The "Forgotten Years" of the Negro Revolution
Author(s): Richard M. Dalfiume
Source: The Journal of American History, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Jun., 1968), pp. 90-106
Published by: Organization of American Historians
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Years"of the Negro
The "Forgotten
Revolution
RICHARD M. DALFIUME
A
presidentoftheAmericanSociologicalSocietyaddressedhimself to a puzzlingquestionaboutwhatwe knowas theCivil RightsRevolution: "Why did social scientists-and sociologistsin particular-not foresee the explosionof collectiveactionof Negro Americanstowardfull integrationinto Americansociety?"He pointedout that "it is the vigor and
urgencyof the Negro demand thatis new, not its directionor supporting
the lack of knowledgecan be
ideas."' Withoutarguingthe point further,
and thehistorians
social
scientists,
to
ahistorical
two
groups-the
attributed
have neglectedmodernNegro history.
who, untilrecently,
The searchfor a "watershed"in recentNegro historyends at the years
thatcomprisedWorld War II, 1939-1945. JamesBaldwin has writtenof
accordedtheNegro duringthe Second World
thisperiod: "The treatment
War marks,forme, a turningpointin theNegro's relationto America.To
put it briefly,and somewhattoo simply,a certainhope died, a certain
respect for white Americans faded."'2Writing during World War II,
GunnarMyrdalpredictedthatthewar would act as a "stimulant"to Negro
of theNegro's
protest,and he feltthat"There is bound to be a redefinition
status in America as a resultof this War."3 The Negro sociologistE.
FranklinFrazierstatesthatWorld War II markedthe point where "The
and
in employment
Negro was no longerwilling to acceptdiscrimination
in housingwithoutprotest.''4 CharlesE. Silbermanwritesthatthewar was
a "turningpoint" in Americanrace relations,in which "the seeds of the
RECENT
Mr. Dalfiume is assistantprofessorof historyin the Universityof Wisconsin.
1
Everett C. Hughes, "Race Relations and the Sociological Imagination," American
SociologicalReview,XXVIII (Dec. 1963), 879.
2 Quoted in J. Milton Yinger,A Minority
Group in AmericanSociety(New York, 1965),
52. Many Negroes agreed with JamesBaldwin in recallingthe bitternesstheyexperienced.
William Brinkand Louis Harris,The Negro Revolutionin America (New York, 1964), 50.
'Gunnar Myrdal,An AmericanDilemma: The Negro Prohlemand Modern Democracy
(New York, 1944), 7 56, 997.
4E. FranklinFrazier,The Negro in the United States (rev. ed., New York, 1957), 682.
.90.
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Years"
The "Forgotten
91
protestmovementsof the 1950s and 1960s were sown."5 While a few
writershave indicatedthe importanceof these yearsin the recentNegro
protestmovement,the majorityhave failed to do so. Overlookingwhat
wentbefore,most recentbooks on the subjectclaim thata Negro "revolution" or "revolt" occurredin 1954, 1955, 1960, or 1963.6 Because of the
neglectof the war period,these yearsof transitionin Americanrace relationscomprisethe "forgottenyears"of the Negro revolution.
To understandhow the AmericanNegro reactedto World War II, it is
he faced. The defense
necessaryto have some idea of the discrimination
build-upbegun by the United States in 1940 was welcomedby Negroes
representedamong the unemployed.Employwho were disproportionately
ment discriminationin the revived industries,however, was rampant.
When Negroes sought jobs at aircraftfactorieswhere employersbegged
forworkers,theywere informedthat"theNegro will be consideredonlyas
Governmentfinancedtraining
janitorsand in othersimilarcapacities....
programsto overcome the shortagesof skilled workers discriminated
againstNegro trainees.When governmentagencies issued ordersagainst
theywereignored.8
suchdiscrimination,
Increasingdefensepreparationsalso meantan expansionof the armed
Black
forces.Here, as in industry,however,Negroes faced restrictions.
Americanswere assigned a minimal role and rigidlysegregated.In the
navy,Negroes could enlistonly in the all-Negro messman'sbranch.The
marine and the air corps excluded Negroes entirely.In the army,black
Americanswere preventedfromenlisting,exceptfora fewvacanciesin the
fourregulararmyNegro unitsthathad been createdshortlyafterthe Civil
War; and the strengthof thesehad been reduceddrasticallyin the 1920s
and 1930s.9
issue forNegroes in this
Althoughthe mostimportantbread-and-butter
theirpositionin the armed forces
period was employmentdiscrimination,
5Charles E. Silberman,Crisis in Black and White (New York, 1964), 60, 65.
6 See, for example,Lewis M. Killian and Charles Grigg,Racial Crisis in America (Englewood Cliffs,1964); Louis E. Lomax, The Negro Revolt (New York, 1962); Leonard
of the Negro American (New York, 1965);
Broom and Norval D. Glenn, Transformation
Brinkand Harris,Negro Revolutionin America.
'Quoted in Louis Coleridge Kesselman, The Social Politics of FEPC: A Study in ReformPressureMovements(Chapel Hill, 1948), 7.
8 Charles H. Thompson, "The AmericanNegro and the National Defense," Journalof
Negro Education,IX (Oct. 1940), 547-52; Frazier,Negro in the United States,599-606;
Robert C. Weaver, "Racial EmploymentTrends in National Defense," Phylon, II (4th
Quarter,1941), 337-58.
9 See Richard M. Dalfiume, "Desegregation of the United States Armed Forces, 19391953" (doctoral dissertation,Universityof Missouri, 1966), 30-57; Ulysses Lee, United
StatesArmyin World War I.: Special Studies: The Employmentof Negro Troops (Washington,1966), 32-87.
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92
The Journal
of American
History
If one couldnotparticipate
was an important
symbol.
fullyin thedefense
of hiscountry,
he couldnotlayclaimto therights
of a full-fledged
citizen.
The NAACP organ,theCrisis,expressed
thisideain itsdemandforunrein thearmedforces:"thisis no fight
toweara
stricted
participation
merely
uniform.
This is a struggle
forstatus,a struggle
offof
to takedemocracy
parchment
and giveit life."10HerbertGarfinkel,
a student
of Negroprotestduringthisperiod,pointsoutthat"in manyrespects,
thediscriminatory
... cut
practices
againstNegroeswhichcharacterized
themilitary
programs
thandid employment
deeperintoNegrofeelings
discrimination."1
Addedto therebuffs
fromindustry
werea hunand thearmedservices
dredothers.Negroes,anxiousto contribute
to theRed Crossbloodprogram,wereturnedaway.Despitethefactthatwhiteand Negrobloodis
thesamebiologically,
it was deemedinadvisable
"to collectandmixcaucasianandNegrobloodindiscriminately.''12
WhenNegrocitizens
calledupon
thegovernor
of Tennesseeto appointsomeblackmembers
to thestate's
draftboards,he told them: "This is a whiteman's country.... The Negro
"13 At a timewhenthe
had nothingto do withthesettlingof America.
UnitedStatesclaimedto be thelastbulwarkof democracy
in a war-torn
world,thelegislature
of Mississippi
passeda law requiring
different
textbooksforNegroschools:all references
to voting,elections,
and democracy
wereto be excludedfromtheblackstudent's
books.'4
The Negro'smoraleat thebeginning
of WorldWar II is alsopartly
explainedbyhis experience
in WorldWar I. BlackAmericahad goneinto
thatwarwithhighmorale,generated
bythebeliefthatthedemocratic
slogansliterally
meantwhattheysaid.MostNegroessuccumbed
to the"close
ranks"strategy
announced
bythecrusading
NAACP editor,W. E. B. Du
Bois,who advocatedsubduingracialgrievances
in orderto givefullsupto
port winningthewar.But the imageof a new democratic
orderwas
smashedby theraceriots,lynchings,
and continued
rigiddiscrimination.
The resultwas a masstraumaanda seriesofmovements
amongNegroesin
the 1920swhichwerecharacterized
bya desireto withdraw
froma white
societywhichwantedlittleto do withthem.Whenthewarcrisisof the
1940scamealong,thebitter
memories
of WorldWar I wererecalledwith
Manhood in National Defense," Crisis, 47 (Dec. 1940), 375.
"Herbert Garfinkel,When Negroes March: The March on WashingtonMovementin
the OrganizationalPolitics for FEPC (Glencoe, Ill., 1959), 20.
2 General James C. Magee, Surgeon General, to AssistantSecretaryof War John J
McCloy, Sept. 3, 1941, ASW 291.2, Record Group 335 (National Archives); Pittsburgh
Courier,Jan.3, 1942.
" Pittsburgh
Courier,Nov. 2, 1940.
'
"Text Books in Mississippi," Opportunity,XVIII (April 1940), 99.
10'For
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Years"
The "Forgotten
93
the resultthat therewas a built-incynicismamong Negroes towardthe
democraticslogansof the new war.'5
Nevertheless,Negroes were partof the generalpopulationbeing stimulated to come to the defenseof democracyin theworld.When theyresponded and attemptedto do theirshare,theywereturnedaway.The resultwas
and a general decline of the Negro's
a widespreadfeelingof frustration
as comparedwiththe restof Americansocimoraletowardthe war effort,
ety.But paradoxically,the Negro's generalmoralewas bothlow and high.
While the morale of the Negro, as an American,was low in regard
group,had high
to the war effort,
the Negro, as a memberof a minority
to fightfor
morale in his heightenedrace consciousnessand determination
caused the
which
The
same
slogans
a betterpositionin Americansociety.
Negro to reactcynicallyalso servedto emphasizethe disparitybetweenthe
creed and the practiceof democracyas far as the Negro in Americawas
concerned.Because of his positionin society,the Negro reactedto the war
bothas an Americanand as a Negro. Discriminationagainsthimhad given
rise to "a sickly,negativeattitudetowardnationalgoals, but at the same
timea vibrantly
positiveattitudetowardracialaims and aspirations."'6
When war brokeout in Europe in 1939, manyblack Americanstended
to adopt an isolationistattitude.Those takingthispositionviewed the war
as a "whiteman's war." George Schuyler,the iconoclasticcolumnist,was a
typicalspokesmanforthisview: "So faras thecoloredpeoples of theearth
are concerned,"Schuylerwrote,"it is a toss-upbetweenthe 'democracies'
} Wjhat is thereto choose betweenthe rule of
. .
and the dictatorships.
'17 Another
the Britishin Africaand the rule of the Germansin Austria?'
Negro columnistclaimedthatit was a blessingto have war so thatwhites
could "mow one anotherdown" ratherthan "have them quietlymurder
This
hundredsof thousandsof Africans,East Indians and Chinese...18
'5 KennethB. Clark, "Morale of the Negro on the Home Front: World Wars I and II,"
Journal of Negro Education, XII (Summer 1943), 417-28; Walter White, "'It's Our
Country,Too': The Negro Demands the Right to be Allowed to Fight for It," Saturday
EveningPost, 213 (Dec. 14, 1940), 27, 61, 63, 66, 68; Metz T. P. Lochard,"Negroes and
Defense,"Nation, 152 (Jan. 4, 1941), 14-16.
1 Cornelius L. Golightly,"Negro Higher Education and Democratic Negro Morale,"
Journal of Negro Education, XI (July 1942), 324. See also Horace R. Cayton,"Negro
Morale," Opportunity,XIX (Dec. 1941), 371-75; Louis Wirth, "Morale and Minority
Groups," AmericanJournalof Sociology,XLVII (Nov. 1941), 415-33; KennethB. Clark,
"Morale Among Negroes," Goodwin Watson, ed., Civilian Mtorale(Boston, 1942), 228and Protest(Minneapolis,
48; Arnold M. Rose, The Negro's Mtorale:Group Identification
1949), 5-7,54-55, 122-24,141-44.
17 Pittsburgh
Courier,Sept. 9, 1939.
'8P. L. Prattis in ibid., Sept. 2, 1939. Similar sentimentswere expressedby Chicago
Defendereditorials,May 25, June15, 1940.
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The Journalof AmericanHistory
against
particularly
kind of isolationismtook the formof anti-colonialism,
for France,however,becauseof its
the British.There was some sympathy
of blackcitizens.19
moreliberaltreatment
of callAnotherspur to isolationistsentimentwas the obvioushypocrisy
ing forthe defenseof democracyabroadwhile it was not a realityat home.
The NAACP bitterly
expressedthispoint:
forbrutality,
blood,and deathamongthepeoplesof Europe,
THE CIUSIS is sorry
criesof the
just as we weresorryfor China and Ethiopia.But the hysterical
forEuropeleave us cold. We wantdemocracy
in Alaof democracy
preachers
in Mississippiand Michigan,in theDistrictof Columbiabamaand Arkansas,
intheSenateoftheUnitedStates.20
The editor of the PittsburghCourierproclaimedthat Negroes had their
"own war" at home "againstoppressionand exploitationfromwithoutand
against disorganizationand lack of confidencewithin"; and the Chicago
Defender thoughtthat "peace at home" should be the main concernof
blackAmericans.2'
Many Negroes agreed with columnistSchuylerthat "Our war is not
againstHitler in Europe,but againstthe Hitlersin America."22The isolationistview of the war in Europe and the antagonismtowardGreatBritain
led to an attitudethatwas ratherneutraltowardthe Nazis and the Japanese, or, in some extremecases,pro-Axis.Appealing to thislatentfeeling,
isolationistperiodicalstriedto gain Negro supportin theirstruggleagainst
Americanentranceinto the war.23By 1940 therewere also Negro cults
such as the EthiopianPacificMovement,the World Wide Friendsof Africa, the Brotherhoodof Libertyfor the Black People of America,and
manyothers,which preachedunityamong the world's darkerpeople, includingJapanese.Many of thesegroupsexploitedthe latentanti-semitism
commonamong Negroes in the urban ghettosby claimingthatthe racial
policiesof Germanywerecorrect.24
Reportsreachedthepublic thatsome black Americanswere expressinga
Courier,Sept.9, 16, 1939.
Pittsburgh
"Lynchingand Liberty,"Crisis,47 (July1940), 209.
PittsburghCourier, Sept. 9, 1939; Chicago Defender,May 25, 1940.
22
Courier,Dec. 21, 1940.
Pittsburgh
23Lee, The Employmentof Negro Troops, 65-67; Horace Mann Bond, "Should the
Negro Care Who Wins the War?" Annals, CCXXIII (Sept. 1942), 81-84; Adam Clayton
Powell, Jr., "Is This a 'White Man's War'?" CommonSense, XI (April 1942), 111-13.
24
Roi Ottley,"A White Folk's War?" Common Ground,II (Spring 1942), 28-31, and
'New World A-Coming' (Boston, 1943), 322-42; Lunnabelle Wedlock, The Reaction of
Negro Publications and Organizationsto German Anti-Semitism(Washington, 1942),
116-93; Alfred M. Lee, "SubversiveIndividuals of MinorityStatus," Annals, CCXXIII
(Sept. 1942), 167-68.
20
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Years"
The "Forgotten
95
vicariouspleasure over successesby the "yellow" Japaneseand by Germany.In a quarrelwithher employerin North Carolina,a Negro woman
retorted:"I hope Hitler does come, because if he does he will get you
first!"A Negro truckdriverin Philadelphiawas held on chargesof treason
afterhe was accused of tellinga Negro soldier thathe should not be in
and war and it's no
uniformand that "This is a whiteman's government
damned good." AfterPearl Harbor,a Negro sharecroppertold his landlord: "By theway,Captain,I heartheJapsdone declaredwar on youwhite
folks."AnotherNegro declaredthathe was going to get his eyesslantedso
thatthenexttimea whiteman shovedhim aroundhe could fightback.25
It is impossibleto determinethe extentof thiskind of pro-AxissentimentamongNegroes,but it was widespreadenoughfortheNegro pressto
make ratherfrequentmentionof it.26 In 1942 and 1943 the federalgovernmentdid arrestthe membersof several pro-JapaneseNegro cults in
and East St. Louis, Illinois. AlChicago,New York, Newark,New Jersey,
thoughthe numbersinvolvedwere small,the evidenceindicatedthatJapanese agentshad been at work among thesegroupsand had capitalizedon
Negro grievances.27
By the time of the Pearl Harbor attack,certainfundamentalchanges
were takingplace among AmericanNegroes. Nowhere is this more evident than in a comparisonof Negroes' reactionsto World Wars I and II.
The dominantopinion among themtowardWorld War I was expressed
by Du Bois. In World War II, mostNegroes looked upon theearlierstand
as a greatmistake.The dominantattitudeduringWorld War II was that
the Negro must fightfor democracyon two fronts-at home as well as
abroad. This opinion had firstappeared in reactionto the discriminatory
treatment
of Negro soldiers;28but with the attackon Pearl Harbor, this
ways,becamethe slogan of black America.29
idea, statedin manydifferent
'St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton,Black Metropolis (New York, 1945), 744-45;
Ottley,"New World A-Coming',306-10; 'Horace R. Cayton,"Fightingfor White Folks?"
Nation, 155 (Sept. 26, 1942), 267-70.
2 "The Negro and Nazism," Opportunity,XVIII
(July 1940), 194-95; Horace R.
Cayton in PittsburghCourier, Dec. 20, 1941; J. A. Rodgers in ibid., Dec. 27, 1941;
Chandler Owen in Norfolk Journaland Guide, Dec. 13, 1941; reportin BaltimoreAfro.
American,Nov. 21, 1942.
27 New York Times,Sept. 15, 22, 1942, Jan.14, 28, 1943.
23
"ConferenceResolutions,"Crisis, 47 (Sept. 1940), 296; "Where the Negro Stands,"
Opportunity,XIX (April 1941), 98; Lester M. Jones, "The Editorial Policy of Negro
Newspapers of 1917-18 as Compared with That of 1941-42," Journalof Negro History,
XXIX (Jan. 1944), 24-31.
' BaltimoreAfro-American,
Dec. 20, 1941, Feb. 7, 1942; Norfolk Journaland Guide,
March 21, 1942; "Now Is the Time Not to Be Silent," Crisis. 49 (Jan. 1942), 7; "The
Fate of Democracy," Opportunity,XX (Jan. 1942), 2. Two Negro newspapersadopted
this themefor theirwar slogans. The PittsburghCourier,Feb. 14, 1942, initiateda "DouL-
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96
of American
The Journal
History
American
of thewarto tietheirracialdemands
Negroestookadvantage
to theideologyforwhichthewarwas beingfought.
BeforePearlHarbor,
theNegropressfrequently
pointedout thesimilarity
of American
treatmentofNegroesandNazi Germany's
treatment
ofminorities.
In 1940,the
ChicagoDefenderfeatured
a mockinvasionof theUnitedStatesbyGermanyin whichtheNaziswerevictorious
becausea fifth
columnofsouthern
senators
and otherracistsaidedthem.30
LatertheCrisisprinted
an editorial
whichcompared
thewhitesupremacy
doctrine
in Americato theNazi plan
forNegroes,a comparison
whichindicated
a markedsimilarity.3'
Eventhe
periodical
oftheconservative
UrbanLeaguemadesuchcomparisons.32
ManyNegroesadopteda paradoxical
standon themeaningof thewar.
At thesametimethatit was labeleda "whiteman'swar,"Negroesoften
statedthattheywereboundto benefit
fromit.Forexample,Schuyler
could
argue thatthe war was not fordemocracy,but "Peace means . . . a continuation of the statusquo . . . whichmustbe ended if the Negro is to get
free."And accordingly,
the longerthe war the better:"Perhapsin the
shuffle
we who havebeenon thebottomof thedeckforso longwill find
ourselves
atthetop."33
Cynicism
andhopeexistedsidebysideintheNegromind.Cynicism
was
oftentheattitude
expressed
aftersomeoutrageous
exampleof discrimination.AfterPearlHarbor,however,
a mixture
of hopeand certainty-great
changesfavorableto the Negro would resultfromthe war and things
wouldneverbe thesameagain-becamethedominant
attitude.
Hope was
evidentin thegrowing
realization
thatthewarprovided
theNegrowithan
excellent
opportunity
to pricktheconscience
of whiteAmerica."Whatan
opportunity
thecrisishas been. . . forone to persuade,
embarrass,
compel
and shame our governmentand our nation . . . into a more enlightened
ble V' campaign-"victoryover our enemiesat home and victoryover our enemieson the
battlefieldsabroad." When a Negro was brutallylynchedin Sikeston,Missouri, a few
weeks after Pearl Harbor, the Chicago Defender, March 14, 1942, adopted as its war
slogan: "RememberPearl Harbor and Sikestontoo." See also Ralph N. Davis, "The Negro
Newspapers and the War," Sociology and Social Research, XXVII (May-June 1943),
373-80.
30 ChicagoDefender,Sept. 25, 1940.
31 "Nazi Plan for Negroes Copies SouthernU. S. A.," Crisis,48 (March 1941), 71.
XIX (Feb. 1941), 35. See also editorialsin Pitts32"American Nazism," Opportunity,
burgh Courier,March 15, April 19, 26, 1941, May 30, 1942; Chicago Defender,Sept. 7,
1940; Norfolk Journaland Guide, April 19, 1941; BaltimoreAfro-American,Feb. 17,
1940, Sept.6, 1941.
PittsburghCourier, Oct. 5, 1940; George S. Schuyler,"A Long War Will Aid the
Negro," Crisis,50 (Nov. 1943), 328-29, 344. See also J. A. Rodgersin PittsburghCourier,
June 28, 1941; Horace R. Cayton in ibid., March 22, 1941; Baltimore Afro-American,
Sept. 12, 16, 1939; Guion GriffisJohnson, "The Impact of War Upon the Negro,"
Journalof Negro Education,X (July 1941), 596-611.
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Years"
The "Forgotten
97
attitude
towarda tenthof itspeople!"thePittsburgh
Courierproclaimed.34
lifewouldresultfromthewarwas basedon thebethata better
Certainty
theworld.It
forceshad beenreleasedthroughout
liefthatrevolutionary
was no longera "whiteman'sworld,"andthe"mythof whiteinvincibilforgood.35
ity"hadbeenshattered
There was a growingprotestagainstthe racialstatusquo by black
in all
of segregation
this was evidencedby the reevaluation
Americans;
of pastaccepIn theNorththerewas self-criticism
of thecountry.
sections
Negroesbecamebolderin
Southern
formsof segregation.36
tanceof certain
In October1942,a group
of segregation.
thesacredness
openlyquestioning
of southern
Negroleadersmetin Durham,NorthCarolina,and issueda
the idea thatthe
on race relations.In additionto endorsing
statement
at homeas wellas abroad,theseleaders
Negroshouldfightfordemocracy
life.WhilerecogequalityfortheNegroin American
calledforcomplete
theDurham
and age" of theSouth'sracialcustoms,
nizingthe "strength
of comandpractice
opposedto theprinciple
was "fundamentally
meeting
in ourAmericansociety."In addition,therewererepulsorysegregation
and eviNegrocollegestudents
amongsouthern
portsof deep discontent
on
dencethatpoliticalactivity
amongtheblacksof theSouth,particularly
thelocallevel,wasincreasing.37
ideologyof thewar,
bythedemocratic
Negro,stimulated
The American
his positionin Americansociety."It cannotbe doubted
was reexamining
todayfrom
thatthespiritof American
Negroesin all classesis different
Partof thisnewspirit
whatit was a generation
ago," Myrdalobserved.38
loud and strongagainst
a readiness
to protest
militancy,
was an increased
PittsburghCourier,Jan. 10, Aug. 8, 1942. Charles S. Johnson,"The Negro and the
Present Crisis," Journal of Negro Education, X (July 1941), 585-95. Opinion surveys
indicated that most Negro soldiers expressed support for this kind of opportunism.
Samuel A. Stoufferand others,The AmericanSoldier (2 vols., Princeton,1949), 1, 516-17.
June 12, Oct. 31, 1942; Walter White in Pittsburgh
3; Baltimore Afro-American,
Courier,May '23, 1942. The impactof world affairson the AmericanNegro is detailed in
Harold R. Isaacs, The New World of Negro Americans (New York, 1963).
" See editorialsin PittsburghCourier,Dec. 28, 1940; Feb. 1, June 28, 1941; May 30,
May 23, 1942.
1942; BaltimoreAfro-American,
To Stem This Tide (Boston, 1943), 131-39; Malcolm S. MacLean,
3 Charles S. Johnson,
presidentof Hampton Institute,to Marvin H. McIntyre,Nov. 20, 1942, OF 93, Roosevelt
Papers (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library,Hyde Park); George B. Tindall, "The Significance
of Howard W. Odum to SouthernHistory:A PreliminaryEstimate,"Journalof Southern
History,XXIV (Aug. 1958), 302. AnthropologistHortense Powdermaker,After Freedom: A CulturalStudy of the Deep South (New York, 1939), 331-33, 353, supportsthe
observationsof a tendencyto rebel among the youngerNegroes of the South. See also
Ralph J. Bunche, "The Negro in the Political Life of the United States,"Journalof Negro
Education,X (July 1941), 567-84; Myrdal,AmericanDilemma, 499; Henry Lee Moon,
Balance of Power: The Negro Vote (Garden City, 1948), 178-79.
38 Myrdal,AmericanDilemma, 744.
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98
The Journalof AmericanHistory
grievances.The crisisgave Negroes more reason and opportunity
to proof all of the trendsof black thoughtand action-the
test.Representative
cynicism,the hope, the heightenedrace consciousness,the militancy-was
theMarch on WashingtonMovement(MOWM).
The generalidea of exertingmass pressureupon the government
to end
defensediscrimination
did not originatewithA. Philip Randolph'scall for
a marchon Washington,D.C., in early1941.39 Agitationformass pressure
had grownsincethe failureof a groupof Negro leadersto gain anymajor
concessionsfrom PresidentFranklinD. Roosevelt in September1940.40
Various organizations,such as the NAACP, the Committeefor Participation of Negroes in the National Defense, and the Allied Committeeson
National Defense, held mass protestmeetingsaround the countryin late
1940 and early1941.41 The weeks passed and theseefforts
did not seemto
have any appreciableimpacton the government;WalterWhite,Randolph,
and otherNegro leaderscould not even securean appointmentto see the
President."Bitternessgrew at an alarmingpace throughoutthe country,"
White recalled.42
It remained,however,forRandolphto consolidatethisprotest.In January 1941, he wrote an articlefor the Negro press which pointedout the
failureof committees
and individualsto achieveactionagainstdefensediscrimination."Only power can effectthe enforcementand adoption of a
given policy,"Randolph noted; and "Power is the activeprincipleof only
the organizedmasses,the massesunitedfor a definitepurpose." To focus
theweightof the blackmasses,he suggestedthat10,000 Negroes marchon
Washington,D.C., with the slogan: "We loyal Negro-Americancitizens
demandthe rightto workand fightforour country."43
This marchappeal led to the formationof one of the mostsignificantthoughtodayalmostforgotten-Negroprotestmovements.The MOWM
pioneeredwhat has become the commondenominatorof today'sNegro revolt-"the spontaneousinvolvement
of largemassesof Negroes in a political protest."44
as AugustMeier and ElliottRudwickhave reFurthermore,
centlypointed out, the MOWM clearlyforeshadowed"the goals, tactics,
and strategyof the mid-twentieth-century
civil rightsmovement."Whites
were excluded purposelyto make it an all-Negro movement;its main
"Garfinkel, When Negroes March, fails to emphasize this point.
40Walter White, A Man Called White (New York, 1948), 186-87; "White House
Blesses Jim Crow," Crisis, 47 (Nov. 1940), 350-51, 357; Dlalfiume,"Desegregation of
theUnitedStatesArmedForces,1939-1953,"46-51.
" PittsburghCourier,Dec. 7, 14,
21, 1940; Jan. 4, 25, Feb. 8, 1941.
42 White,A Man Called White,189-90.
" Pittsburgh
Courier,Jan.25, 1941.
4 Garfinkel,
When NegroesMarch,8.
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The "Forgotten
Years"
99
weapon was directactionon the partof the black masses.Furthermore,
the
MOWM took as its major concernthe economicproblemsof urban slumdwellers.45
Randolph's tactic of mass pressurethrougha demonstrationof black
powerstrucka responseamongtheNegro masses.The numberto marchon
Washingtonon July1, 1941, was increasedto 50,000, and onlyRoosevelt's
agreementto issue an executiveorderestablishinga President'sCommittee
on Fair EmploymentPracticesled to a cancellationof the march.Negroes
then,and scholarslater,generallyinterpreted
thisas a greatvictory.But the
magnitudeof the victoryis diminishedwhen one examinesthe original
MOWM demands: an executiveorderforbiddinggovernmentcontractsto
be awardedto a firmwhichpracticeddiscrimination
in hiring,an executive
orderabolishingdiscrimination
in governmentdefensetrainingcourses,an
executiveorderrequiringthe United StatesEmploymentServiceto supply
workerswithoutregardto race, an executiveorder abolishingsegregation
in the armedforces,an executiveorderabolishingdiscrimination
and segregation on accountof race in all departmentsof the federal government,
and a requestfromthe Presidentto Congressto pass a law forbiddingbenefitsof the National Labor RelationsAct to unionsdenyingNegroes membership.Regardlessof the extentof the successof theMOWM, however,it
representedsomethingdifferent
in black protest.Unlike the older Negro
the MOWM had capturedthe imaginationof themasses.46
movements,
Althoughoverlookedby mostrecentwriterson civil rights,a mass militancybecamecharacterisitic
of the AmericanNegro in World War II. This
was symbolizedby the MOWM and was the reason for its wide appeal.
older Negro organizationsfoundthemselvespushed intomilFurthermore,
itantstands.For example,theNAACP underwenta tremendousgrowthin
its membershipand becamerepresentative
of the Negro massesforthe first
time in its history.From 355 branchesand a membershipof 50,556 in
"August Meier and Elliott M. Rudwick,From Plantationto Ghetto: An Interpretative
Historyof AmericanNegroes (New York, 1966), 222.
" Proposals of the Negro March-On-WashingtonCommitteeto President Roosevelt
for Urgent Consideration,"June 21, 1941, OF 391, Roosevelt Papers. The standardversions of a Negro "victory"are Garfinkel,When Negroes March; Kesselman, The Social
Politics of FEPC; and Louis Ruchames,Race, Jobs, & Politics: The Storyof FEPC (New
see Dalfiume, "Desegregation of the United
York, 1953). For a differentinterpretation,
States Armed Forces, 1939-1953," 172-77. The Negro press generallyrecognizedthat the
MOWM representedsomethingnew. The PittsburghCourier,July5, 1941, claimed: "We
begin to feel at last that the day when we shall gain full rights. . . of Americancitizenship is now not far distant."The Chicago Defender,June 28, July 12, 1941, felt thatthe
white man will be convincedthat "the Americanblack man has decided henceforthand
foreverto abandon the timidrole of Uncle-Tomismin his struggle...." The tacticsof the
MOWM had "demonstratedto the doubting Thomases among us that only mass action
can pry open the iron doors that have been erectedagainst America's black minority."
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100
The Journalof AmericanHistory
1940, the NAACP grew to 1,073 brancheswith a membershipof slightly
less than 450,000 in 1946.47The editorsof the PittsburghCourierrecognized thata new spiritwas presentin black America.In the past,Negroes
and senseof fairplay
upon thegratitude
madethemistakeof relyingentirely
We have neitherfaithin
of the Americanpeople.Now we are disillusioned.
of the Americanpeople,where
promises,nor a high opinionof the integrity
uponour
has taughtus thatwe mustrelyprimarily
raceis involved.Experience
agitate,and demandthatall formsof
own efforts.... That is whywe protest,
out...48
colorprejudice
be blotted
By the timeof the Japaneseattackon Pearl Harbor,manyin America,
both inside and outsideof the government,
were worriedover the stateof
Negro morale. There was fear that the Negro would be disloyal.49The
depth of white ignoranceabout the causes for the Negro's cynicismand
low moraleis obviousfromthefactthattheblackpresswas blamedforthe
displayedin
widespreaddiscontent.The double victoryattitudeconstantly
thewar,and supportedbymostblackAmerNegro newspapersthroughout
icans, was consideredas verging on disloyaltyby most whites. White
America, ignorantof the AmericanNegroes' reactionto World War I,
thoughtthatblack citizensshould subduetheirgrievancesforthe duration.
During World War II, therewas pressureupon the White House and
to indictsome
the justicedepartmentfromwithinthe federalgovernment
4 Frazier, The Negro in the United States, 537; Charles Radford Lawrence, "Negro
Organizationsin Crisis: Depression, New Deal, World War II" (doctoral dissertation,
Columbia University,1953), 103; Myrdal, AmericanDilemma, 851-52. Such close observers of Americanrace relationsas Will Alexander,Edwin Embree,and Charles S. Johnson recognized the changing characterof Negro protest.They believed that "the characteristicmovementsamong Negroes are now for the firsttime becoming proletarian,
as contrastedto upper class or intellectualinfluencethat was typicalof previous movements.The presentproletariandirectiongrows out of the increasinggeneral feelings of
protestagainst discrimination,especially in the armed forces and in our war activities
generally.The presentmovementsare led in part by such establishedleaders as A. Philip
Randolph, Walter White, etc. There is likelihood (and danger) that the movement
may -be seized upon by some much more picturesquefigurewho may be less responsible
and less interestedin actual improvementof conditions.One of the most likely of the
potential leaders is A. Clayton Powell, Jr." Memorandumof Conferencesof Alexander,
Johnson,and Embreeon the Rosenwald Fund's Programin Race Relations,June27, 1942,
Race Relations folder,Rosenwald Fund Papers (Fisk University).
PittsburghCourier,Sept. 12, 1942. See also Roscoe E. Lewis, "The Role of Pressure
Groups in MaintainingMorale Among Negroes," Journalof Negro Education,XII (Summer 1943), 464-73; Earl Brown, "AmericanNegroes and the War," Harper's Magazine,
184 (April 1942), 545-52; Roi Ottley,"Negro Morale," New Republic, 105 (Nov. 10,
1941), 613-15; Thomas Sancton,"Something'sHappened' to the Negro," New Republic,
108 (Feb. 8, 1943), 175-79; Stanley High, "How the Negro Fights for Freedom,"
Reader's Digest, 41 (July 1942), 113-18; H. C. Brearley,"The Negro's New Belligerency,"
Phylon,V (4th Quarter 1944), 339-45.
" Memorandumto AssistantSecretaryof War McCloy fromG-2, June 27, 1942, ASW
291.2, RecordGroup.335.
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Years"
The "Forgotten
101
with the war effort.President
Negro editorsfor seditionand interference
Rooseveltrefusedto sanctionthis,however.There was also an attemptto
denynewsprintto the more militantNegro newspapers,but the President
The reput an end to thiswhen the matterwas broughtto his attention.50
so
widemilitary
installations
became
from
newspapers
of
Negro
striction
had to call a haltto thispracticein 1943.51
spreadthatthe war department
These criticsfailedto realizethat,althoughservingto unifyblack opinion,
theNegro mind.
theNegro presssimplyreflected
One of the mostwidelypublicizedattackson theNegro presswas made
by the southernwhite liberal,VirginiusDabney, editorof the Richmond
Times Dispatch. He charged that "extremist"Negro newspapers and
Negro leaderswere "demandingan overnightrevolutionin racerelations,"
and as a consequencetheywere "stirringup interracialhate." Dabney concluded his indictmentby warningthat "it is a foregoneconclusionthatif
an attemptis made forciblyto abolish segregationthroughoutthe South,
violenceand bloodshedwill result.'"'52 The Negro press reactedvigorously
Negro leaders,
to suchcharges.Admittingthattherewere "all-or-nothing"
theNorfolkJournaland Guide claimedtheywerecreatedbythe "northingat-all" attitudeof whites.53 The Chicago Defenderand BaltimoreAfroAmericantook the positionthattheywere onlypointingout the shortcomings of Americandemocracy,and this was certainlynot disloyal.54The
NAACP and theUrban League claimedthatit was patrioticforNegroes to
protestagainstundemocraticpractices,and thosewho soughtto stiflethis
ones.55
protestweretheunpatriotic
" White, A Man Called White, 207-08; R. Keith Kane to Ulric Bell, May 14, 1942,
OFF 992.11, Record Group 208; Memorandumto RobertA. LovettfromMcCloy, March 6,
1942,ASW 291.2, RecordGroup 335.
Sept. 30, 1941; PittsburghCourier,March 8, 1941, Nov.
'Baltimore Afro-American,
13, 1943. AssistantSecretaryof War McCloy, who was also head of the war department's
AdvisoryCommitteeon Negro Troop Policies, held a criticalview of the Negro press that
was common in the army. McCloy to Herbert Elliston, editor of the WashingtonPost,
Aug. 5, 1943, ASW 292.2, RecordGroup 335.
-2Virginius Dabney, "Nearer and Nearer the Precipice," Atlantic Monthly,171 (Jan.
1943), 94-100; Virginius Dabney, "Press and Morale," SaturdayReview of Literature,
XXV (July4, 1942), 5-6,24-25.
" NorfolkJournaland Guide, Aug. 15, 1942. See also Journaland Guide editorialsof
Oct. 17, April 25, 1942; and March 6, 1943, fora defenseof Negro militancy.
Jan. 9, 1943.
Chicago Defender,Dec. 20, 1941; BaltimoreAfro-American,
Courier,May 8, June 19, 1943. A few conservativeNegroes joined whites
; Pittsburgh
in criticizingthe growingmilitancy.JamesE. Shepard,Negro presidentof North Carolina
to do somethingto undercutthe growing
College for Negroes, asked the administration
supportof the militantsamong young Negroes: "Those who seek to stir them up about
rightsand not duties are their enemies." Shepard to Secretaryof the Navy Frank Knox,
Sept. 28, 1940, OF 93, Roosevelt Papers. FrederickD. Patterson,presidentof Tuskegee
officials
Institute,made it clear in his newspapercolumn and in talks with administration
thathe believed in all-out supportfor the war effortby Negroes regardlessof segregation
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102
The Journalof AmericanHistory
of moderatingtheir
The Negro massessimplydid not supporta strategy
grievancesfor the durationof the war. Afterattendingan Officeof Facts
and FiguresconferenceforNegro leadersin March 1942, Roy Wilkins of
theNAACP wrote:
can facehismem. . . it is a plainfactthatno Negroleaderwitha constituency
the
berstodayand ask fullsupportforthewar in thelightof theatmosphere
has created.SomeNegroeducators
whoareresponsible
government
onlyto their
boardsor trustees
mightdo so, but the heads of no organizedgroupswould
daredo so.56
By 1942, the federalgovernmentbegan investigating
Negro morale in
orderto findout whatcould be done to improveit. This projectwas undertakenbytheOfficeof Factsand Figuresand itssuccessor,theOfficeof War
Information.57
Surveysby theseagenciesindicatedthatthegreatamountof
national publicitygiven the defenseprogramonly servedto increasethe
Negro's awarenessthat he was not participatingfully in that program.
Black Americansfoundit increasingly
difficult
to reconciletheirtreatment
withthe announcedwar aims. Urban Negroes werethemostresentfulover
defense discrimination,
particularlyagainst the treatmentaccorded black
membersof the armed forces.Never beforehad Negroes been so united
behinda cause: thewar had servedto focustheirattentionon theirunequal
status in Americansociety.Black Americanswere almost unanimousin
wanting a show of good intentionfrom the federal governmentthat
changeswould be made in theracialstatusquo.58
and discrimination."Stimson Diary," Jan. 29, 1943 (Yale UniversityLibrary), and
columnsby Pattersonin the PittsburghCourier,Jan. 16, July3, 1943. Such conservatives
were bitterlyattackedin the Negro press. The black leader who urged his people to relax
theirdetermination
to win full participationin Americanlife was a "misleaderand a false
prophet," the Norfolk Journal and Guide, May 2, 1942, proclaimed. Such people "endangered" the interestsof Negroes by "compromisingwith the forces that promoteand
uphold segregationand discrimination,"
wrote the editorof the Chicago Defender,April 5,
1941. The Crisis charged that those Negroes who succumbedto segregationas "realism"
provided a rationalefor those whites who sought to perpetuatesegregation."Government
Blesses Separatism,"Crisis,50 (April 1943), 105.
" Memorandumto White from Roy Wilkins, March 24, 1942, Stephen J. Spingarn
Papers (Harry S. Truman Library,Independence).
5 Memorandum to Archibald MacLeish from Kane, Feb. 14, 1942; Bell to Embree,
Feb. 23, 1942, OFF 002.11, Record Group 208. Some governmentagencies displayed
timiditywhen it came to a subjectas controversialas the race question.JonathanDaniels,
AssistantDirector in Charge of Civilian Mobilization, Officeof Civilian Defense, urged
the creationof a Division of AmericanUnity within the OCD, but his superiorsdecided
Negro morale was "too hot a potato." Memoranda to James Landis, April 1, 7, 1942;
Daniels to Howard W. Odum, Aug. 24, 1942, JonathanDaniels Papers (Universityof
North Carolina).
" "Reportsfromthe Special ServicesDivision SubmittedApril 23, 1942: Negro Organizations and the War Effort";Cornelius Golightly,"Negro Morale in Boston," Special
Services Division ReportNo. 7, May 19, 1942; Special ServicesDivision Report No. 5,
May 15, 1942: "Negro Conferenceat Lincoln University";Special ServicesDivision Mem-
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Years"
The "Forgotten
103
to takestepsto improveNegromorale,
inclination
The government's
bythegeneralattitude
and theNegro'sdesireforchange,werefrustrated
of whiteAmericans.
In 1942, aftertwo yearsof militantagitationby
were
feltthatblackAmericans
Negroes,six out of tenwhiteAmericans
all
satisfied
withthingsthewaytheywereandthatNegroeswerereceiving
theydeserved.More thanhalfof all whitesinterof the opportunities
and Westbelievedthatthereshouldbe separate
viewedin theNortheast
fortheraces.A
and separateneighborhoods
schools,separaterestaurants,
of whitesin all partsof the country
believedthatthe Negro
majority
wouldnotbe treatedanybetterafterthe warthanin 1942 and thatthe
than
rather
was due to hisownshortcomings
Negro'slesserrolein society
to racialchangemay
The whiteopposition
anything
thewhiteshad done.59
the
inactivity.
Furthermore,
haveprovidedtherationaleforgovernmental
ofblackAmericans.
musthaveaddedtothebitterness
whiteobstinance
in
a revolution
it,thewarwasworking
fewpeoplerecognized
Although
RobertE. ParkfeltthattheracialstrucAmerican
Sociologist
racerelations.
reachedaftertheCivil
andtheequilibrium
was "cracking,"
tureof society
whenit is
War seemed"to be underattackat a timeand underconditions
HowardW. Odumwrote
difficult
to defendit."60 Sociologist
particularly
distance
andunbridgeable
fromtheSouththattherewas "an unmeasurable
of theNegro."61
expectation
betweenthewhiteSouthand thereasonable
opposedto changein the racialmoressensedchanges
Whitesoutherners
occurring
among "their"Negroes. "Outsiders"fromthe North,Mrs.
wereall accusedof
and theRooseveltAdministration
FranklinRoosevelt,
under the pretenseof wartime
to underminesegregation
attempting
necessity.62
duringthe
Racialtensionswerecommonin all sectionsof thecountry
war.63Therewereriotsin 1943.TensionswerehighbecauseNegroAmeriorandum, "Report on Recent Factors Increasing Negro-White Tension," Nov. 2, 1942.
All are in OFF and OWI filesin RecordGroup 44.
" "IntelligenceReport: White AttitudesToward Negroes," OW1, Bureau of Intelligence,
Aug. 5, 1942; same title dated July 28, 1942, Record Group 44. Hazel Gaudet Erskine,
"The Polls: Race Relations,"Public Opinion Quarterly,XXVI (Spring 1962), 137-48.
' RobertE. Park, "Racial Ideologies," William Fielding Ogburn, ed., AmericanSociety
In Wartime(Chicago, 1943), 174.
61 Howard W. Odum, Race and Rumorsof Race: Challenge to AmericanCrisis (Chapel
Hill, 1943), 7; for a similar view, see Johnson,To Stem This Tide, 67-68, 73, 89-107,
113, 117.
02John Temple Graves, "The SouthernNegro and the War Crisis," Virginia Quarterly
Review, 18 (Autumn 1942), 500-17; Clark Foreman,"Race Tension in the South," New
Republic,107 (Sept. 21, 1942), 340-42.
Race Riot (New York, 1943);
63 AlfredMcClung Lee and Norman DaymondHumphrey,
Carey McWilliams, "Race Tensions: Second Phase," Common Ground, IV (Autumn
1943), 7-12.
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104
The Journalof AmericanHistory
cans were challengingthe statusquo. When fourteenprominentNegroes,
wereasked in 1944
and liberals,southerners
and northerners,
conservatives
what theythoughttheblack Americanwanted,theirresponseswere almost
unanimous.Twelve of the fourteensaid theythoughtthatNegroes wanted
full politicalequality,economicequality,equalityof opportunity,
and full
social equalitywiththeabolitionof legal segregation. The war had stimulated the race consciousnessand the desireforchangeamongNegroes.
Most AmericanNegroes and theirleaderswantedthe government
to institutea revolutionary
change in its race policy. Whereas the policy had
been acquiescencein segregationsince the end of Reconstruction,
the governmentwas now asked to set the example for the restof the nationby
supportingintegration.This was the demandvoiced by the greatmajority
of the Negro leaderscalled togetherin March 1942 by the Officeof Facts
and Figures.65Crisis magazine summarizedthe feelingsof many black
Americans:Negroes have "waitedthusfarin vain forsome sharpand dramaticnoticethatthiswar is notto maintainthe statusquo here."66
The White House, and it was not alone, failedto respondto the revolutionarychangesoccurringamong the nation'slargestminority.When the
FraternalCouncil of Negro Churchescalled upon PresidentRooseveltto
end discrimination
in the defenseindustriesand armedforces,the position
takenwas that "it would be verybad to give encouragement
beyondthe
point where actual resultscan be accomplished."67Roosevelt did bestir
himselfover particularlyoutrageousincidents.When Roland Hayes, a
notedNegro singer,was beatenand jailed in a Georgiatown,thePresident
dashed off a note to his attorneygeneral: "Will you have someone go
down and check up .
.
. and see if any law was violated. I suggest you send
a northerner."68
Rooseveltwas not enthusiasticabout major steps in the race relations
field proposed by interested individuals within and without the
government.69
In February1942 Edwin R. Embreeof theJuliusRosenwald
(ARayfordW. Logan, ed., What the Negro Wants (Chapel Hill, 1944).
';5Memorandum to White fromWilkins, March 23, 1942, SpingarnPapers; Pittsburgh
Courier,March 28, 1942; Norfolk Journaland Guide, March 28, 1942.
";""U. S. A. Needs Sharp Break With the Past," Crisis,49 (May 1942), 151.
7"A Statementto the Presidentof the United States Concerning*thePresentWorld
Crisis by Negro Church Leaders Called by the Executive Committeeof the Fraternal
Council of Negro Churchesof America," Feb. 17, 1942; McIntyreto MacLean, Chairman
of the President'sCommitteeon Fair EmploymentPractice,Feb. 19, 1942, OF 93, RooseveltPapers.
" Memorandumto the AttorneyGeneral from the President,Aug. 26, 1942, OF 93,
ibid.
' Franklin Roosevelt's conservativeand "leave well enough alone" attitude toward
Negro rightsis discussedin ArthurM. Schlesinger,Jr.,The Age of Roosevelt.The Politics
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Years"
The "Forgotten
105
Fund, acutelyaware of the growingcrisisin Americanrace relations,urged
Rooseveltto createa commissionof expertson racerelationsto advisehimon
what stepsthe governmentshould take to improvematters.FDR's answer
to this proposal indicatesthathe feltrace relationswas one of the reform
areas thathad to be sacrificedforthepresentin orderto prosecutethewar.
He thoughtsuch a commissionwas "premature"and that "we muststart
winning the war . . . before we do much general planning for the future."
The Presidentbelievedthat"thereis a dangerof suchlong-rangeplanning
becomingprojectsof wide influencein escape fromthe realitiesof war. I
am not convincedthatwe can be realistsaboutthewar and plannersforthe
futureat thiscriticaltime."70
Afterthe race riotsof 1943, numerousproposalsfor a nationalcommittee on race relationswereput forward;but FDR refusedto changehis position.Instead, the PresidentsimplyappointedJonathanDaniels to gather
on currentracetensionsand
departments
fromall government
information
what theywere doing to combatthem.71This suggestionfor what would
of Upheaval (Boston, 1960), 431; Frank Freidel,F. D. R. and the South (Baton Rouge,
1965), 73, 81, 97; Mary McLeod Bethune,"My SecretTalks with F. D. R.," Ebony, IV
(April 1949), 42-51. Perhaps Roosevelt's conservativeattitude is responsible for his
privatelyexpresseddislike of the NAACP. In 1943 ArthurB. Spingarn,presidentof the
years of serviceby White to
NAACP, asked him to write a letterpraisingthe twenty-five
that organization.On one version of the proposed letterthereis an attachednote which
reads: "Miss Tully broughtthis in. Says the Presidentdoesn't think too much of this
organization-not to be to[oJ fullsome-tone it down a bit." Roosevelt to Spingarn,
Oct. 1, 1943, PPF 1226, RooseveltPapers.
70 Rooseveltto Embree,March 16, 1942, in answerto Embreeto Roosevelt,Feb. 3, 1942,
OF 93, Roosevelt Papers. In his coveringletterto the President'ssecretary,Embree emphasized thathis proposed commissionshould addressitselfto the problemof race around
the world as well as at home: "A seriousweaknessboth in Americaand amongthe united
nationsis the low morale of the 'colored peoples' to whom this war is being picturedas
simplyanotherstruggleof the white man for dominationof the world. This conditionis
becoming acute among the Negro group at home and among importantallies abroad,
especiallythe Chinese and the residentsof Malaya, the East Indies, and the Philippines."
Embree to McIntyre,Feb. 3, 1942, Commission on Race and Color folder, Rosenwald
Fund Papers.
" In June 1943, Embree and John Collier, Commissionerof Indian Affairs,developed
an idea for a committeeestablishedby the President"to assume special responsibilityin
implementingthe Bill of Rights of the Constitution,particularlyin defendingracial minoritiesat a time of crisis." Memorandumto Johnsonand Alexander fromEmbree,June
16, 1943, Race Relationsfolder,RosenwaldFund Papers. See also JohnCollier and Saul K.
Padover, "An Institutefor Ethnic Democracy," Common Ground, IV (Autumn 1943),
3-7, fora more elaborateproposal.
Embree probablypassed along his idea to Odum of the Universityof North Carolina
so that he could discuss it with a fellow North Carolinian in the White House, Daniels,
assistant-tothe President.Odum and Daniels had a conferencein August
administrative
for a "President'sCommitteeon Race and
1943 fromwhich emerged a recommendation
MinorityGroups." Odum to Daniels, Aug. 23, 1943; Memorandum to Daniels from
Odum, Aug. 30, 1943, Howard W. Odum Papers (Universityof North Carolina).
Although Daniels apparentlygave Odum the impressionthat he was interestedin a
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106
The Journalof AmericanHistory
eventuallybecomea President'sCommitteeon Civil Rightswould have to
wait untila Presidentrecognizedthata revolutionin race relationswas occurringand that actionby the governmentcould no longerbe put off.In
the interim,manywould sharethe shallow reasoningof Secretary
of War
Stimsonthatthe cause of racial tensionwas "the deliberateeffort. . . on
the part of certainradical leaders of the colored race to use the war for
obtaining... raceequalityand interracial
marriages...."72
a worldwar forthe four
The hypocrisy
and paradox involvedin fighting
freedomsand againstaggressionby an.enemypreachinga masterrace ideology,while at the same time upholdingracial segregationand white supremacy,were too obvious. The war crisis provided AmericanNegroes
bewith a unique opportunity
to point out, for all to see, the difference
tweentheAmericancreedand practice.The democraticideologyand rhetoricwithwhichthewar was foughtstimulateda senseof hope and certainty
in black Americansthat the old race structurewas destroyedforever.In
part,thisconfidencewas also the resultof themass militancyand raceconsciousnessthatdevelopedin theseyears.When the expectedwhiteacquiescence in a new racialorderdid not occur,the groundwas preparedforthe
civil rightsrevolutionof the 1950s and 1960s; the seeds were indeed sown
in theWorld War II years.
national committee,this was not the case. "It has been suggested that a committeeof
prominentmen be named to study this situation,"he wrote the President."I am sure
the naming of such a committeewould not now halt the processionof angryoutbreaks
which are occurring.I doubt thatany reportcould be made which would be so effective
as a statementnow fromyou would be. I am very much afraid, indeed, that any committeereport would only serve as a new ground for controversy."Memorandumto the
PresidentfromDaniels, Aug. 2, 1943, Daniels Papers. Roosevelt apparentlyagreed with
Daniels, and Odumrwas informedthat "My boss does not thinkwell of the idea thatwe
discussed." Daniels to Odum, Sept. 1, 1943, Odum Papers.
Daniels' appointmentas White House coordinatorof informationon race relationswas
actually suggestedby him to the Presidentin June 1943. Memorandumto the President
fromDaniels, June 29, 1943, Daniels Papers. By July 1943, Roosevelt had approved of
the new role for his administrativeassistant,and Daniels was hard at work gathering
information.Daniels to Secretaryof War Stimson,July 28, 1943, ASW 291.2, Record
Group 335.
"StimsonDiary," June24, 1943.
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