December 2013
Addressing Sectarianism and Promoting Cohesion
in the British Muslim Community
A Preliminary Report
Anya Clarkson
Centre for Academic Shi’a Studies
Contents
Acknowledgments and Terms of Reference..................................................................2
Introduction...................................................................................................................3
Methodology.................................................................................................................5
Background Information................................................................................................8
Part 1
Sectarianism and Sects.................................................................................................14
Identity Considerations................................................................................................15
Part 2
Causes and Issues of Contention.................................................................................17
Manifestations of Sectarianism...................................................................................24
Positive Action.............................................................................................................29
Conclusions and Recommendations............................................................................35
Glossary of Terms........................................................................................................40
Bibliography and Appendices......................................................................................42
1
Acknowledgements
This report could not have been completed without the many people who gave their time and
patience to help me with my research. I would like to thank Judge Kurshid Drabu, Sayeda Khalida
Rahman, Maulana Shahid Raza, Sheikh Ibrahim Mogra and Dr Omer el-Hamdoon for sharing their
insights with me, and others who gave their time and answered questions. I would like to thank Dr
Kathryn Spellman for her academic support and guidance. I would also like to give thanks to Harrow
Central Mosque and the Shi’a Ithna’ashari Community of Middlesex for including me in their intrafaith community events. Thank you to Francesca Washtell for her tireless help with editing. Finally,
thank you to Sayyed Yousif Al-Khoei, Maryam Ali and CASS for commissioning this report and for
their support throughout the project.
Terms of Reference
This report on sectarian tensions between the Sunni and Shi’a Muslim communities of Britain was
commissioned by the Centre for Academic Shi’a Studies (CASS). CASS is a research body, established
in 2009, which aims to promote original, contemporary and impartial scholarship on Shi’a Islam and
Muslims.
CASS believes that an examination of sectarian issues is pertinent at this time due to concerns raised
by members of the British Muslim community, both Sunni and Shi’a, about the potential for an
escalation in tensions. This concern has been sparked by the recent escalation of sectarian tension
the Middle East and the wider Islamic world, an increasing concern about the influence of hate
preachers and satellite channels broadcasting sectarian messages in Britain and a recent incident of
sectarian violence on Edgware Road in London. The aim of the report is to publish its findings so that
it may be used to inform relevant parties about the situation, its causes and potential action that can
be taken in response.
2
Introduction
Sectarian hostility and conflict can be considered a grievous assault on an individual’s freedom of
religion and belief. Historically, sectarian tensions in Britain between Muslim communities have
been low. However, recent years have seen increased speculation among commentators and in the
media about the possibility of rising levels of sectarianism. This has stimulated further debate about
this currently under-researched area. It is to this debate that this report aims to make a
contribution. This report should be considered an initial ‘springboard’ that will introduce for
discussion some of the key issues related to Muslim sectarianism in the British context. Muslim
sectarianism is a wide field of study and it is hoped that this report can act as a starting point from
which further research in this specific area can be stimulated.
The initial intention of this report was to attempt to build a precise picture of the level of sectarian
tension between different Muslim sects in Britain. However, as the research progressed, it became
clear that to do so would be a far larger project than was first envisaged. Without even accurate
data on the number of Shi’as in Britain, let alone other smaller sects, it would be extremely difficult
to quantify in precise terms the nature and level of sectarian tension within the British Muslim
community. Another issue is the difficulty of quantifying ‘tension’, as it is an emotional
phenomenon; conflict and violence can, to an extent, be quantified but this does not represent the
full spectrum of ways that sectarian ‘tension’ can manifest.
What did become evident, however, throughout the course of the research were the indications that
could be drawn from the perceptions about sectarian relations among members of the community.
From these perceptions I was able to gain an understanding of the position in which many British
Muslims believe themselves to be. Many perceive the British community to be at, or approaching, a
‘cross-roads’. On the one hand, various factors and influences could be nudging some elements of
the community towards a tipping point that may see the British Muslim community subject to
increased sectarian hostility. These factors include the ‘trickle-down’ effect of geopolitical tensions
and sectarian conflicts in the wider Muslim world, as well as the disproportionate and negative
influence of certain outspoken individuals, particularly so-called ‘hate preachers’
However, on the other side of the ‘cross-roads’, some believe that action needs to be taken now to
address the triggers that could bring the community to a tipping point. There is a strong presence
within the community of hope for a more positive future characterised by greater social cohesion.
To navigate this ‘cross-roads’ there is a belief that action should be taken now to steer the
community down a more cohesive path. Many community members indicate that a strategy
designed to promote greater interaction and unity between different Muslim groups in Britain would
reduce what they see as the ‘separateness’ of the communities. Therefore, with this ‘cross-roads’ in
mind, which route the situation takes in coming years will be shaped by events taking place now and
the action taken in response.
The report seeks, therefore, to present the perceptions of the British Muslim community and to
frame them within the historical and geopolitical context of Muslim sectarianism. The historical
narrative of the split within the Muslim community after the death of the Prophet Mohammed into
3
various different sects provides an essential background to the origins of sectarian tension in terms
of ideological and theological differences. Subsequent sectarian relations between the different
sects of Islam in the Muslim world demonstrate how sectarian hostility can manifest and how it can
impact on the highly interconnected global Muslim community. Sectarianism in the Muslim world
can also be considered, to an extent, to be a self-perpetuating phenomenon as sectarian hostility
often breeds further sectarian hostility. Therefore, a study of the geopolitical Muslim sectarian
context is pertinent to provide the context for the ‘trickle-down’ effect of sectarian issues elsewhere
in the world on the British Muslim community.
The intention of this report is not to be exhaustive but to stimulate the debate; therefore, it will call
for further research to be undertaken in this field where it finds the current available literature to be
lacking. Currently, the available literature on the Shi’a community of Britain is limited, and as a result
the tools that can be used to carry out such research are not well-refined and are currently very
blunt, lacking in categorisation and the ability to tease-out issues, which would facilitate a detailed
analysis. These ‘blunt tools’ leave many questions unanswered, and pose further questions in
response.
What can be drawn from the limited evidence, however, are indicators of wider social patterns, from
which conclusions can be drawn and investigated further. Therefore, this report intends to draw out
indicators to act as sign-posts for further research. One of the most immediate indicators is the
existence of the discussion itself, as wherever people are talking about sectarianism this is indicative
of a level of awareness in the community about issues related to the topic. Engagement in a
discussion implies a willingness to know more about the topic. It also implies the existence of
something that has sparked concern over disunity. Therefore, this report aims to tap into this
existing debate and to explore some of the most commonly raised issues within it, with the aim of
making a contribution to the conversation.
4
Methodology
The research used in the construction of this report takes two main forms: primary research
conducted among members of the Muslim community of Britain and secondary reading of news
articles, academic publications and media monitoring. The intention of this two-pronged approach
was to ensure that the report reflects both the perspectives of members of the Muslim community
and the academic perspective given in the literature.
My primary research was conducted through interviews with community leaders and discussions
with approximately 25 members of the British Muslim community, both men and women of varying
ages between 18 and 60. It was pertinent to talk to community leaders because most of those who
were consulted are involved with at least one Muslim organisation or representative body. Many are
also involved in the affairs of their own local communities across the country, ranging from
Southampton to Leicester. My interviews with members of the Muslim community involved
speaking with members of both Sunni and Shi’a communities, especially through informal
discussions conducted at social events held at mosques and Islamic centres. During the informal
discussions, individuals were engaged in conversation about Sunni-Shi’a relations in Britain. They
were asked about their personal experiences and perceptions, how they would characterise
community relations and what they thought needed to be done to improve them. The informal
discussions were particularly fruitful as participants were in a relaxed environment, which meant
that participants were often more confident in discussing their views with me on what can be quite a
sensitive subject.
The secondary research was conducted through pursuing three sources of information. Firstly, news
articles were collected that made reference to sectarian tensions in Britain, and abroad where it was
relevant to the report. These were helpful in initially identifying sectarian issues and were used as a
launch for further research. The very fact that several news articles were discussing sectarianism in
Britain was indicative of an existing interest, and at times concern, surrounding the presence of
sectarianism in Britain. Some articles, such as on the BBC News and Al-Jazeera UK News websites,
were accompanied by additional information explaining the history and background of Muslim
sectarianism. Again, this demonstrated an existing interest.
Secondly, academic publications provided background information and helped direct the theoretical
aspects of the report. However, while there is an abundance of literature concerned with Muslim
sectarianism in history or in the Middle East, very little has been written about sectarianism in
Europe or the USA. Where literature does discuss divisions within the British Muslim community, it
talks mostly in terms of ethno-cultural identity - for example, the differences between Muslims of
Arab and Sub-continental cultural origin. This lack of literature indicates the need for further
research into Islamic sectarian identity in the European and Western context. In the meantime, with
the current situation, my research concentrated on drawing arguments and theories from the
existing literature and analysing them in the British context.
Finally, media monitoring has been used to gain an idea of sectarian issues commonly mentioned
online. It has also been used to identify some of the sectarian language used online. All of the
5
information gathered from the secondary research was used to establish a base level of
understanding on which the rest of the report could be built. The aim was to create a well-informed
platform from which to launch the research and which would give the final report a thorough
grounding in the historical, theoretical and practical implications of Muslim sectarianism in Britain.
In terms of the language used throughout the report, I have endeavoured to be as sensitive and
respectful as possible. Where words, such as ‘Shi’a’ or ‘Qu’ran’, can have several spelling variations, I
have settled on one spelling to use consistently throughout. In order to help clarify terms and
spelling, a Glossary of Terms is provided at the end. When discussing historical narrative, I
acknowledge that there can be many different interpretations of the same historical events and
themes from multiple perspectives. With this in mind, I have tried to present the narrative as
neutrally as possible. However, where theological and ideological beliefs of different groups are
discussed it has been necessary at times to present them from the perspective of those groups. By
acknowledging these concessions, I hope that the integrity of the report can be upheld.
Limitations of the Report
While this report has endeavoured to examine the issue of sectarianism in Britain as closely as
possible, there are limitations to its reach. The views represented here are mostly drawn from
Muslims living in London. Greater London is an important area to focus on because it is home to the
largest Muslim population in Britain, some 37 per cent of the overall British Muslim population.1
However, in talking to community leaders who are involved in representative or umbrella Muslim
organisations, several of whom are based outside of London, the report hopes to give some
representation to the voices of the Muslim community outside London, albeit in a limited sense.
The report was restricted mainly by the limited availability of data related to Muslim sects and
sectarianism. The exact number of Shi’as living in Britain is unknown and so we must make do with
educated estimations. While it is generally the case world-wide that there is a deficiency of accurate
statistics on Shi’a populations, it means that any investigation into Shi’a-related matters starts on an
uncertain footing. In Britain, a general lack of understanding in wider society of the division of Islam
into sects and of the particulars of this division hampers data collection. When official hate crime
figures are released, if any indication of different types of religion-based hate crime is given it is
usually placed under the general term of ‘Islamophobia’. Considerations must of course be given to
the limitations imposed by time and resources when government bodies compile such data.
However, this does not help to identify whether inter-Muslim incidents are rare or whether they are
occurring and are either not being reported or are not being categorised as such. Tell MAMA, an
organisation that measures and monitors Islamophobic attacks, raised concerns that they do not
1
Office of National Statistics, ‘2011 Census: KS209EW Religion, local authorities in England and Wales’,
th
released 11 December 2012
6
receive much communication from members of the Shi’a community. Again, this lack of data could
either indicate a rarity of incidents or a reluctance to report incidents that do occur.
Britain has an acute awareness of sectarianism in the context of the Catholic-Protestant sectarian
conflict in Northern Ireland. However, there is a lower level of understanding of how sectarianism
relates to the Muslim community. News-heavy topics like post-2003 Iraq and the current civil war in
Syria have brought Muslim sectarianism further into the media spot-light recently. However, it could
be argued that the mainstream portrayal of conflicts like these lacks the nuanced approach that
might contribute to fostering a deeper and greater understanding of Muslim sectarianism, which
could be beneficial to the British public and policy-makers.
By discussing these limitations, I hope to highlight them as potential areas for further exploration,
with possible policy implications for both policy makers and the Muslim community itself. Jane
Kinninmont, Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House, recently remarked at a CASS conference in
April 2013 that a lack of data leads to people filling in the gaps with their own assumptions, and that
assumptions in turn fuel sectarian conflict. This is pertinent to the British case as the combination of
a lack of data and a lack of background understanding of Muslim sectarianism may well lead to the
wrong assumptions being drawn from incidents such as that which occurred on Edgware Road on
May 10th 2013. Assumptions must not be made that the lack of data reflects a lack of sectarian
tensions, nor should the gaps be filled with exaggerated claims of deep and worsening sectarian
rifts. Communities and individuals need to be encouraged to report, collect and monitor sectarian
incidents so that a more accurate picture of the situation can be built. From there, policies can be
developed as part of a strategy to address Muslim sectarianism and promote social cohesion within
the community.
7
Background Information on the Sunni-Shi’a Split and Subsequent
Sectarian Tensions
The social, cultural and political history of Islam is a fascinating and multifaceted area of academic
research, and one that has been written about for centuries. For this report, the area under
consideration spans the entire history of Islam, but with a specific focus on the flash points and
patterns found relating to sectarian relations between different Muslim groups. This section gives a
brief introduction to the main historical narrative surrounding the divergence of Islam into several
different Muslim groups following the death of the Prophet Muhammad. It then highlights some of
the commonly identified ‘flash points’ in the history of Muslim sectarianism across the globe, with
the aim of giving a general overview of how sectarian hostility has been characterised in the past
and how it continues today.
The Sunni-Shi’a Split
The split between the Sunnis and Shi’as occurred after the death of the Prophet Muhammad and has
been reinforced over time by political and theological opposition between the two groups. The
origins of the split can be found in the differing approaches of the two groups toward the succession
of the Prophet Muhammad. The term Shi’a derives from ‘Shi’a’tu ‘Ali’, meaning ‘followers of Ali’,
who was the son-in-law and close companion of the Prophet. Shi’as believe that during his lifetime,
the Prophet clearly identified Ali as his successor and, therefore, Ali should have assumed the
position of Caliph* after the death of the Prophet. However, instead of Ali, Abu Bakr, the father-inlaw and companion of the Prophet, became the first Caliph. Ali eventually ascended to the role, but
not until after the death of the third Caliph.
The split between the ‘followers of Ali’ and the majority of Muslims was compounded with the death
of Ali who, according the Shi’as, was the first Imam, and then the death at the Battle of Karbala of
his son, Imam Hussein. Many Muslims consider his death to have been martyrdom. After the death
of the Prophet, the Shi’as followed a succession of twelve ‘rightly guided’ Imams, all of whom were
descendants of the ‘Ahl al-Bayt’, the family of the Prophet. Over the next few decades, Shi’ism grew
in numbers and strength. Under the Safavid dynasty, Persia was consolidated as a Shi’a state in the
16th Century and modern-day Iran remains the only Shi’a state in the Muslim world. Over time, as
with Sunni Islam, Shi’a Islam has splintered into several different groups itself, of which there are
three main branches. The majority of Shi’as are part of the ‘Twelver’ branch, which follows the full
line of succession to the twelfth Imam who is commonly believed to be the Mahdi** and will return
before Judgement Day to restore justice to the world. The other two main branches of Shi’a Islam
are the Zaidis and the Isma’ilis who split from the majority over disagreements about the succession
of the fifth and seventh Imams respectively.
* Caliph: meaning ‘successor’ – the ruler of the Islamic Ummah (community governed by Shari’ah
law)
** Mahdi: the prophesised redeemer of Islam
8
Subsequent Sectarian Tensions
Since the initial split, the Shi’a branch of Islam has been characterised by some observers, such as
Hamid Dabashi,2 as one of struggle and protest. First under the Umayyads and then the Abbasids,
Shi’a communities in the Middle East in early Islamic history experienced institutionalised
persecution. Later, the Ottomans also adopted repressive policies towards the Shi’as, particularly as
a response to the rise of the Safavids in Persia, who also persecuted Sunnis under their rule. In the
modern era scholars have identified three significant periods of sectarianism: after the Iranian
Revolution in 1979, after the 2003 invasion of Iraq and after the Arab Spring that began in 2011,
which is still on-going. These periods have been formative in shaping current Sunni-Shi’a relations.
Estimates of what proportion of the world’s Muslim population is Shi’a can range considerably from
between approximately 8 and 25 per cent, and such a wide range of data can create obstacles for
consistency and accuracy. Because of a lack consensus or consistent data, it is difficult to find a
figure to use here. Some argue that Shi’a numbers should be estimated towards the higher end of
the scale to avoid Shi’as being marginalised. Others, however, argue that Shi’a numbers should be
kept conservative in order not to invoke accusations of unfairly inflating the data. Estimations of
Shi’a populations can also vary depending on whether the author is Sunni or Shi’a. There is much
debate around what can be considered a ‘credible’ source. The Pew Research Centre, which is one
source of estimates of Shi’a population figures, discusses how “almost no censuses and relatively
few surveys ask Muslims about their Sunni or Shi’a affiliation”3, which highlights one of the main
reasons why accurate data is so difficult to compile. A Congressional Research Report on Sunnis and
Shi’as4 and the BBC information page on Muslim Sectarianism5 both estimate the global Shi’a
population to be between 10 and 15 per cent. However, the CIA World Factbook estimates the Shi’a
population to be 10 to 20 per cent6 and the Pew Research Centre7 places estimates between 10 to
13 per cent. These give just an idea of the disparity between many different sources and
demonstrates the difficultly of giving a definitive estimation. For the purpose of this report it is
pertinent to draw attention to this debate but some sort of indication must be given to allow
readers to have a reference point from which to orient themselves. The minority status of Shi’a
Muslims can therefore be shown by the fact that the majority of the world’s Shi’a population lives in
2
Dabashi, H. (2011), ‘Shi’ism: A Religion of Protest’, The Belknap Press (USA)
Pew Research Center (October 2009), ‘Forum on Religion & Public Life: Mapping the Global Muslim
Population’
3
4
Blanchard, Christopher M. (2009), ‘Islam: Sunnis and Shiites’, Congressional Research Report, Available at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21745.pdf [Accessed on: 10th December 2013], p. 4
5
BBC News (2011), ‘Quick Guide: Sunnis and Shi’as’, BBC News Website [Online], available at:
th
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16047709, [Accessed on: 10 December 2013]
6
CIA World Factbook (2013), ‘Field Listing: Religions’, The Central Intelligence Agency Website [Online],
Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html [Accessed on:
10th December 2013]
7
Pew Research Center (October 2009), ‘Forum on Religion & Public Life: Mapping the Global Muslim
Population’
9
four countries - Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq –and in only four countries do Shi’as make up a
majority of the total population - Iran, Azerbaijan, Bahrain and Iraq.8
The Shi’as’ status as a political and cultural minority group has been reflected in the denial of social
and civil rights that Shi’a communities have experienced in some Sunni-led states in contemporary
times. In Saudi Arabia, the regime has traditionally been hostile to the Shi’a religion, believing their
practices to be heretical and polytheistic. In Egypt, since the Arab Spring and in the current political
situation, concerns are growing for the safety of Egyptian Shi’as, Coptic Christians and other
minorities, as reports of public lynchings and communal violence surface. Pakistan has the second
largest Shi’a population after Iran, but the Shi’as are nonetheless still in the minority.9 Currently
Pakistan is witnessing a significant intensification of sectarian attacks against both Shi’as and Sunnis.
Furthermore, the civil war in Syria could be considered to be increasingly sectarian. The majority of
rebels are Sunnis, joined by groups of foreign Sunnis fighting together against the Alawite
government, which claims Alawi’ism to be a branch of Shi’a Islam (although this is disputed by some
Shi’as). The Lebanese Shi’a militant group Hezbollah has joined the fight on the side of the
Government and foreign Shi’as, mainly from Iraq, have been travelling to Syria to protect the many
important Shi’a shrines in the country, most notably the Sayyida Zainab Shrine outside Damascus.
There has also been evidence of foreign Shi’a militants fighting alongside Government troops, in
places like Aleppo.
Sectarian tensions have also been evident in other Middle Eastern countries, for example Bahrain
has recently seen increased street protests from the Shi’a population demanding improved social
and civil rights. Under Saddam Hussein, reports indicate Iraqi Shi’as suffered sustained repression,
particularly after the 1991 Shi’a uprising which followed Iraq’s defeat in the Gulf War. Since the 2003
invasion, Iraqi Shi’as have gained political power but there is still sectarian violence on the streets, in
which both Sunnis and Shi’as are targeted.
Much of the Sunni states’ concern about Shi’ism is linked to a perception of Shi’as as conduits for the
spread of Iranian power across the Middle East. King Abdullah of Jordan warned in 2004 of a ‘Shi’a
Crescent’ stretching across the Middle East, expanding Iranian power over the traditionally Sunnidominated region. The Egyptian Salafi political party, al-Nour, recently declared that by letting
Iranian tourists into Egypt they would be leaving themselves vulnerable to a wave of conversions to
Shi’ism and, as a result, increased Iranian influence in the country.
There is, therefore, evidence to support claims that the Shi’as have experienced persecution as a
minority. However, it would be inaccurate to paint a picture of constant and unbroken antagonism
between the Sunnis and Shi’as. There is a long tradition of dialogue between Sunni and Shi’a
scholars. While the Ottoman and Safavid Empires certainly entered into periods of conflict, they also
had periods of relatively peaceful co-existence. Sunnis and Shi’as in Pakistan, Bahrain, Iraq and other
states have lived relatively harmoniously together in domestic situations for hundreds of years. In
8
Pew Research Center (October 2009), ‘Forum on Religion & Public Life: Mapping the Global Muslim
Population’
9
Pew Research Center (October 2009), ‘Forum on Religion & Public Life: Mapping the Global Muslim
Population’
10
1959, Sheikh Mahmood Shaltoot, the head of the Al-Azhar University in Cairo, issued a Fatwa that
declared the Ja’fari school of Shi’a thought to be as religiously correct to follow as any of the Sunni
schools.10 On 9th November 2004, a statement called the ‘Amman Message’ was released by King
Abdullah II of Jordan calling for unity and tolerance in the Muslim world. This statement was then
reinforced a year later when two hundred Muslim scholars from around the world released a threepoint ruling recognising eight legal schools of Islamic thought, both Sunni and Shi’a, forbidding takfir
(pronouncing disbelief upon others recognised as Muslim), and stipulating precautions on religious
edicts with the intent of preventing illegitimate edicts being issued11. The Amman Message was seen
as, and still is, a historic step towards unity in the Muslim community. Perhaps, therefore, there is
more value in characterising the current sectarianism observed in the Muslim world as a product of
current social, economic and, overall, political factors, rather than deeply ingrained religious
opposition. Maulana Shahid Raza, the Chief Imam of Leicester Central Mosque and an advisor to
MINAB, likened Sunni-Shi’a relations to “fluctuating graphs” of peace and disputes.12
Ideological and Theological Differences
There are several key areas where differences in Shi’a and Sunni theology have arisen as issues of
contention between the communities. These are the beliefs and practices that are most commonly
cited in debates and arguments. At the extreme, these differences are used as the basis and
justification for abusive rhetoric and takfir accusations. The theological issues described below
represent complex and multi-layered ideas and beliefs, but, due to limited space, they are discussed
in simplistic terms rather than in great detail. It is not the intention of this report to delve into the
intricacies of the different schools of Islamic scholarship. However, they are mentioned here with
the intention of highlighting theology as playing a significant role in sectarian discourse. Some of the
issues are:
The Imamate: Shi’as and Sunnis hold in common the four core beliefs of the Muslim faith:
monotheism, Prophethood, the coming Day of Judgement and the Five Pillars of Muslim practice
(prayer, fasting, religious tax, pilgrimage and jihad). The Shi’as, however, believe in another
fundamental of Islam, which is the Imamate. Shi’as believe that the Prophet appointed Ali as his
successor, with the command of Allah. The Prophet also said that he would have twelve successorsthese are the twelve Imams who are Ali and his progeny. This belief in the Imamate is a cause of
tension between the two Muslim communities because Shi’as have been accused of ‘worshipping’
the Imams, especially Ali who is particularly revered in the Shi’a tradition. This has led to accusations
of polytheism and, therefore, apostasy. Shi’as, however, maintain that they are strictly monotheists
and that their reverence of the Imams is, in fact, reverence of and obedience to Allah because the
Prophet and the Imams are His missionaries.
10
Al-Islam, ‘Al-Azhar Verdict on the Shi’a’, Al-Islam Website [Online], available at http://www.alislam.org/shiite-encyclopedia-ahlul-bayt-dilp-team/al-azhar-verdict-on-shia [Accessed on: 4th December 2013]
11
The Amman Message (2004), The Official Website of the Amman Message [Online], available at:
th
http://www.ammanmessage.com/ , [Accessed on: 4 December 2013]
12
th
Interview conducted with Maulana Shahid Raza on 19 September 2013 in Wembley, London
11
The Mahdi: The Muslim faith holds a common belief in the Day of Judgement and the arrival of the
Mahdi to bring justice to Earth. However, the different sects disagree over who the Mahdi is and
whether or not he has been born yet. Most Shi’as believe – although different branches hold
different beliefs – that the Madhi has already been born and is part of the Ahl al-Bayt as the twelfth
Imam. It is believed by the overwhelming majority that the Mahdi has gone into Occultation but is
present on Earth due to the required presence of a representative of Allah on Earth at all times.13
The Companions of the Prophet Muhammad: The ‘companions’ are usually considered to be those
who lived at the time of the Prophet Muhammad and heard him speak.14 Shi’as have been accused
of disrespecting the Companions, a serious offence in Islam. Some Shi’as, however, believe that the
Companions can be divided into two groups; those who were true believers and faithful to the
Prophet and those who were hypocrites and untrue believers. Shi’as agree that disrespecting one of
the faithful Companions is a serious offence; however, some argue that this does not apply to
criticism of the hypocrites.15 This is an issue of particular tension between the sects.
Prayers: Traditional Muslim practice holds that there are five daily prayers that must be observed
and both sects agree on this. However, Shi’a practice holds that certain prayers can be combined to
make three daily prayer times. While Sunni practice does allow for combination of prayers, it is only
during times of exceptional circumstances, whereas Shi’a practice allows for the combination of
prayers at any time. This is related to the Shi’a interpretation of the Qu’ran (Chpt 17, verse 78) as
giving three distinct prayer times and to evidence of the Prophet Muhammad having sanctioned
such combinations. This practice is a common source of criticism levelled at the Shi’a by those who
interpret this as a sign of heresy.16 There is also controversy at times over the placement of hands
during prayer; Sunnis, except the Maliki School, pray with their hands clasped over their diaphragm,
while Shi’as and Maliki Sunnis pray with their arms by their sides. Again, this has been interpreted by
some as a sign of ‘fundamental differences’ between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims.
Taqiyya: A form of legal dispensation whereby a person of faith can deny or hide that faith if they
are in a situation when not doing so would put their lives at risk. The practice has been particularly
emphasised in Shi’a Islam in the context of protecting Shi’as from persecution. The practice of
taqiyya has been criticised by some who view it as ‘deviousness’ and ‘cunning’ or contrary to the
virtues of bravery and courage. There has also been disagreement over what level of danger can be
considered severe enough to permit the practice.17
Mutah: This is the practice of entering into a temporary marriage, the terms of which are agreed
upon through a contract with both parties. This is a particularly fraught subject and has long been
subject to controversy. While Mutah is allowed by the school of jurisprudence of the Shi’a, based on
a belief that it was sanctioned by the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, Sunnis believe the
second Caliph Omar later banned the practice. Controversy stems from the belief by some parties
that Mutah can be used as a cover for ‘improper sexual activity’ and the exploitation of women. On
13
'Inquiries About Shi'a Islam', Sayed Moustafa al-Qazwini (2000), The Islamic Educational Centre of Orange
County, California
14
'Inquiries About Shi'a Islam', Sayed Moustafa al-Qazwini (2000), The Islamic Educational Centre of Orange
County, California
15
Ibid
16
'The Shiah Origin and Faith', Allama Kashif al Ghita (1985), Islamic Seminary Publications
17
Tabatabai, A. (1989), ‘Shi’a’, Ansariyan Publications (Islamic Republic of Iran), p. 223-224
12
the other hand, the practice is defended as a way of allowing Muslims to date and get to know each
other before marriage in a way that doesn’t contravene Islamic laws.
The British Muslim Community
There are approximately 2.7 million Muslims in England and Wales, according to the 2011 Census.18
The largest percentage of people who identified themselves as Muslim live in London; London
Muslims constitute around 37 per cent of the overall Muslim population.19 Other large Muslim
populations can be found in the West Midlands, the North West and Yorkshire. 20 In the Census data
there is no information about religious sect and the exact number of Shi’a Muslims in the UK is
unknown. One source, the Pew Research Centre, estimates that 10 to 15 per cent of the British
Muslim population is Shi’a21, which is in line with the estimates mentioned previously regarding the
global Shi’a populations. However, the same problem that faces researchers estimating Shi’a
numbers globally faces them in Britain: a lack of consensus and a lack of accurate and detailed data.
In the history of the British Muslim community, there have been few publicly documented intraMuslim sectarian incidents. The majority of tension that Muslims in Britain have experienced has
been with the non-Muslim community. Therefore, anti-discrimination, social cohesion and interfaith projects have traditionally been aimed at tackling Islamophobia and promoting positive
interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims. Little attention, particularly in wider society, has
been paid to tensions within the British Muslim community. With the increasingly sectarian nature
of the Syrian conflict and on-going sectarian violence in countries such as Iraq and Pakistan, concerns
are that these overseas sectarian issues are beginning to bleed into Britain, exacerbating existing
tensions.
What is considered by some to be the first high-profile sectarian anti-Shi’a incident in Britain took
place in 2013. On 10th May, protestors marched down London’s Edgware Road, ostensibly in support
of Syrian rebels, accompanied by Anjem Choudary the former leader of banned group AlMuhajiroun. Some protestors carried signs alluding to the ‘Shi’a Enemies of Allah’ and police were
called to intervene after a group of protestors allegedly attacked a man who was Shi’a.22 While it
cannot be stated with certainty that this is the first incident of its kind in Britain, it was significant
because of the attention it gained. This incident has led to speculation that sectarian tensions
18
th
Office of National Statistics (released 11 December 2012), ‘2011 Census: KS209EW Religion, local
authorities in England and Wales’, Office of National Statistics Website [Online], available as an Excel
Spreadsheet at: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/key-statistics-for-local-authorities-inengland-and-wales/stb-2011-census-key-statistics-for-england-and-wales.html#tab---Religion [Accessed on:
th
17 December 2013]
19
Ibid
20
Ibid
21
Pew Research Center (October 2009), ‘Forum on Religion & Public Life: Mapping the Global Muslim
Population’
22
Elgot, J. (2013), ‘Shia and Sunni Tensions in Syria Threaten to Split British Muslim Community’, The
st
Huffington Post United Kingdom [Online] (Last updated 10.55am on 1 July 2013), Available at:
th
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/06/27/shia-and-sunni_n_3510862.html[Accessed on 16 July 2013]
13
between Sunnis and Shi’as in Britain are deepening, with the potential that they may manifest into
more violent incidents like the one on Edgware Road.
14
Part 1: Sectarianism and Sects
Throughout this report, references will be made to ‘sects’ and ‘sectarianism’ (brief definitions of
which are provided in the Glossary of Terms). However, to place the discussion that follows into
context, it serves the purpose of the report to give an outline of what is meant by these terms. A
‘sect’ is a subgroup of a religious, political or philosophical belief system; however, this report will
reference ‘sects’ as those deriving from the larger religious group of Islam. ‘Sectarianism’ itself has
several different interpretations. Functionally, and very basically, it can be defined as devotion to a
particular sect, often religious. However, in common modern parlance it is often taken to refer to
negative relationships between different religious sects. Because ‘sectarianism’ is often associated
with prejudice, persecution, hostility and violence, care must be taken when using the term not to
invoke these factors by implication. ‘Sectarian’ similarly can be interpreted as automatically implying
negativity. Therefore, if any term is intended explicitly to mean hostility then it has been stipulated.
The two largest sects in Islam are Sunni Islam and Shi’a Islam and it is these two groups that are
most often mentioned in discussions of Muslim sectarianism. In the interest of keeping this report
clear and succinct, in the majority the report will refer to these main two groups. Nonetheless, it
must be kept in mind throughout that this is a simplified way of viewing Muslim sectarianism and
that both hostile and positive relations will have varying repercussions throughout the Muslim
community.
While the main scope of this report concentrates mainly on the relationship between Sunni and Shi’a
communities, something should be said about ‘minorities within minorities’ or ‘sects within sects’.
While it simplifies the matter to speak of the broad groups represented by the terms ‘Sunni’ and
‘Shi’a’, these two groups are made up of smaller branches and sub-groups. These smaller groups,
such as the Hazaras, Zaidis and Isma’ilis, often feel marginalised even within their own Sunni or Shi’a
sect. Among Sunni and Shi’a groups there is a broad spectrum of beliefs and attitudes towards
matters of theology and ideology. In some respects, a Sufi Sunni may have more in common with a
Twelver Shi’a than a Salafi Sunni. Another particularly fraught issue is that of the Ahmedis. The
status of Ahmedis as Muslims is disputed by some other Islamic groups and this has in some cases
led to conflict. Issues such as these feature significantly in debates about freedom of religious belief
and expression. For those attempting to tackle the issues surrounding sectarianism, consideration
needs to be given to what role these groups can be assigned.
It is hoped that by placing the use of ‘sects’ and ‘sectarianism’ as well as the focus on Sunni Islam
and Shi’a Islam into the context in which they are meant, the report will be as clear as possible.
However, the issue of ‘minorities within minorities’ is one of great importance that is not, and
should not, be restricted to just sectarian or Muslim dialogue. There is a far wider field of discussion
to be explored in terms of minority rights within larger sects and the role of multi-layered minority
identities.
15
Identity Considerations
Individual and group identities are complex and multi-layered. This was partially touched upon in the
‘Sects and Sectarianism’ section above in terms of minority identity and membership of ‘minorities
within minorities’. Muslim identities are often characterised in part as highly interconnected with
the rest of the global Muslim community and, therefore, this interconnectedness can create
channels along which geopolitical issues and influences can flow. Sectarianism can be argued to be
an example of the intricate relationship between identity and politics, and how each can feed off or
drive the other both in the national and international arena.
The phrase ‘identity politics’, which emerged in the second half of the 20th Century, refers to a wide
range of political activity founded in the shared experiences of injustice held by members of a
certain social group. The aim of such groups is generally to secure greater political freedom and selfdetermination for a marginalised constituency.23 In this sense the experience of oppression and
discrimination is crucial to the formation of the political identity of the group. The role of identity
politics, as well as minority nationalism, in sectarian tensions should be explored in the context of
how British Muslims perceive their identity.
In constructing identities*, values are agreed upon and given meaning within the frame of ‘socially
shared collective self-definitions’.24 This construction of values is what influences and guides the
actions of the group. In regards to Muslim sectarianism, the group identities of Muslim sects are
often constructed strategically to portray their own position as exemplifying, and their opponents’
position as subverting, true Islamic principles.25 This can be identified in declarations made by a
minority of extremists that members of other sects follow heretical practices and are, therefore,
‘kafir’ or ‘non- believers’. The complex interplay between religion and ethnic group or nation also
contributes to sectarian identity construction; religious sectarian identities can contribute to the
wider construction of national identity where importance is assigned to sectarian values, by which is
meant those values associated with one particular sect. Once again, these value positions can be
seen as exemplifying, or subverting, the ‘nation’.
The social construction of identities can be used as a powerful strategic tool; it can be used to give
legitimacy to and gain support for the agenda of a socio-political group. By ‘exemplifying’ the sociopolitical identity of a group, it can be offered up as following the ‘true path’. But, as the philosopher
Pierre Bayle would argue, this is ‘begging the question’. If a sect believes that they are the true
representation of Islam and use this as a justification for persecuting another sect, then they are
open to the same persecution from a rival sect that believes itself to be the ‘true interpretation’.
Arguments such as these are circular and can be highly unconstructive, leading at times to a
perpetuation of conflict. However, they are also unlikely to be resolved as they speak to the core of
how some religious groups define themselves against others.
23
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2002), Identity Politics [Online] (updated 2012) Available at:
th
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-politics/ [Accessed 28 August 2013]
24
Hopkins, N. and Kahani-Hopkins, V. (2004), ‘Identity Construction and British Muslims’ Political Action:
Beyond Rational Actor Theory’, British Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 43, No. 3, p. 342
25
Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, p. 347.
16
Furthermore, in the Muslim world, where ethnic origin and kinship are significant factors in shaping
an individual or group’s identity, there are far more complex and multi-layered factors at play than
simply one’s membership of either the Sunni or Shi’a sect. A traditional Pakistani saying, that is also
echoed throughout the Middle East region, is ‘I against my brother, I and my brother against our
cousins, and our family against our biradiri (community or kinship group), and our biradiri against
another biradiri’.26 This saying really captures the essence of the multi-layered complexity of an
individual’s identity as defined by their relationships with others around them. It shows how
different pulls on one’s loyalty and identity can shift to the forefront dependent on the situation.
Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins argue that a common identification among British Muslims should not
be taken for granted; where such a concept exists it is because people have acted to make it
possible.27 It is not enough to assume that the British Muslim community will naturally be united by
those who see unity among members of different sects as in the best interests of the Muslim
community as a whole. This is particularly pertinent in the current climate, when sectarian divisions
and identity politics are growing in strength and prominence in Muslim communities overseas.
Where these sectarian identities are perceived as, or advocated as, a successful and ‘correct’
expression of Muslim identity then they may gain strength in Britain, bringing with them the conflict
they are plagued by in communities abroad.
Identity can be linked with loyalty; one’s identity is likely to determine the recipient of one’s loyalty.
However, assumptions about loyalty made based on generalisations about an individual or group’s
sectarian identity can lead to incorrect or misleading conclusions. Therefore, by seeking to
understand the complexities of identifying as a Muslim in Britain today, a greater conception can be
developed of the different directions in which British Muslims, particularly young Muslims, can be
pulled in terms of loyalty.
*When sectarian identities are referred to as ‘constructed’, this is not to say that they are entirely
‘false’. These identities have not been created ex nihlo (out of nothing), rather it is often the case
that existing ethno-cultural traditions are used to build a defined political identity that is then used
by the group when engaging in political activities. Walker Connor argued that, when examining
national identity, what ultimately matters is not what is but rather what is believed.28
26
Lieven, A. (2011), ‘Pakistan: A Hard Country’, Penguin Books Ltd. (London)
Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, p. 344
28
Connor, W. (1978), ‘A Nation is a Nation, is an Ethnic Group, is a …’, Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 1, No. 4, p.
379 - 88
27
17
Part 2: Causes and Issues of Contention
When considering sectarian tensions between different Muslim sects, the main causes and issues of
contention can be divided into three general categories: religious differences, geopolitical concerns
and hate preachers. Theological differences are what initially separates and distinguishes different
Muslim groups. These are, therefore, pervasive and long-standing issues that fundamentally bring
these groups into contention and act as the initial point of departure on which subsequent
differences are compounded. Geopolitical concerns are also a core point of contention because of
the emotional, spiritual and familial links that British Muslims have with the wider Muslim world. As
has been mentioned previously, but is explored in more detail below, geopolitics in Muslim majority
societies can have a ‘trickle-down’ effect on the British Muslim community. Finally, the third core
issue is what is perceived by some as the disproportionate influence of certain outspoken individuals
referred to in this report as ‘hate preachers’. The main concern is the impact these hate preachers
can have on stirring up sectarian tensions in Britain through their rhetoric and literature. By
exploring these three elements, it is intended that a better understanding of some of the
motivations and driving-forces behind sectarian tensions can begin to take shape.
Religious Differences
There are a number of differing practices and beliefs held by the two sects that have brought some
members into disagreement. Some of the main theological issues have been listed previously in the
‘Background Information’ section. These include beliefs and practices relating to the succession of
the Prophet Muhammad, the Imamate and temporary marriage. While this is not an exhaustive list
of all of the religious differences between the many different groups within Islam, these are some of
the most commonly found in situations of hostility between the groups.
Debates between Muslims about their different beliefs and practices should not inherently be
perceived as negative. Believers from different Muslim sects have engaged in theological debate for
centuries. In many cases, this has helped to develop scholarly dialogue. Those engaged in such
dialogue can learn from each other and use these debates to strengthen their own beliefs.
Furthermore, disagreement does not automatically lead to sectarian violence or hostility; differences
can be acknowledged without conflict.
However, it is the case that some members of different groups perceive theological differences as a
major barrier to positive sectarian relations. At times these differences have been used to form the
basis of accusations of heresy. They are seen by some as ‘evidence’ of a false adherence to the
religion or of non-belief in what they consider to be ‘true Islam’. These issues are highly entrenched
due to their grounding in religious ritual tradition. Because of this, they also carry with them the
particular authority that is often associated with theology. Debates about the differences between
Muslim sects are concerned with fundamental elements of the religion that each sect professes to
represent correctly. Therefore, they involve challenges to the very core of what members of each
sect believe to be ‘true’ Islam. Not unexpectedly, such challenges evoke strong emotions.
Theological disagreement leading to conflict is a recurrent theme that can be found in many religious
18
traditions. One has only to look to the centuries old sectarian conflict between Catholics and
Protestants to see evidence of this. It could be argued, therefore, that religious differences make a
large contribution to justifications for sectarian violence- they contribute to a belief that
perpetrators of sectarian conflict are ‘righteous’ because they are defending and promoting the
‘true’ religion.
Geopolitical Concerns
‘Geopolitical concerns’ focus on issues that are generally concerned with the political situation in the
Muslim world and the effect they can have on the British Muslim community. There are a number of
issues raised in this section from which a pattern can be discerned about the effect social, economic
and political factors have on sectarianism as a political tool of both the elites and the public. I have
termed the effect of Muslim geopolitics on Muslims in Britain as ‘trickle-down’ because the impact is
not directly translated from state to state, rather it is better characterised as a steady and constant
flow of events, information and debates from a culturally and religiously significant area to the
Muslim diasporas across the world. This is considered a cause for concern because of fears that
tensions in one part of the world be carried through this ‘trickle-down’ and manifest as sectarian
hostility in Britain.
The Middle East and the Sub-continent are the areas which most often come under scrutiny because
these areas hold a dense concentration of large Muslim populations, powerful and influential
Muslim states and globally-significant resources. This region has also often witnessed conflict, be it
sectarian, national or international. These factors give this region a great strategic importance to
both Western states and global Muslim populations. This is not to say that other Muslim states are
unimportant. In Malaysia there has recently been a perceivable increase in intolerance towards
Shi’as; some religious leaders and, increasingly, some politicians are referring to Shi’ism as a deviant
sect. Situations, such as the one in Malaysia, are followed closely by Muslim communities across the
world to monitor the repercussions that they may have globally. However, for the purposes of this
report, this chapter will focus on the Middle East and Sub-continent region because of the
predominance that this region has in academic and social discussions about sectarianism.
Iran
A significant amount of attention paid in the news and academic literature is to the concerns of
Sunni governments surrounding the spread of Iranian influence in the Middle East region through
national Shi’a populations. Recently, the concept of a ‘Shi’a revival’ or a ‘Shi’a Crescent’ has been
raised by Sunni leaders, such as Jordan’s King Abdullah II in 2004. The ‘Shi’a Crescent’ idea refers to
the alleged spread of Shi’a political dominance from Iran, through Lebanon, Syria and Shi’a areas of
Saudi Arabia, disrupting the traditional dominance of Sunni states and fostering revolutionary
discord among Shi’a populations in Sunni states.29 It can be argued that one of the contributing
factors that sparked fears over increased Shi’a influence in the region was the transition of Iraq after
the 2003 invasion from a Sunni-led government to a Shi’a-led one. The accuracy of this concept as a
characterisation of the current and future Shi’a community in the Middle East has been debated in
29
Broning, p. 61
19
the academic literature. Many scholars, such as Pat Proctor,30Jelle Puelings,31 Maximilliam Terhalle32
and Michael Broning33 reject the idea that the Shi’as of the Middle East are a united, monolithic bloc
backed by Iran and intent on effecting revolutionary change in their predominantly Sunni-governed
states.
One of the most common accusations that has been levelled at Shi’as is that their ultimate loyalty
lies not with their home nation but with Iran. Iran is accused of using Shi’a populations as a conduit
through which it can spread its influence across the Middle East and of facilitating wide-spread
conversions of Sunnis to Shi’ism. Puelings, however, argues that such accusations are not born-out in
the, albeit limited, data available regarding conversions; often where conversion to Shi’ism does
occur it is mostly between branches of Shi’a Islam and among people whose ancestry was
traditionally Shi’a.34 Puelings argues that Iran is ‘surfing’ rather than ‘steering’ the wave of Shi’ism.35
Furthermore, some scholars argue that, recently, Iranian foreign policy appears to be less bent
towards creating a region-wide Shi’a revolution than the ‘Shi’a Crescent’ concept proposes.
Exportation of the Iranian Revolution was arguably abandoned after the eight year Iran-Iraq war of
the 1980s. Some scholars argue that since then Iran has tried to promote itself as a ‘pan-Islamic’
authority in order to improve relations with its Sunni neighbours. In terms of foreign policy, Iran can
be interpreted as pursuing more pragmatic policies in recent years. 36
Therefore, the likelihood of a ‘Shi’a Crescent’ of the kind discussed by King Abdullah is perhaps
unlikely to emerge. However, the idea of such a threat is of great strategic use to Sunni states that
feel threatened by Iran or by their own restless national Shi’a population. It is argued that it can be
used to justify a number of repressive policies. The fear that some Sunni states have of a Shi’a revival
can be seen as less to do with a threat to the identity of their national population and more to do
with security concerns linked to a fear of losing their strategic regional position and of a
revolutionary Shi’a movement in their own backyard. Saudi Arabia is a prime example of this;
Salafism has traditionally ideologically been anti-Shi’a, but the Saudi government has often used the
concept of a Shi’a threat as the justification for repressive policies against their Shi’a minority, many
of whom populate some of the Kingdom’s largest oil fields. Therefore, where anti-Shi’a discourse
arises, while religious differences must be given consideration, most often the primary motivation is
political. As Terhalle frames it, “the sectarian argument serves as a means to reassure Sunni rulers of
the legitimacy of their actions”. 37
What are the implications of this political concern over the extension of Iranian influence for Britain?
While Britain certainly has many foreign policy concerns relating to Iran, as a non-Muslim European
state, British national security concerns are not immediately linked to or dominated by a fear of an
expansion of Iranian influence among the British populations. The context, then, in Britain is
30
Proctor, P. (2008), ‘The Mythical Shia Crescent’, Parameters, Spring Issue
Puelings, J. (2010), ‘Fearing a ‘Shiite Octopus’’, The Egmont Papers, Royal Institute for International
Relations¸ Academia Press
32
Terhalle, M. (2007), ‘Are the Shia Rising’, Middle East Policy, Vol. XIV, no. 22
33
Broning, M. (2003), ‘Don’t Fear the Shiites’, Internationale Politik and Gesellschaft, Issue 3
34
Puellings, p. 31
35
Puelings, p. 3.
36
Broning, p. 66-68
37
Terhalle, p. 80
31
20
considerably different compared to the Middle East. British concerns with Iran are international and
not domestic. For example, Iran poses no threat to the legitimacy of the British government, or its
control over its Shi’a population, being as it is a ‘minority of a minority’. However, care must be
taken not to draw from this the conclusion that attention need not be paid to the issues of
sectarianism and anti-Shi’ism, even if they are unlikely to escalate to the levels seen in the Middle
East. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that direct comparisons of the British case and that of
Sunni states in the Middle East will elicit misleading conclusions.
Sectarian Conflicts Abroad
A further area of geopolitical significance is the apparent recent surge in sectarian violence abroad.
Sectarian attacks in Syria, Egypt, Pakistan and Iraq, among others, are increasingly gaining more
attention in the British media. Maulana Shahid Raza spoke of the Indian Subcontinent’s influence on
British Muslims. By his estimations, approximately 40 per cent of British Muslims are Pakistani, 20
per cent are Bangladeshi and 10 per cent are Indian, so around 70 per cent of the British Muslim
population have links to the region. The 2011 Census indicates that these estimates are fairly
accurate as their data states that 68 per cent of British Muslims identify as Asian, within that 38 per
cent are Pakistani and 15 per cent are Bangladeshi.38 Raza argues that this has a direct and
important influence on the British Muslim community. “They have brought their cultures, their
ideologies, their sectarian affiliations also to this country, so whatever happens in the Subcontinent,
willingly or unwillingly, affects our behaviour in this country also….If there is peace in Pakistan,
Pakistanis are living here peacefully.” He argues that the violent sectarian conflict that Pakistan is
currently experiencing is having an effect on the British Muslim community by bringing sectarianism
to the cultural foreground of British Muslim society. According to Raza, traditionally Sunnis and
Shi’a’s have lived in Britain relatively peacefully in the past, but the turning point came with General
Zia’s rule, beginning in 1978, under which several groups emerged in Pakistan with strong sectarian
ideologies. In turn, this has affected the balance in Britain by causing alarm among community
members that similar tensions may grow.39
References have also been made to the radical Salafi influence in Britain. Salafism as a term for
conservative schools of Islamic thought can cover a wider range of beliefs; however, it tends to be
the more radical forms of Salafism - for example Wahhabism, the dominant form of Islam in Saudi
Arabia - that are particularly critical of Shi’a Islam. The issue of increased influence of Salafism from
the Persian Gulf has been raised repeatedly by members of both sides of the community with whom
I have spoken. Some British Muslims have expressed concern that radical Salafism, backed by the oil
wealth of the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia in particular, has been increasing its influence in Britain
through funding mosques and Islamic centres and through providing Imams and financing. Those
who voice this opinion are concerned about the negative effect this increased influence of an ultraconservative doctrine may have on both the internal cohesion of the Muslim community and its
standing within wider British society.
38
2011 Census, ‘Full Story: What does the Census tell us about religion in 2011?’, Office of National Statistics
Website [Online], available at: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/detailed-characteristicsth
for-local-authorities-in-england-and-wales/rpt---religion.html#tab-Religion-by-ethnicity [ Accessed on: 17
December 2013]
39
th
Interview conducted with Maulana Shahid Raza on 19 September 2013 in Wembley, London
21
There is also concern among community leaders about the current situation in Syria. Maulana
Shahid Raza commented that “the Syrian issue is affecting very strongly and deeply….because the
regime is seen by many Sunni Muslims as sympathetic to Shi’ism, and the involvement of Hezbollah
from Lebanon has highlighted it. The political support of Iran may be seen by many Sunnis as not
only the political support but also as ideological support….The Sufi’s see it in a different way, they
see the rebels as [Salafis] because they are destroying the shrines of the Ahl al-Bayt.”40 Dr elHamdoon, President of the Muslim Association of Britain, argued that British Muslims can’t be
expected to “live in a vacuum from everything that is happening in the world” and that the conflict
in Syria is impacting upon Muslims in Britain.41 Another issue that members of the community have
is concern for what will happen when British Muslims who have gone to fight in Syria return to the
UK. Some perceive it as possible that they will bring some of the sectarian hostility present in Syria
back with them. There are differing opinions within the community about the extent to which Syria
will have a lasting effect on the British Muslim community. Some argue that the effect will be
temporary. For example, Raza argued that, while Syria is an important factor, when it is resolved it
will go away. He believes that the Subcontinental effect, however, is permanent and this should be
taken into consideration by parties engaging with the British Muslim community.42 On the other
hand, it could be argued that it is too simplistic to say that Syria will stop being an issue once the
current crisis is resolved as the dynamics of the conflict are constantly in flux and their impact could
be deep and long-lasting in terms of redefining the normative discourse of sectarianism. Syria has
become key in the sense that now, when sectarianism is discussed, Syria is often one of the first
examples cited. The impact of these various foreign influences is difficult for researchers to measure
and quantify conclusively. However, this factor has its own significance as it is considered by some as
a ‘widely held opinion’, thus acting as an indicator of popular opinion.
Shi’a Activism
Generally, unrest among Shi’a populations can mostly be considered as driven by the desire for
greater civil and social rights, often – but not always - coupled with a poor socio-economic status
within a Sunni-dominated state. As with most cases where a minority group is engaged in a struggle
for improved rights, there is a danger of radicalisation in situations where non-violent protest is
perceived as having little or no effect. Cases of Shi’a protest must be considered within the context
of each state, as it is perhaps misleading to talk of a unified Shi’a movement across the globe. One
can talk in loose terms about a shared history, culture and religion, and feelings of solidarity that
these factors may inspire, among the global Shi’a population. Some national Shi’a movements may
take inspiration, legitimacy and ideological orientation from examples of Shi’a revival such as
revolutionary Iran and post-Saddam Iraq. However, the Shi’as are not a monolithic movement and
there are many different factions within the religion, and to treat them as such would lead to
misconceptions about Shi’a activism.
If Shi’a activism is considered to be primarily a struggle for political rights and social promotion as a
result of generally poor economic and social status, then the British case is, again, markedly different
from states in the Middle East. Judge Khurshid Drabu, a founder of the MCB and MINAB,
40
th
Interview conducted with Maulana Shahid Raza on 19 September 2013 in Wembley, London
th
Interview conducted with Dr Omer el-Hamdoon on 16 Septmber 2013 in Queen’s Park, London
42
th
Interview conducted with Maulana Shahid Raza on 19 September 2013 in Wembley, London
41
22
summarised it thus: “The nice thing about the Muslim community here is that it is by-and-large
content with what they have in this society; they have freedom of religion, peace and they live a
reasonable life without fear.”43 Under British law, Shi’as are entitled to the same political and social
rights as all British citizens and, indeed, all British Muslims. Therefore, Shi’a protest in Britain is
unlikely to follow the same format as it does in Sunni-dominated Middle Eastern states, and is
unlikely to differ in any radical way from that of other minority groups in Britain. British Shi’as are
fully enfranchised and, therefore, able to express their grievances through the democratic process.
One woman, who had lived in various countries across the Middle East and North Africa region, said
when interviewed that she had experienced various levels of persecution as a Shi’a, the worst being
in Jordan. However, in the UK she felt free to practice her religion without any persecution.
Puelings claims that anti-Shi’a rhetoric is mainly found among those who would already be
considered as ‘radical’. 44 The implications of this for the British case would be that any escalating
sectarian intolerance would most likely be found among those who already hold radical views in
relation to other issues. This would appear to be supported by the Edgware Road incident, which
involved Anjem Choudary, a British Muslim figure who has previously been accused of radicalism,
and protestors believed to be his supporters. Choudary’s organisation Al-Muhajiroun was banned by
the British government in 2011 under the Terrorism Act of 2000. This, however, does not mean that
intolerant sectarian attitudes have not or could not penetrate the mainstream.
Hate Preachers
In addition to religious differences and geopolitical concerns, a third issue has been raised as a
potentially exacerbating factor. The third factor is the perceived disproportionate influence of
certain outspoken individuals in the Muslim community, commonly termed ‘hate preachers’. Hate
speech is defined as using “threatening, abusive or insulting words” or “any written material which is
threatening” with the intent of causing “harassment, alarm or distress”.45 In the UK, expressions of
hatred towards a person or group on account of that party’s colour, race, nationality, ethnic or
national origin, religion, sexual orientation or disability is prohibited by law. Any communication that
is threatening, abusive or insulting and is intended to harass, alarm or distress someone based on a
prejudice towards that party is also prohibited by law. The penalties for hate speech are a fine,
imprisonment or both.46
Following from this understanding of hate speech, hate preachers are defined, for the purpose of
this report, as a person who defines themselves as speaking from a position of religious authority
and is engaged in advocating violence or hostility towards a person, or group, based on a
discrimination against said party. Hate preachers are raised here as an issue separate to foreign
conflicts and geopolitical concerns because of the perception among many British Muslims that hate
43
th
Interview conducted with Judge Khurshid Drabu on 12 September 2013 in Southampton, Hampshire
Puelings, p. 37
45
Section 4A of the Public Order Act (1986), as amended by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994)
46
Public Order Act (1986), Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994), Race and Religious Hatred Act (2006)
and Criminal Justice and Immigration Act (2008)
44
23
preachers are a particularly potent and negative force and one to which both the government and
the community find it particularly difficult to find a solution.
Concerns have been raised by members of the Muslim community about the presence in Britain of
radical preachers who are known to have made hostile sectarian comments in their sermons. For
example, in early 2013 members of the British Muslim community petitioned the Government to
deny Mohamad Al-Arefe, a Saudi Imam who has previously made anti-Shi’a comments, entry to the
country.47 Another example is that of the new Shi’a mosque in Gerrard’s Cross being opened by
Sheikh Yasser al-Habib; this has raised concern among British Muslims because al-Habib is known to
have made anti-Sunni comments in the past.48The concern is that if hate preachers are able to
spread a hostile sectarian message they will raise tension levels within the British Muslim
community by exacerbating existing sources of hostility.
Khalida Rahman, Chair of the Muhammadi Trust and Vice-Chair of MINAB, describes sectarianism as
“another form of extremism; it cultivates hate and disturbs the peaceful co-existence, harmony and
balance in society.”49 In this context, the Edgware Road incident is taken by some to be a warning of
what can happen when sectarian tensions are aggravated. Radical Islamist preachers are already the
focus of a new government taskforce, TERFOR (Tackling Extremism and Radicalisation Task Force),
which aims to find ways to stop hate preachers from using institutions such as schools and prisons to
spread their extremist views. Often preachers that are known to have made inflammatory sectarian
remarks have also come to public or government attention over allegations of fostering extremism.
For example, Sheik al-Arefe caused concern recently by calling for a jihad in Syria during a speech he
gave in Egypt. Therefore, it is likely that in many cases the concerns of the Muslim community over
sectarian hate preachers and government concerns over extremist clerics may dovetail, laying
common ground and a basis for co-operation on this issue.
However, there are social, legal and political barriers to dealing with the threat posed by Hate
Preachers. Judge Drabu identified the legal constraints surrounding the issue of hate preachers,
most notably the trade-off between the guarantee of ‘freedom of expression’ under UK law and the
legal prohibition of ‘incitement to hatred’.50 There was a certain level of cynicism expressed by some
members of the community when the issue of hate preachers was raised; many believe that while it
is a problem, it is one that is difficult to deal with and impeded by various political obstacles. Dr elHamdoon suggests that a distinction needs to be made “between preaching hate and just having
dialogue". 51
47
Elgot, J. (2013), ‘Muslim Leaders Fear Rise in Sectarian Tensions Over Saudi Preacher Mohammad Al-Arefe UK
th
Visit’, The Huffington Post United Kingdom [Online] (Last updated at 7.46pm on 19 June 2013), Available at:
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/06/19/saudi-preacher-mohammad-al-arefe_n_3465941.html
th
[Accessed 6 August 2013]
48
Milmo, C. (2013), ‘Sunni vs Shia…in Gerrard’s Cross: New Mosque Highlights Growing Tensions Among British
Muslims’, The Independent [Online], Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/sunnivs-shia-in-gerrards-cross-new-mosque-highlights-growing-tensions-among-british-muslims-8671969.html
th
[Accessed on 16 July 2013]
49
rd
Interview conducted with Sayeda Khalida Rahman on 3 December 2013 by telephone
50
th
Interview conducted with Judge Khurshid Drabu on 12 September 2013 in Southampton, Hampshire
51
th
Interview conducted with Dr Omer el-Hamdoon on 16 September 2013 in Queen’s Park, London
24
Manifestations of Sectarianism in England
Reported or known instances of sectarian hostility in Britain are rare and relatively low-level,
certainly when compared to cases such as Iraq and Pakistan. However, as has been mentioned
elsewhere in the report, consideration must be given to the fact that the low incident rate may be
affected by a lack of accurate reporting. Public hate crime figures released by the police and
Government are limited in the information they provide relating to motive. I submitted a Freedom of
Information Request to the Home Office asking for data relating to the number of hate crimes where
the victim’s Muslim sect was a factor. However, they were unable to provide me with the
information because “the information returned by the police to the Home Office only gives the total
number of offences recorded for each of the five monitored hate crime strands, one of which is for
religion. It does not specify individual religions in the breakdown”.52 Therefore, crime statistics do
not reflect whether hate crime incidents were motivated by intra-Muslim sectarianism.
What the statistics do show is that, in 2011, of the recorded hate crimes in England, Wales and
Northern Ireland aggregated by True Vision, the hate crime reporting service of the Association of
Chief Police Officers, 5 per cent were motivated by faith.53 Of this 5 per cent, 35 per cent were
related to Islam54, which represented the largest percentage of faith-based hate crimes. Therefore,
the available data reflects that the Muslim community as a whole faces significant levels of
discrimination. However, this data is limited and this demonstrates how the tools available are blunt
when examining inter-Muslim relations in Britain. Despite this obstacle to research, indications can
be drawn from an analysis of other sources of evidence. These sources can be identified under two
crude categories: online and offline incidents of sectarian hostility.
Online
Online incidents of sectarian hostility are easily accessed through social media websites and online
forums through both media monitoring software and manual searches. Numerous examples of antiSunni or anti-Shia speech can be found online on the various major social media platforms. Due to
their written nature, one of the main indicators that can be drawn from these examples is of the
kind of language and content used in hostile sectarianism. From the examples of sectarian hostility
that were found online key lexicon could be identified that was used in such a way as was intended
to cause offence. This lexicon included terms such as ‘kafir’ (in several spelling variations), ‘heretic’,
‘son of mutah’, ‘devil’ and ‘Shaytan’ (for explanations of these terms, please refer to the Glossary of
Terms). This lexicon is used with the intention of accusing the subject of being non-Muslim or
‘deviant’. The content of sectarian comments varied depending on the subject that had motivated
52
th
Freedom of Information Request submitted by the author to the Home Office on 27 August 2013,
Reference number: 28757 – see Appendix 1.
53
True Vision Hate Crime Data, ‘Recorded Hate Crime Data for 2011 for England, Wales and Northern Ireland’,
True Vision Website [Online] (Last updated October 2012) Available at: http://www.reportth
it.org.uk/files/final_acpo_hate_crime_data_2011_(revised_oct_2011)_1.pdf [Accessed 15 July 2013]
54
True Vision Hate Crime Data, ‘Breakdown of Religious Hate Crime 2011’, True Vision Website [Online]
Available at: http://www.report-it.org.uk/files/religious_hate_crime_data_2011_published_(june_2013)_1.pdf
th
[Accessed 15 July 2013]
25
the post. Posts were made in response to various issues including, but not limited to, the Syrian
crisis, Iran, sectarian violence in – among other countries – Iraq and Pakistan, and conversations with
other social media or forum users. The content of these posts varied considerably in terms of
severity, ranging from heated arguments through to graphic pictures of sectarian violence. Threats
featured regularly, again ranging in severity from vague allusions of violence to explicit death
threats.
The lexicon of these posts indicates a common focus on accusations of apostasy and moral
corruption as a core source of abuse, thus indicating that this is a sensitive area likely to cause great
offence to the recipient, as well as a central theme in hostile sectarian dialogue. The content of the
posts can indicate both the issues that are particularly emotive when under discussion and the level
of hostility felt towards the subject of the post. Graphic and violent material is of particular concern
to observers as this can be distressing to view, especially for young audiences.
Dr Omer el-Hamdoon raised concern about the role of the internet; he said “obviously with the
information explosion that we’ve had in the last few decades, people have more access to what is
happening in different parts of the world. But not only that but also information that is being
recycled over the internet via Youtube and so on, which I would probably say tends to add more to
the problem than it helps.”55 Some have argued that the ‘normal rules’ of social engagement do not
apply online and that the ‘anonymous’ nature of the medium encourages users to behave in a way
that they might not offline and to make claims that they are unlikely to act upon offline. Therefore, it
could be argued that threats such as those mentioned above should not be assigned the same level
of severity as a threat made offline.
There is an extent to which online incidents of sectarian hostility need to be considered within the
wider legal and cultural context of the internet. The British legal system is currently undergoing a
formative debate surrounding the extent to which British law can have jurisdiction over the internet,
its content and users in terms of offensive content and ‘trolls’ (internet bullies). Online threats of any
kind have yet to be defined within the legal system in terms of severity and liability, and this extends
to hostile sectarian content. The fundamental question remains: to what extent can online threats
be taken to pose a physical off-line threat? This is not an issue that is likely to be resolved soon as
the debate about freedom of expression and censorship in relation to the internet is on-going. In the
meantime, it is left to the community itself to decide what level of severity they will assign to threats
such as these.
Offline
There have been few publicly documented incidents of sectarianism in Britain. The incident on
Edgware Road in May is considered by some to be the first public act of sectarian violence in Britain.
Some commentators believe that the Edgware Road incident marks an increase in sectarian violence
and Britain will begin to see more incidents similar to Edgware Road in the future. However, whether
this will be the case is being debated among British Muslims. With no known history of sectarian
incidents to use as a reference point it is hard to make predictions about whether Edgware Road was
55
th
Interview conducted with Dr Omer el-Hamdoon on 16 September 2013 in Queen’s Park, London
26
an isolated and uncommon incident or whether it does in fact signal the start of a pattern of
increasing violence. The matter is made harder to judge by the lack of data available on sectarian
incidents. It is possible that instances of sectarian violence are occurring within the Muslim
Community but they are either not being reported or are reported but are not identified as
sectarian.
However, we can look to the level of awareness of the issue of sectarianism among the Muslim
community as an indicator. Judge Khurshid Drabu spoke about the recent rise in awareness about
sectarian issues. He argues that when the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) first started in 1997
“there was not an iota of feeling about sectarianism” but since then, the issue has risen in
prominence.56 Indications can also be drawn from the presence of a debate within the community
around the issue. Events, such as a recent ‘Question Time’ style debate on the subject of Muslim
sectarianism hosted by a Shi’a organisation in a Sunni mosque,57 demonstrate that there is an
awareness of the importance of this matter within the community. This awareness can perhaps be
interpreted as indicating a rising concern within the community on sectarian issues galvanised by a
perceived increase in sectarian tensions in the Muslim world.
Anecdotal evidence can be considered another indicator of rising concern about sectarianism. For
example, at Southampton Medina Mosque, attention was drawn to an Imam who was refusing to
perform funeral prayers for a man he believed to be Shi’a. The reason the Imam gave was that he
believed that if he touched the body of a Shi’a, he would become divorced from his wife. The
executive committee governing the Mosque dealt with the matter by issuing the Imam a formal
disciplinary notice and by making it publicly known that they would not tolerate such behaviour
among their congregation.
When I spoke to members of the community, some did raise concerns about an increase in
sectarianism. One man said that he thought that the situation was more hostile now than before as
everything was being ‘looked at as sectarian now’ and people were concentrating more on the
differences between Sunnis and Shi’as. Often this concern about increased sectarianism was linked
to increases elsewhere in the Muslim world. For example, one man said that he was concerned
about the impact the Syrian conflict might have and about what would happen when people who
had gone to fight in Syria returned to the UK. The same man also alluded to the involvement of
Middle Eastern powers in ‘stirring up’ sectarian tensions. Those who spoke about external influences
often cited foreign hate preachers and extremist ideologies as some of the key factors ‘poisoning’
the British Muslim community.
Satellite stations that broadcast messages of sectarian hostility were mentioned by several people
concerned about the impact of such material on the British Muslim community, young Muslims in
particular. Some of these stations are broadcast from Britain; however, the majority originate from
abroad, for example from Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Stations broadcast from abroad are difficult to
regulate as they are outside of British jurisdiction. Therefore, to take legal action against, or shut
56
57
th
Interview with Judge Khurshid Drabu on 12 September 2013 in Southampton, Hampshire
th
Event organised by SICM and held at Harrow Central Mosque on 14 September 2013
27
down, any station that broadcasts messages inciting religious or sectarian hatred from abroad into
Britain is legally and logistically difficult.
Finally, university student groups were also often mentioned by community members as actual or
potential sources of sectarian hostility. Several university graduates mentioned an awareness of
tensions within the Muslim communities at their respective universities. A student from Birmingham
University said that the Islamic Society, which was dominated by Sunnis, had not allowed the Shi’a
students to have their own programme. Therefore, the Shi’a students had set up their own Ahl alBayt Society in order to be able to pray without restriction. A student from Oxford University said
that while she had been there the Islamic Society had been integrated and friendly but knew that
the society had previously experienced sectarian tensions.
In 2008 the Centre for Social Cohesion, a British think tank that aims to explore how best to promote
greater tolerance and cohesion in society, released a report on Islam Societies at UK universities that
showed a trend of intolerance among members of these societies. The report concluded that 15 per
cent of those surveyed were hostile to the idea that Sunnis are true Muslims and 29 per cent were
not sure, while 30 per cent of respondents were hostile to the idea that Shi’as are true Muslims and
27 per cent were not sure.58 These results indicate a significant proportion of Islamic Society
members do not consider members of the opposite sect to be true Muslims. There is also a
significant proportion, approximately a third of both Sunni and Shi’a students, who have yet to make
up their mind, which indicates the potential for increased sectarianism within Islamic Societies.
However, on the other hand, this ‘undecided’ third may also be persuaded to join the more tolerant
group of their peers. The report also raises the issue of the access extremist groups and speakers can
have to university campuses. While the majority of parties considered to be promoting a ‘hate’ or
‘extremist’ agenda have been banned from most university campuses, the report claims that some
parties are still able to access university students.59 This is of considerable concern to some sections
of the Muslim community as university is a formative experience for young British Muslims and will
contribute to shaping their actions and views in later life.
Recent sectarian incidents in Europe are also of concern as they can be considered ‘closer to home’.
Muslim communities in other Western European countries share similar contextual aspects as those
in Britain, such as being a minority community within either a secular or Christian state. One
particular example that shocked Muslim communities in Britain was the March 2012 arson attack on
a Shi’a mosque in the Belgium capital of Brussels in which an Imam was killed. The perpetrator was a
Muslim man who is reported to have shouted comments relating to the current situation in Syria
during the attack.60 From these indicators, the incident is suspected by some to have been
motivated by sectarian hostility. For some members of the British Muslim community, events such
as this one can be taken as a warning of how sectarian hostility might manifest in Britain if it was
allowed to escalate.
58
Stuart , H. And Thorne, J. (2008), ‘Islam on Campus: A Survey of UK Student Opinions’, The Centre for Social
Cohesion, London, p. 49-50
59
Stuart , H. And Thorne, J. (2008), ‘Islam on Campus: A Survey of UK Student Opinions’, The Centre for Social
Cohesion, London
60
th
BBC News (13 March 2012), ‘Imam dies in mosque arson attack in Belgian capital’, BBC World News website
[Online], available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17346927 [Accessed on 2nd December 2013]
28
Separate Communities
An important issue that was raised by many members was the perception that the Sunni and Shi’a
communities in Britain generally keep themselves separate. Several attributed this ‘separateness’ to
the communities occupying different social spaces, rather than to any overt sectarian hostility. One
man said “most of the people in my social group are Shi’as but just because those are the people I
grew up with, not because of any conscious choice I made or because of any rivalry”. This was
echoed by several others who also said that the majority of the people they socialised with were
from their own sect and that this was because of the particular area they lived in or the school they
attended was predominantly Shi’a or Sunni. Furthermore, several people said that their friends were
made at their mosque, for example at the madrassa they attended as children, which was Shi’a or
Sunni. One man said that he had “some Sunni friends but not many”. The sense was that this was
‘just the way it is’.
However, some did characterise the separateness as more conscious. One woman said that “the
groups kind of know their own place; they have their separate mosques and so on”. She also added,
however, “they don’t have a problem with each other per se, they just keep separate”. This
separateness, while perhaps not a direct manifestation of sectarian hostility, is a significant barrier
to improved relations as separateness tends to self-perpetuate. If people socialise only, or primarily,
within their own sect they are less likely to develop a healthy familiarity with members of other
sects. Separateness also reinforces the perceived differences between the groups and can lead to
the perpetuation of prejudices based on lack of experience or ignorance of the sects. However, the
fact that members of the community recognise and acknowledge this separation is another indicator
of willingness to engage in a debate about sectarian relations. Several people interviewed expressed
a regret at the separateness of the communities; one woman said “yes we are separate but more
integration would be nice”.
29
Positive Action
Despite evidence of sectarian tensions within the British Muslim community, this report does not,
and must not, focus only on the negative. A large part of the reality of relations between the
different British Muslim communities is a history of, and significant precedence for, co-operation
and harmony. There are a number of past, present and future unity and intra-faith projects with
which representatives from both the Sunni and Shi’a communities are and have been involved.
These can roughly be divided into two sections: umbrella organisations, such as the Mosques and
Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), and community initiatives, such as the Big Iftar project.
From speaking to community members and leaders, it is clear that there are already strong ideas of
how to build better relations within the community.
Many people interviewed expressed a hope for greater integration between the two groups, which
supported what many of their peers had said about the ‘separateness’ of the communities. One
woman asserted that she was certain that the separateness will diminish over time, and greater
unity will inevitably develop. While she acknowledged that there were many differences to
overcome, she was also very confident in her optimism for closer relations in the future. While other
people were not as confident, many shared a belief in the need to promote greater unity. One
woman said that “there is definitely room for more integration” as the two communities have “a lot
in common”. She believed that to begin work to improve integration “you just need one person to
start it off”. One man suggested more social events would help and that getting young people
involved was “very important”. Facilitation of greater interaction between members of the Sunni
and Shi’a communities was a commonly made suggestion. One woman said that more frequent
social interaction would promote friendship, as once you get to know someone in an informal
environment you realise that they are more like you than you think.
Maulana Shahid Raza expressed optimism at the future of Sunni-Shi’a relations in Britain; he said “on
both sides I see good signs of some sort of commitment”. Echoing a sentiment expressed by several
other members of the community, Raza said “The differences are there and these differences have
always been there so we have to accept that Sunnis and Shi’as have differences. We probably cannot
overcome those differences entirely so these differences will remain there. But despite these
differences we have a lot in common, particularly in a country like Britain where Muslims are a very
small minority facing a threat from outside.”61 Therefore, there is a sense of hope and optimism
within the community, which, if harnessed and encouraged, could help to drive positive counteraction to tackle sectarianism.
Umbrella Muslim Organisations
One of the key ways in which positive action is being taken to improve intra-Muslim relations is
through collaborating in umbrella organisations representing Muslims across Britain. Organisations
such as the Muslim Council of Britain and the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB)
involve members from a range of different Sunni and Shi’a sects. In several cases, proportional
61
th
Interview conducted with Maulana Shahid Raza on 19 September 2013 in Wembley, London
30
representation for Sunnis and Shi’as is guaranteed within the constitution of the organisation. A
similar approach is used to ensure the involvement of women. Policies such as guaranteed
representation for the larger community groups is considered by many to be a ‘good start’ as it sets
a precedent to be built on.
Umbrella organisations can play an important role in presenting a ‘united front’ against issues facing
the Muslim community. Statements issued by Muslim organisations in response to divisive or
sectarian events are considered positive examples of members of different Muslim communities
working together for a common outcome. Joint statements can be a very effective tool if they are
collaborative and issued quickly and sensitively. For example, leaders and representatives of a
number of different Muslim groups and organisations signed a unity statement, ‘A Commitment to
Muslim Intra-Faith Unity in the United Kingdom’ in June 2013.62 Effective, and widely publicised,
joint statements were released through the MCB on the Edgware Road incident63 and the murder of
Drummer Lee Rigby.64 Similarly, the ‘Code of Conduct for Satellite Stations’ drawn up in a joint effort
by several Muslim organisations, encompassing different Muslim schools of thought, can be
considered a successful joint-initiative that demonstrates what can be achieved through effective
intra-Muslim co-operation. Members of the Muslim community face some of the same threats,
regardless of their sect. Therefore, joint responses give the whole community guidance drawn from
a common purpose.
One commonly mentioned institution involved in helping foster good relations between Sunnis and
Shi’as is the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), which was established in 2006
with the aim of promoting best practice in mosques and Islamic centres. Many people involved with
the MINAB project believe that it has made significant headway in the effort to get Sunnis and Shi’as
to co-operate. As Sayeda Khalida Rahman said “in other countries, due to sectarianism, there is
destruction, violence and loss of life. In Britain, through MINAB, we have been successful in
respectfully working together” 65. Within MINAB, Shi’as are guaranteed a 20 per cent stake in the
organisation to ensure their involvement. Maulana Shahid Raza said of MINAB that it has “played a
very good role by bringing these two major groups together. Before the creation of MINAB, I had
witnessed the two groups sitting face-to-face but not prepared to work side-by-side….MINAB was
created where both Sunnis and Shi’as agreed to sit face-to-face and work side-by-side.”66
62
Muslim Council of Britain (MCB)(2013), ‘Joint Statement on Muslim Solidarity and Unity’, Muslim Council of
Britain Website [Online], Available at:
http://www.mcb.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2327:mcbnewstemplate&catid=82:
th
mcb-news [Accessed on 11 September 2013] – Appendix 2
63
th
Muslim Council of Britain (12 May 2013),‘Muslims Stand United, Resist Divisive Sectarian Rhetoric’, MCB
Website [Online], available at:
nd
http://www.mcb.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2322&Itemid=93 [Accessed on: 2
December 2013] – Appendix 3
64
nd
Muslim Council of Britain (22 May 2013), ‘Muslims Condemn Attack on Soldier in Woolwich’, MCB Website
[Online], available at:
nd
http://www.mcb.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2333&Itemid=93 [Accessed on: 2
December 2013]- Appendix 4
65
rd
Interview conducted with Sayeda Khalida Rahman on 3 December 2013 by telephone
66
th
Interview conducted with Maulana Shahid Raza on 19 September 2013 in Wembley, London
31
One of the benefits of MINAB as a guidance body for the Muslim community is that, as Judge Drabu
has highlighted, the organisation is not intended to be involved in matters of theology.67 Its original
purpose was to promote best practice in Mosques and Islamic centres. In 2011 MINAB released its
‘Mosques in the Community’ report, which outlines suggestions for improving engagement with the
local community. Many of the initiatives set out by the report can be applied to intra-Muslim
relations as well. The report encourages openness and wider engagement of Muslims with the local
community; suggestions include involvement of mosques with local social action campaigns, joining
interfaith networks and working with community and voluntary organisations. If such initiatives are
successful in building better relations with the wider non-Muslim community, then they are worth
considering in application to the problem of sectarianism.
Another suggestion made by the report is for training to be given to mosques and Islamic centres on
how best to deal with threats from radical right-wing groups, such as the English Defence League
(EDL). Similar training could be devised and given to inform attendees about sectarianism, and how
it can be countered. This will have similar positive effects as the policies for dealing with the radical
right; it will help the communities to present a united front against sectarianism and also to prepare
for any sectarian incidents that may arise and thus prevent retaliation from their own members.
However, organisations such as MINAB cannot be relied on solely to build bridges between Sunnis
and Shi’as; this needs to be a community-wide effort. This does, however, raise logistical concerns,
such as the availability of and access to funds and resources. There are concerns among those who
set up MINAB about its ability to continue its work in the future due to a withdrawal of government
funding. Dr el-Hamdoon also highlighted the fact that organisations such as MINAB and the MCB do
not have a “total buy-in” from the Muslim community as not all groups are involved in these projects
and this compromises their representative nature.68 For example the Hazara community often feel
that they are included under the umbrella of ‘Shi’a’ and not recognised in their own right. As
Maulana Shahid Raza highlights, organisations such as MINAB and the MCB “should not be the
beginning and end of everything”.69
Community Initiatives
A second way in which intra-Muslim relations can be improved is by facilitating informal interaction
through community initiatives. These can vary from national to local, from large organised social
projects to small-scale events. The main function of these community initiatives is to create
situations in which members of different Muslim communities can interact in an environment that
encourages co-operation and familiarity.
On the national level, Sheikh Ibrahim Mogra, Assistant Secretary General of the MCB, mentioned the
Big Iftar as an example of good Sunni-Shi’a co-operation. This is a project run during Ramadan that
encourages communities all over the country to invite non-Muslims and Muslims from other sects to
67
th
Interview conducted with Judge Khurshid Drabu on 12 September 2013 in Southampton, Hampshire
th
Interview conducted with Dr Omer el-Hamdoon on 16 Septmeber 2013 in Queen’s Park, London
69
th
Interview conducted with Maulana Shahid Raza on 19 September 2013 in Wembley, London
68
32
celebrate breaking the fast together. Sheikh Mogra identified the inclusion of two separate times for
breaking the fast at Harrow Central Mosque as an example of the celebration of “unity in diversity”,
as different sects break the fast at slightly different times.
Locally, MINAB encourages mosques and Islamic centres to host community events and provide local
services in order to promote an open and accessible approach to community relations. In particular,
it is valuable to focus on social clubs hosted by the mosques and Islamic centres that are open to the
general public, such as tea clubs for the over 50s, sports clubs, yoga sessions and summer fetes.
Social events such as these would be constructive in building good intra-Muslim relations if the
mosques and Islamic centres promoted them to both local Sunni and Shi’a communities as they
facilitate friendly and informal interaction.70
Many community members were keen to identify the efforts made by both the Sunni and Shi’a
communities of Harrow in promoting good relations between the groups. A member of the
executive committee of the Shi’a Ithna’ashari Community of Middlesex (SICM) told me about the
many different events they hold to which Sunni lay-people and speakers are often invited. One man
attributed it to an ‘active grassroots’ presence among the Harrow community; he believed that
theirs was a keenly involved community-minded congregation, which actively sought greater
integration with the local Sunni population. Certainly, the large turn-out at this particular event
indicated that the SICM congregation is very active and enthusiastic about their community.71 The
committee member attributed to the community an ethos of ‘openness and integration’. What was
clear from speaking to attendees of this event was the high level of pride that they felt in their
community.
Another way in which communities could work together in a collaborative situation is by working
together on local social campaigns. Maulana Shahid Raza suggests this approach as a means of
uniting them under a common cause.72 These campaigns would revolve around issues that affect
their local area, such as litter, or local charities. The aim would be to create what is intended to be a
neutral environment within which members of the community could interact in a constructive
manner. Dr el-Hamdoon advocated this approach as it “helps to remove barriers between people”
and creates a common ground on which to, once again, build the familiarity that is key to improved
relations.73
70
Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) (2011), ‘The Mosques in Communities Project:
Understanding the Role of Mosques in Relation to Their Local Communities’, MINAB Website,[Online],
Available at: http://minab.lmnocouk.netdnacdn.com/images/stories/Documents/Events/neighbourhood_report_-_amended_15092011.pdf [Accessed on
10th September 2013]
71
th
Social event held by SICM on 27 September 2013 in Harrow, London
72
th
Interview conducted with Maulana Shahid Raza on 19 September 2013 in Wembley, London
73
th
Interview conducted with Dr Omer el-Hamdoon on 16 Septmeber 2013 in Queen’s Park, London
33
Interfaith
A practice that is frequently mentioned in discussions about intra-Muslim relations is interfaith
dialogue and the precedence that this has set in relation to Sunni-Shi’a co-operation. Within the
Muslim community in Britain, there has been a concerted effort by many organisations to become
involved with interfaith projects, liaising with members of the Christian and Jewish communities in
particular. These efforts have resulted in the successful involvement of Muslim representatives in
projects such as the Interfaith Network for the UK, the Three Faiths Forum and Faiths Forum for
London. This has created a pressure on the Muslim community itself; as Maulana Shahid Raza
phrases it, “if you can have dialogue with Christians, with Jews, and if you can continue with that,
why can’t you have dialogue within Muslim groups?”74 Sheikh Mogra, at the ‘Question Time’ panel
discussion in Harrow, spoke about the need to extend interfaith efforts to within the Muslim
Community as they have proved to be incredibly effective in improving relations between Muslims
and other faiths.
However, Raza also identifies a significant obstacle to intra-Muslim dialogue: “going into an
interfaith dialogue is relatively easy because we are going into a dialogue where others are not
claiming anything from our own territory.” He argues that the terms of engagement with Christians
and Jews are set because “we know that they are Christian and we are Muslims, so we accept that
we are two different religious groups”. However, with Sunnis and Shi’as the terms of engagement
are not as clear; “when it comes to having dialogue within a home, there is a debate about
territory…there are some additional questions to be asked when we have intra-faith dialogue.”75
Therefore, interfaith methods of fostering good relations, while a useful guide, cannot be translated
directly to intra-faith dialogue without additional problems arising.
The Role of the Government
While there is considerable consensus among members of the Muslim community about the need
for greater intra-Muslim co-operation, there are issues that all Muslim groups must face but the
solution for which is unclear. When asked about what role the British government can play in
helping the Muslim community to deal with sectarian issues, differing opinions arise between
community leaders and among members of the community. Some believe that greater involvement
of the Government would be welcomed and should be encouraged. For example, the government
could provide funding for unity projects and community initiatives aimed at fostering good intraMuslim relations, thus affording these projects the resources to facilitate their success.
However, others express scepticism about the extent to which the Government can actually be of
assistance. Maulana Shahid Raza believes that the “involvement or interference of the Government
cannot be conceded as entirely conducive. It could selectively be helpful; for example, when the
Government starts a process of consultation, it is in our interest that the Government invites both
74
75
th
Interview conducted with Maulana Shahid Raza on 19 September 2013 in Wembley, London
ibid
34
Sunnis and Shi’as. If they only invite one side, that initiative will not be helpful for the community.”76
There is a feeling among some members of the community that the Government is not able to act to
support the Muslim community in some situations. For example, in terms of financial support, the
Government is perceived to an extent as unable to provide a constant or stable source because of
political and practical restrictions.
Other members of the community reject increased involvement of the Government outright. This is
not necessarily related to a distrust or dislike of the Government, it can be attributed to other
factors. There is a belief among some members of the Muslim community that sectarianism is a
‘community matter’ and needs to be dealt with internally in order for any action to be effective.
Another opinion is that the Government does not understand the subtleties of the issue and,
therefore, their approach would likely be too blunt, perhaps doing more harm than good.
Hate Preachers
People also have differing opinions on how best to deal with hate preachers. Many within the
Muslim community believe that preachers who are identified as spreading messages of intolerance
or ‘hate’ against different sects are a major contributor to sectarianism. There is concern among
many members of the community that preachers are entering Britain from abroad and are
exacerbating sectarian tensions through inflammatory sermons and literature. However, despite a
general agreement that this is a problem that needs to be dealt with, there is less agreement over
how this might be achieved.
This issue is often linked with the previously discussed debate about the desirability of government
involvement in, what some consider to be, a community matter. There is also a certain amount of
scepticism about the ability of the government to act effectively. The issue of hate preachers is
inextricably linked with the complex debate surrounding freedom of speech and expression. Many
people expressed a lack of faith in the ability of the Government to deport hate preachers, for
example Judge Khurshid Drabu. He argued for a community-based solution to the problem because
“the more the government interferes in these matters, the worse it’s going to get…because the
Muslim community doesn’t want to be seen as special.” He believes that government policies that
single out the Muslim community as the focus of special action will serve to create resentment
within the community, and push some individuals closer to extremism.77 Maulana Shahid Raza
suggested that hate preachers might be dealt with from within the community by isolating any local
individual or group that has been identified as inciting hatred. He also raised the issue of television
channels and the need to find some way of regulating channels broadcasting from abroad that
feature what is considered to be inflammatory content. Raza echoed a common sentiment:
“Muslims in the UK should be allowed to grow independently, according to the needs of their
community” without the interference of foreign hate preachers.78
76
ibid
th
Interview conducted with Judge Khurshid Drabu on 12 September 2013 in Southampton, Hampshire
78
th
Interview conducted with Maulana Shahid Raza on 19 September 2013 in Wembley, London
77
35
Conclusions
This report has sought to make a contribution to the ongoing debate about Muslim sectarianism by
focusing on the under-researched area of the British Muslim community. By identifying key
indicators drawn from the perceptions of the British Muslim community, it is intended that a betterinformed picture of sectarian relations between different Muslim groups can begin to be formed and
further areas of research can be signposted in order that the debate can continue to develop. From
the initial evidence available, it appears that levels of sectarian conflict in Britain are low. To an
extent, this can be attributed to the particular nature of the British context. Sectarian violence on a
large or frequent scale is unlikely to develop in Britain because of the absence of many of the main
drivers of sectarian violence, such as deliberate intra-Muslim socio-economic disparity,
authoritarianism and denial of rights. Often sectarian violence is linked causally to political, social
and economic dissatisfaction and the effectuality of peaceful protest. As a liberal democracy, Britain
guarantees all citizens freedom of religion and equal civil and cultural rights, regardless of religious
sect. Under British law, Muslims of all religious sects are equally free to worship and function as a
part of British society. Therefore, it is not expected that existing sectarian sentiments in Britain will
escalate into large-scale violence because of the legal and democratic channels through which
grievances can be expressed and resolved equally by all Muslim citizens.
Furthermore, Muslims in Britain of every sect hold in common the status of ‘minority’ within a
traditionally Christian country. Hate crime data shows that Muslims in Britain have experienced
‘Islamophobic’ discrimination from some members of the non-Muslim community and this can, to an
extent, be considered to unite members of the community against an ‘external threat’. Therefore,
Britain provides a very different context for both Sunni and Shi’a Muslims when compared to
countries affected by sectarian violence, such as Iraq or Pakistan, where sects have been, or are
currently, discriminated against both formally and informally.
However, there are concerns among British Muslim community leaders and members of the
community about the potential for an escalation in tensions. There are three major factors that can
be identified as aggravating sectarianism in Britain: religious differences, geopolitical ‘trickle-down’
from the wider Muslim world and hate preachers. These factors present a challenge to the cohesion
of the British Muslim community and undermine the advantages that the liberal democratic British
system affords to their community relations. Foreign conflicts where Muslim sectarianism is a
notable factor, such as the current Syrian civil war, post-2003 Iraq and internal unrest in Pakistan,
have an effect that is two-fold. Firstly, they have an emotional effect on the British Muslim
population, members of which may feel a connection with conflicts taking place in the Muslim world
and are, therefore, emotionally impacted upon by any sectarian hostility that feature in these
conflicts. Secondly, conflicts in countries such as Syria and Iraq garner considerable media interest in
Britain, which brings the issue of sectarianism to the attention of the public. This can have a positive
effect of raising awareness but can result in a narrow understanding of the concept, directly linked
to that particular conflict, which perhaps lacks the nuanced approach needed to explain such a
complex issue as this.
Another factor that affects sectarianism in Britain is the effect of the geopolitical situation in the
Middle East on the British Muslim community. The rivalry between Shi’a Iran and some Sunni states
36
in the region has created a situation in which sectarianism is used by the elites as a tool for political
mobilisation. This has led to a perception among some members of the British Muslim community
that Sunni and Shi’a populations are subject to the influence of ‘foreign powers’. One example often
cited is the concern among community members about the spread of radical Salafism into Britain
and the use of oil money to bolster its influence in the country. In other cases, Shi’as are considered
by some to be conduits through which Iran can advance its ideological agenda. Events in the SubContinent are also considered by some British Muslims to have a significant impact on the
community, because Muslims of Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian origin make up the largest group
in the British Muslim community. Therefore, because of the cultural, religious and sentimental
connections that British Muslims have with the wider Muslim world, current political events in these
areas of the world have a substantial impact on the world view of some British Muslims.
The third factor that is considered to aggravate sectarian tensions in Britain is the hostile rhetoric of
hate preachers. This issue is of particular concern to the British Muslim community as it has a direct
impact on the national community because it is taking place in Britain itself, rather than having and
indirect impact from abroad. The legal and ethical debates surrounding the issue of dealing with
hate preachers have already been discussed at length in this report. However, this subject speaks to
another issue- that of the voice and identity of the British Muslim community as a minority within a
traditionally Christian society. Sectarian rhetoric from both foreign and domestic hate preachers, as
well as that coming from the internet and satellite television stations, is considered by some to be
encroaching on a social group that is in an on-going process of identity formation. It could be argued
that British Muslim identities are still being built and sectarian relations play an important part in
this. Action taken now will shape the character of British Islam in the future. Many in the community
want British Islam to be developed by members of the community itself, without the negative
impact of sectarian rhetoric imported from abroad.
Positive action is already being taken by some individuals, groups and organisations within the
British Muslim community to tackle negative sectarian attitudes and promote positive interaction
between sects. Much can, and has, been learnt from interfaith projects in which the Muslim
community participates alongside Jewish, Christian and other religious communities. Interfaith
initiatives set a precedent for co-operation that can then be applied to intra-Muslim relations. Both
formal and informal events that actively involve both Sunnis and Shi’as help to promote familiarity
and create bonds between the communities. Co-operation by members of different sects on local
social projects can encourage positive interaction based on common interest. Many community
members characterise the Sunni and Shi’a communities as existing in separate spheres, with limited
interaction. ‘Separateness’ should not automatically imply negativity, as this can be seen more as
‘the way things are’. However, separateness can be a self-perpetuating status quo phenomenon
that, while not necessarily creating or fostering sectarian tension, can be considered to re-emphasise
differences at times. It also makes interaction infrequent and non-normative, not necessarily by
design but nonetheless creating an obstacle to familiarity. Therefore, when members of the different
communities spend time together in a positive and constructive atmosphere it is hoped that they
can build a familiarity that, in turn, encourages further positive interaction.
A combined strategy of both proactive and responsive initiatives is likely to be more successful than
a reactive approach. Long-term proactive measures, such as the community relationship-building
37
initiatives mentioned above, will lay strong foundations on which to build positive, long-lasting
community relations. This will provide a stable basis from which to respond to urgent sectarian
issues. Joint statements, such as the Unity Statement released in May 2013, set a precedent for
responding quickly to sectarian issues without exacerbating the situation. I use the term ‘responsive’
instead of ‘reactive’ deliberately as it is indicative of a more measured, premeditated approach. The
aim of such measures should be to calm tensions and prevent any kind of retaliation or impulsive
action that may be damaging to community relations. Open and willing dialogue appears to be key in
this situation. Addressing some of the some of the main issues of contention between members of
the British Muslim community through debate and discussion can be beneficial for both the social
and spiritual development of the community.
Increased awareness of the issue and its potential threat in the Muslim community, wider British
society and the Government is important. Ignorance of sectarian issues in Islam will contribute to a
misunderstanding of the situation both in Britain and abroad. Issues such as the current civil war in
Syria have brought Muslim sectarianism into the spotlight in Britain. It is important that an accurate
picture is being given of the social, political and economic factors at play in order that
misunderstanding does not damage the British Muslim community.
Furthermore, policy-makers and other stakeholders need to be made aware of the specific nature,
character and extent of Islamic sectarian relations in the British case so that they too can be better
informed and prepared to deal with any future threats to social cohesion. It is here that further
research can make an invaluable contribution because, for these measures to be effective, there
needs to be further qualitative and quantitative research into both sectarian divisions within the
British Muslim community and the number and level of hostile sectarian incidents taking place in
Britain. Two other areas that would benefit from further research are sectarian relations between
Muslim students in British universities, and the impact that sectarian content on the internet and
satellite television stations can have on exacerbating tensions and fostering radicalism, versus the
positive role it can play in providing previously hard to access information about faith, religion and
sectarian relations.
In conclusion, Muslim sectarianism is a complex and multi-layered phenomenon, the investigation of
which is of the utmost relevance and importance to the British Muslim community. The contribution
this report hopes to make to this formative debate is to draw out some of the key issues raised by
the community. Four particular issues that have been highlighted are the impact of geopolitical
‘trickle-down’ from the wider Muslim world, the threat from hate preachers and the proliferation of
hostile material through the internet and satellite television channels, concerns that tensions may be
increasing and, finally, hopes for improved social cohesion within the Muslim community. Debates
within the community about sectarianism, its impact and the future of intra-Muslim relations are,
and will continue to be, crucial in shaping how the community responds to the threat this issue
poses.
38
Recommendations
The following are recommendations for further areas of research that would be beneficial to
undertake in order to expand understanding and available data regarding Muslim sectarianism in
Britain.

The role of the internet in influencing sectarian discussion – The internet as an unregulated
forum can have a negative impact by making hostile sectarian rhetoric widely available,
thereby contributing towards increasing sectarian tensions. This can be tied in with the
spread of sectarian hate speech through satellite television stations. However, the internet
can also be considered to have a positive impact through providing an easily accessible
information resource from with Muslims and others can learn about the Muslim faith, its
different sects and their beliefs. Further exploration of both the positive and negative impact
that the internet can have on Muslims, particularly young Muslims, would make an
interesting contribution to the currently on-going legal, academic and social discussion
about the role of the internet.

The impact of sectarian hate preachers and the link with radicalism – It is possible to
identify a surface link between sectarian hate speech and wider radicalism. Often, there is
significant overlap between those who preach sectarian hate and those who preach a radical
or extremist doctrine. A closer examination of this link may prove beneficial in identifying
patters and commonalities that will help concerned parties collaborate in efforts to tackle
hate preachers and radicalism.

Hate crime statistics – The current hate crime reporting system does not facilitate the
identification of intra-Muslim incidents due to the limitations of hate crime statistics
released to the public. In order that more accurate information can be gathered, members
of the British Muslim community should be encouraged to report any sectarian hate crime
incidents that they experience or witness through the various channels available. Non-police
hate crime organisations, such as TellMAMA and Stop Hate UK offer alternative portals
through which hate crimes can be reported. If more people are made aware of the
importance of reporting incidents, then researchers will be better equipped to determine
whether the low statistics indicate a low occurrence of incidents or a low level of reporting.
While this is not explicitly a research topic, once wider data is available, quantitative analysis
of the information can contribute to building a more accurate picture of the level and nature
of sectarian hostility in Britain.

Minority British Muslim national identities – While much has been written about identity
formation in the theoretical sense, and about Muslim identity formation, a more detailed
examination of the identity formation of minority Muslim sectarian identity formation has
been limited. Deeper consideration of the importance that Muslim minorities in Britain
attach to their minority or sectarian identity would help shed light on how these identities
interact with and shape sectarian relations between Muslim groups.
39

Sectarian relations between Muslim students in British universities –university campuses
can be identified as areas of particular concern when looking to places where sectarian
hostility among the British Muslim community may manifest and have a particular impact. In
particular, research into how free students from different sects feel to practice their religion,
or research into universities where multiple Islamic Societies have been created, would
provide an insight into the exposure young Muslims have to sectarian issues in Britain today.
40
Glossary of Terms
Ahmediyya: an Islamic reform movement that follows the teachings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad who
claimed to have been the prophesised Mahdi; while Ahmedis define themselves as Muslims, some
Muslims argue that they cannot be Muslim as Gulam Ahmad should be considered a ‘false prophet’
Alawism: a Muslim sect found predominantly in Syria; some consider Alawism to follow a branch of
Shi’a Islam, however this has been disputed.
Apostasy: desertion of or departure from one’s religion
Caliph: meaning ‘successor’, the ruler of the Islamic Ummah
Hadith: a report of the deeds and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, used to aid in interpretation
of the Qu’ran and Islamic law
Hate preacher: a person who defines themselves as speaking from a position of religious authority
and is engaged in advocating violence or hostility towards a person, or group, based on a
discrimination against them.
Imam: an Islamic leadership position, in the Sunni tradition a worship-leader, in the Shi’a tradition a
title for a scholar (this term also takes on a particular significance when referring to the succession of
twelve Imams)
Isma’ilism: a branch of Shi’ism that departs from the other Shi’a traditions after the seventh Imam
Kafir: an Arabic term usually translated as ‘unbeliever’, its use can be considered denigrating
Mahdi: the prophesised redeemer of Islam
Maliki School: One of the schools of religious law within Sunni Islam
Ottoman Empire: a trans-continental empire founded by Turkish tribes which existed from 1299 to
its collapse in 1923
Safavid Dynasty: the ruling dynasty of Persia from 1501 to 1736, which established Twelver Shi’a
Islam as the official religion
Sect: a subgroup of a religious, political or philosophical belief system, usually an off-shoot of a
larger group
Sectarianism: devotion to a particular sect, often religious; in common modern parlance it is often
used to refer to negative relationships between different religious sects
41
Shaytan: one of several Islamic terms used for the Devil or devils
Sufism: a branch of Sunni Islam that emphasises the mystical dimension of Islam
Sunnah: a way of life as described by the teachings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad
Takfir: the accusation of apostasy directed at a person who claims to be Muslim
Troll (internet): a person who sows discord on the internet through abusing other users; often
referred to as an online bully
Ummah: a community governed by Shari’ah law; often used to refer to the global Muslim
community
Umayyads Dynasty: one of the caliphates following the death of the Prophet under the rule of the
Umayyad family from the 3rd Caliph in 661 CE until it was toppled by the Abbasids in 750 CE
Zaidism: a branch of Shi’ism that departs from the other Shi’a traditions after the fifth Imam,
particularly prevalent in Yemen
42
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Freedom of Information Request submitted by the author to the Home Office on 27th
August 2013, Reference number: 28757
Appendix 2: ‘A Commitment to Muslim Intra-Faith Unity in the United Kingdom’ statement, Muslim
Council of Britain (28th June 2013),Muslim Council of Britain Website [Online], Available at:
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(12th May 2013), MCB Website [Online], available at:
45
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[Accessed on: 2nd December 2013]
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2013), MCB Website [Online], available at:
http://www.mcb.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2333&Itemid=93
[Accessed on: 2nd December 2013]
46
Appendix 1
Crime Statistics
2 Marsham Street
London
SW 1P 4DF
Tel: 020 7035 0278
www.homeoffice.gov.uk
Ref: 28757
18 September 2013
Dear Alexandra Clarkson,
Thank you for your e-mail of 27 August 2013, in which you ask for data on the number of incidents
where a person’s membership of a Muslim religious sect was identified as a factor in an incident
between 2009 and 2013. You also asked for data relating to Islamophobic incidents organised by
county between 2009 and 2013. Your request has been handled as a request for information under
the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
The Home Office does not hold the information which you have requested. The information
returned by the police to the Home Office only gives the total number of offences recorded for each
of the five monitored hate crime strands, one of which is for religion. It does not specify individual
religions in the breakdown.
If you are dissatisfied with this response you may request an independent internal review of our
handling of your request by submitting a complaint within two months to the address below,
quoting reference 28757. If you ask for an internal review, it would be helpful if you could say why
you are dissatisfied with the response.
Information Access Team
Home Office
Ground Floor, Seacole Building
2 Marsham Street
London SW1P 4DF
e-mail: [email protected]
As part of any internal review the Department's handling of your information request will be
reassessed by staff who were not involved in providing you with this response. If you remain
dissatisfied after this internal review, you would have a right of complaint to the Information
Commissioner as established by section 50 of the Freedom of Information Act.
Yours sincerely,
Jack Cooper
Home Office Crime Statistics
47
Appendix 2:
48
Appendix 3:
12 May 2013
Muslims Stand United, Resist Divisive Sectarian Rhetoric
"And hold fast, all of you together, to the rope of Allah, and do not separate." Quran, Surah Imran, 103
The Muslim Council of Britain today affirms the unity of Muslims, particularly in the UK. We are a
community with plural traditions and viewpoints, but united in our faith in Allah and his last Prophet. This is
a view held by the vast majority of British Muslims
Our affirmation comes after small but isolated incidents of hateful sectarian messages being imparted on
the streets of Britain. We condemn the antics of Anjem Choudary and his (un)merry-band of publicity
seekers who last Friday took to the streets of London to spew their hate-filled message and attack people
they thought to be from the Shia tradition. We will speak out against anyone fostering division in our
community, from whichever quarter it comes from. We urge the media to be vigilant and refrain from
stoking up tensions where they do not exist.
Sunnis and Shias remain united in the UK and have a long-established history of intra-faith co-operation.
We are acutely aware that the complex situation in the Middle East and Muslim world has the possibility of
threatening that tradition. We are also aware that those from without the community will seek to exploit
these divisions for their own nefarious ends.
We call on our scholars, leaders and institutions from all traditions to stand firm and be vigilant, speak out
against sectarianism and ensure the forces of unity prevail. We should avoid hate and condescending
speech and literature in our midst. Finally we should respect each other and the personalities, places and
events that any group among us holds in esteem, abiding by the Islamic manner (adab) of disagreement
that is neither inflammatory nor insulting.
[ ENDS]
Note to Editors:
1. The Muslim Council of Britain is the UK's representative Muslim umbrella body with over 400 affiliated
national, regional and local organisations, mosques, charities and schools.
2. Our recent public pronouncement on this matter was in The Times:
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/faith/article3755800.ece
3. For further information please contact:
The Muslim Council of Britain,
PO Box 57330,
London,
E1 2WJ
Tel: 0845 26 26 786
Fax: 0207 247 7079
[email protected]
49
Appendix 4:
22 May 2013
Muslims Condemn Attack on Soldier in Woolwich
 No cause justifies this murder
 A barbaric act that has no basis in Islam and we condemn this unreservedly
 Vast majority of British Muslims acknowledge armed forces for the work they do
 Calls for calm and unity in all communities
The Muslim Council of Britain this evening spoke out, in the strongest possible terms, the news of a horrific
murder that has taken place in Woolwich, London. Eye-witnesses suggest that the murderers made Islamic
slogans during their heinous action and were thus motivated by their Islamic faith.
This is a truly barbaric act that has no basis in Islam and we condemn this unreservedly. Our thoughts are
with the victim and his family. We understand the victim is a serving member of the Armed Forces. Muslims
have long served in this country’s Armed Forces, proudly and with honour. This attack on a member of the
Armed Forces is dishonourable, and no cause justifies this murder.
This action will no doubt heighten tensions on the streets of the United Kingdom. We call on all our
communities, Muslim and non-Muslim, to come together in solidarity to ensure the forces of hatred do not
prevail. It is important we allow our police authorities to do their job without speculation. We also urge the
utmost vigilance and ask the police authorities to calm tensions.
Please email [email protected] for follow-up media inquiries
[ ENDS]
Note to Editors:
1.
2.
3.
The Muslim Council of Britain (www.mcb.org.uk) is the UK's representative Muslim umbrella body
with over 400 affiliated national, regional and local organisations, mosques, charities and schools.
Muslims speak out against
terrorism: http://www.mcb.org.uk/article_detail.php?article=announcement-656
Read ‘Remembering the Brave: The Muslim Contribution to Britain’s Armed
Forces:http://www.mcb.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1071:rememberingthe-muslim-contribution-to-britains-armed-forces&catid=40:press-release
For further information please contact the MCB:
The Muslim Council of Britain,
PO Box 57330,
London,
E1 2WJ
Tel: 0845 26 26 786
Fax: 0207 247 7079
[email protected]
50