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Leung, PingSun; Sethboonsarng, Sununtar; Stefan, Adam
Working Paper
Rice contract farming in Lao PDR: Moving from
subsistence to commercial agriculture
ADB Institute Discussion Papers, No. 90
Provided in Cooperation with:
Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Tokyo
Suggested Citation: Leung, PingSun; Sethboonsarng, Sununtar; Stefan, Adam (2008) : Rice
contract farming in Lao PDR: Moving from subsistence to commercial agriculture, ADB Institute
Discussion Papers, No. 90
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Rice Contract Farming in Lao PDR:
Moving from Subsistence to Commercial Agriculture
Sununtar Setboonsarng
PingSun Leung
Adam Stefan
February 2008
ADB Institute Discussion Paper No. 90
ADBI Discussion Paper 90
Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
Sununtar Setboonsarng is a senior research fellow at the Asian Development Bank
Institute. Ping Sun Leung was an off-site visiting fellow at the Asian Development
Bank Institute from December 2005 to August 2006. He is also a professor of
molecular biosciences and bioengineering at the University of Hawaii at Manoa,
Honolulu, USA. Adam Stefan is a research associate at the Asian Development
Bank Institute.
The views expressed in this paper are the views of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views or policies of ADBI, the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not
guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no
responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not
necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.
ADBI’s discussion papers reflect initial ideas on a topic, and are posted online for discussion.
ADBI encourages readers to post their comments on the main page for each discussion
paper (given in the citation below). Some discussion papers may develop into research
papers or other forms of publication.
This discussion paper is part of an ADBI research project on contract farming and market
facilitation for the rural poor. The project will produce a book, tentatively titled Making
Globalization Work for the Poor and the Environment: Contract Farming and Organics.
Suggested citation:
Setboonsarng, Sununtar, PingSun Leung, and Adam Stefan. 2008. Rice Contract Farming in
Lao PDR: Moving from Subsistence to Commercial Agriculture. ADBI Discussion Paper 90.
Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. Available: http://www.adbi.org/discussionpaper/2008/02/25/2492.rice.contract.farming.in.lao.pdr/
Asian Development Bank Institute
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© 2008 Asian Development Bank Institute
ADBI Discussion Paper 90
Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
Abstract
Poverty is prevalent among small farms in transition economies such as the Lao PDR, where
market failures prevail and subsistence production is the norm. Contract farming is emerging
as a promising tool to facilitate market linkages and provide the necessary supports that
enable small farms to transition to commercial production. Using data from a household
survey of 332 contract farmers and 253 non-contract farmers, this study attempts to
empirically assess the potential of contract farming as a development tool to increase small
farm incomes and reduce rural poverty.
Using propensity score matching methodology and an endogenous switching regression
model to assess the profitability of contract and non-contract rice farms in the Lao PDR, we
found that contract farmers earn significantly higher profits than non-contract farmers. The
results also show that contract farming tends to provide the greatest increase in income to
farmers with below-average performance. These findings suggest that contract farming can
be an effective private-sector-led mechanism to facilitate the transition to commercial
agriculture. In addition to bringing foreign direct investment (FDI) into the rural sector,
contract farming can be an effective tool to improve the profitability and raise the incomes of
small farmers, thereby reducing poverty in rural areas with limited market development.
JEL Classification: Q12, Q13, O31
ADBI Discussion Paper 90
Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
Contents
I.
Introduction
1
II.
Production and Marketing in the Lao PDR
2
III.
Contract Farming in the Lao PDR
3
IV.
Case Study: Contract Rice Farming in Vientiane Province
5
V.
Household Characteristics
6
VI.
Farming Characteristics
8
VII.
Propensity Score and Matching Analysis
10
VIII.
Switching Regression
12
IX.
Conclusion
16
References
18
Appendix
20
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Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
I.
INTRODUCTION
As globalization and market liberalization profoundly change global agricultural production,
small farms in developing countries are at risk of being excluded from the opportunities for
higher-value production arising from the opening of regional and international markets. Small
farms typically lack the resources, knowledge, and information to compete in increasingly
integrated markets. They are hampered by imperfect market information, poor infrastructure,
and have few links with buyers in the marketing chain. These disadvantages contribute
significantly to the low incomes and poverty found in developing countries where small farms
dominate the agricultural sector.
In the Lao PDR, agriculture accounts for nearly half of the country’s gross domestic product
(GDP) and employs 77% of the national workforce according to the United Nations
Development Programme/National Statistics Centre (UNDP/NSC, 2006). Rice cultivation is
the single most important economic activity, accounting for half of all agricultural output and
one-fifth of total GDP. Almost all of the country’s agricultural output is produced on small
family farms. Despite the importance of agriculture to the national economy, poverty in the
Lao PDR is most prevalent among small farming households. An estimated 87% of the
country’s poor live in households headed by farmers (NSC, 1999).
Although the enactment of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in 1986 opened the
country to international markets, low market integration remains the prevailing condition.
The vast majority of farmers practice subsistence rice farming and lack access to the
supports necessary to improve their productivity and income. Market access is limited due to
poor infrastructure, insufficient market information, and a regionally confined marketing
system dominated by a limited number of traders (MPDF, 2004).
To facilitate the transition from subsistence to a market-oriented economy, the government
has encouraged foreign direct investment (FDI) by the private sector in rural areas. In areas
where transport infrastructure has been put in place, FDI has flowed in to take advantage of
the country’s relatively abundant, fertile land and low cost of labor.
One example of private sector investment that has proliferated in recent years is contract
farming, an institutional arrangement that links farmers to consumers in foreign or domestic
markets and links farmers to vital inputs. Under a typical contract agreement, the contracting
firm (usually an agro-processing or marketing firm) agrees to purchase a specific commodity
at an agreed-upon price and time, while the farmer agrees to supply the contracted
quantities at the specified quality standards. The contracting firm also agrees to provide the
farmer with production inputs and in-kind credit, to be reimbursed by the farmer at the time of
sale.
While contract farming appears to facilitate market linkages and provide opportunities for
farmers to increase their income, the rapid and widespread expansion of contract farming
has prompted us to take a closer look at its benefits and costs to smallholders.
Using the case of Lao Arrowny Corporation, a Lao-Japanese joint venture that has
contracted more than 2,000 farmers since 2002 to produce Japanese rice for export, this
study provides a comprehensive comparison of contract rice farming households and noncontract rice farming households under similar agro-ecological and social conditions. It
employs propensity score matching comparison and endogenous switching regression
models to determine if contract farms are more profitable than non-contract farms, and
whether contract farming is biased towards more competitive farms.
The first section of the paper examines the agricultural production and marketing system and
provides an overview of contract farming in the Lao PDR. The second section describes the
ADBI Discussion Paper 90
Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
survey data and summarizes the household characteristics of the sampled farms. The third
section briefly discusses the methodology used in this study and presents the results of the
profitability comparisons. A concluding section summarizes the main findings.
II.
PRODUCTION AND MARKETING IN THE LAO PDR
Crop production systems in the Lao PDR remain primarily subsistence oriented, with minimal
use of improved varieties, fertilizers, and pesticides. Although the use of modern inputs is
increasing, their adoption has largely been confined to production in the Mekong river
corridor (Schiller et al., 2006). Farmers are generally excluded from the growing markets for
high-value crops due to the lack of extension mechanisms and credit provision systems.
Adoption of new technologies by risk-averse subsistence farmers is also constrained by the
absence of risk-sharing strategies.
Figure 1: Average Sources of Rural Household Income in the Lao PDR
Other
14%
Cereals
32%
Non-Farm
Employment
10%
Forest
7%
Livestock
18%
Vegetables
& Fruits
19%
Source: UNODC, Laos Opium Survey, 2004
In 2004, average annual productivity (agricultural GDP/agricultural population) was $235 per
worker, compared with $148 in Cambodia, $159 in Viet Nam, and $413 in Thailand (FAO,
2006). At the province level, however, there is significant variation in agricultural productivity.
While national average productivity (measured in terms of gross revenue from agriculture) is
$0.14 per hour worked, the provincial averages range from $0.09 per hour worked in
Saravane to $0.26 in Xayabury and Bokeo (NSC, 2005). The comparatively high productivity
in Xayabury and Bokeo can be attributed to the prevalence of contract farming and crossborder exports in those provinces, suggesting the potential of market-oriented production to
increase productivity and income. Overall, the border districts of the Lao PDR show stronger
economic activity and have lower poverty headcounts than non-border districts (World Bank,
2006).
The lack of a functional marketing system is a major barrier to improving the productivity of
Lao agriculture. Agricultural marketing is generally on a small scale with short marketing
channels. Only 5% of the country’s total rice production (approximately 110,000 tons) is
commercially marketed (MPDF, 2004). The commercial trade in rice is dominated by a stateowned enterprise, the State Enterprise and Food Crop Promotion (SEFCP), which controls
70% of the market. The SEFCP has historically constrained the growth of trade and output
growth by fixing the prices of food commodities (often below production costs) and restricting
private sector trade between provinces (ADB, 2006).
Small farms typically sell paddy to traders who visit rural areas or deliver paddy to mills
located along the main road or near larger towns for consumption or direct sale in the village.
Due to the predominance of spot markets, prices are set by traders based on the previous
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Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
season’s price or production costs, and price fixing among traders is common. As a result,
there is the widespread perception that traders are exploiting farmers (Oraboune and
Nanthavongdouangsy, 2006).
III.
CONTRACT FARMING IN THE LAO PDR
Contract farming has spread rapidly in the Lao PDR in recent years. Growth in domestic
demand for agricultural produce has been driven by urban expansion, providing new market
opportunities for small farms, especially those located near urban centers. There is also
increasing regional demand from Thailand, Viet Nam, and China for specialty crops including
hemp, mulberry paper, castor bean, Job’s tears, and palm nut, all of which are produced in
Laos.
Thailand, in particular, has actively pursued contract farming as an area for economic
cooperation in the Mekong region. Under an initiative of the Association of the Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area (AFTA), for example, Thailand agreed to provide
assistance to develop border areas in Laos for contract farming to meet the demand of its
growing food industry (MPDF, 2004). Thailand has also announced that it would allow tarifffree importation of all approved agricultural products produced under contract farming in
ACMECS1 member countries.
There is also significant export potential for niche products and organic products. Although
small and medium enterprises are marginalized by the advancing consolidation of
multinational agribusinesses, certain niche markets remain competitive for small farms
(UNDP/NSC, 2006). Diversification of agricultural activities into these high-value markets
can improve small farms’ incomes.
Contracts can take a wide variety of forms, ranging from a simple verbal agreement between
farmer and trader to a written contract that explicitly details the obligations of each party.
However, the majority of contract farming ventures in the Lao PDR are informal
arrangements between farmers and small traders that operate outside legal boundaries.
Firms have reported losses due to farmers violating the contract to sell their crops on the
market, while farmers have reported losses because the contracting firm did not share the
cost of a failed crop or did not collect the produce after harvest. In such cases, there is no
legal avenue for farmers or firms to recover losses (ADB, 2007).
Nonetheless, a number of local and foreign private investors have established medium- to
large-scale contract farming agreements with smallholder farmers:
Tea, Phongsaly Province
Tea contract farming in Phongsaly involves 520 households and covers a production area of
approximately 400 hectare (ha). The contracts are signed between Chinese traders and the
Provincial Government, which organizes farmers to grow the tea for a predetermined price.
The Chinese investors provide seed and technical assistance on production and processing
methods, and they purchase all of the tea from the farmers to sell in the PRC market.
Maize, Bokeo Province
Maize is produced under verbal contract with a Thai import firm by approximately 600
households with a total cultivation area of 1,136 ha. The firm supplies contracted farmers
1
2nd ACMECS Summit, held 3 November 2005 in Bangkok, Thailand. The Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya Mekong
Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) is a cooperation agreement among Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia,
the Lao PDR, and Viet Nam, which aims to promote balanced development in the Mekong region.
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Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
with inputs including seed, fertilizer, and credit. The maize is grown in accordance with
government regulations.
Soybeans, Udomsay Province
Soybean production is organized by an American-Lao joint venture feed mill firm in several
districts. The firm provides seed and technical assistance for production technology yet
offers a price slightly below market price. In 2004, many contracts were breached and the
supply chain broken when Chinese traders offered more competitive prices and purchased
soybeans from the contracted farmers.
Maize, Luang Nam Tha Province
An American non-governmental organization (NGO) registered as a trading firm operates
contract farming of maize in three districts without a formal contract. The NGO provides
farmers with in-kind credit in the form of seed and purchases their produce at the end of the
season. During its first two years of operation, the NGO did not encounter any breaches of
contract; however, in 2003, Chinese traders purchased all farmer output. The NGO did not
possess the means to enforce the verbal contracts and lost the seed.
Sugar Cane, Phongsaly Province
Lao farmers produce sugar cane for a Chinese sugar mill across the border. The buyers
provide some seeds and fertilizer but do not offer a guaranteed price. At harvest, the dried
sugar cane is weighed and the cost of inputs is subtracted from the sale price. Although the
transaction is one-sided, additional farmers have shifted to sugar cane cultivation—without
input supports—to participate in the sales (UNDP/NSC, 2006).
Sweet Corn, Vientiane Province
Lao Agro Industry Co. (LAI) is a Thai–Lao joint venture affiliated with Lampang Food
Products, a Thai food processor and exporter. LAI has been operating in the Lao PDR since
1994, processing bamboo shoot, baby corn, mango, and sugar palm seed. LAI contracts
households from the sweet corn farmer production and marketing group (FPMG) to supply
sweet corn to its cannery. The company provides credit for seed and fertilizer, while the local
government provides credit for land preparation. Although only 11 households on 3.5 ha
were contracted in the 2006/07 dry season, LAI is targeting a planting area of approximately
160 ha to produce 2,000 tons of sweet corn.
Horticulture, Bokeo Province
Thai processing firms organize contract farming of horticulture crops such as mustard
cabbage in Bokeo Province. Information is not available on the number of participating
households or land area under cultivation. Green bean production has largely been
discontinued as farmers experienced negative health consequences due to high pesticide
use; one farmer interviewed during a field visit reported a death in his family due to pesticide
poisoning.
Rubber, Northern provinces
Para-rubber cultivation was introduced in Luang Namtha province in the mid-1990s with
assistance from China. The rubber cultivation area in the Northern provinces has since
expanded steadily due to growing demand from China. Although large-scale concession
areas currently account for the majority of rubber production, the government is promoting
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Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
smallholder rubber production as a way of stabilizing shifting cultivation and increasing
upland farmer income (Manivong and Cramb, 2007).
IV.
CASE STUDY: CONTRACT RICE FARMING IN VIENTIANE PROVINCE
Established in 2002, the Lao Arrowny Corporation is a joint venture between a Lao and a
Japanese investor to produce organic Japanese rice for export to Japanese expatriates in
Southeast Asia. The company received approval from the Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry (MAF) to recruit small farms from an area covering 18,500 ha countrywide. As of
2004, the company had approximately 2,000 households with a total land area of 800 ha
under contract.
The selection criteria for contract farms include: 1) owning their own rice field; 2) acceptance
by fellow farmers as hard working in order to become members of the farmers’ association;
and 3) agreeing to not use chemical fertilizers in the growing process. While the company
markets the rice as “bio-organic rice,” it is not sold as certified organic rice. In fact, the
company allows farmers to use a small amount of chemical fertilizers, up to 30 kilo/ha.
Contract farmers receive the premium price specified in the contract for growing organic rice,
less the amount of credit used for inputs. The company supplies raw materials in the form of
in-kind credit for seed and organic fertilizer (bat manure) and provides technical assistance.
The team leader of the extension staff was a former government extension agent who
received training in Japan under official development assistance (ODA).
Lao Arrowny, however, faces several challenges that reflect the early stage of private sector
development in the Lao PDR. The supply of rice from farmers presently exceeds the
company’s working capital for procurement and processing. The company lacks in-house
processing capacity and incurs high transport costs to have the paddy processed in Thailand
prior to third-country export. As a result, Lao Arrowny failed to meet the market demand in
2004, exporting only 540 tons of rice against potential demand for up to 10,000 tons.
Using a standard questionnaire, a farm survey was conducted in September 2004 with 585
farmers in Vientiane Province. The surveyed households include 332 contract farmers and
253 non-contract farmers in the same agro-eco and socioeconomic settings. The surveyed
villages are fertile, low-land rice growing villages located in Vientiane Municipality,
immediately outside of the capital city of Vientiane. These areas have relatively good road
access, public health service centers, and agriculture extension centers, including the
Agriculture Promotion Bank (APB).
Rice is primarily grown under rain-fed production, although in some areas supplementary
irrigation is available. These areas represent a farming system in transition from subsistence
to commercial orientation, as traditional agriculture adapts to the emergence of new
economic opportunities from increasing demand for crops and livestock from the Vientiane
urban center. Farmers generally have more than one plot of rice land, growing certain
varieties for home consumption (typically sticky rice) and other varieties for sale.
The following sections describe the socioeconomic characteristics and rice production
systems of contract farming households and non-contract farming households.
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ADBI Discussion Paper 90
Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
V.
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
Family size and land size
On average, contract farmers have larger families and own more land. The average family
size for contract farmers is 5.88 persons (4.52 adults) per household, greater than noncontract farmers’ average of 5.61 persons (4.03 adults) per household. On average, a
contract farming household owns 2.48 ha, compared with 1.72 ha for non-contract farmers
(Table 1).
Table 1: Household Characteristics
Contract
NonContract
p-value*
No. of family members
No. of family members older than 16
Percentage of females in family
5.88
4.52
49
5.61
4.03
49
0.0853
0.0011
0.8628
Total land (ha)
2.48
1.72
0.0002
No. of TVs
No. of radios
No. of hand tractors
No. of plows
No. of bikes
No. of motorbikes
Value of livestock (millions of kip)
0.96
0.23
0.61
0.006
1.02
0.81
6.22
0.86
0.19
0.46
0.011
1.02
0.65
4.83
0.0038
0.3316
0.0004
0.4683
0.9798
0.0155
0.0533
Monthly consumption expenditure per person (1,000 kip)
Percentage of home-grown in consumption expenditure
144
36
147
38
0.8592
0.3695
Credit total (1,000 kip)
446
191
0.0196
Income per adult from non-rice sources (1,000 kip)
Income per adult from other crops (1,000 kip)
Income per adult from animal sales (1,000 kip)
Income per adult from off-farm activities (1,000 kip)
Ratio of off-farm income in non-rice income (%)
Ratio of handicrafts in off-farm income (%)
Ratio of wage in off-farm income (%)
Ratio of remittance in off-farm income (%)
Ratio of other activities in off-farm income (%)
2,401
298
417
1,686
67
9
45
6
40
2,334
163
262
1,909
77
12
44
8
36
0.7546
0.0848
0.0039
0.2428
0.0012
0.1767
0.7825
0.2503
0.2887
Distance to farm-to-market road (km)
Distance to highway (km)
20.23
7.54
22.20
8.61
0.2224
0.1020
Variables
* p-value is the smallest level of significance for which we can reject the respective hypothesis test of difference in means
between contract and non-contract farmers using the appropriate t-test.
Household economic conditions
On average, contract and non-contract farmers have similar household economic conditions.
Although contract farmers own more fixed assets than non-contract farmers, including
televisions, tractors, motorbikes, and livestock, contract and non-contract households have
similar monthly consumption expenditures (147 thousand kip/person and 144 thousand
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ADBI Discussion Paper 90
Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
kip/person, respectively) 2 and rely on homegrown products to a similar extent (36% and
38%, respectively). The average monthly consumption expenditure for both contract and
non-contract households is slightly higher than average for Vientiane Province (NSC, 2004).
Income profile
The incomes of the surveyed households are not limited to agriculture but derived from
diverse sources, as shown in Figure 2. On average, contract and non-contract farmers have
similar incomes from non-rice sources (2.4 million and 2.3 million kip/adult, respectively).
However, non-contract farmers derive a significantly higher percentage of non-rice income
from off-farm activities (77%) than contract households (67%). The composition of off-farm
income is similar for both groups, with wage labor comprising nearly half of off-farm income.
For wage income, household members typically travel to Vientiane city for employment
opportunities.
Contract farmers on average have higher incomes from the sale of crops and livestock,
suggesting that they are more oriented toward commercial production than their non-contract
counterparts. As they are located slightly, although not significantly, closer to the highway
and market than non-contract households, contract farmers may have better access to
market information and be able to take advantage of market demand for their produce.
Figure 2: Average Sources of Income of Surveyed Households
Rice
16%
Other
22%
Vegetables
7%
Handicrafts
7%
Livestock
16%
Remittance
4%
Labor
28%
Credit
Overall, 16% of the surveyed households had loans from the APB, including 20% of contract
farmers and 10% of non-contract farmers. Since Lao Arrowny operates in areas immediately
outside of the capital city, the surveyed households have better access to formal credit than
most small farms in the Lao PDR. In 2003, less than 3% of rural households in the Lao PDR
borrowed from the formal sector (Coleman and Wynne-Williams, 2006). As the APB
generally lends to farmer groups rather than to individual small farms, these results suggest
that the contract arrangement can facilitate improved access to credit.
Among farmers borrowing from the APB, there is no significant difference in the amount of
credit received. The average loan size from the APB for contract farmers was 2.24 million kip
compared with 1.85 million for non-contract farmers. As all loans were financed by the APB,
the interest rates and repayment terms were largely the same.
2
US$1 = 9,478.80 kip at the time of this writing (27 November 2007).
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Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
VI.
FARMING CHARACTERISTICS
Commercial rice field
Relatively few non-contract households engage in commercial production of rice (29%
compared with 89% of contract farms). It is interesting to note that the average commercial
plot of non-contract households producing rice for sale is 1.43 ha, significantly larger than
the average 1.11 ha of contract farmers (Table 2). This may imply that the few commercial
farmers not under contract are more specialized in commercial production, while contract
farmers are farmers in transition to commercial farming.
The majority of surveyed households plant multiple varieties of rice in their commercial plots.
In addition to primarily producing organic Japanese rice for Lao Arrowny, some contract
farmers also produce CR203 rice under contract with the Beer Lao Brewery Company. This
suggests that once farmers become familiar with contract farming through one firm, they are
more likely to enter into contract farming with another firm. Both types of farmers typically
also plant small amounts of traditional varieties to sell to traders or in the local market.
Table 2: Commercial Production: Revenue, Cost, and Profit
Contract
NonContract
p-value*
No. of households
296
72
--
Size of commercial area planted (ha)
Percentage of planted area harvested
1.11
98
1.43
99
0.0327
0.6068
Revenue (1,000 kip/ha)
Rice price (kip/kg)
Yield (kg/ha)
5,237
1,587
3,272
3,527
1,344
2,603
0.0008
0.0000
0.0420
Cash Cost (1,000 kip/ha)
Cash Cost (kip per kg of rice production)
Ratio of hired labor cost in total cash cost (%)
2,251
1,290
32
1,778
936
45
0.1102
0.0830
0.0001
Profit per area of land (1,000 kip/ha)
2,924
1,751
0.0307
Variables
* See footnote in Table 1.
Rice price
Contract farmers received significantly higher prices than non-contract farmers. Under the
contract, farmers received an average price of 1,911 kip per kg for organic Japanese rice.
For other varieties of rice, there is no significant difference in the prices received by contract
and non-contract farmers, as rice sold outside of the contract is sold at market prices. Due to
the premium price for Japanese rice, the average rice price for all varieties was 1,587 kip/kg
for contract farmers and 1,344 kip/kg for non-contract farmers.
The higher-than-market price offered by Lao Arrowny was ranked by 62% of contract
farmers as the most important factor influencing their decision to join the contract.
Yield
In addition to receiving higher prices, farmers under contract also had significantly higher
yields than non-contract farmers. Contract farmers’ average yield for all varieties of rice is
3,272 kg/ha, compared with 2,603 kg/ha for non-contract farmers. The yield difference
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Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
between contract and non-contract farmers likely reflects the higher intensity and efficiency
of production under contract. As stated previously, farmers under contract have better
access to inputs and technology, as the contracting firm provides technical assistance and
supplies in-kind credit for high-yield seed and fertilizer.
Costs
On average, farmers under contract have higher cash costs than non-contract farmers,
spending 1,290 kip to produce one kilo of rice compared with 936 kip/kg. Contract farmers
also have higher total cash costs per hectare of rice field (2.2 million kip to 1.8 million kip);
however, this difference is not statistically significant.
Material costs
Contract farmers have significantly higher (cash) material costs than non-contract farmers,
averaging 1,474 thousand kip/ha of rice field compared with 920,000 kip/ha. The difference
was also significant for material costs per kilogram of rice production (852 kip/kg compared
with 462 kip/kg). For both contract and non-contract farmers, fertilizer is the largest material
expense. Contract farmers, however, have significantly higher fertilizer costs, spending on
average 814,000 kip/ha, compared with 528,000 kip/ha for non-contract farmers.
Similarly, contract farmers also have significantly higher seed costs than non-contract
farmers, both per hectare (283,000 kip/ha compared with 81,000 kip/ha) and per kilo of rice
production (192 kip/kg compared with 41 kip/kg).
On average, contract and non-contract farmers do not differ significantly in the use of
compost, pesticides, irrigation, or machine rental cost (Table 3).
Table 3: Material Cost Structure for Commercial Operation
Contract
Total material cost (1,000 kip/ha)
Total material cost (kip/kg)
1,474
852
NonContract
920
462
Seed cost (1,000 kip/ha)
Seed cost (kip per kg of rice production)
Seed price (kip/kg)
283
192
2,842
81
41
1,913
0.0009
0.0144
0.0000
Fertilizer cost (1,000 kip/ha)
Fertilizer cost (kip per kg of rice production)
Fertilizer price (kip/kg)
814
429
3,347
528
272
3,231
0.0567
0.1239
0.2223
Pesticide cost (1,000 kip/ha)
Pesticide cost (kip per kg of rice production)
0.31
2.78
0.33
1.67
0.9256
0.4733
Irrigation cost (1,000 kip/ha)
Irrigation cost (kip per kg of rice production)
180
107
137
74
0.2203
0.1885
Rental machine cost (1,000 kip/ha)
Rental machine cost (kip per kg of rice production)
136
82
166
71
0.4686
0.6249
Variables
* See footnote in Table 1.
9
p-value*
0.0044
0.0127
ADBI Discussion Paper 90
Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
Labor structure
Commercial production under contract is significantly more labor intensive than production
outside of the contract, requiring an average of 147 days of labor per hectare compared with
88 days per hectare for non-contract farms (Table 5). In terms of labor composition, family
labor accounts for 80% of contract farms’ total labor and 67% of non-contract farms’ total
labor. The amount and cost of hired labor does not differ significantly between contract and
non-contract farmers. On average, the cost of hired labor for contract farms was 783,000
kip/ha, compared with 792,000 kip/ha for non-contract farms. Contract farms used slightly
more female hired labor than non-contract farms, although the difference is not significant.
Table 4: Labor Cost Structure for Commercial Operation
Contract
Hired labor (days/ha)
Hired labor cost (1,000 kip/ha)
Hired labor cost (kip/kg)
Ratio of females in hired labor (%)
26.0
783
431
59
NonContract
24.1
792
442
52
Family labor (days/ha)
Family labor (kg/day)
118.4
55.7
58.8
60.7
0.0000
0.5378
Total labor (days/ha)
Ratio of family labor in total labor (%)
Ratio of hired labor in total labor (%)
146.4
80
20
87.8
67
33
0.0006
0.0015
0.0015
Variables
p-value*
0.7985
0.9563
0.9010
0.1593
* See footnote in Table 1.
Profitability
Although they have higher costs than non-contract farmers, contract farmers are
compensated by higher yields and price premiums. As a result, contract farmers are
significantly more profitable than farmers outside the contract, earning an average of
2,924,000 kip/ha of rice field, compared with the 1,751,000 kip/ha earned by non-contract
farmers.
VII.
PROPENSITY SCORE AND MATCHING ANALYSIS
In an impact assessment study, one of the most difficult issues is the possibility of selection
biases. This problem occurs because we would like to know the effect of a treatment on the
participants’ outcome but cannot observe the outcomes with and without treatment on the
same individual at the same time. Simply comparing mean outcomes may not reveal the
actual treatment effect, as participants and non-participants typically differ even in the
absence of treatment (Caliendo and Kopeining, 2005). For example, contract farmers may
differ systematically from non-contract farmers and the above simple mean comparisons
may reflect differences in their characteristics rather than the impacts of contract farming. In
other words, failure to account for treatment selection biases may lead to biased estimation
of the true treatment effect.
The propensity scoring matching (PSM) method (Becker and Ichino, 2002) provides a more
refined method of comparing the performance of contract and non-contract farmers by
accounting for their inherent differences. The basic concept is to compare contract farmers
to non-contract farmers who are similar to contract farmers in all relevant characteristics
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Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
except the contract. The differences in the outcomes of contract farmers and the selected
non-contract farmers can then be attributed to the contract.
The first step of the PSM approach is to estimate farmers’ propensity scores based on their
basic characteristics (i.e., characteristics that are not affected by the choice of contract). The
propensity score of each farmer measures his tendency to join the contract. The magnitude
of a propensity score ranges between 0 and 1; the larger the score, the more likely the
farmer is to join the contract.
After farmers’ propensity scores are estimated, the second step is to divide farmers into
groups of similar propensity scores. In addition, each group should be balanced, containing
farmers who do not have significantly different characteristics.
After the balanced groups are formed, we can compare the performance of contract and
non-contract farmers in each group. As such comparisons are based on stratification control
for the differences of farmers’ characteristics, the performance differences between contract
and non-contract farmers would be more likely caused by contract farming rather than
farmers’ intrinsic characteristics.
Finally, the performance difference between contract and non-contract farmers can be
measured by the weighted average of the contract and non-contract differences in each
group, with the number of observations in each group as the weights.
The propensity score approach is used here to compare contract farmers’ and non-contract
farmers’ performance in their commercial operation. The following variables are used in the
propensity score estimation: 1) farm size; 2) number of adult family members; 3) ratio of
females in the family; 4) value of production assets; 5) value of consumption assets; 6) value
of transportation assets; 7) farm distance to highway; and 8) farm distance to market.
Table 5 presents the differences in the performance of contract and non-contract farms,
using simple mean and propensity score matching comparisons. The findings of the PSM
comparisons are consistent with the results of the simple mean comparisons. They indicate
that contract farms have higher revenue, rice price, yield, cash costs, and profit than noncontract farms, and that the results are statistically significant.
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ADBI Discussion Paper 90
Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
Table 5: Propensity Score Matching Comparison
of Contract and Non-Contract Farms
Difference (Contract minus Non-Contract)
Variables
Simple Mean
PSM Comparison
Revenue (1000 kip/ha)
p-value
1,710
0.0008
1,949
0.0000
Rice Price (kip/kg)
p-value
243
0.0000
266
0.0000
Yield (kg/ha)
p-value
669
0.0420
794
0.0058
Cash Cost (1,000 kip/ha)
p-value
473
0.1102
564
0.0542
Cash Cost (kip/kg)
p-value
354
0.0830
343
0.0360
Cash Profit (1,000 kip/ha)
p-value
1,173
0.0307
1,296
0.0013
The use of PSM to minimize selectivity bias thus suggests that these differences are the
result of contract farming rather than the intrinsic characteristics of the sampled households.
However, like the simple mean comparison, PSM may misinterpret the treatment effect,
because it only controls for observed variables, and hidden self-selectivity bias may remain.
As the decision to join the contract is voluntary and is based on individual self-selection, it is
possible that contract farmers have systematically different unobserved characteristics from
non-contract farmers. For example, farmers’ motivation may be an unobserved covariate
affecting both their performance and their decision to join the contract. To address these
unobservable selection biases, we employ an endogenous switching regression model as
described below.
VIII.
SWITCHING REGRESSION
Consider the following selection model that describes farmers’ choices of joining the contract
and their performance with and without the contract:
If
γZ i + u i > 0 , farmer i chooses to join the contract, which is described by I i = 1 ;
If
γZ i + u i ≤ 0 , farmer i chooses not to join the contract, which is described by I i = 0 ;
Farmer i's profitability with the contract (
I i = 1 ) is y1i = β 1 X 1i + ε 1i ;
Farmer i's profitability without the contract (
Ii = 0
12
) is
y 0i = β 0 X 0i + ε 0i
;
ADBI Discussion Paper 90
Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
In the model, Zi is a vector of farm characteristics that affect farmers’ decision to join the
contract; X1i and X0i are two vectors of farm characteristics that affect farmers’ performance
under the contract and without the contract; and y1i and y0i are dependent variables
measuring farmers’ profitability. γ, β1 and β0 are vectors of parameters to be estimated. ui, ε1i,
and ε0i are three random error terms that follow a trivariate normal distribution.
After the parameters are estimated, we can calculate:
xb1i = E ( y1i x1i ) = x1i β1
(1)
xb0i = E ( y 0i x0i ) = x0i β 0
(2)
yc1 _ 1i = E ( y1i I i = 1, x1i ) = x1i β1 + σ 1 ρ1 f (γZ i ) / F (γZ i )
(3)
yc0 _ 1i = E ( y 0i I i = 1, x1i ) = x1i β 0 + σ 0 ρ 0 f (γZ i ) / F (γZ i )
(4)
yc0 _ 0i = E ( y 0i I i = 0, x0i ) = x0i β 0 − σ 0 ρ 0 f (γZ i ) /[1 − F (γZ i )]
(5)
yc1 _ 0i = E ( y1i I i = 0, x0i ) = x0i β 1 − σ 1 ρ1 f (γZ i ) /[1 − F (γZ i )]
(6)
xb1i represents the unconditional expectation of farmers’ performance under the contract;
xb0i represents the unconditional expectation of farmers’ performance without the contract;
yc1_1i represents the conditional expectation of contract farmers’ performance under the
contract; yc0_1i represents the conditional expectation of contract farmers’ performance
without the contract; yc0_0i represents the conditional expectation of non-contract farmers’
performance without the contract; and yc1_0i represents the conditional expectation of noncontract farmers’ performance under the contract. σ 1 and σ 0 are the standard errors of ε1i,
and ε0i; ρ1 is the correlation coefficient between ε1i and ui; ρ 0 is the correlation coefficient
between ε0i and μ i ; f(.) is the normal density function; and F[.] is the cumulative normal
distribution.
Indicators for premiums of joining the contract
yc1 _ 1i and yc0 _ 1i represent, respectively, the average of contract farmers’ actual
performance under the contract and the average of their counterfactual performance without
the contract. The difference Π 1 = yc1 _ 1i − yc0 _ 1i provides a measure of the impact of contract
farming on the performance of farmers who actually chose to join the contract. Π 1 > 0 (or
Π 1 < 0 ) would indicate a positive (or negative) impact of contract farming. Similarly,
Π 0 = yc1 _ 0i − yc0 _ 0i provides a measure of the impact of contract farming on the
performance of farmers who actually chose not to join the contract.
Indicators for selection bias
The estimated correlation coefficients, ρ 0 and ρ1 , provide interesting insights of the
sampled farms in choosing the contractual arrangement. For example, ρ1 > 0 would
indicate that farms that actually chose to enter the contractual arrangement have above-
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ADBI Discussion Paper 90
Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
average performance under the contract. The average performance in this case is defined
as xi β1 , assuming all farms in the sample were subjected to the contractual arrangement. In
other
words,
the contract.
a
positive
ρ1
implies
“positive
selection”
into
choosing
Furthermore, if non-contract farms had in fact chosen to join the contract, their performance
would be worse than those farms that actually chose to enter the contract. On the other
hand, ρ1 < 0 implies “negative selection” into choosing the contract, or farms that actually
chose to enter the contractual arrangement have below-average performance under the
contract. In this case, if the non-contract farms had in fact chosen to join the contract, their
performance would have been above that of the contracted farms.
Conversely, ρ 0 > 0 implies “negative selection” into not choosing the contract for the noncontract farms. In other words, non-contract farms have below-average performance, and if
the contract farms had in fact chosen not to join the contract, their performance would have
been better than that of the non-contract farms.
If ρ 0 < 0 , there is “positive selection” into not choosing the contract for the non-contract
farms, or farms that actually chose not to enter the contract have above average
performance without the contract. In this case, if the contract farms had in fact chosen to not
join the contract, their performance would have been worse than that of the non-contract
farms.
Following Maddala (1983) and Hamilton and Nickerson (2003) but using the correlation
coefficients instead of the covariances, four interesting cases can be discerned from the two
correlation coefficients.
Case 1: ρ 0 < 0 and ρ1 > 0
In this case, farms that chose to enter the contractual agreement have above average
performance under the contract, while farms that chose to stay outside the contract have
above average performance without the contract.3 In other words, both contract and noncontract farms chose the correct or appropriate tactics by which they have relative
advantage. This case may be characterized as a situation where both contract and noncontract farms are in fact capturing their “comparative advantage.”
Case 2: ρ 0 > 0 and ρ1 > 0
In this case, farms that actually chose to enter the contract (i.e., the contract farms) would
have above-average performance whether they are under the contract or without the
contract. In other words, contract farms have an “absolute advantage” in the sense that they
have above-average performance with or without the contract. Conversely, non-contract
farms in general have below-average performance whether they are under the contract or
without the contract.
Case 3: ρ 0 < 0 and ρ1 < 0
3
The “average performance under the contract” in this report means the average of the performance of all
farmers (irrespective of their actual contract choices) if they are under the contract. The “average performance
without the contract” in this report means the average of the performance of all farmers (irrespective of their
actual contract choices) if they are without the contract.
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ADBI Discussion Paper 90
Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
In contrast to case 2, non-contract farms in this case have an “absolute advantage” in the
sense that they tend to have below-average performance both under the contract and
without the contract, while contract farms have below-average performance both under the
contract and without the contract.
Case 4: ρ 0 > 0 and ρ1 < 0
In this case, contract farms would in general have below-average performance under the
contract but above-average performance without the contract, while non-contract farms
would have above-average performance under the contract but below-average performance
without the contract. In this sense, farms chose the tactics that provide them “comparative
disadvantage.” This would not happen most of the time except when there are factors that
may force farms to adopt less-desirable tactics.
Comparison of contract farmers’ and non-contract farmers’ profitability in commercial
rice farming
Based on the above switching regression model, we use “movestay” module (Lokshin and
Sajaia, 2004) in the STATA program to evaluate factors that affect farmers’ decisions to join
the contract and their performance with or without the contract. We measure farmers’
performance by their profits per hectare in their commercial operations.
The selection model includes the following variables: household characteristics, including
family size and ratio of females in the household; and farm characteristics, including farm
size, value of production assets, value of consumption assets, value of transportation assets,
the distance of the farm to the market and the distance of the farm to the highway. The profit
functions4 include farm size, family size, and the value of consumption assets. The estimated
results of the selection model and profit functions are presented in Appendix Tables A.1 and
A.2, respectively. The overall model is significant at the 10% level as indicated by Wald’s χ2.
Using the indicators described above, the premiums from joining the contract and their
selection bias indicators are calculated. Figure 2 depicts the distribution of contract and noncontract farmers’ profits under contract and without the contract.
The counterfactual analysis indicates that both contract and non-contract farmers tend to
increase their profitability by joining the contract. The contract farmers’ profits under contract
(bottom left graph) are on average higher than their counterfactual profits without the
contract (top left graph). Joining the contract is estimated to have increased the profits of
contract farmers by 4.63 million kip. In the case of non-contract farmers, the counterfactual
profits under contract (bottom right graph) are on average higher than the actual profits
outside the contract (top right graph). In other words, the profits of non-contract farmers
would have increased by 3.21 million kip had they joined the contract.
4
Due to the unavailability of data to formulate a traditional profit function, we resort to a more “ad hoc”
specification in this case.
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ADBI Discussion Paper 90
Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
Figure 3: Profitability Comparison of Contract and Non-Contract Farmers
10
20
30
40
Non-contract Farmers
0
perc entage of farmers
Contract Farmers
-20
-10
0
10
20 -20
-10
0
10
20
10
20
Profits Without Contract (million Kip)
Graphs by contract_type1
10
20
30
40
Non-contract Farmers
0
perc entage of farmers
Contract Farmers
-20
-10
0
10
20 -20
-10
0
Profits Under Contract (million Kip)
Graphs by contract_type1
As shown in Appendix Table A.1, the estimated ρ0 and ρ1 are both negative, although ρ1 is
not statistically significant. This pattern is described above as case 3, indicating that contract
farmers have below-average performance both under contract and without the contract. In
other words, contract farmers are less profitable than non-contract farmers, both under
contract and without the contract. This suggests that the observed higher profitability of
contract farming is not due to contract farming attracting more profitable farms; rather,
contract farming tends to be more attractive and more beneficial to farmers with relatively
low performance.
IX.
CONCLUSION
The rapid expansion of contract farming in the Lao PDR necessitates the empirical
verification of its impacts on farmers. As we cannot compare the same farmer both under
contract and outside the contract, we must estimate the average impact of contract farming
by comparing groups of contract and non-contract farmers. As contract farmers may be
different, however, from non-contract farmers in many ways and the decision to join the
contract is voluntary, these unobservable factors may lead to selection and self-selection
biases. Controlling for these biases is generally the most difficult part of an impact
assessment study.
To account for the possible occurrence of selection bias and disentangle the effects of
contract farming, this study employed propensity score matching comparison methodology.
The findings of the PSM comparison confirm the results of the initial assessment and verify
that the higher revenue and profitability of contract farms are the result of joining contract
farming, rather than systematic differences between contract and non-contract farms.
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ADBI Discussion Paper 90
Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
To control for potential hidden self-selection biases affecting their decisions to join the
contract, farmers’ performance with and without the contract was evaluated using an
endogenous switching regression model. The results of the switching regression provide
evidence that contract farming tends to be more profitable than non-contract farming, and
suggests that the higher profitability of contract farms is not the result of farms with higher
profit potential joining the contract. In fact, the counterfactual simulations indicate that
contract farmers would have lower profits than non-contract farms if they operated outside of
the contract. In other words, contract farming is particularly attractive to farmers with
relatively poor performance. This finding has strong development implications as it implies
that better-off farmers may have better access to information on production and markets and
therefore choose to produce independently rather than taking on the burden of fulfilling the
requirements of a contract. In this context, the contract farming arrangement is an attractive
development tool as it effectively targets relatively poor-performing farmers, who require the
most support.
The results of the empirical analysis support the claim that contract farming is an effective
tool to increase the incomes of smallholder farmers in rural areas where market failure is
prevalent. The findings show that the sampled contract rice farmers cultivated higheryielding, improved rice varieties and earned higher incomes than non-contract rice farmers
under similar agro-ecosystem and socioeconomic conditions. The sampled contract farmers
have better access to inputs and credit and an assured market for their produce, which
enables them to earn higher profits. The evidence also suggests that contract farmers are
more likely to diversify production into other commercial crops or livestock, leading to
increased incomes and more secure livelihoods. The contract arrangement thus appears to
be effective in facilitating the transition of small farmers from subsistence to commercial
production.
The role of extending new technology to improve the productivity of the agricultural sector is
traditionally performed by the public sector. Moving the vast number of subsistence farmers
toward commercial production, however, requires enormous public sector resources that are
generally unavailable in transition economies such as the Lao PDR. This study shows that
promoting contract farming arrangements to draw FDI into the rural sector has been a policy
in the right direction.
Through contract farming, the private sector effectively extends new production technology
and facilitates access to modern inputs and remote markets offering higher prices. This
translates into improved incomes and an effective transformation from subsistence to
commercial production with no financial burden to the public sector. Contract farming
appears to be particularly appropriate for rural areas where transport infrastructure has
recently been established and in transition economies where institutions to facilitate market
exchange are in an early stage of development.
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Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
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Available:
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Setboonsarng, Sununtar, P.S. Leung, and J. Cai. 2006. Contract Farming and Poverty
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Setboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan
APPENDIX
Table A.1 Endogenous Switching Regression Estimation Results
(The Lao PDR Conventional Rice Farming)
Number of observations: 295 (241 contract conventional farmers; 54 non-contract conventional
farmers)
Wald chi2(10) = 10.73
Prob > chi2 = 0.0971
Log likelihood = 531.89
Selection Model
Land (farm size)
Labor (family size)
Capital (production assets)
Capital X Labor
Capital X Land
Land X Labor
Ratio of females in
household
Transportation assets
Consumption assets
Distance to highway
Distance to market
Constant
σ0
σ1
ρ0
ρ1
Coefficient
-0.7840
0.2806
0.0189
-0.0260
-0.0125
0.5750
Std. Err.
0.3993
0.3543
0.0389
0.0266
0.0160
0.2832
z
-1.9600
0.7900
0.4900
-0.9800
-0.7800
2.0300
P>z
0.0500
0.4280
0.6270
0.3290
0.4350
0.0420
-0.7022
0.0056
0.0208
0.1529
0.2175
0.0350
0.5208
0.0181
0.0198
0.1166
0.0761
0.6253
-1.3500
0.3100
1.0500
1.3100
2.8600
0.0600
0.1780
0.7560
0.2930
0.1890
0.0040
0.9550
0.0153
0.0307
-0.7218
-0.2038
0.0027
0.0015
0.1504
0.2069
z
P>z
Table A.2 Profit Functions
Profit Functions
Coefficient
Std. Err.
Profit without contract
Land (farm size)
Labor (family size)
Capital (production assets)
Capital X Labor
Capital X Land
Land X Labor
Constant
0.0154
-0.0024
-0.0006
0.0008
-0.0007
-0.0092
18.9919
0.0114
0.0081
0.0010
0.0007
0.0004
0.0078
0.0128
1.3500
-0.3000
-0.6700
1.1400
-1.8200
-1.1800
1,485.7300
0.1780
0.7640
0.5040
0.2550
0.0680
0.2380
0.0000
Profit under contract
Land (farm size)
Labor (family size)
Capital (production assets)
Capital X Labor
Capital X Land
Land X Labor
Constant
-0.0131
0.0014
0.0002
0.0001
0.0000
0.0065
19.0099
0.0083
0.0071
0.0007
0.0005
0.0003
0.0058
0.0102
-1.5700
0.1900
0.2700
0.1200
0.0800
1.1100
1,859.1200
0.1150
0.8480
0.7860
0.9030
0.9390
0.2670
0.0000
20