THE EGYPTIAN UPRISING: The Mass Strike in the Time of Neoliberal Globalization
Author(s): Michael Schwartz
Source: New Labor Forum, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Fall 2011), pp. 33-43
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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By Michael Schwartz
THE EGYPTIAN
UPRISING
The Mass Strike in the Time
of Neoliberal Globalization
As the Arab Spring became an Arab Summer, the failure of other
uprisings to replicate the regime changes in Tunisia and Egypt has raised impor-
tant questions about these increasingly impressive successes.
With this in mind, I want to scrutinize Egypt
• This combination of political-economic
carefully, looking for the points of leverage that
vulnerability and a savvy mass movement
allowed and impelled the movement to oust
created a strategic bind for Egyptian and
Hosni Mubarak in only eighteen days of protest
global capitalism in which abandoning
with low mortality counts, particularly in light
Mubarak was the least dangerous exit from
of the much longer and far more lethal and less
an intractable crisis.
successful uprisings in other countries.
The outcome in Egypt was in large part
What is notably absent from this list of
key factors is the most visible feature of Egypt's
a conjunction of several visible, but rarely
almost-peaceful regime change. The Egyptian
scrutinized, aspects of the Egyptian political
armed forces, unlike their Libyan and Syrian
counterparts,1 decided not to attempt to crush
economy:
• Egypt is the poster child of neoliberal reform
in the Middle East. Its rapid integration
the rebellion; this forbearance may have been
a key factor in enabling the protest to succeed.
into globalized capitalism since 1990 made
However, making military forbearance a
it vulnerable to a savvy mass movement
central explanatory factor in Egypt's outcome
that could exploit the pressure points in the
doesn't answer the causal question. It simply
current world system.
raises two related issues:
• Egypt's recent history produced a legacy of
• Why was the military so restrained this
working-class militancy and organization
time around, when- as Egyptian scholar
that provided a tangible foundation for the
Shashank Joshi put it- for fifty years Egypt's
Tahrir Square movement.
New Labor Forum 20(3): 33-43, Fall 2011
Copyright © Joseph S. Murphy Institute, CUNY
ISSN: 1095-7960/11 print, DOI: 10.4179/NLF.203.0000006
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army had "stood at the core of a repressive
Poses Threat to Italys Economy." No mention
police state"?2
was made of the Libyan economy.8
• Why couldn't the government, with or
Unlike comparably large rebellions in
without a military ready to turn its guns
neighboring countries, the Tahrir Square uprising
on the protesters, endure a few more days,
had the sledgehammer effect on the Egyptian
weeks, or even months of protest, while
economy of a general strike or- perhaps more
waiting for the demonstrators to exhaust
appropriately- the impact and demeanor of
themselves, and- as the BBC put it- "have
the "mass strike" codified in Rosa Luxemburg s
the whole thing fizzle out"?3 This waiting
classic analysis.9 Starting on January 25th, the
game has been applied with at least some
success in Yemen.4
first day of the protest, tourism- the largest
industry in the country, which had just begun
its high season- went into free fall.10 After two
Egypt is the poster
weeks, it had "ground to a halt," leaving a large
portion of its two million workers with reduced
child of neoliberal
or nonexistent wages, many horses dead due
to lack of food, and the few remaining tourists
reform in the
rattling around in empty hotels and resorting to
viewing the pyramids on television.11
Middle East.
Since Egyptian sites attract more than a
million visitors a month and account for at
The answers to these questions began to
least 5 percent of the Egyptian economy,12 it
appear at the start of the uprising on January
is not surprising that news reports soon began
25, 2011.
mentioning revenue losses of up to $310 million
per day.13 In an economy with an annual GDP
of well over $200 billion, each day of disruptive
THE INITIAL
protest produced a tangible and growing decline
ECONOMIC IMPACT
in the annual GDP. After two weeks of this ticking
time bomb, Crédit Agricole, the largest banking
onstrations in Cairo attracted the world s
group in France, lowered its growth estimate for
ONCE onstrations attention,
attention,
THE the in TAHRIR the
international
international
Cairo attracted SQUARE mediamedia
the world DEMbegan
began s
the country's economy by 32 percent.
recording and decrying what the BBC called
the business "paralysis induced by the protests"
THE NEOLIBERAL
and its "huge impact on the creaking economy"
CONTRADICTION
of Egypt.5 As Finance Minister Samir Radwan
complained after fourteen days of protest, the
economic situation was "very serious"6 and
"the longer the stalemate continues, the more
initially concentrated in the tourist, hotel,
THESE and initially travel
andDEVASTATING
travelconcentrated
sectors
sectors ofofthe inthe
EgyptianEgyptian
the LOSSES tourist, economy,
economy,
WERE hotel,
damaging it is."7
It is important to note that this complaint
was not registered with any regularity in the many
other countries that were subsequently swept up
industries dominated by huge multinational
corporations and major Egyptian business groups.
Tourism was also a showcase for the success of the
neoliberal reforms engineered by the Mubarak
into the Arab Spring. Even in Libya, where the
regime starting in the early 1990s. During this
uprising inspired a $30 rise in world oil prices,
twenty-year period marked by drastic privatiza-
the New York Times coverage of the price increase
carried this ironic headline: "Turmoil in Libya
tion and rapid economic growth, previously
state-owned enterprises were integrated into
34 • New Labor Forum M. Schwartz
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domestic and international business networks.
This fast-breaking crisis was made consider-
The exemplar was the industrial empire of indicted
ably more severe by the global integration of the
billionaire Ahmed Ezz, built upon the acquisition
Egyptian economy, especially the tourism- related
of the state-owned steel industry in the 1990s.
industries which had been fueled by infusions
By 2010, he had achieved a virtual monopoly
of international capital eager to participate in
in supplying structural steel to international
what some called "the Egyptian miracle."15 In
investors in tourism and related industries.14
the neoliberal universe, the costs of expansion
With tourism as its core sector, the neo-
are paid from current revenues, and therefore
liberalized Egyptian economy was particularly
the crashing tourism industry deprived Egyptian
vulnerable to the kinds of disruptions the Tahrir
and foreign capitalists of the cash flow needed to
Square demonstrations created. One element
pay lenders, construction companies, and other
in this vulnerability is the specific nature of
economic components of their expanding domains.
globalized tourism. With vacationers from
around the world planning relatively brief
sojourns, the reality that sightseeing might (or
The disruptive protests therefore threatened
much more than profits: they threatened the
viability of various new projects, while raising the
would) be impractical leads quickly to the sort
specter of loan defaults turning into widespread
of cancellations that Egypt experienced. When
bankruptcy.
this critical cash flow dies, vast expenses remain:
hotels must still be heated, airline schedules must
Very quickly then, the demonstrations in
Tahrir Square undermined the financial standing
of major capitalist interests inside and outside
With tourism as
of Egypt. The most influential representatives
its core sector, the
of Egyptian business groups, recently nurtured
of this business community were the captains
by the privatization process, which gave them
control of various domestic industries.16
Egyptian economy
These activists of the capitalist class might
was particularly
vulnerable to the
have urged the government to suppress the
protests. This option, however, was precluded
by the emergence of a mobilized civil society
shedding thirty years of passivity. The protesters'
kinds of disruptions
brave response to initial police attacks- in which
the Tahrir Square
demonstrations created.
repression was met by masses of new demonstrators
pouring into the streets17 - made it clear that
brutal suppression could not quickly silence
the protest. Once the demonstrations involved
hundreds of thousands, approaching millions, a
still be kept, and many employees- especially
executives- must still be paid. In such a situa-
huge and bloody suppression guaranteed longterm economic paralysis that could threaten the
tourist season in 2012.
tion, even the largest companies can face a crisis
quickly. In tourist-driven sectors, the situation
is especially ominous; even a short hiatus can
cancel the whole tourist season.
The Egyptian Uprising New Labor Forum • 35
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WHEN DO ARMIES
economy, including the ultra-vulnerable hotel
BECOME PACIFISTIC?
industry. To offer just a few examples of its farreaching interests, the following should be noted:
• The military's involvement in the tourism
industry was, in itself, an economic time
industry involved major hotel holdings,
THE bomb industrybomb
PARALYSIS thatthat
was, threatened
threatened
in itself, OF the anthe
THE economic
viability
viability TOURISMofof time
the
the
core of the Egyptian capitalist class. Recovery
vast Mediterranean beachfront properties
could only begin after a "return to normal life."18
under development as tourist destinations,
and key construction companies involved
For President Mubarak the equation was
in tourist-oriented road building and other
somewhat different. His grasp on power was at
projects.21
stake, he was under the threat of prosecution and
• Its ownership of a Jeep assembly plant,
imprisonment, and he feared the confiscation
originally funded by U.S. military aid,
of his estimated $70 billion financial empire.
These factors must have made the economic
had- over the years - expanded into the
calamity of suppression the lesser evil. It is
major Jeep dealership servicing armies and
therefore not surprising that, in the early days,
private citizens throughout the Middle East.
Mubarak attempted to clear Tahrir Square with
• A fleet of Gulfstream Jets, also originally
successive waves of violence involving police,
part of U.S. military aid, had morphed into a
security forces, and hired thugs.19 When these
charter airline, capturing a substantial share
efforts failed, it became clear that only the army
of travel by executives of Middle Eastern and
could possibly suppress the growing mass strike.
European corporations.
However, the traditionally compliant military
• A U.S. -funded military hospital had developed
leadership refused to order an attack. This refusal
into a regional tertiary-care center, accessible
may have been based on the plausible fear that
to prosperous patients who flew in from North
the enlisted personnel - faced with firing on
African and other Middle Eastern countries.
demonstrators with whom they sympathized
These enterprises, and many others, gave
or to whom they were even related - would
the army a huge stake in minimizing the impact
mutiny. Indeed, this may well have been decisive
of the mass strike rippling outward from Tahrir
in Tunisia; though the same threat failed to deter
Square. Moreover, the generals had much less
military leaders in Libya and Syria.
to fear from a victory for the protesters, whose
But beyond the fear of mutiny, the Egyptian
demands had few negative implications for the
military had a unique set of interests that helped
military's role either in the economy or in Egyptian
account for its reluctance to undertake a massive
society more generally. Like the business elite,
repression. Unlike any other military in the world,
the military had little to gain and much to lose
the Egyptian army s peculiar development had
made it a central institution in the neoliberal
from forceful repression.
expansion underway since 1990. By 2008, it
WHY DID THE PROTEST
had become, as a U.S. diplomatic cable put it, a
MAINTAIN ITS MOMENTUM?
"quasi-commercial enterprise" at the hub of a
"large network" of "military-owned companies
often run by retired generals . . . particularly
all-out attack on the demonstrators, Mubarak
active in the water, olive oil, cement, construction,
Left and all-out hisand
withouthis
attack shrinking
shrinking
on the the demonstrators,
coterie
coterie weapon
of ofinstitutional
institutional Mubarak of an
hotel, and gasoline industries."20
supporters might have tried to wait out the protest.
In other words, the military as an institution
was itself integrated into the globalized Egyptian
This strategy was indeed attempted, and made
visible by Mubaraks promises to step down or
36 • New Labor Forum M. Schwartz
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initiate various reforms at future dates. After
union drive in and around the industrial center
a few days of this waiting game, however, the
of Suez.26
regime collapsed.
During 2007, the working-class move-
The failure of these efforts was rooted in
ment widened its reach and appeal, taking up
the pre-history of the Tahrir Square protests,
broader political demands while continuing
especially the way they were embedded in
trade union actions. Mass protests, multi-site
the working-class institutions that had been
strikes, petition campaigns, and the full range
developing for a dozen years. As neoliberalism
of public demonstrations marked the Egyptian
spread across the Egyptian economy, workers'
political landscape for the first time in decades.
material conditions deteriorated, while their
On April 6, 2008, when Mahalla workers- always
latent institutional leverage grew. By 2004,
at the center of ferment - initiated a nationwide
these contradictory processes translated into
campaign to demand that the national govern-
increasingly viable organizations and grow-
ment establish a minimum wage that would
ing strategic savvy.22 Despite laws that made
quadruple the pay of a large proportion of
only government- controlled unions legal, an
workers, their initial demonstration attracted
"unprecedented wave of wildcat strikes" swept
tens of thousands of Mahalla residents. Their
through the textile industry and into other sectors,
march became the target of police violence,
continuing unabated for over two years.23 The
leaving two protesters dead and many injured,
epicenter of this movement was in the textile
a precursor of the attacks experienced in Tahrir
city of Mahalla where, in late 2006, mass rallies
Square.27 And, as with Tahrir Square, the police
of workers faced down police that had been
violence did not dampen the protest, but instead
sent to disperse them. After decades of vicious
broadened it, inspiring - among other new
repression of even modest demonstrations, the
protest organizations- the creation of the "April
Mahalla workers reestablished for themselves and
6 Movement" made up of middle- class students
others "the right to assemble in their thousands
who, thirty months later, would be credited by
to protest, debate, and organize."24
the international media as the "catalyst" of the
Inspired by this victory, a new strike wave
exploded, involving hundreds of thousands of
workers. This movement was also centered in
the textile industry, but soon established itself
in the railroad, longshore, steel, and cement
Tahrir Square movement.28 The minimum-wage
demand has now become a major national
campaign in the post-Mubarak era.29
When the Mahalla textile workers stared
down the police, they triggered an epidemic of
sectors (and among the all-important Suez Canal
civil disobedience. Their ability to do this was
employees).25 They cast aside the state-controlled
rooted in the structure of the industry. Once the
unions, forming their own, illegal organizations.
textile factories were integrated into the larger
Victories began to pile up: workers at a state-owned
networks of global capital, employers could not
factory in Mahalla won a long-promised pay
endure a long shutdown. Organized workers
raise after only a five-day strike; workers in an
Italian-owned cement factory quadrupled their
held the trump card as long as they were willing
to violate the dictates of their state-controlled
salaries with only a four-day strike; thirty-five
official leadership.
thousand tax assessors duplicated the cement
workers victory, achieving a 325 percent pay
raise; tobacco workers quickly won shorter
hours, higher pay, and less oppressive working
The textile workers neutralized the army,
reduced the police to sporadic violence, and
inspired workers and protesters in other sectors
to test the endurance of their own institutional
conditions; and Suez workers reversed the firing
of two union activists, kicking off a sustained
The Egyptian Uprising New Labor Forum • 37
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adversaries, often discovering that they could
and sporadic due to a combination of shutdowns
win the contest quickly.
aimed at hampering the protests or because the
protests interfered with normal operations. And
Protest-related
such disruptions quickly rippled outward to
many sectors of the economy, from banking to
disruptions quickly
foreign trade.31
rippled outward
Many left work to
to many sectors of
join the protest
the economy from
after noon prayers ,
banking to
leaving their offices
foreign trade.
undermanned
or closed.
The strike wave that began in 2006 established
a triple legacy: a history of protest that could stare
down the police without fear of overwhelming
As the demonstrations grew, employees,
violence; the knowledge that sufficient lever-
customers, and suppliers of various businesses
age could force concessions from powerful
became ever more consumed with preparing
institutions, public and corporate; and the
for, participating in, or recovering from the
organizational experience necessary to mobilize
latest protest, or protecting homes from looters
a large proportion of the productive workforce.
and criminals after the government withdrew
the police force from the streets.32 On major
STRANGLING THE
demonstration days especially, many people left
EGYPTIAN ECONOMY
work33 to join the protest after noon prayers,34
quickly grasped the lessons of the labor
sustained, the economy continued to stagnate,
leaving their offices undermanned or closed
completely.35 As long as the protests were
The insurgency, quickly
insurgency,
Tahrir grasped underscored
underscored
Square the lessons protesters
byby ofthe
the thevisible
visible labor
and business and political elites became ever
collapse of the tourism industry and media calls
more desperate for a solution to the crisis.
for a "return to normal life." Other signs of viable
leverage included the capitulation of Vodafone,
THE MARRIAGE OF POLITICAL
the major cell phone provider, one week into the
AND LABOR PROTEST
protest. Told by the government to participate
in a total "Internet blackout" aimed at depriving
the most productive instances of the
the protesters of critical communication capacity,
the firm reopened after only a few days, appar-
Rosa the mass mostmass
Luxemburgstrike
strike productive
as asthose
those that characterizes
that combine
instances combinebroadbroad- of the
ently against the wishes of the Mubarak regime,
based political reforms with concrete economic
delivering a visible victory to the protesters.30
demands.36 From the beginning of the Tahrir Square
The attack on the tourism industry spread
demonstrations, large numbers of workers- both
quickly to collateral sectors. The transportation
previously active and new to the movement- had
system, local and inter-city, became unreliable
participated, but not as workers. After ten days,
38 • New Labor Forum M. Schwartz
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however, they began spreading the uprising into
El Fattah, a well-known political blogger, told
their workplaces, fulfilling Luxemburg's model
Democracy Now that the crowd "could continue
of combining political and economic protest.
to escalate, either by claiming more places or by
On February 9th, reports of a widening
wave of strikes in major industries began
pouring in,37 as lawyers, medical workers, and
other professionals joined the traditional union
movement in expressing their grievances with
street demonstrations, sit-ins, and strikes.38
actually moving inside these buildings, if the
need comes."43 With the economy choking to
death, the demonstrators were moving to put a
hammerlock on the political system itself.
By that point, the business elite began
deserting the sinking ship of state. Several large
In a single day, as many as twenty thousand
companies took out ads in local newspapers
employees39- in textile factories, at newspapers
"putting distance between themselves and the
and other media companies, and in government
regime."44 The London Guardian reported
agencies, including the post office, sanitation
widespread "nervousness among the business
workers, and bus drivers- began demanding
community," and that "a lot of people you might
economic concessions as well as the departure
of Mubarak.40
lost patience."45
think are in bed with Mubarak have privately
Since the Suez Canal is second only to
tourism as a source of income for the country,
a sit-in there- involving up to six thousand
workers - was particularly ominous. Though
the protesters made no effort to close the canal,
the threat to its operation was self-evident.41
A shutdown of the canal would have been both
an Egyptian and a world calamity: a significant
proportion of the globe s oil flows through Suez,
especially critical for energy- starved Europe. A
substantial oil-economy slowdown threatened
a possible renewal of the worldwide recession
of 2008-2009, even as it would choke off the
Egyptian governments major source of revenue.
As if this weren't enough, the demonstrators
turned their attention to various government
The mass strike in
Egypt was an uprising,
perhaps even an
insurrection. But it
was not ultimately
a revolution.
Any impulse Mubarak may have entertained
to crush the movement with overwhelming
firepower was vetoed by a growing array of
institutions, attempting to render them "nonfunc-
military leaders, major businessmen, foreign
tional."42 The day after Mubarak's third refusal to
investors, and foreign governments. They saw
step down, protesters claimed that many regional
a far more appealing alternative solution.
capitals- including Suez, Mahalla, Mansoura,
Ismailia, Port Said, and even Alexandria (the
country's major Mediterranean port)- were "free
of the regime" (purged of Mubarak officials, state-
controlled communications, and the hated police
Wael Ziada, head of research for a major
Egyptian financial firm, spoke for the business
and political class on February 11, 2011 when
he told Guardian reporter Jack Shenker that:
and security forces). In Cairo, they surrounded
Anti-government sentiment is not calming down, it
the parliament, the national media, and other
is gaining momentum. . . This latest wave is putting
centers critical to the government. Alaa Abd
a lot more pressure on not just the government
The Egyptian Uprising New Labor Forum • 39
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but the entire regime; protesters have made their
Economic demands merged with the broader
demands clear and there's no rowing back now.
issues raised by the Tahrir Square demonstrators.
Everything is going down one route. There are two
The linchpin of the old April 6 Mahalla protest,
or three scenarios , but all involve the same thing :
a drastically increased national minimum
Mubarak stepping down- and the business com-
wage, became a national campaign.50 When
munity is adjusting its expectations accordingly.46
the provisional military government failed to
The next day, Mubarak resigned and left
Cairo.
respond, "protesters reiterated their demands
to sack Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq and the
Cabinet, release political detainees, dismantle
THE STRUGGLE GOES ON
its predecessor in Tunisia) was an uprising,
THE perhaps its predecessor
perhaps
MASS even STRIKE
even
an in an
Tunisia)insurrection.
insurrection. IN EGYPT was an ButBut
uprising,it(LIKEwas
it was
not ultimately a revolution. Its initial accomplish-
ments-removing an autocrat and laying claim
to a huge range of political rights- were only
the State Security apparatus, and annul the
emergency law."51
Days after the fall of
Mubarak , workers
insisted on drastic
a small portion of the demands raised by the
demonstrators. As the dust settled on this initial
stage of what promised to be a lengthy process, the
Egyptian economic and military establishments
labor reforms.
In response, the provisional government
remained in place. Even Egypt's weakened- but
enlisted the leadership of the Muslim Brothers
not overthrown- political establishment had
to join a chorus of establishment figures calling
survived, at least until the forthcoming elec-
for the mass movement "to quit protesting and
tions and probably for the foreseeable future.47
return to work, for the sake of the economy."52
Nevertheless, Mubaraks departure left behind a
When these appeals failed, the government fol-
highly experienced mass movement- made up
lowed up with a series of rhetorical concessions,
of the Tahrir Square veterans, their compatriots
in other cities, and the union movement- with a
including: a promise that Mubarak officials
would be prosecuted to the full extent of the
clear understanding that further change would
law; a declaration that a commission on women's
depend as much on mass action as on institutional
rights would be established; the creation of a
maneuvering.
planning board to develop plans for one mil-
The Egyptian working class has become
the operational core of the ongoing effort.48
lion low-cost housing units; a promise to deny
visas to low- wage foreign workers imported to
Days after the fall of Mubarak, the workers
fill jobs traditionally held by Egyptians; and a
insisted on drastic labor reforms and at least
wholesale revision of labor laws (including the
a partial reversal of neoliberalization. Strikes
critical demands for union recognition and a
by newly independent (but still unrecognized)
national minimum wage). In the meantime, the
unions "exploded" around the country, reraising
government promised an immediate 15 percent
old demands and issuing new ones for "wage
increase in all wages across the economy.53
increases, changes in management, and solutions
to long-running disputes." Textile mills, banks,
airports, electrical facilities, and hospital services
None of these promises have yet been
fulfilled, and their implementation is by no
means guaranteed. But the struggle continues
were hobbled. Even police and journalists struck
in the context of the new reality created by the
for improved conditions and higher wages.49
Tahrir Square uprising. As long as the mass
40 • New Labor Forum M. Schwartz
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movement retains its ability to sustain targeted
already-promised concessions and pursue new
disruption, it can force the implementation of
demands.
Z
1 . Re: the Libyan Army's posture, see (for
example) "Libyan Army 'Marching to
ft
Cleanse Country,'" Sydney Morning Herald,
March 14, 201 1, available at www.smh.
О
1Л
com.au/world/libyan-army-marching-tocleanse-country-201 10314-1 bt9i.html.
2. Shashank Joshi, "Egypt Unrest: Military at Heart of Egyptian State," BBC News,
February 4, 201 1 , available at www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-middle-east-1 236871 1 .
February 10, 201 1, available at http://trav-
el.nytimes.com/201 1/02/10/
travel/1 Oegypt-travel.html.
13. "Protests Cost Egypt $310 Million a
Day',' Associated Press, February 4, 201 1 .
14. Kareem Fahim, Michael Slackman,
and David Rohde, "Egypt's Ire Turns to
Confidant of Mubarak's Son," New York
Times, February 6, 201 1, available at www.
3. "Egypt Unrest: Mubarak Moves to
Restart Economy," BBC News, February 5,
201 1, available at www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-us-canada-1 2372397.
4. Dexter Fi I kins, "Letter from Yemen:
After the Uprising," New Yorker, April 11,
201 1, 39-51, available at www.newyorker.
com/reporting/201 1/04/1 1/1 1041 1fa_
fact_filkins?printable=true&currentPage=
all.
5. BBC News, "Egypt Unrest: Mubarak
Moves to Restart Economy."
6. Ibid.
7. "Egypt's Finance Minister Says 'Coup Is
Very Bad for Everybody,"' lloubnan, February
11, 201 1, available at www.iloubnan.info/
nytimes.com/201 1/02/07/world/
middleeast/07corruption.html.
15. Matein Khalid,"Woes of Inflation
and Succession in Egypt," Khaleej Times,
July 1 2, 2008, available at www.khaleej-
times.com/DisplayArticle.
asp?xfile=data/opinion/2008/July/opinion_July46.xml&section=opinion&col.
16. Fahim et al., "Egypt's Ire Turns to
Confidant of Mubarak's Son."
1 7. "Egyptian Voices from Tahrir
Square," Yahoo News, February 6, 201 1,
available at http://news.yahoo.eom/s/
yblog_exclusive/201 1 0206/ts_yblog_
exclusive/
egy ptia n-voices-from-ta h ri r-sq ua re.
politics/actualite/id/561 60/titre/
Egypt's-Finance-Minister-says-%22coupis-very-bad-for-everybody%22.
8. Rachel Donadio, "Turmoil in Libya
Poses Threat to Italy's Economy," New York
Times, March 5, 201 1, available at www.
nytimes.com/201 1/03/06/world/
europe/06italy.html?pagewanted=print.
9. Rosa Luxemburg, The Mass Strike, the
Political Party and the Trade Unions ; translated by Patrick Lavin (Detroit: Marxist Educational Society of Detroit, 1 925), chapters
1-2, available at www.marxists.org/archive/
luxemburg/1 906/mass-strike.
10. Scott Mayerowitz, "Unrest Hits Egypt
During High Tourist Season," Associated
Press, January 31, 201 1, available at www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/41 351 339/ns/
travel-news.
1 1 ."Egypt's Tourism Industry Grinds to a
Halt," ABC News (video), February 6, 201 1,
available at www.abc.net.au/news/
video/201 1/02/08/3 132845.htm.
1 2. Jennifer Conlin, "Options for Travel-
ers Headed to Egypt," New York Times,
18. Edmund Blair, "Army Asks Egyptians to Return to Normal Life/'fleufers,
February 2, 201 1 , available at www.
reuters.com/article/201 1/02/02/
egypt-army-statement-idUS-
WEA51 77201 10202.
1 9. Yahoo News, "Egyptian Voices from
Tahrir Square."
20. United States Embassy, Cairo,
"Academics See the Military in Decline,
but Retaining Strong Influence," Diplomatic Communication to Department of
State, Washington, D.C., ID
#08CAIR02091, September 23, 2008,
released by Wikileaks, 201 1, available at
http://cablesearch.org/cable/view.php7i
d=08CAIR02091 &hl=scobey+quasi.
21. Ibid.
22. See Joel Beinin, "Striking Egyptian
Workers Fuel the Uprising After 10 Years of
Labor Organizing," Democracy Now
(video), February 10, 201 1, available at
www.democracynow.org/201 1/2/10/
The Egyptian Uprising New Labor Forum «41
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egyptian_uprising_surges_as_work-
ersjoin.
cfm?widCall 1 =customWidgets.
content_view_1 &cit _id=30379.
wy, "Egyptian Textile Workers Confront the
Suffers as Strikes Intensify," Guardian, Feb-
New Economic Order" (Washington, D.C.:
Middle East Research and Information
ruary 1 1, 201 1, available at www.guardian.co.uk/world/201 1/feb/1 1/
Project, March 25, 2007), available at www.
merip.org/mero/mero032507.html.
24. Anne Alexander, "Inside Egypt's
Mass Strikes," International Socialism,
egypt-economy-suffers-strikes-intensify.
23. Joel Beinin and Hossam el-Hamala-
March 31, 2008, available at www.isj.org.
uk/index.php4?id=428&issue=1 18.
32. Jack Shenker, "Egypt's Economy
33. Tom Perry and Jonathan Wright,
"Cairo Protesters Slam 'Stubborn'
Mubarak," Pretoria News, February 8, 201 1,
available at www.pretorianews.co.za/
cairo-protesters-slam-stubborn-
25. Sameh Naguib, "Interview: Egypt's
Strike Wave," International Socialism, Sep-
mubarak-1. 1023324.
tember 28, 2007, available at www.isj.org.
and Alex Spillius, "Egypt Crisis: Cairo
uk/index.php4?id=363.
Braced for Conflict after Friday Prayers,"
26. Beinin, "Striking Egyptian Workers";
Naguib, "Egypt's Strike Wave"; Anne Alex-
ander and Farah Koubaissy, "Women Were
Braver than a Hundred Men" Socialist
34. Richard Spencer, Colin Freeman,
Telegraph, February 3, 201 1, available at
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
africaandindianocean/egypt/8302195/
Egypt-crisis-Cairo-braced-for-conflict-
Review, January 2008, available at www.
socialistreview.org.uk/article.
after-Friday-prayers.html.
35. Ibid.
php?artidenumber=1 0227.
36. Luxemburg, The Mass Strike, 1 3-1 9,
29-35.
27. Beinin, "Striking Egyptian Workers";
Joel Beinin, "Egyptian Workers Demand a
37. Beinin, "Striking Egyptian Workers."
Living Wage," Foreign Policy, May 1 2, 201 0,
38. Shenker, "Egypt's Economy Suffers."
available at http://mideast.foreignpolicy.
com/posts/201 0/05/1 2/
egyptian_workers_demand_a_living_
wage.
28. Jijo Jacob, "What is Egypt's April 6
movement?" International Business
Times, February 1, 201 1, available at
www.i bti mes.com/a rti-
cles/1 07387/201 1 0201/what-is-egypt-s-
april-6-movement.htm.
29. Michelle Chen, "Beyond the Media
39. "Workers Boost Egypt Protests,"
Al-Jazeera (English) online, February 9,
201 1, available at http://english.aljazeera.
net/news/middleeast/201 1/02/201 12913546831 171. html.
40. Kareem Fahim and David D. Kirkpatrick, "Labor Actions in Egypt Boost Protests," New York Times, February 9, 201 1 ,
available at www.nytimes.
com/2011 /02/1 0/world/
middleeast/1 Oegypthtml.
Radar, Egypt's Arab Spring Pushes Forth,"
41. Ibid.
In These Times, May 5, 201 1, available at
42. Shenker, "Egypt's Economy Suffers";
www.inthesetimes.com/working/
entry/7269/
beyond_the_media_radar_egypts_arab_
spring_pushes_forth.
30. Raphael G. Satter, "Vodafone: Egypt
'Forced' Us to Send Text Messages," Associated Press, February 3, 201 1, available at
www.commondreams.org/
headline/201 1/02/03-7.
31. "Egypt in Turmoil- the Practical
and Legal Implications forTrade and Shipping," Reed Smith Client Alerts, February 4,
201 1, available at www.reedsmith.com/
publications/search_publications.
Al Jazeera (English) online, "Workers Boost
Egypt Protests."
43. Alaa Abd El Fattah,"We Are Not
Going Home Until This Regime Leaves,"
Democracy Now (video), February 11,
201 1, available at www.democracynow.
org/2011/2/11/
we_are_not_going_home_until.
44. Shenker, "Egypt's Economy Suffers."
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Joshua Stacher, "Egypt Without
Mubarak" (Washington, D.C.: Middle
East Research and Information Project,
42 • New Labor Forum M. Schwartz
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April 7, 201 1), available at www.merip.
25, 201 1, available at www.thedailynews-
org/mero/mero04071 1 .
48. Kareem Fahim, "Freed by Egypt's
egypt.com/editorial/egypts-battle-fordemocracy.html.
52. Stacher, "Egypt Without
Mubarak."
Revolt, Workers Press Demands," New York
Times, February 16, 201 1, available at
www.nytimes.com/201 1 /02/1 7/world/
53. Ammar Shikhani, "Egyptian Prime
Minister: Economy Moves in Right Direc-
html?_r=1 &pagewanted=print.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
tion," Global Arab Network, March 8, 201 1,
middleeast/17labor.
available at www.english.globalarabnet-
work.com/201 1 03081 01 48/Economics/
51 . Rania AI Malky, "Egypt's Battle for
Democracy," Daily News Egypt, February
egyptian-prime-minister-economymoves-in-right-direction.html.
The Egyptian Uprising New Labor Forum • 43
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