risky and unprofitable that one mistake can cancel out the benefits.
Most of the villagers make not one but dozens of mistakes in their farming practices, and any
one of those mistakes can cause great harm. In other words, they can be gainful only if fortune
is on their side’. (farmer from Lori)
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Lack of Ideological Basis in Political Behaviour
One of the main problems is the lack of a real ideological foundation for political
behaviour. This problem affects the political activity, affiliation and electoral
behaviour of both citizens and politicians. Some have reported that this negative trend
has worsened in recent years.
‘With very few exceptions, citizens in Armenia do not have the important political
grounds for voting, which is why election results in Armenia are very volatile: a party
may get 20 percent in one election and zero in the one after. It is not even the
generations that are volatile but an individual’s voting over the course of a four-year
period between two elections’. (politician)
‘In the recent past, political behaviour was primarily driven by national interests, but
now, it is determined more by individual interests’. (political analyst)
‘Many people, for example, have no idea about politics, and they say that they will vote
for whoever gives them a little something, but they really do not understand whom they
are voting for or what they are doing’. (young woman from Armavir)
Some analysts and politicians problematise this situation as the lack of
ideological maturity of political relationships and politicians or as the low level of
political discourse and political culture in the country. This problem has frequently
been discussed within and prior to this study. From the perspective of this study, it is
more important that this characteristic of the political landscape is also mirrored in
young people’s behaviour, which is essentially guided by situational, individual,
community and other reasons rather than by civic position.
‘For example, I like their ideas and programmes. Besides, if I see some help from a
party, why should I not be a member of it? We get the free shuttle to the city from them,
for example’. (young woman from Armavir)
‘Why should they participate if there is no material benefit in it? They will get involved
when the problem touches them and their pockets. The people living near Mashtotz Park
should fight for it’. (young man from Syunik)
Many young people need a political orientation, but this need largely remains
unmet. The focus group participants stated they wanted to join political forces with a
convincing ideology. At present, however, they see limited possibilities for such a
party. During the discussion, the respondents shared examples of how their own vote
or party affiliation had been non-ideological. The ideological deficit, coupled with the
profound mistrust in institutions and processes, causes many to engage in more
materialistic and economic-oriented political behaviour.
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‘People very often do not trust the election process, so they just choose to somehow
benefit from the process <...> It is a problem: there is a layer of society for which
elections are associated with earning money’. (political analyst)
Furthermore, situational factors can act not only as motivators but also as
demotivators: some young people do not vote and do not participate in demonstrations
because ‘nobody will join’ or because ‘there is no time for it’.
Another consequence of the vague ideological basis is that political affiliation is
more often based on formal necessity rather than sympathy, and people find this basis
for affiliation acceptable.
‘As a public official, I became a member of the Republican Party. But I could not tell
you that I did it for myself. I have not gained or lost because of it. I sometimes forget
that I am a party member or that I have ever been one’. (young woman from Armavir)
‘I am a member of Party X, but I do not really ‘get along’ with that party. They just said
to join, and I became a member, you see. But I have not helped and will not help’.
(young man from Syunik)
The lack of an ideological foundation, however, gives rise to other behaviours:
not everyone ‘derives benefits’ from the situation or depends on the prevailing public
opinion. In the absence of a specific orientation, the vote becomes abstract for many
people, but it is psychologically a key symbolic act that confirms the fact that they are
citizens. Some young people consider it important to perceive themselves as actors in
an abstract sense from concrete circumstances and results. Others have more
minimalist expectations: they wish to insure themselves against a future sense of guilt
for non-engagement and follow the stereotypical cliché of ‘honouring the civic duty
when going to vote’.
‘I thought that I am a citizen of the Republic of Armenia; I have the right to vote, so I
went there and exercised my right, and it really is irrelevant whether or not that
particular candidate will get elected. I went to vote because of the belief that I am not
just putting a checkmark but that my vote will really bear great significance’. (young
woman from Armavir)
‘You should be able to do what you can, so that you do not blame yourself for
indifference later. The people who want you to do nothing are waiting for you to
become disillusioned. That’s why everyone should make their little contribution, so they
can later claim that they have made a little attempt towards the struggle, even if it
failed’. (young woman from Yerevan)
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Personalised Perception of Politics
The lack of an ideological foundation is closely connected with the personalisation of
political events. This personalisation has several aspects, including the tendency to
vote for the political persona rather than the party line. Culture-driven communal and
family guides as well as historical experiences are also essential in this context.
‘In post-Soviet societies like ours, the focus on the leader is important. People focus
little on the programme <...>. Wherever we are, right or left, the focus is always on the
leader’. (political analyst)
However, the personalisation of the political process does not solely or
primarily result from the cultural factor. Seeing political reality in a personalised way
has its objective reasons in the current reality, and it is a derivative of the personalised
relationships and apolitical conduct of the politicians themselves. Personalisation is to
an extent justified by citizens’ recurring experience and subsequently reinforced by
their subjective interpretations. People become convinced that their life depends less
on the ideological platform of the structure than on the individual motivations of the
decision makers. In other words, there are still no grounds for viewing politics as an
impersonal process.
Another aspect reported by young people and deeply rooted in the public is the
belief that politics are based on narrow private interests, which causes them to treat
politics negatively—as an unclean sector—and to distance themselves from it.
‘I generally have nothing to do with anything. I would not even go to vote, had they not
taken me there by picking me up in front of the building. I always end up just voting for
someone irrelevant. I live in the Avan district: I know that they are all the people of one
man. So who can I vote for? I don’t care for any of them’. (young man from Yerevan)
‘I participate in the election. I am not a member of any party, and I don’t read the
newspapers. For me, politics is disgusting’. (young woman from Yerevan)
Another aspect of personalisation is related to being guided by friends, relatives,
or formal or informal figures when voting or participating in demonstrations or other
processes. Politicians and experts have also stated that elections in Armenia are
influenced by these considerations, in addition to fear and bribes. This trend is
particularly noticeable in the regions and the rural communities, where interpersonal
relations and dependency on local partisan or state structures are more tangible. The
political collective identity of ‘self’ and ‘other’ is determined by proximity to the inner
circle of a candidate or politician rather than by any ideological identification.
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‘I took part in all of his demonstrations: I just went because the community mayor or
the community chairman of those Armenian Eagles is a relative or a close
acquaintance’. (young man from Vayotz Dzor)
‘If a respected person tells them to go and vote for such and such, it is no longer
discussed. Although it’s slowly changing and the civil society experience in recent years
shows that it may no longer work like that in the near future, it is still there, working,
less in the larger towns and more in the rural communities’. (politician)
Fear of the New and Scepticism of Change
Although economic behaviour is more flexible than political behaviour, some aspects
of economic behaviour are also conservative and demonstrate a reluctance to try new
things. Farmers and economic experts often state that there is a scarcity of innovative
and unique business projects and ideas, which they frequently attributed to the
culturally driven conservatism (e.g., villagers are reluctant to switch to new land
farming practices, and sole entrepreneurs often replicate what their peers are doing and
offer services that are no longer demanded in the market).
The ambivalent attitude towards the new is typical primarily of urban
perceptions. These perceptions are, of course, coupled with concerns such as ‘it cannot
continue like this anymore’ or ‘something has to be changed’, but they have yet to
acquire specific substance. Scepticism towards the new is often combined with
scepticism towards positive change and success (unlike economic activity, which is
more heavily based on optimism).
Only some of the young people participating in elections actually believe that
change will occur. There is a prevalence of disillusionment and apathy, especially in
the rural areas in the regions.
‘Whoever gets to the polling station says ‘nothing will change, no matter what’ before
going inside to vote’. (young woman from Vayotz Dzor)
‘Many people go to vote for the lesser evil, choosing ‘the devil’ they know’. (young man
from Armavir)
There are several possible sources of such beliefs. First, such beliefs are
influenced by culturally dominant values and perceptions: the prevailing attitudes
towards the new and different are ambivalent and disapproving, and individual activity
and rebelliousness are not encouraged. This trend is stronger in the regions and the
rural communities, where judgements appreciating the old and relying on the familiar
are more deeply rooted in communal relationships. As a consequence, many young
people engage in political behaviour despite the prevailing beliefs. New types of social
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behaviours are not well received in a conservative environment, as confirmed in the
following quotation.
‘One of the main problems is the mentality of the citizens of our town, Gyumri. If I work
as a volunteer every day, free of charge, for a public cause, then a group of young
people may consider me stupid. They think it’s a matter of honour and that they should
not do free work for another person. Honour is a positive word, but we’ve gotten it
confused’. (young man from Shirak)
Another source of scepticism of change is the current socio-political reality and
individuals’ recurring negative experience therein (i.e., the negative results or absence
of results of political participation).
‘People are sure that nothing can be changed. This is also due to the elections’.
(political analyst)
‘It has been the case until now: they can get anyone elected. If people’s vote mattered
even once, they would have faith’. (young woman from Vayotz Dzor)
‘If 90 percent are paid up front, then they go and vote. Why should I go? My vote is
not going to change anything anyway’. (young man from Yerevan)
Clearly, the belief that vote buying is universal is frequently used as a pretext
for justifying one’s own passiveness.
It may not be a misstatement that the events of the 1st of March specifically
contributed to cautiousness regarding change and participation. To date, this
fundamental factor continues to influence the social mood and behaviours, especially
in the capital city.
‘I used to participate a lot before. Now, I have become passive, after the events of the 1st
of March. I hope it will recover. There is mistrust, or rather, disillusionment’. (young
woman from Yerevan)
‘After the 1st of March, I was completely disillusioned about all types of demonstrations.
You can just never be sure that it will not occur again. I saw with my own eyes what
was happening’. (young man from Yerevan)
‘People were there for change of power. They did almost everything to get there. There
was one last step remaining. And then, the demonstration leader stepped aside at the
very end. I don’t believe in either the outcome of demonstrations or the ones holding
demonstrations. I think they are just pursuing their personal interests. I would not go to
a demonstration for someone else’s personal interests’. (young man from Shirak)
Many young people, especially men, are sceptical about resistance and the
change process, which they view as an imitation or as having potentially unpredictable
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outcomes. Scepticism of change is reinforced by the mistrust of those implementing
such changes, including both politicians and civil activists. This issue is further
reviewed in the section titled Mistrust on page 81.
Thus, sceptical attitudes have a particular bearing on collective actions
(demonstrations and rallies), in which people are reluctant to participate.
It is an important motivation for an individual to be good and to be considered
good as well as to be certain that his or her actions and ideas are right. In this society,
it is no longer clear what ‘pro-social’ means and which conduct is right because the
expectations that should be met and the beliefs that should be adhered to are unclear.
In everyday perceptions, what is considered ‘Armenian’ or what is approved
collectively is contradicts one’s civic position. A young woman who is an activist may
hear widely used comments of abuse, such as ‘behave decently as a girl should!’ In
this sense, any protest is also a cultural clash. Any civil struggle is also a struggle
against cultural assumptions, whereas in the West, for example, a struggle and the
desire to change are enabled and legitimated by the culture itself.
Growing Civil Consciousness and Reflexive Judgements
The previous sections of the analysis did not aim to paint a homogenous picture. The
beliefs and behaviours presented hold true for different groups of young people to
varying degrees. Young people, as in the rest of society, are rather diverse in terms of
their mindsets and behaviour, activity or inertness, and sensitivity to change. Active
individuals are vocal about the need to redefine and clarify values and social
relationships.
‘What we see at first is profound indifference and cynicism: all the political actors are
perceived as crooks. The second, conflicting trend is that civil activism is high among
some segment of the youth’. (political analyst)
‘Three parts of society can be distinguished, in decreasing order: the first group is the
‘citizens’, i.e., those who are aware of politics and do participate. The second group are
the so-called ‘minions’, i.e., those who are aware of politics but do not participate. And
the third and the largest group are the ‘dwellers’, whose participation is like a ritual—
they regularly go there as a family, show their passports, and drop ballots in the box’.
(political analyst)
The young people demonstrate civil activity are not homogenous, either.
Although their actions may be consistent, their underlying motivations and ideas vary.
‘We saw scores of citizens in Mashtotz Park, but the spectrum there was very broad—
from ultranationalists to anti-globalists, all with their different ideologies. Some were
struggling against international organisations and the authorities serving them, while
others were fighting for green space or even national causes’. (political analyst)
102
The focus groups revealed reflexive and self-transcending as well as passive
and distanced segments (the latter were in majority). Moreover, the same individual
may well alternate between active and passive positions, which is an indicator of a still
evolving and fluid semantic field of being a citizen in Armenia.
‘People are sitting there and complaining all day about a problem not being solved, but
they fail to ask themselves what they have done to get it solved. This second mentality
should spread among young people, so that they start considering ways of solving those
problems’. (young man from Armavir)
‘Mentality has a lot to do with it. There was this discussion once, and someone was
complaining about corruption. When he was asked whom he would hire—a relative or
someone else, he said he would hire his relative. In other words, we are often not too
different from the authorities’. (young man from Yerevan)
The main target of the ‘critical’ young people is the still unformed civil
consciousness and the cultural-traditional obstacles along the path of its formation,
which are referred to as ‘the Armenian mentality’. The downside of the ‘mentality
theory’ is that it provides an essentialist interpretation of the situation, finding causes
in deeply rooted national features and thereby limiting belief in change.
103
CONCLUSION
The values and beliefs prevailing among today’s citizens of Armenia are influenced by
a variety of factors at the intersection of universal ideals and past and present
experiences (including the national narrative, the post-Soviet heritage, and the
transformation of sociocultural and particularly economic-political systems since
gaining independence). The consequences of these manifold influences are manifested
in how they shape the value system, social practices, and social structure. Our study,
however, focused on examining the path of the direct effect (i.e., the ways in which
internalised value orientations and beliefs influence the subjective representations of
specific situations according to which individuals act).
The study captured certain behaviour patterns and attitudes formed in line with
the sociocultural changes of Armenian society. The results of the study provide insight
into the value orientations and beliefs prevailing among Armenians today as well as
their effects on behaviour patterns that are encountered in typical economic and
political settings.
The prevalent value orientations are the motives of affiliation with the primary
group (one’s relatives, family, and inner circle of friends) and displaying accepted
normative behaviour to meet expectations. Some dynamics have been observed among
young people and females living in cities in terms of a shift towards the values of selfenhancement and achievement. However, values that are conducive to active
citizenship attitudes and beliefs are not yet strongly marked.
Prevalent beliefs regarding social realities include the lack of rule of law,
ambiguity in ‘the rules of game’ and uncertainty, mistrust in social institutions as and
groups, social injustice, and a lack of perspective. With these dominant beliefs, people
tend to rely on their own strength and on supernatural forces (e.g., fortune, faith) in
matters of economic prosperity, for instance. In matters of political and civil
participation and affiliation, there is also mistrust in the political processes and
political forces, which primarily gives rise to security concerns, leading to further
avoidance of the new and scepticism towards change.
Given the absence of clear ‘rules of the game’ and uncertainty, the asymmetry
of values, beliefs, and practices has become an acceptable approach in everyday
behaviour. The value of achievement, for example, is especially dominant in the value
104
orientations of young people, women, and urban dwellers, although the behaviour
strategies targeting this value are ambiguous, and different behaviour patterns are
possible. There is a risk of failure because the rules of the game are unclear, which
demotivates many people’s initiatives and actions. However, those that can accept the
idea of playing without clear rules gain additional opportunities for manoeuvring.
Self-criticism is a typical behaviour attitude: no one is satisfied with the ambiguity,
but they still do not appear to reject it.
Security and safety needs become salient against the backdrop of prevailing
uncertainty and social mistrust. These needs in turn lead to another typical behaviour
pattern that is currently more widespread in society: maintaining stable relations with
relatives, close ones, and friends becomes a means for overcoming threats and
uncertainty. We believe that this pattern is the reason that values with a group focus,
such as conformity and benevolence, continue to be reproduced, thereby obtaining
secondary reinforcement. In both economic and political/civil behaviour, acting for the
well-being of one’s family members becomes not only a necessity but also a preferred
goal. This pattern can partially explain the low levels of trust and social capital in
Armenian society.
Uncertainty regarding the future does not mobilise people to initiate action for
change. On the contrary, this uncertainty helps to reinforce the pro-status quo
behaviour pattern. Change, especially in politics, is apparently perceived as a greater
uncertainty than the uncertainty of the present, and from these two levels of perceived
uncertainty, citizens continue to choose the ‘close-by’ or ‘familiar’ uncertainty in an
attempt to maintain the status quo. Although some young people opt for increased
civil activity in current challenges, the vivid cultural pressure (which is expressed
largely through conservative values compensating for security) still does not view this
behaviour pattern of struggling for one’s rights as ‘normative’ behaviour.
Another pattern of overcoming uncertainty and social mistrust manifests in
migration behaviour as an alternative to the increasing certainty and predictability of
life and, therefore, as a means of ensuring security. This behaviour trend is reinforced
and justified by various beliefs, such as the absence of prospects, inequality, obstacles
to self-fulfilment, and injustice.
Thus, individuals in today’s Armenian society are in a continuous state of
uncertainty and lack of trust, accompanied by a protracted transition that is manifested
in their value orientations, beliefs, and behaviour. Perhaps society is becoming
increasingly multilayered as a result of current political and civil processes, but in
terms of the maturing of civil consciousness, a society-wide effect has not yet been
observed. Individuals still hesitate in terms of defining the meaning of their own
actions and formulating attitudes towards them. There is a clear understanding that the
current sociocultural conditions do not secure a prosperous life for citizens, but there
is still no understanding of the desirable vectors of change and the agents who will
implement such change. Furthermore, the outcomes show that change trends are
105
manifested in economic practices more clearly than in political practices. New
economic practices and the rules that regulate these practices can be more easily
ʻtamedʼ for present-day life than political/civil activity forms and their underlying
values because against the backdrop of the current values of survival, whenever the
demand for fulfilling security needs is triggered, new behaviour strategies aimed at
one’s own prosperity become more effective. Such behaviour strategies are perceived
by ordinary individuals as ‘closer’ and more immediate resources for addressing
primary needs and realising and demonstrating one’s competences and potential.
Perhaps the definition of change policies and messages with respect to changes in
beliefs and behaviour attitudes should begin with economic activity. Under these
scenarios, new patterns of economic behaviour should pursue not only the goal of
avoiding threats and surviving but also—more importantly—focus on articulating the
outcomes of achievement, development, promotion (rather than prevention), and
future planning. These objectives could be more effectively achieved by raising
awareness of economic transactions and related practices as well as through the
development and implementation of programmes promoting innovative initiatives,
cooperative entrepreneurship, and social business projects.
The social engagement of people in such programmes can reduce real and
perceived threats as well as risks affecting economic intentions, increase the role of
the reflexive component in people’s decisions, and help to project outcomes more
realistically. Such programmes can also help individuals to be more persistent as
claim-holders and rights-holders in the advocacy process.
106
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Journal of Political Research, 42, 341–379.
105. White, Leslie. (1959) 2010. Energy and tools. In: Paul A. Erickson & Liam D.
Murphy (eds.), Readings for a history of anthropological theory. (pp. 293-310).
Ontario: Broadview Press.
106. World Bank 2013. Doing business 2013: Smarter regulations for small and
medium-size enterprises. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. DOI:
10.1596/978-0-8213-9615-5. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0
107. Wright, Susan 1998. The politization of culture. Anthropology Today, 14 (1), 715.
108. Yu, A.B. & K.-S Yang 1994. The Nature of achievement motivation in
collectivist societies. In: U. Kim, H. C. Triandis, C. Kagitçibasi, S.C. Choi & G.
Yoon (eds.) Individualism and collectivism: theory, method, and applications (pp.
239–250). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
114
APPENDIX 1
QUESTIONNAIRES
Dear participant,
The ‘Personality and Social Context’ laboratory at Yerevan State University is
conducting a scientific research on values, beliefs, and social behaviour in Armenia. This
questionnaire consists of three parts. Please read the instructions for each section carefully
before you answer.
Thank you for your support.
Part 1. Please answer the questions below by choosing the answer that best suits your
opinion.
1. How interested are you in political issues of Armenia?
1. not interested at all
3. somewhat interested
2. not interested
4. very interested
2. When you meet your relatives, friends and colleagues, how often do you discuss issues
related to politics in Armenia?
1. never>go to question 3
3. sometimes
2. rarely
4. often
2.1 When you meet your relatives, friends, and colleages, you discuss issues related to
politics in Armenia, because
1. as a citizen, I am concerned about the issues in the country.
2. I like talking about different topics with my relatives, friends, and colleagues.
3. other reason (please indicate)_______________________________________________
2.2 Usually, what’s your involvement in such discussions?
1. I initiate the discussions > go to question 2.3
2. I don't initiate myself, but participate in discussions > go to question 2.3
3. I am not active but I listen to other's opinions > go to question 3
4. I keep neutral and do not participate > go to question 3
2.3 If you have your opinion about these issues, how often do you try to persuade your
relatives, friends, and colleagues?
1. never
3. sometimes
2. rarely
4. often
3-4 days
in a week
Every day
1
1
1
Once or
twice
a week
3.1 read political articles in newspapers
3.2 watch/listen to political news on TV/radio
3.3 use internet to find political news
Not every
week
Never
3. In general, how often do you
2
2
2
34
3
3
4
4
1
1
1
4.Do you usually participate in elections?(answer each question separately):
YES
NO
Presidential
1
0
Parliamentary
1
0
Local self-government
1
0
115
4.1 If you participate, then why? Select the statement that best expresses the reason
you participate in elections (please check no more than two answers):
1. I express my opinion as citizen
2. Participate so that my vote is not used
3. I believe that my vote matters in elections
4. It’s just interesting to participate in elections
5. My friend or relative asked me to participate
6. I go to vote for the candidate or party I sympathize
7. I am a member of that party
8. The candidate is my friend or relative
9. I have to go because of some circumstances
10. Other (please indicate)_________________
4.2 If you do not participate, then why? Select the statement that best expresses the
reason you don’t participate in elections (please check no more than two answers):
1. I am not interested in politics
2. Politics isn’t my business
3. There is no one whom I can trust
4. I express my protest or disagreement by that
5. I don’t have any preferred political party
6. I don't believe that elections will change anything
7. Nobody from my family goes, why should I go?
8. I don't have the time
9. I don't like that situation, it's useless stress
10. Other (please indicate)_________________
5. Over the last five years (2007-2012), how many times did you participate in elections?
1. 0
2. 1
3. 2
4. 3 and more
6. Did you participate in the last Parliamentary elections?
1. yes
2. no
7. Are you going to participate in the elections of local self-government to take place this
autumn?
1. yes
2. no
8. Do you intend to participate in upcoming presidential elections?
1. yes
2. no
Will surely
participate
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
Will not
participate
Might
participate
9. Below are several political and civic actions, in which people usually engage. For each
action, please indicate the probability of your involvement.
9.1 Petitions, sit-ins, and demonstrations
9.2 Attempts to contact any public official or party representative
(to raise a public/community issue or to express an opinion)
9.3 Expression of an opinion regarding political/civic issues in the
mass media
9.4 Expression of an opinion regarding political/civic issues in
online media, including social networks
116
10. How do you think the political situation in the country will change in the next 5 years?
1. will become worse
2. will stay the same
3. will improve
11. How interested are you in economic issues of the country or region?
3. somewhat interested
1. not interested at all
2. not interested
4. very interested
12. When you meet your relatives, friends, and colleagues, how often do you discuss
issues related to economics in Armenia?
3. sometimes
1. never >go to question 13
2. rarely
4. often
12.1 You discuss social-economic issues in order to (please, choose one answer)
1. just share my financial problems, concerns
2. figure out how to best save and/or increase my income
3. figure out how to make use of loan opportunities
4. figure out how to manage my expenses
Every day
2
2
2
3-4 days in
a week
1
1
1
Once or
twice a
week
13.1 read economic articles in newspapers?
13.2 watch/listen to economic news on TV/radio?
13.3 use internet in search of economic news?
Not every
week
Never
13. In general, how often do you
3
3
3
4
4
4
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
Will
probably
do it
Surely
will do it
1
Maybe
Probably
will not do
it
14.1 loan to improve living conditions (house
renovation or acquisition or the acquisition of
household appliances or a car)
14.2 loan to start one’s own business
Will never
do it
14. To improve your living conditions, which loans indicated below are you ready to go
for?
15. Are you ready to assume economic risks in the next five years (e.g. to start a business)
in order to increase your income?
1. no, never
3. maybe
2. probably not
4. yes, for sure
16. Which statement indicated below do you agree with?
16.1. I think well-being depends on economic state of the country.
16.2 I think well-being depends on my efforts.
17. In your opinion, how will the economic situation in the country change in the next five
years?
1. will get worse
2. will stay the same
3. will improve
18. In your opinion, how will the economic situation of your own family change in the
next five years?
1. will get worse
2. will stay the same
3. will improve
117
Believe
1. Good luck follows if one survives a disaster.
2.Fate determines one’s successes and failures.
3. Individual characteristics, such as appearance and birthday, affect
one’s fate.
4. Most disasters can be predicted.
5. There are certain ways to help us improve our luck and avoid
unlucky things.
6. There are many ways for people to predict what will happen in the
future.
7. Religious faith contributes to good mental health.
8. Religion makes people escape from reality.
9. Religious people are more likely to maintain moral standards.
10. There is a supreme being controlling the universe.
11. Religious beliefs lead to unscientific thinking.
12. Belief in a religion helps one understand the meaning of life.
13. Belief in a religion makes people good citizens.
14. Caution helps avoid mistakes.
15. One who does not know how to plan his or her future will
eventually fail.
16. Knowledge is necessary for success.
17. Adversity can be overcome by effort.
18. Every problem has a solution.
19. Competition brings about progress.
20. One will succeed if he/she really tries.
21. Failure is the beginning of success.
22. Hard working people will achieve more in the end.
23. Human behaviour changes with the social context.
24. People may have opposite behaviour on different occasions.
25. One has to deal with matters according to the specific
circumstances.
26. There is usually only one way to solve a problem.
27. One’s behaviours may be contrary to his or her true feelings.
28. Current losses are not necessarily bad for one’s long-term future.
29. Young people are impulsive and unreliable.
30. It is rare to see a happy ending in real life.
31. Power and status make people arrogant.
32. Powerful people tend to exploit others.
33. People will stop working hard after they secure a comfortable life.
34. The various social institutions in society are biased towards the
rich.
35. Kind-hearted people are easily bullied.
36. Old people are a heavy burden on society.
37. People deeply in love are usually blind.
38. Kind-hearted people usually suffer losses.
39. To care about societal affairs only brings trouble for yourself.
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
118
Strongly
believe
No opinion
1
1
Strongly
disbelieve
Disbelieve
Part 2.The following sentences are statements related to beliefs. Please read each statement
carefully, and check the box that most closely reflects your opinion.
No opinion
Believe
One will not find his/her place in life if he/she is uneducated.
People deserve to be respected regardless of circumstances.
If somebody does not have a job, they should not feel
accomplished.
4. Regardless of the type of relationship, one should accept
imperfections in others.
5. One shouldn’t fully trust another person.
6. If you say what you think, you will be misunderstood.
7. One can only rely on him/herself in times of trouble.
8. One should have luck in order to succeed.
9. Life circumstances change humans.
10. Even real friendship is forgotten with time.
11. A person is like his/her environment.
12. Anything a person does has an influence on all of humanity.
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
Living in this world means suffering.
Society gives a person the opportunity to be happy.
Bad is found in life more than good is.
Important events are the result of chance.
In any type of relationship, one should count their own desires
first.
Success depends on life circumstances.
Society always restricts people.
Success will find a person.
People are appreciated by their deeds.
All people are similar regardless of their nationalities.
Power determines one’s place in society.
If they wish, people can make the world better.
People always act according to their personal interests.
Society suppresses individuality.
One cannot live in welfare without having a job.
All people are the masters of their own fate.
A kind-hearted person is always appreciated in society.
A person who is good at figuring out the character of people
around him or her will act effectively.
One can become a better person if society helps him/her.
The rules of universe are unchanging regardless of the
development of humankind.
In order to have good relationships sometimes you shouldn’t
openly express your opinion.
In life everything happens for some reasons.
One can change many things in his/her life if there is the wish to
do so.
The future is predetermined from above.
If you don’t enjoy life then you live in vain.
1
2
3
4
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
119
Strongly
believe
Disbelieve
1
1
Strongly
disbelieve
1.
2.
3.
Part 3. In this questionnaire, you are to ask yourself: ‘What values are important to ME as
guiding principles in MY life, and what values are less important to me?’ There are two lists of
values on the following pages. These values come from different cultures. In the parentheses
following each value is an explanation that may help you to understand its meaning.
Your task is to rate how important each value is for you as a guiding principle in your life.
Use the rating scale below:
0--means the value is not at all important, it is not relevant as a guiding principle for you.
3--means the value is important.
6--means the value is very important.
The higher the number (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), the more important the value is as a guiding principle
in YOUR life.
-1 is for rating any values opposed to the principles that guide you.
7 is for rating a value of supreme importance as a guiding principle in your life;
ordinarily there are no more than two such values.
In the space before each value, write the number (-1,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7) that indicates the
importance of that value for you, personally. Try to distinguish as much as possible between the
values by using all the numbers. You will, of course, need to use numbers more than once.
AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is:
Important
Opposed to my Not
values
important
-1
0
1
2
3
Very
Of supreme
important importance
4
5
6
7
Before you begin, read the values in List I, choose the one that is most important to you and
rate its importance. Next, choose the value that is most opposed to your values and rate it -1. If
there is no such value, choose the value least important to you and rate it 0 or 1, according to its
importance. Then rate the rest of the values in List I.
VALUES LIST I
1____ EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)
2____INNER HARMONY (at peace with myself)
3____ SOCIAL POWER (control over others, dominance)
4____ PLEASURE (gratification of desires)
5____ FREEDOM (freedom of action and thought)
6____ A SPIRITUAL LIFE (emphasis on spiritual not material matters)
7____ SENSE OF BELONGING (feeling that others care about me)
8____ SOCIAL ORDER (stability of society)
9____ AN EXCITING LIFE (stimulating experiences)
10____MEANING IN LIFE (a purpose in life)
11____POLITENESS (courtesy, good manners)
12____WEALTH (material possessions, money)
13____ NATIONAL SECURITY (protection of my nation from enemies)
14____ SELF RESPECT (belief in one's own worth)
15____RECIPROCATION OF FAVORS (avoidance of indebtedness)
16____CREATIVITY (uniqueness, imagination)
17____A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict)
18____RESPECT FOR TRADITION (preservation of time-honored customs)
120
19____MATURE LOVE (deep emotional & spiritual intimacy)
20____SELF-DISCIPLINE (self-restraint, resistance to temptation)
21____PRIVACY (the right to have a private sphere)
22____FAMILY SECURITY (safety for loved ones)
23____SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, approval by others)
24____UNITY WITH NATURE (fitting into nature)
25____A VARIED LIFE (filled with challenge, novelty, and change)
26____WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)
27____AUTHORITY (the right to lead or command)
28____TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close, supportive friends)
29____A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)
30____SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice, care for the weak)
VALUES LIST II
Now rate how important each of the following values is for you as a guiding principle in
YOUR life. These values are phrased as ways of acting that may be more or less important for
you. Once again, try to distinguish as much as possible between the values by using all the
numbers.
Before you begin, read the values in List II, choose the one that is most important to you
and rate its importance. Next, choose the value that is most opposed to your values, or--if there
is no such value--choose the value least important to you, and rate it -1, 0, or 1, according to its
importance. Then rate the rest of the values.
AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is:
Important
Opposed to my Not
values
important
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Very
Of supreme
important importance
5
6
7
31____ INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
32____ MODERATE (avoiding extremes of feeling & acti on)
33____LOYAL (faithful to my friends, group)
34____AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring)
35____BROADMINDED (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)
36____HUMBLE (modest, self-effacing)
37____DARING (seeking adventure, risk)
38____PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (preserving nature)
39____INFLUENTIAL (having an impact on people and events)
40____HONORING OF PARENTS AND ELDERS (showing respect)
41____CHOOSING OWN GOALS (selecting own purposes)
42____HEALTHY (not being sick physically or mentally)
43____CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient)
44____ACCEPTING MY PORTION IN LIFE (submitting to life's circumstances)
45____HONEST (genuine, sincere)
46____RESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE (protecting my ‘face’)
47____OBEDIENT (dutiful, meeting obligations)
48____INTELLIGENT (logical, thinking)
121
49____HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)
50____ENJOYING LIFE (enjoying food, sex, leisure, etc.)
51____DEVOUT (holding to religious faith & bel ief)
52____RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable)
53____CURIOUS (interested in everything, exploring)
54____FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)
55____SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals)
56____CLEAN (neat, tidy)
57____SELF-INDULGENT (doing pleasant things)
BACKGROUND ITEMS








Your Sex (circle): 1. Male
2. Female
Your age: __________Years
In what kind of a place did you grow up? (circle):
1. large city (500,000+)
2. small city
3. rural area
Where do you live?
city (indicate) __________
rural area (indicate)______
How will you evaluate the economic condition of you family when you were a
child (circle)?
1. very bad
2. bad
3. medium
4. good 5. very good
What is your education level?
1. secondary
2. high
3. vocational
4. other (indicate)__________
Your Marital status (circle):
1. Single 2. Married 3.Widowed 4. Divorced
Your specialization (indicate) ____________________________
122
123
Figure 1. Theoretical model of relations among motivational types of values (Schwartz 2011: 466-467)
APPENDIX 2
Regions
Yerevan
124
9.4
10
Male
13.6
13.2
Female
Male Female
not interested at all
14
21.8
12.7
14.4
not interested
50.7
40.9
53.5
57.6
somewhat interested
15.3
25.3
32.7
14.8
very interested
Figure 3.1. How interested are you in political issues of Armenia?
18‐29
10.4
11.2
9.3
30‐41
8.6
42‐53
18.8
54‐65
6.9
12.9
8.2
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
12.7
16.3
11.2
9.3
14.5
10.1
not interested at all
54‐65
APPENDIX 3
31.2
18.1
51.2
59.3
57.9
43.8
50
somewhat interested
49.1
56.9
36.7
not interested
40.5
14.6
15.1
13.2
20
26.2
27.6
28.2
very interested
Figure 3.2. How interested are you in political issues of Armenia?
Comparative Percentages of Political Behaviour Indicators
Regions
Yerevan
125
Regions
Yerevan
11.6
11.2
Female
Male
25.7
23.7
20.4
I like talking about different topics with my relatives, friends, and colleagues
as a citizen, I am concerned about the issues in the country
other
37
rarely
29
39.4
36.8
sometimes
39.3
12.1
often
28.3
39.4
65.4
Yerevan
30.8
3.8
69
Regions
29.8
12.1
1.2
28.3
Figure 3.5. When you meet your relatives, friends, and colleages you discuss issues related to politics in Armenia, because
11.3
Male
Female
never
Figure 3.3. When you meet your relatives, friends, and colleagues how often do you discuss issues related to politics in Armenia?
Regions
Yerevan
20
27.6
19.5
29.3
19.3
17.7
I am neutral and do not participate
I am not active but I listen to other's opinions
I don't innitiate myself, but participate in discussions
43.9
28.3
32.7
21.5
rarely
41.5
41.4
38.6
sometimes
46
33.8
often
26.5
42.7
50.6
17.2
10.7
28.5
Yerevan 57.4
3.4
14.6
28.9
Regions
51.8
4.8
15.3
16.1
25.6
24.1
27.9
Figure 3.6. Usually, what's your involvement in such discussions?
14.3
10.3
13.4
5.2
20.7
14.3
10.1
4.5
I innitiate the discussions
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
never
Figure 3.4. When you meet your relatives, friends, and colleagues how often do you discuss issues related to politics in Armenia?
Regions
Yerevan
Regions
Yerevan
26.5
25.2
23.4
28.7
37.3
14.6
16.5
18.6
7.3
11.5
13
11.7
26.5
5.3 11.2
23.9
6.9
Female
11.2
8.7
Male
Male
10.7
Female
9.6
15.1
17.9
8.3
11.9
13.2
22
16.5
17.1
never
once or twice a week
every day
17.8
56.9
42.8
41.6
43.7
not every week
three or four days in a week
11.6
16.7
16.6
not every week
three or four days in a week
Figure3.9. In general, how often do you watch/listen to political news on TV/radio?
Male
33.1
24.8
Male
Female
24.3
Female
never
once or twice a week
every day
Figure 3.7. In general, how often do you read political articles in newspapers?
Regions
Yerevan
Regions
Yerevan
126
6.9
30‐41
15.3
8.5
42‐53
16.9
12.1
54‐65 1.7
9.5
30‐41
18‐29
5.5 6.4
42‐53
16.1
9.8
11.7
13.8
10.3
not every week
3.8 6.4
18‐29
36.7
33.7
24.1
41.5
22.2
22.2
5.3
13.3
9.8
14.1
16.3
15.7
22.2
18.4
6.1
12.8
7.3
7.4
10.6
13.3
25.5
14.6
24.1
14.1
11.7
11.5
20.7
18.3
19.5
6.9
17.6
18.2
15.5
12.2
67.9
35.9
32.7
39.1
47.6
55.2
48.9
56
three or four days in a week
17.2
14.3
once or twice a week
16.2
14
every day
18.4
22
20.4
26.9
14.8
every day
27.6
4.7
three or four days in a week
34.9
25.5
28.9
29.6
18.4
once or twice a week
Figure 3.10. In general, how often do you watch/listen to political news on TV/radio?
54‐65
never
18‐29
30‐41
19.5
27.8
42‐53
54‐65
25.9
30.3
11.1
30.3
not every week
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
never
Figure 3.8. In general, how often do you read political articles in newspapers?
127
Regions
Yerevan
27.8
35.7
Female
Male
33
45.8
Male Female
11.9
17.9
never
once or twice a week
every day
9.9
24.6
10.1
14.3
9.3
12.9
14.2
11.2
30.7
35.1
8.8
10.4
18.1
18.3
not every week
three or four days in a week
Figure 3.11. In general, how often do you use internet to find political news?
Regions
Yerevan
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
20.7
24.7
40.2
33.6
18‐29
54‐65
32.1
20.6
25.3
61
13.3
16.1
10.3
14.9
19.5
8.4
11.7
9.3
19.6
12.6
12.2
15.4
3.7
7.1
8.3
7.8 1.3
18.2
13.9
6.5
35.1
26.4
24.4
12.5
21.9
20.4
23.4
every day
29.4
10.7
three or four days in a week
14.8
once or twice a week
50
42.6
not every week
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
never
Figure 3.12. In general, how often do you use internet to find political news?
Regions
Yerevan
89.7
56.5
18‐29
30‐41
53.6
77.8
72.4
54‐65
42‐53
70.1
18‐29
86.2
84.3
91
30‐41
yes
no
29.9
72.3
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
18‐29
46.4
43.5
91.4
15.7
13.8
9
81.2
77.6
69.1
22.2
27.6
88.9
84.9
42‐53
30‐41
89.7
no
54‐65
yes
Figure 3.14. Do you usually participate in elections
(Parlamentary)?
Figure 3.15. Do you usually participate in elections (Local self‐government)?
8
4.9
10.3
18.6
26.2
12.2
5.5
5.1
42‐53
54‐65
92
30‐41
18‐29
95.1
81.4
73.8
42‐53
54‐65
18‐29
87.8
94.5
42‐53
30‐41
94.9
no
54‐65
yes
Regions
Yerevan
Figure 3.13. Do you usually participate in elections (Presidential)?
Regions
Yerevan
128
30.9
18.8
22.4
27.7
8.6
15.1
11.1
10.3
129
46.4%
18.9%
4.8%
5.5%
18.2%
6.5%
.3%
3.8%
.7%
Participate so that my vote is not used
I believe that my vote matters in elections
It’s just interesting to participate in elections
My friend or relative asked me to participate
I go to vote for the candidate or party I sympathize
I am a member of that party
The candidate is my friend or relative
I have to go because of some circumstances
Other
49.8%
2.5%
3.4%
1.6%
6.2%
15.1%
2.7%
8.7%
31.7%
33.8%
49.1%
Yerevan Regions
I express my opinion as citizen
Table 3.1. Reasons for participation in elections
23.7%
29.9%
I express my protest or disagreement by that
I don’t have any preferred political party
I don't believe that elections will change anything
41.4%
21.0%
11.5%
26.1%
5.1%
I don't like that situation, it's useless stress
Other
5.2%
4.1%
I don't have the time
2.5%
8.9%
.6%
2.4%
There is no one whom I can trust
17.2%
13.4%
1.3%
37.1%
Politics isn’t my business
Regions
Nobody from my family goes, why should I go?
6.5%
9.3%
I am not interested in politics
Yerevan
Table 3.2 Reason for not participation in elections
Regions
Yerevan
Regions
Yerevan
4.6 3.7
8.9
6.9
18.4
14.9
9.9
10.5
2
30.3
27.6
28.6
24.7
21.4
1
23.5
63.6
50.6
59.3
23.4
75
75.4
83.5
3 and more
29.6
22.8
86.4
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
53.1
58.3
67.2
79.3
76.6
86.4
30‐41
18‐29
no
94.9
42‐53
54‐65
yes
41.7
46.9
13.6
20.7
23.4
32.8
5.1
13.6
Figure 3.18. Are you going to participate in the elections of local self‐government to take place this autumn?
18‐29
6.2
30‐41
5.3
42‐53
23.4
8.8
54‐65
16.7
18‐29
30‐41 3.6 11.4
42‐53
54‐65 1.36.3
0
Figure 3.16. Over the last five years (2007‐2012), how many times did you participate in elections?
Regions
Yerevan
Regions
Yerevan
130
65.5
69.4
84.1
81
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
82.7
89.7
91.5
89.7
84.6
30‐41
18‐29
94.5
92.1
42‐53
no
94.9
yes
54‐65
30.6
31
34.5
5.5
17.3
10.3
8.5
10.3
15.4
7.9
15.9
19
5.1
10.9
10.3
17.1
Figure 3.19. Do you intend to participate in upcoming presidental elections?
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
18‐29
69
89.1
82.9
42‐53
30‐41
89.7
no
54‐65
yes
Figure 3.17. Did you participate in the last Parlamentary elections?
Regions
Yerevan
Regions
Yerevan
44
63.2
30‐41
49
74
71.9
61.7
18‐29
31
36
might participate
65.2
57.9
52.1
will not participate
42‐53
54‐65
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
35
36
50
might participate
32
36
33
34.7
28.5
32.2
30.9
12.3
18.8
26.2
15.6
will surely participate
10.4
14
16.3
4.6
7.4
15.8
19.4
16
15.8
23
28
will surely participate
Figure 3.22. Expression of an opinion regarding political/civic issues in the mass media, social networks
Male
Female
Male
Female
will not participate
Figure 3.20. Participation in petitions, sit‐ins, and
demonstrations
Regions Yerevan
Regions
Yerevan
131
45
57.3
57
62.9
might participate
26.4
28
32.6
21.9
28.6
will surely participate
68.4
might participate
64.4
56.7
Female
Male
57.3
Male
Female
will not participate
21.5
32.7
24.5
21.2
will surely participate
Figure 3.23. Expression of an opinion regarding political/civic issues in online media, social networks
Male
Female
Male
Female
will not participate
14.1
10.5
18.1
10.4
14.6
10.5
15.2
Figure 3.21. Attempts to contact any public official or party representative (to raise a public/community issue or to express an opinion)
132
Regions
Yerevan
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
83.6
79.2
might participate
27.6
28.5
29.9
21.7
will surely participate
33.8
25.2
21
36.4
will improve
Yerevan
42.6
will stay the same
30.9
Regions
40.3
will become worse
28.8
13.8
1.8
2.5
7.4
10.4
13.1
14.5
22.2
24.5
10.4
Figure 3.25. How do you think the political situation in the country will change in the next 5 years?
48
65.2
63.8
56.3
49.3
67.3
will not participate
Figure 3.24. Expression of an opinion regarding political/civic issues in online media, social networks
Regions
Yerevan
9.1
Male
9.2
Female 3.5
Male
11
Female 4.3 7
9.2
7.8
not interested at all
26.5
52.3
39.5
44.4
not interested
56.6
somewhat interested
33.1
42.1
44.4
very interested
Figure 4.1. How interested are you in economic issues of the country/region?
5.1
7
30‐41
18‐29
6.1
54‐65
42‐53
8.3
6.9
18‐29
13.3
9.3
7.3
10.3
13.1
6.4
6.4 4.5
30‐41 3.6 4.3
42‐53
9
not interested at all
54‐65
APPENDIX 4
31
42.1
30.9
19.2
42.8
50
50
48.8
not interested
50
51.7
58.2
65.4
somewhat interested
31.6
33.7
37.8
35.9
very interested
Figure 4.2. How interested are you in economic issues of the country/region?
Comparative Percentages of Economic Behaviour Indicators
Regions
Yerevan
133
134
Regions
Yerevan
13.3
Female
10.5
10.5
Male
Male
8.2
Female
31.8
rarely
26
30.1
often
35.3
43.4
36.3
23
19.7
7.2
30‐41
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
6.9
16.3
13.4
10.3
15.2
5.5
42‐53
18‐29
7.7
54‐65
20.1
16.4
31
34.5
19.5
26.9
never
32.7
29
figure out how to manage my expenses
figure out how to make use of loan opportunities
figure out how to best save and/or increase my income
Yerevan
25.9%
3.5%
18.2%
52.4%
30.9
rarely
32.2
43.9
32.8
27.6
35.3%
7.8%
18.8%
38.1%
Regions
31.7
19.2
sometimes
38.8
often
41
47.3
46.2
26.4
23.2
25.9
28.3
12.2
Figure 4.4. When you meet your relatives, friends, and colleagues how often do you discuss issues related to economics in Armenia?
Table 4.1. Discussing social-economic issues in order to
39.5
sometimes
just share my financial problems, concerns
27
20.1
25.4
never
Figure 4.3. When you meet your relatives, friends, and colleagues how often do you discuss issues related to economics in Armenia?
Regions
Yerevan
Regions
Yerevan
Regions
Yerevan
47.9
19.6
31.1
29.7
30.2
19.6
16.6
22.1
11
9.9
10.7
7.6
9.9
9.1
12.1
13.9
Male
Female
Male
13.7
20.2
23.8
30.6
13.7
never
once or twice a week
every day
16.2
17.2
17.4
22.1
19.2
11
46.1
25.8
30.1
30.8
10.6
4.7 6.5
not every week
three or four days in a week
17
10.4
18.7
not every week
three or four days in a week
Figure 4.7. In general, how often do you watch/listen to economic news on TV/radio?
Female
Male
31.8
31.1
Male
Female
30.1
Female
never
once or twice a week
every day
Figure 4.5. In general, how often do you read economic articles in newspapers?
Regions
Yerevan
Regions
Yerevan
135
31.7
50.6
42.3
33.3
39.2
36.4
27.9
18.5
28.7
25
32.9
25.9
23.8
20.8
34
20.4
27.6
14.8
24.3
19.5
19.5
18.9
12
11.3
9.2
13
15.6
19.6
11.5
30‐41
18‐29
9.8
42‐53
8.6
14.8
18‐29
54‐65
12.2
19.3
12.8
30‐41
42‐53 3.7
54‐65 3.8
20.7
27.6
28
19.7
15.1
6.4
22.3
30.9
8.6
19.3
25.6
never
once or twice a week
every day
23
24.1
14.6
20.4
12.8
5.7
22
18.3
17.5
14.4
11.3
20.6
25.6
26.8
32.2
37.9
45
36
not every week
three or four days in a week
51.3
8
8.5
6.2 6.2
4.6
7.3
13
10.5
13.2
20.4
7.7
9.6
7.8
not every week
three or four days in a week
Figure 4.8. In general how often do you watch/listen to economic news on TV/radio?
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
never
once or twice a week
every day
Figure 4.6. In general, how often do you read economic articles in newspapers?
Regions
Yerevan
136
Male
Female
Male
Female
30
43.3
34.7
44
25.3
15.5
24
9.1
19.4
13.3
14.2
12.7
12.3
14.7
7
13.5
13.5
18.7
26.5
8.3
three or four days in a week
once or twice a week
every day
not every week
never
Figure 4.9. In general, how often do you use internet in search of economic news?
Regions
Yerevan
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
never
27.8
27.6
30.6
54.5
57.1
27.8
32.2
19.4
13.8
once or twice a week
46.3
37.7
41.7
not every week
16
13.4
3.9
11
5.6
11.7
12.4
9.2
7.3
10.9
11.1
15.2
9.3
14.9
16.4
14.5
18.3
24.1
13
three or four days in a week
9.1
9.1
18.6
16.1
17.1
22.9
18.8
19.4
14.3
every day
Figure 4.10. In general, how often do you use internet in search of economic news?
Regions
Yerevan
Male
Female
Male
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
11.3
21.8
14.7
21.2
16.1
18‐29
24.4
18.1
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
15.3
16.9
36.2
will never do it
34.2
37.8
27.5
32.9
9.6
9.1
probably will not do it
19.5
17.4
36.9
32.2
37.2
17.9
will probably do it
28.4
maybe
18.9
15.4
27.9
29.3
11.1
10.7 3.4
5.81.7
16.5
9.9
36.5
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
13.5
20.6
25.6
25.4
33.9
30.2
23.3
17.4
28.5
30.9
26.4
37
33.3
16
26.9
43.8
23.2
5.71.1
3.7
3.63.6
7.6
8.2 2.1
13.6
15.3
14.6
17.6
13
surely will do it
10.4
17.5
12
35.1
47.1
29.6
10.7
22.1
will probably do it
32.1
7.8
maybe
23.7
10.2
19.5
7.3
58.9
11.8
46.8
probably will not do it
21.5
will never do it
54‐65
28.8
24.6
will probably do it
Figure 4.13. Obtaining loans to start one's own business
36.8
22.4
33.3
maybe
37.2
46.5
34.7
21.7
probably will not do it
surely will do it
Figure 4.12. Obtaining loans to start one's own business
will never do it
Female
Regions
Yerevan
Figure 4.11. Obtaining loans to improve living conditions Regions
Yerevan
137
Regions
Yerevan
Regions
Yerevan
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
37.8
20.5
16.6
21.1
probably not
29.1
37.8
maybe
45
43.8
41.4
48.6
60.5
54.1
economic state of the country
53.3
42.7
my efforts
22.6
30.2
29
29.1
yes, for sure
Figure 4.16. Well‐being depends on
24.5
23
28.5
no, never
Figure 4.14. Are you ready to assume economic risks (to start a business) in the next five years in order to increase your income?
9.9
4.1
6.6
Regions
Yerevan
Regions
Yerevan
138
23.7
36.7
36.6
52.2
50.6
55.2
17.9
66.7
71.8
economic state of the country
30‐41
18‐29
33.3
22.5
14.5
maybe
51
41.7
26.9
45.9
56.1
45.5
my efforts
36.8
37.8
34.8
37.7
36.8
38.8
17.2
37.3
yes, for sure
Figure 4.17. Well‐being depends on
24.5
60.3
18.2
46.2
54.9
22.4
31.2
32.7
probably not
42‐53
54‐65
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
18‐29
30‐41
42‐53
23
18‐29
54‐65
18.7
17.5
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
no, never
26.3
9
7.1
6.9
7.5
5.2
13.3
15.8
15.5
20.9
17.2
Figure 4.15. Are you ready to assume economic risks (to start a business) in the next five years in order to increase your income?
Regions
Yerevan
139
4.1
12.2
6.9
18‐29 3.1
30‐41
42‐53
54‐65
19
14.5
30‐41
18‐29
12.7
16.7
42‐53
54‐65
Yerevan
35.1
will stay the same 29.5
Regions
43.6
will get worse
26.9
26.9
42.9
will improve
60.9
52.4
40.6
44.5
34.6
53.4
will stay the same 69
44.9
27.6
32.2
35.4
42.7
48.7
54.1
will get worse
Figure 4.19. How will the economic situation of your own family change in the next five years?
18.2
46.8
will improve
Figure 4.18. How will the economic situation in the country change in the next five years?
CULTURE, VALUES, BELIEFS:
BEHAVIOUR GUIDELINES IN CHANGING ARMENIAN
SOCIETY
Narine Khachatryan
Sona Manusyan
Astghik Serobyan
Nvard Grigoryan
Anna Hakobjanyan
Translated from Armenian by Khachatur Adumyan
Edited by Sona Manusyan and Narine Khachatryan
Cover design by Arsen Makaryan
Circulation – 300 copies
Printed by: “Legal Plus” Co.Ltd.
Address: Armenia, 0033 Yerevan, H.Hakobyan St., 3 Building
Tel. (+37410) 27 69 92, Fax. (+37410) 23 62 39