23
"DECONSTRUCTING DEPENDENCY":
OSAGE SUBSISTENCE AND UNITED STATES INDIAN
POLICY, 1800-1830.
..
"
E
e
T
by
JetTMeans
..
J.r
11 ......"
C
lJ
U
II
T
Y
For most Americans, the western fur trade represents an extremely
adventurous and positive era within American history and folklore. Nothing
embodies the symbol of American freedom and self-reliance more than that of
the lone trapper who conquered the wilderness and carved a place in the West
for future generations. American textbooks, literature, and movies abound with
portrayals of physically and morally superior mountain men whose courage
dwarfed both their contemporaries and modem man. (Who can forget Robert
Redford's stirring performance as Jeremiah Johnson, conqueror of grizzlies,
Indians, and the mountains themselves?!) Trappers were also seen as
ambassadors to the western Indian tribes, helping to open the way for the
settlement of the West for industrious white farmers and ranchers. Trading
posts, such as St. Louis, blossomed into industrious and burgeoning towns.
However, trading posts established by these bold trappers provided more than
commercial exchange and jumping off points for settlers headed west.
Historian David Wishart stated that these posts became cultural meeting
places where news, customs, and beliefs were exchanged between Indians and
traders. I He also noted that the Indian-trader relationship offered the most
natural and congenial interaction between whites and Indians. 2 This benevolent
view of the American fur trade permeated United States school systems for
decades, and perpetuated an idealized view towards the fur trade and trappers.
However, within the last twenty-five years historians have revisited this topic
chland District
Jeff Means' interest in Western History is a lifelong passion. He began his academic
career after a four-year tour in the Marine Corps in 1991. He is currently a doctoral
candidate at the University of Oklahoma in Nonnan. His interest in studying Native
Americans of the Great Plains region, and the Oglala Lakota in particular, stems from his
family ties to tribe and his love for the Great Plains environment. His current work
centers on the Oglala Lakota and the emerging plains cattle industry in the late 19th.
century.
24
and presented a far less flattering picture of the machinations of the American
fur trade.
For many oftoday's historians, instead ofbuilding a cultural bridge between
Indian tribes and the United States, the fur trade came to represent a weapon
used for the subjugation and exploitation of Native Americans. The widely
accepted theory pertaining to dependency holds that as Native American tribes
began to trade for European goods, such as rifles and manufactured goods, they
became completely dependent upon those goods. Once dependent, the tribes
became easily manipulated by the American government into accepting federal
demands. Thus, through dependency, they lost their land, tribal autonomy, and
way of life. Historian Bernard Sheehan demonstrated clearly in, Seeds of
Extinction that the United States attempted to use Indian dependency upon
trade goods not only to obtain Indian land, but also as a means to force tribes to
assimilate to American culture. 3 As Sheehan's subtitle denotes, Jeffersonian
philanthropic ideology maintained that it was in the Indian's best interest to
divest them of their native culture and create "Americanized" yeoman farmers
out of savages. The primary method used in "civilizing" the natives involved
allowing the Indians to build a substantial debt to the traders, and then accepting
land as payment for these debts. According to Sheehan, the acquisition of land
provIded two distinct benefits for the United States; it encouraged the migration
of white settlers to new fertile territories, and forced the "nomadic" Indians to
settle down and cultivate their ever-dwindling lands.
Other historians such as Anthony F. C. Wallace and Richard White shared
similar, and sometimes more insidious, views pertaining to the fur trade.
Wallace placed the practice of encouraging Indian tribes to establish a large
trade debt in order to obtain diplomatic concessions as being the most successful
method for United States land acquisition. 4 Richard White went further yet,
stating that the establishment ofthe fur trade brought tribes into a world market
economy that eventually overwhelmed them, thus creating a complete economic
dependence upon the United States. 5 It should be noted that these historians do
not see dependency alone as the only variable in the equation of subjugation; it
is, however, presented as the primary factor in the downfall of Native
American societies. Interestingly, many social historians have examined the fur
trade without delving deeply into the topic of dependency, but instead focusing
on its social and cultural machinations. For example, Sylvia Van Kirk explored
the role women played in fur trade s
similar topic of fur trade families. 6
The wide pendulum swing in
three decades created a dependency
trade eagerly climbed aboard. It is
trade that does not record the devas
hands of the United States market
commercial dependence upon the U:
most Native American tribes, it is al
lead to complete tribal subjugation
trade dependency led to the destru
autonomy. This study will demonstr:
tribes by creating a trade depend .
absence of other vital conditions.
tribal economic infrastructures, a co
territorial incursions by large numb .
importantly, a strong federal mili~
As the United States expanded ~
with more and more tribes. Those tt1
faced increased pressure from the!
Mississippi in order to provide land f1
lands were the home of many tribes 11
of alien Native Americans into thei!
Osage, who dominated most of the S
center of this study.
The Osage tribe, which numbel
bounded by the Missouri, Red, and Mi
This region included most of the
Oklahoma, and the southeastern are
contained three distinct bands, the Or
the Little Osage that resided about
Osage, that lived on the river of th
nineteenth century the Osage lived a!
They made yearly buffalo hunts om
supply of winter meat. The Osage al
beans in the region's numerous ri1
e machinations of the American
uilding a cultural bridge between
de came to represent a weapon
Native Americans. The widely
; that as Native American tribes
:s and manufactured goods, they
ds. Once dependent, the tribes
Ivernment into accepting federal
their land, tribal autonomy, and
nonstrated clearly in, Seeds of
o use Indian dependency upon
L1so as a means to force tribes to
's subtitle denotes, Jeffersonian
in the Indian's best interest to
I\m.ericanized" yeoman fanners
'civilizing" the natives involved
o the traders, and then accepting
Sheehan, the acquisition of land
Ltes; it encouraged the migration
breed the "nomadic" Indians to
mds.
Lllace and Richard White shared
IS pertaining to the fur trade.
ldian tribes to establish a large
ons as being the most successful
ichard White went further yet,
ought tribes into a world market
IS creating a complete economic
be noted that these historians do
11 the equation of subjugation; it
or in the downfall of Native
llstorians have exan:rined the fur
ependency, but instead focusing
ID1ple, Sylvia Van Kirk explored
25
the role women played in fur trade society, and Jennifer S. H. Brown studied the
similar topic of fur trade families. 6
The wide pendulum swing in fur trade historiography over the last two or
three decades created a dependency bandwagon that most historians of the fur
trade eagerly climbed aboard. It is difficult to find a recent study of the fur
trade that does not record the devastating effects suffered by Indian tribes at the
hands of the United States market economy. While it is irrefutably true that
commercial dependence upon the United States did cause severe problems for
most Native American tribes, it is also true that trade dependency alone did not
lead to complete tribal subjugation to the United States. Other forces besides
trade dependency led to the destruction of Native American tribal power and
autonomy. This study will demonstrate that American attempts to subdue Indian
tribes by creating a trade dependency among tribal societies failed in the
absence of other vital conditions. These conditions included the destruction of
tribal economic infrastructures, a complete trade monopoly for the United States,
territorial incursions by large numbers of Indian or white migrants, and most
importantly, a strong federal military presence.
As the United States expanded its borders westward it came into conflict
with more and more tribes. Those tribes residing east of the Mississippi River
faced increased pressure from the United States to relocate west of the
Mississippi in order to provide land for white settlers. However, these Western
lands were the home ofmany tribes that resisted the migration of large numbers
of alien Native Americans into their territory. One such Western tribe, the
Osage, who dominated most of the southern plains until the 1830s, will be the
center of this study.
The Osage tribe, which numbered 6,300 in 1806,7 controlled the lands
bounded by the Missouri, Red, and Mississippi rivers and the Rocky Mountains. 8
This region included most of the present states of Arkansas, Missouri,
Oklahoma, and the southeastern area of Nebraska. By 1800 the Osage tribe
contained three distinct bands, the Great Osage that lived near the Osage River,
the Little Osage that resided about six miles from them, and the Arkansas
Osage, that lived on the river of the same name. 9 At the beginning of the
nineteenth century the Osage lived as semi-nomadic hunters and agriculturists.
They made yearly buffalo hunts onto the southern plains in order to obtain a
supply of winter meat. The Osage also cultivated crops of corn, pumpkins, and
beans in the region's numerous river valleys. The tribe wintered in semi­
26
pennanent villages in these protected river valleys of the Mississippi river's
western tributaries. 10
More importantly, the Osage traded furs and pelts with the Spanish, French,
and English in order to acquire muskets and rifles, ammunition, gunpowder,
horses, blankets, clothing, and other European manufactured merchandiseY
The trade network that developed in the eighteenth century on the southern
plains allowed the Osage to exploit their position near the Mississippi river; thus
allowing the tribe greater access to European goods, especially weapons, than
their western and southern enemies. The Osage preferred to trade with the
French, and developed a close allegiance to them, because the Spanish refused
to trade weapons with Indian tribes and the English seldom traded with the
Osage. 12 This trade alliance with the French gave the Osage a technological
advantage over their southern and western foes that traded primarily with the
Spanish, which allowed the Osage to dominate a large and productive region.
While the French traders themselves often remained behind, the French supplies
of weapons and other goods disappeared with their defeat in the French and
Indian War. English traders from the Great Lakes region now vied with
American and Spanish traders for access to valuable furs and pelts procured
and processed by Indians. However, when the United States purchased the
Louisiana Territory from France in 1803, the dynamics ofthe fur trade and the
Osage-United States relationship changed considerably.
The Osage tribe's regional power and strategic location near the Mississippi
River, and its western tributaries, made them the center of United States Indian
policy and trade interests after the Louisiana Purchase.u This region contained
some the best hunting and trapping west ofthe Mississippi River and the Osage
and other tribes traded eagerly with anyone who could supply good quality
merchandise. 14 However, the Osage also possessed something far more
valuable than furs and pelts in the eyes of the United States government; they
controlled large amounts of land.
As the population of the United States increased following the American
Revolution a great westward migration occurred in the United States. Shortly
after the Louisiana Purchase both Northerners and Southerners pulled up stakes
and headed west in search of economic opportunities. The increased national
hunger for land led to hostilities with eastern tribes such as the Shawnee,
Kickapoo, and Delaware in the Ohio Valley and the Creek, Choctaw, and
Cherokee in the South. American efforts to "civilize" and "assimilate" Native
Americans into white society failed,
extinction. 15 In order to accomplish
needed to provide land for the mig
territorial lands occupied the perfi
eastern tribes.
During the first two decades 0
attempted to obtain Osage lands by c:
trade goods; these attempts, however,
their lands. Throughout this period
eastern tribes by forcing the three
River in the northern area of their
inhabited the southern part of Osage
States efforts to consolidate the tribe.
United States did not maintain a
economic base remained intact, and
insufficient to force these concessi,
eventually subjugating the Osage, b
trade dependency. The United S
threats, the destruction of the Os
inundating the region with enough
tribe militarily.
~'
After the acquisition of the Lo .
establish control over their newly
federally run trading posts in Osaget
on the Arkansas River, while the I
Missouri. IS The trading house's p~
profit; instead these factories traded ~
capital investment. The factories hOB
by requiring them to obtain licenses til
or the Secretary of War. While'
favorable relations with the Native j
failed to control the misconduct ofPr1
of the factories focused on produc~
not the establishment of good reId
abusive traders. 19 The United StatQ
English, Spanish, and private comp~
lleys of the Mississippi river's
i pelts with the Spanish, French,
rifles, ammunition, gunpowder,
n manufactured merchandise. I I
tecnth century on the southern
1 near the Mississippi river; thus
~oods, especially weapons, than
age preferred to trade with the
:m, because the Spanish refused
English seldom traded with the
gave the Osage a technological
:s that traded primarily with the
: a large and productive region.
ined behind, the French supplies
l their defeat in the French and
It Lakes region now vied with
aluable furs and pelts procured
~e United States purchased the
lynamics of the fur trade and the
:iderably.
~gic location near the Mississippi
ile center of United States Indian
Llfchase. 13 This region contained
Mississippi River and the Osage
who could supply good quality
possessed something far more
United States government; they
creased following the American
:ed in the United States. Shortly
and Southerners pulled up stakes
tunities. The increased national
m tribes such as the Shawnee,
, and the Creek, Choctaw, and
civilize" and "assimilate" Native
27
Americans into white society failed, leaving removal as the only alternative to
extinction. 15 In order to accomplish the task ofIndian removal the United States
needed to provide land for the migrating tribes to inhabit. The Osage tribe's
territorial lands occupied the perfect region for the proposed relocation of
eastern tribes.
During the first two decades of the nineteenth century the United States
attempted to obtain Osage lands by creating a tribal dependence upon American
trade goods; these attempts, however, failed to persuade the Osage to surrender
their lands. Throughout this period the United States sought to open land for
eastern tribes by forcing the three bands of Osage to reunify near the Osage
River in the northern area of their territory.16 The Arkansas band, which
inhabited the southern part of Osage lands, became the central target of United
States efforts to consolidate the tribe. These efforts failed primarily because the
United States did not maintain a trade monopoly in the region, the Osage
economic base remained intact, and the American presence in the region was
insufficient to force these concessions. I? The United States did succeed in
eventually subjugating the Osage, but not solely through the machinations of
trade dependency. The United States succeeded primarily through military
threats, the destruction of the Osage tribe's economic foundation and by
inundating the region with enough white and Indian enemies to overwhelm the
tribe militarily.
After the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory the United States, eager to
establish control over their newly acquired territory, quickly opened two
federally run trading posts in Osage territory. The first began operations in 1805
on the Arkansas River, while the second opened in 1808 at Fire Prairie,
Missouri. 18 The trading house's purpose did not include the accumulation of
profit; instead these factories traded goods at a rate meant only to maintain the
capital investment. The factories hoped to control the abuses of private traders
by requiring them to obtain licenses from either the local factory superintendents
or the Secretary of War. While these developments sometimes created
favorable relations with the Native American tribes, the factory trade system
failed to control the misconduct of private traders. Moreover, the primary goal
of the factories focused on producing a trade monopoly for the United States,
not the establishment of good relations with the Osage, nor the control of
abusive traders. 19 The United States hoped that once the factories drove off
English, Spanish, and private competition, trade bans or the threat of trade bans
28
might force the Osage to agree to cede some of their territory. Interestingly,
despite the historical condemnation of the fur trade as a weapon used in the
destruction of Native American societies, the United States factory system is
often portrayed as a benevolent institution. 20
Ironically, the first such trade bans occurred in 1805 just before the
establishment of the Arkansas Trading House, when, after accepting French
trader Pierre Chouteau's advise, Governor John Wilkinson cut offtrade with the
Arkansas band of the Osage. 21 The purpose of this ban aimed at forcing the
southern Arkansas band to move northward and join their brethren on the Osage
River. Wilkinson believed that this relocation would not only create room for the
Cherokee and other migrating eastern tribes, it would also make trade with St.
Louis much easier. 22 The Governor's ban failed despite creating a shortage in
essential supplies for the Arkansas band. First of all, the federal trading houses
did not enjoy a trade monopoly, and secondly the Osage tribe's ability to provide
sufficient food and other essentials remained intact. 23 A trader that visited the
Arkansas band reported that the Osage told him that, "they will cultivate com,
which God will cause to grow in abundance," and that there was plentiful game
in the south, and therefore no reason to leave.24
In addition to rigid Indian detennination, Governor Wilkinson also had to
contend with the actions of Secretary of War, Henry Dearborn. Dearborn
issued a two-year trading license to Jacob Bright, of the Morgan and Bright
Trading Company of New Orleans, which allowed Bright to trade with the
Arkansas band of the Osage despite Wilkinson's trade ban. 25 This situation
allowed the Osage to bypass the Governor's ban and obtain needed supplies.
Eventually, Secretary of War Dearborn removed Wilkinson's ban and trade
continued unabated. 26 For two years all three Osage bands fought to keep both
encroaching eastern tribes and white hunters from trespassing on their hunting
territory. The Osage bands depended on their hunts to provide the furs and pelts
that they traded for weapons, ammunition, and other goods. The increased
hunting activity of migrating tribes such as the Cherokee, and whites, reduced
the numbers of game animals on tribal lands, thus weakening the Osage
economic foundation. When the Osage encountered foreign hunting parties they
harassed them and stole their possessions. Moreover, if the hunting party
consisted of Indians they often killed the offending tribesmen. This struggle for
control over what is now eastern Arkansas and Missouri continued until the
spring of 1808, when a new territorial governor arrived.
~
~
The new governor, Meriwether
and consolidate the United States'
refused to stop their resistance to
Governor Lewis again banned tr:
United States needed to withhol
necessary. Furthennore, he believi
supplying the tribe during the tral
licensed traders to remove all gunp
attempt to weaken the tribe militaril
a trade ban alone could not succe,
eastern regions oftheir territory.
Lewis believed war with the Os
resorted to far less passive actions .
and establish United States regi
Dearborn's intention of building a
Lewis decided instead to construct
River, eighty miles north of Dearbo
the placement of the new post invi
eastern tribes faced with removal. j
Osage tribe's bitter enemies from1
Kickapoo, Miami, and Potawatomi.j
"malcontent" Osage that refused to j
enjoyed United States protection.
alliance and attack any Osage not a
tribal alliance to attack with enough 1
assistance and drive them out ofthel
These tribes gathered 1,200 Wl
Osage as they returned from their Sill
the Osage before they could re-s
gunpowder after their long hunt. ,
Captain William Clark and his comp
at Fire Prairie. 31 On the way to Fire
Osage village near the Osage River
new post or face attack by the Ind
Captain Clark seized the opportuni~
Osage and the United States. 32 11
29
of their territory. Interestingly,
trade as a weapon used in the
United States factory system is
:urred in 1805 just before the
:, when, after accepting French
Wilkinson cut offtrade with the
of this ban aimed at forcing the
Ijoin their brethren on the Osage
'Quld not only create room for the
would also make trade with St.
~ despite creating a shortage in
of all, the federal trading houses
e Osage tribe's ability to provide
ltact?3 A trader that visited the
n that, ''they will cultivate corn,
nd that there was plentiful game
Governor Wilkinson also had to
I, Henry Dearborn. Dearborn
ight, of the Morgan and Bright
llowed Bright to trade with the
In's trade ban. 25 This situation
Ian and obtain needed supplies.
,ved Wilkinson's ban and trade
)sage bands fought to keep both
rom trespassing on their hunting
unts to provide the furs and pelts
nd other goods. The increased
e Cherokee, and whites, reduced
ds, thus weakening the Osage
:ered foreign hunting parties they
Moreover, if the hunting party
ling tribesmen. This struggle for
nd Missouri continued until the
r arrived.
i
~
~
J
The new governor, Meriwether Lewis, resolved to end Osage depredations
and consolidate the United States' control over the region. When the Osage
refused to stop their resistance to Indian and white territorial infringements,
Governor Lewis again banned trade with the Osage. Lewis stated that the
United States needed to withhold merchandise from the Osage whenever
necessary. Furthermore, he believed it vital to prevent the British traders from
supplying the tribe during the trade ban. Lewis also ordered the departing
licensed traders to remove all gunpowder from Osage possession in an obvious
attempt to weaken the tribe militarily.27 However, Governor Lewis realized that
a trade ban alone could not succeed in forcing the Osage to cede the disputed
eastern regions of their territory.
Lewis believed war with the Osage to be inevitable; therefore, the Governor
resorted to far less passive actions in his attempt to gain control of Osage lands
and establish United States regional domination. 28 Disregarding Henry
Dearborn's intention of building a trading house near the Osage River villages,
Lewis decided instead to construct the new post at Fire Prairie on the Missouri
River, eighty miles north of Dearborn's intended location. 29 The reason behind
the placement of the new post involved the freeing up even more land for
eastern tribes faced with removal. Lewis then met with a delegation of the
Osage tribe's bitter enemies from the northeast, the Shawnee, Delaware,
Kickapoo, Miami, and Potawatomi. The Governor told these tribes that any
"malcontent" Osage that refused to move to the post at Fire Prairie no longer
enjoyed United States protection. He encouraged these tribes to form an
alliance and attack any Osage not at the post. Lewis went on to instruct the
tribal alliance to attack with enough force to cut the Osage off from any possible
assistance and drive them out oftheir country.30
These tribes gathered 1,200 warriors and designed a plan to attack the
Osage as they returned from their summer buffalo hunt. They hoped to surprise
the Osage before they could re-supply themselves with ammunition and
gunpowder after their long hunt. After approving the plan Lewis then sent
Captain William Clark and his company through Osage territory to build a post
at Fire Prairie. 3l On the way to Fire Prairie Captain Clark stopped at the Little
Osage village near the Osage River and told Chief Pawhuska to move to the
new post or face attack by the Indian alliance. When the chief acquiesced,
Captain Clark seized the opportunity and negotiated a peace treaty between the
Osage and the United States. 32 The leaders of the Little Osage signed the
30
treaty on September 14, 1808. In doing so the entire Osage tribe gave up 50,000
square miles of territory, an area roughly the size of the state of Virginia. 33
Despite the supposed American success, this treaty failed to subjugate the
Osage tribe under United States domination, or even gain undisputed access to
the ceded lands. Many Osage, including many principal Osage leaders, refused
to accept the terms of the treaty because they had not attended the negotiations.
According to Osage tribal custom a majority ofthe tribe needed to approve such
an agreement and the Treaty of 1808 did not meet this requirement. Moreover,
many of the Little Osage leaders stated that they misunderstood the meaning of
the treaty and believed they would retain their lands. 34 In order to quell the
rising complaints concerning the treaty, Governor Lewis sent Pierre Chouteau
back to the tribe at Fort Osage to acquire the signatures needed to make the
treaty official. 35 Chouteau's instructions from Governor Lewis included using
threats of trade bans and military actions against the Osage if they did not sign
the treaty and move to Fire Prairie. 36 George Sibley, a witness to the treaty
negotiations, stated that "so much were the Osages awed by the threat of Mr.
Chouteau, that a very unusual number of them touched pen; many of whom
knew no more the purpose of the act than if they had been a hundred miles
Off."37 The Great and Little Osage signed the treaty on November 10, 1808
under the threat of war and destitution. 38
However, the effect of the treaty on the Arkansas band proved minimal.
The Arkansas band did not attend the second meetings either. They considered
the idea to move to Fire Prairie a plot of Pierre Chouteau and refused to accept
the agreement. 39 The Arkansas band remained under trade ban until they
agreed to the treaty in August of 1809. 40 Despite the Arkansas band's
acceptance of the treaty it still refused to move north to Fire Prairie;
furthermore, all three bands of the Osage continued to hunt on the ceded lands,
which made conflicts with eastern Indian and white hunters more frequent and
violent. The United States closed the Arkansas trading house in 1810, hoping
that the lack of trade might force the Arkansas band to join the northern bands
at Fire Prairie, but the band still refused to abandon its home. Furthermore, the
location of the trading house at Fire Prairie proved so vulnerable to attack by
eastern tribes that in 1810 the Great Osage returned to the Osage River. The
Little Osage followed two years later. 41
Governor Lewis's struggle to drive the Osage out of their eastern hunting
territory failed for several reasons. The Osage still obtained needed supplies
such as ammunition and gunpowd
Furthermore, the Osage could still
and did not rely completely upon
the United States military and civili
to strictly enforce the terms of the
ceded lands. 43
The American victory in the
United States-Osage relationship
English traders from the Great L
avenue for circumventing Ameli<
increasingly dependent upon Ameri
invading eastern tribes. As the p
eastern tribes poured across the .
ceded by the Osage in the Trea~
outnumbered the Osage substantial
other Indians of various tribes, no~
Osage. 44 As the competition for me4
themselves losing ground to the eai
Cherokee. The Osage tribe's econ~
By 1817, increased white and In.
with ever-dwindling economic stabili
left the tribe weakened significantly.
came upon an unguarded Osage vill
children. The Cherokee knew that tl
away from their villages for long pc
such an unprotected camp. When t
warriors, they butchered him and a
women and children and took more·
The fear of angering the Amen
tribes, led the Osage to proceed cam
However, the Cherokee, long-time
more familiar with United States Inl
support for more land cessions frOJ
to the secretary of war claiming th2
therefore should be granted their t
war agreed and ordered the gov'
ltire Osage tribe gave up 50,000
ze ofthe state of Virginia. 33
is treaty failed to subjugate the
even gain undisputed access to
lrincipal Osage leaders, refused
Ld not attended the negotiations.
the tribe needed to approve such
let this requirement. Moreover,
Vmisunderstood the meaning of
: lands.3 4 In order to quell the
lor Lewis sent Pierre Chouteau
signatures needed to make the
Governor Lewis included using
rt the Osage if they did not sign
Sibley, a witness to the treaty
1ges awed by the threat of Mr.
tl touched pen; many of whom
hey had been a hundred miles
treaty on November 10, 1808
rkansas band proved minimal.
~ings either. They considered
Chouteau and refused to accept
ed under trade ban until they
Despite the Arkansas band's
move north to Fire Prairie;
ued to hunt on the ceded lands,
hite hunters more frequent and
trading house in 1810, hoping
band to join the northern bands
don its home. Furthermore, the
IVed so vulnerable to attack by
l11led to the Osage River. The
ge out of their eastern hunting
: still obtained needed supplies
31
such as antrnunition and gunpowder from either the English or other tribes. 42
Furthermore, the Osage could still support themselves by hunting and farming
and did not rely completely upon the United States for sustenance. And finally,
the United States military and civilian populations remained too distant to be able
to strictly enforce the terms of the treaty that forbid the Osage to hunt on the
ceded landsY
The American victory in the War of 1812 changed the dynamics of the
United States-Osage relationship dramatically. The eventual removal of the
English traders from the Great Lakes region meant that the Osage lost a vital
avenue for circumventing American trade restrictions. This left the tribe
increasingly dependent upon American arms and antrnunition in order to fight the
invading eastern tribes. As the pressure for Indian removal increased, more
eastern tribes poured across the Mississippi River and moved into the lands
ceded by the Osage in the Treaty of 1808. By 1817 the eastern tribes
outnumbered the Osage substantially, with six thousand Cherokee, and many
other Indians of various tribes, now occupying lands that once belonged to the
Osage. 44 As the competition for meat and trade furs escalated the Osage found
themselves losing ground to the eastern tribes, especially the more numerous
Cherokee. The Osage tribe's economic foundation was beginning to crumble.
By 1817, increased white and Indian incursions into Osage territory, coupled
with ever-dwindling economic stability, and a near United States trade monopoly,
left the tribe weakened significantly. In October 1817, a Cherokee raiding party
came upon an unguarded Osage village occupied by one old chief, women, and
children. The Cherokee knew that the Osage tribe's buffalo hunts kept the men
away from their villages for long periods during the fall and hoped to find just
such an unprotected camp. When the old chief went out to meet the Cherokee
warriors, they butchered him and attacked the camp. They killed thirty-eight
women and children and took more than one hundred prisoners. 45
The fear of angering the Americans, and increased raids from non-Osage
tribes, led the Osage to proceed cautiously in seeking a resolution to this attack.
However, the Cherokee, long-time neighbors of the Americans, and therefore
more familiar with United States Indian policy, used the incident to gain federal
support for more land cessions from the Osage. 46 The Cherokee sent a letter
to the secretary of war claiming that they had defeated the Osage in battle and
therefore should be granted their territory as spoils of war. The secretary of
war agreed and ordered the governor to negotiate a new treaty with the
32
Osage. 47 Unwilling to fight the United States and the Cherokee at the same
time, the Osage traveled to St. Louis to meet with the Cherokee. The new
treaty, signed on September 25, 1818, ceded over three million acres of excellent
prairie land east of the Verdigris River. The only concession requested of the
Cherokee involved the return ofthe prisoners taken on the raid. 48
For the Osage this treaty proved an especially bitter pill to swallow; only a
few of the 104 captives taken by the Cherokee ever returned to their villages.
Furthermore, the Osage recognized that the influx of eastern tribes was a
deliberate United States policy designed to overwhelm them. The Osage knew
that the United States controlled vast military power because lheir chiefs visited
Washington DC and toured cities like New York and Boston. Having visited
these seemingly miraculous cities lhey realized what great forces could be
brought against them. Nonetheless, the Osage continued to resist United States
regional domination. 49 In 1820 the Osage still presented a formidable enemy;
they harassed white hunters that trespassed on their territory and continued to
resist the tide of eastern tribes that threatened their lands. Moreover, Osage
warriors greatly outnumbered American military contingents in the area. The
Osage believed that they could perpetuate their regional hegemony by keeping
the eastern tribes at bay and reinforcing their dominance over the western parts
of their territory. 50 However, the Osage tribe's ability to withstand the
American onslaught lasted only another five years.
The third decade of the nineteenth century began with the Osage facing a
number of serious threats to its regional hegemony. By 1820 hundreds of white
settlers found their way to Osage lands and thousands of Indians still crossed the
Mississippi River in an unstoppable torrent that would end the Osage tribe's
ability to resist American domination. 51 As previously noted, a regional trade
monopoly achieved by the United States shortly after the War of 1812 made lhe
threat of trade bans a more effective weapon in federal Indian policy pertaining
to the Osage. Moreover, the Osage economy, while still able to provide some
level of sustenance for the tribe, declined rapidly because of increased
competition for meat and furs in the first two decades of the nineteenth century.
Unfortunately, the Osage tribe's ability to feed itselfafforded them no protection
against the flood of invaders that encroached upon their homeland. The United
States, while able to maintain peaceful trade relations with the Osage,
encouraged and supported the migration of eastern Indian tribes that came into
violent conflict with the Osage.
The battles between lhe Osage
years following the signing ofthe Tt,
States showed little concern over the
one event forever changed the cours,
a hunting party, comprised ofnine w:
started a hunt in Osage territory ne
Buffalo, a Little Osage Chief, attac.
hunters, including Major Curtis WeI
Although the United States re
lands led to the attack, the United S
the apparent murder of white m
commander of Fort Smith immediaJ
tribesmen guilty of the attack. Soon
five companies of soldiers to con
Little Osage villages. 54 This aggres
Mad Buffalo and five other Osage l~
8 June 1824. 55 ThefmalblowforOsj
the tribe ceded all of their rem~
small fifty-mile strip in the northern
land, which is located in what is
Oklahoma, is all that is left oflhe 0Ill
By 1825 the United States ha
southern plains. By confining lhe Os
they controlled at the tum of lhe Cel
eastern tribes, such as the Cheroke
Mississippi River. However, the des1
not fit any set pattern of American
exists. The evolution ofAmerican d4
complex and unpredictable proces
conditions commonly seen in Arneric
as trade dependency and lhe lhreat c
unique evolution.
Soon after the Louisiana Purch
to acquire land for lhe resettlement
desired land the United States attemI
that would permit the federal govern
~s and the Cherokee at the same
et with the Cherokee. The new
verthree million acres of excellent
only concession requested of the
taken on the raid. 48
ially bitter pill to swallow; only a
~e ever returned to their villages.
influx of eastern tribes was a
erwhelm them. The Osage knew
power because their chiefs visited
,ork and Boston. Having visited
zed what great forces could be
continued to resist United States
II presented a formidable enemy;
tl their territory and continued to
i their lands. Moreover, Osage
:uy contingents in the area. The
ir regional hegemony by keeping
lominance over the western parts
ribe's ability to withstand the
~ars.
y began with the Osage facing a
.any. By 1820 hundreds of white
Jsands ofIndians still crossed the
!lat would end the Osage tribe's
reviously noted, a regional trade
f after the War of 1812 made the
I federal Indian policy pertaining
while still able to provide some
rapidly because of increased
.ecades ofthe nineteenth century.
itselfafforded them no protection
pon their homeland. The United
ade relations with the Osage,
tern Indian tribes that came into
33
The battles between the Osage and the eastern tribes continued for five
years following the signing ofthe Treaty of 1818. During this period the United
States showed little concern over the Indian conflicts until November 1823 when
one event forever changed the course of southern plains hegemony. That fall
a hunting party, comprised ofnine white men and twelve Quapaw mixed bloods,
started a hunt in Osage territory near Blue River. An Osage party led by Mad
Buffalo, a Little Osage Chief, attacked the hunting camp and killed at least four
hunters, including Major Curtis Welborn, the leader ofthe ill-fated expedition. 52
Although the United States realized that Welborn's trespassing on Osage
lands led to the attack, the United States government dared not appear to accept
the apparent murder of white men at the hands of the Osage. 53 The
commander of Fort Smith immediately demanded the surrender of the Osage
tribesmen guilty of the attack. Soon after this demand the war department sent
five companies of soldiers to construct a new fort only a few miles from the
Little Osage villages. 54 This aggressive move convinced the tribe to hand over
Mad Buffalo and five other Osage leaders to the United States government on
8 June 1824. 55 The final blow for Osage hegemony came in June of 1825, when
the tribe ceded all of their remaining lands to the United States, except for a
small fifty-mile strip in the northern part of their old territory. 56 This strip of
land, which is located in what is today the northern part of the state of
Oklahoma, is all that is left of the once far ranging Osage domain.
By 1825 the United States had achieved regional hegemony over the
southern plains. By confining the Osage to a small fraction of the vast territory
they controlled at the turn of the century the United States created space for
eastern tribes, such as the Cherokee and Choctaw, to relocate west of the
Mississippi River. However, the destruction of Osage territorial domination did
not fit any set pattern of American westward expansion, for no such pattern
exists. The evolution of American domination ofthe southern plains involved a
complex and unpredictable process. While this process at times shared
conditions commonly seen in American policy towards other Indian tribes, such
as trade dependency and the threat of military attack, it also possessed its own
unique evolution.
Soon after the Louisiana Purchase the United States recognized the need
to acquire land for the resettlement of eastern tribes. In order to obtain the
desired land the United States attempted to establish a territorial trade monopoly
that would permit the federal government to deal with the Osage from a position
34
of strength. The American victory in the War of 1812 presented the United
States with a true regional trade monopoly by eliminating the only European
power in the area that traded weapons to Native Americans. Ironically, the
tribe had no other choice than to turn to the United States for supplies and
assistance in maintaining Osage regional control. As more eastern tribes and
white settlers encroached upon Osage territory, the tribe asked the federal
government to use its great power to stem the tide of invading peoples. 57
However, this request ran counter to contemporary American Indian policy and
the United States continued to encourage the westward movement of eastern
tribes into Osage territory. The increased competition for food and furs soon
left all three bands of the Osage in severe economic distress, which in turn
provided the United States with greater influence over the tribe because of the
Osage tribe's dependence upon American arms and ammunition.
However, trade dependency upon the United States did not by itself end
Osage regional hegemony. The eventual subjugation of the Osage tribe
occurred because of the mass migration of Indians and whites into Osage
territory, which eventually destroyed their tribal economy. The thousands, and
then tens of thousands, of eastern Indians that migrated across the Mississippi
River proved too numerous and aggressive to defeat. Moreover, the expanded
presence of United States military detachments near Osage villages both
increased American control over tribal political decisions and consolidated
United States regional hegemony. For example, both the 1808 and the 1825
treaties emerged from the direct threat of United States military action against
the Osage. Clearly, American attempts to use trade as a weapon in order to
subjugate the Osage could not, and did not, solely lead to the tribe's loss of
regional hegemony. Instead, the United States obtained territorial domination
through a non-systemic combination of a United States' trade monopoly, the
destruction ofthe Osage tribe's economic system, Native Americanjanissaries,
and federal dragoons.
NOTES
4. Anthony F.C. Wallace, "The Obta' .
American," in Thomas Jefferson an
Conservation (Albuquerque: University 0
S. Richard White, The Roots of Depe.
Change among the Choctaws, Pawnee,
Press, 1983). Since this publication Ri,
stated that capitalism was the driving fc
the United States government. His late
much less detenninistic, and yet it still
of Native American subjugation to federal
6. Sylvia Van Kirk, Many Tender
(Noonan: University of Oklahoma Press,
n
Blood: Fur Trade Company Families
Oklahoma Press, 1980). Both these wor]
university press, are outstanding e
developed between the traders and trapp
so closely during the extended intercultura
7. American State Papers: Indian Affai~
1834),4:707-708.
8. John B. Treat to Henry Dearborn, No~
Trading House, 1805-1810, Microcopy 1
Affairs, National Archives Microfilm Pub~
9. Willard H. Rollings, The Osage: An
Prairie-Plains (Columbia: University of N
Papers: Indian Affairs, 4: 707-708.
10. Rollings, The Osage, Chapters 7 ani
which delineates the Osage rise and fall fro
1840, he also examines their social and eee
11. Paul Chrisler Phillips, The Fur Trade, I
2:488; Treat to Dearborn, November 15,
House, 1805-1810.
12. Donald Jackson, ed., The Journal oJ
Related Documents, Vol. 2 (Nonnan: Uni,
13. Rollings, The Osage, 215.
14. John B. Treat to Henry Dearborn, No
Trading House, 1805-1810. Treat was
1. David J. Wishart, The Fur Trade of the American West, 1807-1840, A Geographical
Synthesis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 88.
2. Ibid., 214-215.
3. Bernard W. Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the
American Indian (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1973), 154-155, 170-171.
established Arkansas Trading House, and
15. Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction, 119
American attempts and failures to "eivilizl
16. Governor John Wilkinson to Henry D
ed., The Territorial Papers of the United
ar of 1812 presented the United
y eliminating the only European
Ltive Americans. Ironically, the
United States for supplies and
rol. As more eastern tribes and
lry, the tribe asked the federal
the tide of invading peoples. 57
rary American Indian policy and
westward movement of eastern
Ilpetition for food and furs soon
conomic distress, which in turn
lce over the tribe because of the
; and ammunition.
lted States did not by itself end
ubjugation of the Osage tribe
Indians and whites into Osage
economy. The thousands, and
migrated across the Mississippi
defeat. Moreover, the expanded
ents near Osage villages both
ical decisions and consolidated
lIe, both the 1808 and the 1825
ed States military action against
e trade as a weapon in order to
lolely lead to the tribe's loss of
; obtained territorial domination
ted States' trade monopoly, the
m, Native American janissaries,
u
" West, 1807-1840, A Geographical
79),88.
Teffersonian Philanthropy and the
lany, 1973), 154-155, 170-171.
35
4. Anthony F.C. Wallace, "The Obtaining of Lands: Thomas Jefferson and the Native
American," in Thomas Jefferson and the Changing West: From Conquest to
Conservation (Albuquerque: University ofNew Mexico Press, 1997),39.
5. Richard White, The Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social
Change among the Choctaws, Pawnee, and Navajos (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1983). Since this publication Richard White renounced his own thesis, which
stated that capitalism was the driving force behind the subjugation of Indian tribes to
the United States government. His latest theory, found in his text Jvfiddle Ground, is
much less deterministic, and yet it still presents trade dependency as the primary cause
ofNative American subjugation to federal authority.
6. Sylvia Van Kirk, Many Tender Ties: Women in Fur-Trade Society, 1670-1870
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), and Jennifer S.H. Brown, Strangers in
Blood: Fur Trade Company Families in Indian Country (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1980). Both these works, published in the same year and at the same
university press, are outstanding examinations of the complex relationships that
developed between the traders and trappers and the Indian tribes with whom they lived
so closely during the extended intercultural contact that the fur trade afforded.
7. American State Papers: Indian Affairs, (Washington DC: Gales and Seaton, 1832­
1834),4:707-708.
8. John B. Treat to Henry Dearborn, November 15, 1805, Letter book of the Arkansas
Trading House, 1805-1810, Microcopy No. 142-Reel No.1, U.S. Bureau of Indian
Affairs, National Archives Microfilm Publications.
9. Willard H. Rollings, The Osage: An Ethnohistorical Study of Hegemony on the
Prairie-Plains (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1992), 215-216; American State
Papers: Indian Affairs, 4: 707-708.
10. Rollings, The Osage, Chapters 7 and 8. For a history of Osage see Rollings' text,
which delineates the Osage rise and fall from regional dominance in the period from 1673­
1840, he also examines their social and economic lifeways during the same period.
11. Paul Chrisler Phillips, The Fur Trade, (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1961),
2:488; Treat to Dearborn, November 15, 1805, Letter book of the Arkansas Trading
House, 1805-1810.
12. Donald Jackson, ed., The Journal of Zebulon Montgomery Pike: With Letters and
Related Documents, Vol. 2 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), 37.
13. Rollings, The Osage, 215.
14. John B. Treat to Henry Dearborn, November 15, 1805, Letter book of the Arkansas
Trading House, 1805-1810. Treat was the superintendent, or "factor," at the newly
established Arkansas Trading House, and Dearborn was the Secretary of War.
15. Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction, 119-181. Part two of Sheehan's text discusses
American attempts and failures to "civilize" Native Americans.
16. Governor John Wilkinson to Henry Dearborn, July 27, 1805, Clarence Edwin Carter,
ed., The Territorial Papers of the United States, (Washington DC: Government Printing
36
Office, 1953), 13: 170.
17. Governor John Wilkinson to Henry Dearborn, September 22, 1805, ibid., 230. "When
I estimate the number and force of the Indian nations, who inhabit the Country watered
by the Missouri and Mississippi, and who if not made our friends will become our
enemies. . . when I cast my eyes over the expanse of Territory to be occupied or
controlled [sic] that we are not in sufficient strength, of men or means, to meet the
occasion and profit by the favorable [sic] circumstances of the moment." Wilkinson also
mentioned the threat of British trade from Lake Superior to the Mississippi River.
18. Phillips, The Fur Trade, 497-499; Dearborn to Treat, March 3, 1805, Letter book of
the Arkansas Trading House, 1805-1810. Lewis to Dearborn, December 15, 1808,
Letters Received by the Secretary of War, Main Series, Microcopy No. 221-Reel No. 25,
National Archives, Washington DC, 1954.
19. Treat to Davy, November 15, 1805, Letter book of the Arkansas Trading House,
1805-1810; Jackson, The Journal ofZebulon Montgomery Pike, 37.
20. Robert A. Trennert, Jr., Indian Traders on the Middle Border: The House ofEwing,
1827-1854 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), 2-3. Trennert called the
factory system an "attempt to counteract some of the inherent abuses in the private
Indian trade by licensing traders and... ensuring that the tribes were not cheated." He
also stated that the factory system aimed to foster "good relations with the Indians.";
Jerome O. Steffen, William Clark: Jeffersonian Man on the Frontier (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1977), 55-60; and Sheehan, Seeds ofExtinction, 154-155,
170-171. Both Steffen and Sheehan agree with Trennert's view, however, they also see
the factory system as an attempt to integrate the Native Americans into American
society by depriving them of their land and forcing the Indians to become yeoman
farmers.
21. Governor John Wilkinson to Henry Dearborn, July 27, 1805, Carter, Territorial
Papers, 13: 170.
22 Ibid.
23. Rollings, The Osage, 218.
24. Treat to Dearborn, December 27, 1805, Letter book ofthe Arkansas Trading House,
1805-1810.
25. Treat to Davy, February 27, 1806, ibid.; Treat to Davy, April 15, 1806, ibid.
26. Dearborn to Treat, Apri129, 1806, ibid.
27. Lewis to Dearborn, July 1, 1808, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, Main
Series, Reel 25.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Rollings, The Osage, 224.
33. Institute for the Development of Indian Law, Treaties and Agreements ofthe Eastern
Oklahoma Indians (Washington DC: In:
21-25; Kate L. Gregg, ed., Westward
His Expedition to Establish Fort Osa
Missouri: Ovid Bell Press Inc., 1937), 3
34. Clark to Dearborn, December 2,180
Series, Reel No. 20.
35. American State Papers, 766-767.
36. Lewis to Dearborn, December 15, l'
Main Series, Reel No. 25.
37. Lewis Edwin James, comp., Accou
Mountains Performed in the Years 181
Secretary of War, Under the Command
1846, edited by Reubon Gold Thwaites
276.
38. Institute for the Development of Ind'
39. Thomas Maitland Marshall, ed., Th
Missouri Historical Society, 1926), 2:44
40. Clark to Eustis, September 21,1809.
Series, Reel No. 20; Carter, Territorial PI
41. E.B. Clemson to William Eustis, Julyl
42. Lewis to Dearborn, July 1, 1808, ~
Series, Reel No. 25; Marshall, The Life
William Clark, 63-66.
43. Kate L. Gregg, "The War of 1812
Historical Review 33 (October 1938-July
44. Fred W. Voget, Osage Research Rl
A. Horr (New York: Garland Publishers 1
45. Grant Foreman, Indians and Pionee
1830 (Norman: University of Oklahoma 1
46. Rollings, The Osage, 240-241.
47. Calhoun to Clark, May 8,1818, ClU1
48. Clark to Calhoun, October, no day, I
49. Thomas Nuttall, Journal of Travel
1819, edited by Savoie Lottinville (Norm
50. Rollings, The Osage, 253.
51. Arkansas Gazette, March 25, 1820,
52. Brad Agnew, Fort Gibson: Ter
Oklahoma Press, 1980), 25-26; Rollings
P. Gaines, December 3,1823, Carter, Te
53. Arbuckle to Gaines, December 4, 18
54. Agnew, Fort Gibson, 28-31; Foreffill
37
ltember 22, 1805, ibid., 230. "When
s, who inhabit the COlmtry watered
made our friends will become our
Ise of Territory to be occupied or
;th, of men or means, to meet the
es of the moment." Wilkinson also
tor to the Mississippi River.
[reat, March 3, 1805, Letter book of
to Dearborn, December 15, 1808,
~s, Microcopy No. 221-Reel No. 25,
lk of the Arkansas Trading House,
mery Pike, 37.
~ddle Border: The House ofEwing,
, 1981), 2-3. Trennert called the
the inherent abuses in the private
It the tribes were not cheated." He
"good relations with the Indians.";
Man on the Frontier (Norman:
'ehan, Seeds ofExtinction, 154-155,
mert's view, however, they also see
Native Americans into American
19 the Indians to become yeoman
July 27, 1805, Carter, Territorial
ok ofthe Arkansas Trading House,
)avy, April 15, 1806, ibid.
'ed by the Secretary of War, Main
'ties and Agreements ofthe Eastern
Oklahoma Indians (Washington DC: Institute for the Development of Indian Law, 1975),
21-25; Kate 1,. Gregg, ed., Westward With Dragoons: The Journal of William Clark on
His Expedition to Establish Fort Osage, August 25 to September 22, 1808 (Fulton,
Missouri: Ovid Bell Press Inc., 1937), 37-43.
34. Clark to Dearborn, December 2, 1808, Letters Received by the Secretary ofWar, Main
Series, Reel No. 20.
35. American State Papers, 766-767.
36. Lewis to Dearborn, December 15, 1808, Letters Received by the Secretary of War,
Main Series, Reel No. 25.
37. Lewis Edwin James, comp., Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky
Mountains Perfonned in the Years 1819 and 1820, By Order of the Han. J.C. Calhoun,
Secretary of War, Under the Command ofMaj. s.H. Long, Early Western Travels, 1748­
1846, edited by Reubon Gold Thwaites (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1905), 16:
276.
38. Institute for the Development of Indian Law, Treaties and Agreements, 21-25.
39. Thomas Maitland Marshall, ed., The Life and Papers ofFrederick Bates, (St. Louis:
Missouri Historical Society, 1926), 2:44-45.
40. Clark to Eustis, September 21, 1809, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, Main
Series, Reel No. 20; Carter, Territorial Papers, 14: 314-317.
41. E.B. Clemson to William Eustis, July 16, 1812, Carter, Territorial Papers, 14:587-590.
42. Lewis to Dearborn, July 1, 1808, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, Main
Series, Reel No. 25; Marshall, The Life and Papers of Frederick Bates, 2:35; Steffen,
William Clark, 63-66.
43. Kate 1,. Gregg, "The War of 1812 on the Missouri Frontier," Parts 1-3, Missouri
Historical Review 33 (October 1938-July 1939), 3-22, 184-202,326-348.
44. Fred W. Voget, Osage Research Report, Vol. 1 of Osage Indians, edited by David
A. Horr (New York: Garland Publishers Inc., 1974),206-207.
45. Grant Foreman, Indians and Pioneers: The Story ofthe American Southwest Before
1830 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1936),51-52; Rollings, The Osage, 239.
46. Rollings, The Osage, 240-241.
47. Calhoun to Clark, May 8,1818, Carter, Territorial Papers, 15: 390-391.
48. Clark to Calhoun, October, no day, 1818, ibid., 454-455.
49. Thomas Nuttall, Journal of Travels into the Arkansas Territory, During the Year
1819, edited by Savoie Lottinville (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), 197.
50. Rollings, The Osage, 253.
51. Arkansas Gazette, March 25, 1820, and November 26, 1822.
52. Brad Agnew, Fort Gibson: Terminal Trail of Tears (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1980),25-26; Rollings, The Osage, 252; Mathew Arbuckle to Edmund
P. Gaines, December 3, 1823, Carter, Territorial Papers, 19:570-571.
53. Arbuckle to Gaines, December 4, 1823, Carter, Territorial Papers, 19:572-573.
54. Agnew, Fort Gibson, 28-31; Foreman,Indians and Pioneers, 163-170.
38
55. Arkansas Gazette, JUll 29, 1824.
THE EMIGRANT'S VOICE: C
DURING THE GREAT MI'
184
56. Institute for the Development of Indian Law, Treaties and Agreements, 51-54.
57. Donald Jackson, ed., Letters of the Lewis and Clark Expedition with Related
Documents, 1783-1854, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978), 1:284-289.
I
!
I
t
f
r
i!
~
f
Robert
It has been the good fortune of
story of one of the most marvelous e
has been recorded for us by a numl
excellent diaries and personal journals
in the original hand, or typescript or 0
emigrant's voice telling what it was ,.
the gold fields of California during
article we look at the emigrant's vie
of the Great Plains, the five hundred
to the vicinity of Fort Laramie in prl
Rocky Mountains. 1
The first vie
about described their jumping-offpo'
for their excursions across the Grl
jumping-off points along the Missouri
southern Iowa. The common thre
centers providing a good supply b
convenient rallying points for the h1
assemble. Independence, Missouri,
had made its name already from thl
Missouri, sixty miles up the river, bl,
outfitting business. Council Bluffs or
Robert Willoughby is currently assistant
College in Hannibal, Missouri. He
University and a Ph.D. from the UniVI
Robidoux's Town: A Nineteenth Century
book, The Great Migration to the Gold Fi'
from McFarland & Company in 2002.