NON-CIRCULATING j
|.JN L I B R A £
YUN INTERVIEW
•: : A WALTER EYTAN ' . ; . " U, .,
n
JUNE 20. 1990
v
„ . ~f)n
....
X)Hi j / , COLLEC1
NEW YORK CITY. NEW YORK
'"
INTERVIEWER. JEAN KRASNO
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOUNDING OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
Positions Held by Mr. Eytan
1/2,4
The Jewish Agency
2-5,7,10,11
The New York Delegation
4,5
Statehood and P a r t i t i o n
6-9
UN Special Committee on Palestine
6-8,12,28
General Assembly
7,8,11
Jerusalem
8-12,26,28,40
The Fighting . . .
11,12,24,29,39,40
The B r i t i s h Role
13,18,19,21
Declaring Independence
15-18
The Palestine Committee .
19-21
The Truce
22-24
UN Mediation
25,26,27
Armistice Negotiations at Rhodes
27-41
UN C o n c i l i a t i o n Commission
35,44,45
Mixed Armistice Commission
39,41
UNTSO
42
1
JK:
For the record, Mr. Eytan, could you please explain the
role
that
you
establishment
played
of
during
the
state
between the years of
1947
the
of
and
time
Israel
around
the
approximately
1949?
When d i d your
involvement with Palestine begin?
Eytan:
My
involvement with Palestine began much e a r l i e r , i n
1933.
But
i n 1933
there was
no
UN
and
a l l these
questions that you are r a i s i n g don't r e a l l y apply.
1947 I was i n Jerusalem.
department
In
I was a member of the p o l i t i c a l
of the Jewish Agency f o r Palestine.
I came
out then to New York as a member of the Jewish Agency's
delegation at the meeting
of the General Assembly i n
September, October, and November of 1947.
back
to
Palestine,
independent i n 1948
and
I was
then
when
I then went
Israel
appointed the f i r s t
General of the M i n i s t r y f o r Foreign A f f a i r s .
became
Director
That was a
post I held f o r eleven and one h a l f years, u n t i l I became
Ambassador to France.
While I was Director General
of the M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s , more or l e s s by a
fluke
I
became
the
head
of
our
delegation to
armistice negotiations with Egypt at Rhodes.
January 12th to February 25th I was
I
was
the
Conference
head
which
of
our
was
delegation to
called
by
the
C o n c i l i a t i o n Commission f o r Palestine.
1
So, from
i n Rhodes.
that, i f you are s t i l l interested i n my UN
the
After
involvement,
the
United
Lausanne
Nations
I was i n Lausanne
from A p r i l ,
1949 t i l about J u l y of that year.
came back t o Jerusalem.
Then I
And that about accounts f o r my
x
doings i n M7, M8* and 49.
JK:
Good, that establishes a good base so that we can go on
to some of the s p e c i f i c questions about that time.
So,
you were with the Jewish Agency i n Jerusalem and came to
New York f o r the General Assembly i n the f a l l of 1947.
At
that
time was the Jewish Agency representing the
Jewish community of Palestine?
Eytan:
Absolutely, i t was the one and only representative of the
Jewish community i n Palestine.
JK:
Was there opposition to that
Eytan:
No, i t was accepted by everybody.
JK:
Who e l s e worked with you i n New York?
Eytan:
Oh, there was a tremendous delegation.
New York.
representation?
Everybody was i n
I think that I should mention that the Jewish
Agency of Palestine, j u s t
like
the Jewish Agency f o r
I s r a e l which s t i l l e x i s t s i n rather attentuated form, was
composed
partly
Palestine i t s e l f ,
of
representatives
of people
from
as from I s r a e l now, and p a r t l y from
representatives from what i s c a l l e d world Jewry.
the main spokesmen i n the f a l l
One of
of 1947 was Rabbi Abba
H i l l e l S i l v e r of Cleveland who was a great man i n h i s
day, a b i g , t a l l , massive, handsome, and e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y
eloquent man and not easy to get on with.
others.
And there were
From Palestine there were not only members of
2
the executive of the Jewish Agency l i k e Mr. Moshe Sharett
who at that time was s t i l l c a l l e d Shertok.
original
name.
He was the head
That was h i s
of the p o l i t i c a l
department of the Jewish Agency of which I was a member.
There were also representatives of the various p o l i t i c a l
p a r t i e s , some whom I remember and most of whom I don't
remember. Just to mention two that I happen to remember,
one
was a man who at that
Rubashov.
time
was c a l l e d
Zalman
He Hebraized h i s name afterwards t o Shazar.
He became the t h i r d president of I s r a e l .
Another was a
man who at that time was c a l l e d Pinchas Rosenblut and he
l a t e r shortened and Hebraized i t t o Rosen.
He l a t e r
became M i n i s t e r of J u s t i c e i n the I s r a e l i government. I
think he was the best Minister of J u s t i c e we ever had.
There were other p o l i t i c a l representatives representing
the
different
particularly
represented
political
parties.
These
were not
easy people t o get on with because
different
political
views.
They
always get along very well with each other.
they
didn't
There was
always a tremendous amount of argument.
I f you are interested i n what my
job was a t the time, my job was t o organize the whole
delegation i n New York at t h i s time.
n o n - p o l i t i c a l person.
I was completely a
I belonged t o no p o l i t i c a l party
and I have not belonged t o a p o l i t i c a l party since.
I
was and I saw myself as a c i v i l servant and so everybody
3
was on more or l e s s good terms with me.
or l e s s trusted me.
delegation.
Everybody more
I d i d the organizing work f o r the
That i s to say, I hardly ever went to a
meeting of the General Assembly.
In f a c t , I don't think
I went to the General Assembly which I think was
Flushing Meadows at that time.
at
I went out there maybe
once or twice j u s t to get the scene, to see how things
were running and how things were organized.
But, my job was
i n New York.
i n the o f f i c e of the Jewish Agency
We had a meeting of the whole delegation i n
the morning which I was responsible f o r organizing. And
then we had a debriefing session i n the evening when the
people a l l came back from Flushing Meadows. When people
came back i n the evening they usually came back with
requests.
I remember once a man named Moshe Tov who
was
our expert f o r L a t i n America came to me.
The L a t i n American countries at that time formed more
than one t h i r d
of the t o t a l membership of the United
Nations. The t o t a l membership of the United Nations then
was 57 including 20 L a t i n American countries.
were very important
important f o r us.
one
evening
So, they
f o r us and t h e i r votes were very
I remember very well Tov came back
saying that the Argentine delegation had
requested a memo on some t o p i c that he had spoken to them
about.
They wanted to see i t i n w r i t i n g .
I see that he had i t
He asked would
f i r s t thing the following morning
4
of the Special Committee which the Assembly had
appointed
at the extraordinary meeting i n the spring of that year.
The
recommendation
was
for
conditions f o r p a r t i t i o n .
this
i s an
statehood.
There
were
But, i n f a c t , and I think that
important point, the whole debate f o r the
whole of the two months at the UN r e a l l y d i d not so much
turn on the
there
should
idea of p a r t i t i o n but,
be
a Jewish
state.
on whether or
No
one
was
really
interested i n an Arab state because the Arabs had
they didn't want one.
not
said
The debate was not f o r or against
an Arab state or f o r or against p a r t i t i o n as such, as an
ideal.
Whether or not there should be a Jewish state was
the r e a l t o p i c of
100% emphasis was
debate at the General Assembly.
on that.
JK:
The recommendation of the Committee was
Eytan:
I t was
a
And
majority
recommendation.
for partition.
I
think
something l i k e by a vote of eight to three.
it
was
I t was a big
majority but i t had not been unanimous.
JK:
Then the General Assembly d i d adopt that r e s o l u t i o n .
Eytan:
The
General
Assembly
adopted
r e q u i s i t e two-third majority.
the
r e s o l u t i o n by
the
I remember the voting, 33
voted f o r and 13 against and 10 abstained and one didn't
turn up.
I think that was
Thailand.
I t was
Siam i n
those days.
The job of our delegation was not merely to
explain why
a Jewish state was
6
necessary but,
also an
to give t o them.
would then
required
So, i t was that sort of job I d i d .
s i t down u n t i l
and prepare
delegation with i t .
whatever time
a l l this
I
at night i t
so I could equip the
Of course they didn't a l l come every
day with requests f o r memos but, I j u s t give that as an
example because i t stuck i n my mind.
So, I had r e a l l y no personal experience, or hardly
any, of the debates i n the General Assembly i t s e l f .
I
d i d the d u l l work organizing the whole thing.
Incidentally, one of the people there was Abba Eban.
He was also a member of that group.
a pretty large group.
A l l together i t was
I think i n our morning meetings we
something l i k e twenty people.
JK:
What was the p o l i c y of the Jewish Agency at the time?
What was the p o s i t i o n
on statehood,
f o r example, or
partition?
Eytan:
The p o l i c y was 100% support.
We were not so interested
i n p a r t i t i o n as such, p a r t i t i o n as a p r i n c i p l e or as an
i d e a l but, we were very interested i n Jewish independence
and the establishment of a Jewish state which had been
recommended by the UN Special Committee on Palestine at
the very beginning
of that
session.
They had been
instructed t o have t h e i r report i n by September 1st and
they had i t i n by September 1st.
I think the session of
the General Assembly started on September 23rd.
The debate i n the General Assembly was on the report
5
important,
votes.
practical
job was
to garner
a l l possible
The idea of an independent Jewish state was
new.
Hind you, i t had been recommended ten years e a r l i e r by
the B r i t i s h Royal Commission, the Peel Commission i n
1937.
But,
nevertheless, there
objections and reservations.
a l l kinds
of
So, one had to make sure to
get every possible vote because
majority f o r something
were
to get a two
thirds
that could be pretty debatable
wasn't a l l that easy.
JK:
Were there parts of that r e s o l u t i o n that was passed by
the General Assembly
that
the Jewish
Agency d i d not
p a r t i c u l a r l y approve of but they went along with simply
to pass the resolution?
Eytan:
Oh sure, nobody on the Jewish side was t h r i l l e d with the
way the UN Committee had drawn i t s map.
odd map.
They drew a very
I t was drawn i n such a way that Palestine was
divided into s i x parts, three to be Jewish and three to
be Arab.
I t was drawn i n such a way that they met at two
points which were c a l l e d k i s s i n g points.
touched.
without
Where they just
You could go through the proposed Arab state
ever
touching Jewish
territory
and
could go
s i m i l a r l y through the Jewish state without touching Arab
territory.
I t was a very odd looking map.
S t i l l , that
was i t and i t was better than nothing.
The
other
thing
was
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of Jerusalem.
7
the
proposed
About Jerusalem I ' l l
j u s t say t h i s .
Speaking h i s t o r i c a l l y a long way before
the UN, there was always a problem with Jerusalem.
The
problem of Jerusalem existed i n the days of the Ottoman
Empire
long,
Palestine.
long
before
there
was
And i t existed because
the problem
of
there were so many
d i f f e r e n t churches a l l f i g h t i n g f o r leadership and f o r
what nowadays we would c a l l t u r f .
Quite apart from a l l
the many C h r i s t i a n sects there were Jews and Moslems and
they weren't united e i t h e r .
very d i f f i c u l t
So, Jerusalem was always a
question.
The B r i t i s h Royal
Commission had t r i e d to solve the question of Palestine
by saying that the country
should be p a r t i t i o n e d , h a l f Jewish, h a l f Arab.
side
wanted
the whole.
recommendation, and t h i s
Incidentally,
Only each
the
basic
i s a c t u a l l y written i n t h e i r
report, was based on the o l d saying that h a l f a loaf i s
better than no bread.
English.
I still
That was the way they put i t i n
remember the English phrase.
The
recommendation was that Jerusalem and the area around
Jerusalem should remain under B r i t i s h mandate.
That was
an elegant way of both evading the Jerusalem question and
insuring f o r B r i t a i n a continued foothold i n the Middle
East.
They had that i n mind as w e l l .
When i t
came to the UN s p e c i a l committee they also took Jerusalem
out of the r e s t
of Palestine because
i t was so much
disputed between the d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s .
They recommended
8
that an i n t e r n a t i o n a l regime be established.
Jews have
always regarded Jerusalem as t h e i r s , as t h e i r h i s t o r i c
capital.
I t goes back to David, King of I s r a e l 3,000
years ago.
So, the thought of not being i n Jerusalem was
a t e r r i b l e thing.
However, i f that was the p r i c e to be
paid f o r Jewish independence we r e a l l y had no choice but
to swallow i t .
I w i l l t e l l you something else on
t h i s subject. In s p i t e of a l l the annoyance, anger, and
reservations about Jerusalem, what made i t palatable, or
l e s s unpalatable, was the proviso incorporated actually
into the General Assembly's r e s o l u t i o n of November 29th
that t h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l regime should be i n s t i t u t e d for
a period of ten years.
In fact, I think i t said a period
not exceeding ten years. A f t e r which by a referendum the
people of the c i t y would be asked whether they wanted i t
modified.
At that time the population of Jerusalem was
165,000. I t ' s much more now but then i t was 165,000.
this
100,000 were Jews and
others.
65,000 were Moslems
Of
and
The Jewish Agency had absolutely no doubt as to
what the outcome of the referendum would be.
So, they
saw the i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of Jerusalem as
something
that they would have to swallow f o r as much as ten years
and then afterwards the thing would r i g h t i t s e l f .
s p i t e of a l l the reservations about i t ,
i t was accepted
as part and parcel of the proposed settlement.
JK:
Why was t h i s r e s o l u t i o n not implemented?
9
In
Eytan:
I t was not implemented f o r the simple reason that the
Arabs refused i t .
do with i t .
The Arabs would never have anything to
The Arabs claimed, as they s t i l l claim, the
whole of Palestine and would absolutely not compromise.
That was why the B r i t i s h Royal Commission recommendation
in
1937
was
not
implemented,
immediately rejected i t .
because
the
Arabs
I f you have a recommendation or
a proposed s o l u t i o n which depends on the cooperation of
the two sides and one side says absolutely not, I won't
have anything t o do with i t , then there i s nothing you
can do.
What happened, i n fact, was when the day came we
implemented our part and proclaimed the independence of
Israel.
On that same day the Arabs t r i e d to subvert the
whole thing by sending i n t h e i r armies.
Then there was
warfare which lasted most of 1948.
JK:
Shortly a f t e r the r e s o l u t i o n was passed i n the General
Assembly that f a l l f i g h t i n g broke out.
Eytan:
The next day.
JK:
Was t h i s a reaction by the Arabs to the resolution?
Eytan:
Of course.
There i s an area i n Jerusalem which i s c a l l e d
the commercial center. In fact, i t wasn't the commercial
center of the town but i t was a commercial
known as the commercial
center.
area and was
That very night or the
next day the Arabs came and burned i t down and finished
it.
That was within 24 hours.
That was t h e i r f i r s t sign
that they were not going to knuckle under.
10
JK:
F i g h t i n g contiued a f t e r that point?
Eytan:
A l l over the country, s p o r a d i c a l l y .
siege.
Jerusalem came under
I was i n Jerusalem throughout the siege, we were
surrounded
f i r s t by what nowadays would be c a l l e d Arab
g u e r i l l a forces.
These were not the regular armies of
any of the Arab states because the B r i t i s h mandate was
still
i n force.
The Syrians and the Egyptians and the
others could not send i n t h e i r armies as long as the
B r i t i s h were there.
guerilla
But, there were a l l these Arab
forces which were armed by the neighboring
states but operated on t h e i r own.
route t o Jerusalem.
They cut o f f the main
A f t e r independence, a f t e r May 14th,
that's when the armies came i n . We were r e a l l y cut o f f .
It
was very
interesting
to be a besieged
city
with
nothing t o eat and nothing to drink and no e l e c t r i c i t y ,
with extraordinary consequences.
JK:
I t went on f o r months.
Why d i d the B r i t i s h decide to terminate the mandate at
that point?
Eytan:
Apparently out of sheer despair. They could no longer do
anything about i t .
They had t r i e d
immediately
after
World War I I t o hold some kind of conference i n London
between themselves and the representatives of the Jewish
and Arab sides but, that l e d to nothing.
the same before the war.
They had done
I t never could lead t o anything
and i n the end they came to the conclusion that they were
11
j u s t not capable of solving the question.
They put the
whole thing i n the hands of the United Nations.
then
that
the United Nations
I t was
held the extraordianry
meeting of the General Assembly i n the spring of 1947 and
appointed the Special Committee; that i s when that whole
process started.
You have to see i t as i f you
were looking at i t
h i s t o r i c a l l y against a l l that was happening to B r t i t a i n
a f t e r World War I I .
They were no longer a great imperial
power capable of maintaining i t s e l f a l l over the world.
IN that same year of 1947 India became independent.
of the reasons that the B r i t i s h had
One
h i s t o r i c a l l y for
holding on to the Middle East, Egypt, Palestine and so
on,
f o r as
long as they
could, was
staging post on the road to India.
as
an
essential
When the Indian
empire collapsed the Middle East became very much less
important f o r them.
So, they decided to l e t the United
Nations struggle with t h i s headache.
Also, i f you take
a s l i g h t l y more l e g a l i s t i c view of the thing, the B r i t i s h
held t h e i r mandate from
the League of Nations.
League of Nations had disappeared.
holding?
So, what were they
They were r e a l l y holding something
l o s t i t s legitimacy, i t s l e g a l basis.
reason f o r handing
The
that had
That was
another
i t over to the United Nations as a
sort of successor to the League of Nations.
what happened.
12
So, that's
JK:
I n i t i a l l y Great B r i t a i n seemed to support the idea of a
homeland f o r the Jews.
But, with the establishment of
the White Papers they seemed to have gone back on that.
What was the e f f e c t of the White Papers?
Eytan:
Now
you
are taking me
back
into
a very
complicated
history.
To put i t as b r i e f l y as possible, back during
World War
I the B r i t i s h r e a l l y believed i n having what
was
c a l l e d at that time a Jewish national home.
The
B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r David Lloyd-George
said at the
time
to have the
that i t had
always been the
ideal
national home develop into a Jewish state.
There were
a l l kinds of reasons f o r being not only i n favor of i t
but enthusiastic about i t . There have been a l o t of very
good books about i t .
I n c i d e n t a l l y the most recent of
these books was not only about the Balfour declaration
but about the whole of the Middle Esat settlement.
a book by
a man
by
the name of David
It is
Fromkin which
appeared l a s t year and which the New York Times chose as
one of the 13 best books of the year i n a l l categories.
I t appeared i n 1989 c a l l e d very s a r d o n i c a l l y A Peace to
End A l l Peace.
I t t e l l s the whole story, among other
things, of the Jewish national home.
As time went on and as the Arabs were much more
numerous than the Jews, and therefore, more important and
with more natural resources, o i l and so on, the B r i t i s h
t r i e d more and more to appease them, not only t r i e d but
13
d i d appease them. That period between the two World Wars
was
a period of appeasement by the B r i t i s h and by
French.
They were always g i v i n g i n to others.
And
the
the
more they appeased the Arabs, automatically the more they
retreated from the p o l i c y of the Jewish national home.
JK:
The B r i t i s h mandate was to expire on May
14, 1948,
and up
u n t i l that point the United Nations who
had been handed
that issue had not been able to come up with a solution
other than p a r t i t i o n .
So,
on that day
I s r a e l declared
i t s independence. What other choices did I s r a e l have and
how was that decision a r r i v e d at to declare independence
on that day?
Eytan:
I t o l d you j u s t now that I was i n the siege of Jerusalem.
Being i n a besieged c i t y surrounded by enemy forces means
that you
world.
are completely cut o f f from the
r e s t of
Having p r a c t i c a l l y nothing to eat or to drink and
no e l e c t r i c i t y also meant that you
because the radio wasn't working.
i n Jerusalem.
Tel Aviv.
r e a l l y had
no news
We were very cut o f f
We had no c l e a r idea what was happening i n
I t was
being taken.
i n T e l Aviv that the decisions were
I did not hear the news.
I assumed that
independence would be declared that Friday afternoon
14th
the
but,
I had
not heard that i t had
the
happened u n t i l
sometime the
following morning,
15th.
known a l l over the world i n a few seconds
I t was
Saturday morning
May
but, i n Jerusalem by pure chance a CBS correspondent was
14
walking by my house i n Jerusalem that Saturday morning
and s a i d h e l l o and he t o l d me.
I couldn't believe i t .
Of course, I believed i t but, t h i s was about 16 to 18
hours a f t e r the r e s t of the world knew i t .
only t h i r t y miles away.
And we were
So, I honestly cannot t e l l you
What went on i n those debates.
I can t e l l you roughly
what the ideas were. There were people who had cold feet
when they saw the Arab opposition and they saw that the
Arabs were f i g h t i n g and they thought t e r r i b l e things were
going t o happen.
They even thought that a Jewish state
would never be able to defend i t s e l f .
with other ideas.
So, people came up
One of them was the United States.
The United States i n May only a few days before a l l t h i s
in
May, 1948, came up with the idea that instead of
p a r t i t i o n and the establishment of the two independent
states
which
Palestine
the General
should
trusteeship
independent
come
regime.
Assembly
had
f o r the time
In other
words
recommended,
being
that
under
a
the two
states should not be proclaimed, should not
be established.
There were people, a man that I knew who was c a l l e d
Nahum Goldmann, who was one of the representatives not
from I s r a e l .
I think he was an American c i t i z e n but who
held a p o s i t i o n i n the Jewish Agency.
He said how can we
proclaim the independence of the Jewish state at a time
even when the United States i s having doubts and very
15
l i k e l y w i l l not support i t .
anyway.
We
That was
one
alternative,
had the General Assembly's recommendation
but, he said, we don't have to carry i t out now.
The
United States i s proposing something d i f f e r e n t .
So,
there was
subject.
quite an
internal
debate
on
the
However, I never doubted that the independence
of I s r a e l would be proclaimed.
I t was too s i l l y not to.
This was the one great h i s t o r i c opportunity and who could
tell
i f i t would ever recur,
given the
international
s i t u a t i o n and also our physical s i t u a t i o n v i s - a - v i s the
Arabs.
Remember we had p r a c t i c a l l y nothing i n the way of
arms. We were surrounded by Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and
Egypt.
A l l of them with armies, not armies as strong as
they have now
but, they had greatly more than we
There must have been plenty of people who
had.
said t h i s i s
taking a r i s k and our people are going to be slaughtered.
We can't carry the moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r that.
As I say, I was
not present f o r those arguments
but, that was roughly what went on.
JK:
What
kind
of
effect
did
the
declaration
of
the
independence of I s r a e l have on the people there?
Eytan:
Enormous, enormous enthusiasm.
This was a d e c i s i v e step
and with hindsight h i s t o r i c a l l y
i t was
absolutely the
r i g h t thing to do.
JK:
There would
have been
decided.
16
a
vacuum.
Nothing
had
been
Eytan:
The B r i t i s h were leaving that very day.
vacuum.
thing.
There was a vacuum.
You said a
I t was a very curious
You know there i s never supposed t o be a vacuum
i n power.
The B r i t i s h High Commissioner f o r Palestine
l e f t Jerusalem at 8:00 on the morning of May the 14th.
The independence of I s r a e l was not proclaimed u n t i l 4:00
that afternoon.
So, during those eight hours from 8:00
i n the morning u n t i l 4:00 i n the afternoon there was, i n
f a c t , a vacuum.
Legally there was nobody i n charge.
In
p r a c t i c e people were very much i n charge on the ground.
JK:
Did the acceptance of the State of I s r a e l by the United
States and the Soviet Union which happened immediately
a f t e r the announcement of independence a f f e c t the Arab
intentions?
Eytan:
Absolutely not.
JK:
What were t h e i r intentions?
Eytan:
Their intentions were to prevent the establishment of the
Jewish
state.
To
put
i t i n dramatic
language,
" t h r o t t l i n g the infant state at b i r t h , " to prevent i t
from coming into existence.
JK:
Had they offered at any time any solutions f o r a peaceful
settlement?
Eytan:
No.
Never.
JK:
Did the B r i t i s h attempt at a l l to maintain law and order?
Eytan:
No, the B r i t i s h played a very despicable r o l e during
17
those l a s t few months and e s p e c i a l l y the l a s t few weeks.
They not only allowed
things to wind down as
they
gradually evacuated and stopped the p u b l i c services but,
they d e l i b e r a t e l y sabotaged
things.
They were almost
going t o leave something l i k e scorched earth. They were
getting out and they wanted no Jewish state.
The were
extremely uncooperative with the United Nations.
give you one example.
I will
The United Nations appointed what
i t c a l l e d the Palestine Committee r i g h t early on i n the
course of t h i s period which consisted of representatives
of f i v e countries whose job i t was to go out to Palestine
and insure orderly and peaceful t r a n s i t i o n from the hands
of the B r i t i s h into the hands of t h e o r e t i c a l l y both the
new
states.
This commission never came.
The
British
never allowed i t to come.
What the UN d i d was, i t sent what was c a l l e d an
advance party.
people.
The
The
head
advance
of
i t was
party
consisted of s i x
a man
called
Pablo
da
Azcarate. Azcarate was a Spanish Republican who had been
the l a s t Ambassador from the Spanish Republic i n London,
to the Court of Saint James's.
He was the head of t h i s
group and he was the p o l i t i c a l man.
The other three were
a Norwegian m i l i t a r y man c a l l e d Colonel Rosher Lund, an
Indian economist c a l l e d Ghosh, and a Greek l e g a l adviser
who
afterwards
became
Nations, Stavropoulos.
18
legal
adviser
to
the
United
These were the four members of
the advance party.
They were accompanied by two
lovely
s e c r e t a r i e s f o r s e c r e t a r i a l services.
When these people came the B r i t i s h were supposed to
welcome them properly and f a c i l i t a t e things f o r them to
start
their
work.
They
were
supposed
to
foundation f o r the t r a n s i t i o n of authority.
which the B r i t i s h put them into a c e l l a r .
lay
the
Instead of
Every time I
pass that house i n Jerusalem I think about them.
I t was
an underground place where there were about s i x rooms.
I t was
a cellar.
They i n s t a l l e d themselves
best they could. They couldn't do anything.
prevented them from doing anything.
with
a suitcase,
i f you
are
there the
The B r i t i s h
Azcarate came
looking f o r picturesque
d e t a i l s f o r t h i s o r a l h i s t o r y I can give you some, and i n
t h i s suitcase he c a r r i e d the whole of Spain with
That was the f i r s t thing that he unpacked.
been back to Spain since Franco had won.
back to Spain since 1939 or before.
never returned t o Spain.
Geneva.
him.
He had not
He had not been
He was i n e x i l e .
He
He died many years l a t e r i n
In t h i s suitcase he c a r r i e d pictures of Spain
and a l l kinds of memorabilia and knickknacks.
The
first
thing he d i d was t o decorate h i s room with a l l kinds of
Spanish symbols.
I t was very touching, very moving.
c a r r i e d h i s own Spain with him i n a suitcase.
very
sweet
man
but,
19
inevitably
he
was
He
He was a
completely
ineffective,
effective
ieffective
man
in
the
because
world
he
wasn't
anyway
but,
the
he
most
was
a
gentleman. He could have done h i s job i f the B r i t i s h had
l e t him.
Stavropoulos and Ghosh didn't do anything very much.
Rosher Lund, the Norwegian Colonel, was
He
i n h i s element.
couldn't do anything but, being a m i l i t a r y
enjoyed the f i g h t i n g .
man
he
A l o t of f i g h t i n g was going on,
snipers and s h e l l i n g .
A l l that interested him.
He also
went foraging a l l the time, sometimes with my help, for
whiskey and other strong drink which he
could not
without and which the B r i t i s h would not supply.
do
There
was very l i t t l e of i t i n Jerusalem at the time.
The Jewish Agency had two l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s with t h i s
group,
one
was
I
who
is
President of I s r a e l today, President Chaim Herzog.
He
was a m i l i t a r y man
and
the
other
then and I was
i s the
man
a civilian.
I was a
member of the p o l i t i c a l department of the Jewish Agency.
I t was
our job to maintain the l i a i s o n with t h i s group
and to get whatever benefit we could out of them and to
help them i n any way we could. The two g i r l
in
fact,
became cooks
because
nothing i n the way of food.
this cellar
f o r a few
the
secretaries,
British
had
done
So, these people stayed i n
weeks and
after
independent they went back to New York.
Israel
became
I f you had seen
t h i s you would have seen what was meant by the B r i t i s h
20
not cooperating.
They were d e l i b e r a t e l y t r e a t i n g these
UN representatives with disdain.
The B r i t i s h were a l l
very angry and they vented t h e i r anger on these
JK:
Eytan:
people.
At that time the Secretary-General of the United Nations
was Trygve L i e .
How a c t i v e l y
Palestine issue?
Was he supportive?
I don't know.
involved was he i n the
I had seen Trygve L i e i n New York i n 1947
but, I doubt i f I even spoke to him.
As I t o l d you my
job was an i n s i d e job and I have no r e c o l l e c t i o n of that.
JK:
There were some unsuccessful c a l l s f o r a c e a s e - f i r e by
the
Security
Council
and then
finally
a truce
was
accepted on June 11. They set the truce f o r a four week
period.
Do you have any idea why they decided on a four
week period?
Eytan:
A truce i s always a temporary thing.
g l o r i f i e d cease-fire.
A truce
is a
There are various stages of not
f i g h t i n g , one i s a c e a s e - f i r e , the next i s a truce, the
next i s an armistice. Between f i g h t i n g and not f i g h t i n g ,
between war and peace there are a l l these
stages.
So, t h i s was c a l l e d a truce.
intermediate
I also imagine
that i f they had c a l l e d f o r a longer truce I assume they
wouldn't have gotten the Arabs to accept i t .
JK:
Fighting broke out again and am I correct i n saying that
the Arabs began the f i g h t i n g
expired?
21
a day before
the truce
Eytan:
I don't know i f i t was the day before but, at that time
the truce was maintained
f o r four weeks.
The Arabs said
they would not renew i t and so the f i g h t i n g began again.
JK:
What d i d that period of time mean f o r Israel?
Eytan:
Those four weeks, well, f o r me i t meant that I was able
to get out of Jerusalem
f o r the f i r s t time.
the f i r s t night of the truce.
I got out
We l e f t i n a Jeep at 9:00
at night a f t e r i t got dark because we didn't r e a l l y t r u s t
the Arabs.
We didn't want to r i s k i t i n the daytime.
From Jerusalem t o Tel Aviv i s a matter of about 30 miles.
We l e f t Jerusalem
at 9:00 at night and we got into T e l
Aviv at 8:00 the next morning.
hours t o do 30 miles.
I t took us p r a c t i c a l l y 12
Anyway, we got there.
a c t u a l l y started my job I was Director General
Foreign M i n i s t r y .
When I
of the
Before that I had been cut o f f .
What the truce
meant f o r us was a very welcome breathing space because
we had been very hard pressed by these people.
r e a l l y very
We had
l i t t l e i n the way of defensive material.
A f t e r May 14th we had the Egyptian army and the Syrian
army and the Jordanian army and the I r a q i army and even
the Lebanese although the Lebanese didn't have very much.
They had a l l invaded our t e r r i t o r y .
and we were very hard pressed.
space.
to
They had a l l come i n
So t h i s was a breathing
We used t h i s breathing space, and they d i d too,
t r y t o redeploy and get a d d i t i o n a l weapons and that
22
kind of thing so that i f and when the f i g h t i n g resumed we
would be i n a better p o s i t i o n than we were the
first
time.
JK:
When the f i g h t i n g d i d resume . . .
Eytan:
They made the mistake of resuming the f i g h t i n g .
they only l a s t e d 10 or 12 days.
Then
They l o s t a l o t of
ground during that time and they were much worse o f f than
i f they hadn't re-started the f i g h t i n g .
We made the most
of those 10 or 12 days, l e s s than two weeks.
Then there
was another truce.
JK:
Then the truce i n J u l y took place.
Even a f t e r the truce
there was s t i l l p e r i o d i c f i g h t i n g that would break out.
Eytan:
I t was i n e v i t a b l e .
I don't remember the d e t a i l s now but,
each side was n a t u r a l l y anxious to better i t s p o s i t i o n as
much as they could.
JK:
The UN had appointed a mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte.
How e f f e c t i v e was he and was he considered neutral?
Eytan:
When Bernadotte f i r s t arrived, t h i s was a thing I have a
very c l e a r memory of, he was received very favorably.
I
s t i l l remember I was standing on the roof of the Jewish
Agency's b u i l d i n g , a pretty b i g b u i l d i n g on a h i l l and
you could get a good view from the roof, I was standing
there with a man c a l l e d Dov Yosef, who was the m i l i t a r y
governor of Jerusalem at the time.
We saw t h i s white UN
plane coming i n from the south bringing Bernadotte.
It
landed on a l i t t l e a i r f i e l d j u s t north of Jerusalem.
An
23
hour or so l a t e r Bernadotte a c t u a l l y came to the o f f i c e .
I
still
remember the
carrying Bernadotte
feeling
as the UN
feelings were very p o s i t i v e .
when t h i s
mediator
white
plane
arrived.
The
I don't know whether people
thought he would solve a l l the problems or anything l i k e
that but, i t was a r e l i e f .
As time went on and t a l k s and negotiations with him
continued the thing became s t i c k i e r and s t i c k i e r . My
own
f e e l i n g was, and s t i l l i s , that he was a reasonably well
intentioned person.
By reasonably well intentioned I
don't mean that he was on our side but, that he thought
that people shouldn't be f i g h t i n g and k i l l i n g each other.
I don't think he had any notion of the complexity of the
problem.
I'm
not
sure
that
he
was
really
i n t e l l i g e n t man but, he was a neutral, a Swede.
a member of the Royal family.
That was
of h i s specialty, to negotaite and to mediate.
were s i t t i n g with a man
trust
was
who
i n him.
that he was
That had
three years
I t gave me a spooky
think that our people had
or confidence
assumption
was.
I don't
On
terrific
the other hand, the
doing h i s best, such as i t
He d i d some very f o o l i s h things.
24
sort
I always had the f e e l i n g
before had been t a l k i n g to Himmler.
feeling.
was
He had negotiated
i n 1945 with the Nazis and with Himmler.
that here we
He
very
There were things about
him that we didn't l i k e p a r t i c u l a r l y .
been j u s t three years before.
a
The
most f o o l i s h was
that he
didn't seem to r e a l i z e ,
for
example, the extreme complexity of the whole question of
Jerusalem,
how
sensitive
proposed that the
a
subject
i t was.
whole of Jerusalem
r u l e of King Abdulla of Jordan.
And
he
be put under the
The idea of putting the
whole of Jerusalem i n the hands of an Arab king was bound
to set us against him.
I don't think that anyone would
have forgiven him f o r that.
any wicked way.
I don't think he meant i t i n
I t was j u s t the complexity of the whole
thing and the background that was beyond him.
JK:
What kind of power d i d he as a mediator have?
Was
he
j u s t supposed to go back and f o r t h between the two sides
or i f he made a proposal was
i t f e l t that i t would be
implemented?
Eytan:
No, he couldn't give orders.
i n such a way
A good mediator puts things
and makes an o f f e r that you can't refuse.
He puts things i s such a way
that he pursuades you.
order to pursuade people you
reasonable.
under an
have to be more or
To say the whole of Jerusalem
Arab king was
a
foolish
In
less
should come
thing to bring
up
because he should have known that the 100% r e s u l t would
be complete r e j e c t i o n by us.
JK:
Was there some fear that h i s recommendations would be put
into e f f e c t ?
I'm only asking because he was assassinated
shortly a f t e r that.
Eytan:
I don't think so, not by anyone who a c t u a l l y had dealings
25
with him.
I took part i n a l l kinds of meetings with him.
They were a l l p r a c t i c a l l y held on the terrace of the
small Foreign Ministry b u i l d i n g that we had i n T e l Aviv
at
that time.
I don't remember the d e t a i l s of them.
There must have been minutes kept of those discussions.
They e x i s t i n the archives.
I remember Bernadotte very
well.
He was a fine
looking man, very t a l l , quite impressive but, I must say
not t e r r i b l y i n t e l l i g e n t though.
JK:
The next thing I would l i k e to t a l k to you about i s your
involvement i n the Armistice agreements i n the I s l e of
Rhodes i n 1949. In our e a r l i e r discussions we have been
b u i l d i n g up t o that.
was assassinated
The mediatior,
i n Jerusalem
Count Bernadotte,
i n September
of 1948.
A f t e r that Ralph Bunche was named acting mediator. Did
things change a f t e r that?
How d i d Ralph Bunche operate
i n that role?
Eytan:
Ralph
Bunche had been
Bernadotte's
number
two
man,
assistant, or r i g h t hand man, so he was already involved.
I think two things helped when Bunche took over.
that Bunche was well known t o us.
One was
Bunche had been the
a s s i s t a n t secretary-general of the UN Special Committee
on Palestine back i n the spring of 1947. The secretarygeneral of the committee was a Chinese man named Mr. Hoo.
Bunche was h i s number two man.
A p r i l of 1947.
I had known Bunche since
So, by the f a l l
26
of 1948 we had known
Bunche f o r over a year.
about
a year but
Palestine
he
himself.
Bernadotte had been.
in
Not only had we known Bunche for
had
He
was
situation
much more
out i n
familiar
than
Bunche i n those respects and also
terms of i n t e l l i g e n c e
Bernadotte.
known the
was
a great improvement
on
I think that the second element probably was
that the assassination of Bernadotte
came as
such a
shock that i t automatically insured cooperation with h i s
successor whoever h i s successor might have been.
happened i t was Bunche whom we knew.
As i t
Although i t i s not
nice to say t h i s , i n fact, i t was a b i g improvement.
JK:
Then l a t e r on that f a l l the General Assembly asked that
an armistice agreement be established.
Eytan:
The
Security Council i n a r e s o l u t i o n
1948,
c a l l e d f o r an armistice.
didn't want i t .
of November
16,
There again the Arabs
We immediately said, "Okay, we'd be very
happy to negotiate armistice agreements with a l l these
countries," four of them. And the Arabs said, "no."
it
took
another
couple
of
months
m i l i t a r y f a i l u r e on t h e i r part.
went on s p o r a d i c a l l y .
or
so
of
So,
further
As you said the f i g h t i n g
By December, 1948,
and the very
f i r s t days of January, 1949, we had driven the Egyptians
back to t h e i r side of the border.
is
worth adding,
that
people
Incidentally, i t
always think that when
Jerusalem was besieged, i t was besieged by the forces of
Jordan.
In f a c t , i t was besieged by the forces of both
27
Jordan
and
Egypt.
The
Egyptians
got
Jerusalem, r i g h t into the c i t y boundary.
a long way.
right
into
They had come
They had come r i g h t through the southern
part of the country.
By the end of December, 1948, and the f i r s t days of
January,
1949,
we
had
t h e i r own t e r r i t o r y .
the S i n a i .
into
In fact, we were pursuing them into
Then the Egyptians decided to c a l l i t a day.
They had had enough.
the
driven the Egyptians back
Security
And that i s when they responded to
Council's
negotiations.
call
for
the
armistice
In fact, f i v e days l a t e r we started.
At
that point they were ready.
JK:
As you said e a r l i e r you then became head of the I s r a e l i
delegation.
Eytan:
Yes, That's r i g h t .
mediator.
full
Ralph Bunche presided.
He was the
He represented the United Nations.
staff.
He had a p o l i t i c a l
He had a
s t a f f and a m i l i t a r y
s t a f f , not an enormous number of people but quite enough.
I don't know how b i g the United Nations' party was but,
I think i t was
not less than the I s r a e l i or Egyptian
delegations.
JK:
Who
were some of the important actors?
Bunche and who
Eytan:
Yourself and
else?
Let me f i r s t of a l l t e l l you a curious thing.
head
of our
delegation.
I was
a
civilian
I was the
and
the
Director General, the permanent head, of the Ministry of
28
Foreign A f f a i r s .
The head of the Egyptian delegation was
a m i l i t a r y man c a l l e d S e i f ed-Din. He may have only been
a colonel at that time.
Later he was a general.
the head of the Egyptian delegation.
of
people
over
conclusion.
civilian,
the
Both
that
years
the
is
have
m i l i t a r y , h a l f and h a l f .
From that a l l kinds
drawn
delegations
political,
He was
the
were
following
composed
representatives
of
and
But, because our delegation was
headed by a c i v i l i a n people said,
and I think that we
ourselves f o r a long time said, that we saw the armistice
agreement
as
a
political
agreement
delegation was composed of c i v i l i a n s ,
and
that
our
Foreign Ministry
o f f i c i a l s , plus m i l i t a r y advisors. Whereas the Egyptians
saw
the
armistice
as
military
agreements.
Their
delegation was headed by a m i l i t a r y man and was therefore
m i l i t a r y with p o l i t i c a l advisors.
A l l t h i s i s not true.
simple reason.
I t i s not true f o r a very
I t was purely by chance that I became the
head of our delegation.
In fact, I didn't become the
head of the delegation u n t i l the morning on which we l e f t
f o r Rhodes.
I had been involved with the preparations
f o r the negotiations but, I wasn't going to go to Rhodes.
I was Director of the Foreign M i n i s t r y and was b u i l d i n g
up the whole Foreign Ministry and I couldn't get away
from my desk.
delegation could
My
job was
at home.
The head of the
quite e a s i l y have been a man
29
called
Yigael
Yadin,
who
afterwards
became
a
famous
archaeologist, and at that time was head of operations of
the
Israeli
army.
I f he
had
been the
head
of
the
delegation our delegation would have been headed by a
m i l i t a r y man and the Egyptian delegation would have been
headed by a m i l i t a r y man.
Everybody would have seen the
negotiations as being on s t r i c t l y m i l i t a r y matters which
is
quite
n a t u r a l l y the
armistice
on
nature
i t s practical
of
an
side
armistice.
deals
An
mainly
with
m i l i t a r y matters, l i k e t e r r i t o r y and defense l i n e s
the
exchange of prisoners.
Had
c e r t a i n things
and
been
d i f f e r e n t Yigael Yadin could have been the head of the
delegation.
Then
i t would
have
delegations.
By chance t h i s i s how
been
the
other
was
not
had
no
military
i t worked out.
f a c t that the head of one delegation was
and
two
The
a military
man
s i g n i f i c a n c e whatever
despite a l l the s i g n i f i c a n c e that people t r i e d to read
into i t both then and
later.
Among the people
p r i n c i p a l l y involved those that I remember are the head
of the Egyptian delegation, S e i f
p o l i t i c a l man
was
ed-Din.
Their chief
Abdul Moneim Mustafa, who
c e n t r a l non-military figure on the delegation.
was
their
Later on
he became the Egyptian minister to Switzerland and then
he died soon a f t e r .
Then there was
the king's
brother-
in-law, Colonel Sherein.
This was when King Farouk was
s t i l l reigning i n Egypt.
The King wanted h i s own man
30
on
the
delegation
so he
government f o r a report.
didn't
have
to rely
on h i s
He had h i s own brother-in-law.
He i s s t i l l a l i v e i n Cairo and I have often thought i f
ever I were i n Cairo I'd look him up. Then there was a
man c a l l e d Mahmoud Riad who I think l a t e r became Foreign
Minister or possibly Prime M i n i s t e r of Egypt.
moment
probably
I don't
remeber
the r e s t .
remembers them a l l .
Shabtai
At the
Rosenne
They had a good and fine
q u a l i t y delegation.
On our side I had Shabtai Rosenne with me.
our l e g a l advisor.
He was
Then I had four m i l i t a r y men.
One
was General Yadin whom I've mentioned who was Chief of
Operations of the I s r a e l i Defense Forces.
Another was a
much more j u n i o r o f f i c e r c a l l e d Yehoshafat Harkabi who
l a t e r became a professor a t Hebrew U n i v e r s i t y and has
written
a
great
deal
about
Arab-Israeli
relations.
Another was Yitzhak Rabin who became Prime Minister of
Israel.
young.
At that time he was a j u n i o r o f f i c e r and very
And the other was c a l l e d Arieh Simon who became
an educator.
On the c i v i l i a n side we had E l i a s Sasson
who had been f o r years the Jewish Agency's senior advisor
on Arab a f f a i r s and l a t e r
on i n the Foreign
Service
became Ambassador t o I t a l y , Switzerland, Turkey, and so
on.
We had a good delegation as w e l l .
On the UN
side there was Bunche and h i s main m i l i t a r y man, William
Riley.
He was a General i n the US Marines.
31
There was a
Frenchman c a l l e d Henri V i g i e r who l a t e r presided over the
negotiations between us and the Syrians and the Lebanese
on behalf of Bunche. That was very useful because he was
a Frenchman and the negotiations with the Syrians and
Lebanese were conducted i n French.
That
was
about
i t unless
you are
interested i n one curious person because he belonged to
neither side nor t o the UN. A l l t h i s was taking place on
Greek s o i l i n Rhodes and the Greek Foreign M i n i s t r y was
curious as t o what was going on and they also wanted to
be h e l p f u l .
name
called
So, they sent a young man with a wonderful
Themistocles
Chrysthanthopoulos
whom I
remember very well because of c e r t a i n things connected
with the Greek language.
scholar.
At one time I was a Greek
I remain friends t o t h i s day with Themistocles
Chrysthanthopoulos.
delegation
He became a member of the Greek
t o the UN
later.
Ambassador to Canada and China.
Then
he became the
He's r e t i r e d now and, i n
f a c t , I had a l e t t e r from him yesterday.
to those days i n Rhodes.
That goes back
Those were the main people
there.
JKs
The f i g h t i n g had taken place with several Arab nations.
Why were the negotiations set up separately with each
nation involved?
Eytan:
Now you are bringing up a b i g question.
about that f o r another three hours.
32
I could t a l k
This was part of
Bunche's wisdom.
Egypt was the f i r s t nation t o respond
and that was under m i l i t a r y pressure. We had driven them
back.
We had invaded t h e i r country.
their territory.
others.
Our troops were on
That was not the case with any of the
They were the leading Arab country and they were
the f i r s t t o respond.
Within two or three days of our
meeting with the Egyptians
at Rhodes, roughly
around
January 15th, 1949, Ralph Bunche t o l d us that he had had
a request from Lebanon and a request from Jordan t o j o i n
i n the negotiations.
they
So, Egypt having set the example
also wanted t o j o i n
agreements.
i n and negotiate armistice
He hadn't asked us or consulted us.
He was
simply informing us that he had said t o them, "no, we are
now busy with Egypt.
When we are f i n i s h e d with Egypt we
w i l l be delighted t o s t a r t with Lebanon and delighted to
s t a r t with Jordan."
was
Not t o get the things mixed up, he
100% r i g h t .
were not the same.
The questions and issues
The t e r r i t o r i a l questions were not
the same. Between us and Egypt we had the problem of the
S i n a i , the Suez Canal, which didn't concern Lebanon or
Jordan.
So, he had said no. I have written about t h i s .
This was the awful
mistake
that the UN
Conciliation
Commission made i n A p r i l , 1949, i n Lausanne where I was
also the head o f our delegation.
countries were represented.
The same four Arab
The Commission instead of
t r e a t i n g them as a delegation of Egypt separately, Jordan
33
separately,
Syria and so on, they molded them into a
s i n g l e Arab delegation.
The r e s u l t was that they were
a l l looking over each other's shoulders and each one was
terrified
of saying
s o l u t i o n or concession
think.
or even thinking
of any kind of
f o r fear of what the others might
That was doomed to f a i l u r e from day one. Bunche
was a smart fellow and he must have r e a l i z e d that r i g h t
from the s t a r t .
As I said he didn't even consult us. He
informed us that he had said, "no, we'll wait.
We'll
f i n i s h with Egypt and then there w i l l be time enough f o r
the
others."
I understand that Bunche started o f f the meetings i n a
way by saying that there was no v i c t o r and no vanquished.
Mr. Rosenne had explained that to me and that had set a
mood that made i t easier to t a l k .
I
don't r e c a l l .
everything
that
I t would take too long
went
on procedurally
to discuss
at Rhodes but,
Bunche knew how to handle everybody and s i t u a t i o n s .
knew how t o handle negotiations.
He
He had an i n s t i n c t i v e
f e e l f o r them.
Did the I s r a e l i s and the Egyptians s i t i n the same room
face t o face a t t h i s time or d i d Ralph Bunche meet with
each delegation
All
separately?
these things.
sessions.
The f i r s t
There were not many
session was a f u l l
full
formal
formal
session
with the two delegations meeting under the chairmanship
of the mediator and so was
the f i n a l session with the
f i n a l signature of the agreement.
There may
have been
one or two or more l i k e that but, most of our meetings
with the Egyptians were informal. The two l e g a l advisors
would meet together and the m i l i t a r y people would meet
together.
We met the Egyptians constantly.
b i l l i a r d s with them.
We played
We were i n the same h o t e l .
The
reason that we were i n the same hotel was probably that
Bunche also had i n mind that i f you have a l l these people
under the same roof they are bound to s o c i a l i z e a b i t .
This
was
immediately a f t e r the c i v i l war i n Greece and i n fact the
civil
war
i n the north of Greece was
Greece was absolutely destroyed.
the food was i n e d i b l e .
still
going
on.
There was nothing and
I t was absolutely appalling for
s i x weeks. But, they suffered from the same food that we
did i n the same dining room. We weren't a c t u a l l y s i t t i n g
at the same table but, i f you have your meals i n the same
dining room at the same time with the same people every
day f o r s i x weeks you're bound to f r a t e r n i z e quite a b i t .
The b i l l i a r d s
I remember.
We met
them constantly.
I
remember t h i s Abdul Moneim Mustafa whom I t o l d you about.
He was
t h e i r c h i e f c i v i l i a n man.
point and was l a i d up i n bed.
He f e l l
s i c k at one
And I remember very well
that E l i a s Sasson and I came to v i s i t him and we sat by
his
bedside.
We
brought
35
him
chocolates.
The
r e l a t i o n s h i p was good.
The
The negotiations were l i k e that.
formal meetings were r e a l l y e i t h e r introductory or
sort
of
concluding.
In between there
was
a
l o t of
informal t a l k .
JK:
Were these agreements considered
temporary that would
lead up to some permanent agreement?
Eytan:
I think that they were quite d e l i b e r a t e l y —
t h i s was also Bunche's wisdom —
I t was
not
and I think
they had no time l i m i t .
assumed that they would l a s t
indefinitely
because there i s a clause i n each of them saying that one
year a f t e r the signature of the agreement i f e i t h e r side
wanted to propose a r e v i s i o n , they could
Secretary-General
request
the
of the United Nations to c a l l a meeting
of the two and that each side would be obliged to attend.
That implies that i t wasn't r e a l l y thought that i t would
l a s t more than a year or that there would be a need for
i t f o r more than a year.
Each of the agreements started
with a quotation i n accordance with the Security Council
Resolution of November 16, 1948,
to
conclude
present
an
armistice
"as
c a l l i n g upon the sides
a
transition
truce to permanent peace."
from
Everybody
the
signed
that, therefore, the assumption was t h i s was a t r a n s i t i o n
to permanent peace and that there would be a permanent
peace.
How
long would i t take?
Maybe a year.
I f for
some reason i t took longer than a year there was
p r o v i s i o n i n the
agreement that the
36
this
Secretary-General
could be asked t o c a l l a meeting.
This was invoked only
once, by us i n the case of the agreement with Jordan,
because the Jordanians had f a i l e d
to f u l f i l l
t h e i r obligations under the agreement.
attend,
their
some of
They refused to
so they broke the agreement by not f u l f i l l i n g
part
and by refusing to accept
the Secretary-
General's i n v i t a t i o n .
JK:
But the c r i t i c a l
issues had been dealt with during the
armistice negotiations and so i t seemed t o work.
For
many years that was the only thing that there was.
Eytan:
Under each of the agreements a j o i n t armistice commission
was set up c o n s i s t i n g of a delegate of the UN and each of
the
two p a r t i e s .
They were
Commissions or MACs.
called
Mixed
Armistice
They met r e g u l a r l y . Every time
e i t h e r side had a complaint they would meet.
That was
on-going a l l the time.
JK:
There were other Arabs besides those four nations
were a part of the f i g h t i n g .
that
How was that handled i n the
negotiations?
Eytan:
A l l kinds of Arabs sent token forces, but they didn't
count.
The
The only ones that d i d count were the I r a q i s .
Iraqis
sent
a
powerful
force
but the Iraqis
absolutely refused to negotiate an armistice.
that the Jordanians could negotiate
They said
f o r them and that
they would be bound by what the Jordanians agreed to. I t
didn't quite work out that way because the I r a q i s were so
37
happy to be there that they caused a l o t of trouble f o r
the Jordanians
specifically
afterwards.
on
Jordan's
They had
side.
really
Their
come i n
troops
were
occupying c e r t a i n sectors within the o v e r a l l Jordanian
scheme of things.
political
The Iraqis for
reasons
refused to negotiate an armistice.
They should have, because they had been very a c t i v e l y
engaged i n the f i g h t i n g .
I t i s very hard f o r people to
r e a l i z e what happened i n those days.
Even while the
B r i t i s h were s t i l l running the country supposedly, there
were already Arab g u e r r i l l a forces operating against us
i n s p i t e of the B r i t i s h .
I remember very well that the
o f f i c e r i n command of the Arab g u e r r i l l a force i n J a f f a
from which they
officer.
attacked T e l Aviv was
That was
even before May,
an
1948.
I r a q i army
The
Iraqis
were very a c t i v e .
JK:
You
mentioned that much of the agreements were of a
m i l i t a r y nature.
Do you
r e c a l l what parts were
non-
military?
Eytan:
Yes,
first,
a l l the
basic
clauses
like
the
one
I
mentioned, the Preamble, l a i d the basis of the background
for the t r a n s i t i o n from the present truce to a permanent
peace.
of
There were two or three paragraphs of that kind
a political
nature.
Then there were a l l kinds of
t h e o r e t i c a l arrangements, f o r example, i n the agreement
with Jordan which i n some ways was
38
the most d i f f i c u l t
because i t touched on Jerusalem. There were t h e o r e t i c a l ,
not p r a c t i c a l , arrangements made.
supposed t o be l e f t to a committee.
The p r a c t i c a l were
The p r a c t i c a l issues
were t o provide f o r access of Jewish worshipers to the
Wailing Wall which i s now c a l l e d the Western Wall.
it
provided
access to Mount Scopus
Also,
where the Hebrew
U n i v e r s i t y had been which had been cut o f f but remained
i n a s o r t of enclave within the t e r r i t o r y held by Jordan.
The railway l i n e from T e l Aviv to Jerusalem which passed
j u s t close t o Jordanian t e r r i t o r y was also an example of
the p r a c t i c a l arrangements that were made.
There were
others as well which I don't r e c a l l at the moment which
were m i l i t a r y i n a sense that i f the Jordanians chose to
refuse us access to the Western Wall, how would they
refuse us? By m i l i t a r y means, by putting s o l d i e r s there.
The idea was not a m i l i t a r y idea.
People didn't go to
the Wailing Wall f o r m i l i t a r y purposes. There were other
provisos of that kind.
JK:
How was the issue of law and order handled within the
d e m i l i t a r i z e d zones and the governing or sovereignty of
those zones handled?
Eytan:
There was a d e m i l i t a r i z e d zone at a place c a l l e d E l Auja
that was established between I s r a e l and Egypt.
were
Israel
demilitarized
and
Jordan
zones,
in
or no-mans-lands,
Jerusalem.
There
There
between
was
d e m i l i t a r i z e d zone under the agreement with Syria.
39
a
In
the no-mans-lands because i t was neither t h e i r s nor ours
i t was not necessary to make any arrangements.
In the
d e m i l i t a r i z e d zone between I s r a e l and Egypt I think that
i s where the United Nations planned
to e s t a b l i s h the
Mixed Armistice Commission j u s t because i t was a neutral
zone. In the agreement with Syria the c i v i l i a n authority
was going t o be I s r a e l because that d e m i l i t a r i z e d zone
was almost wholey on the I s r a e l i
side of the border.
There was a l i t t l e piece on the Syrian side and I suppose
the c i v i l i a n authority there would have been Syria.
I s r a e l provided the p o l i c e force?
I f there was one.
During the armistice duscussions was there t a l k
about
bringing i n United Nations troops as was l a t e r done? Did
they think that step wasn't necessary?
I don't quite know what the answer to that question i s .
There were United Nations troops i n the area at the time
because the place which had been the High Commissioner's
residence i n Jerusalem, which was c a l l e d Government House
and had o r i g i n a l l y been handed over t o the Red Cross, was
transfered at some stage from the Red Cross to the United
Nations.
That was where the UNTSO, the United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization, had i t s headquarters.
Those people were i n the country and i n the area a l l
along.
They must have been appointed under some e a r l i e r
provision.
The chairman
of each
of the four Mixed
Armistice Commissions was
was
part
of
this
a United Nations o f f i c e r
UNTSO set up.
I think
who
the UNTSO
nominally s t i l l e x i s t s because i n Jerusalem I sometimes
see cars with a UNTSO l i c e n s e p l a t e .
JK:
Their function at that time was
as observers.
Is that
correct?
Eytan:
Their function was always as observers.
They don't take
on the f i g h t i n g .
JK:
In summary I wanted to ask you i f you have any thoughts
on some of the lessons e i t h e r good or bad that could be
learned
from the
handling
of
the
Palestine
question
during t h i s period.
Eytan:
I'm not sure that any lessons can be learned because the
d i f f e r e n c e between then and now i s simply t h i s .
was
A l l this
almost immediately a f t e r the establishment
United Nations.
The United Nations was
Francisco i n 1945.
The UN was
set up
of
i n San
asked by the B r i t i s h to
handle t h i s whole Palestine question e a r l y i n 1947.
other words maybe 16 months l a t e r .
thing that the UN
was
the
In
I t was the very f i r s t
asked to handle.
At that time
everybody's intentions with regard to the UN were s t i l l
pure or r e l a t i v e l y pure.
r e a l l y at i t s height.
The
prestige of the UN
was
I remember hearing i t said that to
do such and such a thing meant defying the United Nations
which people r e a l l y didn't want to do.
that was
I t was
something
p o l i t i c a l l y rather counter productive.
41
Today
nobody minds defying the United Nations.
The United
Nations a t that time c a r r i e d a l o t more weight and moral
authority than i t has since and c e r t a i n l y than i t has
now.
A man l i k e Ralph Bunche as a representative of the
United Nations c a r r i e d the moral weight i n a way which i s
hardly the case today.
Therefore, I think that at that
time the UN was a better place t o handle a problem of
t h i s kind than i t i s at the present time.
I t a l l depends
on the use which was made and s t i l l could be made of the
United Nations.
Everything that Ralph Bunche achieved
and
Bunche
that
Ralph
gained
i n the course
of the
armistice negotiations was diminished and t o some extent
totally
lost
by the UN
Conciliation
Commission on
Palestine a t Lausanne and afterwards.
about i t i n a s i l l y
way?
Why d i d i t go
For a l l kinds
of reasons.
Ralph Bunche was one single man, an employee or servant
of the United Nations.
except
foolish
He was responsible t o nobody
t o the Secretary-General.
idea
of
setting
up
They then
this
UN
had t h i s
Conciliation
Commission to be composed of the representatives of three
countries: the US, France, and Turkey.
the
US, France,
and Turkey
representatives.
each
as
t o name t h e i r
own
The representatives were not named by
the UN the way i n which Bunche was.
Commission
I t was l e f t to
a
commission
42
The UN C o n c i l i a t i o n
reported
through i t s
secretary, who
reported to the Secretary-General.
Each
one of the three members, the Turk, the Frenchman, and
the American was also reporting to h i s own government and
was
g e t t i n g reactions and
government.
instructions
from
his
own
So, t h i s was a t e r r i l b y weakened form of UN
representation and didn't carry anything l i k e the same
prestige that Bunche had
done because the
handled i n a stupid way.
I t was handled
thing
was
i n a way that
r i g h t from the f i r s t moment i t was bound to weaken the
thing.
Supposing each of the three countries had named an
absolutely
outstanding
man,
someone
who
was
i n t e l l e c t u a l l y the equivalent of Bunche i t could have
conceivably
perhaps.
been
different,
not
a l l together
The United States nominated a man
but,
c a l l e d Mark
Etheridge who was the e d i t o r of the " L o u i s v i l l e Courier
Journal".
What d i d he
know about
it?
The
French
nominated Claude de Boisanger who was a foreign service
o f f i c e r and afterwards became the Director of the Comedie
francaise.
He was a nice man and a cultured man but not
interested i n t h i s
issue.
The
Turks
nominated a
man
c a l l e d Hussein Y a l c i n who was a j o u r n a l i s t and who was 80
years o l d .
I am p r a c t i c a l l y 80 years o l d myself and I
shouldn't say anything against 80 year o l d people but, he
wasn't a very good 80 year o l d . So, these were the three
people: Etheridge, de Boisanger, and Y e l c i n , operating i n
43
the name of the United Nations.
by h i s own government.
Each had been appointed
The e f f e c t of the United Nations
depends on the way i n which the thing i s handled.
imagine
things l i k e
that being
handled
I can
very well or
handled very badly.
The
man who l a s t
year
handled
the business of
Namibia. He was an American A f r i c a n s p e c i a l i s t (Crocker)
who joined the State Department at the beginning of the
Reagan regime and he devoted eight years s i n g l e handedly
to the Namibia question.
He knew what he was doing.
He
was an expert on the subject. He didn't court p u b l i c i t y .
He didn't make p u b l i c statements.
negotiation with the Russians
By eight years of
and the Americans, the
South A f r i c a n s (who were pretty d i f f i c u l t ) and with the
Angolans and the Cubans and with the Namibians, etc. i n
the end he hammered out an agreement which had eluded
everybody e l s e .
That man was operating i n the name of
the United States but, i f a man l i k e
that had been
operating l i k e that i n the name of the United Nations he
would have succeeded.
I f the operation had been i n the
hands of a body l i k e
the C o n c i l i a t i o n
Palestine, i t would have f a i l e d .
Commission on
So, I don't think there
i s any d e f i n i t i v e answer t o your question.
Also, things are so a p p a l l i n g l y
today.
I t depends.
politicized
The United Nations, f o r these purposes anyway,
should not be a p o l i t i c a l
44
instrument but a diplomatic
instrument.
JK:
Thank you so much f o r taking the time to do t h i s .
Eytan:
Thank you.
45
INDEX OF NAMES
Abdulla, King
26
Azcarate, Pablo da
19, 20
Bernadotte, Count Folke
24, 25, 27, 28
Boisanger, Claude de
45
Bunche, Ralph
27-29, 33-37, 43, 44
Chrysthanthopoulos, Themistocles
33
Eban, Abba
5
ed-Din, S e i f
30, 31
Etheridge, Mark
44, 45
Farouk, King
32
Fromkin, David
14
Ghosh
19, 20
Goldmann, Nahum
16
Harkabi, Yehoshafat
32
Herzog, Chaim
21
Himmler, Heinrich
Hoo,
25
Mr.
27
L i e , Trygve
21, 22
Lloyd-George, David
13
Lund, Rosher
19, 20
Mustafa, Abdul Moneim
31, 37
Rabin, Yitzhak
32
Reagan, Ronald
45
R i l e y , William
33
Rosenblut, Pinchas (Rosen)
3
46
Rosenne, Shabtai
32, 35
Rubashov, Zalmon (Shazar)
3
Sasson, E l i a s
32, 37
Sharett, Moshe
3
Sherein, Colonel
32
S i l v e r , Rabbi Abba H i l l e l
2
Simon, Arieh
32
Tov, Moshe
4
V i g i e r , Henri
33
Yadin, Yigael
31, 32
Y a l c i n , Hussein
45
Yosef, Dov
24
47
UNITED NATIONS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT
ORAL HISTORY AGREEMENT
I, \sJxfftr~ £>ffixv\.
(Interviewee)
hereby
agree
to
participate i n the' United Nations Oral History Project, sponsored
by the Yale University Institution for Social and Policy studies,
and consent to the recording by magnetic audio tape of (an)
interview(s)
with
~3«<xt/\
K-^^s^o
(Interviewer)
on ~ ^ S A A n-efDate) at
A/<2^UJ
Vor
(City),
My(State).
}
I t i s my understanding that a typed transcript w i l l be made
of such tape(s) and returned to me for any necessary corrections.
I hereby agree that i f for any reason I have not returned the
transcript with my corrections to the Institution f o r s o c i a l and
Policy Studies within three months of the time i t was sent to me,
the Proj ect Staff may e d i t the transcript and make i t available f o r
research and other use as provided here below.
In the understanding that the tape(s) and transcript(s) w i l l
be preserved' at the United Nations and made available f o r
h i s t o r i c a l , schola*rty and (as deemed appropriate by the United
Nations) p u b l i c information purposes, and that copies w i l l be
placed on deposit at Yale University for research and study, I
hereby grant, assign, and transfer legal t i t l e s and a l l l i t e r a r y
rights i n the tape(s) and transcript(s) to the United Nations.
However, i t i s agreed that neither the United Nations nor Yale
University
wilJL publish or authorize publication
of
the
transcript(s) or any part thereof during my l i f e t i m e without my
written permission.
(For the I n s t i t u t i o n of Social
and Policy Studies)
(Date)