The
American Influence on
Conservation
in Canada:
1899-1911
by R. PeterGillisand ThomasR. Roach
n Canada,as in the UnitedStates,historiansand conservationists tend to look on the years from 1899 to
1911 with nostalgia. Conservationmovements in both
nations made great strides in influencingofficialpolicy and
in awakeningpublic interestand concernduringthis period.
The evidence suggests that American conservationistssaw
and graspedtheir opportunitiesto a greaterextent than did
their Canadian counterparts.Nevertheless, the Canadians
saw policy changes at the federal level in these twelve years
they had thought unattainablesince the depressionof the
early 1890s waylaid the initiatives following from the
American Forestry Congressof 1882. Conservationbegan
to revive as a political issue at the federal level in Canada
slowly after 1893, with a revitalizationof the forest reserve
surveysand the creation in 1894 of Moose Mountain Reserve in present-day southeasternSaskatchewan.Then, in
the general election of 1896, the Conservatives,long in
power, were toppled from office and the Liberals, led by
Wilfrid Laurier,formed the government.
The Liberal party under Laurier was an amalgam of
interest groups and ideologies stretching from the prime
minister'srathertraditionallaissez-faireliberalism,tempered
by political expediency,to Minister of the InteriorClifford
Sifton'sclear-headed,calculateddedicationto materialprogress. Sifton thought governmentshould act as the dynamic
leader for privateenterprise,using strict regulationif neces-
This articlehasbeenadaptedfromLostinitiatives:Canada'sForest
Industries,ForestPolicy and ForestConservation(GreenwoodPress,
1986), publishedby permission.
160 JOURNAL OF FOREST HISTORY / OCTOBER 1986
sary in guiding businessmen to serve the public interest.1
Regardlessof ideological orientation,the Liberalshad as a
priority the speeding up of the economic developmentof
Canada, particularlyin the West, where they thought efficient and enlightenedresourcepolicies would aid the settlement process. Just as with the Conservativeparty before
them, these policies did not preventLiberalpoliticiansfrom
directingpatronageso as to ensuretheirparty won the next
election. In Canada, the era had definite affinitieswith the
"Great Barbecue"in the United States, which contributed
to the rise of the ProgressiveMovement.
Nevertheless, the Liberals were determined to proceed
with some progressiveresourcepolicies if these could aid
western development and bring a national prosperityfor
which the party could take credit. Three specificacts of the
Liberalgovernmentcontributedto this process. They were
the founding of the ForestryBranchwithin Canada's Departmentof the Interior,the Dominion Forest ReserveActs
of 1906 and 1911, and the founding in 1909, at the instigation of American president Theodore Roosevelt, of
Canada'sCommissionof Conservation.
M\
,[ any of the ideasfor conservation
policiescamefrom
civil serviceemployeeswithin the Departmentof the
Interior and had been in gestation during the Tory years
before 1896. Clifford Sifton was a key figure in getting
1. Forbiographical
detailson SiftonseePierreBerton,ThePromised
Land:Settlingthe West1896-1914 (Toronto:McClellandandStewart,
1984), andDavidJ. Hall, CliffordSifton,vol. 1, TheYoungNapoleon,
1861-1900, and vol. 2, The LonelyEminence,1901-1929, (Vancouver:Universityof BritishColumbiaPress,1981 and 1985).
. S|a. ' . . :
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Wilfrid Laurier,Prime minister of Canada from 1896 to 1911.
Clifford Sifton, minister of the interior under Prime Minister
Wilfrid Laurierand later chairman of the Canadian Conservation Commission, in June 1910. Public Archivesof Canada
PublicArchivesof Canada photo PA-12279.
photoPA-25966.
these ideas acceptedand basingpolicy on them. He strongly
believed in centralizingpolicy for the public lands in the
prairies and western forests. An interested observer of
Americantrends, the ministerwell appreciatedthe mounting popularityof scientificforestryin that country and the
economic argumentsprovided by men such as GiffordPinchot
to th
more
efficient
use. In
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moving quickly
by administrative ordersin council to establish new regulat9rysystems if
these servedhis overallgoals.
Some specificrecommendationsfor improving the management of the western Canadian forests originated with
William Pearce, superintendentof mines in Calgary, and
E. F. Stephenson,inspectorof Crown timber agents, based
in Winnipeg. Pearce favored forest reserves because they
would preservewaterneededfor irrigation.Stephensoncontrolled the men responsible for scaling the timber cut on
Dominion timber berths but was also interestedin classifying forestland for local settlement needs. He suggested
that more and largerforest reservesshould be createdin the
West and that their management goals should go beyond
watershedprotection. He proposed that woodlands could
be protected while still making timber availablefor settlement and commercialpurposes.2
The LauriergovernmentapprovedStephenson'sproposals and issued an order in council on 24 July 1899. This
the Interior Department. Besides reportingon the state of
the western forest reserves,the inspectorwas to surveynew
areasand investigatethe wildfiresituation on all Dominion
lands. A second section in the orderalteredthe timber-berth
leasing regulations.In addition to establishinga minimum
diameter limit of ten inches on all timber cut, it required
operators to pay half the cost of fire preventionand suppressionon their berths. The orderin council, probablyfor
ease of administration,containedtwo majorsections,which
had long-termimplications.They effectivelydividedresponsibilityfor forest managementbetween two separateoffices:
what became the Forestry Branch and the Timber and
GrazingBranch.The first grew out of the chief inspector's
office and was the precursor of the present Canadian
Forestry Service. Until the transfer of natural resources
from federal to provincial control in 1930, it was responsible for all fire fighting on Dominion forestland and for
managing the reserve system. The Timber and Grazing
Branch,on the other hand, continued to be responsiblefor
leasing Dominion land for timberproduction.This division
of responsibilities,which emulated the Ontario example,
had unfortunateeffectson the forest conservationmovement
in Canada.
T
2. Canada,Departmentof the Interior,AnnualReport(1898).
he Liberalsmadea fortunatechoicein the man they
lappointed their first inspector of timber and forestry.
Elihu Stewart was a land surveyor with extensive experience, some ambition, and excellent political connections.
CONSERVATIONIN CANADA
161
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that, be-
(Reform Party) credentials,
he
was a sound administratorand had an amateur'savid enthusiasm for his newfound vocation. He successfully reinterpreted his rathervague commission to be the creationof "a
judicious system of forestry in Canada" based on "the
encouragementof [tree]planting on the plains of Manitoba
and the North-West Territories"and, as the minister indicated in the House of Commons.,the establishmentof more
forest reserves. He also worked hard to separate himself as
much as possible from his superior, the chief clerk of the
Timber and GrazingBranch.3
In 1899, there was heavy public pressure on the Dominion governmentto afforestthe prairieprovinces.Boards
of tradeof the majorwesterncentershad written to Clifford
Sifton and the prime minister requesting a tree-planting
program. The rationale had, by this time, changed from
aesthetic-that trees would alleviate the bleakness of the
plains-to economic-that windbreakswould reducecrop
damage and water evaporation.Treeplanting was expected
to increase a farm's productivityas well as enhancing its
beauty. Stewart drew his inspiration for a tree-planting
program from the U.S. Bureauof Forestryas well as from
projects started by the American midwestern states. In
PAC)RG15,vol. 772, file
3. PublicArchivesof Canada(hereafter
523278, PrivyCouncil(hereafterPC) 1762, 29 July 1899.
162 JOURNAL OF FOREST HISTORY / OCTOBER 1986
, 5:
March 1901, Norman M. Ross, the first professional
foresterhired by the governmentof Canada, joined Stewart
as the latter'sassistant.4
As a result of this work, Stewart's title was formally
changedto "Superintendentof Forestryfor Canada,"marking the creation of a Forestry Branch independent of the
chief clerk of the Timber and Grazing Branch. The new
branch was supposed to assist farmers in planting trees
and to cooperate with municipalities and other organizations such as railroadcompanies. In addition, Stewart retained his earlierresponsibilitiesfor wildfirepreventionand
suppression.
At the end of 1901, Stewart was well on the way to
becoming the leading representativeof Canadian forestry.
Ironically,his confidenceand position were bolsteredby the
failure of the Ottawa Valley lumbermen to influence the
governmentsof Ontario and Quebec. These men wanted to
have current forest conservationmeasures applied to the
forests in which they operated. When their early efforts
failed, this influential group began to demand federal
government leadership for their errant provincial governments. Many were of the Liberal persuasion, politically,
and faithfully supported Laurier'sconservation program.
Through men such as lumbermanW. C. Edwards,who was
a confidant of Wilfrid Laurier,they soon had direct access
to the prime minister. This support aided the expansion of
the ForestryBranchin the yearsto come, from practicalaid
for western settlement to advocating a national forestry
movement.
This shift in policy occurred slowly over a number of
years,constrainedby politicalconditionsin westernCanada.
In contrast to policy in the older provinces, some prairie
settlers and federal officials initially agreed that existing
forested areas had to be preserved. Living in a fragile,
largelytreelessenvironment,these settlersreadilyrecognized
the connectionbetween forest conservationand soil protection. They also knew firsthand the hardshipsof timber
scarcity.The local prairielumber industrymet some of the
need for lumber on farms, in railwayconstruction,and in
mines, but the large area of forest let for timber limits on
the prairieswas scattered.Thus the settlers had to rely on
mills operating on the western coast of the United States
and Canada, ratherthan on the prairies, for most of their
lumber. But the majority of settlers, and especially prairie
lumber interests, showed little support for forest conservation, which as a movement drew its strengthmore from the
federalgovernmentand substantialeasternlumbermen,who
recognized forestry as the basis of the resource planning
4. Canada,Departmentof the Interior,Annual Report (1900);
and Peter Murphy, History of Forest and Prairie Fire Control Policy in
EnergyandNaturalResourcesInformationCentre,
Alberta(Edmonton:
1985), pp. 102-105. Rosshadgraduatedfromthe Universityof ToronCollegeat GuelphandfromCarlA. Schenck's
to'sOntarioAgricultural
BiltmoreForestSchool,wherehe was consideredone of the best stuwritten
dents.Schenckhad,at therequestof the Canadiangovernment,
advocatedgoverna reporton Canadianforestryin whichhevehemently
mentsupportfor treeplantingthroughprovisionof seedlingstock.See
Carl Alwin Schenck, Birth of Forestry in America (Durham, North
Carolina:ForestHistorySociety,1974), p. 146.
techniquesneeded for increasedsettlementand rational
nationaldevelopment.
The keythatwouldopenthedoorto Stewart'sambitions
provedto be the reservesystem.Since1884, whenSirJohn
A. Macdonald'sConservatives
had startedcreatingforest
reserves,the numberhad been slowly increasinguntil, by
1906, they totaledover2.9 millionacres.At firstreserves
wererestrictedto the easternslopesof the RockyMountains,butsoontheyencompassed
manyof thesmallislands
of timberfound on the prairiesand, eventually,even included parts of the northerntree belt. Stewartwanted
authorityoverthereserves;
to establisha systemof managementon themandextendthemto includeall forestedland
in the vastregion.He hadshamelesslydrawnthisambition
fromhis dynamicAmericancounterpart,
GiffordPinchot,
chief of the ForestryBureauin the U.S. Departmentof
Agriculture.5
One of Stewart's first actions after taking office in July
1899 had been to write to Pinchot for information and
publicationsabout forestry. Stewart recognizedthe AmericanIs expertise and also knew that the Dominion government drew on the United Statesfor examplesof administration in other areas. The letter was the first of a series that
culminated in Stewart'svisit to Washington, D.C., in the
late fall of 1899. Pinchot was flatteredat this attentionand
told his admirerhe was lucky to be starting out fresh. He
advised Stewart on two points that were to become important guideposts in future Canadian forest policy. First he
pointed out that the division of federalforest administration
in the United States among three governmentorganizations
reduced efficiency and increasedconflict. Second, he contended that reservingall remaininggovernment-heldforestland in the North-West Territoriesand British Columbia
was all-important.6
Pinchot's well-founded advice to Stewart foreshadowed
a general habit among Canada's federal forestersof using
Americanexperienceto guide their own actions. The Canadian foresters apparently believed that the two countries
had more in common than was actually the case, and they
looked on the U.S. Forest Serviceas a successfulprototype.
Their lack of appreciationfor the political, constitutional,
and cultural differencesbetween the two nations produced
a number of crucial policy miscalculations.
A
t thetimeStewartandPinchotfirstmet,theAmerican
was just starting on the campaign that would unite
federal forest management under his service. Stewart
adopted Pinchot's goal and methods as his own. Ironically,
a relatively limited initiative to promote agriculturaltree
planting set this campaign in motion. A meeting originally
organized to discuss this topic led to the most important
public gatheringof forestrysupportersin Canada since the
5. PAC RG39, vol. 267, file 39766-I, "Policy, National Forest
Policy."
6. From PAC RG39, vol. 19, file 383, "Policy, U.S. Forest Service": Elihu Stewart to Gifford Pinchot, 23 August 1899; Pinchot to
Stewart, 26 August 1899; Stewart to Pinchot, 29 November 1899;
Pinchot to Stewart, 16 December 1899.
American Forestry Congress held in Montreal in August
1882. Just before Christmas1899, Stewartreceiveda letter
from his new deputy minister, James Smart, an old friend
and confidant of Sifton. Smart suggested Stewart should
bring together all those interested in tree planting on the
prairies and draw up a plan of work. Stewart replied that
he would "ask a few gentlemen to meet some evening for
the purpose of starting a Canadian ForestryAssociation,"
which, he was convinced, would be a "useful factor" in
furthering the cause of prairie tree planting. Stewart also
committed himself to discussing the idea with the first
chairman of the American Forestry Congress, Sir Henri
Joly de Lotbiniere, then serving as the minister of inland
revenuein Sir Wilfrid Laurier'scabinet.7
Stewart moved swiftly on the project and sent out a
circularletteron 8 January1900 calling for a meetingin his
office one week later. Invitedto attend were Sir Henri Joly;
J. R. Booth, the influential Ottawa lumber baron; James
Smart; William Saundersof the Dominion Department of
Agriculture;ProfessorJohn Macoun of the Geological Survey; W. T. Macoun of the Dominion experimental farm;
WilliamLittle, the organizerof the Montreal meetingof the
AmericanForestryCongress;Thomas Southworth,clerkof
forestry for Ontario; SydneyFisher,Dominion ministerof
agricultureand a leading supporterof conservationideas;
and Thomas C. and Charles H. Keefer, two well-known
engineersbased in Ottawa. All, except Fisher,were able to
attend and, after appointing Little as chairmanand Stewart
as secretary,the groupnameda committeeto write a constitution for a forestry association, expressly modeled on the
American Forestry Association, and then settled down to
listen to Saunders'presentation about conditions on the
prairies.' The importance of this meeting cannot be overemphasized. It united the old leadershipof the American
ForestryCongress,which had influencedCanadianlegislators throughoutthe 1880s, with a new group of provincial
and federal officials and politicians determinedto advance
the conservation cause in Canada by direct government
intervention.
Once he had obtainedSmart'sreadilygrantedpermission
to use the resources of the Department of the Interior,
Stewart organizeda public meeting to inauguratethe new
association. He drafted a second circularletter stating the
purpose of the Canadian Forestry Association was "the
encouragementof the growth and cultivation of trees on
our North-Westernplains." Thomas Southworth, as a crucial provincialrepresentative,reviewedthis draft and, recognizing the full potential of the new organization,advised
7. From PAC RG39, vol. 232, file 349, "Head Office, Publicity,
Canadian Forestry Association": James A. Smart to Elihu Stewart, 20
December 1899; Stewart to Smart, 22 December 1899; Stewart to
Smart, 3 January 1900. Henri Joly had been knighted on 25 May 1895
and earlier, in 1888, had added his wife's family name to his. PAC
MG27, II, C2, M794.
8. PAC MG28, I, 188, vol. 1, Canadian Forestry Association
Minute Book, 15 January 1900. PAC RG39, vol. 232, file 349, Sydney
Fisher to Elihu Stewart, 16 January 1900; Thomas Southworth to
Stewart, 24 January 1900; Henri Joly to Stewart, 13 March 1900;
Stewart to H. L. Patmore, 13 March 1900.
CONSERVATIONIN CANADA
163
that prairietree planting would not interestmany people in
Ontario, the province expected to make up the bulk of the
membership.Southworthsuggesteda new theme:
The time has arrivedwhen the effortsbeingmadeby our
variousgovernments
for the adoptionof nationalforestry
methodsshouldbe assistedandguidedby intelligentpublic
opinion.Thiscanbest be doneby theformationof suchan
Associationas we havein view,composedof menwho are
interestedin forestpreservation.9
This theme was accepted and the circular letter was sent
out to the names on mailing lists provided by Southworth
and others.
The responseto the circularletter was gratifying.Those
attending the meeting filled the Railway Committee rooms
in the east block of the Parliamentbuildings in Ottawa on
8 March 1900. As with the 1882 meeting of the American
Forestry Congress, a relativelyshort business meeting preceded a seriesof papersabout forestryconditionsin Canada.
Appropriately,the meeting recognizedthe older leadership
of the forestry movement by making Sir Henri Joly de
Lotbiniere president and William Little vice-president.To
show the national scope of the organization,a slate of vicepresidents was elected to representthe provinces, although
the board of directorswas heavily weighted toward Ottawa
and Toronto.10
The influenceof the Canadian ForestryAssociationundoubtedly supportedStewart'sefforts to increasethe power
and prestige of his Forestry Branch. In early 1905, the
Dominion government formally recognized the need for
cooperation between the forestry and timber-leasingparts
of its administration.Robert H. Campbell, who worked
well with Stewart, was appointedchief clerk of the Timber
and GrazingBranchunderthe generaldirectionof Stewart.
Pinchot had talked about this step in 1899 as the vital
move toward consolidation. It had taken Stewart six years
to maneuverhimself and the branchhe headed from being
subservient to the chief clerk of timber and grazing to a
position of authorityover that office. Without a doubt, this
success, achieved through political gamesmanship,did not
increaseStewart'spopularitywith some officials in the Department of the Interiorand createda powerful opposition
to further efforts. This fleeting victory was the closest he
ever came to achieving the goals urged on him by Pinchot.
n early 1905, political events dimmed Stewart's hopes.
l Clifford Sifton, a dynamic supporterof conservation,resigned from his cabinet post. His deputy minister, James
Smart, resigned soon after. Sifton left office principally
9. PACRG39, vol. 232, file 349, ThomasSouthworthto Elihu
Stewart,24 January1900.
10. CanadianForestryAssociation,Report of the First Annual
Meeting(Ottawa:1900). "Formationof the CanadianForestryAssociation,"Rod and Gun in Canada10 (March1900): 192, 202-204,
239-41. The Departmentof the Interiorpaid for all the printingand
office costs in the early yearsand the association'sbusinessfiles are
mixed up with those of the ForestryBranch.Afterthe meeting,Elihu
Stewartcontinuedas secretaryassistedby a youngclerkin the Timber
and GrazingBranch,RobertH. Campbell.
164 JOURNAL OF FOREST HISTORY / OCTOBER 1986
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becausehe opposed Frenchlanguageeducationin the public
school system of the new provinces of Saskatchewanand
Alberta,then being created.But he was also ill from nervous
tension caused by overwork and had already talked about
resigning earlier. He thought he had finished his main work
in the InteriorDepartment;he wanted new responsibilities
and was increasingly frustrated with Laurier's lack of deci-
sive leadershipand his failureto give the West greaterrepresentation in the federal cabinet. The northwesternschools
question thus robbed federal conservationefforts of their
most effectiveleader.'I
FrankOliver,an independentLiberalM.P. from Edmonton, Alberta, was the new minister. In contrast to Sifton,
Oliver wanted the governmentnot to intervenein western
developmentand supportedthe farmersand small businessmen who were then settling the area. He was the founder
and publisherof the Edmonton Bulletin, advocatedwholeheartedly western developmentand values, and demanded
greater attention to local issues.12 Oliver was an efficient
and consummatepolitician. He had built a political orga-
11. Somespeculatedthat Siftonalso resignedto preventclosescrutinyof a potentiallyscandalousalliancewith anotherman'swife and of
his own increasinglyobviouswealthgainedquestionablyfromwestern
developmentprojects.On the resignation,see Berton,PromisedLand,
pp. 226-49, and Hall, CliffordSifton,2:162-82.
12. A biographyof this colorfuland livelywesternerhas yet to be
written.See: Hall, CliffordSifton, 2:61-62, 191-92, 199, and 299;
and Berton,PromisedLand,pp. 58-59, 94-98, 206-208, 255.
nization for the Liberalsin the northernhalf of Albertathat
had significant influence outside of its immediateboundaries. Laurierwas thus in considerabledebt to Oliver even
though, in the House of Commons, Oliver took a strong
independentstance.
Oliver and Sifton were ideologically opposed. Sifton advocated centralizedplanning and developmentof the northwest, but Oliver interpretedthis as a furtherattempt by the
East to dictate to the free West. The new ministerdid not
support federal forestry initiatives, except for controlling
wildfires. As a believerin freeenterprise,he rejectedgovernment regulationof lumbering,especiallyon the prairies.
With the departureof Sifton, Stewartneededthe support
of the CanadianForestryAssociationmore than ever.Most
importantly, the association helped to sponsor an event
intended to move forestry to the forefront of public issues
in Canada: a "Canadian ForestryConvention"to be convened by the prime minister in Ottawa, 10-12 January
1906. Membersof the governmentapplaudedthe idea for a
convention. On the political plane, Laurierand the Liberal
Partycarefully arrangedthe meeting to identify themselves
with the popular issue of conservation.The actions of the
parties involvedleave little doubt that they were attempting
to copy Pinchot's and Roosevelt'salreadysuccessfulefforts
toward this end."3
People from all parts of Canada responded enthusiastically to the announcement of the convention, although
most of those who actually attended came from the urban
areas of Ontario. Lord Grey, the Governor General of
Canada, opened the meeting, which featuredmany presentations by people well known in the conservationmovement. They called for increasedfire protection, more forest
reserves,better forestryeducation, tree planting, and artifi14
cial regeneration.
The tensions lurking close to the surface of Canada's
conservation movement came out, however, in speeches
from the minister of the interior, the prime minister, and
the leader of the opposition. The prime minister, who
potentially had the most to gain or lose politically from the
convention,carefullysupportedboth forest preservationand
reforestationwithout blaming the lumbermenfor devastation or giving them the responsibilityfor rebuildingstocks.
Robert Borden,leaderof the opposition, was buoyedby the
public'senthusiasmfor forestryand seized this opportunity
to criticizethe government.Bordencited statementsby BernhardFernow,who was becoming a popular scientificfigure
in Canada, against uncontrolledexploitation of the country's forests, and he advocated increased government involvement in forest management.But as if to underlinethe
completely political nature of the conservationidea, both
party leaderswere overshadowedby the keynote speakerof
the meeting, GiffordPinchot.
13. GiffordPinchot,BreakingNew Ground(Seattle:Universityof
WashingtonPress,1972), pp. 254-62. CanadianForestryAssociation,
Reportof the CanadianForestryConvention(Ottawa:1906). Of interestis JudsonF. Clark'scomparatively
radicalpaper,whicheventually
led to his resignationfromthe employof the government
of Ontario.
14. CanadianForestryAssociation,Report(1906).
Pinchot was full of confidenceafter his recentsuccess at
the American Forest Congress in 1905. Resolutions had
been passed in support of a bill in the U.S. Congress
transferringthe administrationof public lands from the
General Land Office of the Department of the Interiorto
Pinchot's Bureauof Forestryin the Departmentof Agriculture. Pinchot's plans for the Americanmeeting, as revealed
after the fact in his autobiography,undoubtedlyexpressed
Stewart's hopes for the Canadian Forestry Convention:
"The American Forest Congress issued the call, but the
meeting was planned, organizedand conductedfor the specific purpose of the transferby the Bureauof Forestry."15
Passageof the TransferAct followed shortly and this legislation, along with the AppropriationsAct of 1905, gave
the newly named U.S. Forest Servicewide powers. In particular, the service could now fund its own work directly
through sales of forest products, could marketthose products, and could arrest those suspectedof violating forestry
regulations."6
In his speech to the Canadianconvention,Pinchot called
for the Canadiangovernmentto adopt an organizednational
forest policy; to evaluate land before settlement and to
reserve all nonagricultural forest areas; to promote the
managementof reservesby trainedgovernmentemployees;
to improve federal fire fighting, including cooperation by
railwaycompanies in controllingfiresduringtheirconstruction and operation;and lastly, to encouragetreeplanting on
the prairies.17Almost every speaker at the convention actually repeated these five points, which clearly emerged
as the meeting'stheme. Reflecting Pinchot's influence, the
resolutions passed covered several activities in which the
federalgovernmentwas alreadyinvolved. The main thrust,
however, was to increasethe national government'saction
in forest conservationand to createa single forestryservice.
The resolutionsboth defined the issue for the government
and gave it support to enact the necessarylegislation. The
question now was how far Laurierand FrankOliver were
willing to go. This became clear on 26 March 1906 when
Oliver introducedthe Dominion Forest ReservesAct.'8
T
he bill governingthe forestreserveshadbeenplanned
for a long time, and Stewart clearly intendedthe convention to garnersupport for it. The bill was conceived in
November 1904, just a few months before Sifton's resignation. It followed on Stewart's inquiries about Ontario's
practices and method of creating forest reserves.The Dominion system set up reserves by orders in council but
their creation and managementhad no permanentor specific basis in legislation. Stewart wanted the new forest
reserveact to give him full control to manage the reserves
but still permit their creationthrough the simple administrative device of an order in council. Such orders could
reserve nonagricultural areas in the West regardless of
whether or not they were under a currenttimber licenseor
15. Pinchot,BreakingNew Ground,p. 254.
16. Ibid.,pp. 256-60.
17. CanadianForestryAssociation,Report(1906).
18. Canada,Houseof Commons,Debates(1906), vol. 1, p. 559.
CONSERVATIONIN CANADA
165
Not surprisingly,the bill was held over for a year, ostensibly because Oliver thought parts of it interfered with
provincial jurisdiction, particularly over game protection
within forest reserves.At the heart of the matter,however,
lay the basic philosophical differencesbetween Sifton'smen
and Oliver. Sifton had advocatedregulationthroughorders
in council, but Oliver strongly opposed this mechanism.
Sifton would have expropriatedprivate property, whether
leasehold or freehold, or regulated its use, but Oliver supported the rights of the individual over government and
considered the alterationof a lease to be a breach of contract. The departure of Sifton and the arrival of Oliver
radically altered the balance of power within the Interior
Department. Stewart had gotten used to bypassing the
seniorcivil servantsin the departmentby taking his ideas or
requests directly to James Smart or Clifford Sifton, as he
had in proposing the amendmentsto the Dominion Lands
Act and in orderingthe draftingof the Forest ReservesAct.
Naturally,these shortcutscreatedantagonisms.T. G. Rothwell, the department's solicitor, appears to have been a
leading personal opponent of the superintendent's and
found an ally against Stewart when W. W. Cory replaced
James Smart as deputy minister.Cory was a Sifton appointee from the Yukon but now knew he must get along with
Oliver.AInthe months of March and April 1906 following
the bill's first reading in the House of Commons, Rothwell
and Cory passed drafts back and forth with occasional
requeststo Stewart to justify or clarify a point.20
During these procedural delays, a political crisis was
brewing in the West. It had its roots in the economic
history of the western lumber trade. After 1900, the rate
of prairiesettlementhad increaseddramatically.Coinciden-
tally, from 1898 through 1906-1907, the averageprice of
lumber in eastern Canada rose from an index of 99 to an
index of 165. In the United States,it rose from a base index
of 100 to a peak of 210, at an average annual rate of
increaseof 2.4 percentabove the averageannual cost of all
commodities.21Prairiepurchasersof lumberwere in a peculiar position. Most of their wood came from the western
coasts of Canada and the United States and was delivered
in returningrailcars that otherwisewould havebeen empty.
Deliveries of lumber to the prairies varied inverselywith
eastern demand for forest products. In other words, the
prairieswere convenientdumpinggroundsfor the surpluses
of western lumbermen.
The unstablecosts of lumberbecamea touchy topic with
westernersduring late 1905 and early 1906. The disastrous
earthquakeand fire in San Franciscoin April 1906 drove
lumber prices beyond their previous peak.22In the next
eighteen months, the demand for lumber to rebuild the
city set virtually every mill on the Pacific Coast operating
twenty-four hours a day. The sudden demand and high
prices even interruptedVancouver'sbuilding boom by siphoning lumberoff to the south. The U.S. governmentremoved the 2 percenttariffon lumberimported from British
Columbia. Mills on the coast of the provinceboomed. The
supply of logs on the open market disappeared and all
lumbershipmentsinland ceased.This left the prairiemarket
wide open to mill owners in the mountainregionsof British
Columbiaand Alberta.23
Yearafter year, these men had watched as trainloadsof
lumberpassed eastward. Now, seeing the chance to make a
good profit in a business that was notoriously fickle, these
operatorsallied themselveswith lumberdealers'associations
on the prairies. While the forest reserves bill was being
debated in the House, prairie lumber prices rose precipitously, eventuallyreachingnearlytwice their 1905 levels in
some areas. Farmersand settlers in the region claimed the
values were artificially high and created such a furor in
Ottawa that, in late 1906, the House of Commonsnameda
select committeeto investigatethe facts, chairedby Thomas
Greenway (the former Liberal premier of Manitoba who
was then federal M.P. for Lisgar). The committee's final
report in April 1907 charged that lumber manufacturers,
dealers, and other interestedparties had combined to keep
lumber prices high. Although it did not directly affect the
price of lumberon the prairies,the investigationsleading to
19. FromPACRG39,vol. 259, file 3805-1-2, "HeadOfficeSupervision,ForestReservesAct":ElihuStewartto ThomasSouthworth,28
November1904; Southworthto Stewart,19 November1904; Clifford
Sifton to T. G. Rothwell, 19 December1904; R. G. Keysto E. L.
Newcombe,20 January1905; EmestLemaireto Stewart,21 February
1905; Rothwellto Sifton, 1 March1905; Stewartto WilfridLaurier,
23 February1906.
20. FromPACRG39,vol. 259, file 3805-1-2: W. W. Coryto T. G.
Rothwell,5 March1906; Rothwellto Cory, 16 March1906; and a
seriesof lettersexchangedbetweenCoryand Rothwell,9 March1906
to 17 March1906;J. B. Naskinto Eliht Stewart,22 March1906;see
also the "supportingcorrespondence"
from Thomas Southworthto
FrankOliverand WilfridLaurierduringMarchandApril1906, in the
samerecordgroupand file.
21. R. H. Coats, WholesalePricesin Canada,1890-1909 (Inclusive) (Ottawa:1910), pp. 393, chart78. WilsonM. Compton,The
Organizationof the LumberIndustry,with SpecialReferenceto the
InfluencesDeterminingthe Pricesof Lumberin the UnitedStates(Chicago:AmericanLumberman,
1916), pp. 80-82.
22. Hall, CliffordSifton,2:96. KennethH. Norrie,"TheNational
Policyandthe Rateof PrairieSettlement:A Review,"Journalof Canadian Studies14 (Fall 1979): 63-76. Compton,LumberIndustry,pp.
79-80.
23. Canada,Houseof Commons,"Proceedings
of the SelectCommitteeappointedfor the Purposeof Inquiringinto the PricesCharged
for Lumberin the Provincesof Manitoba,AlbertaandSaskatchewan,"
Journalsof the Houseof Commonsof Canada,vol. 42, pt. 2, App. 6
(Ottawa:1907) (hereafter
"SelectCommittee").
otherlease. GiffordPinchotwould haveapprovedwholelegislation.Sifton
heartedlyof thispowerful,single-purpose
of the Interiorto
to the Department
instructedthesecretary
to theexistingDominionLands
draftsuitableamendments
Act. By January1905, Siftonwas aboutto receivea completelyrevampedact, includingwildlifeprotection,but he
neverexaminedthe revisedbill becauseof his resignation.
Instead,the draft was passed to the prime minister,as
actingministerof the interior,who was not preparedto
takeactionuntilhe had appointeda new minister.In this
way,Stewart'sproposalscamebeforeFrankOliver,a man,
towardStewart's
predisposed
as we haveseen,not favorably
objectives.19
166 JOURNAL OF FOREST HISTORY / OCTOBER1986
I
The rich forests of British Columbia were an
important source of capital for the province's
century.Although the government in Ottawa
was theoreticallyin favor of consewation, it
did not always strictly enforce timber regulaProvincialArchivesphoto 51422.
the reportdid tremendousdamage to the ForestryBranch's
efforts to garnerpolitical support for a new Forest Reserves
Act. Rumorswarnedthe new act would impose controlson
local lumbermenand make it more difficult for them to get
access to timber, thus reinforcing the high lumber prices
paid by settlersand farmers.24
Between the first reading of the forest reservesbill and
its second appearance before the House of Commons,
Stewart lobbied hard to counteractthese rumors, not hesitating to write directly to Laurier,Oliver, and Sifton. In
spite of these efforts, by the second reading in early May
opponents had emasculatedthe bill. Although it appeared
to follow closely the resolutionspassed by the forestryconvention in January, vital clauses exempted timber leaseholders from Forestry Branch control. Also omitted were
Stewart'sdraft clauses permittingthe creationof the forest
reservesthemselvesand of managementregulationsby order
in council. Clearly,the Liberaladministrationwas not about
to createa new, all-powerful forestryorganization.In spite
24. Ibid.
of its limitations, however, the bill took a vital step in
transferringcontrol of the forest reservesfrom the Timber
and GrazingBranchto the superintendentof forestry.25
The politics surroundingthis measureinvolved complex
alliances and much backtracking. Laurier, for example,
made a speech in favor of the bill in which he recognized
that it contradicted some of the ideas he had supported
at the forestry convention. On the other hand and in the
bill's favor, he claimed that it would allow the government
to regulate directly all Dominion forestland. Oliver reiterated this point to the committee of the whole, thus
appearingto abandon his normal support for leaseholders'
rights. Opposition members, led by Robert Borden, then
undermined this claim by forcing Oliver to read out the
standard clauses of a lease, which made it obvious that
leaseholderseffectively held their land indefinitely with no
restrictionsand that the bill upheldthis position. Eventually,
25. Canada, House of Commons, Debates (1906), vol. 2, pp. 2832,
3318, 3412; vol. 3, pp. 5416, 5537, 5556. See correspondence in PAC
RG39, vol. 259, file 3805-1-2, cited above.
CONSERVATIONIN CANADA
167
Productionof Lumberin Canada by Regions, 1908-40
500
4,000
C-/2 -66t
:.
/942.
From D. Roy Cameron andJ. D. B. Harrison, Statistical Record to 1940 of the Forests and Forest Industriesof Canada (Ottawa:
Dominion Forest Service, 1943).
an embarrassedLaurierconceded the point to Borden,confirming that to change the terms of a lease would entail a
breach of faith with its holder. Then John Haggart, the
ConservativeM.P. from Lanark South in Ontario, turned
the tables again by pointing out that the governmentdid in
fact have the legal power to end a lease if it so desired; not
to do so simply followed the provinces' practice of not
interfereingwith existing, almost perpetual,leases. For the
Dominion government,however, the question was a moral
issue ratherthan a legal one.26
Attacks by Borden, Haggart,and other opposition members from Ontario probably reinforced Oliver's attitude
toward eastern Canada. In the end, with the vocal support
of other members from the West such as the M.P. for
Assinaboia (in the North-West Territories),John Turriff,
Oliver's interpretationof the rights of established timber
leaseholdersprevailed.The sole concession was to expedite
the return to the Crown of a leased timber berth once it
was cut over. This policy statement ended Stewart's and
other conservationists'hopes of obtaining total control over
all federalforestland.The ForestryBranchwas denied regulatory authority over working leases and could only take
them over when they had been denuded of merchantable
timber. It was progress but hardly a stunning victory for
forestryin Canada.27
The
26. Canada, House of Commons, Debates (1906), vol. 3, pp. 5538,
5543.
27. Ibid.
28. See, for example, J. Foster, Working for Wildlife: The Beginnings of Preservationin Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1978), pp. 74-79.
168 JOURNAL OF FOREST HISTORY / OCTOBER 1986
debatewasrepeatedfiveyearslaterwhenthe Forest
Reserves Act was amended to become the Forest Reserves and National Parks Act of 1911. This latter act is
generally considered to be the culmination of the Liberal
government'sefforts in resourceconservation.The bill definitely originated in the Liberals'attempt to identify their
party with the popular conservationcreedin preparationfor
the rapidlyapproachingfederalelection of that year. Historians have generallyinterpretedthe law as a victory for the
conservationmovement because it gave a definite mandate
to the National Parks Branch and established a separate
Parks Service.28Although these were important achievements, in largerterms the bill representeda step backwards
for the conservationmovement as a whole in Canada. The
objectives behind the act, inspiredby FrankOliver, hid the
first real challenge to the ideals of the conservationmovement. Oliver aimed to cripple the Forestry Branch, the
flagshipof the movement.
The debate and political maneuveringbehind the scenes
revealboth the fragilityof the concept of forest conservation
prior to World War I and the Laurieradministration'sambivalencetoward it. As introduced,the Forest Reservesand
National Parks Act of 1911 completely revised its predecessor. In the debates in the House, a number of familiar
themes reappeared. Politicians representingwestern con-
stituenciessplit from easterners.A prairiepopulism emphasizing local control was once more pitted against eastern
reliance on scientific planning and the controlled use of
natural resources. This was largely because, in the west,
Oliver was under pressure from three distinct groups.
Farmersand wealthy ranchersin southern Alberta wanted
to enlarge the forest reserveson the eastern slopes of the
Rocky Mountains. Western lumbermen, in contrast, worried that larger reserveswould jeopardizetheir precarious
position within the industry,as ForestryBranchregulation
of their leased timber berths would increasetheir costs and
drive them out of business. Finally, the prairiesettlersand
farmers had not changed their position since 1906. Even
though the retail price of lumberhad droppedin the intervening years,they still consideredit too high. Their dissatisfaction over the eviction of squattersfrom the forest reserves
following the 1906 act only exacerbatedtheir basic hostility
toward the ForestryBranch. Unfortunately,the popularity
of Norman Ross's shelterbelt program did not counterbalance their anger.29
Oliver took all these pressuresinto account in drafting
the new bill. He aimed mainly to give the Dominion's
nationalparks the same legal status as the forest reserves,to
enlarge the area of the Rocky Mountain Reserve and to
ensure continued utilization of the forests. On the other
hand, the ForestryBranchsaw the bill as an opportunityto
achievesome long-plannedobjectives,especiallyto increase
its control over logging on timber berths leased by the
Timber and GrazingBranchbut actually locatedwithin the
reserves.As tabled, the bill increasedleaseholders'security
of tenure. In a letter accompanying the bill, the assistant
secretaryto the minister of the interior,L. Pereira,emphasized this significant change from the 1906 legislation.30
Oliver made other changes as well-for example, limiting
the government'sright of expropriationto land held in fee
simple on the groundsthat the cost of compensatingleaseholders would be too high.3"For the ForestryBranch,the
good news in the act was that the reserved areas were
increased from twenty-one, with an area of 3.3 million
acres, to thirty-six, totaling 16.6 million acres. The government boasted of this expansion as proof it was dedicatedto
wise resourceplanning. Indeed, the extent of the new areas
was impressivedespite the flaws in the legislation.
The new law raisedthe budget of the ForestryBranchto
keeppace with its new responsibilities,which includedmore
authorityover fireregulationsand the right to restrictpublic
access to the reservedareas. Unfortunately,the branchalso
lost its preeminentposition in the wider conservationcause
when the act transferredresponsibilityfor the preservation
of wildlife to the new "ParksBranch."For the conservation
29. Norman M. Ross, The Tree-PlantingDivision: Its History and
Work (Ottawa: Forestry Branch, 1923). See testimonials in PAC RG39,
vol. 1, file 18374, "Policy Resolutions."
30. From PAC RG39, vol. 259, file 3805-1-2: Owen Ritchie to
Frank Oliver, 16 November 1910; L. Pereira to E. L. Newcombe, 27
December 1910; P. G. Keyes to Owen Ritchie, 1 August 1911.
31. Canada, House of Commons, Debates (1911), vol. 5, pp. 8085,
8606-23, 8650-59.
ethic in Canada, this was both good and bad: the movement was developing more diversesources of support, but
was also fragmenting,at least within the federalorganizations. The early conservationistshad tended to see reserve
areasor watershedsas ecological wholes, to be managedby
single agencies, but this was clearlychanging.
The new Parks Branch'sindependenceand freedom of
administrationwould allow it to depart from the utilitarian
forestryviewpoint. Furthermore,Oliver himself stated that
the bill includedparks and forestryunderthe same regulations so that forest reservescould easily become parks. But
he cannily omitted that the reversewas also true; logging
could just as easily be carried out in the parks under
ForestryBranchsupervisionif the demand were to warrant
it. Effectively,the only differencebetween a forest reserve
and a park was that public access to the latter was guaranteed. The bill also considerablyreducedthe size of the two
existing federally controlled national parks in the Rocky
Mountains, Banff and Jasper. Oliver wanted to make as
much land as possible available for lumbering, mining,
grazing, and water power, though in this instancedevelopment would be subject to governmentcontrol. Thus the
governmentrecognizedthe growing importanceof tourism
and yielded to the public clamor for protectionof scenery,
flora, and fauna, but only to a limited extent. Only in 1914
would the pressure of public opinion restore the park
boundaries.32
F
orestryadvocatesmighthavewelcomedthesechangesif
the minister had fully committed his government to
conservation.Frank Oliver'sspeeches during the House of
Commons debates early in 1911 said little about conservation but emphasized the protection of established rights.
Time and again he ignored calls from eastern M.P.'s for
increasedcontrol over logging. In a statementthat would be
familiar to present-day conservationists,Oliver said that
"our purpose, in dealing with the timber in the reservesis,
first, the economic utilizationof the timber which is useful
for economic purposes and, next, the reproductionof timber so that thereshall be a continuoussupply."To which he
added that it must be rememberedthat timber had two
values, one of which was in dollarsper thousand board feet
(the other being aesthetic). He did not think the public
would allow cutting to be stopped altogetherbecause "we
have to meet the immediate pressureof public opinion of
the settler who wants wood and who wants building
logs. 33
In this, Oliver clearly was stating the government'senduring position: existing business rights and interests, exemplified by holdersof timber leases, were to be protected
and nurtured,but their ability to exploit the situation and
raise prices was to be checked by granting farmers and
settlers easy access to the timber on the reserves.Unfortu32. Canada, House of Commons, Debates (1911), vol. 5, p. 8610.
Sylvia Van Kirk, "The Development of National Park Policy in Canada's Mountain National Parks, 1885 to 1930," (unpublished Master's
thesis, University of Alberta, 1969), chapter 1.
33. House of Commons, Debates (1911), vol. 5, p. 8612.
CONSERVATIONIN CANADA
169
:::|::~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..
..,..
..
........
A fire ranger'shut on Lake Minsinaqua in
Ontario. Public Archivesof Canada photo
0-2-4-2.
SI.N
nately, this policy delayed the industry'sconversionto conservation.Why invest in renewinga resourcewhen its owner
activelypursueda policy of keepingits value low? 34
The gap between ideals of forest management and the
final provisions of the 1911 act thus revealedthe vulnerability of the conservationmovement to political necessity.
Oliver well understood this vulnerability,which was the
final limit governing the Lauriergovernment'ssupport of
conservationin general.The Liberalswould provide ample
funding for the ForestryBranchbut would not face down
either the political difficultiesor the additional expense of
intensiveforest managementon the productivetimberlands
of the West. Nor was the governmentprepared to regulate the western lumber industry. Like most of Canada's
provincial governments,the Laurieradministrationturned
to creating and enlarging the forest reserves as an excellent political compromise. This policy protected "vested
interests"" in resource exploitation while appearing to
adopt modern resourcemanagementand land classification
ideas.
The acts of 1906 and 1911 put the Forestry Branch in
chargeof fighting fires on Dominion forestlandsoutside the
reserves,but gave it no control over existing lumber companies logging those lands. The branchcould haveregulated
logging on the reserves,but the timber berthsalreadyunder
the control of the Timber Branch, outside the reserves,
more than met existing demand. Thus most logging continued outside forestry'scontrol. Worse still, the existing
leased areas were scatteredthroughoutthe reserves,including those on the eastern slopes of the Rocky Mountains.
34. For example, see the regulations governing timber sales in
Canada, Department of the Interior, Forestry Service, Timber Disposal Manual (Ottawa: 1929), pp. 54-57. The text accompanying the
regulations makes it clear the phrase "non-competitive rates" means
below market value. In particular, settlers were to receive all the wood
they wanted free. When surpluses were sold noncommercially, the objective was to keep small, local concerns in business and help ease
unemployment.
35. Canada, House of Commons, Debates (1911), vol. 5, pp.
8619-23.
170 JOURNAL OF FOREST HISTORY / OCTOBER 1986
These leasesencompassedthe pockets of superior,accessible
timber, leaving to the branch most of the unproductive
forest: stands that were either too young or not economically exploitable. Because it never obtained control over a
substantial area of productive forest, the Forestry Branch
could never demonstrate what forest management could
achieve in practice. As a result, Stewart and his successors
effectivelybecame foresterswithout axes!
Only with hindsight can we truly appreciateand criticize
the restrictedmandate of the ForestryBranch.At the time,
the officers of the branch thought they could make more
progress if only they could galvanize the leadershipof the
conservationmovement into pushing for new measures.In
this sense, the branch'sfirst five yearsof life, between 1906
and 1911, were crucial to its future performance and
reputation.
WYlhen Elihu Stewart stepped down as superintendent
on 1 March 1907, he could point to the reservesystem and the fire-fightingresponsibilitiesas important beginnings. The Canadian ForestryAssociationhad long advocated a federal forestryorganizationwith such powers.36
Stewart himself did not say farewell to forestry;he left to
take up the vice-presidencyof SpruceFalls Power and Paper
Company at Kapuskasing, Ontario, and at his departure
his influencewith the LaurierLiberalsremainedhigh enough
that he could dictate the choice of his successor. This was
Robert Henry Campbell,who had been chief of the Timber
and Grazing Branchin the few months before the passage
of the 1906 act, when it had been nominally under the
control of the ForestryBranch.He had also helped to found
the Canadian Forestry Association and was solidly committedto a stableand progressiveforestpolicy. Like Stewart,
he had had no formalscientifictraining.More than Stewart,
however, Campbell was considereda "good tactician" be36. F. G. Fensom, Expanding Forestry Horizons: A History of the
Canadian Institute of Forestry-Institut Forestier du Canada, 19081969 (Montreal: Canadian Institute of Forestry, 1972), p. 404. PAC
RG2, PC 51-399, 28 February 1907.
and political
causeof he was able to get his bureaucratic
thanany
more
This
quality,
his
opinions.
mastersto accept
through
other,enabledhim to guidethebranchsuccessfully
the difficultperiodup to the end of WorldWar1.37
Campbell'sfirstassignment,underthe 1906 ForestReservesAct, wasto evictsettlersillegallysquattingwithinthe
compensatedthe
forestreserves.Althoughthe government
majorityof the squattersfor theirlosses,the branchneverthelesslost muchof the good will it hadgatheredfromits
A secondmajortask for Campbell,
shelterbeltprogram.38
andforthestaffof forestershe slowlymanagedto hire,was
Experts
newloggingregulations.
draftingandimplementing
and
Timber
the
with
cooperated
Branch
Forestry
in the
GrazingBranchto producethe new regulationsby 1907.
propercruisingon all berthsbeforetheywere
Theyrequired
openedfor auction,set a minimumdiameterfor cutting,
and dictatedthatall logs cut on Dominionlandsbe manufacturedin Canada.Two othermajorprovisionswereincluded.The firstsprungdirectlyfromtherecommendations
andrevisedthe
of theselectcommitteeheadedby Greenway
way royaltieswerepaid to the Crown.39Henceforth,logs
couldbe scaledin the bushbeforetheywereremovedfrom
the landingsif the branchesso desired.Secondand most
cuttingon Dominionlandswould
all operators
importantly,
haveto disposeof theirslashas directedby the officersof
the Departmentof the Interior.40
In summary,the ForestryBranchused the regulations
to makelumberingconformto its own idealsof efficient
utilizationthat would still ensurecontinuedproductivity
37. PAC RG32, C2, vol. 40, Frederick H. Byshe, "Robert Henry
Campbell." PAC RG2, PC 51-399, 28 February1907.
38. For examples of the public reaction, see PAC RG39, vol. 1, file
18374, "Policy Resolutions." PAC RG39, vol. 267, file 39766-1,
Charles McCormick, generalmerchant, Kenville, Manitoba, to Minister
of Agriculture, 10 March 1914; and PAC RG39, vol. 448, file 34238,
H. R. Duchane (letter and petition), Plamondville, Alberta, to Minister
of the Interior, 29 September 1915. Others can be found in file 38067
of the RG39, vol. 448. This presented Oliver with a chance to profit.
He had some friends file fraudulent squatter's claims and supervised
their processing himself. When the claims were paid, the money was
divided between the parties involved. Berton, Settling the West, p. 207.
39. Chester Martin, Dominion Lands Policy (Toronto: McClelland
and Stewart, 1973 [1938]), p. 189. Canada, House of Commons,
"Select Committee." The returns to the Crown were based on sworn
statements made to the Timber and Grazing Branchby the mill's owner
and were rarely checked by the branch's officers. The millmen typically
reduced the reported volume by up to 50 percent of what they actually
sold as lumber. In some cases, this reduction was much higher. One
enviable mill in Winnipeg followed this pattern even though it had no
waste whatsoever. What it did not burn to produce its own steam, it
sold as firewood. The new regulations compromised on the choice of
log-scaling rules, requiring the use of Scribners instead of the Doyle
desired by the millowners or the new International pushed by the
Forestry Branch.
40. From PAC RG39, vol. 268, file 39770-1, "Forestry, Head
Office, Brush Disposal": report by R. H. Palmer, chief fire ranger,
Edmonton, June 1913, forwarded to W. W. Cory by R. H. Campbell
on 11 June 1913; memo by F. K. Hershmeir, district inspector, Manitoba, 11 January 1914; Campbell to Cory, 5 Sept 1917. Various petitions from operators and their answering letters until 1923 are in PAC
RG39, vol. 268, file 39770-1; after that date they are in RG 39, vol.
268, file 39980.
In practice,however,the TimberBranch
and regeneration.
Thisbranch
controlledall thesignificantloggingoperations.
simplypointedout to loggersthat, underthe regulations,
theymustfollowdirectionsfromTimberBranchofficersandthat,if no directionsweregiven,theloggerscoulddo as
theypleased.The TimberBranchsawthe foresters'regulations and objectivesas just so muchunprovedtheorythat
"practical men" should ignore. This rift in attitude and
divisionsapparentin
policydirectlyreflectedlong-standing
the debateoverthe
and
in
in
council
1899
order
again
the
Forest Reservesacts of 1906 and 1911.41
I
on forestryand
n spiteof the uniquenationalconstraints
in Canada,the Canadianmovement
forestconservation
couldnot escapethe dynamicinfluenceof PresidentTheodore Rooseveltand GiffordPinchot, his chief forester.
policiesdesperately
When Canadianfederalconservation
neededdirection,thesetwo leaptonto thestageoncemore,
offeringAmericanexamplesto guidethe Canadianmovement.Rooseveltwasnot themostpopularAmericanpresident northof the borderafterthe disputeoverthe Alaska
boundarywas resolvedin favorof the United Statesin
1903. Nevertheless,with his usualaplombhe continuedto
manipulateCanadianforestpoliciesto meet the internal
needsof the UnitedStates,therebyaffectingimmeasurably
causein Canada.
the conservationist
In early1908, whenhe hadonly one yearremainingas
president,Rooseveltandhischiefforesterknewthatcertain
figures,both insideand outsideof Congress,werebiding
theirtimeto undomuchof theprogressmadeby American
One way to restrictthe freedomof action
conservationists.
of the waitingwolvesin sheep'sclothing(asonecartoonist
laterdepictedthem)42 was to forma permanent,independent commissionto act as a watchdogand reporton all
would
mattersof interestto themovement.Thecommission
and it would needwide suphaveto be self-perpetuating
port, fromall the individualstatesof the Union.
of theInland
PinchotmadeF. H. Newell,thenchairman
WaterwaysCommission,responsiblefor creatingthe new
commission.In the summerof 1907, as describedlater
by Pinchot,Newell'sdiscussionswith PresidentRoosevelt
transformedthe proposedpermanentcommissioninto a
conferenceof all the stategovernorswith a limitednumberof expertsin attendance.The "Governors'
Conference"
was held for threedaysin May 1908 with W J McGee,a
as
civil servantand a well-knownfigurein conservation,
The meetingcalledfor the establishment
of state
secretary.
conservationcommissionsand a nationalbody based in
Washington,D.C. The vastmajorityof the forty-sixstates
in the Unioncompliedwith the resolution,and Roosevelt
Commissionin June
appointedthe NationalConservation
1908. RobertCampbelland SenatorW. C. Edwardsat41. PAC RG39, vol. 267, file 39766-1, W. J. Roche, minister of the
interior, to James White, secretary, Commission of Conservation, 22
April 1915. See the briefs and submissions made by the Dominion
Forestry Service to the Royal Commission on Transfer of Natural Resources to Alberta and Saskatchewan in PAC RG15, vols. 15 and 16.
42. Pinchot, Breaking New Ground, p. 437.
CONSERVATIONIN CANADA
171
tended the national commissions' founding meeting, as
Canadiandelegates.43
Like all of Roosevelt's commissions, the National ConservationCommission relied on volunteerlabor. Evenwithout a professional staff, the commission completed an
inventory of the nation's natural resources in time for its
first meeting held in early December 1908, barely four
months before the end of Roosevelt'ssecond and last term.
The speed with which this considerable task was done
speaks volumes for the organizationalabilities of the protagonists, and also for their sense of almost frantichaste to
createa permanentbody before Roosevelt'sdeparture."
Neither Pinchot nor the president were content with a
national commission; both wanted to legitimate their creation by giving it international links. On Christmas Eve
1908, Roosevelt invited Lord Grey, the governorgeneralof
Canada, and President Porfirio Diaz of Mexico to send
representativesto meet him and Pinchot for a North American ConservationConferencein mid-February1909. Roosevelt immediately released copies of the invitations to the
press, claiming that Mexican and Canadian interest in the
National Conservation Commission and in the National
Rivers and Harbors Congresswarranteda special international conferenceto identify and discussconservationissues
common to the three countries. Rather than entrust the
43. Ibid., pp. 344-45, 355-60, 421-22. PAC RG15, vol. 1038,
file 17115 11, PC 2561, Report of the Committee of the Privy Council,
21 November 1908. "Preservationof the Forest," Ottawa Citizen, 15
December 1908.
44. Pinchot, Breaking New Ground, p. 357.
..... X^W
^l .
|L
.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.........................
.S
letters of invitation to normal diplomatic channels, Roosevelt sent them with Pinchot, first to Canada and then to
Mexico, as his personalrepresentative.45
Pinchot left Washington for Ottawa on December 28,
arriving on the following day with only the shortest of
advancewarning. Pinchot'sabruptarrivalcausedsomething
of a crisis. A special luncheon meeting of the Canadian
Club was hastily organized for Friday, the thirtieth. In a
speechto that gathering,which the Ottawa papersdescribed
as being interruptedby "loud applause,"Pinchot reviewed
the work of Roosevelt'scongressesand commissions;stated
that problemsas well as resourcesknew no nationalboundaries; and called for internationalcoordination that would
benefit the whole continent.46
The governorgeneral'sreplyto Pinchot'saddressrevealed
that the letter Pinchot had just passed to him called for
cooperation between Canada and the United States in "a
common and joint endeavor to safeguard the interests of
posterityand guardfrom furtherrecklesswaste and wanton
destructionand to protect that great inheritanceof natural
resources with which providence has so bounteously endowed us."47Grey pledged his government'scomplete support and promisedit would soon choose delegatesto attend
Roosevelt's meeting. Inadvertently,he exceeded his constitutionallimitationsin making these promises.Laurierrecognized this but sensedthat an importantpolitical opportunity
was in the making and let the matterslip, joking that "the
GovernorGeneralhas told you of the action that his advisers
intend to take" and which he, Laurier,endorsed.48
Thus Canada committed itself to a course of action that
originated in Pinchot's and Roosevelt's desire to protect
their policies from an uncooperativeCongressand, to their
minds, a less-than-enthusiasticPresidentTaft. David Hall,
Sifton's biographer,sees this incident as evidence that the
United States was exporting progressivereform politics to
its neighbors,given that
concernfor conservation
also was partof the reformsentimentof the era.By applicationof utilitariantheory,scien-
*1
_ _
wlwL
-S
S=
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..
. .......
....
A session of the North American ConservationConferenceheld in Washington, D.C. in February1909 at the invitation of American president
Theodore Roosevelt. Shown are, from left to right:James R. Garfield
(U.S. secretaryof the interior),Henri S. Baland (Canadiandelegate),
Sydney Fisher (Canadianminister of agriculture),Clifford Sifton (former
Canadian minister of the interior), Gifford Pinchot (U.S. forester),
Thomas R. Shipp (secretaryof the U.S. National ConservationCommission), R. E. Young (secretaryof the Canadian delegation), Romulo
Escobar (formerMexican secretaryof agriculture),Miguel A. de Quevedo
(Mexican commissioner of forestry),and Carlos Sellerier(Mexican secretary of agriculture).Public Archivesof Canada photo C-16975.
172 JOURNAL OF FOREST HISTORY / OCTOBER 1986
45. Ibid., p. 361.
46. Ibid.,p. 361-66. "Resourcesof NorthAmerica,"Ottawa Citizen, 28 December1908; "Mr. GiffordPinchot,"Ottawa Citizen,30
December1908; "International
OttawaCitizen,31 DeConservation,"
cember1908. The problemwas thatPinchotlackedformaldiplomatic
status.Thus,how was he to presenthis letterwithoutupsettingRoosevelt's appointedambassadorto the BritishEmpirebased in London,
England?An ingenioussolutionwasquicklydevised.That Saturday,31
December1908, the presidentof the Republicof Honduraswas to
addressthe OttawaCanadianClub.As a result,the primeminister,the
leaderof the opposition,the governorgeneraland the diplomaticcorps
would be in the city and a specialluncheonmeetingof the Canadian
Club was quicklyorganized.See also: C. R. Smithand D. R. Witty,
Resources
andEnvironment:
An Explanation
"Conservation,
andCritical
Evaluation
of theCommission
of Conservation,"
PlanCanada11 (1970):
55-71; D. M. Calnan,"Businessmen,
Forestryand the Gospelof Efficiency:The CanadianConservation
Commission,1909-1921," (unpublished Master'sthesis, Universityof WesternOntario,1976); and S.
Renfrew,"Commissionof Conservation,"
DouglasLibraryNotes n.v.
(Spring1971): 17-26.
47. Ottawa Citizen, 30 December1908.
48. Ibid.
. .....
Timber
rafts
on of.Ca.ada.photo.C.5949
the
Ottawa
.
eSeSeeswe!al.
river
l
in_Ottawa
below
the
Parliament.buildings.Public.Archives
|_E2t
,_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
..w
Timber rafts on the Ottawa riverin Ottawa, below the Parliamentbuildings. Public Archivesof Canada pboto C-5949.
regulation,and moralsuatificresearch,somegovernment
sion, it was thought that the machineryof society and
couldbe cleansedand renewed,whilecorrupgovernment
tion,slums,greedandwastewerecontrolledor eliminated.
was essentialfor
A clean,productivenaturalenvironment
theproperfunctioningof the social... environment.49
Few governmentsneededcleansingand reformmore than
Laurier's.The governmentsent SydneyFisher,the minister
of agriculturewho was very sympathetic to conservation
issues;CliffordSifton; and Henri S. Beland, a LiberalM.P.
from Quebec who had spoken often in supportof conservation measuresfor pulpwood, to the conferenceas Canada's
representatives.F. H. Outerbridgerepresentedthe Colony
of Newfoundland. Meeting with four Mexicans and three
Americansled by Pinchot, these men identifiedfive areasof
common concern:public health, forests, water, lands, and
minerals.Not surprisingly,the conferencerecommendeda
permanent national conservationcommission for each of
the three countries and the Colony of Newfoundland. The
commissions would have no formal authority, but would
collect and exchange information and work toward common legislative goals. The conferencestressed the interdependenceof conservationmeasuresfor all naturalresources
and the need for governmentto regulatethe privatesectorin
the public interest.50
The conferencecompleted its work less than two weeks
before Taft's inauguration.Almost immediatelythe participants' plans fell apart. Newfoundland and Mexico never
49. Hall, CliffordSifton,vol. 2, chapter2.
50. Pinchot,BreakingNew Ground,pp. 366-72.
organizedtheir commissions.In the United States, Congress
deleted funds for the National ConservationCommission
from the budget and President Taft did not come to the
commission's aid, thereby forcing it to become a public
association (ratherthan an official agency). Only Canada,
where Lauriersaw the idea as politically useful, created a
permanentcommission.51
The creation of the commission requiredan act of Parliament. The bill would haveto avoid the obvious dangerof
encroaching on provincial governments' powers. Laurier
asked Sifton, as the most knowledgeable individual in the
field and the one most sympatheticto conservation,to draft
the legislation. The bill, introduced by Sydney Fisher in
April 1909, allowed the commission to investigateand report on mattersreferredto it or that it definedbut gaveit no
administrativeresponsibilityor executivepowers.52
The opposition allowed the bill an easy passage since in
actual fact they favored the establishment of an official
advocate for conservation.Thus, the governmentended up
with the best of all worlds, a commissionthat would investigate difficult issues of greatpopular concernbut could not
make binding recommendations.Laurier, who, as stated
above, was not at home with a larger regulatory role for
government, had once again found a policy compromise
that satisfied his political needs. Subsequently,the govern51. HaroldT. Pinkett,GiffordPinchot:Privateand PublicForester
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), pp. 114-15.
52. Canada, House of Commons, Debates (1909), vol. 1, pp. 35556; vol. 4, pp. 4988, 5249, 6363, 6375-76, 6379-80. Canada, Commission of Conservation, First Annual Report, 1910 (Ottawa: 1910).
CONSERVATIONIN CANADA
173
ment named Clifford Sifton as chairmanof the new organization, and he named a committee to guide the commission in its work. Among members of this committee were
some of the country's leading supportersof conservation,
including W. C. Edwards and BernhardFernow, supplemented by ex-officio representativesof the governments
from each provinceand businessfigures,such as E. B. Osler
and Sir Sanford Fleming. Sifton, who himself remaineda
memberof Parliament,hoped that the Liberalswould make
relativelynonpartisanappointments,but only some of those
appointedwere the men of vision and knowledgehe wanted.
At first the commission carefully restricted itself to only
part of its theoretical role-offering advice on questions
referredto it, ratherthan raisingprioritiesof its own.
The Commission of Conservationwas rathera peculiar
organization for Canada at this period of the country's
development. It was really the forerunnerof agencies such
as the National Research Council, although it was more
independentof government.It epitomizedPinchot's multidisciplinary approach to conservation,embracing a wide
range of resource, environmental, and health issues and
advocating inventoriesand researchas the bases for policy.
Although the commission depended on Dominion government funds and reportedto Parliamentthroughthe minister
of agriculture, it enjoyed greater freedom from constitutional constraints than did parliamentarycommittees or
governmentdepartments.53
Under the leadershipof Sifton and its energeticpermanent secretaryJames White, the Commission of Conservation soon developeda reputationfor independentand accurateresearch.It hired many bright individual researchersto
investigateproblems. An excellent example is Roland D.
Craig,a pioneerin modernforest surveys,who producedan
inventoryof British Columbia'sforests. Such projectswere
initiated by the provinces concerned, carried out by independent investigators,and financed by the federal government. On its own initiative,the commissionhired Thomas
Adams to report on town planning, and it investigatedthe
location of water resourcesand power sites across Canada.
Public health and the preservationof game were also investigatedand introducedto public scrutinyfor the first time.54
C
anada'sCommissionof Conservation
highlightsthe
peculiar and ironic history of official conservation
policy in Canada. In 1899 Gifford Pinchot emphasized to
Elihu Stewart the importanceof uniting all aspects of Dominion forestry policy under one body. The 1909 White
House Conferencereinforcedthis principle by stressingthe
interdependenceof all conservationmeasures.Yetafter 1911
Canada's federal government divided forest management
alone among four federalorganizations:the ForestryBranch,
Parks Branch,and Timber and GrazingBranchin the De53. Canada,Statutes,8-9 Edward111,chapter27.
54. On the workof the commission,especiallyurbanplanning,see
A. F. J. Artibiseand G. A. Stelter,"Conservation
Planningand Urban
Planning:The CanadianCommissionof Conservationin Historical
in R. Kain,ed., Planningfor Conservation
Perspective,"
(New York:St.
Martin'sPress,1981), pp. 17-36.
174 JOURNAL OF FOREST HISTORY / OCTOBER1986
partmentof the Interior;and the Commissionof Conservation loosely attached to the Departmentof Agriculture.In
fact, Pinchot contributed to this result by advocating the
formationof the commission.Administrativefragmentation
made the effectivepracticeof forest conservationharderto
achieve, as it dependedon voluntarycooperationamong all
these organizations.In addition, the situation gave politicians such as Frank Oliver, who had little sympathy for
forest conservationmeasures, the opportunity to "divide
and rule," an opportunity Oliver was not slow to exploit.
Supportedby Oliver, the Timber and GrazingBranchcontrolled practicallyall the merchantableforest on Dominion
lands and gave loggerswide freedom of operation.
Conservationof natural resourceswas a major political
issue at the federal level in Canada from the 1890s up to
World War I. The issue may have originatedin the United
States, but public supportfor conservationin the Dominion
also forced the Canadiannational governmentto formalize
the managementof the country'svaluableand increasingly
scarceresources.But conservationpolitics also revealedthat
Canadian governments,both before and after the Liberals
under Laurier,lacked the political will to face vested interests in western Canada and bring forest managementto
the producing woodlands controlled by the Dominion.
Effectively, the federal government was careful to go no
further with its policies than the minimum acceptableto
the provincialgovernments,opting for forest reservesextensive in acreage but that excluded all of the commercial
timberlandunderlease.
Fromthis perspective,the political rhetoricof Liberalsin
support of forest conservationwas just so much windowdressing.During the 1920s, officialpartiesof forestersfrom
every Dominion and colony in the British Empire were
shown Canada'sneat demonstrationforestryplots and magnificent westernparks. They neversaw the berthscontrolled
by Timber Branch.Here, hidden in the background,some
of the worst nineteenth-century logging was carried on
under the benign eye of the same government.The Laurier
administration, and later governments, boasted of their
progressivepolicies but neveradmittedthey ignoredadvice
from their own expert officials. Nor did they admit they
were following principles and patterns first advocated by
Americanconservationists.
This behavioris completelywithin the traditionof Canadian political compromise. On the one hand, the government could appearto be taking action on a seriousnational
problem while, on the other, it could allow relativelyunfettered exploitation of valuable forestlands in order not to
offend politically influentialgroups. Becausethe Canadian
federalgovernmentfailed at this time to apply forest management to the producing woodlands under its control, it
also failed to present the provinces with an example of
leadership that they might have copied. This failure of
statesmanship had a tremendous negative impact on the
development of forest conservationin the provinces. At
best, it promoteddiverseand partial solutions to the problem and, at worst, it gave a politically satisfactorymodel
for avoiding effectivepolicies.
A