Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition
1997, Vol. 23, No. 2,259-278
Copyright 1997 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
0278-7393/9?y$3.00
The Process-Dissociation Procedure and Similarity: Defining and
Estimating Recollection and Familiarity in Recognition Memory
Vincenza Gruppuso and D. Stephen Lindsay
Colleen M. Kelley
University of Victoria
Macalester College
In L. L. Jacoby's (1991) 2-study-list process-dissociation (PD) procedure, recollection (R) is
estimated by the difference in responding between including and excluding items from
previously studied lists. Familiarity (F) is estimated with the estimate of R and equations
representing the assumption that F and R are independent. The authors hypothesized that
ability to exclude items from 1 list (and hence R and F) depends on similarity between lists. As
predicted, R was greater and F was smaller when the 2 study lists were encoded with different
tasks rather than the same task. Thus, R in the 2-study-list PD procedure does not necessarily
involve retrieval of all attributes of the study episode, and F is not necessarily a completely
undifferentiated feeling of oldness. Dividing attention at test (Experiment 2) or study
(Experiment 3) dissociated F and R. Results are interpreted using a functionalist approach to
recognition memory that combines aspects of dual-process and global memory models.
In this article, we have two objectives. One aim is to
demonstrate that estimates of the contributions of recollection and familiarity to recognition memory judgments
obtained with Jacoby's (1991) two-study-list processdissociation (PD) procedure are dramatically affected by the
discriminability of the two study lists. Our more grand,
theoretical aim is to argue that rather than being viewed as
evidence of measurement error in the two-study-list PD
procedure, our findings can be interpreted as support for a
functionalist approach to recognition memory. The proposed
approach combines aspects of dual-process theories (Jacoby
& Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980) with aspects of global
memory models (Gillund & Shiffiin, 1984; Murdock, 1982)
and, more generally, with theories in which memory for an
event consists of multiple records of the component processes that gave rise to and constituted the experience of that
event (e.g., the multiple-entry, modular memory system
[MEM] model of Johnson, 1983, 1990, 1992, or the
transfer-appropriate processing approach articulated by Roe-
Vincenza Gruppuso and D. Stephen Lindsay, Department of
Psychology, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia,
Canada; Colleen M. Kelley, Department of Psychology, Macalester
College.
D. Stephen Lindsay is now at the School of Psychology,
University of Wales, Bangor, Gwynedd, Wales; Colleen M. Kelley
is now at the Department of Psychology, Florida State University.
This research was supported by National Science Foundation
Grant BNS-9109465 and by Natural Sciences and Engineering
Research Council of Canada Grant OGP0121516. These experiments were reported at the annual meeting of the Psychonomic
Society, Los Angeles, California, November 1995. We thank Larry
L. Jacoby for many inspiring dialogues, helpful comments, and
insightful criticisms of earner versions of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Vincenza Gruppuso, Department of Psychology, University of
Victoria, P.O. Box 3050, Victoria, British Columbia, V8W 3P5,
Canada. Electronic mail may be sent via Internet to
vincenza @ uvic.ca.
diger, Weldon, & ChaUis, 1989). We do not offer a detailed
model of recognition memory, but rather offer a set of
arguments for defining the psychological constructs of
familiarity and recollection in terms of the functional roles
of multiple kinds of episodic memory information in particular situations. We argue that familiarity and recollection each
reflect retrieval of episodic memories of multiple aspects of
the prior encounter with an item. Furthermore, we propose
that although some kinds of memory information typically
contribute to recollection and others typically contribute to
familiarity, it is possible for a particular kind of memory
information to contribute to recollection in one situation and
to familiarity in another. From our perspective, what counts
as recollection (or as familiarity) depends on the specifics of
the situation.
In the following section, we first briefly contrast dualprocess and global models of recognition memory and then
describe Jacoby's (1991) PD procedure and our hypothesis
regarding list discriminability. Experiment 1 tested and
supported that hypothesis. Our proposed functionalist approach to recognition memory is introduced in the Discussion section of Experiment 1. One component of our
proposal is the hypothesis that episodic memory information
about various attributes of a past experience can be retrieved
independently of one another, regardless of whether they
contribute to recollection (/?) or to familiarity (F). Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to test that hypothesis.
Dual-Process Versus Global Models
of Recognition Memory
Dual-process theories of recognition memory hold that
two functionally independent and qualitatively different
memory mechanisms contribute to recognition of studied
items (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980). One
mechanism, which following Jacoby (1991) we term recollection, enables conscious retrieval of episodic memories of
studying the item (e.g., remembering how the item looked or
259
260
GRUPPUSO, LINDSAY, AND KELLEY
one's thoughts when the item was presented). The other
mechanism, familiarity, is said to give rise to an undifferentiated feeling of "oldness," without conscious remembering
of details of the study encounter (as in Mandler's, 1980,
example of seeing the butcher from one's grocery store on a
bus, recognizing him or her as familiar, but being unable to
remember who he or she is).1 In support of the claim that
recollection and familiarity are functionally independent,
Mandler (e.g., Mandler, 1980, 1991) and Jacoby (e.g.,
Jacoby, Yonelinas, & Jennings, 1996) and their respective
colleagues have demonstrated dissociations between various
manipulations and measures of recollection versus familiarity. For example, measures of recollection are greatly
affected by variables such as full versus divided attention at
study or lest, aging, and amnesia, whereas measures of
familiarity are largely unaffected by these variables (Jacoby
etal., 1996).2
Global models of recognition memory, in contrast, hold
that recognition of studied items relies on a single mechanism that assesses the overall strength of all matches
between a probe set and the contents of long-term memory
(e.g., Gillund & Shifrrin, 1984; Murdock, 1982). According
to such models, studying an item gives rise to a memory
representation that contains various aspects of the study
encounter (e.g., contextual information, information about
the item's meaning, information about its associations with
other studied items, &.C.). At test, a recognition probe set
(typically, context cue and item cue) activates the contents of
memory to varying degrees, with strength of activation
determined by the strength of the associations between the
probe set and the memory representations of studied items.
The likelihood of an item being recognized as old is
determined by the aggregated strength of activated representations relative to response criterion.3 The important point is
that unlike dual-process models, global memory models
assume that a single mechanism is responsible for recognition memory judgments.
The exclusion instructions, in contrast, ask participants to
say yes only to items not recollected from list 1, such that
they will say yes only to List 1 items that are familiar but are
not recollected:
/>(Yes; exclusion test) = F(l - R).
(2)
R is estimated by subtracting the proportion of yes responses
to List 1 items under the exclusion instructions from the
proportion of yes responses to List 1 items under the
inclusion instructions. F is then estimated with simple
algebra by using the estimate of R> the proportion of yes
responses to List 1 items under one of the test instructions,
and the corresponding equation.
Jacoby and his colleagues (see Jacoby et al., 1996) have
reported a number of experiments supporting the PD procedure and its underlying assumptions regarding recognition
memory (including the most important assumption that
recollection and familiarity are independent processes with
certain characteristics). For example, Jacoby, Toth, and
Yonelinas (1993) found that dividing attention at study
greatly lowered the estimate of R but had no effect on the
estimate of F. Similarly, Jennings and Jacoby (1993) found
that elderly and young participants differed greatly in the
estimate of R but not in the estimate of F.
The PD procedure has been criticized on several grounds
(e.g., Curran & Hintzman, 1995, 1997; Gardiner, Java, &
Richardson-Klavehn, 1996; Graf & Komatsu, 1994; Joordens & Merikle, 1993; Ratclifif, Van Zandt, & McKoon,
1995; Richardson-Klavehn, Gardiner, & Java, 1996). A
review of the arguments raised by these critics and of the
counter arguments offered by Jacoby and his colleagues
(Jacoby, Begg, & Toth, 1997; Jacoby & Shrout, 1997;
Jacoby, Toth, Yonelinas, & Debner, 1994; Toth, 1995; Toth,
Reingold, & Jacoby, 1995; Yoneiinas & Jacoby, 1996b)
would obscure the main points of our article. Therefore, for
the most part we have set these issues aside to focus on what
Jacoby's (1991) Two-Study-List PD Procedure
Jacoby (1991) developed the PD procedure as a means of
separately estimating the contributions of recollection and
familiarity to recognition memory judgments. Jacoby's
approach is based on a dual-process model of recognition
memory, which as noted above holds that R and F are
independent bases for judging test items as old. The PD
procedure compares performance in a condition in which
both F and R contribute to yes responses with performance
in a condition in which F contributes to yes responses but R
opposes yes responses. In the two-study-list procedure,
participants study two lists and are then tested with items
from both lists randomly intermixed with new items under
two types of instructions. The inclusion instructions ask
participants to say yes to items from either study list, such
that List 1 items are called old on the basis of R or F or both.
Under these instructions and assuming independence between R and E the probability of calling a List 1 item old is
p(Yes; inclusion test) = R + F(l - R).
(1)
1
Note that for dual-process models of memory both recollection
and familiarity give rise to a subjective feeling of recognizing an
item as one that has been previously encountered. However, the
underlying mechanisms differ. Recollection gives rise to a subjective feeling of recognizing because of retrieval of episodic details.
In contrast, familiarity gives rise to a subjective feeling of
recognizing due to residual activation and intraitem integration
(Mandler, 1980) or to fluency or other automatic influences of
memory (Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981).
2
The distinction between recollection and familiarity in dualprocess theories of recognition memory may be analogous to, and
perhaps homologous with, remembering and knowing in the
remember-know paradigm (e.g., Gardiner & Java, 1991) and is
also related to the distinction between explicit and implicit remembering (reviewed by Kelley & Lindsay, 1996; Roediger & McDermott, 1993).
3
In contrast, global memory models of cued recall are based
most often on recovery of specific memory representations.
Recognition can also be modeled in this way (Mensink &
Raaijmakers, 1988).
SIMILARITY, FAMILIARITY, AND RECOLLECTION
we see as the most fundamental point: the conceptual and
operational definitions of familiarity and recollection.
The Two-Study-List PD Procedure and List
Discriminability
The two-study-list PD procedure operationally defines R
as the ability to exclude List 1 items: It is assumed that
participants will say yes to recollected List 1 items on the
inclusion test and no to recollected List 1 items on the
exclusion test (regardless of whether or not the item also
gives rise to F). F is operationally defined as recognition of
List 1 items as old in the absence of the ability to exclude
them: It is assumed that participants will say yes to List 1
items that give rise only to F, regardless of test instructions
to include versus exclude List 1 items. It follows that
manipulations that decrease the discriminability of items
from Lists 1 and 2 should decrease the estimate of R and
increase the estimate of F (just as such manipulations impair
list discrimination [see Abra, 1972] and source monitoring
[see Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993] without affecting old-new recognition). Experiment 1 demonstrates that
this is the case.
Experiment 1
Overview
Participants studied two lists of words and took one test.
Similarity of to-be-excluded (List 1) items to not-to-beexcluded (List 2) items was manipulated within subjects by
way of encoding tasks. Participants estimated the monetary
value of some List 1 items and estimated the frequency of
encounter for other List 1 items. Participants made the same
type of encoding judgment for all List 2 items (value for half
of the participants and frequency for the remaining participants). A single test established both an overt exclusion
condition and a covert inclusion condition. At test, participants were instructed always to exclude (i.e., say no to)
items from List 1. Thus, test items from List 1 constituted
the exclusion items (i.e., participants should have responded
yes only to items that were familiar but not recollected), and
test items from List 2 constituted the inclusion items (i.e.,
participants should have responded yes to items that were
familiar from List 2, recollected from List 2, or both familiar
and recollected from List 2). This single-test procedure
differs from Jacoby's (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1993; Jennings &
Jacoby, 1993) procedure in which participants first perform a
test under inclusion instructions and then perform a second
test under exclusion instructions. The use of the single-test
procedure eliminated the possibility of criterion shifts between inclusion and exclusion tests in the two-test procedure
and simplified the procedure.4
261
Participants were informed at the beginning of the session that
the experiment consisted of two study lists followed by a memory
test. During the first phase of the experiment (List 1), participants
encoded some words by making monetary value judgments and
encoded other words by making frequency judgments, with the two
types of encoding randomly mixed across trials. In the next phase
(List 2), half of the participants encoded all of the words with one
of the judgment tasks, and the remaining participants encoded all of
the words with the other judgment task. All participants then
completed a memory test composed of words from Lists 1 and 2
randomly intermixed with new words. They were instructed to say
yes to all items recognized as old unless they remembered them
from List 1. That is, participants were to exclude List 1 items and
new items. List 2 test items were used as inclusion items (i.e., yes
responses to these items could be based on familiarity, recollection,
or both). List i items that had been studied with the same judgment
task as List 2 items constituted the "difficult condition," and List 1
items that had been studied with the different judgment task
constituted the "easy condition."
Materials. A pool of 146 concrete nouns was chosen from
KuCera and Francis's (1967) pool and from Webster's New World
Dictionary of American English (1991) with the restriction that
participants could potentially determine both the monetary value
and the frequency with which they had encountered the item in the
past month. The items were chosen to represent a range of values
($0 to more than $1,000) and frequencies (0 to more than 100
occasions in the past month).
There were 52 critical items in each study list, with those in List
1 randomly divided into two sets (A and B) of 26. An additional set
of 26 items was used as the set of new items for the test, and
another 16 items were used as filler items, with 4 fillers placed at
the beginning and end of each study list The test consisted of 134
items (4 old filler items [ 1 from the beginning and 1 from the end of
each study list] followed by a random ordering of 52 items from
List 1,52 items from List 2, and 26 new items).
The composition and order of words in each study list and the
test List were the same for all participants. In Phase 1, half of the
participants judged value for List 1A and frequency for List IB, and
this assignment was reversed for (he remaining participants. Study
items were randomly assigned to list position with the restriction
that there be no more than three consecutive items with a given
encoding task. In Phase 2, half of the participants in each List 1
assignment judged all List 2 items for value, and the remaining
participants judged all List 2 items for frequency. Test items were
randomly assigned to test list position with the restrictions that the
test began with the four old fillers and that there were no more than
three consecutive correct answers (yes or no) that were the same.
Procedure. The experiment was conducted on an IBMcompatible personal computer using the Micro-Experimental Laboratory (Schneider, 1988) software package. Study and test words
were presented in lowercase letters in the center of the screen.
Each study trial began with the presentation of a symbol
indicating the type of encoding judgment to be made on the top half
of the monitor and the appropriate response categories on the
bottom half of the monitor. The $ symbol indicated a value
judgment (response categories: [1] 0 to $10; [2] $11 to $50; [3] $51
to $200; [4] $201 to $1,000; and [5] more than $1,000), and the *
symbol indicated a frequency judgment (response categories: [1] 0
to 5 times; [2] 6 to 30 times; [3] 31 to 60 times; [4] 61 to 100 times;
Method
Participants and design. Twenty-four University of Victoria
undergraduate students participated for extra credit in an introductory psychology course or for a $5 payment.
4
As noted in the General Discussion, both procedures may
produce somewhat biased estimates, but the evidence indicates that
any such biases are not great
262
GRUPPUSO, LINDSAY, AND KELLEY
conditions were analyzed in a 3 (item type: List 1 value, List
1 frequency, List 2) X 2 (List 2 encoding: value or
frequency) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA),
with item type as the within-subjects variable and List 2
encoding as the between-subjects variable. There was a main
effect of item type, F(2, 44) = 50.61, MSE - 0.013, and a
reliable Item T^pe X List 2 Encoding interaction, F (2,44) =
24.03, MS£ = 0.013.
Planned comparisons indicated that responses to List 2
items were unaffected by encoding judgment, F < 1, and
that yes responses were more frequent on List 2 (include)
items (M = .80) than on List 1 (exclude) items {M = .51),
F(l, 23) = 127.70, MSE = 0.015. The latter result is
consistent with the instructions to exclude List 1 items. As
predicted, the interaction between List 1 item type (List 1
value vs. List 1 frequency) and List 2 encoding was
significant, F(l, 22) = 40.76, MSE = 0.015. Further
comparisons revealed that participants who made the value
judgment for List 2 items correctly excluded List 1 frequency items more often than List 1 value items, F(l, 11) =
13.07, MSE = 0.018, whereas participants who made the
frequency judgment for List 2 items correctly excluded List
1 value items more often than List 1 frequency items, F(l,
11) = 31.61, MSE = 0.013.
For each participant, estimates of R and F were calculated
separately for the easy and difficult conditions. The mean
estimates are given in Table 2. A one-way ANOVA found
that as expected, R was reliably greater in the easy condition
than in the difficult condition (difference = .22), F(l, 23) =
41.00, MSE = 0.015. A separate one-way ANOVA revealed
that as predicted, F was reliably greater in the difficult than
in the easy condition (difference = .11), F(l, 23) = 25.67,
MSE = 0.006.
and [S] more than 100 times). After 1.25 s, the item to be judged
was also presented, and all information remained on the monitor
until the participant responded or until 3.5 s elapsed. Participants
used the computer keyboard to record their responses. There was a
1-s pause between each trial. Following the presentation of List 1,
the instructions for List 2 appeared on the screen. After briefly
reviewing the instructions, participants began studying List 2.
Presentation was the same as for List 1, except that participants
performed the same encoding task (either value or frequency
judgments) for all items.
At test, participants were instructed to say yes to all old items
unless they remembered them from the first list. Thus, participants
were to respond yes to items recognized from the second list and to
other items they recognized as old without recollecting in which
study list they had been presented. Participants were to respond no
to items from List 1 and to new items. Two phrases presented at the
bottom of the computer screen throughout the test reminded
participants of the situations that required a yes response and those
that required a no response; for example, No = In first list (value
and times) or new word and Yes = In second list (value) or not sure
which list.
The probabilities of responding yes to easy and difficult to-beexcluded (List 1) items, to not-to-be-excluded (List 2) items, and to
new items were the raw dependent measures. Estimates of F and R
for the easy and difficult conditions were derived for each
participant by using these probabilities and Jacoby's (1991)
equations. Alpha for all analyses was ,05.
Results
The mean proportions of yes responses to List 1 (exclude), List 2 (include), and new items are shown in Table 1.
There was no difference in the false-alarm rate (i.e., yes
responses to old items) between participants who judged
List 2 for value and those who judged List 2 for frequency,
r(22) = 1.17, j? > .25. Data from the exclusion and inclusion
Table 1
Mean Probabilities of Yes Responses to List 1, List 2, and New Items
Item type and list I encoding
Listl (exclude )
Exp.,
List 2 encoding,
and manipulation
Exp. 1
Value
Frequency
Exp. 2: Test manipulation
Full attention
Value
Frequency
Divided attention
Value
Frequency
Exp. 3: Study manipulation
Full attention
Value
Frequency
Divided attention
Value
Frequency
Note.
Exp. = experiment.
Value
Frequency
List 2 (include)
New
M
SEM
M
SEM
M
SEM
M
SEM
.60
.39
.05
.05
.40
.65
.06
.05
.79
.80
.03
.03
.05
.03
.01
.01
.65
.30
.05
.05
.33
.54
.05
.04
.77
.77
.02
.03
.04
.04
.01
.02
.71
.58
.07
.04
.62
.63
.06
.05
.75
.75
.05
.04
.04
.06
.02
.01
.66
.32
.04
.03
.39
.63
.06
.05
.84
.83
.03
.03
.03
.03
.01
.01
.60
.42
.06
.05
.50
.60
.05
.05
.73
.78
.05
.02
.06
.04
.02
.02
263
SIMILARITY, FAMILIARITY, AND RECOLLECTION
Table 2
Mean Estimates ofR and F
F
R
Easy
Difficult
Easy
Difficult
Experiment and manipulation
M
SEM
M
SEM
M
SEM
Experiment 1
Experiment 2: Test manipulation
Full attention
Divided attention
Experiment 3: Study manipulation
Full attention
Divided attention
.40
.03
.18
.03
.63
.04
M
.74
SEM
.03
.45
.15
.04
.02
.18
.10
.03
.03
.55
.70
.04
.04
.72
.74
.02
.04
.48
.30
.03
.04
.19
.16
.03
.03
.67
.65
.04
.03
.80
.71
.02
.03
Note.
R = recollection; F ~ familiarity.
Discussion
As predicted, manipulating the similarity of items in the
two study lists affected the estimate of R and the estimate of
F in opposite directions. For items in the easy condition,
remembering information about the type of judgment with
which a List 1 item had been studied served as a basis for
identifying List 1 as the source of that item and hence for
excluding it (such that memory for encoding judgment
contributed to the estimate of R for items in the easy
condition). Consider, for example, a participant who judged
the monetary value of kayak in List 1 and who estimated
frequency of encounter for the items in List 2: For such a
participant, retrieving information about judging the value
of kayak would serve as a basis for identifying it as a word
from List 1, hence contributing to the estimate of R. For
items in the difficult condition, in contrast, remembering
information about the encoding judgment with which a List
1 item had been studied could contribute to recognizing the
item as one studied in the experiment but could not, in itself,
provide a basis for excluding it. For example, retrieving
information about judging the value of kayak would not
serve as a basis for identifying it as a List 1 item if List 2
items were also judged for value; under such conditions,
retrieving information about the encoding judgment would
contribute only to recognition of the item as old (i.e., it
would add to the estimate of F)-5
The results of Experiment 1 demonstrate that retrieval is
not an all-or-none phenomenon: People can retrieve some
aspects of a past event without retrieving other aspects (e.g.,
can remember information about the encoding task without
remembering the study list; see also Johnson & Raye, 1981).
Our findings also indicate that retrieval of relatively highlevel, conceptual, episodic memory information (i.e., the
encoding task with which an item was studied) can contribute either to the estimate of R or to the estimate of F obtained
with the two-study-list PD procedure, depending on whether
that information does or does not provide a basis for
excluding to-be-excluded items.
Table 3 indicates the roles of each of three categories of
memory information in contributing to the estimates of R
and F obtained in Experiment 1. In the table, Judgment
refers to episodic memory information that enabled partici-
pants to identify which type of judgment (value or frequency) had been made about an item. List refers to memory
information, other than memory for the encoding task, that
enabled participants to identify the list in which a test item
had been presented (e.g., episodic memory information that
indicated that the item was presented toward the beginning
or end of the experiment or that the item had been preceded
or followed by an item for which a different judgment had
been made, which would indicate that the item was in List 1
because the same judgment was made for all List 2 items).
Other refers to more generic sorts of memory information
that enabled participants to recognize an item as old but not
to identify its source. Table 3 illustrates the rinding that
although the same amount and kind of memory information
was available and retrieved for items in the easy and difficult
conditions, memory for encoding task contributed only to R
for items in the easy condition and contributed only to F for
items in the difficult condition.
Dual-process models of recognition posit one memory
process that enables recollection of episodic details and
another memory process that through some other mechanism (e.g., priming, intraitem integration, or fluency), gives
rise to an undifferentiated feeling of familiarity. The entries
under the columns in Table 3 labeled List and Other are
consistent with traditional dual-process theories of recognition memory (if Other is construed as the output of a special
familiarity process): Memory for list-specific information
contributed only to R, and memory for non-list-specific
information contributed only to F. The column labeled
Judgment, however, is directly at odds with traditional
dual-process models, because for items in the difficult
condition, retrieval of episodic memory information regarding the judgment with which an item had been studied
contributed to F rather than to R. From the perspective of
5
In this and the subsequent experiments, the difference between
the easy and difficult conditions was greater for R man for F. This
asymmetry in the effect of the manipulation on the two parameter
estimates may reflect differences in the weighting of retrieved
memory information when it provides a basis for source identification (and hence contributes to R) versus when it serves only as a
basis for recognizing an item as old (and hence contributes to F).
264
GRUPPUSO, LINDSAY, AND KELLEY
Table 3
Functional Roles of Various Types of Retrieved
in Experiment 1
Information
^__
Type of memory information and item condition
Parameter Easy
R
F
Difficult
0
Other
List
Judgment
Easy
Difficult
Easy
Difficult
0
0
++
++
Note. Judgment refers to memory information specific to one of
the encoding tasks (i.e., value or frequency judgments) with which
items were studied. List refers to retrieved memory information
that is specific to study list (other than judgment). Other refers to
retrieved memory information that is not specific to study list (i.e.,
memory for cognitive processes common to the two study lists,
often relatively low-level, data-driven automatic processes). The
constituents of these categories of memory information are assumed to be functionally independent. Plus signs indicate that a
particular category of memory information contributes to one
parameter estimate for one type of item (i.e., easy or difficult). (Plus
signs are doubled here for comparison to the divided-attention
conditions in Experiments 2 and 3.) Zeros indicate that there is no
contribution or a negligible contribution. See text for details. R =
recollection; F = familiarity.
traditional dual-process models of recognition memory, the
interpretation of the results of Experiment 1 is straightforward: The estimate of F for items in the difficult condition
was contaminated by memories that should properly have
been classified as recollection, and the estimate of R for
items in the difficult condition was thereby underestimated.
By this account, the important implication of Experiment 1
is that researchers wishing to use the PD procedure to obtain
process-pure estimates of R and F should take steps to
minimize the likelihood of such measurement error.
The findings of Experiment 1 are also consistent with an
alternative view, one that rejects traditional dual-process
models of recognition memory in favor of functionalist
definitions of recollection and familiarity. We propose that
rather than relying on different mechanisms, both recollection and familiarity reflect the retrieval and use of multiple
kinds of episodic memory information. Further, we propose
to define recollection as retrieval of memory information
that enables one to accomplish the task set by the situation
(e.g., identification of a test item as a List 1 item or
identification of a person encountered on a bus as one's
butcher) and to define familiarity as retrieval of memory
information that gives rise to a feeling of recognition but
does not enable one to accomplish the task set by the
situation (e.g., recognition of a test item as old without being
able to identify it as a List 1 item or recognition of a person
on the bus without being able to remember who he or she is).
One implication of our proposal is that retrieved episodic
memory information that gives rise to recollection in one
situation might give rise to familiarity in another and vice
versa. It is likely that some kinds of memory information
typically contribute to familiarity rather than to recollection
(e.g., memory for low-level, data-driven, automatic processes, such as those involved in perceptually identifying a
word, probably usually contributes to familiarity) and that
other kinds of memory information typically contribute to
recollection rather than to familiarity (e.g., memories of
consciously controlled reflective processes, such as those
involved in noting relationships among studied items, which
likely often contribute to recollection). However, for present
purposes, the central points of our proposal are that (a) rather
than reflecting the operation of two distinct memory mechanisms, both recollection and familiarity reflect retrieval and
use of multiple kinds of memory information and (b)
recollection and familiarity can be defined in functionalist
terms.
The PD procedure's operational definitions of R and F
map on to these functionally defined psychological constructs of recollection and familiarity. From this perspective,
the findings of Experiment 1 do not reveal measurement
error; rather, items in the easy condition really were more
often recollected than items in the difficult condition, and
items in the difficult condition really did more often give rise
to familiarity than did items in the easy condition. This is
because remembering the type of judgment with which an
item in the difficult condition was studied would lead
participants to recognize it as old but would not enable them
to accomplish the task set by the situation (i.e., identification
of the list in which the item was encountered) and hence
would give rise to familiarity, not recollection.
We anticipate that some readers will have difficulty
entertaining the idea that retrieving episodic information
about the type of judgment with which an item was studied
could contribute to familiarity rather than to recollection.
The proposal seems odd because familiarity has usually
been described as based on something other than the
retrieval of episodic memory information. A central part of
our argument, however, is that both familiarity and recollection rely on retrieval of episodic memory information. This
aspect of our argument is similar to Koriat's (1993, 1995)
proposal regarding the basis for the "feeling of knowing" in
the "tip of the tongue" state that people experience when
they are unable to answer a question but feel they know the
answer (e.g., "Who wrote Charlottes' Web?"). Others have
proposed that feeling of knowing reflects the operation of a
special memory mechanism, distinct from the memory
mechanism by which answers are retrieved, but Koriat
argued compellingly that feeling of knowing reflects retrieval of information about the sought for answer (e.g.,
information about initial letters, number of syllables, closely
related answers, etc.) and that this partial information is
retrieved by the same mechanism through which answers are
retrieved. Similarly, we propose that the feeling of familiarity in old-new recognition reflects retrieval of information
about a studied item, which enables one to recognize that
item as old but does not enable one to answer the question
set by the situation (e.g., to identify the list in which the item
was encountered or to recognize the person on the bus as the
butcher).
Why propose such a reconceptualization of recollection
and familiarity? The proposed functionalist definitions of
recollection and familiarity allow us to maintain a fundamental contrast in the phenomenology of memory—the contrast
between the satisfying sense of recollecting a particular,
unique autobiographical event, on the one hand, versus the
often nagging feeling of familiarity, on the other—without
SIMILARITY, FAMILIARITY, AND RECOLLECTION
cleaving to the idea that recollection reflects the operation of
one process and familiarity reflects the operation of another.
The construct of familiarity is measured in a wide variety of
paradigms (e.g., implicit memory tests such as perceptual
identification, fragment or stem completion, and categoryexemplar generation [reviewed by Kelley & Lindsay, 1996];
know responses in the remember-know paradigm studied by
Gardiner and his colleagues [e.g., Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner
et al., 1996]; the mere exposure effect [Kunst-Wilson &
Zajonc, 1980], etc.)- The notion that familiarity, as it is
measured in these different paradigms, reflects the operation
of a single, unitary process has become untenable in the face
of dissociations across such measures (e.g., Blaxton, 1989;
McDennott & Roediger, 1994; Srinivas & Roediger, 1990;
Wagner, Gabrieli, & VerfaeUie, 1997; Witherspoon & Moscovitch, 1989). At a theoretical level, it seems both unparsiraonious and simplistic to assume that memory is composed
of two processes, one of which enables episodic retrieval
and the other of which gives rise to familiarity. This view is
unparsimonious because it posits two memory processes
that differ in their fundamental mechanisms and is simplistic
because it dichotomizes a wide range of kinds of memory
information.
The perspective on recognition memory proposed here—
and at present it is merely a perspective, not a detailed
model—combines aspects of dual-process theories with
aspects of global memory models in which specific information is retrieved at test. Like dual-process theory, our view
maintains a qualitative distinction between recollection and
familiarity but, as explained above, defines these two
psychological constructs in functionalist terms rather than
attributing them to the operation of two separate memory
processes. As in global memory models, we assume that
memory for a studied item consists of representations of
multiple aspects of that experience (although we have in
mind many more different kinds of information than have
been simulated in global memory models, ranging from
memory for relatively automatic processes such as letterfeature identification to memory for more reflective processes such as noting a relationship between an item and its
predecessor). Also as in global memory models, we assume
that a recognition test probe reactivates associated memory
information. Unlike in most global memory models, memory
information about an item is not assumed to be unitized
(Raaijmakers, 1993); instead, representations of aspects of a
past event can be activated without first sampling a particular "central file." Like global memory models, our approach
assumes that some stored features can be retrieved independently of others (e.g., memory information about perceptual
processes involved in reading a word can be activated
without activating memory information about processing the
word's meaning). There likely are dependencies between
retrieval of some memory attributes, but a key part of our
argument is that retrieval of some kinds of memory information is independent of retrieval of some other kinds of
memory information.
Unlike global memory models, our approach assumes that
the kinds of memory information that contribute to remembering the context in which an event occurred is not
specified a priori at encoding. Whether a particular kind of
265
information will provide cues to context depends, in a word,
on the context (e.g., memory for the encoding task was a
good basis for identifying context for items in the easy
condition and a poor one for items in the difficult condition,
and this could not be specified a priori during presentation of
List 1 but rather arose later because of the encoding task
used to study List 2). Thus, recollection is not retrieval of
prespecified context tags. It is just as important that recollection is not simply retrieval of more of the same information
that supports familiarity in a particular situation. (If this
were so, then the relationship between recollection and
familiarity would be one of redundancy rather than independence, and the process dissociations Jacoby et al., 1996,
obtained would be inexplicable.) Rather, recollection is
defined as retrieval and use of the specific kinds of information that in a given situation, are sufficient to perform the
memory task at hand (e.g., identification of the list in which
an item was encountered), and familiarity is denned as
retrieval of other kinds of information that in that particular
situation, enable recognition of items as old but do not
enable performance of the memory task at hand (e.g.,
exclusion of List 1 items or identification of the butcher on
the bus).
Both dual-process models and our functionalist perspective assume that recollection and familiarity are independent. From the perspective of dual-process models of
recognition memory, familiarity and recollection are said to
be independent because they reflect the operation of two
separate mechanisms. From the perspective of our functionalist account, in contrast, familiarity and recollection are
said to be independent because they reflect retrieval of
different aspects or attributes of the study experience and
because it is assumed that at least some aspects of a past
event can be retrieved independently of other aspects. This
assumption of independence is central to our argument that
the PD procedure's estimates of R and F map onto our
functionalist definitions of recollection and familiarity, because the equations used in the PD procedure assume that R
and F are independent.
At first glance, the findings of Experiment 1 might appear
to evidence a violation of the independence assumption,
because a manipulation that decreased R simultaneously
increased F (cf. Curran & Hintzman, 1995, who obtained
superficially similar crossover interactions for quite different
reasons). Our account holds that such across-condition
comparisons are not informative. The crucial issue from our
perspective is whether within a particular condition (e.g., the
difficult condition) memory information that contributes to
R is independent of memory information that contributes to
F. If so, then it should be possible to manipulate memory for
information that, in a particular situation, contributes to R
independently of the memory information that, in that
situation, contributes to F.
To explore the independence hypothesis, Experiments 2
and 3 manipulated full versus divided attention at study and
at test, respectively. The rationale here was the same as that
developed and used by Jacoby (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1993): We
assumed that use of conceptual information is attention
demanding, whereas lower level perceptual processes are
266
GRUPPUSO, LINDSAY. AND KELLEY
relatively automatic. If so and if memory for our conceptual
encoding tasks operates independently of memory for other
aspects of the study encounter, then effects of an attentional
manipulation on estimated R for items in a particular
condition (easy or difficult) should be independent of effects
of that manipulation on estimated F for items in that
condition. Specifically, we predicted that dividing attention
at test would affect use of memory information about the
encoding task (which contributes to R for items in the easy
condition and to F for items in the difficult condition) but
would have no effect on uses of memory for lower level
processes (which typically contributes to F for items in both
conditions).
Experiment 2
Method
Participants, design, and materials. Forty-six University of
Victoria undergraduate students participated for extra credit in an
introductory psychology course or for a $5 payment. Five participants in the divided-attention condition were replaced because they
missed responding to more than five test items from one or more of
the conditions (i.e., List 1 value items, List 1 frequency items. List
2 items, or new items). An additional participant in the dividedattention condition was replaced because of a very high false-alarm
rate (30.8%, 3.17 SDs above the mean). Thus, data are from 20
participants in each attention condition.
Participants completed the study phases as in Experiment 1. Half
of the participants completed the memory test as in Experiment 1,
and the remaining participants completed the memory test while
simultaneously performing an auditory number-detection task. The
materials and procedure were the same as those in Experiment 1
except as noted.
Procedure, As in Experiment I, participants were instructed at
test to say yes to all old items except those that they remembered
from List 1. Participants in the divided-attention condition also
monitored an auditory series of random numbers presented at a 1-s
rate with instructions to detect each series of three consecutive odd
numbers (Craik, 1982). Participants gave verbal responses on the
memory test (which the experimenter entered on the computer
keyboard), and those in the divided-attention condition tapped a
pen on the table every time they heard three odd numbers in a row.
The experimenter monitored participants' performance on the
number task by following a printed version of the number
sequence. Participants in the divided-attention condition were told
that performance on bom tasks was equally important.
Test items in both attention conditions remained on the monitor
until the participant responded or 5 s elapsed. It was expected that
this constraint would limit the amount of time participants in the
divided-attention condition could spend on each task and therefore
would reduce the possibility that they would fully attend to and
complete each task in turn.
Participants were given feedback in the form of a high-pitched
tone from the computer when they did not respond to a test item
within the allotted time, thereby encouraging them to speed up their
responses on upcoming trials. In addition, feedback in the form of a
low-pitched tone was provided by having the experimenter press a
key any time participants in the divided-attention condition missed
a series of three odd numbers.
Results
Data were conditionalized on the number of completed
responses because some participants occasionally did not
respond to memory test items within the 5-s deadline. Table
1 lists the mean conditionalized probabilities of responding
yes to study list items and new items in the full- and
divided-attention conditions. On average, participants in the
divided-attention condition responded to 95.5% of the items
(99.7% in the full-attention condition). False-alarm rates did
not differ as a function of attention condition or List 2
encoding (Fs < 1.31, p > .26).
The data were analyzed in a 2 (attention: full or divided) X
3 (item type) X 2 (List 2 encoding) mixed-model ANOVA,
with item type as the repeated measure. A reliable three-way
interaction, F(2, 72) = 10.93, MSE = 0.010, emerged.
Consistent with the instructions to exclude List 1 items, in
both the full-attention and divided-attention conditions participants less often responded yes to List 1 items (full
attention M = .46; divided attention M = .64) than to List 2
items (full attention M = .77; divided attention M — .75),
F(l, 19) = 127.64, MSE = 0.063 and F(l, 19) = 29.45,
MSE = 0.037, respectively. There was no effect of the
encoding task performed on List 2 (Fs < 1). The interaction
between List 1 item type (List 1 value vs. List 1 frequency)
and List 2 encoding (value vs. frequency) was reliable, F(l,
36) = 52.56, MSE - 0.011: As in the previous experiment,
participants were better able to exclude List 1 items that had
been studied with the encoding task that differed (i.e., easy
items, M = .46) from the encoding task performed on List 2
(i.e., difficult items, M - .63), As predicted, there was a
reliable three-way interaction between List 1 item type, List
2 encoding, and attention at test, F(l, 36) - 18.59, hfSE =
0.011. Although the two-way interaction between List 1 item
type and List 2 encoding was reliable in both the full- and
divided-attention conditions, F(l, 18) = 55.19, MSE =
0.014 and F(l, 18) = 5.47, MSE = 0.009, respectively, the
interaction was larger in the full-attention condition (full
attention: easy M = .32, difficult M = .60; divided attention: easy M = .60, difficult M = .67). Further, dividing
attention at test reliably increased the probability of responding yes to List 1 items in the easy condition (difference = .28), F(l, 38) = 35.12, MSE = 0.023, but had no
reliable effect on responses to List 1 items in the difficult
condition (difference = .07), F(l, 38) = 2.08, MSE =
0.029, p > . 15. Thus, analyses of the raw data indicate that
dividing attention at test reduced use of memory information
about the encoding task with which items in the easy
condition had been studied as a basis for excluding those
items.
Estimates of R and F were derived with the PD equations.
This resulted in negative values of R for items in the difficult
condition for 1 participant in the full-attention condition and
for items in the difficult or easy conditions or both for 5
participants in the divided-attention condition. To avoid
negative values (which indicate measurement error and little
or no ability to distinguish between List 1 and List 2 items),
in these cases the estimate of R was set to zero.
Estimates of R and F are shown in Table 2. The analysis of
267
SIMILARITY, FAMILIARITY, AND RECOLLECTION
List 2 raw scores indicated no main effect of List 2 encoding
task, and therefore the estimates of recollection and familiarity were collapsed across this variable and analyzed in
separate 2 (attention) X 2 (similarity: easy or difficult)
mixed-model ANOVAs, with similarity as the withinsubjects variable. Significant interactions between the effects of these two variables on estimates of R, F(l, 38) =
25.03, MSB = 0.009, andtf f ( l , 38) = 15.92, MSE = 0.006,
were interpreted with subsequent one-way ANOVAs for
each attention condition. The findings for R and F in the
full-attention condition replicated those of Experiment 1: R
for items in the easy condition was greater than R for items
in the difficult condition (difference = .27), F(l, 19) =
58.63, MSE - 0.012, and F was greater for items in the
difficult condition than for items in the easy condition
(difference = .17), F(l, 19) = 28.85, MSE = 0.010. An
attenuated version of this pattern was observed in the
divided-attention condition: The estimate of R in the dividedattention condition was greater for easy items than for
difficult items (difference = .05), F(l, 19) = 4.76, MSE =
0.006, and the estimate of F was greater for difficult items
than for easy items (difference = .04), F(l, 19) = 6.33,
MSE = 0.002. The fact that dividing attention did not
eliminate the difference in R for easy versus difficult items
indicates that the secondary task did not altogether eliminate
ability to use memory for encoding task as a means of
excluding easy List 1 items.
The most important analyses are those comparing the
effects of divided attention on estimates of R versus estimates of F for items of each type (easy and difficult). For
items in the difficult condition, our results were similar to
those Jacoby and his colleagues (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1996)
havereported:Dividing attention at test reliably lowered the
estimate of R (difference = .08), F(l, 38) = 5.22, MSE =
0.014, but had no effect on the estimate of F(F < 1). For
items in the easy condition, in contrast, dividing attention at
test both lowered the estimate of/? (difference = .30), F(l,
38) = 50.09, MSE = 0.018, and increased the estimate of F
(difference = .15), F(l, 38) = 9.10, MSE = 0.025. Power
for detecting an effect of dividing attention on F for difficult
items, estimated with the GPOWER software program
(Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996; Faul & Erdfelder, 1992)
and the effect magnitude for F on easy items, was .90
(one-tailed). This indicates that for difficult items, the power
to detect an effect of dividing attention of the size observed
for easy items was reasonably high.
Discussion
Results for participants in the full-attention condition of
Experiment 2 closely replicated the findings of Experiment
1: Estimates of R were greater for items in the easy condition
than for items in the difficult condition, and estimates of F
were greater for items in the difficult condition than for items
in the easy condition. As in Experiment 1, this indicates that
memory for the encoding task with which an item had been
studied served as a basis for excluding items in the easy
condition (and hence contributed to /?)* but served only as a
basis for recognizing items in the difficult condition as old
(and hence contributed to F).
Table 4 illustrates our interpretation of the pattern of
effects of dividing attention at test on estimates of R and F
for items in the easy and difficult conditions. The pattern is
somewhat complex but fits well with a relatively simple
explanation. That explanation turns on a distinction between
retrieval of potentially source-specifying information versus
use of such information as a basis for excluding List 1 items
(i.e., to contribute to R, potentially source-specifying information about a List 1 item must not only be retrieved but
must also be used as a basis for excluding the item). If
potentially source-specifying information is retrieved when
a List 1 test item is presented but participants do not use it as
a basis for excluding, then that information will instead
contribute to E Our results suggest that information about
Table 4
Functional Roles of Various types of Retrieved Information in Experiment 2
(Attention Divided at Test)
Type of memory information and item condition
Experimental
manipulation
and parameter
Full attention
R
F
Divided attention
R
F
Judgment
List
Other
Easy
Difficult
Easy
Difficult
++
0
0
++
++
++
0
0
0
0
++
++
+
0
+
++
+
+
0
0
Easy
Difficult
0
0
++
++
Note. Judgmentrefersto memory information specific to one of the encoding tasks (i.e., value or
frequency judgments) with which items were studied. List refers to retrieved memory information
that is specific to study list (other than judgment). Other refers toretrievedmemory information that
is not specific to study list (i.e., memory for cognitive processes common to the two study lists, often
relatively low-level, data-driven automatic processes). The constituents of these categories of
memory information are assumed to be functionally independent. Zeros and single or double plus
signs are used to indicate the contribution and any changes (i.e., when attention is divided) in such
contribution from a particular category of memory information to a parameter estimate for an item
type (i.e., easy or difficult). See text for details. R = recollection; F = familiarity.
268
GRUPPUSO, LINDSAY, AND KELLEY
the encoding task (i.e., the Judgment column of Table 4) was
retrieved at test, regardless of full versus divided attention,
but dividing attention impaired ability to use that information as a basis for excluding items in the easy condition.
Hence, divided attention both decreased R (i.e., + + in the
full-attention condition becomes + in the divided-attention
condition) and increased F in this condition (i.e., 0 in the
full-attention condition becomes + in the divided-attention
condition; see Table 4). Divided attention also impaired the
ability to retrieve other kinds of source-specifying information; (i.e., the List column) useful for excluding items in both
conditions and hence lowered R (i.e., + + for easy and
difficult items of the full-attention condition becomes + in
the divided-attention condition). However, dividing attention at test had no effect on memory for Other information
(i.e., memory for relatively low-level and generic information; see Table 4). Thus, the secondary task had no effect on
F for items in the difficult condition because retrieval of
information useful only for identifying those items as old
(including information about the judgment with which those
items had been studied) occurred automatically and hence
was not affected by dividing attention at test. If dividing
attention had impaired retrieval of information about the
encoding task, then the estimate of F for items in the difficult
condition would have been reduced by the divided-attention
task. As in the process dissociations reported by Jacoby and
his colleagues (reviewed by Jacoby et al., 1996), dividing
attention did impair retrieval of source-specifying information of the sorts useful for identifying items in the difficult
condition as List 1 items and hence lowered the estimate of
R for those items. For example, participants might remember
that a particular test item had been preceded at study by a
word judged with a different encoding task and thereby
might identify the item as a word from List 1. Dividing
attention at test appears to have impaired retrieval of such
information, because R for difficult items was lower in the
divided- than in the full-attention condition, but F was
invariant. This finding is important because it supports the
hypothesis that R and F operate independently (in that a
manipulation can lower R without affecting F) even when
episodic memory information regarding the encoding task
contributes to the estimate of F.
The same explanation fits the quite different pattern of
findings observed for items in the easy condition. Estimates
of R were dramatically reduced by dividing attention,
because the secondary task both impaired use of automatically retrieved information about the judgment with which
those items had been studied and impaired effortful retrieval
of other kinds of source-specifying information. Most
provocatively, estimates of F for items in the easy condition
were increased by dividing attention. This occurred because
memory information about encoding task tended to be
retrieved automatically, regardless of full versus divided
attention at test, but dividing attention impaired participants'
ability to use that information as a basis for excluding easy
List 1 items. Under full attention, participants used retrieved
memory information about encoding task as a basis for
excluding easy List 1 items, and hence such information
contributed to the estimate of R. Under divided attention, in
contrast, participants were less often able to use retrieved
memory information about encoding task as a basis for
excluding easy List 1 items; instead, that information served
only as a basis for recognizing items as old and hence
contributed to the estimate of E Thus, recollection as
measured by the PD procedure demands not only the
retrieval of source-specifying information but also consciously controlled use of that information to exclude
to-be-excluded items. Consider our previous example in
which kayak was judged for value in List 1 and all List 2
items were judged for frequency. Our results suggest that
participants in the divided-attention condition often remembered that they had judged the value of kayak, but were often
unable to use that information to conclude that kayak was a
List 1 item (i.e., were unable to reason, "I thought of the
value of kayak, and all List 2 items were judged for
frequency; therefore, kayak is a List 1 item, and I should say
no")- Because dividing attention at test impaired ability to
perform this type of reasoning but did not prevent retrieval
of memories of the encoding task with which items had been
studied, dividing attention reduced the estimate of R and
increased the estimate of F for items in the easy condition.
Our results indicate that memory information about the
judgment with which an item had been studied was automatically retrieved in our procedure, but it is likely that retrieval
of this information would have been impaired if the secondary task had been more demanding. At some point, one
would expect performance on the memory test to break
down altogether. The fact that our divided-attention manipulation impaired exclusion of List 1 items in the easy
condition while having no effect on List 1 items in the
difficult condition, List 2 items, or new items demonstrates
that (a) the secondary task was sufficiently demanding to
have a substantial impact on performance and (b) the impact
was specific to the cognitive processes required by the
exclusion task.
The findings of Experiment 2 are compatible with our
hypothesis that F and R each reflect the independent
contributions of memories of multiple aspects of the study
encounter, with the composition of F and R dependent on
specifics of the study and test situations. For example, even
though memory information regarding the encoding task
contributed to the estimate of F for items in the difficult
condition, dividing attention at test lowered the estimate of/?
while leaving the estimate of F invariant. This finding, like
the findings Jacoby et al. (1996) have reported, supports the
independence assumption. The pattern of results for items in
the difficult condition is also consistent with the hypothesis
that the kinds of memory information that contribute to R in
a given condition can operate independently of the kinds of
memory information that contribute to F in that condition.
We sought further evidence of the independence of F and
R in Experiment 3 by dividing attention during the study
phase. The primary purpose of the secondary task was to
disrupt encoding of information about the judgment made at
study. To the extent that memory for the encoding task can
be selectively disrupted independent of memory for other
aspects of encountering the words on the study lists, for
SIMILARITY, FAMILIARITY, AND RECOLLECTION
items in the easy condition a process dissociation of the sort
reported by Jacoby et al. (1996) should be obtained: That is,
for items in the easy condition, dividing attention at study
should lower R while leaving F invariant. In contrast,
because information about the judgment with which words
in the difficult condition were studied can contribute only to
F, dividing attention at study should lower F while having
little effect on R.
The predicted pattern when attention is divided at study is
different from the pattern observed when attention was
divided at test (Experiment 2). Dividing attention at test did
not reduce retrieval of information about task, but rather
reduced ability to use automatically retrieved information
about task as a basis for excluding easy List 1 items. Thus,
for items in the easy condition, dividing attention at test both
decreased R (use of memory for task as a basis for excluding
List 1 items) and increased F (use of memory for task as a
basis for recognizing List 1 items as old). In contrast,
dividing attention at study should reduce encoding (and
hence reduce later retrieval) of information about task.
Consequently, for items in the easy condition (for which
information about task contributes to R), dividing attention
at study should decrease R without affecting E For items in
the difficult condition (for which information about task
contributes to F), dividing attention at study should decrease
F without affecting R.
Experiment 3
Method
Participants, design, and materials. Forty-one University of
Victoria students participated for extra credit in an introductory
psychology course. One participant in the full-attention condition
was replaced because of language difficulties that interfered with
this individual's ability to make the encoding judgments.
Half of the participants (full-attention condition) completed the
study and test phases as in Experiment 1. For the remaining
participants, List 1 and List 2 were studied under conditions of
divided attention. TTie materials for this experiment included those
of Experiment 1 and an additional 36 words selected for a practice
session (24 words) and as filler items placed at the beginning of List
1 (8 words) and List 2 (4 words). The procedure was the same as
that of Experiment 1 except as noted.
Procedure. Before the study phase, all participants completed
a practice session that consisted of 8 items, a pause, and an
additional 16 practice items. During the pause and at the end of the
practice session, participants were given an opportunity to review
their performance and to ask any questions they had about the task.
Thus, each participant completed 28 trials (the 24 practice items
and the 4 filler items presented at the beginning of list 1 as in
Experiment 1) before the critical trials of the first study list. We
expected that the practice trials would allow performance of
participants in the divided-attention condition to stabilize before
the critical trials of List 1.
During study, participants in the divided-attention condition
performed an auditory number-detection task while making value
and frequency judgments for the study items. The rationale for the
experiment requires that dividing attention impairs performance of
(and hence memory for) the encoding task, without disrupting
performance of other more generic processes that later support
recognition of items as old. Pilot studies found that the secondary
269
task used at test in Experiment 2 (detecting series of three odd
numbers in a row) interfered with performance of the primary study
task to such an extent that some participants did not even read aloud
some of the study words. Therefore, we used a less arduous
secondary task in Experiment 3: With the same tape-recorded series
of digits as in Experiment 2, participants were to detect all
occurrences of the numbers 2 and 3.
Participants were required to read the study words aloud to
ensure at least minimal processing of items. Tlie durations of the
symbols used to cue encoding tasks, the items, and the response
categories on the computer screen were the same as in Experiments
1 and 2. For participants in the divided-attention condition, the
practice and study sessions began with the number task alone
(approximately 25 numbers) before the addition of the study task.
Participants were verbally reminded to repeat the words in the
study list aloud if they did not do so. In addition, a tone was
presented if they missed noting three successive target events.
Results
The mean probabilities of responding yes to List 1
(exclude), List 2 (include), and new items in the full- and
divided-attention conditions are presented in Table 1. A
reliable three-way interaction emerged in a 2 (attention) X 3
(item type) X 2 (List 2 encoding) mixed-model ANOVA,
F(2, 72) = 4.74, MSE = 0.013. Consistent with the
instructions to exclude List 1 items, participants less often
responded yes to List 1 items than to List 2 items in both the
full-attention condition (List 1 M = .50; List 2 M = .84),
F(1, 19) = 225.23, MSE = 0.040, and the divided-attention
condition (List 1 M = .53; List 2 M = .76), F(l, 19) =
65.33, MSE = 0.062. A significant interaction between
attention and similarity (easy or difficult), F(l, 36) = 6.48,
MSE = 0.018, was interpreted with separate analyses of the
attention conditions. The difference between easy and
difficult items benefited participants in both the fullattention condition (easy M = .36; difficult M = .65), F(l,
18) = 61.12, MSE = 0.014, and the divided-attention
condition (easy M = .46; difficult M = .60), F(l, 18) =
9.12, MSE - 0.022, but the difference was substantially
attenuated in the divided-attention condition. An analysis of
responses to List 2 items revealed that participants in the
full-attention condition recognized more items than those in
the divided-attention condition (difference = .08), F(l, 36) =
5.34, MSE = 0.012. In both the full- and divided-attention
conditions, responses to List 2 items were equivalent for
participants who judged List 2 for value and those who
judged List 2 for frequency (F < 1).
Because the type of judgment with which list 2 items had
been studied was not a significant variable in the recognition of
items, the scores were collapsed across this variable in analyzing
the estimates of F and R. As in Experiment 2, negative estimates
of recollection (1 participant in full attention [difficult condition]
and 3 participants in divided attention [easy condition, difficult
condition, or both]) were assigned a value of zero. The mean
estimates are presented in Table 2.
The data from participants who studied under conditions
of full attention provide a second replication of the findings
of Experiment 1: A for items in the easy condition was
greater than R for items in the difficult condition (difference = .29), F(l, 19) = 66.59, MSE = 0.013, whereas Ffor
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GRUPPUSO, LINDSAY, AND KELLEY
items in the easy condition was less than F for items in the
difficult condition (difference = .13), F(l, 19) - 28.25,
MSE = 0.006. An attenuated version of the same pattern was
observed in the divided-attention condition: R was greater
for items in the easy condition than for items in the difficult
condition (difference = .14), F(l, 19) = 8.94, MSE =
0.022, whereas F was greater for items in the difficult
condition than for items in the easy condition (difference = .06), F(l, 19) = 8.53, MSE = 0.004. These findings
indicate that the secondary task did not entirely prevent
encoding of information about the judgment during study.
The crucial analyses are those comparing full versus
divided attention within the easy and difficult conditions.
These findings were exactly as predicted. For items in the
easy condition, dividing attentionreducedthe estimate of/?
(difference = .18),F(1,38) = 12.73, MSE= 0.027, and had
no effect on the estimate of F, (F < 1; as in experiments by
Jacoby, e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby et al., 1993, 1996;
Jennings & Jacoby, 1993). For items in the difficult condition, this pattern was reversed. Dividing attention had no
effect on the estimate of R (F < 1), but decreased the
estimate of F (difference = .09), F(l, 38) = 5.48, MSE =
0.015. Power to detect an effect of dividing attention on F
for items in the easy condition, estimated with GPOWER
(Faul & Erdfelder, 1992) using the magnitude of the effect of
dividing attention on F for the difficult condition, was .75
(one-tailed; the GPOWER analysis estimates that at least 64
participants would be required in each condition to achieve a
power of .90). Power to detect an effect of dividing attention
on R for items in the difficult condition, estimated with
GPOWER using the magnitude of the effect of dividing
attention on R for items in the easy condition, was .95
(one-tailed).
Discussion
The effects of divided attention at study on estimates of R
and F for items in the easy and difficult conditions were
exactly as predicted. Table 5 depicts our interpretation of the
findings. In summary, the attention-demanding encoding of
information about judgment (which contributed to R for easy
items and to F for difficult items) and other kinds of
list-specific information (which always contributed to R)
was impaired by dividing attention at study. Other non-listspecific information (which contributed to F) does not
require attention-demanding encoding, and hence dividing
attention at study would have no effect on memory for this
information.
Dividing attention at study impaired performance and
encoding of information about the judgment tasks. Thus, in
the divided-attention condition, information about the judgment with which an item had been studied was less often
available at test and consequently could less often be used as
a basis for excluding items in the easy condition. Therefore,
R was reduced (i.e., + + becomes +; see Table 5), but F
remained invariant (i.e., 0 remains 0) for easy items across
the full- and divided-attention conditions. For example,
among participants who had judged the value of kayak in
List 1 and had made the frequency judgment for List 2 items,
those who had studied the words with full attention were
often able to retrieve memory information about the encoding judgment and were thereby able to identify kayak as a
to-be-excluded item. In contrast, those who had studied the
words with divided attention less often encoded information
about the judgment and so less often retrieved information
that could be used as a basis for excluding List 1 items in the
easy condition (hence lowering estimates of R for easy
items, relative to the full-attention condition). Because
information about the encoding task contributed to R rather
than F for items in the easy condition, impairing encoding of
this information did not affect F for these items (i.e., 0
remains 0; see Table 5). This process dissociation, like those
Jacoby (see Jacoby et al., 1996) has reported, supports the
hypothesized independence between F and R.
Table 5
Functional Roles of Various Types of Retrieved Information in Experiment 3
(Attention Divided at Study)
Type of memory information and item condition
Experimental
manipulation
and parameter
Full attention
R
F
Divided attention
R
F
Judgment
List
Other
Easy
Difficult
Easy
Difficult
Easy
Difficult
++
0
0
++
++
0
++
0
0
++
0
++
+
0
0
+
+
0
+
0
0
++
0
++
Note. Judgment refers to memory information specific to one of the encoding tasks (i.e., value or
frequency judgments) with which items were studied. List refers to retrieved memory information
that is specific to study list (other than judgment). Other refers to retrieved memory information that
is not specific to study list (i.e., memory for cognitive processes common to the two study lists, often
relatively low-level, data-driven automatic processes). The constituents of these categories of
memory information are assumed to be functionally independent. Zeros and single or double plus
signs are used to indicate the contribution and any changes (i.e., when attention is divided) in such
contribution from a particular category of memory information to a parameter estimate for an item
type (i.e., easy or difficult). See text for details. R = recollection; F — familiarity.
SIMILARITY, FAMILIARITY, AND RECOLLECTION
As one would expect, this pattern of results was reversed
for items in the difficult condition: F was reduced and R was
unchanged by dividing attention at study. Remembering the
judgment with which an item in the difficult condition had
been studied could not serve as a basis for excluding that
item. Therefore, R was the same (i.e., 0 remains 0; see Table
5) regardless of how well participants had encoded memory
information about the judgment at study. However, remembering the judgment with which an item in the difficult
condition had been studied could serve as a basis for
recognizing that item as old. Thus, F was greater when
participants were more likely to have encoded that information (full attention; + +) than when they were not (divided
attention; + + contribution reduced to +). Jacoby (19%)
and Lindsay and Kelley (1996) also reported manipulations
that affected F but left R invariant but the causal mechanisms underlying their effects differed from those involved
in Experiment 3. In the previous experiments, manipulations
were used that affected the likelihood of relatively low-level,
data-driven influences of memory. In Experiment 3, in
contrast, greater accessibility of episodic information regarding the judgment with which items had been studied
increased the estimate of F for items in the difficult
condition, because for those items that information could
serve only as a basis for recognizing items as old, not for
identifying list membership. For present purposes, the
important point is that this process dissociation, like those
Jacoby and his colleagues (see Jacoby et al., 1996) have
reported, supports the hypothesized independence between
R and F, even though under the conditions of our experiment
episodic memories contributed to F for items in the difficult
condition.
General Discussion
Summary of Findings
In Experiment 1, R was greater for List 1 items studied
with an encoding task different from that used with List 2
items (the easy condition) than for List 1 items studied with
the same encoding task as that used with List 2 items (the
difficult condition), whereas F was greater for List 1 items in
the difficult condition than for those in the easy condition.
These findings, which were replicated in the full-attention
conditions of Experiments 2 and 3, demonstrate that whether
the two-study-list PD procedure classifies retrieval of episodic memory information as R or as F depends on the
usefulness of that information as a basis for identifying list
membership. Specifically, memory for the judgment with
which items in the easy condition had been studied contributed to the estimate of R, whereas memory for the judgment
with which items in the difficult condition had been studied
contributed to the estimate off.
In Experiment 2, in which full versus divided attention
was manipulated at test, for items in the difficult condition
dividing attention decreased the estimate of/? and increased
the estimate of F. We interpret this pattern of results as
evidence that information about encoding task was retrieved
regardless of full versus divided attention at test, but
271
dividing attention impaired participants' ability to use that
information as a basis for excluding List 1 items in the easy
condition. That is, information about encoding task was
retrieved under both full and divided attention, but that
information was used as a basis for excluding easy List 1
items only when participants had full attention at test;
otherwise, it merely contributed to recognition of items as
old. Thus, recollection as measured by the PD procedure
requires not only retrieval of episodic memory information
but also use of that information as a basis for excluding list
1 items. Presumably, in previous studies in which dividing
attention at test lowered R without increasing F, the secondary task impaired retrieval of source-specifying information,
rather than merely impairing use of that information as a
basis for excluding items (perhaps because attention was
more fully divided than in our experiments or because
source-specifying information tended to be less easily
retrieved than in our experiments). For items in the difficult
condition, dividing attention at test reduced the estimate of/?
but had no effect on the estimate of F. This finding suggests
that the secondary task impaired retrieval of information
useful for identifying the list membership of items in the
difficult condition but did not interfere with retrieval of
information useful only for recognizing those items as old
(including retrieval of information about the encoding task,
which for items in the difficult condition contributed to F).
This process dissociation, like those reported by Jacoby et
al. (1996), supports the hypothesized independence between
R and F—even though for items in the difficult condition of
our experiments retrieval of episodic memory information
contributed to the estimate of £
Dividing attention at study (Experiment 3) produced a
process dissociation for items in the easy condition similar
to process dissociations reported by Jacoby et al. (19%):
The estimate ofR was greatly reduced, but the estimate o f f
was unaffected. This finding supports the hypothesized
independence between F and R: Dividing attention at study
impaired encoding of information useful for discriminating
between List 1 and List 2 items {R) but had no effect on
encoding of other information that supported recognition of
studied items as old (F). For items in the difficult condition,
in contrast, F was reduced by dividing attention at study, but
R was not affected. This is not surprising, because for items
in the difficult condition, memory information about the
judgment with which an item had been studied could not be
used to identify it as a List 1 item and hence could only
contribute to the estimate of F. Thus, for participants who
read the words under divided attention, information about
the encoding task was less often available to contribute to R
for items in the easy condition or to contribute to F for items
in the difficult condition. This dissociation also supports the
hypothesized independence between F and R.
Biases in the Estimation Procedure
It is likely that the estimates of F and R obtained in our
experiments were biased, because we used responses on List
2 items to represent the inclusion condition. The equations
assume that F and R are the same for List 1 and List 2, but
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GRUPPUSO, LINDSAY, AND KELLEY
because List 2 was more recent, R (and perhaps also F) for
List 2 items was likely somewhat greater for List 2 than for
List 1 (for related comments, see Graf & Komatsu, 1994).
The same concern can be raised when participants first
perform an inclusion test and then later take an exclusion test
(e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Jennings &Jacoby, 1993). Any such bias
in our estimates would be the same for items in the easy and
difficult conditions and so cannot account for the interactions we obtained. Thus, although the absolute values of our
estimates may be inaccurate, this problem does not compromise our evidence regarding the effects of similarity on
estimates of F and R. Furthermore, the fact that for items in
the difficult condition, dividing attention at test reduced R
but had no effect on F and the fact that for items in the easy
condition, dividing attention at study likewise reduced R but
had no effect on F, suggests that any distortion of the
estimates was not great.
Curran and Hintzman (1995) questioned the independence assumption of the PD procedure and argued that
item-based correlations can produce artifactual and sometimes paradoxical dissociations between R and F in cuedrecall paradigms. Jacoby et al. (1997) argued that even if
such correlations occur in some cued-recall situations, they
produce only small distortions in the parameter estimates. In
addition, Jacoby et al. provided evidence supporting the
view that the paradoxical dissociations reported by Curran
and Hintzman were due to characteristics of their test
instructions that may have tacitly encouraged use of a
generate-recognize strategy in which participants first automatically generate words in response to test cues and then
perform a consciously controlled recognition judgment. The
independence assumption is not valid when participants use
a generate-recognize strategy, because under such a strategy, execution of the consciously controlled recognition
process is dependent on successful completion of the
automatic generation process. Therefore, paradoxical dissociations are likely to be observed when the PD equations,
which assume independence, are applied to data from a
situation in which participants used a generate-recognize
strategy. For present purposes, the important point is that
because we used a recognition paradigm rather than a
cued-recall paradigm, there is little ground for concern that
our participants used a generate-recognize strategy. In any
case, the theoretically sensible patterns of dissociations we
obtained cannot plausibly be attributed to item-based correlations. We suspect that Curran and Hintzman's criticisms of
the PD procedure, along with other debates about the
procedure (e.g., Buchner, Erdfelder, & Vaterrodt-Plunnecke,
1995; Graf, 1995; Graf & Komatsu, 1994; Toth, 1995; Toth
et al., 1995; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996b), will ultimately
serve to determine the boundary conditions of the procedure
and, like the work reported here, will serve to clarify the
meaning of the estimates it yields.
Theoretical Interpretations
In the Discussion section of Experiment 1, we sketched
two ways of accounting for our findings. In the following
sections, we elaborate on these alternative approaches.
Dual-process models. According to dual-process models of recognition memory, familiarity and recollection
reflect the operation of two functionally independent and
qualitatively different memory processes: one that enables
retrieval of episodic memories of studying an item and one
that gives rise to an undifferentiated feeling of familiarity.
By this view, our estimate of F for items in the difficult
condition was contaminated by episodic memories, and our
estimate of/? underestimated recollection for those items.
An advantage of this dual-process interpretation of our
findings is that it allows one to maintain the theoretical
construct of two distinct and unitary memory processes,
each with its own mechanisms and properties, that independently contribute to recognition memory judgments. This
view also accords with the idea that the phenomenological
experience of familiarity without recollection is one of
completely undifferentiated oldness (as in Mandler's, 1980,
example in which one encounters a familiar person in an
unusual context and has the feeling of knowing the person
but cannot identify him or her).
From the perspective of dual-process theories of recognition, the message of our results is clear: Different kinds of
memory information can contribute to estimates of F and R
obtained with the two-study-list PD procedure in different
situations. For example, in our experiments memory for
encoding task contributed to estimates of R for items in the
easy condition but contributed to estimates of F for items in
the difficult condition. Thus, researchers wishing to use the
procedure to obtain an estimate of F that is free of conscious
memories of high-level processes must ensure that their
procedure does not allow such contamination and must
report empirically clear-cut and theoretically sensible process dissociations as evidence of having done so, as Jacoby
and his coworkers (Jacoby et al., 1996,1997) have done.
One way to minimize the likelihood that memories of
high-level processes contribute to the estimate of F is to use
a one-study-list design. For example, Jennings and Jacoby
(1993) had participants study a list of nonfamous names and
later presented those names along with new nonfamous and
famous names. They then asked participants to judge which
names were famous. For the inclusion test, participants were
told that all of the previously studied names were famous,
such that participants would call a studied name famous if
they recollected it from the list or if it was both recollected
and familiar from the list. For the exclusion test, participants
were informed that all of the studied names were nonfamous; thus, participants would call a studied name famous
only if it was familiar from the study list but they did not
recollect that it was on the list. Estimates of F obtained in
such procedures likely index only quite undifferentiated
familiarity, because retrieval of virtually any episodespecific information regarding the prior encounter with a
studied name might enable participants to identify it as a
name presented during the experiment and therefore correctly reject it as nonfamous.
A functionalist account of recognition memory. The
alternative account introduced in the Discussion section of
Experiment 1 combines aspects of dual-process and global
models of recognition memory. According to this approach,
both R and F reflect the independent contributions of
SIMILARITY, FAMILIARITY, AND RECOLLECTION
memory for myriad aspects or attributes of a study encounter. By this view, rather than arising from two distinct and a
priori memory processes, recollection and familiarity are ad
hoc categories of memory influences, with the constitution
of the two categories dependent on the specifics of the
situation.
An underlying assumption of this account is that memory
for an item consists of records of the multiple cognitive
processes that gave rise to and constituted the encounter
with that item (e.g., in a word-list experiment, these might
include processes involved in detecting and integrating letter
features, identifying the word, making associations between
the word and other words on the list, etc.; Johnson, 1983,
1990, 1992). When a test probe is presented, some of this
memory information is activated, with the probability of
activation determined by the degree and uniqueness of
overlap between processes structured by the test and those
structured by the study conditions (transfer-appropriate
processing; Jacoby, 1983; Kolers & Roediger, 1984; Roedigeretal., 1989).
Our approach assumes that memories of some aspects of a
past experience are independent of memories of other
aspects. This assumption is supported by the dissociative
effects of dividing attention at test or study on estimates of F
and R in Experiments 2 and 3. Dissociations between source
monitoring and old-new recognition (reviewed by Johnson
et al., 1993) and between direct and indirect tests of memory
(reviewed by Kelley & Lindsay, 1996; Roediger & McDermott, 1993) can also be taken as evidence of independence
between memory attributes (cf. Chandler, 1994). Similarly,
Galbraith (1975) found that memory for an associative
attribute and memory for frequency functioned independently, and Fisher and Cuervo (1983) found that memory for
gender and language functioned independently. Of course,
there may be dependencies among memory for some
attributes of past experiences (e.g., see Hayman & Rickards,
1995), and our experiments illustrate how the two-study-list
PD procedure could be used to detect such dependencies
(i.e., by setting up a situation in which a particular kind of
information is the primary basis for excluding List 1 items
and then determining if manipulations such as dividing
attention at study or test have associated effects on estimates
of F and R). Nonetheless, memories for some aspects of a
past experience may be functionally independent of memories of other aspects; when this assumption is met, the PD
procedure can be used to estimate functionally defined
familiarity and recollection.
The functionalist account holds that recollection was not
underestimated for items in the difficult condition of our
experiments—rather, there really was less recollection (and
more familiarity) for those items than for items in the easy
condition. This approach is radically functionalist in that it
holds that what counts as recollection depends on one's
purposes. Recollection allows one to exert control based on
retrieval of memory for particular aspects or attributes of a
prior event, and familiarity refers to retrieval of information
that falls short of the specificity required by the task.
Consider again Mandler's (1980) example of encountering
the butcher from one's grocery store on a bus and not being
able to specify why he or she is familiar. Mandler presented
273
this as an example of pure familiarity without retrieval. The
example is compelling because most people have experienced the gnawing feeling of familiarity in the absence of
recollection in such situations. But are such experiences
really typified by completely undifferentiated feelings of
familiarity without retrieval of specific episodic information? By our functionalist view, episodic memories are
retrieved in such situations (e.g., one might think "I'm sure
that I've encountered this person fairly recently, and I think I
was shopping at the time"), but the retrieved information is
not sufficient to allow one to perform the task set by the
situation (e.g., identification of the person as the butcher).
We propose that it is precisely the retrieval of episodic
memory information—information too incomplete to support unique identification—that gives rise to the nagging
feeling of familiarity just as Koriat (1993, 1995) has
proposed that it is retrieval of information about a sought for
word that gives rise to the feeling of knowing in the
tip-of-the-tongue state (but see Metcalfe, Schwartz, &
Joaquim, 1993; Reder & Ritter, 1992; Schwartz & Metcalfe,
1992, for alternative views).
Consistent with this idea, the phenomenological experience of familiarity without recollection seems to occur less
often when a stimulus is encountered in its usual context,
perhaps because that context supports retrieval of sourcespecifying information. For example, one rarely has a
subjective experience of familiarity when an intimate is
encountered in situ (B. W. A. Whittlesea, personal communication, November 11, 1994). According to our approach,
seeing one's spouse at the breakfast table does not give rise
to a feeling of familiarity, not because seeing him or her fails
to activate nonspecific memory information of the sort that
gives rise to familiarity, but because it also activates a wealth
of source-specifying memories that enable one immediately
to identify him or her as one's spouse.
The functionalist account, with an additional assumption,
makes predictions similar to those of dual-process models.
That assumption is that processes that are executed automatically in the course of performing a task (e.g., letter-feature
identification in a reading task) tend to be item or subitem
specific, whereas consciously controlled processes more
often involve noting relations between the target item and its
context. Automatic processes often have a generic quality to
them (e.g., many of the low-level automatic processes
involved in reading the word flag are essentially the same
when the word flag is read in different contexts or on
different occasions), whereas consciously controlled processes are often unique and specific to an individual
encounter (e.g., meaningful elaboration of the word flag
would likely differ at a parade vs. a football game). Hence,
influences of memory for automatic processes (e.g., facilitated reading of a previously read word) are often inherently
ambiguous (i.e., nothing about them specifies that memory
for a specific prior encounter is the source of that influence).
When oriented toward the past, people may attribute the
facilitating influence of memories of prior automatic processes to memory (e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989;
Lindsay & Kelley, 1996; Whittlesea, 1993), but when
oriented to other judgments, they may misattribute such
memory influences to parameters relevant to those judg-
274
GRUPPUSO, LINDSAY, AND KELLEY
ments (e.g., influences of memory may be misattributed to
the inherent ease of anagrams, Kelley & Jacoby, 1996; to
general knowledge, Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; or to visual
clarity, Whittlesea, 1993). Hence, memory for automatic
processes performed at study may later give rise to quite
undifferentiated feelings of familiarity on a recognition
memory test. In contrast, because consciously controlled
processes more often involve noting relations between items
and their context and other processes that would be specific
and unique to a particular encounter, their influence at test
more often inherently signals use of memory (e.g., "Why
would ideas about the cost of kayaks pop to mind when I
read the test item kayak unless I had studied kayak with the
value encoding task?").
The functionalist account suggests that in studies using
the PD procedure in which manipulations such as dividing
attention at study or test lowered R and left F invariant (see
Jacoby et al., 1996), conditions were such that there were
very good correspondences between consciously controlled
processes and the information needed to exclude to-beexcluded items and between automatic processes and information that enabled participants to recognize a to-beexcluded item as old but not to exclude it. Under such
conditions, dividing attention would disrupt encoding and
retrieval of the kinds of source-specifying information
required to exclude to-be-excluded items but would have no
effect on encoding or retrieval of memories of more
automatic processes and hence would lower R without
affecting F. But such correspondences need not always hold,
as demonstrated by our findings.
There are probably limits to the functionalist definitions
of familiarity and recollection. As noted above, memories
for different aspects of a prior encounter vary in the degree
to which they are inherently source specifying. Thus,
memory information may range along a continuum anchored by a class of memory influences that are capable of
giving rise to only an undifferentiated feeling of familiarity
regardless of the situation (e.g., memory for very low-level,
highly automatic, and generic cognitive processes, such as
those involved in identifying letters in a word). At the
extreme, such memory influences might not even always
give rise to a feeling of familiarity per se but rather simply
have a vague and ambiguous impact on cognitive processing
at test (as in the mere-exposure effect; Kunst-Wilson &
Zajonc, 1980; Mandler, Nakamura, & Van Zandt, 1987). The
opposite end of the continuum is defined by kinds of
memory information that in almost any situation would
enable one to identify that information as a memory of a
specific past experience. For memory influences between the
two extremes of the continuum, whether retrieval of a
particular kind of memory information gives rise to familiarity or to recollection would depend on the functional
usefulness of that information in accomplishing the task set
by the situation (cf. Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989;
Johnson et al., 1993).
Related Findings by Other Researchers
While writing this article, we learned of related research
by several investigators. Mulligan and Hirshman (1997)
reported experiments using a manipulation analogous to that
used in Experiment 1 and found that R was lower and F was
higher when List 1 and List 2 items were similar to one
another than when the two lists were dissimilar. They fit
these data to a multinomial model that replaces the distinction between recollection and familiarity with a contrast
between retrieval of "diagnostic" (i.e., source-specifying)
and "nondiagnostic" (i.e., non-source-specifying) information. The primary difference between our interpretation and
Mulligan and Hirshman's is that they do not posit a
functional distinction between the psychological constructs
of familiarity and recollection. As argued above, we believe
that this distinction is fundamental to recognition memory.
Dodson and Johnson (1996) also found that the similarity
between sources affected estimates obtained with the PD
procedure.6 Although many of the ideas articulated by
Dodson and Johnson are similar to those presented here (see
the next section, Relation to Source Monitoring), their
conclusions differ from ours in two important ways. First,
they argued that their findings demonstrate violations of the
assumptions of the PD procedure and that the procedure is
therefore fatally flawed. We have argued that to the extent
that source-specifying information can be retrieved independently from other information, the finding that retrieval of
episodic memory information can contribute to F in some
conditions and to R in others does not necessarily violate the
independence assumption. We have also emphasized that the
fact that one can contrive situations in which retrieval of
relatively high-level, conceptual memory information contributes to F does not mean that estimates of F derived with
the PD procedure invariably include such memory influences (e.g., the single-study-list PD procedure is likely to
yield relatively pure estimates of quite low-level, undifferentiated influences of memory). Second, Dodson and Johnson
rejected a dichotomy between familiarity and recollection in
favor of a continuum of source specificity, ranging from
memory information that is not at all source specifying to
memory information that is highly specific to a particular
source. We too have claimed that memory information
ranges along such a continuum but have argued for a
qualitative functional distinction between retrieval of memory
information that in a particular context, is sufficient to
complete the task set by the situation versus retrieval of
memory information that in that context, enables one to
recognize an item as old but not to perform the task set by
the situation.
Yonelinas and Jacoby (1996a) used a different sort of
manipulation but obtained results compatible with our
arguments. They orthogonally varied the location and size in
which study words were presented on a computer screen,
with instructions to remember the location in which each
6
Dodson and Johnson (1996) also found that F was affected by
the proportion of old items on the test and argued that this finding
demonstrates that contrary to an assumption of the PD procedure,
familiarity is not an automatic process. This finding does not strike
us as problematic for the PD procedure, because the procedure
assumes that there is a response criterion on familiarity, and that
response criterion might well be affected by the proportion-old
manipulation.
SIMILARITY, FAMILIARITY, AND RECOLLECTION
275
word was presented. One test asked participants to exclude
items presented in one location, and another test asked them
to exclude items presented in one size. Yonelinas and Jacoby
predicted that automatic retrieval of task-irrelevant memories regarding location would occur quite frequently when
participants were attempting to exclude items on the basis of
size, because they would have tried to remember the location
of each word during the study phase. In contrast, it was
expected that automatic retrieval of information about size
would rarely occur when participants were attempting to
exclude items on the basis of location, because size had been
treated as irrelevant during the study phase. Consistent with
this prediction and with the findings we have reported, the
estimate of F was greater and the estimate of R was lower in
the size-exclusion test than in the location-exclusion test.
This is presumably because during the size-exclusion test,
information about location quite often came automatically to
mind, but as with information about the encoding task with
which items in the difficult condition had been studied in our
experiments, that information could not be used as a basis
for exclusion and hence contributed to F rather than to R. It
is important that Yonelinas and Jacoby found that requiring
participants to respond quickly lowered the estimate of R but
had no effect on the estimate of F, even when memory for
location contributed to the estimate of F. This led them to
conclude that what they termed noncriterial recollection
(i.e., memory for location that came to mind during the
size-exclusion test) behaves like familiarity (i.e., is fast and
automatic and is dissociable from recollection). Although
Yonelinas and Jacoby stopped short of proposing, as we
have, that recollection and familiarity should be viewed as
ad hoc categories of memory information defined in terms of
functional significance in particular situations, their findings
are consistent with our argument.
much as it would be recognized during perception. The
source-monitoring framework holds that some types of
memory information typically provide better cues to source
than do others but that the source specificity of a particular
piece of information depends, in large part, on its uniqueness
against the background of other memories from other
sources. Our empirical manipulation follows directly from
Johnson's work on source monitoring, and several aspects of
our proposed functionalist account of the findings were
inspired by MEM.
Studies of source monitoring typically expose people to
information from two sources and then ask them to discriminate between items from Source A, items from Source B,
and new items. Performance has most often been measured
in terms of the proportion of old items recognized as old that
are also correctly attributed to source (the source-monitoring
score). This measure may exaggerate memory for source,
because when people recognize an item as old but do not
remember its source, they will guess between the two
potential sources (and will guess correctly half of the time).
Batchelder and Riefer (1990) developed a multinomial
approach to measuring memory for source, which includes a
parameter for guessing source when items are recognized as
old but their sources are not remembered. Guessing may also
distort the estimate of R obtained with the PD procedure.
Buchner et al. (1995) proposed a multinomial model for
correcting the estimate of/? for response bias, and Yonelinas,
Regehr, and Jacoby (1995) developed a dual-process signaldetection method with the same aim (see Yonelinas &
Jacoby, 1996b, for a comparison of Buchner et al.'s and
Yonelinas et al.'s correction methods). Future research is
needed to compare the source-monitoring score, estimates of
memory for source obtained with Batchelder and Riefer's
model, and the PD procedure's estimates of/?.
Relation to Source Monitoring
Relation to Other Memory Research
Several of the assumptions underlying the functionalist
definitions of recollection and familiarity proposed here
were inspired by Johnson's (Johnson et al., 1993) work on
source monitoring and her multiple-entry modular memory
system (MEM; Johnson, 1983,1990,1992). MEM describes
memories as records of the multiple cognitive operations
that gave rise to and constituted an experience. Johnson's
approach assumes that typically only some of these records
are accessed when memory is tested and that remembering
involves interpreting and adding to retrieved memory information rather than simply reading it off. The sourcemonitoring framework addresses issues previously studied
under rubrics such as list differentiation and memory for
context but also extends to questions such as how people
discriminate between memories of imagined versus perceived events and how people identify the sources of their
knowledge and beliefs. According to the source-monitoring
framework, recollections are attributed to particular sources
through decision processes performed during retrieval. For
example, a remembered utterance might be attributed to a
particular speaker because the activated memory records
include information about the perceptual qualities of the
speaker's voice, which is recognized during remembering
Performance on direct or explicit tests of memory (e.g.,
recognition or recall) is often dissociable from performance
on indirect or implicit tests of memory (e.g., fragment
completion or perceptual identification; see Kelley & Lindsay, 1996, for a recent review). The ideas developed here fit
well with processing theories of such dissociations (e.g.,
Roediger et al., 1989; Toth, Lindsay, & Jacoby, 1992). From
the functionalist point of view, both direct and indirect tests
measure retrieval of episodic memory information: The
difference between the two lies in the goals set by the tasks
(i.e., to make memory judgments or to perform some other
task) and the types of information required for those two
tasks. Indirect tests typically tap memory for relatively
low-level, automatic, non-source-specifying processes,
whereas direct tests typically tap memory for relatively
high-level, conscious, source-specific processes. This is not
to say that one cannot set up situations in which indirect tests
reveal influences of memory for higher level processes (see,
e.g., Blaxton, 1989; Roediger et al., 1989), but is merely to
say that our arguments imply that it is harder in such
situations to obtain dissociations between the indirect test
and direct tests of memory.
In an important line of research related to the explicit-
276
GRUPPUSO, LINDSAY, AND KELLEY
implicit distinction, Gardiner and his colleagues (e.g.,
Gardiner & Java, 1991; Gardiner & Parkin, 1990; Gardiner
et al., 1996) have investigated people's phenomenological
reports of remembering versus knowing that test items had
been encountered on a study list. Rates of reports of
remembering are affected by the sorts of manipulations that
characteristically affect performance on direct tests of
memory such as recall (and on estimates of R obtained with
the PD procedure), whereas rates of reports of knowing are
typically not reliably affected by such manipulations. From
the functionalist perspective, reports of knowing and of
remembering both reflect retrieval of episodic memories,
with the former relying primarily on memory for relatively
low-level, automatic, non-source-specifying cognitive processes and the latter reflecting retrieval of higher level, more
conscious, source-specifying processes (Lindsay & Kelley,
1996).
Gardiner and his colleagues (e.g., Gardiner et al., 1996)
assumed that remember and know responses reflect the
operation of mutually exclusive memory processes. Consequently, they use the proportion of know responses as an
index of the occurrence of the memory influences that
underlie know responses. In contrast, Jacoby et al. (1996)
argued that remember and know responses reflect the
independent operation of recollection and familiarity. If so,
then the proportion of know responses underestimates the
occurrence of familiarity, because participants respond remember whenever familiarity and recollection co-occur.
With respect to this issue, our view is similar to Jacoby's
(Jacoby et al., 1996) in that we assume that retrieval of
relatively automatic, non-source-specifying memory information that would typically underlie know responses operates independently of retrieval of higher level, sourcespecifying information that would typically underlie
remember responses (see Lindsay & Kelley, 1996, for a
more extended discussion).
With regard to the explicit-implicit and remember-know
distinctions, our approach differs from the controlled versus
automatic processing account offered by Jacoby and his
colleagues (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1996; Toth et al., 1992) only
in that we emphasize that (a) neither of these constructs is
factor pure (i.e., both reflect memory for myriad kinds of
cognitive processes) and (b) which kinds of memory information contribute to explicit remembering and which to
implicit influences of memory depends, in part, on the
specifics of the situation and the rememberer's history. Thus,
for example, we predict that repeated testing in the remember-know paradigm would lower rates of reported remembering and increase rates of reported knowing, not because of
changes in encoding or even (solely) because of changes in
retrieval, but because having such a history changes what it
means to remember an item.
Conclusions
The experiments reported here reflect a particular conception of memory and remembering. Rather than thinking of
autobiographical memories as discrete, unitary entities that
are retrieved and "read out" at test, we assume that
memories are complex and multifaceted and that remember-
ing is an active and synthetic process performed in particular
situations. This approach integrates aspects of Jacoby's (e.g.,
Jacoby et al., 1989) earlier work on the bases for the
subjective experience of remembering with aspects of
Johnson's (e.g., Johnson et al., 1993) work on source
monitoring. Our perspective also draws on work by other
theorists who take a functionalist approach to memory
phenomena (e.g., Kolers & Roediger, 1984; Roediger et al.,
1989;Watkins, 1990;Whittlesea, 1993).
In the difficult condition of our experiments, we set up a
situation in which memories of a semantic encoding task
contributed to the PD procedure's estimate of E At minimum, this result demonstrates that the two-study-list PD
procedure's estimates of R and F are not necessarily pure
measures of the operation of two unitary and qualitatively
different memory mechanisms. We argued that, rather than
indicating that the estimate of F in the difficult condition was
contaminated by recollection, our results provide support for
functionalist definitions of familiarity and recollection.
From this perspective, both familiarity and recollection
depend on a single mechanism that retrieves myriad kinds of
information; what counts as recollection or as familiarity
depends on the situation. Recollection is defined as retrieval
and use of memory information that, in a given situation,
enables one to perform the task set by the situation;
familiarity is defined as retrieval of memory information that
enables one to recognize an item as old but not to accomplish the task set by the situation.
We acknowledge that this is an extreme position and that
there are grounds for arguing that it is inappropriate to treat
remembering a semantic encoding task as equivalent to
other, lower level influences of memory of the sort traditionally associated with familiarity. For example, the phenomenological experience of remembering a semantic judgment
surely differs from the phenomenological experience of
reactivating memories of low-level perceptual processes
such as those involved in letter-feature identification, even
when neither type of information enables identification of
list membership. Thus, there may be important differences
between familiarity that arises from low-level memory
information and familiarity that arises from memory for
higher level processes.
Nonetheless, we believe that there is an important qualitative distinction between remembering whatever information
is required to meet the demands of a memory task (e.g.,
identifying a test item as a word studied in List 1 or
identifying a familiar person on the bus as the butcher) and
remembering information that enables one to recognize a
stimulus as familiar but not to perform the task set by the
situation. We also believe that traditional dual-process
models, which explain this qualitative distinction in terms of
the operation of two unitary memory mechanisms, are
inadequate. Our data provide support for functionalist
definitions of familiarity and recollection and for the claim
that the functionally defined psychological constructs of
familiarity and recollection map onto the operational definitions of F and R provided by the PD procedure. We believe
this approach is a provocative and potentially fruitful one
and that it constitutes a substantial advance over traditional
dual-process models of recognition memory. Definitive
SIMILARITY, FAMILIARITY, AND RECOLLECTION
claims and more detailed formal models await further
research using converging methods to refine the conceptual
and operational definitions of familiarity and recollection.
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Received April 24,1995
Revision received August 21,1996
Accepted August 21,1996