The Context of Censorship: A Look at Swearing, the Self, and the State
Jameela Syed
Advisor: Richard K. Larson
Readers: Mark Aronoff and Agnes He
Senior Honors Thesis
Department of Linguistics
Stony Brook University
May 2014
1
Contents
1. Introduction
3
2. What is bad language?
4
2.1 Types of swearing
5
2.2 Taboo
7
3. Coping with bad language in private discourse
12
3.1 Dysphemism, orthophemism, and euphemism
13
3.2 Are bad words inherently taboo?
16
3.3 Reactions to bad language: censoring and censorship
19
3.4 Politeness and bad language
23
3.4.1 The concept of face
24
3.5 When is bad language appropriate?
28
3.6 Functions of bad language in private discourse
32
4. Public discourse and bad language
35
4.1 (Un)protected speech and the First Amendment
35
4.2 Unprotected speech: Incitement
37
4.3 Unprotected speech: Obscenity
40
4.4 Obscenity and the youth: Butler v. Michigan (1957)
43
4.5 Obscenity v. Indecency
45
4.5.1 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978)
4.6 Public display of bad language: Cohen v. California (1971)
47
50
5. Conclusion
53
References
58
Appendix A: “What does free speech mean?” (United States Courts)
63
Appendix B: “Appendix to opinion of the Court” for FCC v. Pacifica (1978)
64
2
1. Introduction
The f-word, the n-word, the c-word, the b-word: to a non-native speaker of English, it
may initially seem odd that certain English words are often referred to in this manner, but
chances are the majority of native speakers know exactly which words these titles represent. We
manipulate, conceal and avoid dirty or bad words in polite company, and are generally taught not
to use foul language (that language which is often labeled in general speech as swearing or
cursing). Although the saying goes that sticks and stones may break my bones but words will
never hurt me, linguists have suggested that words do indeed have the power to hurt, as one of
the powers included in a greater spectrum of linguistic agency. That is to say that particular
language use allows a speaker to achieve a wide range of tangible effects on their interlocutors
and the world around them through communication1. The effects of bad language are of
particular interest due to the range of reactions that such language elicits when it is used both in
and outside of a prototypical discursive context. In private discourse, speech occurs on a personto-person basis (it is experienced by interlocutors and observers that are within earshot of
conversation). This is the prototypical context of discourse as it is generally observed in
linguistics. The language of the state, the law, and the arts are all theoretically accessible to the
people, and so established organizations are interlocutors in their own right. Therefore, speech as
it appears in the media and government institutions can be classified as public discourse.
In public, bad language is subject to disapproval at the lowest degree of scrutiny and to
censorship at the highest. We see this in challenges to such language as it appears in television
and radio broadcasts, as well as in literature. This work will examine the context of censorship
with a specific focus on the treatment of swearing and other forms of taboo speech in the United
1
This idea was first introduced by J.L. Austin (1962) in How to do Things with Words, a work that defined
utterances along the lines of performativity as part of a broader speech act theory.
3
States. Attention will be paid to instances of censoring in order to establish the conventions that
define the boundaries of bad language as it occurs in private versus public discourse. A specific
focus will be placed on the distinction between government censored speech and speech that is
censored by individuals, as well as the various motivations behind both practices. Within the
discussion of public discourse will be a review of speech that is unprotected or protected under
the First Amendment. Several cases centered on taboo speech and swearing in the public domain
that had a significant impact on modern First Amendment Jurisprudence will be provided as
representations of state backed censorship.
The various nuances of swear speech will be observed, specifically as it relates to the
community. We seek to explain how bad language is perceived, as well as why and how it is
incorporated or avoided in discourse. Further analysis of bad language as it occurs in private
discourse will be provided through the synthesis of Politeness Theory. This work attempts to
ultimately outline the treatment of bad language as it occurs within private and public discourse.
2. What is bad language?
In order to assess bad language, we must first note that “language that is often thought of
as being bad in some way may not necessarily be bad, or is bad only in certain contexts or in
certain respects” (Andersson and Trudgill 1990: 29). In this work, there is no qualitative
judgment meant by the term bad language, rather it is used here because it is a label that is
commonly applied to the language at hand. We define language as bad in a manner of ways. Bad
language is generally deemed undesirable on two accounts, according to its:
1.
Word form (swearing)
2.
Referential content (taboo)
and/or its
4
Let us first examine bad language as it is manifested through swearing. In discourse, swearing
supports a wide range of action and to a degree, swear words retain this force out of their usual
contexts. As a highly variable domain of speech, swearing presents a wealth of information that
is worthy of discussion.
2.1 Types of swearing
Swearing is not limited to random insertions of vulgar terms into speech, rather, speakers
employ particular bad words and phrases tactically to achieve some desired effect.
We may generally define swearing across these lines, in which the language:
(a) Refers to something that is taboo and/or stigmatized in the culture;
(b) Should not be interpreted literally, and
(c)
Can be used to express strong emotions and attitudes.
(Andersson and Trudgill 1990: 53)
One form of swearing, foul language, is distinct in that “[it] trespasses on topics and domains
generally deemed appropriate in personal but not social language-- that is, bodily functions and
body products (or effluvia)” (Wajnryb 2005: 19). Examples of foul language include the terms
shit, fuck, jizz, and bloody, which in turn refer to excrement, intercourse, semen, and of course,
blood.
Two closely related terms that describe different methods of swearing are blasphemy and
profanity. Blasphemy is “a form of swearing that deliberately vilifies religion or anything
associated with religious meaning” whereas profanity is “swearing through the use of words that
abuse anything sacred” (Wajnryb 2005: 17-21). The difference lies in the intention of the speaker,
as one who blasphemes is openly insulting the religious, while a speaker who profanes is more
5
passively mentioning the divine in an inappropriate and often irrelevant context. Furthermore,
the adjectival use of profane refers to that which is secular, as “to be profane means to be
ignorant or intolerant of the guidelines of a particular religious order” (Jay 1992: 3). An instance
of profane speech would be a phrase such as For the love of God, get on with it!, which refers to
a deity, while a phrase such as Screw the Pope! would fall under the umbrella of blasphemy,
being a direct attack on a religious figure (Jay 1992:4).
A curse is similar to blasphemy in its directness, but while blasphemy is an open assault
on the religious (or the church), a curse is an open attack on the addressee or intended recipient
of the curse. Swearing must meet a number of conditions to be considered an instance of true
cursing:
Cursing invokes the aid of a higher being; it is more ritualistic and deliberately articulated;
it is future-oriented, built on an understanding that the effect may be delayed; and it may
not involve the use of foul language.
(Wajnryb 2005: 17)
It may be difficult to imagine a subset of swearing that does not necessarily feature foul language,
and yet it is very clear that a curse such as Go to Hell! carries a certain pragmatic weight unlike
the common command. The curser requires a target (the cursed), and it is this element of threat
that lends a curse its power.
Socially driven censoring gives rise to euphemistic swearing, which “involves the
substitution of an inoffensive term, or one that is seen as acceptable...for one that is considered
indelicate or taboo-breaking” (Wajnryb 2005:18). Although they are commonplace, euphemistic
swear words are marked counterparts to the words they replace and as such they are not as
versatile as the swear words from which they gain their inspiration: a swear word may not be
6
substituted in all environments with its euphemistic partner. Examples of euphemistic swearing
can be seen in the following pairs:
English Shoot! [is substituted] for Shit!, Spanish Caramba! for Carajo! ‘Prick!’, German
Scheibenkleister! (‘window glue’) for Scheisse! ‘Shit!’, [and] Russian Yaponski bog!
(‘Japanese god’) for Yob tvojú mat’! (‘Somebody fucked your mother!’ often
inadequately rendered into English as ‘Fuck your mother!).
(Ljung 2010: 11)
It is evident by these examples that euphemistic swear words seek to imitate the ‘bad’ words they
replace, either in terms of the initial phonemes of each word (as in the / ʃ/ of shoot and shit)
and/or in the number of syllables of each phrase (Yob tvojú mat’! and the euphemistic Yaponski
bog! both contain four syllables). Additionally, euphemistic swear words may copy the nucleus
of the ‘bad’ word they replace, as in the French phrase sacre bleu ‘sacred blue’, in which the
word bleu [blø] is substituted for phonetically similar Dieu [djø] ‘God’ (Hughes 1991: 12).
Each of these cases of swearing would constitute bad language, mainly due to the form
of the words used but also due to the fact that these expressions (shit, fuck you!, etc.) depict
particularly delicate subjects: their referential content is also ‘undesirable’, as it is taboo.
2.2 Taboo
We come now to an examination of bad language as it characterized by its taboo
referential content. The term taboo refers to that which is:
set apart for or consecrated to a special use or purpose; restricted to the use of a god, a
king, priests, or chiefs, while forbidden to general use; prohibited to a particular class
(esp. to women), or to a particular person or persons; inviolable, sacred; forbidden,
unlawful; also said of persons under a perpetual or temporary prohibition from certain
7
actions, from food, or from contact with others.
(“taboo | tabu, adj. and n.”)
In other words, “a taboo is a proscription of behavior for a specifiable community of people, for
a specified context, at a given place and time”, and as such does not “[hold] for all worlds, times
and contexts” (Allan and Burridge 2006: 27). Taboos may vary across cultures as they reflect the
differing values and beliefs of different communities, but they often concern reference to the
following:
•
bodies and their effluvia2 (sweat, not faeces, menstrual fluid, etc.);
•
the organs and acts of sex, micturition3 and defecation;
•
diseases, death and killing (including hunting and fishing);
•
naming, addressing, touching and viewing persons and sacred beings, objects and
places; [and]
•
food gathering, preparation and consumption.
(Allan and Burridge 2006: 1)
The taboo on bodily effluvia is evident in common expressions that we use to describe bad
language, as we can use gutter-talk and filthy language and be foul-mouthed, each of which
evoke imagery of the soiled and dirty. Indeed, according to linguists Lars Andersson and Peter
Trudgill,
Everything that leaves the body at different places and in different ways (feces, urine,
mucus, sweat, menstrual blood, spittle, semen, ear wax and all the smells of the body) are
things which we are supposed to be afraid and ashamed of… [and] there is a desire, even
an obsession, in our society to keep our bodies clean.
(Andersson and Trudgill 1990: 36)
2
One exception to this taboo are tears, which do not seem to carry the same negative connotations as other bodily
products.
3
urination 8
Andersson and Trudgill argue that the human preoccupation with cleanliness extends to the
language we use itself, in that we aspire to use “clean” language and to avoid “dirty words”.
A taboo that is common cross-linguistically is the name taboo. In his article “Name
Taboos and Rigid Performativity”, Luke Fleming states that names elicit linguistic politeness
from speakers because of their referential nature:
Inherently referential noun-phrase [NP] types4 … are the ones which most often
develop ‘polite’ pragmatic alternants…[as] reference to addressee is the most elaborated
site of pragmatic distinctions cross-linguistically.
(Fleming 2011: 145)
It is this direct reference to another person that is avoided, and often predicated on the
relationship between the speaker and the addressee; for example in Bengali, name taboos are
based on relation by marriage as “the taboo on a wife uttering the name of her husband, or of an
male inlaw of same or ascending generation, developed from pragmatic restrictions on her use of
these names in direct address” (Fleming 2011: 147). Name avoidance does not follow the same
rules in all languages that share this taboo however, as in “Oromo (Ethiopia), the names of a
man’s mother- and father-in-law are wholly taboo to him while he merely avoids the names of
his other affinal relations in direct address” (Fleming 2011: 147). Not only do name taboos apply
specifically to names, in an interesting twist they may apply to name homophones as well. Take
for example, the polite speech of male Zulu speakers:
men’s respectful speech with regard to the King or Chief…consists in an avoidance of his
name and words similar to it. For instance, taboos on the personal names uMpande,
4
Fleming claims that names are inherently referential NPs on the following logic: “personal names are social
indexicals…[and] the successful use of a personal name presupposes that both the speaker and the addressee have
been socialized to this name-referent connection” (Fleming 2011: 145).
9
uNdlela, and sandla meant that the words iMpande ‘root’, iNdlela ‘path’, and isAndla
‘hand’ were also avoided.
(Fleming 2011: 154)
This taboo on personal names and name homophones is present among the Tiwi people of
northern Australia as well, however in this case “the proper name of a dead person is
taboo…[and] words that sound like these proper names also become taboo” (Andersson and
Trudgill 1990: 57).The variable treatment of name taboos reflects that even when different
communities share basic values of linguistic restriction, this language censoring may manifest
differently.
The taboo on the divine is apparent in phrases such as do not take the Lord’s name in
vain. The logic behind the condemnation of profanity is expressed by English clergyman Josiah
Woodward in his work A kind caution to profane swearers, where he states “it is…to be
considered That the Tongue of Man is his Glory and human Speech a Sort of Miracle in Nature:
And it is given to Man, that he might glorify God who gave it to him” (Woodward 1790: 6). It
seems clear that the English taboo on uttering God out of context is a name taboo motivated by
some respect for the divine. However, religious name taboos are not restricted to the ‘higher’
powers, as in addition to the taboo on direct reference to God, certain languages express a taboo
on the “infernal”, that is, mention of the Devil and Hell. The tabooed reference to these ‘lower’
powers is not motivated by respect for the subject, rather it is based on the assumption that
reference to these entities would invoke their wrath5. For example, French features the phrase
Quand on parle du loup on en voit la queue ‘When you speak of the wolf, you can see its tail,’
5
Young Anglophone girls often participate in the ritualistic flouting of name taboos in the “Bloody Mary” tradition.
Variations on this folklore exist (see Dundes 1998) but generally it consists of girls uttering Bloody Mary several
times in front of a mirror in an unlit bathroom. It is said that Mary (a ghost or demonic specter) will appear as a
result of being “called”.
10
and Swedish has the similar När man talar om trollen står de i farstun ‘When you speak of the
trolls they are on your doorstep’ (Ljung 2010: 6). As these superstitions concern the potentially
ruinous power of spoken language, we may extend the taboo on the divine to be a general taboo
on the supernatural.
Linguistic taboos may also arise in one language within a bilingual community due to
speakers’ knowledge of another language. For example, work by Mary Haas showed that ThaiEnglish bilinguals (L1= Thai, L2= English) in an English setting “didn’t use certain Thai words,
because they sounded like obscene words in English…[including] fâg ‘sheath’; fág ‘to hatch’;
[and] phríg, ‘(chili) pepper’,” these words being phonetically similar to fuck and frig (Andersson
and Trudgill 1990: 57). Interestingly enough, this cross-linguistic taboo did not only apply oneway, as the Thai-English bilinguals would not use the English word yet, “because it sounded too
close to Thai jéd, ‘to have sexual intercourse’” (Andersson and Trudgill 1990: 58). The taboos
on the Thai words (‘sheath,’ ‘pepper’ and ‘to hatch’) and the English yet would be considered
“purely linguistic” as the words were only taboo in their phonetic similarity with truly taboo
words in the opposite language, and only in the context of an English immersion environment.
In theory taboos are not arbitrarily imposed, as they “normally arise out of social
constraints on the individual’s behavior…in cases where the individual’s acts can cause
discomfort, harm or injury” to themselves or to others (Allan and Burridge 2006: 9). However, it
is possible to create a taboo within a speech community. Consider the following example, from
my own experience. A third grade teacher, in an attempt to bolster her students’ self-esteem,
forbade students from uttering the words can’t and cannot. This restriction was not just imposed
on students’ spontaneous speech, but also extended to literacy activities as well: if students came
across the words can’t or cannot in a text when reading out loud, they were required to
11
emphatically say can (effectively reversing the meaning of the phrase) or to replace the taboo
can’t with a pointedly muffled mmph. According to the teacher, ‘negative’ words such as can’t
and cannot were harmful to the students, as they would unconsciously encourage self-doubt in
the students who used such negations in their speech. In the dialect of the class, can’t and cannot
became tabooed at the insistence of the teacher, who saw this proscription on can’t as a means of
inspiring her students to fulfill their potential. However, this taboo does not apply to the larger
Anglophone community, and so it seems that it is possible to create taboos under the right
environmental circumstances (I would hazard a guess that the majority of students from the
can’t-taboo class have since reinstated the negation in their personal speech).
Although the subject of taboos fluctuates cross-culturally, taboos seem to belong to some
intrinsic natural class. Taboos concern the human experience, as defined through our bodies
(food and waste, reproduction, health and disease), our social needs (personal address and
interactions), and our belief in the supernatural (superstition and religion). It is not surprising that
we avoid direct discussion of such weighty subjects, as they are reminders of our finite existence.
Like other incarnations of bad language, we treat taboo subjects in very particular ways in
private discourse.
3. Coping with bad language in private discourse
As we have seen, speakers sometimes manage taboo language by avoiding its utterance
altogether. However, speakers may adopt other “avoidance strategies” to deal with taboo
language: whispering the taboo word, using conversational hedges (such as not to be vulgar,
but… or the conventional pardon my French6), and/or by changing an utterance as it is spoken
6
The expression excuse my French has been recorded in English from 1895. It seems this association of the French
with taboo ideas is a remnant of cultural tension between the British and the French, which has carried over into the
English language. Other instances of so-called “French insult” include french prints (recorded c. 1850, meaning
pornographic images) and French pox (recorded 1598, meaning syphilis) (Hughes 1991:131-2).
12
(as previously mentioned in section 2.1, substituting shoot for shit) (Wajnryb 2005: 179).
Speakers’ avoidance of bad language in private discourse is further manifested in their use of
different registers. Different registers favor the use of the pragmatically distinct dysphemism,
orthophemism, and euphemism.
3.1 Dysphemism, orthophemism and euphemism
The differences between dysphemism, orthophemism and euphemism are the differences
between fat, overweight, and big-boned: each term indicates the same denotatum, but varies
considerably in its connotations. According to Allan and Burridge, “denotation is the relation
between language expressions and things or events in worlds − not just the world we live in, but
any world and time (historical, fictional, imagined) that may be spoken of,” whereas a word’s
connotations “are semantic effects (nuances of meaning) that arise from encyclopedic knowledge
about a word’s denotation and also from experience, beliefs and prejudices about the contexts in
which the word is typically used” (31). So, while denotatum encompasses the relationship
between words and reality, connotation refers to the variable metaphoric or “extra” meanings of
words. Triads of dysphemisms, orthophemisms, and euphemisms share denotative meaning but
are distinct in their connotative meanings, and often they represent different linguistic treatment
of taboo subjects.
A dysphemism is defined as “a word or phrase with connotations that are offensive either
about the denotatum and/or to people addressed or overhearing the utterance” (Allan and
Burridge 2006: 31). Taboo language in the form of swearing is generally considered to be
dysphemistic. Whereas dysphemisms are “dispreferred (tabooed) expressions”, orthophemisms
13
and euphemisms are “alternative[s] to a dispreferred expression7” (32). More specifically, an
orthophemism is used in a formal, clinical or scientific register, whereas euphemisms belong to
informal, colloquial registers (orthophemisms are more direct/literal than euphemisms). The
relationship between dysphemism, orthophemism and euphemism is best seen through example,
as in Figure 1, which depicts X-phemism8 triads:
Orthophemism
Euphemism
Dysphemism
faeces
toilet
menstruate
my vagina
Jesus
poo
loo
have a period
my bits
Lord
shit
shithouse
bleed
my cunt
Christ! [blasphemy]
Figure 1: Contrasting X-phemisms (as taken from Allan and Burridge 2006: 32)
Oftentimes we find several euphemisms for a tabooed subject. For example, Figure 1
notes loo as a euphemism for toilet, and yet we also have the euphemistic bathroom, powder
room, water closet, washroom, commode, potty, lavatory, john and restroom. While we may feel
more rested after using the restroom the main purpose of a restroom is not to rest, and similarly a
bathroom is not required to contain a bath; as speakers of English, we know this, and we know
that these expressions are polite, as opposed to literal, terms. Although we also have the formal
orthophemism latrine, and the rather abrupt dysphemism crapper, the number of euphemisms for
the ‘room in which one relieves themselves’ seem to outweigh the formal and dispreferred (or
impolite) expressions for such a place. In ordinary parlance, euphemisms are assumed to be polite
alternatives to impolite expressions. However euphemisms are not necessarily polite, as we can
7
Dispreferred expressions are not exclusively defined by word form, as Allan and Burridge note that “under most
circumstances the dispreferred response to an invitation is refusal” and “dispreferred responses to a greeting are a
dismissal or a cold stare” (32).
8
Dysphemisms, orthophemisms, and euphemisms are said to belong to a class of X-phemisms which share “crossvarietal synonymy, i.e. words that have the same meaning as other words used in different contexts” (Allan and
Burridge 2006: 29) 14
see by terms that describe oral sex. The euphemisms give head/a blow job are not as direct as
their corresponding orthophemisms (cunnilingus/fellatio) and dysphemisms (eat pussy/suck
cock), and yet they certainly are not polite; in this case, the euphemisms are purely colloquial.
In the discussion of the taboo, dysphemisms are not confined to swear words. The mention or
direct address of a taboo subject, such as God, would be “offensive…to people addressed or
overhearing the utterance,” and would therefore constitute a dysphemism (Allan and Burridge
2006: 31). Indeed, in English there have appeared at least thirty-five euphemisms for the word
God which are provided in Figure 2. It is also considered taboo to utter Jesus Christ, and so we
find many euphemisms for this name as well: jis, jeeze, jove, gee, gee whiz, jeepers creepers, by
jingo, jiminy cricket, cripes, crust, crumbs, crikey (Wajnryb 2005: 115), jiminy Christmas, Jesus
H. Christ, Cheese and rice, and even Jeebus9.
Date
Euphemism
Date
Euphemism
1350s
1386
1569
1570
1598
1598
1598
1599
1600
1601
1602
1602
1611
1621
1650s
1672
1673
gog
cokk
cod
Jove
sblood
'slid (God's eyelid)
slight
'snails (God's nails)
zounds (God's wounds)
sbody
sfoot (God's foot)
gods bodykins
gad
odsbobs
gadzooks (God's hooks)
godsookers
egad
1695
1706
1709
1728
1733
1734
1743
1743
1749
1760s
1820s
1842
1842
1844
1851
1884
1900
odso
ounds
odsbodikins (God's little body)
agad
ecod
goles
gosh
golly
odrabbit it
gracious
ye gods!
by George
s'elpe me Bob
Drat! (God rot!)
Doggone (God-damn)
Great Scott
Good grief
Figure 2: English euphemisms for God, and their dates of recording (Hughes 1991: 13)
9
Jeebus originated on The Simpsons, and although its use is undocumented, its reference is not unheard of.
15
It seems that not all dysphemisms come equipped with corresponding euphemisms,
however. For example, the dysphemism motherfucker may be referred to in orthophemistic terms
as depicting incest or an Oedipal relationship, but one would be hard-pressed to find a
conventional euphemism to describe such a situation (with cultural knowledge of the film
Psycho (1960), it would be possible to call someone a Norman Bates, but this is certainly not as
ubiquitous an expression as motherfucker). This lack of a conventional euphemism for
motherfucker is evident in the censored (televised) versions of the films Snakes on a Plane (2006)
and Die Hard 2 (1990), in which characters’ utterances of motherfucking10 and motherfucker are
dubbed over with the somewhat absurd terms monkey-fightin,’ Monday-to-Friday, and mister
falcon. Perhaps words like motherfucker do not have lexicalized euphemisms as they are so
taboo that their mention, even in other terms, is unwelcome in discourse11. It would seem that
swear words that denote strongly abhorred concepts, such as incest, are intrinsically taboo. This
leads us to question whether all dysphemisms are inherently bad.
3.2 Are bad words inherently taboo?
In the discussion of bad language, a question that often arises is whether swear words (a
subclass of dysphemism) are inherently taboo, or whether they have gained tabooness over time.
A number of former English street names seem to suggest that the latter is true, that words’
tabooness is acquired and not intrinsic. London’s present-day Sherborne Lane was alternately
known by Shitteborwelane (recorded 1272), Shiteburgh Lane (1321), Schittebourne Lane (1349),
10
motherfucking is an intensifier which may indicate a strong negative or positive connotation (“motherfucking, adj.
and adv.”)
11
On urbandictionary.com, a website that allows any user to define English slang terms, there are 50+ entries
declaring mofo as an abbreviation for motherfucker, with 16,000+ “approval” ratings for these entries. While it
seems mofo is a lexicalized equivalent of motherfucker in at least in some speech communities, it is unclear as to
whether this constitutes a euphemism (whether polite or impolite) or a dysphemism. 16
and several other shit variants. The street first acquired a non shit-based name in 1467, when it
became Shirbouruelane ('Shelley House - Ship Alley'). Apparently Sherborne Lane was
originally associated with excrement as it was once home to a number of public lavatories;
therefore, the use of shit was relevant and referential (Partridge, 2004). The forthright use of shit
in the street’s older name suggests that the word was not taboo at the time if it was appropriate
enough for such public display. Another curious example is the former Pissing Alley. Pissing
Alley acquired the non-dysphemistic name Passing Alley sometime between 1746, when its
original form was noted on John Rocque's map of London, and the 1790s, when it appeared
under the new moniker on Horwood’s map ('St John’s Gate and St John’s Lane '). The
motivation behind the name change is not entirely clear, although it seems to indicate that in this
time period piss acquired a degree of ‘badness’ that warranted a name change.
Perhaps the most shocking street name by today’s standards is London’s former
Gropecuntlane (1230), which was a purported center of prostitution, and thereby rather aptly
named (Hughes 1991:20). The name Gropecuntlane was not unique to London, as there were
reportedly various Grope lanes across England, and in fact one Grope Lane remains to this day
in Shrewsbury’s town center. According to urban archeologist Dr. Nigel Baker, as quoted in an
article from The Telegraph, “the Victorians got rid of a lot of the Grope Lanes around the
country, it has only remained in Shrewsbury…the name is often explained away today because it
is a dark street that people have to grope their way along” (“Street names,” 2009). However,
London’s Gropecuntlane became Magpie Lane in the seventeenth century (“Magpie Lane,”
2012), indicating perhaps that the term cunt began to become undesirable some two centuries
prior to the Victorian era.
17
Cunt was formerly used as a scientific term for vulva, as noted by the Oxford English
Dictionary’s first definition of the word. The orthophemistic definition cites this quote from
Lanfrank's "Science of Cirurgie" (a1400) as supporting evidence: In wymmen þe necke of þe
bladdre is schort, & is maad fast to the cunte (‘In women the neck of the bladder is short and is
made fast to the cunt’). In the Middle Ages it seems that it was appropriate to use cunt as an
anatomical term in a medical text, whereas in modern times it would be highly unlikely for a
gynecologist to refer to one’s vulva as a cunt due to the word’s acquired tabooness. The formerly
orthophemistic word even featured in family names, as in the case of the English men Robert
Clevecunt (1302), John Fillecunt (1216), and the women Gunoka Cuntles (1219) and Bele
Wydecunthe (1328) (Hughes 2006: 110). The OED’s second definition for cunt (n.) is
dysphemistic: “A woman as a source of sexual gratification; a promiscuous woman; a slut. Also
as a general term of abuse for a woman.” The earliest citations for this more familiar,
dysphemistic, use of cunt come from 1663, 1674, and c1675, supporting the idea that cunt was
gaining tabooness in the 1600s, and was appropriate prior to this time.
From the examples above, it seems that words’ connotative meanings change over time.
This occurs even in words that do not necessarily acquire tabooness, but rather become more
positive as in the adjectival use of pretty. The Oxford English Dictionary gives one definition of
pretty (adj.) as “Originally: cunning, crafty. [and] Subsequently: clever, skillful, able.” The
original, rather negative connotation of pretty is evident in a citation from c. 1475: Titivillus kan
lerne yow many praty thyngys (‘Titivillus [a demon] can teach you many cunning things’). In its
modern form the adjectival pretty, when used in reference to skill as in the phrase you’re pretty
good at that, does not carry strongly negative connotations; its connotative meaning has shifted.
Such connotative changes indicate that words are not inherently bad, and as Andersson and
18
Trudgill (1990) note, “No word or phrase is in itself bad. It is bad only in the eyes of those who
evaluate and look at the language” (35). Indeed, the Telegraph article on former London street
names attributes the changes to a burgeoning “puritanical” Protestantism that gained traction in
sixteenth century England. Our perceptions regarding bad language are subjective in relation to
our time period, and even in relation to our personal speaking style12. It is difficult to pinpoint
exactly when and how words become bad, but like most instances of language change the shift
seems to be gradual, so much so that individuals may not be aware of the connotative changes
within their lifetime.
3.3 Reactions to bad language: censoring and censorship
Regardless of how words become bad, once they are seen in such a negative light they
elicit some rather extreme reactions in the forms of censoring and censorship. The terms
censorship and censoring are often used interchangeably to refer to the restriction of certain
behaviors. The difference between the terms lies in the authority of the agent: while the
censorship of language denotes “institutional suppressions of language by powerful governing
classes, supposedly acting for the common good”, language censoring “encompasses both the
institutionalized acts of the powerful and those of ordinary individuals...[as] everyone censors
his/her own or another’s behaviour from time to time” (Allan and Burridge 2006: 24). It would
seem then that censoring and censorship are motivated by a set of shared social ideals that lay the
12
For example, many English speakers object to the word moist, apparently due to its sensory connotations;
however, one could hardly claim that moist is conventionally ‘bad’ or taboo in the Anglophone world.
19
framework of acceptability within a community, but that censorship is enacted only in extreme
cases where mere social disapproval does not sufficiently rectify the ill behavior13.
The use of taboo language, in particular swearing, in spoken discourse is generally
frowned upon. Children are often punished for swearing with verbal reprimands and groundings.
Punishments are also physical in nature, as children are spanked and/or have their mouths
washed out with soap as a result of swearing. In the study “Memories of Punishment for Cursing”
by Jay, King, and Duncan (2006) it was found that parents most often punished children for
swearing by verbal reprimand (41%), followed by soaping of the mouth (20%), and other
physical punishments (14%)14. Perhaps because we are taught not to swear as children, we
develop other means of discussing taboo. As previously mentioned, speakers elect to use
euphemisms or orthophemisms as opposed to offensive dysphemisms when broaching taboo
subjects (for example, choosing to say that he passed away or he died as opposed to he snuffed
it). As bad words evoke a range of reactions, we learn to modify our discourse style to fit
interactions; this constitutes self-censoring.
Bad language is censored in print as well, whether as part of literary texts or dictionaries.
To censor literature based on the bad language it contains is to bowdlerize, “to expurgate (a book
or writing), by omitting or modifying words or passages considered indelicate or offensive; to
castrate” (“bowdlerize, v.”). This term is derived from the name of Dr. Thomas Bowdler (17541825), self-declared censor. Bowdler sought to clean up the works of Shakespeare to make them
13
Indeed, according to Allan and Burridge, “all kinds of tabooed behaviour are subject to censoring, but only certain
kinds are subject to censorship – for instance, child pornography is subject to both censorship and censoring, but
picking your nose in public is subject only to censoring”(24).
14
Although individuals endured the unpleasantness of soap punishment as children, Jay, King and Duncan note that
“this does not prevent them from cursing” as adults. Their work compares childhood punishments for swearing to
individuals’ swearing habits in adulthood, suggesting that “punitive responses by and large have little effect on later
cursing.”
20
appropriate for family reading by eliminating all profane and obscene content, but he lacked
consistency in censoring, generally cutting sexual speech while preserving the violent (Hughes
1991: 243-244). Although Bowdler censored in nineteenth century England, the spirit of
challenging books based on ‘objectionable’ content is alive and well in modern America.
According to the American Library Association (ALA), 5,099 challenges were reported to the
ALA’s Office for Intellectual Freedom between the years 2000 and 2009. The ALA defines a
challenge as a “formal, written complaint, filed with a library or school requesting that materials
be removed because of content or appropriateness”, and notes that their figures are not wholly
representative of the number of national challenges as their data is dependent on challenges
being reported15 (“Frequently challenged books,” 2014). Materials such as books and other
media are challenged most often in classrooms and libraries, with objections to content involving
taboo subjects (grounds for challenges are noted in Figure 3, below).
Grounds for
Challenge
Sexually
Explicit
Material
Number of
Materials
Challenged
1,577
Materials
Offensive
unsuited to
Language
age group
1,291
Violence
Homosexuality
Satanic,
occult
themes
Religious
Viewpoint
AntiFamily
619
361
274
291
119
989
Figure 3: The basis for challenges, 2000-200916 (“Frequently challenged books,” 2014)
Attempts to remove ‘objectionable’ materials from public access reveal that taboo content
(generally of a sexual nature) and undesirable word form (offensive language), our building
blocks of bad language, have the potential to arouse the greatest disgust from individuals, even
when bad language is unspoken.
15
The ALA estimates that there is a 1:4 (or 1:5) ratio of reported to unreported challenges, suggesting that the actual
number of challenges from 2000-2009 fall in the range of 20,396 to 25,495 incidents.
16
Note that materials may be challenged on multiple accounts, which is why the number of materials challenged
here (5,521) is greater than the total number of challenges (5,099).
21
Swearwords have historically received limited attention from dictionaries, with recent
omissions of words such as fuck in Webster’s New International Dictionary17 (1962), Random
House’s Dictionary of the English Language (1966), and the Oxford English Dictionary (editions
prior to the 1970s) (Wajnryb 2005: 59-61). When written in newspapers, swearing is often
alluded to as opposed to represented accurately as a printed swear word might offend some
reader and prompt complaints. Periodicals tend to censor swear words by altering their written
form, as “[one] swearing-curtailing device is to allow the taboo word, but disenvowel it, so that
FUCK and CUNT become ‘f-ck’ and ‘c-nt’ [or ‘f*ck’ and ‘c*nt’]” (Wajnryb 2005: 187). In
comics, such typographical censoring is taken a step further and bad words are replaced by
grawlixes. Grawlixes, also known as obscenicons, are combinations of “mixed typographical
symbols” or “cursing characters” that provide visual representations of bad words, as in
@#$%&! . The use of grawlixes to represent swearing in comics is found as early as 1909
(Zimmer, 2010).
It seems that bad language is censored whether in spoken or written form due to its
referential content and its composition, and this censoring ranges in severity. Bad language in
written word is censored by changes to its visual form, or by total eradication of the targeted
language from texts. In responses to spoken language, bad words are censored via verbal
chastisements (clean up that dirty mouth!) and physical punishments (soaping of the mouth). To
gain further understanding of the censorship of bad language, it is important to consider
discourse through a model of politeness.
17
Interestingly, this edition includes other so-called “four-letter words”, only excluding fuck (Wajnryb 2005: 61).
22
3.4 Politeness and bad language
Speech in interaction is often guided by a speaker’s notion of politeness. Linguistic
(im)politeness “refers to the ways in which speakers adapt (or fail to adapt) to the fact that their
interlocutors, actual or imagined, have social needs like their own” (Johnstone 2008: 145). In
other words, linguistic politeness determines how a speaker interacts with their interlocutor(s) as
a social agent; this is especially true in regards to speakers’ use of bad language. Language
choice is commonly regarded as a reflection of the complex social self. Indeed, according to
linguist Barbara Johnstone:
We use the resources of language to perform a variety of social identities, geared to the
situations we find ourselves in and the ways we are socially positioned by others. But we
can also use language to construct and project a coherent, more durable personal identity.
(Johnstone 2008: 155)
In different social situations, we speak differently; for example, someone may use a formal
register when speaking to their boss, but drop to a casual register and “swear like a sailor” when
among friends. Stylistic shifts in speech are frequent, everyday occurrences, but we may ask
ourselves what exactly is the motivation for shifting registers. Simply put, specific situations
demand different behaviors depending on what it is we seek to accomplish in an interaction. As
speakers we modify our speech to fit our social environment, within the confines of politeness.
We have previously established that bad language, defined by its taboo content and/or form, is
generally condemned as a matter of prescriptive tradition. The following section will treat bad
language from this traditional approach, where such language is viewed negatively, as the
positive aspects of bad language will be explored further down the line.
23
3.4.1 The concept of face
A thorough framework of linguistic politeness is established by Brown and Levinson (1987) in
“Politeness: Some Universals in Language Use”. Central to this work is the concept of an
individual’s face,18 which consists of their social persona with respect to others. Face, though a
representation that is created by an individual, is dependent on the perceptions of others. In order
for an individual to effectively claim positive social value, they must rely upon the cooperation
of those with whom they are interacting. There is, therefore, an inherent cooperation in face
construction, and face is mutually sustained. According to Brown and Levinson:
Face is something that is emotionally invested, and that can be lost, maintained, or
enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in interaction. In general, people cooperate
(and assume each other’s cooperation) in maintaining face in interaction.
(Brown and Levinson 1987: 311)
Adequate face maintenance depends on collaborative social construction, and interlocutors are
mutually vulnerable because of this collaborative aspect19. Mutual face maintenance is dependent
on the idealized behavior of an interlocutor. Brown and Levinson refer to an idealized
interlocutor, one that is cooperative as well as rational, as a “Model Person (MP).” It is necessary
to utilize the notion of an MP (or any generalized representation of an interlocutor) as “no matter
how much we know about the social context of discourse, we cannot predict what a particular
person will say in a given instance, or how it will be interpreted by another person” (Johnstone
2008: 157). This is due to the fact that even as members of a social set, humans retain their
relative linguistic spontaneity:
18
Face is a social element first introduced by Irvin Goffman (1967) as “the positive social value a person effectively
claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact” (299).
19
Face may fluctuate: when one interlocutor’s face is compromised, so is the other’s.
24
People’s linguistic resources and choices are limited by the ways in which their behavior
forms a part of the whole ecology of human social life...participants in discourse are
individual human beings mean[ing] that discourse is fundamentally creative, even if the
linguistic decisions made by one individual are often the same as those made by others.
(Johnstone 2008: 157)
We can assume that an MP understands the social constraints of their environment as well as the
relative social distance of the relationship with their interlocutor, and that on a broad level social
distance will systematically determine how a person acts with respect to linguistic politeness.
Brown and Levinson further define face by dividing it into two components, positive face
and negative face. Positive face is “the want of every ‘competent adult member’ that his wants
be desirable to at least some others” (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 312); in other terms, one’s
positive face represents their need to be affirmed, approved of and admired by others20. In
contrast to positive face, negative face is “the want of every ‘competent adult member’ that his
actions be unimpeded by others” (312); negative face is one’s need to be autonomous and
uninhibited. Both negative face and positive face are present in humans, as they represent our
inherent desires and needs. Face is relevant to discourse, as we act under the constant need to
maintain face.
The security of our positive and negative face may be compromised by Face-Threatening
Acts (FTAs), as caused by Speaker (S) or Hearer (H); FTAs may arise from the use of bad
language. For example, a Hearer’s negative face may be threatened by a Speaker if S impedes
H’s freedom of action through an order or request if “S indicates that he wants H to do, or refrain
from doing, some act” (313). A swearer is vulnerable to this negative FTA if their swearing is
20
This supports Goffman’s (1967) definition of face, as he states that “face is an image of self delineated in terms of
approved social attributes”(299).
25
perceived to be undesirable by their interlocutor, and if the interlocutor chastises them for
swearing. This is evident in the following dialogue taken from the Kids in the Hall sketch, “Ham
of Truth”:
Mother:
Enjoying your ham steak head, Bob?
Bob:
Yeah I like it, it’s really fuckin’ good…ooh oops, I mean, fine ham
abounds, mom.
…
Father:
Okay, you listen to me, little guy - you don't curse under my roof, you
don't curse on my roof, or in front of my wife! You got that?
In this dialogue, the Father (S) threatens the negative face of Bob (H) by commanding him not to
swear, thereby limiting his freedom of action. This doubles as a positive FTA, as reprimands
indicate that “the speaker does not care about the addressee’s feelings [or] wants…that in some
important respect he doesn’t want H’s wants” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 314). By vocally
disapproving of Bob’s use of fuckin’, the Father negatively evaluates Bob’s positive face in that
he negatively evaluates his speech style.
The Speaker may threaten the Hearer’s positive face through the use of expletive
swearing; an expletive is “the exclamatory swear word or phrase said in emotional
circumstances…[that] betrays a letting off of pent-up steam” (Wajnryb 2005: 18-19). Positive
FTAs that threaten the Hearer’s face include “expressions of violent (out-of-control)
emotions…[that give] H possible reason to fear [S] or be embarrassed by him,” and so a stream
of expletives from a Speaker displaying aggression may easily frighten or embarrass their
interlocutor (Brown and Levinson 1987: 314). A Speaker may threaten their own face as well.
For instance, an episode of charged expletive swearing constitutes “emotional leakage,” which
directly damages the Speaker’s positive face as it causes others to negatively evaluate him (315).
26
FTAs are not restricted to the use of swearing, they also apply to discussion of the taboo.
For example, the Speaker may present a negative FTA to the Hearer if S discusses taboo subjects
and makes H uncomfortable (315). Take for example, the following interaction between sibling
characters from the television series, Peep Show:
Sarah:
All the shit that went on at Grange Terrace before the move, get it all out!
Cause it's so hard when you're trying to work through this family stuff on
your own, isn't it?
Mark:
(In voiceover:) Why do the people who want to talk about things always
win? Why can’t the people who don’t want to talk about things win?
In this excerpt, Sarah (S) urges her brother to discuss their family issues. This threatens Mark’s
(H’s) negative face as it goes against his discursive autonomy: his thoughts indicate that he does
not wish to talk about this taboo subject because it makes him uncomfortable.
Just as bad language is varied in its form and content, so are its effects on Speaker-Hearer
interactions. Because bad language can cause a number of FTAs, this motivates speakers to
avoid tabooed language in order to save face. Issues of censoring are inherently issues of face
maintenance, and this seems to be reflected by the tendency to suppress bad language in the aim
of preserving social mores as we have seen. Although the maintenance of our own face is of
primary concern, we are capable of applying politeness standards to other people, to make
judgments about the appropriateness of bad language use. Knowledge of politeness standards
allows us to speculate on the likelihood of certain linguistic behavior as well.
27
3.5 When is bad language appropriate?
Politeness standards guide our perceptions of bad language, and they help us to determine
under which circumstances bad language is appropriate in private discourse. Speakers’ swearing
behavior is dependent on the context of speech (which varies largely according to the physical
environment and the parties involved) as “pragmatically, swearing can be understood in terms of
the meanings it is taken to have in particular circumstances and what it achieves in any particular
circumstance” (Wajnryb 2005: 24). English speakers’ beliefs on taboo language use were tested
in a study conducted by cognitive psychologists Jay and Janschewitz (2008), “The Pragmatics of
Swearing.” The study gaged participants’ judgments of appropriate contexts for swearing, with
attention paid to participants’ gender and knowledge of English. The participants in the study
were 121 undergraduates at the University of California at Los Angeles (68 native English
speakers21, 53 non-native speakers22). Participants were given questionnaires that presented
scenarios with swearing by different speakers in different environments. The hypothetical
speakers were a university Dean, Janitor and Student, as they represented different levels of
occupational prestige, and the locations were a Dean’s office, a Parking garage, and a Dorm
room, environments which presumably warranted particular language use by the theoretical
speakers. Participants were asked to rank the likelihood and the offensiveness of taboo language
as used by the speakers in each environment. The taboo words were equally divided among three
levels of tabooness, with the low-taboo words crap, hell, and idiot, medium-taboo words bastard,
goddamn, and piss, and high-taboo words cocksucker, cunt, and fuck. The questions were based
on this model: “How likely would it be to hear a dean say “idiot” in a dorm room?” (Jay et al.,
21
22
41 women, 27 men; age M = 20.27, SD = 1.97 years
34 women, 19 men; age M = 20.75, SD = 2.44 years
28
2008: 276-277). Participants’ offensiveness rankings are displayed in the charts from Figure 4
below:
Figure 4: Offensiveness rankings of swearing by a Dean, Janitor, and Student; 1 is low offensiveness, 7 is
high offensiveness (Jay et al., 2008: 278)
It seems that overall it is most offensive for anyone to swear in a Dean’s office, it being a
highly professional environment likely to have mixed company (interlocutors of varying age,
gender and/or social status). While it would be moderately offensive for a Dean or Janitor to
swear in a Dorm room, presumably because their presence would be in a professional capacity, it
would be very inoffensive for a student to swear in a dorm room as it is their ‘home turf,’ so to
speak. The environment in which swearing was judged least offensive was a Parking Garage,
perhaps due to several factors. For the majority of speakers, a Parking Garage is not a
professional environment, and as a very informal environment, the rules of politeness are less
thoroughly observed. Secondly, there is not a high level of interpersonal interaction: we are in
parking garages briefly, to walk to/from our vehicles with our passenger(s), with whom we likely
have some established relationship. As such, this environment does not generally sustain long
periods of discourse, or lend itself to face-threatening situations.
29
Participants’ likelihood judgments reflect these environmental considerations as well, as
can be seen in the likelihood rankings displayed in the charts from Figure 5 below:
Figure 5: Likelihood rankings of swearing by a Dean, Janitor, and Student; 1 is low likelihood, 7 is high
likelihood (Jay et al., 2008: 279)
The likelihood and offensiveness of swearing in different environments seem to share an
inverse relationship; as it becomes more offensive for a speaker to swear, it is less likely for them
to do so and risk losing face. For example, as it was judged highly offensive for a student to
swear in a Dean’s Office participants believed it was very unlikely for students to swear in this
environment. Results showed that the participants’ level of English experience had no profound
effect on their offensiveness and likelihood ratings but that for native speakers, “offensiveness
ratings were numerically higher for women23…than men24,” and “the range between the highest
and lowest average condition rating was larger for native than non-native speakers” (Jay et al.,
2008: 283, 280). This suggests that the higher speakers’ English experience, the more nuanced is
their understanding of when it is appropriate to swear.
Overall, this study affirms some general intuitions about swearing in accordance with
notions of politeness. The likelihood and offensiveness ratings indicate that the appropriateness
23
24
M = 3.68, SD = 0.88
M = 3.26, SD = 0.86 30
of swearing is tied to a speaker’s identity, as well as their socio-physical setting. Indeed,
according to Jay and Janschewitz “our use of and reaction to swear words tells us who we are
and where we fit in a culture; in short, our identities are marked by our use of swear words”
(275). Allan and Burridge support this notion, as they state that perceptions of status are
determined by interlocutors’ relative status. They note that:
Relative status derives from two sources: the relative power of the interlocutors and the
social distance between them… [and this] Social distance between interlocutors is
determined by such parameters as their mutual (un)familiarity, comparative ages, genders
and socio-cultural backgrounds.
(Allan and Burridge 2006: 77)
It should be noted that speakers of a language understand the mechanics of swearing regardless
of their personal swearing habits, as “it is well documented that even people with a reputation for
not swearing know how to swear, an ability that they may come to demonstrate if they suffer
some kind of brain decay or brain damage in later life25” (Allan and Burridge 2006: 78).
Therefore, the data from Jay and Janschewitz’ study is valuable as it is based on participants’
informed speculations relevant to their understanding of politeness expectations. The study
reveals that English speakers have some consensus on when and why bad language is
inappropriate, according to factors such as speakers’ occupational prestige and notions of
politeness in regards to status. It even shows that speakers of a language understand when the use
of such bad language is appropriate. This brings us to question how bad language may be used
appropriately, and to what end. Controversial language is met on all sides by criticism, and yet
25
A well-known example of this is the case of railroad worker Phineas Gage (1823-1860). In 1848, a tamping iron
rod that Gage was using to pack explosive powder penetrated his skull and passed through his brain after the powder
exploded unexpectedly, propelling the rod. The doctor who treated Gage wrote that friends found his pre- and postaccident personalities in direct contrast to one another, noting that after the accident he was now prone to speaking
“the grossest profanity,” whereas before he did not swear (Twomey, 2010).
31
its use persists in private discourse. There are many factors that influence speakers’ decision to
use bad language, and we will discuss several in the following section.
3.6 Functions of bad language in private discourse
Our swearing is governed by our own and others’ social needs as they fluctuate with the
formality of our environment, and some situations allow tabooed language more than others. The
use or avoidance of bad language is a matter of linguistic style. Our speech style is determined
by the following:
•
Who we are and whom we are communicating with;
•
Whether we are speaking or writing;
•
Where we are and when the utterance takes place;
•
What we are talking about; and
•
How we feel about the whole situation.
(Allan and Burridge 2006: 75)
We have explored how bad language is used in relation to interlocutor identity, speech
environment, and speech form and content, as well as the various feelings on bad language. We
now seek to explain why our styles shift to include or exclude the use of bad language. The
motivations behind the use or disuse of bad language in private discourse change depending on
the individual and their interlocutor(s). Ruth Wajnryb suggests that swearing can be separated
on the basis of intention, into “broad domains of achievement – catharsis, aggression, and social
connection” (Wajnryb 2005: 25).
The first category concerns bad language and the individual, as speakers may swear for
cathartic purposes. Cathartic swearing most often takes the form of an expletive, a type of
expressive emotional swearing. Expletives are “reflexive” because “[often they are] turned in on
32
the user,” as opposed to directed at an addressee26 (Wajnryb 2005: 19). Typically said in
response to some sudden and often unpleasant stimulus, expletives are aptly referred to as “stubyour-toe” swearing. This reactionary and reflexive nature is evident as exclamations such as
fucking hell! and fuck me! are not intended to convey any literal meaning, as they are simply
emotive outbursts27. In a study on cathartic swearing, Stephens, Atkins and Kingston (2009)
found that participants were able to withstand “a moderately to strongly painful stimulus for
significantly longer if they repeated a swear word rather than a nonswear word” (4). Swearing
coincided with an increase in heart rate and a lowered sensitivity to pain perception. This study
indicates that cathartic swearing actually does soothe the swearer, as data showed that “swearing,
rather than being a maladaptive pain response, actually produces a hypoalgesic (pain lessening)
effect” (Stephens, Atkins and Kingston 2009: 4). Swearing seems therefore to be an effective
response to pain. However, in order for cathartic swearing to retain its effectiveness, speakers
must not over-use this speech strategy, as in a follow-up study Stephens and Umland (2011)
found that “people who swear more often in daily life experience a lesser emotional response to
swearing…because of habituation to the stimulus of swearing” (1278). So while it might seem
that expletives are the answer to all of life’s minor aches and pains, swearing as a preventative
health care measure is unadvisable (damn).
The second domain of achievement, aggression, is fairly straightforward: bad language is
used to abuse the addressee(s) and/or to create distance between interlocutors. Aggressive bad
language often takes the form of abusive swearing. Abusive swearing is the use of “swear words
that are directed toward others (‘You fucker’); derogatory in tone (‘This is a shitty piece of
26
Although expletives generally lack an addressee, as previously noted they may be offensive to a hearer as they
reveal a “loss of decorum” (Wajnryb 2005: 19).
27
It is unlikely that anyone would describe hell as a sexual agent (re: fucking hell), or be extending a sexual
invitation to no one in particular (re: fuck me) when these phrases are uttered after the speaker sustains some injury.
33
work’); involve metaphoric curses (‘Go to hell!’); or denigrate through name-calling (‘You
bastard’)” (Wajnryb 2005: 17). Name-calling begins in childhood (poo poo head) and continues
into adulthood (shithead), as swearing lexicons develop with age. More often than not, namecalling is based on perceived differences between the speaker and the addressee. For example,
“names such as, fatty, four eyes, carrot top (physical), goofy, weirdo, or spaz (psychological),
and fag, wimp, or slut (social)” indicate “a discrepancy between ‘normal’ [speakers]…and
deviant [addressees]” (Jay 1992: 25). As these examples show, name-calling does not necessarily
employ swearing, but may just focus on the tabooed qualities of an addressee (their physical,
mental, or social ‘failings’). Speakers in this way highlight their own ‘normalcy’ by revealing the
addressee’s ‘abnormal’ aspects, furthering the social distance between speaker and addressee.
One’s aggressive use of bad language connotes “toughness and strength,” which increases the
speaker’s covert prestige (Andersson and Trudgill 1990: 8-9). When bad language is used in a
intentionally bad way (as to hurt others), it fortifies a speaker’s reputation as a formidable
individual, which is valuable to some people.
Like aggression, the third domain of achievement concerns bad language use and the
other. In this category, swearing is used as a means of social cohesion. Speakers’ bad language
may indicate their belonging in social circles in that “swearing can act as an in-group solidarity
marker within a shared colloquial style” (Allan and Burridge 2006: 77). If we attempt to fit in
with a group that uses a heavy swearing style, we are likely to converge linguistically and alter
our style to match the group. The informal register of swearing “signals and builds in-group
membership,” as the common use of bad language promotes solidarity among interlocutors
(Wajnryb 2005: 175).
34
Bad language may be used as an outlet for personal pain, as a means of abuse, and as a
method of bridging social distance and strengthening ties between interlocutors. Speakers choose
to swear or to avoid swearing or the mention of taboo subjects based on the interlocutors’
prestige, speech environment, and social goals. We have seen that speakers of a language have a
comprehensive knowledge of swearing that is independent of their own speech habits. Also, we
have explored how the concept of taboo influences language choice and the treatment of bad
language. The reasons behind the negative evaluation of bad language were reviewed, and such
language was defined as bad in private discourse according to its 1. Word form (swearing) and 2.
Referential content (taboo). Now that we have laid the groundwork for how bad language is
treated in private discourse, we may approach the treatment of bad language as it appears in
public discourse.
4. Public discourse and bad language
In the public discourse of the United States, bad language is determined to be bad by the
state and the courts. Earlier we defined public discourse as including speech that appears in the
media and government institutions; we may broaden our definition to include speech that is
directed at the public (either by an individual, the media, or the government), and/or takes place
in a public area. In order to take a closer look at what constitutes bad language in public
discourse, we must first analyze the broad categories of protected vs. unprotected speech.
4.1 (Un)protected speech and the First Amendment
Protected speech encompasses all modes of expression that are constitutionally
sanctioned by the First Amendment, which reads as follows:
35
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
(U.S. Constitution)
As this assertion is rather broad sweeping, First Amendment Jurisprudence is a highly evolving
territory that has been modified many times over the years. Speech as defined by the United
States Supreme Court includes language (both uttered and written) and symbolic actions. While
speech is defined in terms of action as well as language, we are primarily concerned with
(un)protected speech as it is manifested in spoken and written form, and so will focus on just a
few of the subsets of (un)protected speech28. According to the United States Courts, the First
Amendment guarantees the right:
•
To use certain offensive words and phrases to convey political messages.
("What Does Free Speech Mean?": emphasis added)
The First Amendment does not give the right:
•
To incite actions that would harm others (e.g., “[S]hout[ing] ‘fire’ in a crowded
theater.”).
•
To make or distribute obscene materials.
•
Of students to make an obscene speech at a school-sponsored event.
("What Does Free Speech Mean?": emphasis added)
How the courts define linguistic content as (un)protected is a matter of great interest and debate,
and we will examine this process through an analysis of several cases that involved challenged
speech.
28
For a more detailed list of what constitutes (un)protected speech, see Appendix A.
36
4.2 Unprotected speech: Incitement
The first category of unprotected speech is that speech which would incite harm to others.
Such speech was first defined in Schenck v. United States (1919). Appellant Charles Schenck, a
socialist, had attempted to mail thousands of anti-draft flyers to men who had recently been
drafted to fight in the First World War. The flyers likened the draft to slavery (“A conscript…is
forced into involuntary servitude”) and urged draftees to protest conscription ("Do not submit to
intimidation") (‘SCHENCK v. UNITED STATES’). Schenck was charged with violating the Espionage
Act29 and as he believed this to be a violation of his freedom of speech, the issue was brought to
the Supreme Court (McBride, 2006). The Court found that Schenck’s actions did not constitute
protected speech as they claimed his protest had the potential effect to arouse violence based on
the logic that “the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done”
(Schenck v. United States, 1919: 52-53). In effect, to protest the draft in wartime would cause an
uproar as a result of existing national tension, but to protest the draft in peacetime would be
acceptable as it would be less likely to cause upheaval. The Court further analogized, stating that
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting
fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction
against uttering words that may have all the effect of force.
(Schenck v. United States, 1919: 52-53; emphasis added)
In this case, Schenck’s speech was considered to have the power to incite terror among the
people, and it was the potentially deleterious effects of his speech that were targeted by the Court.
It was the priority to ensure that the possible negative consequences of Schenck’s speech did not
29
The government claimed that Schenck violated this act by “conspiring ‘to cause insubordination ... in the military
and naval forces of the United States’" (McBride, 2006).
37
come to fruition, and this took precedence over freedom of expression. Furthermore, this case
narrowed the parameters of protected speech, as the Court stated:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
(Schenck v. United States, 1919: 52-53; emphasis added).
The doctrine of “clear and present danger” reveals the motivation behind the state’s censorship
of injurious speech. It is the state’s responsibility to protect the people from harm, and this gives
the government the right to curb behavior for the greater good of the nation. The state is in a
paternalistic way protecting us from ourselves, and the focus of censorship here is not on the
form of the targeted language itself, but rather its potential to incite harmful actions.
The incitement category of unprotected speech encompasses what are known as “fighting
words.” The fighting words doctrine was created in Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire (1942)
and placed further limitations on freedom of expression. Appellant Walter Chaplinsky, a
Jehovah’s Witness, was handing out pamphlets on a public sidewalk and had attracted a large
crowd as he was “denouncing all religion as a 'racket'” (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 1942:
570-571). His display garnered the complaints of many passerby, and he was given a warning by
a City Marshall, Bowering; shortly thereafter, a nearby traffic officer took Chaplinsky into
custody due to the disturbance, without informing Chaplinsky of any intent to arrest. On their
way to the police station, the traffic officer and Chaplinsky ran into Marshall Bowering, who
reiterated his earlier warning because he had heard that Chaplinsky’s petitioning had incited a
riot. In response, Chaplinsky called Bowering “a God damned racketeer” and “a damned
38
Fascist” ” (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 1942: 569-570). Chaplinsky was arrested for
harassing the police officer, and later convicted of violating a New Hampshire law which stated:
No person shall address any offensive…word to any other person who is lawfully in any
street or other public place…with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him
from pursuing his lawful business or occupation.
(Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 1942: 569-570)
Under this law it was illegal to verbally harass others in a public space with the intent to harm
the interlocutor. We saw earlier that such abusive use of bad language in private discourse is not
unheard of, but in the case of public discourse it is not allowed. When this case reached the
Supreme Court, they affirmed the constitutionality of the New Hampshire law. In their decision,
the Court clarified the boundaries of free speech, stating that:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These
include the lewd and obscene…and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
(Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 1942: 571-573; emphasis added)
As in Schenck v. United States (1919), the Court found that the targeted language (the epithets30
used by Chaplinsky) was not protected under the First Amendment as it had the effect to
dangerously disturb the peace, to provoke and incite the interlocutor(s) to action. The Court had
no particular objection to the individual forms of the words used (damned Fascist), but rather
objected to their abusive content and intent. Words of incitement are seen by the state to have a
30
Epithets include any “defamatory or abusive word or phrase” (Wajnryb 2005: 18).
39
strong causal relationship to behavior, as according to “the theory that words injure…offensive
language is more likely than polite language to cause breaches of the peace and thus ought to be
restricted” (Battistella 2005: 74).
In the cases of Schenck v. United States (1919) and Chaplinsky v. State of New
Hampshire (1942), the speech was declared unprotected on the grounds of its potential
incitement. The taboo nature of language that could create a “clear and present danger” or “incite
an immediate breach of the peace” is rather evident, as it is the aim of the government to
preserve a safe environment for the citizenry and restrict any behavior that could compromise
this safety. The speech that was targeted in these cases was a part of public discourse in that the
speech was directed at the public (as at the draftees), and/or occurred in public (on the street).
Unprotected speech also includes any speech that is in some way obscene, and so we
must now look to how obscene content is treated in public discourse. The following sections will
serve to highlight influential cases that helped to further define the treatment of bad language in
public discourse in relation to First Amendment Jurisprudence and obscenity: Butler v. Michigan
(1957), Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation (1978), and Cohen v.
California (1971). The content of the objectionable speech in all cases violated conventional
taboos of the time, and in some cases its word form (swearing) was the object of criticism as well.
4.3 Unprotected speech: Obscenity
Obscene speech is not protected under the First Amendment, and as a subset of
unprotected speech, its definition is of great interest. Of course, obscenity is defined across
several contexts. In terms of private discourse, obscenity may be indicative of “swearing through
40
the explicit use of indecent or taboo words to refer to intimate parts of the body and the body’s
functions and products (for example, ‘shit’ or fuck’)” (Wajnryb 2005: 20). However, in terms of
public discourse, obscenity is defined more broadly than by its explicit linguistic form: it is
obscene according to its referential content. The unprotected nature of obscene speech was
established in Roth v. United States (1957).31 In this case, the Court declared the following:
Obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected freedom of speech or press
- either (1) under the First Amendment, as to the Federal Government, or (2) under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as to the States.
(Roth v. United States, 1957: 481-485).
Obscene speech is therefore unprotected on all fronts, on both a federal and state level. In a later
case, Miller v. California (1973), the Court adopted a three-prong obscenity test32 that is still
used to this day. In order for the Court to judge material as obscene, it must consider the
following conditions:
•
Whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest33,
•
Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law, and
31
Roth v. United States (1957) concerned the mailing of obscene advertisement and the sale of obscene books by
the appellant Roth, who ran a mail-order book business out of New York City ("ROTH v. UNITED STATES").
32
This test is also known as The Miller Test. In Miller v. California (1973), Marvin Miller “was convicted of
mailing unsolicited sexually explicit material in violation of a California [obscenity] statute”; Miller had massmailed brochures advertising the pornographic books “Intercourse," "Man-Woman," "Sex Orgies Illustrated," "An
Illustrated History of Pornography," and a pornographic film, "Marital Intercourse" (Miller v. California, 1973: 1516, 18-19). 33
The so-called prurient interest was defined in Roth v. United States (1957) thusly: “Obscene material is material
which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest – i.e., material having a tendency to excite lustful
thoughts.”
41
•
Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
(Miller v. California, 1973: 15)
Therefore it seems that speech (in symbolic or uttered forms) must be sexually explicit in some
aspect in order to be defined as obscene. However in common parlance, what is said to be
obscene is often alternately referred to as indecent. This equivalent usage of the terms indecent
and obscene is present in United States law as well. Section 1461 (Mailing obscene or crimeinciting matter) of Title 1834 of the United States Code (U.S.C.) refers to content interchangeably
as being obscene and indecent, stating that “every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or
vile article, matter, thing, device or substance35…is declared to be nonmailable matter” (18
U.S.C. § 1461 [1976 ed.]). The section concludes with the following definition of indecent: “The
term ‘indecent’, as used in this section includes matter of a character tending to incite arson,
murder or assassination” (18 U.S.C. § 1461 [1976 ed.]; emphasis added). It would seem from
this law that both obscene and indecent content are not protected by the First Amendment, as
they are in some way undesirable to society; obscene content is patently offensive to the
community and thereby harms the public, and indecent content is harmful to the public in that it
may incite acts of violence. However, in contrast to § 1461’s definition of indecent content,
which directly links indecency to incitement, indecent speech is actually constitutionally
protected (Consumer Guide 2013). This discrepancy between the state’s definition of indecent
and the Court’s definition warrants a closer look, which we shall discuss in later sections. Before
we discuss the distinction between indecency and obscenity we must first analyze why obscene
content is deemed harmful to the public, through a look at Butler v. Michigan (1957).
34
Title 18 - Crimes and Criminal Procedure details, as the title indicates, Federal criminal law of the United States.
The section discussed here falls under Chapter 71 – Obscenity.
35
Prior to 1955, § 1461 referred to nonmailable material more specifically as “‘every…lascivious or filthy book,
pamphlet, picture paper, letter, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character’” (18 U.S.C. § 1461
[1976 ed.]).
42
4.4 Obscenity and the youth: Butler v. Michigan (1957)
In October 1956, the United States Supreme Court heard the arguments for a case that
would set a legal precedent for the censorship of obscene material: Butler v. Michigan. At the
time of the case, Section 343 of the Michigan Penal Code made it “a misdemeanor to sell or
make available to the general reading public [child or adult] any book containing obscene
language ‘tending to the corruption of the morals of youth’” (Butler v. Michigan, 1957: 380381). The offending material at the heart of Butler v. Michigan was a 1952 novel written by John
Howard Griffin entitled The Devil Rides Outside, which told the story of a young man’s attempts
to stifle his sexual desires in a bid for a life of abstinence. Unsurprisingly, the novel contained
overtly sexual language which earned it the obscene label, as is shown in the following quote
from the book’s narrator: “ ‘a vision of strong legs, deep navels, bursting milk-white breasts—
insatiable, grasping, choking triangles of pubic greyness before my eyes’ ” (Calvert 2012: 253).
The appellant, Alfred E. Butler, sold a paperback copy of The Devil Rides Outside to a
Detroit police inspector and was subsequently levied with a one hundred dollar fine in
accordance with Section 34336. Butler’s attempt to dismiss the case in the initial trial was
unsuccessful and eventually it reached the Supreme Court. In the trial, the Solicitor General of
Michigan made the argument that the only way of ensuring the welfare of the youth was to shield
both adults and children from consuming offending material. Thereby, it was necessary to censor
the material that was available to adults in order to protect children, on the offhand chance that
the children encounter the offensive material (Calvert 2012: 255). This argument was not found
to be substantial, and Frankfurter dismissed this defense, stating:
36
Butler was not only aware of the risk involved in this transaction, it seems he actually sold the book as a
calculated move in order to take the issue to court. Butler had a particular interest in this issue of censorship, as he
“was no ordinary bookseller [but rather] the Detroit district sales manager for Pocket Books...America’s first
paperback publisher” (Calvert 2012: 253-254).
43
We have before us legislation not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is
said to deal. The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult population of
Michigan to reading only what is fit for children.
(Butler v. Michigan, 1957: 383-384)
Furthermore, Frankfurter stated that this argument for blanket censorship was illogical and
condemned Michigan’s law as being overbroad:
The State [of Michigan] insists that, by thus quarantining the general reading public
against books not too rugged for grown men and women in order to shield juvenile
innocence, it is exercising its power to promote the general welfare. Surely, this is to burn
the house to roast the pig. (Butler v. Michigan, 1957: 383-384)
The State of Michigan’s initial censorship of the ‘obscene’ language in The Devil Rides Outside
was motivated by a desire to protect the young from sexual content that was inappropriate to
their age group. This is one of the most common arguments against obscene material, the idea
that obscene speech may in some way harm its public audience. Nevertheless, the obscene
material in the novel could not reasonably be construed as harmful to a consenting adult
audience. In this case, the obscene speech did not make its way into the hands of a minor as the
novel was sold to an adult man, a police officer. The Court found that the Michigan law against
the selling of books containing obscene language was inapplicable in the case of the Butler
transaction, and further found the law to be too far-reaching in its scope. Ultimately, the decision
of Butler resulted in a “victory for consenting adults to access and receive materials that, in the
determination of legislative bodies, are not suitable for minors37”(Calvert 2012: 255-256).
37
This finding brought to light the need for “legislative bodies…to draft more narrowly tailored laws in the future to
protect adults’ rights to receive speech while simultaneously shielding minors from alleged ills of speech” (Calvert
2012: 255-6).
44
The exact nature of the bad language from The Devil Rides Outside was not of central
concern to Court, and in the end the Court did not make any claims as to whether the sexual
content was indecent or obscene38. If the Court had labeled the bad language as obscene this
would have little to no effect on the material as this case predated Roth v. United States (1957),
the case which established obscene speech as unprotected, by several months. Our review of
Butler gives us greater insight on the American social mores that dominated during the time in
which the anti-obscene speech doctrine was first adopted. Obscene speech is suppressed with the
goal of protecting the public audience (in particular, the young) from its taboo and thereby
dangerous content.
Now that we have some idea of how obscene speech is seen as dangerous, and therefore
unprotected, we will seek to understand the boundaries of obscene speech. The second case that
we will analyze, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978), tested the Court’s distinction of obscenity
and indecency.
4.5 Obscenity v. Indecency
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978) concerned bad language that entered into public
discourse through the broadcast medium. As the controversial speech at the heart of the case was
dispersed to the public through the broadcast media, we must first examine how the modern
American media separates obscene and indecent content according to government regulation. In
the United States, broadcasting material is subject to the rules and regulations of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC states in its Consumer Guide on Obscene,
Indecent and Profane Broadcasts that:
38
The language was deemed obscene by the original trial judge. 45
It is … a violation of federal law to air indecent programming or profane language during
certain hours. …[and] The FCC may revoke a station license, impose a monetary
forfeiture or issue a warning if a station airs obscene, indecent or profane39 material.
Profane and indecent content is strictly prohibited from broadcasts airing between 6 a.m. and 10
p.m. on the radio and television and, as mentioned above, the FCC has the power to penalize
stations that do not comply with this rule. In its Consumer Guide, the FCC states that it follows
the Supreme Court’s three-pronged obscenity test when reviewing controversial material. It also
notes the Commission’s assessment of indecent material, stating:
broadcast indecency [is] ‘language or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory organs or activities.’ Indecent programming
contains patently offensive sexual or excretory material that does not rise to the level of
obscenity.
(Consumer Guide 2013: emphasis added)
This language is very similar to the state’s definition of obscenity, in that it evokes judgments
based on contemporary community standards and sexual themes (for good measure, the FCC
includes excrement here as well). It seems that the FCC’s vague definition of indecent material is
predicated largely on the established definition of obscenity: it is almost as though they are
saying that indecent content is obscene-ish. As indecent material is defined here in the same
terms as obscene material, it is difficult to determine what separates the two. It seems that this
judgment, at least for the purposes of the FCC, is rather subjective. The current FCC regulations
regarding indecent broadcast programming arose from the decision on FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation (1978).
39
The FCC “has defined profanity as ‘including language so grossly offensive to members of the public who
actually hear it as to amount to a nuisance.’” (Consumer Guide, 2013).
46
4.5.1 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978)
The case of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978) arose from a complaint about a radio broadcast
of comedian George Carlin’s monologue, “Filthy Words” (also commonly known as “7 words
you can’t say on television”). The following is a short excerpt from a transcript of the broadcast40
demonstrating the language that prompted the complaint:
I was thinking about the curse words and the swear words, the cuss words and the words
that you can't say, that you're not supposed to say all the time… Okay, I was thinking one
night about the words you couldn't say on the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you
definitely wouldn't say, ever… and it came down to seven but the list is open to
amendment…The original seven words were, shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits.
(FCC v. Pacifica, 1978: 751-752. Emphasis added)
The controversial broadcast aired in the early afternoon on a weekday, from a radio station in
New York that was owned by the Pacifica Foundation. The FCC complaint was lodged by a man
who had unwittingly tuned in to the monologue from his car radio while driving with his minor
son. The circumstances surrounding the broadcast of “Filthy Words” are noted in the Supreme
Court decision as follows:
[According to Pacifica] the monologue had been played during a program about
contemporary society's attitude toward language and that, immediately before its
broadcast, listeners had been advised that it included ‘sensitive language which might be
regarded as offensive to some.’
(FCC v. Pacifica, 1978: 730-731)
40
Included in the Supreme Court’s decision on FCC v. Pacifica is an appendix of “a verbatim transcript of ‘Filthy
Words’ prepared by the Federal Communications Commission”. As a point of interest, the full transcript is included
in this work as Appendix B.
47
As opposed to censoring the language of the broadcast, the radio station provided a warning
about its content prior to airing. In its response to the FCC complaint, Pacifica noted that in the
broadcast “Carlin is not mouthing obscenities, he is merely using words to satirize as harmless
and essentially silly our attitudes towards those words" (FCC v. Pacifica, 1978: 730-731). It is
clear however that the form of the bad language, its swearing content, was what initiated the
original complaint. Carlin’s use of the swear words in his monologue (which he ironically noted
to be unacceptable for the “public airwaves”) was partially referential, in that he spoke about
their different contextual usages for comedic effect. Take for example, Carlin’s analysis of cock:
“cock is a half-way dirty word, 50% dirty - dirty half the time, depending on what you mean by
it…And the cock crowed three times… the cock - three times. It's in the Bible, cock in the Bible”
(FCC v. Pacifica, 1978: 752-753). Here, Carlin refers to conflating the ‘polite’ meaning with the
taboo meaning of the word cock (i.e. rooster vs. penis), playing on the referential context of the
word. Had Carlin discussed cock without alluding to its sexual connotations, it would not have
elicited criticism (or laughs). Of course, Carlin also mapped out conventional curse words and
phrases in his monologue through various other examples in a less analytic manner presumably
to exhaust all uses of particular curses, as in “I’ve had that shit up to here. I think you’re full of
shit myself…Shit on a stick. Shit in a handbag...” (FCC v. Pacifica, 1978: 753-754).
The FCC, in contrast to Pacifica’s claims, described the monologue’s language as patently
offensive:
The [FCC] characterized the language used…as ‘patently offensive,’ though not
necessarily obscene, and expressed the opinion that it should be regulated by principles
analogous to those found in the law of nuisance where the ‘law generally speaks to
channeling behavior more than actually prohibiting it…[T]he concept of `indecent' is
intimately connected with the exposure of children to language that describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
48
medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a
reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.’
(FCC v. Pacifica, 1978: 731-733)
It seems that indecent language is patently offensive according to “contemporary community
standards”, and that patently offensive content may be obscene (but this does not mean that
patently offensive = obscene):
patently offensive
↔
indecent
obscene
→
patently offensive
patently offensive
⇏
obscene
This clarifies some of the language used in the Court’s obscenity test. It seems that like obscenity,
indecency is determined by the interplay between patently offensive content and the age group of
its audience. Therefore, certain indecent content may be deemed appropriate for adults, but not
for children, as we have seen in Butler v. Michigan (1957).
The Court found in favor of the FCC’s request to prohibit indecent speech from daytime
broadcasts, and this remains in effect today. What is interesting is that indecent and obscene
content are treated as equally dangerous for an adolescent public audience, as obscene content is
prohibited outright from broadcast, and indecent content is channeled to times where it is
unlikely for a child to tune in. We know that swearing does not necessarily equate with obscenity,
as swearing gains its obscene nature from its taboo referential content. Furthermore, it is likely
that the words bastard, hell, and damn, which Carlin uttered, were not the words that prompted
the complaint against the broadcast. We can assume therefore, that Carlin’s speech was
challenged on the basis of its sexual referential content, as well as its word form. In regards to
the censoring of speech such as that from Carlin’s monologue the Court stated: “the
constitutional protection accorded to a communication containing such patently offensive sexual
49
and excretory language need not be the same in every context41.” (FCC v. Pacifica, 1978: 747748). As Carlin’s speech was deemed to be indecent, it was ultimately protected under the First
Amendment, albeit restricted under FCC regulations. Carlin’s speech it could not be construed as
unprotected speech as it did not in some way incite violent action, nor could it be claimed to
promote obscene acts (if it promoted any action, it would be the linguistic behavior of swearing).
We have seen bad language (obscene and indecent) as it is embodied in the media,
presented to the public in printed and broadcast forms. In both instances, the bad language
centered on sexual themes and was objected to on the paternalistic grounds of protecting the
youth. Our final case to be discussed, Cohen v. California (1971), concerned bad language that
entered public discourse through public display.
4.6 Public display of bad language: Cohen v. California (1971)
On April 26, 1968, Paul Robert Cohen was arrested for wearing a jacket emblazoned with
the phrase Fuck the Draft in the Los Angeles County Courthouse. He was charged with violating
the California Penal Code 415, specifically the section which prohibits "maliciously and willfully
disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person…by…offensive conduct”, and was
sentenced to 30 days’ jail time (Cohen v. California, 1971: 15-16). The particular circumstances
surrounding his arrest are noteworthy, as Thomas G. Krattenmaker explains in his retrospective
on the case:
Interestingly, when Cohen entered the courtroom, he removed his jacket…Meanwhile, a
police officer sent the presiding judge a note suggesting that Cohen be held in contempt
41
This is consistent to the Court’s claim in Schenck v. United States (1919) that Schenck’s protest of the draft would
have been legal in other contexts, i.e., in peacetime.
50
[which the judge declined] and Cohen was arrested by the officer after he left the
courtroom.
(Krattenmaker 2011: 659-660)
Cohen only wore the jacket in view of others in the less formal areas of the courthouse, but as the
Courthouse is a government property, all areas within it may be considered a public area. It is in
this way that Cohen’s speech entered into public discourse, as he was in a public setting.
Also of interest is the Court’s note in the exposition to the case that “there were women
and children present in the corridor” (Cohen v. California, 1971: 16-17). This is rather revealing
of the social mores of the time, and like our previous cases concerning (un)protected speech, it
seems that the targeting of Cohen’s message was primarily motivated by his supposedly
objectionable audience. Presumably, adult women were categorized along with children as
requiring protection from obscene speech. Although fuck is an active character in discourse
today,42 at the time of the case it was generally unspoken:
Quaint or even sexist as these facts [the Court’s note on the exposure of women and
children to the jacket] may appear today, the word was rarely spoken by women or
employed by men when women were present, even in private settings. It was not merely
that the ‘F word’ was not spoken on radio or television; in conventional American society,
‘fuck’ was not spoken where people whom the speaker did not know might overhear it.
(Krattenmaker 2012: 654)
42
Krattenmaker notes as a prominent example the popularity of the 2010 song Fuck You by Cee Lo Green, known
for its signature lyric “I see you driving 'round town with the girl I love and I'm like, ‘fuck you!’” (Cee Lo Green,
Fuck You). Between its release in August 2010 and December 2011, it sold 5.3 million downloads in the United
States alone (Sisario, 2011). The ubiquity of this song in recent years is reflective of the ever-evolving standards of
acceptability for swear speech in the public sphere.
51
Although fuck was undoubtedly offensive, the form of this offensive speech was not aggressive
in some extreme way, and it could not be claimed that the speech would create a clear and
present danger among its audience. Because Cohen silently conveyed his message via its display
on his person it addressed no one in particular, and did not demand attention. The Court
acknowledged this, stating that:
Persons confronted with Cohen's jacket were in a quite different posture than, say, those
subjected to the raucous emissions of sound trucks blaring outside their residences. Those
in the Los Angeles courthouse could effectively avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.
(Cohen v. California, 1971: 21-22)
Because Cohen’s audience could easily disengage from his message, it was not so
disruptive as to warrant the claim that Cohen “maliciously…disturb[ed] the peace,” as his arrest
suggests (Cohen v. California, 1971: 15-16). In the original trial, Cohen was found guilty of this
charge on the popular notion that the word fuck is obscene regardless of its context of use and
therefore as obscene language, “it could be proscribed without any further showing, such as a
tendency to cause illegal acts, or its being thrust upon unwilling persons, or distributed to minors”
(Krattenmaker 2012: 660). Obscene content does not necessarily have any violent or illegal
elements, it is purely proscribed due to its lascivious nature, and it is this sexual content that is
construed as harmful to the public. However, when it reached the Supreme Court, the
contentious language in Cohen v. California (1971) was not construed as obscene as it in no way
appealed to the prurient interest43. The Court noted that the phrase Fuck the Draft could not be
interpreted in such a literal sexual context as it was not “in some significant way, erotic” (Cohen
43
The condition that obscene material appeal to the prurient interest was established some years prior, in Roth v.
United States (1957).
52
v. California, 1971: 20-21). The bad language of Fuck the Draft was negatively evaluated purely
on the basis of its word form, as it connoted no taboo sexual elements. Furthermore, Cohen’s
expression of anti-war sentiment was not directed at any particular individual, and in this sense
could not warrant “the exercise of the State's police power to prevent a speaker from
intentionally provoking a given group to hostile reaction” in accordance with the fighting words
doctrine (Cohen v. California, 1971: 20-21).
The Court concluded in their ruling that ”the State may not, consistently with the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display of this single four-letter expletive
[fuck] a criminal offense” (Cohen v. California, 1971: 15-16). It would seem therefore that the
Court is not concerned with word form when it seeks to censor, but rather the referential intent of
language. Obscene content is labeled solely on the basis of its sexual reference, as we have seen
in Butler v. Michigan (1957), and not on the basis of its impolite linguistic form, as we have seen
in FCC v. Pacifica (1978) and now in Cohen v. California (1971). Now that we have discussed
the basis on which content is labeled as obscene, and the other types of speech that are
unprotected under the First Amendment, we may draw some conclusions on the evaluation of
bad language in public discourse and compare this to our earlier observations on bad language as
it appears in private discourse.
5. Conclusion
In our initial assessment of bad language, we focused on the realm of private discourse,
as it is from here that we derive public notions of appropriate language. We established that bad
language was so-called due to its (1) word form, swearing, and/or due to its (2) referential
content, the taboo. In our introduction to swearing, we described several categories: foul
language, blasphemy, profanity, curses, and euphemistic swearing. This was followed by a
53
cross-cultural analysis of taboo, its common themes and linguistic manifestations. Taboos
generally concern the supernatural, disease, sexual activity, human waste production, and human
consumption. In short, taboos arise out of the intimate aspects of the human experience, and are
treated with such reverence (or in some instances, fear) as they pertain to our vulnerabilities. In a
continuation of this vein, an exploration of denotation and connotation was provided in terms of
dysphemism, orthophemism, and euphemism: “coping mechanisms” that we use to navigate bad
language in private discourse.
It was established that bad language is not inherently bad, but rather accumulates its
negative connotations over the course of time, as in the case of the words shit and cunt. Negative
evaluations of bad language and methods of its censoring were introduced, and analyzed through
politeness theory as it pertains to face maintenance. Motivations behind the use of bad language
and judgments of its appropriateness entered the discussion. We saw that speakers may employ
bad language as a means of catharsis (as in the use of expletives in response to pain), as a means
of aggression (as in the use of name-calling to deride the interlocutor), and as a means of social
cohesion (as in the imitation of bad language styles that are shared by an in-group). A study on
the appropriateness of bad language use, “The Pragmatics of Swearing,” was analyzed. This
study showed that participants’ negative evaluations of hypothetical swearing situations were
contingent on such contextual factors as the identities of the speakers and interlocutors, as well
as the socio-physical setting of speech. Participants judged swearing by a high status speaker, a
Dean, to be more offensive in most settings than swearing by a low-status speaker, a Student. It
seems intuitive that these offensiveness judgments also influenced participants’ judgments of the
likelihood of certain speakers to use bad language, as they generally found a Dean less likely to
swear than a Student. Although we refer to bad language as bad, it may in some instances
54
promote the positive, and its qualitative evaluation is highly contextual according to speakerhearer relationships and the speech environment.
Following our evaluation of bad language in private discourse, we turned the discussion
of bad language to its appearance in the public domain. Public speech was defined along the
lines of its addressee (the general population) and the environment in which it occurs (a public
area). The topic of protected and unprotected speech as it relates to the First Amendment was
explored, and our focus was on verbal and written speech as opposed to symbolic action. We
found that according to First Amendment Jurisprudence, unprotected speech includes speech that
incites harmful action, as in the case of speech that creates a clear and present danger for its
audience. In the case of Schenck v. United States (1919), the Court stated that the (un)protected
nature of speech may vary according to the situation in which speech occurs. This was affirmed
in the decision on Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), in which the Court stated that “it is well
understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances”
(Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 1942: 571-572). Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942)
expanded the boundaries of language of incitement to include fighting words, which it defined as
speech which either deliberately provokes its addressee or disturbs the peace. The fighting words
and clear and present danger doctrines thus compose the first class of unprotected speech, which
encompasses speech that is construed to be injurious in some way to the general public. From
this observation, we concluded that the state is motivated to classify such speech as unprotected
because it is considered a threat to the American people.
The second class of unprotected speech that we covered includes speech that relates
obscene content. Objections to obscene content are largely predicated on the notion that
obscenity is injurious in some way to the youth or other impressionable individuals, as evidenced
55
by the arguments against obscene literature in Butler v. Michigan (1957). In the exploration of
obscene speech, we analyzed the state’s definitions of obscene and indecent content, concluding
that obscene speech must be of a sexual nature that specifically appeals to the prurient interest.
This is consistent with the Court’s findings in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978) and Cohen v.
California (1971). In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978), the swearing in George Carlin’s
monologue was ultimately found to be indecent as opposed to obscene, due to the circumstances
of its use. The linguistic form of the bad language in this case was not the main concern of the
Court, rather its critical focus was on the taboo sexual content. Although indecent language was
established as protected, it is still subject to government regulation due to its patently offensive
content. In Cohen v. California (1971), the right to use “certain offensive words and phrases to
convey political messages” was affirmed. Paul Cohen’s display of the patently offensive phrase
Fuck the Draft was construed as protected indecent language according to its linguistic form and
referential content. The phrase Fuck the Draft was determined by the Court to have no sexual
connotation, and therefore was not obscene, as it did not suggest prurient taboo notions.
From these cases it is clear that the Court does not seek to censor speech due to its
linguistic form, as to censor speech solely on the grounds that it contains swearing is not
substantial. It seems that speech is censored according to its intent (fighting words), as well as its
taboo referential content (obscenity), when the speech has the potential to be significantly
disruptive and injurious to the public. In public discourse, the link between speech and action is
of utmost importance in the distinction between protected and unprotected speech. We may
conclude therefore that the state does not strive to censor linguistic behavior, but rather seeks to
censor action as it is inspired by language. Bad language in public discourse is thus targeted on
the basis of its potential to harm the public by the provocation of dangerous actions among its
56
audience. In contrast, bad language is censored in private discourse due to the negative
evaluations of linguistic behavior. Speakers in private discourse censor their own and others’ use
of bad language to preserve social norms of politeness; of course, politeness norms to not apply
to the state as it is an authoritative entity and not subject to social constraints.
Speech is simultaneously spontaneous and formulaic, and this is especially true of that
which we refer to as bad language: it takes a certain linguistic form, intent, and/or subject to be
considered bad, but may be manipulated in a variety of ways despite these constraints. Swearing
in particular presents a rich linguistic tradition, and cross-cultural comparisons of swearing
reveal some interesting commonalities shared by different languages. Bad language is generally
highly charged in regards to its subject, and so its use is controversial in both private and public
discourse. Within private discourse the reactions to bad language vary greatly, as bad language
may be met in equal measure with criticism or approval. The opinions of bad language in private
may find their way into public discourse, but ultimately the decision to publicly censor speech is
derived from its prospectively dangerous consequences. The boundaries of free speech are
defined by the state along with the tenuous border of the individual and society. When speech
has the effect to substantially threaten the general peace, the welfare of society takes precedence
over the individual’s right to freedom of expression. The state takes on the task of regulating
speech that relates to action, and in this manner recognizes the inherent power of language. As
cultures and language evolve so does the law, and we may conclude with the knowledge that the
boundaries of speech will continuously be stretched, broken, and redefined over the coming
years.
57
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62
Appendix A: “What does free speech mean?” (United States Courts)
The content below is taken directly from the website of the United States Courts.
The following are examples of speech, both direct (words) and symbolic (actions), that the Court
has decided are either entitled to First Amendment protections, or not.
Freedom of speech includes the right:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Not to speak (specifically, the right not to salute the flag).
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Of students to wear black armbands to school to protest a war (“Students do not
shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate.”).
Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
To use certain offensive words and phrases to convey political messages.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
To contribute money (under certain circumstances) to political campaigns.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
To advertise commercial products and professional services (with some
restrictions).
Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
To engage in symbolic speech, (e.g., burning the flag in protest).
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310
(1990).
Freedom of speech does not include the right:
•
•
•
•
•
•
To incite actions that would harm others (e.g., “[S]hout[ing] ‘fire’ in a crowded
theater.”).
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
To make or distribute obscene materials.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
To burn draft cards as an anti-war protest.
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
To permit students to print articles in a school newspaper over the objections of
the school administration.
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Of students to make an obscene speech at a school-sponsored event.
Bethel School District #43 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Of students to advocate illegal drug use at a school-sponsored event.
Morse v. Frederick, __ U.S. __ (2007).
63
Appendix B: The “Appendix to opinion of the Court” for FCC v. Pacifica (1978)
The following is a verbatim transcript of "Filthy Words" prepared by the Federal
Communications Commission.
Aruba-du, ruba-tu, ruba-tu. I was thinking about the curse words and the swear words, the cuss
words and the words that you can't say, that you're not supposed to say all the time, [']cause
words or people into words want to hear your words. Some guys like to record your words and
sell them back to you if they can, (laughter) listen in on the telephone, write down what words
you say. A guy who used to be in Washington knew that his phone was tapped, used to answer,
Fuck Hoover, yes, go ahead. (laughter) Okay, I was thinking one night about the words you
couldn't say on the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn't say, ever, [']cause I
heard a lady say bitch one night on television, and it was cool like she was talking about, you
know, ah, well, the bitch is the first one to notice that in the litter Johnie right (murmur) Right.
And, uh, bastard you can say, and hell and damn so I have to figure out which ones you couldn't
and ever and it came down to seven but the list is open to amendment, and in fact, has been
changed, uh, by now, ha, a lot of people pointed things out to me, and I noticed some myself.
The original seven words were, shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, mother-fucker, and tits. Those
are the ones that will curve your spine, grow hair on your hands and (laughter) maybe, even
bring us, God help us, peace without honor (laughter) um, and a bourbon. (laughter) And now
the first thing that we noticed was that word fuck was really repeated in there because the word
motherfucker is a compound word and it's another form of the word fuck. (laughter) You want to
be a purist it doesn't really - it can't be on the list of basic words. Also, cocksucker is a compound
word and neither half of that is really dirty. The word - the half sucker that's merely suggestive
(laughter) and the word cock is a half-way dirty word, 50% dirty - dirty half the time, depending
on what you mean by it. (laughter) Uh, remember when you first heard it, like in 6th grade, you
used to giggle. And the cock crowed three times, heh (laughter) the cock - three times. It's in the
Bible, cock in the Bible. (laughter) And the first time you heard about a cock-fight, remember What? Huh? naw. It ain't that, are you stupid? man. (laughter, clapping) It's chickens, you know,
(laughter) Then you have the four letter words from the old Anglo-Saxon fame. Uh, shit and fuck.
The word shit, uh, is an interesting kind of word in that the middle class has never really
64
accepted it and approved it. They use it like, crazy but it's not really okay. It's still a rude, dirty,
old kind of gushy word. (laughter) They don't like that, but they say it, like, they say it like, a
lady now in a middle-class home, you'll hear most of the time she says it as an expletive, you
know, it's out of her mouth before she knows. She says, Oh shit oh shit, (laughter) oh shit. If she
drops something, Oh, the shit hurt the broccoli. Shit. Thank you. (footsteps fading away) (papers
ruffling)
Read it! (from audience)
Shit! (laughter) I won the Grammy, man, for the comedy album. Isn't that groovy? (clapping,
whistling) (murmur) That's true. Thank you. Thank you man. Yeah. (murmur) (continuous
clapping) Thank you man. Thank you. Thank you very much, man. Thank, no, (end of
continuous clapping) for that and for the Grammy, man, [']cause (laughter) that's based on people
liking it man, yeh, that's ah, that's okay man. (laughter) Let's let that go, man. I got my Grammy.
I can let my hair hang down now, shit. (laughter) Ha! So! Now the word shit is okay for the man.
At work you can say it like crazy. Mostly figuratively, Get that shit out of here, will ya? I don't
want to see that shit anymore. I can't cut that shit, buddy. I've had that shit up to here. I think
you're full of shit myself. (laughter) He don't know shit from Shinola. (laughter) you know that?
(laughter) Always wondered how the Shinola people felt about that (laughter) Hi, I'm the new
man from Shinola. (laughter) Hi, how are ya? Nice to see ya. (laughter) How are ya? (laughter)
Boy, I don't know whether to shit or wind my watch. (laughter) Guess, I'll shit on my watch.
(laughter) Oh, the shit is going to hit de fan. (laughter) Built like a brick shit-house. (laughter)
Up, he's up shit's creek. (laughter) He's had it. (laughter) He hit me, I'm sorry. (laughter) Hot shit,
holy shit, tough shit, eat shit, (laughter) shit-eating grin. Uh, whoever thought of that was ill.
(murmur laughter) He had a shit-eating grin! He had a what? (laughter) Shit on a stick. (laughter)
Shit in a handbag. I always like that. He ain't worth shit in a handbag. (laughter) Shitty. He acted
real shitty. (laughter) You know what I mean? (laughter) I got the money back, but a real shitty
attitude. Heh, he had a shit-fit. (laughter) Wow! Shit-fit. Whew! Glad I wasn't there. (murmur,
laughter) All the animals - Bull shit, horse shit, cow shit, rat shit, bat shit. (laughter) First time I
heard bat shit, I really came apart. A guy in Oklahoma, Boggs, said it, man. Aw! Bat shit.
(laughter) Vera reminded me of that last night, ah (murmur). Snake shit, slicker than owl shit.
(laughter) Get your shit together. Shit or get off the pot. (laughter) I got a shit-load full of them.
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(laughter) I got a shit-pot full, all right. Shit-head, shit-heel, shit in your heart, shit for brains,
(laughter) shit-face, heh (laughter) I always try to think how that could have originated; the first
guy that said that. Somebody got drunk and fell in some shit, you know. (laughter) Hey, I'm shitface. (laughter) Shit-face, today. (laughter) Anyway, enough of that shit. (laughter) The big one,
the word fuck that's the one that hangs them up the most. [']Cause in a lot of cases that's the very
act that hangs them up the most. So, it's natural that the word would, uh, have the same effect.
It's a great word, fuck, nice word, easy word, cute word, kind of. Easy word to say. One syllable,
short u. (laughter) Fuck. (Murmur) You know, it's easy. Starts with a nice soft sound fuh ends
with a kuh. Right? (laughter) A little something for everyone. Fuck (laughter) Good word. Kind
of a proud word, too. Who are you? I am FUCK. (laughter) FUCK OF THE MOUNTAIN.
(laughter) Tune in again next week to FUCK OF THE MOUNTAIN. (laughter) It's an interesting
word too, [']cause it's got a double kind of a life - personality - dual, you know, whatever the
right phrase is. It leads a double life, the word fuck. First of all, it means, sometimes, most of the
time, fuck. What does it mean? It means to make love. Right? We're going to make love, yeh,
we're going to fuck, yeh, we're going to fuck, yeh, we're going to make love. (laughter) we're
really going to fuck, yeh, we're going to make love. Right? And it also means the beginning of
life, it's the act that begins life, so there's the word hanging around with words like love, and life,
and yet on the other hand, it's also a word that we really use to hurt each other with, man. It's a
heavy. It's one that you have toward the end of the argument. (laughter) Right? (laughter) You
finally can't make out. Oh, fuck you man. I said, fuck you. (laughter, murmur) Stupid fuck.
(laughter) Fuck you and everybody that looks like you. (laughter) man. It would be nice to
change the movies that we already have and substitute the word fuck for the word kill, wherever
we could, and some of those movie cliches would change a little bit. Madfuckers still on the
loose. Stop me before I fuck again. Fuck the ump, fuck the ump, fuck the ump, fuck the ump,
fuck the ump. Easy on the clutch Bill, you'll fuck that engine again. (laughter) The other shit one
was, I don't give a shit. Like it's worth something, you know? (laughter) I don't give a shit. Hey,
well, I don't take no shit, (laughter) you know what I mean? You know why I don't take no shit?
(laughter) [']Cause I don't give a shit. (laughter) If I give a shit, I would have to pack shit.
(laughter) But I don't pack no shit cause I don't give a shit. (laughter) You wouldn't shit me,
would you? (laughter) That's a joke when you're a kid with a worm looking out the bird's ass.
You wouldn't shit me, would you? (laughter) It's an eight-year-old joke but a good one. (laughter)
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The additions to the list. I found three more words that had to be put on the list of words you
could never say on television, and they were fart, turd and twat, those three. (laughter) Fart, we
talked about, it's harmless It's like tits, it's a cutie word, no problem. Turd, you can't say but who
wants to, you know? (laughter) The subject never comes up on the panel so I'm not worried
about that one. Now the word twat is an interesting word. Twat! Yeh, right in the twat. (laughter)
Twat is an interesting word because it's the only one I know of, the only slang word applying to
the, a part of the sexual anatomy that doesn't have another meaning to it. Like, ah, snatch, box
and pussy all have other meanings, man. Even in a Walt Disney movie, you can say, We're going
to snatch that pussy and put him in a box and bring him on the airplane. (murmur, laughter)
Everybody loves it. The twat stands alone, man, as it should. And two-way words. Ah, ass is
okay providing you're riding into town on a religious feast day. (laughter) You can't say, up your
ass. (laughter) You can say, stuff it! (murmur) There are certain things you can say its weird but
you can just come so close. Before I cut, I, uh, want to, ah, thank you for listening to my words,
man, fellow, uh space travelers. Thank you man for tonight and thank you also. (clapping
whistling) ”
(FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 1978)
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