TonamiPaper
Japan’sAchillesheel?Japan’sPolarengagement
andtheroleofscientificwhaling
AkiTonami
NIAS–NordicInstituteofAsianStudies
UniversityofCopenhagen
[email protected]
Paperpreparedforthepanel‘Asiaatthepoles’,ISAAsia-Pacific,HongKong,26June2016
Firstdraft-Notforcitation
Introduction
WithglobaltemperaturerisingandsubsequentclimaticchangesinthePolarregions,the
issueofhowhuman-beingsshouldandcan‘govern’thepristine,fragilenaturalenvironment
ofthePolarregionshasgainedmuchattention.Particularlydiscussedhasbeenwhether
existingframeworksofgovernanceofthePolarregions,suchastheArcticCouncil(AC)and
theAntarcticTreatySystem(ATS),areabletocopewiththerapidlychangingenvironment
ofthePolarregions.Moreover,aquestionofhowto‘harness’the‘emerging’actorswho
(wereperceivedto)haveagreatinterestintheregionshasbeenontheagendaaswell.
These‘emerging’actorsincludedEastAsianstates,inparticularChina,anemerging
economicandmilitarypower.Ratherunfortunateforher,ChinaenteredArcticpolitics“at
timewhentheregionhasbecomebothmorecrowdedandmorediplomatically
unpredictable”(Lanteigne,2014,p.11),asaresultreceivingmuchmediaattentionand
criticismsfromthescholarlycommunityoftheArcticcoastalstates.Thisphenomenon
appearstobepresentinAntarcticpolitics.Subsequently,Japan’sPolarengagementcaught
attentionasitwasoneofthefiveAsianstateswhose(permanent)Observerstatusatthe
ArcticCouncil(AC)wasaccepted1attheKirunaMeetinginMay2013,alongwithChina.
In2013,ArcticCouncilabandonedtheflexiblemechanismofgranting“ad-hocObserver”
statusandimplementedamorestaticlistofcriteriathatcontrolsaccesstoCouncilmeetings
(Knecht,2015).Therefore,thecolloquialuseoftheterm‘permanentObserver’asopposed
the‘ad-hocObserver’willnolongerbevalid.
1
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BeingacceptedtotheArcticCouncilasObserverandwiththereleaseofofficialArcticpolicy
in2015,Japanbecameafull-fledgedstakeholderintheArctic.Similarly,Japanhasbeenone
ofthemostactivestatesintheAntarctic,sendingnationally-fundedAntarcticexpeditions
onaregularbasis.InlinewithJapan’senvironmentalandsciencediplomacyinrecentyears,
Japan’sPolardiplomacyisgenerallyspeakingliberal,basedonJapan’sidealofpromoting
multilateralsolutionstoglobalproblems.However,thereisoneaspectofJapan’sPolar
engagementthatstandsoutlikeasorethumb:itscontroversialresearchwhalingpolicyin
theAntarctic.FortheWesternaudience,whichisgenerallyanti-whaling,theJapanese
government’sseeminglyunnecessaryadherencetowhaling,somuchsoitlostacaseatthe
InternationalCourtofJustice,appearnothingbutpuzzling(see,forexample,WingfieldHayes(2016)).
Againstthisbackground,myquestionsforthispaperare:WhydoesJapancontinue
scientificwhaling?WhatdoesitmeantoitsPolarengagement?Intherestofthepaper,
firstly,IwillintroduceJapan’sPolarpolicy,ArcticpolicyandAntarcticpolicy.Iwill
incorporateabipolarperspectivebecausewhilebothPoleshavesomesimilarities(and
manystatesincludingJapanjuxtaposebothPolarregionsagainsteachother),thereare
distinctdifferencesthataredeemedtopreventasimilargovernancesystemliketheATSfor
theArctic.Forinstance,Young(2012)dismissesthepossibilityofcreatingan‘ArcticTreaty’
because:Arcticlandsandcoastalwatersaresubjecttoundisputedjurisdictiononthepart
oftheArcticstates;theArctichasasizablepopulationofpermanentorlong-termresidents,
includingindigenouspeopleswhohaverightsrecognizedininternationallawaswellasin
thelawsofindividualstates;theArcticisalocusoflarge-scaleindustrialactivities,including
world-classlead,zinc,nickelanddiamondminingalongwithoilandgasextraction;andthe
Arctichaslongbeenandcontinuestobeamilitarizedregion(p.392).Itisalsousefultopay
attentiontobothArcticandAntarcticpoliciesforthesakeofcomparativeanalysis.
Secondly,IwillfollowwithanintroductionoftheoriesIwillusefortheanalysis:the
luxurytheorybyHansMouritzen(Mouritzen,2009;Mouritzen&Wivel,2012)andatheory
offoreignpolicychangebyDavidW.Welch(2005).Inconductingforeignpolicyanalysis,
RobertPutnam(1988)’sconceptofa‘two-levelgame’appearstobeoneofthemost
commonlyusedanalyticalframeworks.Putnamfamouslyarguedthatinnegotiations,
nationalleadersareengagedina‘two-levelgame’,alignedwithboththeirpositionin
relationtotheirnegotiatingpartner(s)andtheirpositionindomesticpolitics.Itootakea
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positionthatthereisa‘two-levelgame’asPutnamdescribesinforeignpolicymaking.While
atthesametime,Idoacknowledgethatfocusingtooheavilyonintrastatefeaturesposea
dangerofgettingcaughtina“logic/politicsdichotomy”andpreventtheanalysistobeonly
capturingpartofagivenforeignpolicyoutcome(Freedman,1976).Withthisinmind,the
luxurytheoryprovidesacompellingargumentthattheroleofinternalconsiderationsinthe
state’sexternalactionspace,whichisgoingtoberelevantforthesubjectofthispaper.In
addition,Welch’stheoryofforeignpolicychange,particularlythesegmentinwhichhe
analysedtheJapan’s(lackof)foreignpolicychangewithregardstoaterritorialdisputewith
Russia,providesagoodreferencepointforthispaperasIwilldiscussthepuzzling
adherenceofJapantowhaling.
Japan’sPolarpolicy
Japan’sPolarpolicycentresonscientificresearch.Indeed,JapanhasbeenoneoffewnonWesternstatestoconductpolarresearch,doingsosince1957,butmainlyfocusingon
Antarctica(Tonami&Watters,2012).ThisisnotunrelatedtothefactthatthefirstJapanese
Antarcticexpeditionduring1911-1912,inwhichNobuShiraselandedonAntarcticaon16
January19122,iscommemoratedastheburgeoningofJapan’sPolarengagement.Although
Japan’spolarresearchhasconsistentlybeenconductedbothintheArcticandtheAntarctic,
theArcticresearchcommunityhadbeensmallerbycomparisonandresearchershadbeen
dispersedamongvariousinstitutions,consequentlyallowingtheAntarcticvoicetobe
strongerandmoreinfluentialthanthatoftheArcticinthePolarpolicy-making.3In2009,
however,theArcticissuefinallybegantoattractsignificantpublicattentioninJapan.In
April,theJapaneseViceForeignMinisterreleasedanofficialstatementonthe50th
anniversaryoftheAntarcticTreatyandannouncedJapan’sintentiontoapplyforObserver
statusattheArcticCouncil(Hashimoto,2009).InJuly,theJapanesegovernmentofficially
submittedanapplicationtotheAC.Thisformalself-recognitionofJapan’sdesiretobe
acknowledgedinanintergovernmentalbodyofArcticgovernancespedupthepolicymakingprocesseswithregardstotheArcticwithinthegovernment.Forthetime-being,
therefore,thereisnounifiedPolarpolicythatencompassesbothPolarregions.
2
ThiswasapproximatelyamonthaftertheNorwegianRoaldAmundsenreachedtheSouth
Pole.
3
Author’sinterviewwithaJapanesePolarresearcher,November2012.
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Arcticpolicy
AlthoughcomparativelysmallerinscalethanthatoftheAntarctic,Japanhasahistoryof
ArcticengagementthatdatesbacktoWWII(Naganobu,2012).Inaccordancewiththe
generaltrendofJapan’senvironmentaldiplomacy,Japantakesaliberalpositioninthe
Arcticandtriestopromotemultilateralsolutions(Hook,Gibson,Hughes,&Dobson,2012,p.
320).OneofthefirstevidentsignsofthisliberalpositionisJapan’sjoiningtheInternational
ArcticScienceCommittee(IASC)asanon-Arcticstatein1992.JapanwasthefirstAsianstate
todoso,anditwasonlytwoyearsaftertheCommitteewasestablished.4
ThisisbackedbyJapan’sformalrecognitionoftheroleofscienceandtechnologyin
itseconomicdevelopmentanddiplomacyduringthatperiod.Asymbolicexampleisthe
ScienceandTechnologyBasicLawthatwasenactedinNovember1995.Thelawclaimed
thatitsobjectivewas“toachieveahigherstandardofscienceandtechnology,tocontribute
tothedevelopmentoftheeconomyandsocietyofJapan...”(CabinetOfficeofJapan,2015).
Inotherwords,theLawgaveclarityonthesharedunderstandingoftheJapanesedecisionmakersthat,inordertoshakeoffthelongrecessionandtheendoftheeraofJapanasa
‘catching-upnation’totheWesterndevelopedeconomies,itwasindispensabletocreate
newindustriesbydevelopingcreativeandhigh-techscientifictechnologies(Akashi,2011).
WhileitisdebatablewhenandhowJapanbegantorecognizescienceandtechnologyasan
importanttooltofacilitateitseconomicgrowthanditsnationalwealth,itisimperativeto
understandtheJapaneseinterpretationoftheroleofscienceandtechnologyinlinkingits
domesticindustrialpolicyandforeignpolicy.
Inthebeginningof2000s,theJapanesegovernmentbecameawareoftheneedof
supportingpolarresearch.InDecember2004,theCouncilforScienceandTechnology
Policy,whichisundertheCabinetOffice,agreedonthePromotionStrategyofEarth
Observation.ThisStrategyincludedJapan’saimtorealizealong-term,continuous
observationofthePolarregionsandcryosphere(MEXT2010).From2009,Japan’sArctic
policybegantosetforth.Aspreviouslymentioned,inJuly2009Japansubmittedits
4
IASCwasfoundedin1990byrepresentativesofnationalscientificorganizationsofthe
eightArcticcountries:Canada,Denmark,Finland,Iceland,Norway,Russia,Swedenandthe
USA(InternationalArcticResearchCenter,2015).
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applicationforObserverstatusattheAC.InparttoimpresstheArcticcoastalstateswho
hadasayinJapan’sapplicationtotheAC,andinotherparttopreparethegroundfor
when/ifJapanbecameObserverattheAC,thegovernmentfolloweduptheapplicationwith
severaldomesticinitiatives.TheyincludedtheestablishmentanArcticTaskForceatthe
MinistryofForeignAffairsofJapan(MoFA),aspecialpublic-privatejointcommitteeonthe
NorthernSeaRoute(NSR)5organizedbytheMinistryofLand,Infrastructure,Transportand
Tourism(MLIT),theadditionoftheword‘Arctic’18timestotherenewedBasicPlanon
OceanPolicy,settingupofaninter-ministerialcommitteeontheArctic(LiaisonCommittee
amongMinistriesandAgenciesonVariousIssuesRelatedtotheArctic),ortheappointment
ofJapan’sownArcticAmbassador.Nonetheless,theflagshipofJapan’sArcticengagement
hasbeenconsideredas,atleastbytheJapanesestakeholders,itsscientificresearch.
Therefore,thesegovernmentinitiativesbecame‘complete’whentheywerecomplemented
bynation-wide,large-scale,government-fundedscientificresearchprojectsthataimedat
protectingandunderstandingtheArcticenvironment.
IntermsofministerialbodiesrelatedtotheArctic,atpresentthereisnocrossministerial,unifiedorganizationtodealwithArcticissuesexceptfortheaforementioned
inter-ministerialcommitteeontheArctic.Amongstvariousministries,businesssectorsand
researchinstitutes,themostrelevantare:
•
MinistryofEducation,Culture,Sports,ScienceandTechnology(MEXT)andthe
NationalInstituteofPolarResearch(NIPR)underMEXT
•
MinistryofForeignAffairs(MoFA)
•
MinistryofLand,Infrastructure,TransportandTourism(MLIT)
•
TheHeadquartersforOceanPolicyundertheCabinetOffice
•
TheOceanPolicyResearchInstitute(OPRI)undertheSasakawaPeaceFoundation
•
ShippingSector
•
Ports&infrastructureindustry
•
EnergySector
5
TheNorthernSeaRoute(NSR),isasearoutethatrunsfromtheKaraGatetotheBering
Strait,connectingEuropeandAsiaacrosstheHighNorth.Duringthesummermonths,when
theicelevelisatitslowest,theNSRcancuttheshippingdistancebetweenAsiaandEurope
byasmuchas30%comparedtoconventionalroutessuchasviatheSuezCanal.
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TwoyearsafterJapanwasacceptedtobeObserverattheACandbecameafull-
fledgednon-Arctic-Arcticstakeholder,JapanannounceditsfirstofficialArcticpolicy.Atthe
ArcticCircleAssemblyheldinReykjavik,IcelandinOctober2015,theJapaneseArctic
AmbassadorKazukoShiraishiexcitedlyintroducedthepolicyprefacing:
[Todayis]themostimportantdayeverforJapan’sArcticpolicy.Just6
hoursago,PrimeMinister[Shinzo]AbeadoptedacomprehensiveArctic
policyforthefirsttimeinhistory…Economicopportunitiesand
environmentalchallenges…theentireglobalenvironment.Thisrecognition
isthebasisofouraction.”
TheofficialArcticpolicylistsglobalenvironment,indigenouspeoples,scienceand
technology,theruleoflawandinternationalcooperation,searoutes,naturalresources,and
nationalsecurityasareasofpriority,andresearchanddevelopment,international
cooperationandsustainableuse(ofnaturalresources)asspecificinitiatives.ThisratherallembracingArcticpolicyisduetoapolicy-makingprocessofanirontrianglecomprisedof
bureaucracy,politiciansandbusinessgroups,eachofwhichholdvaryinginterests(Tonami,
forthcoming).Seenfromthisperspective,JapanregardstheArcticasaregiontoodifficultto
generateanyfinancialbenefitsintheshort-term,butsufficientlyimportanttocontinue
plantingflagstobeusedinthefuture;indoingso,scienceandtechnology,including
scientificresearch,isconsideredasausefultool.
Antarcticpolicy
DespiteJapan’slonghistoryofAntarcticengagement,thereisonlyasmallvolumeof
publishedstudiesdescribingtheroleofJapanandthegovernanceofAntarctica.However,
theydonotnecessarilyreflectthelateststateofJapan'sAntarcticpolicyanditscharacter.
Forinstance,Joyner(1989)describedthehistoryoftheAntarcticTreatySystemandJapan's
nationalinterestsintheAntarctic.Theywereregardedas:morecooperationwiththe
AntarcticTreatyConsultiveParty(ATCP),economicinterestsandpreservationofaccessfor
Japanesenationalstoexploitlivingmarineresourcesandminerals,scientificinterestsand
preservationoftheresourcesoftheAntarcticforfutureexploitation.Japan'seconomic
interestsintheAntarcticandsubsequentreluctancetoratifytheProtocolonEnvironmental
ProtectiontotheAntarcticTreatywascriticizedbeforeJapanfinallyratifiedin1997(Blay,
1992).OthersexploredthepoliticsandlegalimplicationsaroundJapan'srenunciationof
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territorialrightsinAntarcticaintheSanFranciscoPeaceTreatyof1951afterthedefeatof
WWII(Hara,1999,2006;Scott,1999).RecentstudiesofJapanandtheAntarcticrevolve
aroundthecontroversialresearchwhalingthatJapanconductsintheAntarctic(Anton,
2009)andso-called‘eco-terrorism’committedbyananti-whalingNGOatJapaneseresearch
whalingvessels(Roeschke,2009).
TheAntarcticTreatyisthecentrepieceofthelegalregimeandgovernanceofthe
Antarctic.TheTreatywassignedinWashingtonon1December1959bythetwelve
countrieswhosescientistshadbeenactiveinandaroundAntarcticaduringtheInternational
GeophysicalYear(IGY)of1957-58(SecretariatoftheAntarcticTreaty,2014).Itenteredinto
forcein1961andcurrentlythetotalnumberofPartiestotheTreatyis50.TheAntarctic
TreatyandrelatedagreementsarecalledtheAntarcticTreatySystem(ATS)andwithinthe
ATSinternationalrelationswithregardstoAntarcticaareregulated.6Japanwasoneofthe
twelveoriginalcontractingstatesoftheAntarcticTreatyandoneofthetwelve
governmentsthathadparticipatedintheWashingtonConferenceTreatynegotiationsand
ratifiedit,whichbroughttheTreatyintoforceon23June1961(Joyner,1989).Japandoes
notclaimterritorialrightsinAntarcticaanddoesnotrecognizeothernations'claimeither,
similartoBelgiumandSouthAfrica.ThisisbecauseJapanwasforcedtorenounceitsclaim
toAntarctica,togetherwithanumberofterritoriesintheAsia-Pacific,intheSanFrancisco
PeaceTreatyof1951afterthedefeatofWWII(Hara,2006).
InordertounderstandJapan’spositionontheAntarctic,itisnoteworthytomention
thefiveimportantprovisionsofTheAntarcticTreaty,whichare(SecretariatoftheAntarctic
Treaty,2014):
1. Antarcticashallbeusedforpeacefulpurposesonly(Art.I);
2. FreedomofscientificinvestigationinAntarcticaandcooperationtowardthatend…
shallcontinue(Art.II);
3. ScientificobservationsandresultsfromAntarcticashallbeexchangedandmade
freelyavailable(Art.III);
4. AmongthesignatoriesoftheTreatyweresevencountries-Argentina,Australia,
Chile,France,NewZealand,NorwayandtheUnitedKingdom-withterritorialclaims,
Forthetreatysystem,Antarcticaisdefinedasallofthelandandiceshelvessouthof60°S
latitude.
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sometimesoverlapping.Othercountriesdonotrecognizeanyclaims.TheUSand
Russiamaintaina“basisofclaim”.AllpositionsareexplicitlyprotectedinArticleIV,
whichpreservesthestatusquo;
5. Topromotetheobjectivesandensuretheobservanceoftheprovisionsofthe
Treaty,"AllareasofAntarctica,includingallstations,installationsandequipment
withinthoseareas…shallbeopenatalltimestoinspection"(Art.VII). Japan'spositionisthat:a)thebasicgoalistoplacetheAntarcticaunderinternational
management,b)Japanrecognizestheimportanceofcontinuingthesystemtothefuture
basedontheAntarcticTreaty,c)itisimportanttoactivelysupporttheplanningandthe
implementationofmeasurestopromotetheaimsandprinciplesoftheAntarcticTreaty
(NationalInstituteofPolarResearch(NIPR),2003).Japanisoneof27membersofthe
AntarcticTreatyConsultativeMeetingwithothernationsthathavebeenactiveinscientific
researchinAntarctica.Japanhassentregularscientificresearchexpeditioneveryyearsince
1956(theJapaneseAntarcticResearchExpedition(JARE)).ThefirstexpeditionreachedEast
OngulIslandinQueenMaudLandinJanuary1957,andopenedtheSyowaStation,whichis
nowthemotherstationoftheJARE(NationalInstituteofPolarResearch(NIPR),2014).The
expeditionissenteveryyearsince,thelatestonebeingthe57th
(http://www.nipr.ac.jp/jare/jare57/index.html).Japanisoneofthenationsthatdonot
supportanyminingactivitiesinAntarcticabasedontheProtocolonEnvironmental
ProtectiontotheAntarcticTreatythatJapanratifiedin1997(MinistryofForeignAffairsof
Japan,2013a).
Forthetime-being,itappearsamajorpartofJapaneseAntarcticpolicyisrelatedtothe
AntarcticResearchExpedition.IncontrastwithArcticaffairs,thereisacross-ministerial,
unifiedorganization,called"IntegrationPromotionHeadquarteroftheAntarcticRegion
Observation(nankyokuchiikikansokutōgōsuisinhonbu)"headedbyMEXT.The
Headquarterconsistsof10ministriesandapanelofacademicexperts,butthemost
relevantministerialbodiesare(MEXT,2013):
•
MEXTandNIPRunderMEXT
•
MinistryofInternalAffairsandCommunications
•
MLIT(GeospatialInformationAuthorityofJapan,JapanMeteorologicalAgency,
JapanCoastGuard)
8
•
MinistryofDefense(MoD)
•
MoFA
•
MinistryofEnvironment(MoE)
TonamiPaper
UndertheauspicesofMEXT,NIPRconductsAntarcticresearchandobservationas
thecentralagencyoftheAntarcticobservationprogram.GeospatialInformationAuthority
ofJapanisresponsiblefortheobservationoftheionosphereandauroras.Japan
MeteorologicalAgencyadministersthesurveyingandmappingofAntarcticaandJapan
MeteorologicalAgencyobservestheozonelayerandtheupper-air.JapanCoastGuard
overseesaffairsrelatedtomarinephysics,marinechemistryandtidalfluctuation.
IntermsofcapacitytoconductmaritimeactivitiesinthePolarregions,three
icebreakersownedbyJapan;theShirase,SoyaandTeshio.TheShiraseisundertheauspices
oftheJapanMaritimeSelfDefenseForce(SDF).Forthisreason,therearelegalrestrictions
onthescopeofusagefortheShirase,basedontheSDFAct.7Atpresent,theShirasemay
onlybeusedasasupplyvesselfortheJapaneseAntarcticResearchExpedition(JARE)under
NIPR.8TheSoyaandTeshioareownedbytheJapanCoastGuardandonlyusedaspatrol
boats,operatingfromHokkaidoinnorthernJapan.MoDengagesinthetransportationof
themembersoftheExpeditionandnecessarysuppliesbyseaandair.MoFArepresentsthe
JapanesegovernmentintheAntarcticTreatyConsultativeMeetings.MoEisresponsiblefor
theActonProtectionoftheEnvironmentinAntarctica,whichisadomesticlegislationthat
correspondstotheProtocolonEnvironmentalProtectiontotheAntarcticTreaty,and
administersproceduresrequiredfortheAntarctictourismandvisits.
ScientificWhaling
ThemostcrucialaspectofJapan’sAntarcticpolicyforthispaperisthatJapanconducts
researchwhalingintheAntarctic.JapanjoinedtheInternationalWhalingCommission(IWC)
in1951andundertheInternationalConventionfortheRegulationofWhaling(ICRW),Japan
implementedacommercialwhalingmoratoriumin1986.Meanwhile,in1987,Japanstarted
itsfirstresearchwhalingprogramintheAntarcticacalledJAPRA(TheInstituteofCetacean
7
RefertoSelf-DefenseForcesAct(ActNo.165of1954),4thclauseofArticle100,the
EnforcementOrderoftheSelf-DefenseForcesAct(CabinetOrderNo.179of1954).
8
Thereisthereisnosignificantdiscussiontochangetherelevantlaw.
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Research,2013b).Theprogramendedin2004butwasimmediatelysucceededbyJARPAII.
Japan'scontinuationofwhalinghasreceivedmuchcriticism,especiallyfromabroad,
examplesbeingdirectanti-whalingactionsagainstJapan'sAntarcticwhalingexpeditionby
theanti-whalingNGOSeaShepardsince2007(SeaShepherd,2008),oracasebyAustralia
againstJapan(NewZealandintervening)regardingwhalingintheAntarcticatthe
InternationalCourtofJustice,whichJapanlost(InternationalCourtofJustice,2014).
TheInstituteofCetaceanResearch(ICR)isanindependentresearchinstitutethat
specializesinthebiologicalandsocialsciencesrelatedtowhalesandthemainbodyto
conductresearchwhalingintheAntarcticawiththepermissionoftheJapanese
government.AccordingtotheICR,Japan’sobjectivewithregardstowhalingisto"resume
commercialwhalingforabundantspeciesonasustainablebasisunderinternational
control"(TheInstituteofCetaceanResearch,2013a).
TheJapanesegovernment'sofficialpositionregardingresearchwhalingatleastuntil
theICJ’srulingwasthat:"aswithanyothermarinelife,whalesareanaturalresourceand
canbeutilizedassuch,solongasthisisdoneinamannerthatissupportedbythebest
scientificevidenceavailabletobesustainable"(MinistryofForeignAffairsofJapan,2013b).
ThreeentitiesarerelevanttoJapan'swhalingpolicyintheAntarctic:TheJapanFisheries
Agency(JFA)undertheMinistryofAgriculture,ForestryandFisheries(MAFF),theICR,
MoFA.InNovember2014,theJapangovernmentannouncedanewscientificwhaling
programcalled'NewScientificWhaleResearchProgramintheAntarcticOcean(NEWREPA)'.On6October2015,JapanmadeanewdeclarationrelatedtotheICJ.Japandeclared
“consideringthat,asJapanisaStatePartytotheUNCLOSandcontinuestoobserveits
obligations,itismoreappropriate,aslongasthereisnospecialagreement,toapplydispute
settlementprocedureundertheUNCLOSthatestablishesprovisionsregardingliving
resourcesoftheseaaswellastheinvolvementofexpertsfromthescientificortechnical
perspectivewhenaninternationaldisputeariseswithrespecttoresearchon,or
conservation,managementorexploitationof,livingresourcesofthesea,”inrelationtothe
ICJjudgementonJapan’sscientificwhaling(MinistryofForeignAffairsofJapan2015).
ThereisareasonableamountofexistingresearchthattriestoexplainwhyJapan
continuesitsscientificwhalingwhileeconomicandpoliticalbenefitsofdoingsoareso
marginal(ifnotnegative).Underthecurrentclimate,itisalostcause,anditissimply
“puzzling”thatwhalingpolicyisratheratoddswithJapan’soverallapproachto
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environmentaldiplomacy,letaloneforeignpolicyingeneral(Strausz,2014).Catalinacand
Chan(2005)assertedthatJapan’spersistenceinitsrighttowhaleisbecausetheJapanese
governmentregardsthewhalingdisputeas“athreattoresourcesecurityandalsoadanger
tointer-staterespectfordifferencesincustomandcuisine”.YetJapan’sdesiretobe
perceivedasaresponsiblememberofinternationalsocietycreatesadilemma,thusleading
tothecurrentformofscientificwhalingpolicyasacompromise.IshiiandOkubo(2007),on
theotherhand,arguedthatthedomesticincentivesof“thewhalingcamp”most
representedbyJFAarewhatdrivestheJapanesestance.TheAgencyisincentivizedto
continuescientificwhalinginordertoavoidtheaccountabilityquestionandtoincreaseand
maintainitswhale-relatedbudget.Moreover,itdoesnothelpthatJapanesepolicymakers
regardnon-issueslikewhalingasoneofthefewissueswheretheycanrelieve“diplomatic
stress”causedbytheperceptionthatJapanalwayshasaweakerhandagainstWestern
powerssuchastheUnitedStates(p.85).Morikawa(2009,p.1)criticisedtheJapanese
governmentthatitallowedthewhalingissueto"takeonamagnitudeandsignificancefar
beyonditsactualimportance"and"hasmadethecontinuationofwhalinganationalgoal
andamatterofnationalpride"(Morikawa,2009,p.19).Indeed,someargueJapaneven
boughtvotesatIWCbyprovidingODAtosmallIWCmemberstates(Miller&Dolšak,2007;
Strand&Tuman,2012).
Blok(2008,2011)investigatedfurthertheissueofidentity-basedpoliticsofwhaling.
AccordingtoBlok(2008),whatwhalingconflictsare“really”aboutis“anessentially
contestednormativequestion”(p.41)and“nationalsentimentsofprideandhumiliationare
clearlyatstakeforpro-whalingelites”ofJapan(p.61).Amongtheseelites,theimageof
“Super-Whale”thatisamajestic,intelligent,sociallycomplex,caring,andsingingfriendof
humanity,wordssuchasabundant,Japanese,anddepictionofwhalesasfish-predatingare
associatedtogethertoformpro-whalingcommitments(Blok,2011,p.74).
Strausz(2014)endeavoredtogobacktotheoriginalpointbyaskingaquestion:Why
didJapanbeginscientificwhaling,apolicythatbenefitsfewdomesticallyandalienates
manyaroundtheworld?Hisanswerfromtheforeignpolicyanalysispointofviewwasthat
Japan'sscientificwhalingregimewasformedasaresultofa'two-levelgame'betweenUS
PresidentRonaldReaganandPrimeMinisterYasuhiroNakasone.WhenJapan’sscientific
whalingregimewascreated,althoughReaganhimselfwasnotparticularlyconcernedabout
whaling,hewasfacedwithaunified,anti-whalingCongress.Nakasonewasneithermuch
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concernedaboutwhalingbuthadtofaceaDietdividedonhowtodealwithwhaling,as
stoppingitwasconsideredtocauseeconomiccoststoafisheriesindustry,amajorJapanese
industry.StrauszarguedthesewerethecircumstancesthatbroughtJapantodevelopthe
scientificwhalingregimethatpersiststothisday;therefore,itishighlyunlikelythatmere
internationalpressure(eventheICJruling)convincesJapantoenditswhalingprogram
unlessotherwisecrediblethreatstoafisheriesindustryexist.IdisagreewithStrauszonthis
pointasithasbeenlongsincefisherieswasamajorindustryinJapan.Forinstance,the
numberofworkersinfisheriesboastedmorethan700,000in1960butdecreased
dramaticallyto180,000in2013,andmorethanhalfoftheseworkersarereportedtobe
olderthan60-years-old(TheMainichiShimbun,2015).Revenuesfromfisheriesconsistless
than1%ofJapan’sGDP.ThefisheriesindustryinJapanmaystillbeimportant,butitismore
precisetosayitisonthevergeofextinction.
Basedonexistingresearch,however,itappearsitisagreeablethatwhalingis
actuallyneitheramajoreconomicissuenoramatterofvitalnationalimportanceforJapan.
Itisdomesticpoliticsthatgavebirthtoitscurrentwhalingpolicyanditwillcontinuetobe
usedasadiplomatictoolthatisusedintheinternationalforabutservesasatooltoachieve
politicalgoalsindomesticpolitics.
TheoriesofForeignPolicyChange
Thequestionsremain,then,whydoesJapancontinuescientificwhalingwhenitclearly
bringsverylittleeconomicandpoliticalbenefits?WhatimplicationsdoesJapan’s
continuationofscientificwhalingbringtoitsPolarengagement?Toanswerquestions,the
luxurytheoryfortheinterplayofdecision-makers’externalandinternalconsiderations
developedbyHansMouritzenandatheoryofforeignpolicychangebyDavidA.Welch
wouldbeuseful.
TheLuxuryTheory
Basedonneoclassicalrealism,Mouritzenrecognisetheoccasionalneedtopayattentionto
intrastatefactorstoexplainagivenforeignpolicyoutcome(Mauritzen&Wivel,2012,p.
41).Theluxurytheorypostulatesthattheroleofdecision-makers’internalconsiderations
willvarywiththestate’sexternalactionspace,whichisdefinedasthestate’sabilityto
remainunaffectedbyotherstates’powerandinfluence.Thesizeofexternalactionspace
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permitsorprohibits“intrastatepeculiarities”toplayanyroleinforeignpolicy;inother
words,itisaluxuryforintrastatepeculiarities(forexample,domesticpolitics)toplayany
significantroleinforeignpolicymaking.Whentheexternalactionspacedecreases,for
examplebecauseofemergingexternaldanger,theroleofintrastatepeculiaritiesdecreases;
statesbecomelessabletoafford“democraticorotherideologicalluxury”(Mauritzen&
Wivel,2012,p.41).Onthecontrary,themorefavourableexternalactionspaceincreases,
themoreroleofintrastatepeculiaritiesinforeignpolicymakingincreases;Luxurycanbe
afforded.
Inaddition,thetheorygivesfourpossiblerolestointrastatepeculiaritiesinforeign
policy.Theyareconsideredas(Mauritzen&Wivel,2012,p.42):
•
CategoryI:Withstrongexternalpressureandnopeculiarities;aneasy‘win’forthe
environment
•
CategoryII:Intrastatefactorsrestraintheexternalonesasinertia
•
CategoryIII:Intrastatefactorsreinforcetheexternalones
•
CategoryIV:Externalpressuresmaybetooweaktogenerateforeignpolicy
outcomes.Intrastatepeculiaritiesfunctionasefficientcausesforforeignpolicies.
“Lessons”learnedbykeydecision-makersfrompastwarsandgeopoliticsare
allowedtoplayadecisiverole.
ATheoryofForeignPolicyChange
Inhisbook“PainfulChoices:Atheoryofforeignpolicychange”(2005),DavidA.Welch
proposedanalternativeframeworktoexplainstates’behaviourthantheRealistparadigm,
which,accordingtohim,characterisesthecentralmotivationofstatesasabstractconcepts
therebymakingapredictivetheoryofstatebehaviourunworkable.Heofferedadecisionbasedoftheorybyprovidingexplanationsof“whystatesdeviatefromtheirprior
behaviour”(p.28).Intest-drivinghistheory,hedevotedoneofthechapterstounderstand
andcompare“uselessislandsdisputes”:theterritorialdisputeovertheFalkland/Malvinas
betweenArgentinaandBritainandtheNorthernTerritoriesissuebetweenJapanand
Russia.Welchhighlightedastarkdifferencebetweenthetwocases;Argentinaresortedto
armstotrytoresolveitslong-standingdispute,whileJapanstuckwithdiplomacytorecover
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theNorthernTerritories.ComparedtoArgentina,from1950stothepresent,“Japanhas
patientlyandsteadilypursuedapurelydiplomaticsolution"(p.72).
Inhisanalysis,Welchfoundthat“[t]herealvalueoftheislandstoJapanissymbolic.
Japan'snationalidentityisinvestedintheNorthernTerritoriesmuchthesameway
Argentina'sisinvestedintheMalvinas.Withoutacknowledgedsovereigntyoverthe
NorthernTerritories,theJapanesefeelthatJapanissimplynotcomplete”(p.98).Moreover,
therecoveryoftheislandsisa“moralimperativeofsufficientpowerandcogencytojustify
theremarkableprioritytheissuehasenjoyedinJapaneseforeignpolicy”(p.98).Whatis
more,Japanwaswillingtopayaconsiderablepriceofitsstubbornnessbypersistingonthe
issue,suchasstrainingRusso-JapaneserelationsorunderminedcredibilityofJapanese
diplomacy(p.102).Indeed,theprocessofNorthernTerritorialissue,whichinactualterms
offersnosignificanteconomicorpoliticalbenefitstoJapan,beingmorphedintoamoral,
symbolicimperativeverymuchresonateswiththewhalingissueIhavedescribedearlier.
Attheendofthechapter,afteracarefulanalysisofthetwoterritorialdisputes,
Welchassertedthattherearecrucialdifferencesbetweenthetwo:theexistence/absence
ofadeadline,perceptionsofthefeasibilityofalternativeoptions,andinternational-society
concerns.Forinstance,Japaneseleadershavethusfarneverfixedadeadlinefora
resolutionoftheNorthernTerritoriesissue.Inaddition,theywereawarethattheyhad
beendealtaweakhand,hencetheydidnothaveanydifficultyinunderstandingthat
perseverance,althoughanadmittedlyunproductiveapproach,servedthebestchanceof
success(p.114).Thiswashelpedbyanuancedandrealisticappreciationofvarious
internationalconcernsandperspectivesontheproblemthattheJapaneseforeignpolicy
establishmentheld(p.115).Lastly,thefactthatJapanwasasecurityclientoftheUS,a
memberoftheG-7,andaprominentplayerinmanypartsofpostwarglobalgovernance,as
wellasJapan’sself-awarenessofitsassertivenessandunilateralisminthepastasa
defeatedpower,preventedJapanfromtakinganyotheractionthandiplomacy(p.115).
Welchconcludesthat“dramaticforeignpolicychangeislesslikelyamongstatesthat
operateinamoreprofoundlysocialandmoredeeplymultilateralcontext”(p.115).
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Analysis
Arctic&Antarcticpolicies
Ifsimplycompared,themostnoticeabledifferencebetweenJapan'sArcticandAntarctic
policiesisthatpoliciesrelatedtotheArcticarestillintheirnascent,changeablestageof
formationcomparedtothoseoftheAntarctic.ThisreflectsthefactthatAntarcticahasa
muchlongerhistoryofbeinggovernedthroughtheinternational,multilateralinstitutions
andJapanhasbeenamemberofthedecisionmakingprocessfromtheirveryearlyage.Of
bothPolarregions,JapanhashistoricallyplacedamuchhigherpriorityontheAntarcticthan
ontheArctic.Aspreviouslymentioned,thegovernment'soverallpositionontheAntarctic
hasbeento1)tobecomeamemberofthemostrelevantgovernancesystemoftheRegion,
2)increaseJapan'spresenceandinfluenceindirectlythroughachievementsofscientific
research,and3)preparethedomesticenvironment(policyandgovernmental/nongovernmentalinstitutions)tosupportachievingthesegoals.Withtherecentannouncement
ofitsofficialArcticpolicy,itappearsJapanverymuchattemptstoincorporatethisapproach
intotheArcticaswell.
Whileatthesametime,thereisadistinctdifferencebetweenJapan'sArcticand
Antarcticpoliciesintheircontents.Underthecircumstances,thekeyprovisionsofthe
AntarcticTreatyandtheEnvironmentalProtocolregardingissuessuchasthefreezingof
jurisdictionalclaims,thedemilitarizationanddenuclearizationoftheentirecontinentand
theprohibitiononminingactivitiesdonotmeettheneedsoftheArcticstates(Young,
2008),henceitishighlyunlikelytheArcticstateswillconcludesimilaragreementsinthe
nearfuture.Onthecontrary,non-ArcticstatesareencouragedtoinvestintheArcticRegion
tofundexpensiveminingprojectsandboostsomewhatstagnatingregionaleconomies.The
examplebeingtheestablishmentoftheArcticEconomicCouncil,whosefirstmeetingwas
heldinSeptember2014(ArcticEconomicCouncil,2014).Inthisregard,asthenationthat
pursuesagreatdealofstate-leddevelopment,theJapanesegovernmentplaysan
importantroleinguidingrelevantdomesticindustriestoincreasetheirinvolvementinthe
Arcticregion.Moreover,thegovernmentandtheresearchersrecognizethattheJapanese
ArcticresearchdeservesmoreassistancefromtheJapanesegovernmentandpublicinlight
ofcurrentclimaticchangesandthesupporttheAntarcticresearchhasreceivedoverthe
years.Forinstance,thereisanon-goingdiscussionofbuildinganewicebreakerdedicated
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TonamiPaper
totheArcticresearch.Thisaspectofeconomicopportunities(orlackthereof)intheregion
inquestionismirroredintherelatedinstitutions;itisnoteworthythateventhoughthe
protectionofthenaturalenvironmentisanimportantelementofbothArcticandAntarctic
policies,onlytheAntarcticpoliciesaredealtbyMoE.
WhydoesJapancontinuescientificwhalingandwhatdoesitmeantoitsPolar
engagement?
Fromtheabovediscussion,itwasevidentthatthereisastronginfluenceofdomestic
politicstoJapan’sscientificwhalingpolicy.Inreality,whalingisneitheramajoreconomic
issuenoramatterofvitalimportanceforJapan.Domesticpoliticswaswhatbroughtthe
currentwhalingpolicyandscientificwhalinghasbeenandremainstobeusedasa
diplomatictoolthatisusedintheinternationalstagebutmainlytobeservedasatoolto
achievepoliticalgoalsindomesticpolitics.Withthisinmind,applyingtheluxurytheoryby
Mouritzen,Japan’swhalingpolicybelongstotheCategoryIV,whereexternalpressuresare
tooweaktogenerateforeignpolicyoutcomesandintrastatepeculiaritiesfunctionas
efficientcausesforforeignpolicies.Forlong,theIWCaswellasbilateralrelationswithantiwhalingstatessuchastheUS,AustraliaandNewZealandhavebeentooweekexternal
pressuresandallowedJapantoenjoytheluxuryofinternalpeculiaritiesplayingan
independentroleinforeignpolicymaking.ThismakesastrikingcontrasttoJapan’sArctic
andAntarcticpolicies(withanexceptionofthescientificwhalingpolicy),whichbasically
soughtmultilateralsolutionsthereforebelongingtotheCategoryI,whereaneasy‘win’was
achievedbytheenvironment.Theenvironment,inthiscase,istheexistinggovernance
regimescenteredontheACortheATS,andthe‘win’islargelyduetotheirabilitytoexert
strong(andprevailing)externalpressureandlittletonointernalpeculiaritieswithinJapan.
Perhaps,however,thescientificwhalingissuewillbecomeapermanentfixtureof
Japan’sdiplomaticlandscapeastheNorthernTerritoriesissueshavebecomeforJapanese
officialsandtheJapanesepeople.Theyare“aconstantirritant,butonetheJapanesehave
managedtolivewith”(Welch,2005,p.112).However,thereisalsoapossibilitythatJapan’s
scientificwhalingcouldbecomeitsAchillesheel,whereotherstatesorinterested
stakeholderscanuseagainstJapaninordertocloseitsalreadysmallexternalspaceof
actionsofitsPolarengagement.Indeed,IshiiandSanadapointedoutintheirlatestbook
thattherulingoftheICJbegantoexertinfluenceinotherforumsrelatedtowhaling,in
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TonamiPaper
particularIWC,toblockJapan’sattempttolegallycontinuescientificwhaling(Ishii&
Sanada,2015).Perhaps,asseeninthecaseofNorthernTerritories,Japancouldbewillingto
takeupthechallengeandadheretoits‘nationalpride’overthewhalingissue,whichcould,
onceagainasthecaseoftheNorthernTerritoriesshowed,becostlyforJapan.
ThepossibleimpactofthefactthatMoE,whichisconsideredasoneoftheleast
powerfulministriesoftheJapaneseadministration,ismainlyinchargeoftheAntarctic
affairsshouldalsobeinvestigated.FurtherresearchisneededastohowrelevantantiwhalingstatessuchasAustralia,NewZealandandtheUS,whicharealsoactiveand
influentialmembersoftheATS(inthecaseoftheUS,alsoaMemberstateoftheAC)
incorporateintoorseparateJapan’sscientificwhalingissuefromoverallbilateralrelations
orPolarrelations.
[Conclusionstobeadded]
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