American Perception and the
Revision of Japan’s No-War
Constitution: Assessing the
Alliance
Jordan Heiligmann
Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies
Fall, 2010
ii
iii
Abstract:
Given the nature of Japan's more proactive foreign policy under
the Liberal Democratic Party and Japan's ever-changing image abroad,
there has been much discussion as of late concerning modern Japan's
founding document: The Post-war constitution. Of the many issues
being discussed, that of Article 9 has attracted perhaps the most
attention. This article of the Japanese constitution prevents the nation
from establishing a formal military and it has served as an effective
barrier to Japanese participation in most world conflicts since 1946.
While there are many lenses through which the subject may be
examined, one of the more pertinent of these relates to the general
opinion among the American military and foreign policy communities.
More specifically, as the primary strategic ally of the United States in
the East Asian region, Japan and the constraints placed upon its foreign
involvement are of key interest to American decision-makers and
military planners.
The paper's primary focus of Article 9 revision revolves around
how American perceptions of Japanese constitutional restraints shape
the limitations and values attributed to Japan as a strategic ally. What
shape has the evolution of these perceptions taken in relation to key
events in the strategic alliance? By investigating how American
scholars, decision-makers, and policy-makers view the issue of the
Japanese constitution, key insights into the value of Japan as a strategic
ally can be discovered.
iv
Table of Contents
Abstractd...............................................................................................................iii
Table of Contentsd................................................................................................iv
Acknowledgmentsd...............................................................................................vi
Introduction ........................................................................................................1
d
Chapter One: Review of Current Literature ..................................................11
1.1: Traditional Breakdown of the Current Scholarship …...............11
1.1.A: Realist School
1.1.B: Realist-Constructivist School
1.1.C: Constructivist School
1.2: “Aspirational Framework” …........................................................16
1.2.A: School of National Power and Prestige
1.2.B: School of National Autonomy
1.2.C: Supra-Nationalist School of Japanese Foreign Policy
Chapter Two: Japan's Post-War History and Article 9 ..................................28
2.1: Prologue ….......................................................................................28
2.2: Security Policy in the Post-Occupation Era ….............................32
2.3: The Formation of the Yoshida Consensus …................................35
2.4: Ministerial Pressure in Post-war Japanese Defense …................38
2.5: Yoshida Solidifies his Consensus …...............................................40
2.6: Japanese Defense Policy and the Japanese Supreme …..............43
Court
2.7: Post-1959 Japanese Defense Policy …...........................................45
2.8: Japanese Defense in the 1970's …................................................48
2.9: Japanese Defense in the 1980's …................................................51
Chapter Three: Military Interventions in Japan's Post-Cold War ............... 59
Experience
d
v
3.1: Kaifu's Fateful Pledge: Japan and The First Gulf Crisis ….......59
Phase 1: Echoes of the Cold War
Phase 2: America Responds
Phase 3: The Ship Slowly Turns
3.2: A Lost Decade, A Resurgent LDP, And the Second Gulf .….......68
War
Phase 0: A Decade in the Wilderness
Phase 1: A Japan That Can Say “Yes”
Phase 2: America Rejoins, Revisionists Entrench
Phase 3: An Alliance for the 21st Century?
Chapter Four: Japan's Regional Security Framework ................................106
4.1: Bilateral BMD …....................................................................107
4.2: China …...................................................................................111
4.3: North Korea ….......................................................................117
4.4: Historical Roots …..................................................................120
4.5: Post-Gulf War Regionalism …..............................................123
Chapter Five: Japan's Global Security Outlook ...........................................130
5.1: Global Security & The Japanese Public ….........................130
5.2: Moving Beyond the Past …...................................................135
5.3: Japan's Global Policy & The US …......................................137
Chapter Six: Conclusion .................................................................................142
6.1: Findings and Associations ….................................................142
6.2: Contending with Differences in the Current …...................151
Scholarship
6.3: Suggestions for a Stronger Alliance ….................................154
Bibliography ......................................................................................................171
Appendixd...........................................................................................................175
vi
Acknowledgments
My Mother and Father, for their constant support throughout the research
and writing of my thesis.
Dr. Bratton and Col. Carl Baker (USAF Ret.), for their significant help and
assistance over the past few years during my extended drafting process.
Last, but not least, thanks be to God for my life through all tests of these past
four years of my graduate education, for His guidance and protection. More
so, had it not been for Him, this thesis would have ended abruptly in
summer 2009 and remained unfinished.
1
Introduction
As Japan’s capacity expands, so also must its responsibilities…
the situation in which Japan finds itself, both at home and
abroad, has changed completely…In the matter of defense, we
seem to be advancing beyond the stage of depending upon the
strength of other countries.
Yoshida Shigeru, 1967 1
With end of the Cold War and over a decade of emerging crises and commitments,
it is clear that the Japan and more broadly, the Asia of 1946 bear little resemblance to
their counterparts in the 21st or even the late 20th century. Changing strategic, economic,
and even, social realities have prompted significant revisions in the way these regional
powers conceive their security policies and Japan is no exception to this trend. 2 However,
few other nations in the region have been so severely constricted in their defense
strategies as has Japan. Even China’s former paradigm of “People’s War Under Modern
Conditions” allowed military intervention in extra-territorial conflict, as was evidenced
by its brief war with Vietnam in 1979.3 Although much has occurred since 1946, even in
terms of Japan’s increasingly flexible interpretation of its military restrictions, the same
unbending language of Japan’s Post-war constitution has endured.
1
In Samuels, Richard J. Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia. Ithaca, NY.
Cornell University Press, 2007 p.59 (hereafter Samuels, Securing Japan).
2
Even during the early stages of the U.S. Government’s articulation of the Global War On Terror,
many in the Japanese defense establishment likely would have conceded to a belief similar to that
of Naofumi Miyasaka of the National Defense Academy, who would state that. “The Manichaean
belief or peace and war hinders one from considering an in-between: Terrorism, guerilla
movements, peace-keeping operations, the anti-drug war, humanitarian interventions and natural
or man-made disaster relief, which are more prevalent than war.” Prepared for roundtable
symposium on Terrorism: Prevention and Preparedness In Green, 2001.
3
Russell D. Howard’s brief overview of Chinese doctrinal shift may be instructive on this topic
<http://www. globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1999/ocp28.htm>.
2
To assume that the restrictive language of Japan’s constitution stands in the way
of Japan’s growing international commitment would be a foregone conclusion. Such
legislation as the recent Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law would attest to the
flexibility of the document in the face of pressing foreign policy demands. However, in
terms of both immediate national security requirements and future foreign policy
development, it is evident that the constitutional language of the Post-war period has lost
much of its earlier confidence; the frequency and scope of SDF deployment has reached a
constitutional barrier. And with every passing day that barrier appears more an impasse
than a safeguard. More pressingly, when the issue of American perception and judgment
comes into play4, this lost confidence, present in the statements of Japanese leaders5 as
well as government think tanks6 and in legislation pertinent to Japan’s national security,
4
Note, for example, the candid, but tactful language used by former Secretary of Defense, Richard
Armitage during a semi-recent public symposium: “I do know that the inability to participate in
collective self-defense is an inhibitor to alliance cooperation. But let me be clear, let me be
absolutely clear: our alliance, and the duties and responsibilities of the U.S. under that alliance,
are very understood and fully embraced by republican and democratic administrations, no matter
what decision Japan reaches on the question of Article 9.” Before Japan Society, June 13 2006.
5
Consider former Prime Minister Koizumi’s pre-9/11 statement: “What is most important to
Japan’s national interest at present? Let’s consider how to maintain Japan-U.S. friendship and
manage the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty efficiently and functionally. Of course, Japan’s use of
force is not permissible in foreign territories, foreign territorial waters or foreign airspace. If U.S.
forces came under attack during their joint exercises or operations with the Japanese SDF in
waters close to Japan, however, the scene would not be foreign territories, foreign air space or
foreign territorial waters. Would Japan be allowed to refrain from doing something even if U.S.
forces came under attack in that case? I respect the government’s present interpretation of the
Constitution, although I think that we must try to consider every possible case. I do not call for
changing the interpretation of the Constitution immediately. But I believe we have room to study
the issue. What I am saying is that we have room to prudently consider the issue.” In East Asian
Strategic Review, 2002 p. 319.
6
On this topic, the National Institute for Defense Studies, one of Japan’s foremost think tanks on
the subject has noted: “Each U.S. ally has had an inherent right to enter into the commitment to
collective self-defense, as endorsed by the U.N. Charter, in response to the United States’ exercise
of the right of individual self-defense against the terrorist attacks…Japan has the right of
individual self-defense and the right of collective self-defense as the inherent rights of sovereign
states under international law, but can only exercise the right of individual self-defense under
constitutional restraint…As a U.S. ally and a member of the international community, Japan’s
cooperation with the United States in military operations is thus under a constraint that prevents it
from exercising the right of collective self-defense or resorting to the use of force.” In East Asian
Strategic Review, 2002 pp. 314-315.
3
becomes all the more pertinent. Ultimately, this general external pressure has compelled
the country to undergo a critical reexamination of its Post-war framework.
When viewed in isolation, the issue of Article 9’s revision is one that can be
validly contested or defended. However, when taken in concert with the larger issue of
the US-Japan Alliance, the revision question takes on a different note. Regardless of
emerging Japanese ambitions, does the article, at present, affect the alliance negatively or
does it stand superfluous as a facet of Japanese policy that is neither a surprise nor a
hindrance? More importantly, how much weight do the views of key American actors
bring to bear in terms of alliance cohesion? Do these opinions link revision with
cooperation or do they view revision as immaterial to the larger interests of the alliance?
These are precisely the questions that require answering, not in a tangential way, but in a
direct and unabashed fashion that takes into account the effects of the article on Japan’s
primary alliance partner.
Keeping these caveats in mind and considering the significance and complexity of
the issues involved, this thesis will address three primary contexts of Japanese foreign
policy: External Military Interventions, Regional Security, and Global Security. While
there does exist overlap in some particular areas (i.e. Bilateral Ballistic Missile Defense,
Global War On Terror), it is in this author’s estimation that these three subjects
encapsulate the general collective framework of the current political discourse.
In relation to the framework, these three categories are far from being of arbitrary
construction, but represent a blend of three separate focuses, each with their respective
proponents. Not only do these three categories serve to provide key insights into the
Japanese decision-making process and thus, the factors upon which Article 9's continued
4
efficacy rests on, but they suggest a model for how Japan has come to view the world in
the years following the end of the Cold War; further, they reflect the course that recent
literature has taken in framing US opinion of Japan's defense reform process. It must be
noted, however, that this framework is purely experimental on this author's part. For a
more conventional breakdown of the primary authors, the literature review contained
herein will begin with a straightforward look into the ideological foundations of the
several authors' theses. Also, although a more complete analysis may examine domestic
security in addition to the other three contexts, since American interests are primarily
focused on Japan’s involvement in regional and global security, the paper will withhold
consideration from the domestic context.7
In terms of the methodology used in the paper, investigating how US scholars,
decision-makers (i.e. Secretaries of Defense, DoD officials, etc.), and policy-makers
(Defense/Foreign Policy Analysts, Industry Leaders, both public and private) view the
issue of Article 9 revision was deemed more likely to yield key insights into the value of
Japan as a strategic ally. For example, frustration toward Japan in terms of the restrictions
placed upon it by its constitution could signal that the United States will be less likely to
rely on Japan as a strategic ally in military operations and instead focus on other regional
partners when planning for future contingencies. Alternatively, little or no significant
frustration could indicate that the United States will continue its traditional cooperation
with Japan and encourage the country to pursue reform while attempting to involve it in
operations that fit the country’s constitutional limitations. While these are purely
conjectures, this author believes that they represent the most likely inferences to be drawn
7
Some sources are drawn, however, from subject regions that deal with all three factors. Anti-terrorism
policy, for example (i.e. reaction to 9/11, Aum Shinrikyo) concerns many domestic, regional and
international issues. Only those issues relevant to US planning will be examined, such as
intelligence sharing and operational cooperation not exclusive to Japanese domestic security.
5
from the interplay betweenArticle 9 and the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Additionally, though
opinions prior to 1991 will be drawn from a variety of individuals, for the purposes of
this paper, post-1991 opinion will be strictly drawn from American scholars and foreign
policy officials only. Japanese opinion will be assessed, however, but these assessments
will only be drawn in reaction to their respective American counterparts.
In focusing on these distinct and select opinions from the perspective of Japan’s
alliance partner, one may ask if it would be prudent to assess the general opinion of the
United States population. This variable will remain absent or fit a marginal role at best, in
part because Americans and more particularly, American consumers, have relegated
Japan to a secondary importance in recent years to that of China. It has become evident
that for the most part, concerns over Japanese real estate expansion and percieved
industrial dominance have given way to comparable concerns over Chinese trade
imbalance and quality control. Alternatively, American investors have found ample
opportunities for wealth in China’s growing markets. Japan has, in essence, lost the flash
and allure that it possessed in the 1970’s and 1980’s in this respect.
Certainly, this author would not write off public opinion as a non-factor. However,
for the purposes of this thesis, its only value will exist in how it is addressed by the
foreign policy actors concerned. It is also important to remember that foreign policy
strategists have not lost their interest in Japan, being attuned to the country’s inherent
strategic significance. However, when a former Director of Global and Multilateral
Affairs for the National Security Council, Robert C. Orr, points out that, “We are no
longer in a world where Mike Mansfield could say ‘the U.S.-Japan Alliance is the most
6
important bar none’,” this again returns us to the question of defense cooperation and the
perceived value of the alliance.8
On a related note, a substantial portion of this thesis will deal with US-Japan
cooperation on defense initiatives and workings of Japan's defense industry. While it may
at times appear a peripheral subject, it is, in fact, a deeply embedded facet of the Article 9
debate, although rarely cited as so. It is in this author's estimation that to simply say that
the future of Article 9 is dependent on Japanese political and cultural factors relative to
American expectations would, in itself, fail to completely grasp the complexity of the
issue. Although the level of analysis outlined earlier in this introduction reflects the
primary objective of this thesis, the issue of defense economy is one that cuts at several
important aspects of the debate at once.
First and foremost, the defense economy provides an indication of the likelihood
that Japan will assert autonomous defense; if Japan were to decouple from the US or in
the least, to lessen its dependency on the US for national security requirements, as it
would with an autonomous or close-to-autonomous defense capability, this would seem
to favor a corresponding policy of national security freedom through Article 9 revision.
This would be heavily influenced by the relative threats present in East Asia. Secondly,
the defense trade has functioned as a means of strengthening the alliance or alternatively,
of providing a signal of waning health in regard to the bilateral relationship; while Japan
may choose to enter into cooperative initiatives on defense or compromise its own
defense production interests to improve relations, inflexibility or reluctance toward this
end could result in the erosion of bilateral ties and thus, increased momentum toward
defense autonomy and possible replacement of US obligations with the dissolution of
8
On the topic of redefining the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan Society March 1, 2004.
7
constitutional restrictions. In these ways, the subject of defense economy represents a
vital and integral component of the paper. Still, in spite of this importance, it will remain
separate from the larger thesis and will only be addressed in the context of the other
subjects presented herein.
Returning to the more formal headings of the thesis, on the subject of External
Military Interventions, both Gulf Wars will be looked at in terms of Japan’s stance
throughout each conflict and the subsequent opinions held by American scholars and
foreign policy officials pertaining to each respective stance. Among the many reasons
outlined later in this paper, one reason for selecting these two conflicts would be the
relative proximity of the events to one another, given the neutrality of Japan in armed
exchanges since the end of WWII. At the same time, the latter conflict represents a key
point in the strategic alliance, given American involvement around the world and the
growing prominence of Southeast Asia in the world power balance.
However, the primary reason for why this period is so vital is, because it
represents the point in time when Japan had been released from the strategic concerns of
the Cold War, giving it the ability to form new policies. The period of time separating the
two Gulf Wars would predictably allow for a clearer picture of how constitutional issues
have been perceived over roughly fifteen years and two conflicts. In this way, the thesis
will be able to present a clearer picture of the affects of the First Gulf War on Japan’s
foreign policy from the standpoint of US scholars and decision-makers. This focus will
additionally provide some perspective on how the Second Gulf War has affected Japan’s
policies under similar circumstances. Special attention will be paid to the constitutional
restrictions placed upon Japanese forces and to the limitations and values placed upon
8
Japan as a strategic ally of the United States. A reciprocal point will be investigated
concerning Japan’s evolutionary response to these opinions when taken as external
pressures. The affects of Article 9 will be discussed both in terms of Japan’s initial stance
and in terms of Japan’s reaction to external pressure.
After a discussion of the first two Gulf Wars, Japan's regional security will be
examined, starting with the early advancements of the joint missile defense program
leading up to the Bilateral Ballistic Missile Defense initiative. This will transition into a
discussion of many other topics in Japan's regional foreign policy, but especially those
concerning the 1996 Taiwan Crisis and related issues. The subjects covered in this section
will be considered both specifically in terms of Japan's independent regional relations and
more broadly in terms of the partnerships held by the United States within the region. The
section will function to achieve three things: It will demonstrate the level of cooperation
in the region between Japan and its neighbors, both historically and following the Cold
War. It will address the antagonisms that exist within the region among Japan and its
neighbors. And finally, it will show the relative position of the United States with regard
to these previous points. Ultimately, however, it will address the issue of Article 9
revision by assessing Japan's concerns over its regional security as well as the degree to
which it is likely to be covered by the US security umbrella as drawn from an analysis of
alliance strength and regional involvement.
Bilateral BMD presents a significant topic in particular, because it has only served
to amplify those fears present among Japan’s neighbors; by rendering their nuclear
deterrents ineffectual, the conventional forces of a future re-militarized Japan would
therefore pose a genuinely-perceived threat of national security. Few if any sources have
9
made a determination with respect to the impact that Bilateral BMD will have on the ease
with which Japan remilitarizes or the effects it has had on the strategic relationship
between the Japan and the US. This paper intends to correct this specific gap in analysis.
On the subject of Global Security, the impact of 9/11 and Japan’s involvement
with the “Global War on Terror” will be investigated under the heading of “Japan's
Global Security Outlook”. Global Security, in this instance, will be defined by
multilateral cooperation between state actors rather than organizations such as the UN,
although such organizations will be considered as they affect and qualify US-Japan
cooperation. This subject will be pursued in terms of Japan’s participation in refueling
operations for the US Navy and the deployment of ground assets in support of the effort
in Afghanistan, but will also address the ideological divides between the United States
and Japan including the specific divide between the Japanese public and the Japanese
government. The section will additionally address the actions of Japan in distancing itself
from its past and moving forward into a more proactive foreign policy stance with
obvious implications for defense policy and planning . Each of these topics will be
addressed in a manner similar to the previous section, with attention to Japan’s stance,
relation to Article 9, US perception and US pressure/Japanese response.
Of course, a brief overview of the period between 1946 and 1990 will precede
these three headings. Within this, the many landmark cases of Japanese constitutional law
and legal precedence concerning the existing interpretation of Article 9 will be examined.
On a related note, some time will be allocated to a discussion of the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security. From this, the reader shall gain insight into the myriad issues
surrounding the topic as well as the key perceptions of American observers into the
10
subject. It will also add to the findings of the thesis by providing the causes and rationales
behind the many turns in the alliance and in Japanese constitutional reform.
The closing section will present the key findings of this thesis as well as make use
of some of the most recent literature. It will also address differences in the current
scholarship, eximining discrepencies between the several primary authors covered in this
thesis. The section will close with a series of suggestions intended to provide a roadmap
for the long-term survival of the US-Japan Alliance. This section will point readers
toward the most current, albeit, more speculative literature on the subject and should
serve to propose “growth areas” for alliance cooperation as well as suggest jumpoff
points for future research.
11
Chapter One: Review of Current Literature
Although much of this author's review of scholarly literature is framed in a more
experimental framework unique to this thesis, it is beneficial link the primary authors to
the several more conventional schools of International Relations theory: Realism,
Liberalism, and Constructivism. During this author's research, several things were
discovered that were surprising about the intellectual foundations grounding the primary
works of this study; neither were the authors predominantly Realist nor were they
noticeably Liberal. In reality, there were few if any signs that the authors found utility in
Liberal theory. On the whole, the authors concerned were actually more skewed toward
Realist thought, starting from a position of concern for Balance of Power, Bandwagoning,
and interest-based foreign relations.
1.1 Traditional Breakdown of the Current
Scholarship
1.1.A Realist School
Among some of the Realist or Realist-spectrum authors that were previously
alluded to, few represent this school better than Richard Samuels. Samuels in particular
exhibits a strong partiality toward Realist concerns and it immediately becomes evident
in his writings. Not more than one page into Securing Japan he presents the particularly
strong statement that of the great misfortunes in Japanese history, one of them lies in the
extent to which idealism has dominated Realism.9 Early on in the book, Samuels evokes
9
Samuels, Securing Japan, 1.
12
Balance of Power concerns emanating from what he views as a power shift in the
region.10 Samuels makes a strong comparison between Japan's post-war hedging and the
strategies of Klemens and Von Metternich.11 He additionally states that Japan will one
day acknowledge the Realist dictum of self-help similar to how they have historically
acknowledged and accepted that of bandwagoning.12 Samuels also makes the assertion
that Japan has always held a pragmatic respect for power and geographically-driven
strategy with values of autonomy and prestige as well as strength and wealth embedded
in those sentiments.
Moving on to Kenneth Pyle, the author begins his seminal work, Japan Rising by
charging that the liberal concept of the “end of history” and the triumph of democratic
capitalism represents a simplistic interpretation of reality.13 Pyle moves more toward a
Realist trajectory as his introduction develops. Within the first few paragraphs, he lists
military author and adherent of Clauswitzian thought, John Keegan, as well as R.R.
Palmer, acclaimed scholar on French and European political history.14 However, Pyle
does balance the more elemental Realist components of his intellectual foundation with
markedly Constructivist components of otherwise Realist thought. For example, he cites
Leopold Von Ranke and Otto Hintze for the former's assertion that states organize
internally and succeed externally and the latter's belief that state is more a reflection of its
external environment than of internal evolution.15
10
Samuels, Securing Japan, 8.
Ibid, 7.
12
Ibid, 9.
13
Pyle, Kenneth. Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose. New York, NY. Public
Affairs, 2007 p. iv (hereafter Pyle).
14
Ibid, 9.
15
Ibid, 25.
11
13
He continues, however, in a Realist direction, positing “Realist patterns in the
Japanese response” and drawing attention to the “weakness of transcendental and
universal ideals” in the Japanese experience.16 This, in turn, sets the tone for the later
subjects of his book, citing the Realist disposition of the Japanese elite structure and the
larger foundations of Japan's response to the international system, based primarily on
martial and strategic influences in the country's history. Having even gone so far as citing
Hobbes and Machiavelli, Pyle's work is one heavily based on traditional Realist thought,
but tempered with the choice addition of Constructivism where useful.
1.1.B Realist-Constructivist School
In contrast to Richard Samuels' strong foundation in the Realist school, Michael
Green appears to represent a “Realist hybrid”, at least in terms of the foundations he uses
for his discussion in Arming Japan and Japan's Reluctant Realism. In the first of these
two works, Green cites Thucydides, positing that smaller states have faced alliances in an
effort to fend off more powerful enemies but with the assertion that modern states with a
higher degree of autonomous weapons production are often more powerful than those
lacking this feature. Furthermore, Samuels draws from Thucydides that a comparatively
weaker state can empower itself within an alliance and hedge against abandonment
through autonomous production alone.17
In Japan's Reluctant Realism, however, Green finds agreement with
Constructivist authors, such as Peter Katzenstein and Carol Gluck, especially in relations
to the latter's belief that “once the structure of its external environment becomes clear,
16
17
Pyle, 41-45.
Green, Michael J. Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for
Autonomy. New York, NY. Colombia University Press, 1995 pp. 2-3 (hereafter Green, Arming
Japan).
14
Japan is likely to accommodate itself to the new order of things...”18 Still, Green's central
viewpoints remain Realist in nature. He directly cites Balance of Power and a “growing
realism, frayed idealism.”19 Much like in Arming Japan, Green cites issues of entrapment,
autonomy, and abandonment. In fact, “Reluctant Realism” represents perhaps Green's
clearest enunciation of his political viewpoints.
1.1.C Constructivist School
Shifting toward the Constructivist school of thought, Peter Katzenstein represents
a strong break from the predominately Realist trend set among other Japanologists like
Samuels and Pyle. In this case, Katzenstein adds significantly to the subject of Article 9
with his strong foundation and, arguably, his contributing work to larger Constructivist
theory. Early in his book, Cultural Norms, he cites British sociologist, Ronald Dore's
“flexible rigidities”.20 In fact, as one reads further, they will notice that there is hardly an
author cited in Katzenstein's book who does not come from the field of sociology or at
least base their research around social or legal studies. Katzenstein builds his discussion
of institutional norms in particular by citing James March and Johan Olsen's work. Olsen
is better known for his part in developing the systemic-archaic perspective of
organizational decision-making, March for his similar focus on individuals, groups, and
societies. Here, the two authors are noted for their position that political institutions
create, confirm, and modify interpretations of common life.21
18
Green, Michael J. Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Age of Uncertain Power.
New York, NY. Palgrave Macmillian, 2003 p. 34 (hereafter Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism).
19
Ibid, 6.
20
Katzenstein, Peter J. Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan.
Ithaca, NY. Cornell University Press, 1996 p.3 (hereafter Katzenstein, Cultural Norms).
21
Ibid, 29.
15
Katzenstein additionally draws from legally-derived frameworks to add scope to
his foundations. Mark Ramseyer and Francis Rosenbluth complement “Cultural Norms”
nicely with their adaptation of the Standard Framework of Business to the political
spectrum.22 Similarly, Katzenstein finds John Haley's comparison between Japan's
political structure and its legal system, heavily based on pre-court conciliation, to be
highly instructive.23 Rohlen's findings of strict, vertical systems of order with high
degrees of lower-level autonomy, Allison and Sone's “set of negotiated bargains” in
Japanese politics, and Ann Swidler's “toolkit of world views” round out other views
present in order to form a notably Constructivist, non-Realists, non-Liberal base for
Katzenstein's strain of thought.
Andrew Oros, in contrast, appears anything but Constructivist at first glance. He
begins Normalizing Japan quite unusually for an otherwise Constructivist-based work,
with the addition of Rawi Abdelal, whose book “The Profits of Power: Commercial
Realpolitick in Europe and Eurasia”, although not cited, clearly sets its author apart as
source for Oros' opening citations.24 This goes to demonstrate, perhaps, Oros' inclination
to draw from Realist scholarship just as many Realist-leaning scholars like Kenneth Pyle
would borrow from Constructivist works. However, the greatest draw on Oros'
intellectual foundation is to be found in the realm of Constructivist theory. He starts
relatively early, citing Henry Nau and Jeffrey Legro in relation to their study that sought
to explain how ideas overlap with security identity in regard to their “worldview of
frameworks” for viewing a state's position or role in the international system.25 Oros will,
22
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 29.
Ibid, 43.
24
Oros, Andrew. Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice. Stanford,
California. Stanford University Press, 2008 p. 7 (hereafter Oros).
25
Ibid, 11.
23
16
however, take almost any opportunity available to distance himself from Constructivist
theorists such as Peter Katzenstein. This may simply be an acknowledgment of his own
pragmatic system of beliefs, but more likely it is a defense against the largely
Constructivist disposition of Oros' language and concepts.
At base, Oros is concerned with patterns of behavior over time in his assertion of
a Japanese security identity.26 His work is heavily based on the process of contestation
among Japan's political actors in relation to this security identity. It is not, however,
concerned with the geo-strategic issues that affect the region. Oros will acknowledge
such issues from time to time within the book, but the main purpose of the work is that of
the “political context” or underlying factors such as the cultural or institutional norms
that shape security practices over time.27 In establishing the central tenets for his “postwar security identity”, he becomes enmeshed in the same institutional and cultural norms
to such an extent that he leaves little room for a wholehearted methodology that would
include aspects of Realism and Liberalism. This is not to say that Oros does not borrow
from these camps. However, this is to say that he begins and ends from a Constructivist
viewpoint, though drawing from the more Constructivist-spectrum thought of Realist
scholars and digressing at time to admit the efficacy of Realism. In this way, although
Oros is not yet well-established in the Constructivist school, of those authors mentioned
thusfar, he exhibits the strongest bias toward it.
1.2 “Aspirational” Framework
In relation to the proposed framework alluded to in the last section, the three
categories of External Military Intervention, Regional Security, and Global Security are
26
27
Oros, 4.
Ibid, 39.
17
derived from the issues and ideas propounded by three separate schools of thought. The
first school of thought is best described by Richard Samuels in his book, Securing Japan:
Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia. Samuels refers to this focus in terms
of “Autonomy and Prestige.” Specifically, he asserts that irregardless of whether one
looks at the “Rich Nation, Strong Army” period of the late 19th century, the early 20th
century movement toward Asian hegemony or the “cheap-riding trading state” of the cold
war, this central theme of autonomy & prestige remains a central fixture of Japanese
foreign policy. As an aside, the previous author’s “Autonomy and Prestige” can be
somewhat compared and interchanged with Kenneth Pyle’s particular conception of
“Rank and Honor”.
The second school of thought is better described by Peter Katzenstein in his more
recent works: Cultural Norms and National Security and Beyond Japan: The Dynamics
of East Asian Regionalism. This shall be referred to as the “School of National
Autonomy”. This viewpoint differs with Samuels and Pyle, but Pyle in particular.
Katzenstein may, in the course of his argument, take specific issue with the value that
Pyle places on national power. In Cultural Norms, for example, he notes the similarities
between Germany and Japan in that both countries have become averse to the traditional
trappings of power, which they believe give states too easy an access to the instruments
of violence. Also falling into the School of National Autonomy would be Andrew Oros as
described in his work, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security
Practice.
The third school of thought, as promoted by Michael Green, centers on the subject
of international participation. Green would hold that Japan’s ends are neither focused on
18
amassing power nor gaining recognition or increasing foreign policy options. It is for this
reason that this school is appropriately labeled the “Supra-Nationalist School of Japanese
Foreign Policy”.
1.2.A School of National Power and Prestige
Richard Samuels, Director of the Center for International Studies at MIT and Ford
International Professor of Political Science, has made great contributions to the field of
Japanese defense policy. His book, "Rich Nation, Strong Army": National Security and
the Technological Transformation of Japan, The Business of the Japanese State: Energy
Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective, and Politics of Regional Policy in
Japan (1996), began Samuels' investigation into the phenomena of Japanese
"Technonationalism" and focused on the development of this concept within the Japanese
state of the latter 19th century and its resilience as a fixture of Japanese policy since that
time. With his book, Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and
Japan (2005), Samuels followed a comparative political study, looking at the impact of
late development among the Japanese and Italian states and their collective experience in
seeking modernity and power to gain a place among the great nations of the world. Some
of the author's other books include The Politics of Regional Policy in Japan (1983), The
Business of the Japanese State (1987), Crisis and Innovation in Asian Technology (2003),
and the Encyclopedia of United States National Security (2005). Samuels has also
authored and co-authored several articles on Japanese defense policy including his 2005
work, “9 Lives? The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan”, which is contained
herein. A good starting point for the purposes of this thesis, however, would be his most
19
recent investigation into the development of Japan's Post-Cold War policy, Securing
Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (2007).
In this work, Samuels suggests that with the unraveling of Japan’s Cold War
consensus over foreign policy, a more moderate accommodation can be expected in
relation to the US-Japan Alliance as well as regional relations. This approach, which the
author labels as the “Goldilocks Consensus”, sees Japan at a greater distance from
Washington, in a deeper economic interdependence with China, and with an enhanced
military capability, yet, at the same time being at a proximity neither too far nor to close
to Washington or Beijing.28 More broadly, however, the book endeavors to show not only
the precedent, but the context and the strategy that exist in relation to Japan’s emerging
Post-Cold War planning.
On the topic of the end of the Cold War, which he refers to as the “Big Bang”,
Samuels posits that Japan had lost the central justification for its security policy.29
However, Samuels takes a stance on these events wholly unique among his peers. First,
Instead of lumping the downfall of the Soviet Union with the advent of the Persian Gulf
War, he separates the two and combines the latter with the developing situation in early
90’s North Korea. 30 Taking these events as separate and co-equal, Samuels consequently
holds that the latter two crises were functional in ways that the larger downfall of the
Soviet Union, by itself, was not. Samuels reiterates his case for “Autonomy and Prestige”
in the Japanese political calculus. He lays out the remaining barriers of the Yoshida
Doctrine and concludes with what he sees as Japan’s four choices, the most noteworthy
28
Samuels, Securing Japan, ix.
Ibid, 65.
30
Ibid, 67-68.
29
20
of these being punctuated by the movement toward greater participation in global security
and expectations of prestige through an increase in national power.31
Kenneth B Pyle, Founding President of the National Bureau of Asian Research
and former Henry M. Jackson Professor of History and Asian Studies at the University of
Washington, precedes Richard Samuels by fourteen years in terms of his first published
work, The New Generation in Meiji Japan (1969). Of particular interest, Pyle was
appointed by the first President Bush to head the Japan-U.S. Friendship commission
(1992-1995) and was later awarded the Order of the Rising Sun by the government of
Japan for his contribution to Japanese scholarship and cultural exchange (1999). In
addition to the NBAR, it is also worth noting that Pyle was a founding member of the
Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation. In terms of Pyle's more recent scholarship, his
1996 book, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era began the author's
investigation surrounding changes in Japan's security policy Post-Cold War. This was
preceded by his 1995 book titled, The Making of Modern Japan, which partially formed
the foundation for his 1996 contribution as well his most recent 2007 book, Japan
Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose. For the purposes of this thesis,
however, this more recent addition to Pyle's scholarship will take precedence.
In his recent book, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and
Purpose (2007), Pyle takes a comparatively more encompassing approach relative to
other authors in his field. He starts by acknowledging that Japan is on the verge of a great
sea change and that there exist recurring patterns in Japanese history that can be
instructive on predicting the qualities and characteristics of this great change. However,
what separates Pyle from other scholars such as Oros, Katzenstein, and even Samuels is
31
Samuels, Securing Japan, 191-194.
21
the sheer time frame of his study, nearly 1500 years. While most of the book covers the
Meiji period and up, the greater frame of time serves as much more than mere window
dressing. The author provides more than adequate attention to the pre-feudal, warring
states, and Tokugawa periods.
Focusing early on in the book in relation to the “Warring States” and Tokugawa
periods, Pyle effectively sets the foundation for his discussion of the Post-Meiji era.
Taking Japanese historical influences with the heritage of the conservative elite, Pyle not
only builds the foundation for explaining the decisions of the Post-Cold War period, but
also those of the Post-War, Meiji, and Prewar Modern periods. In this, the author posits
that Japanese attentiveness to power in the international system, for example, would stem
from the overriding concern for this quality in the Sengoku or “Warring States” period. 32
Power, as the author puts it, was something to be maximized and those who understood
this best happened to be the low samurai from Satsuma and Choshu, who would go on to
establish the Emperor Meiji. On the subject of change in the Post-Cold War period, the
author places a higher importance on generational change, specifically that of the Heisei
generation.33 The author ties this new generation into his practical discussion by
connecting it with Prime Minister Juunichiro Koizumi’s landslide victories and symbolic
relinquishment of office to Heisei politician Shinzo Abe.
1.2.B School of National Autonomy
Peter J. Katzenstein enters the discussion with his book, Japan: Switzerland of the
Far East? (1987). Although his first book, Disjoined Partners: Austria and Germany
32
33
Samuels, Securing Japan, 24, 39-40, 42-44.
Ibid, 356-362.
22
since 1815 predates Switzerland of the Far East by eleven years, it is primarily in the
1990's when Katzenstein begins to investigate Japanese foreign policy specifically. It was
during this decade when Katzenstein entered his most productive period of scholarship in
Japanese political affairs; he would go on to publish nearly a dozen articles and book
contributions during this period, although the pace of his literature on Japanese defense
issues has remained stable well into the current decade.34 Katzenstein is primarily a
European specialist, but several of his articles can be seen following a similar focus to
Cultural Norms. Of these articles, “Coping with Terrorism: Norms and Internal Security
in Germany and Japan” (1993), “Regionalism Compared: Japan and Asia, Germany in
Europe” (1998), and “Same war, different views: Germany, Japan, and the War on
Terrorism” (2002) mark such a similarity. More recently, Katzenstein was elected
President of the American Political Science Association (2008-09) and currently teaches
under the title of Walter S. Carpenter, Jr. Professor of International Studies at Cornell
University. Although his 2006 book, Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian
Regionalism is a more recent distillation of Katzenstein's findings on Japanese foreign
policy moving into the current millennium, his 1996 publication, Cultural Norms and
National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan more clearly frames the
foundation for his thought concerning Japanese policy in the Post-Cold War period and so
it will be addressed first in this thesis.
34
For further study, please consider: “Japan's Security Policy: Political, Economic and Military
Dimensions” (1991), “Defending the Japanese State: Structures, Norms and the Political Responses to
Terrorism and Violent Social Protest in the 1970s and 1980s” (1991) with Yutaka Tsujinaka, “Japan's
Security Policy: Political, Economic and Military Dimensions” (1991) with Nobuo Okawara, “Japan's
National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World” (1993) with Nobuo
Okawara, “Japan as a Regional Power in Asia” (1993) with Martin Rouse, Japan's National Security:
Structures, Norms and Policies” (1996) with Nobuo Okawara,“East Asian Security: An International
Security Reader”, Network Power: Japan and Asia (1997), and “The U.S.-Japan Relationship in a World
of Open Regions” (1999).
23
In Cultural Norms, Katzenstein asserts that in the case of Japanese strategic
policy, norms are not static, but are contested and contingent.35 Taking issue with the core
assumptions of Realism and Liberalism, the author tests their competing claims as
applied to the two countries while also considering cultural norms as expressed by legal
precedent, social mores, and the Japanese media. Essentially, Katzenstein’s assessment of
Japan revolves around two aspects of Japanese security policy. First, the author describes
Japanese security as comprehensive security; it is social, economic, and political.36
Second, Katzenstein identifies that while Japan copes with dramatic change as it seeks to
maintain its security, the variable of “flexible rigidity” that exists within their policy
response requires careful analysis.37 Coming from the angle of Japan’s strategic policy
formulation and response, Katzenstein makes several unique discoveries on the subject.
The author’s application of the institution of Article 9 to the identities of political actors,
for example, provides key insights into the course of reform on defense-related issues in
Japan.
The US-Japan Alliance, which the author hesitantly refers to with every other
possible term except that of ally, contrasts a Realist-leaning Japan, with its dual utility of
defense cooperation and the danger of entrapment, against an idealistic US with grand
strategies and high alliance expectations.38 Under this lens, Japan’s slow revision of
Article 9 reflects concern over foreign entanglements and ideological crusades where the
country holds both a strong collective memory of war and an utter lack of ideological
precedent in its political heritage.
35
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 2-3.
Ibid, 3.
37
Ibid, 3.
38
Ibid, 209.
36
24
Possibly the most instructive contribution that Katzenstein can lend to the Article
9/US-Japan Alliance discussion, however, can be found in the author’s belief that
international cataclysms affect policy through the interpretations that participants lend
these events. Authors like Andrew Oros or Michael Green would allude to the effects of
an all-changing catalyst event, but stop short of describing the criteria for change or the
required severity to enact a “sea-change”. Katzenstein, on the other hand, would write off
the required severity as subjective and the event itself as immaterial to the tangible will of
political actors.39 In this, he both answers the question these authors beg and brings the
discussion back to a more predicable calculus.
Andrew L. Oros, Associate Professor of Political Science and International
Studies at Washington College (MD), enters the discussion as the most recent addition to
his peers in the field. His first contribution, Culture in World Politics entered publication
in 1998 (as editor) and his first book, Japan's New Defense Establishment: Institutions,
Capabilities, and Implications, was published in 2007 (as editor and contributor). That
year he also published an article, “Explaining Japan's Tortured Course to Surveillance
Satellites”. Oros has also worked as the editor of Millennium: Journal of International
Studies and as a Studies Associate for the Pacific Council on International Policy, sister
organization to the New York Council on Foreign Relations. Of particular interest to
Japanese defense studies, Oros specializes in East Asian area studies and theoretical
approaches to managing security with a focus on domestic and international crossovers.
Oros’s primary contribution to the discussion comes in the form of his 2008 book,
Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice, of which
this thesis will focus on specifically.
39
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 204-206.
25
Oros starts his discussion in Normalizing Japan, with the assumption that
“normal” politics in Japan evolve in direct relation to new changes within a particular
framework found acceptable to the Japanese public. While this view may appear selfexplanatory or over-simplistic, Oros follows this central assumption by elaborating that
while such logic is straightforward, the definitions of “normal” and “framework” (taken
by Oros to mean the application of his “security identity”), are far from adequately
defined concepts in the field of Japanese defense studies. More specifically, Oros
examines how this “security identity” is institutionalized and reproduced over time in
addition to how it continues to affect the politics and practice of external defense.40 In
this, Oros rejects labeling this concept a security strategy, but rather asserts that it is a
resilient security identity, politically negotiated, modified periodically through cycles of
contestation and evolution, but never profoundly altered in its core foundation.
1.2.C Supra-Nationalist School of Japanese Foreign
Policy
Michael J. Green is primarily distinguished for his seat as Japan Chair at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies where he also serves as a senior adviser.
His list of contributions to the two major CSIS Pacific Forum publications, Comparative
Connections and PacNet, spans over 22 articles, not counting the instances where Green
has been quoted in the news media, which number in the hundreds. Green has been
appointed to the National Security Council as Senior Director for Asian Affairs (20042005) and has served as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
Putting those books that will be addressed in this thesis aside, Green has co-authored
40
Oros, 3.
26
many other works, including: Restructuring the U.S.-Japan Alliance : Toward a More
Equal Partnership (1997), The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future (1999),
Redefining The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program (2004), and
Asia's New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Community
(2009). However, despite the volumous nature of Green's scholarship, the thesis
presented herein will focus on only three of Green's books: Arming Japan (1995),
Terrorism: Prevention and Preparedness (2001), and Japan’s Reluctant Realism (2003).
More generally, these works will be addressed with regard to their cumulative
contribution to the subject, however, for the purposes of chronological continuity, Green's
1995 book will be examined first.
In his book, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the
Postwar Search for Autonomy, Green posits that among the many considerations that
Japan includes in its strategic calculus, that of autonomy has been both alluring and
historically recurrent. In particular, Green focuses on the concept of Technonationalism
and the effects of nationalistic definitions of technology on interstate relations.41 On this
subject, the heightened political costs of seeking autonomy are charged to have led Japan
toward the displacement of this previous aspiration in favor of other policy goals such as
normalization of ties with China, an expanded strategic role for Japan in Global affairs, or
a stronger relationship with the United States.
Following Arming Japan and the attacks of September 11th, having set up a theme
of bilateral relations and Multilateralism in previous works, Green revived his scholarship
with an additional book revolving around the topic of US-Japan security cooperation in
the area of anti-terrorism initiatives. Terrorism: Prevention and Preparedness: New
41
Green, Arming Japan, 11-13.
27
Approaches to US-Japan Security Cooperation represents Green’s coverage of two
roundtable discussions coordinated by the American National Institute for Research
Advancement and the Research Institute for Peace and Security in Tokyo. The book
primarily details the similarities and differences between American & Japanese antiterrorist strategies, and current phases of bilateral cooperation on anti-terrorist initiatives,
as well as topics of concern such as the threat of WMD Terrorism.
Green continues his research following his volume on the anti-terrorism debate
with his 2003 book titled, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an
Era of Uncertain Power. In this book, Green proposes that there have been perceptible
patterns in Post-Cold War Japanese Foreign policy. On the subject of alliance
cooperation, the book addresses the greater underlying issue of bilateral cooperation and
whether institutions such as Article 9 create political and bureaucratic impasses. One
particular subject of note revolves around the consequences of the Persian Gulf War in
accelerating acceptance of foreign deployments and a progressively stronger recognition
for the Japanese defense establishment. Also, despite being slated heavily toward an
economic framework, Green’s research and conclusions provide a broader understanding
of how Aricle 9 other similar institutions have been received by U.S. spectators and how
their direct implications affect the greater issue of alliance cohesion.
28
Chapter Two:
Japan's Post-War History and Article 9
2.1 Prologue
Before delving into the more current variables of the issue, it is important to
identify the history of Article 9. How was it conceived? Who were the people involved in
its conception? What events effected its inclusion into the current Japanese Constitution?
The Chapter will begin with these questions and will then shift into an examination of
Japan's Post-war history. Following an in-depth look at Article 9, the chapter will turn
toward developments in post-occupation Japanese defense, largely in relation to the
Yoshida Consensus. Following this, the chapter will cover legal actions concerning the
language of Article 9. Throughout, the subjects of the Defense Industry/Trade and the
shifting composition of the Japanese legislature and bureaucracy will be discussed. The
Chapter will close with a look at the defense reforms of the 1970's and 80's leading up to
the eve of the 1990 Gulf Crisis.
To the question of Article 9's conception, research supports the viewpoint that
Article 9 was not an indigenous Japanese development, as noted by Theodore McNelly in
his article: “The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution”. One of the opening
citations for his paper is the text of the Atlantic Charter, formed between President
Roosevelt and Winston Churchill:
Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, and air armaments
continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten
aggression outside their frontiers, we believe, pending the establishment of
29
a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of
such nations is essential. 42
This position was later affirmed by President Harry Truman in a communication made to
General MacArthur prior to the formal signing of the terms of surrender by the Japanese.
In this message he made it clear that Japan was to be “completely disarmed and
demilitarized” and that “Japan is not to have an army, navy, air force, secret police
organization, or any civil aviation.”43
The true birth of Article 9, however, seems to have occurred at a private
conference held between MacArthur and then Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara. Although
the exchange at the conference remains uncorroborated to this day, three possible
scenarios have emerged. The first scenario, as has been promulgated by MacArthur, sees
Prime Minister Shidehara suggesting the original draft of Article 9 (Renunciation of war,
perpetual disarmament). However, the second scenario finds this suggestion from the
Prime Minister to be a fabrication of a shrewd MacArthur, wanting to justify the clause
by claiming it was brought about by a Japanese official. Yet another scenario sees the
discussion of a renunciation of war clause without a definite draft in sight. Proponents of
this argument might say that it was an agreement between Shidehara and MacArthur to
keep the origination ambiguous in nature. Whatever the extent of MacArthur's political
influence, it is evident that he was exceedingly optimistic in his public statements
concerning the future security of Japan. “By this undertaking, and commitment Japan
surrenders rights inherent in her own sovereignty and renders her future security and very
survival subject to the good faith and justice of the peace loving peoples of the world.”44
42
McNelly, Theodore. “The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution” Political Science
Quarterly 77 3 (1962): p. 352.
43
Ibid, 353.
44
Ibid, 369.
30
Despite the great lengths taken to mire Japan in perpetual disarmament, there was
one development that very stealthily cemented a “back door” of sorts into the
constitutional language. In the proceedings that came before final approval of the
document, Hitoshi Ashida is credited with inserting the below revision (in bold type),
which reads:
Article VIII. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice
and order, the Japanese people, forever renounce war as a sovereign right
of the nation, or the threat or use of force, as a means of settling disputes
with other nations. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces as well as other war potential, will
never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized.
At first glance, this change may appear a mute point. However, in the first draft, it was
flatly stated that no land, sea, or air forces would be maintained. In this revision, the last
statement remains, but only in relation to wars waged in order to settle international
disputes. Self defense is not an international dispute; it is a domestic one. Thus, Mr.
Ashida was extremely subtle in providing for an eventual self defense force. The
preamble to the constitution also underwent an interesting revision. It first read:
…we have determined to rely for our security and survival upon the justice
and good faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world
It was revised to:
…we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in
the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world…
It is further instructive to note the following passage from Theodore McNelly’s
composition in which he attempts to explain why the Far East Commission demanded
that all State Department officials be from the civilian sector (Note: this is 1962).
In a later conference with Japanese officials, one American suggested that
the commission perhaps feared that the Ashida amendments might allow
rearmament for purposes such as defense or that the commission was
31
thinking of a time when Japan might, as a member of the United Nations,
be called upon to contribute to an international Police force.
Pyle, on the other hand, comments that both the American occupation forces and
the Far Eastern Commission missed their chance to decisively break the continuity
between Japan's pre-war and post-war political system. He draws attention to the fact that
the retention of Japan's elite bureaucracy allowed the reemergence of the previous
conservative political class once the occupation had ended.45 This was primarily the
outcome of MacArthur's desire to maintain smooth operation of day-to-day business.
Quite surprisingly, it is further contended by Pyle that the plain fact the elite bureaucracy
had drafted ninety percent of the pre-war legislation remained wholly unremarkable to
occupation command.46 To further clarify this point, it was not merely that they had been
responsible for such a large portion of pre-war legislative precedent, but that this core
elite had actively been working to preserve as much of the prior imperial order as
possible given the constraints imposed on them following the surrender. Pursuing this
line of reasoning, US basing and a US constitutional preference were but short-term
compromises in a pragmatic calculus to get back on the path to world status.47
Still, the road to security procurement would prove a much more difficult one to
retrace. Even following the decision of April 1952 in which the US explicitly encouraged
regular arms production in Japan, the defense industry had, by then, become a scapegoat
of sorts for an increasingly accusational Japanese public. As Green points out, despite the
reality that it was the military's grip on industry that took Japan down the path to war and
45
Pyle, 220.
Ibid, 228.
47
Ibid, 228.
46
32
ruin, the Japanese public came to blame the militarization of the economy on industry
itself and sought draconian measures in the interest of preventing a resurgence. 48
2.2 Security Policy in the Post-Occupation Era
Emerging from the ashes of war, Japan faced a new and uncharted security
environment. It was one of near complete detachment from the former militarism and
oligarchy that had permeated the country. For this new environment, a new identity was
soon acquired and institutionalized. Among the finer points of this identity, the
renunciation of a traditional armed force and explicit legal guidelines prohibiting
participation in domestic policy-making was of prime import.49 In some instances, this
effective separation of Japanese defense from general society went so far as to discourage
even the most technical of military terms from the official record, deflecting any
possibility of association through the use of vague and uncharacteristic language.50
Further demonstrative of the grim divide between the Japanese military and the general
public was the political fallout accompanying the Three Arrows Study. Essentially, it
invoked several contentious political concepts, chiefly those of conscription, nuclear
basing, direct support of US war fighters, and the suppression of subversive elements
within the Japanese Korean community.51 The fact that the study was not only a policy
statement, but a simulation did not evade the public's attention either. The entire incident
concluded with a formal apology from Prime Minister Sato and subsequent promises to
rectify the incident through changes to training curriculum of the Japanese armed forces.
48
Green, Arming Japan, 9
Oros, 45-48.
50
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 115.
51
Samuels, Securing Japan, 53.
49
33
The incident, more importantly, brought to light a much larger issue within
Japanese society, an issue duly noted by Richard Samuels as the “Ghost of Yamagata
Aritomo”.52 The ghost that Samuels refers to, of course, is the Meiji Reformation
statesmen and later militarist Prime Minister who held that the Imperial military could
independently dissolve representative government in addition to a host of other martial
excesses. Generally, this phenomena can be better described as the pervasive fear among
the general public that even with myriad legal and institutional safeguards in place and an
overwhelming delicacy among the security establishment, that a relapse into the excesses
of the Imperial Japanese Army remains a constant threat to the postwar prosperity.
Japanese bureaucracy served to further tether Japanese forces to a place where
they could not present even the slightest possibility of becoming a threat to the newly
won peace. Denied ministry status and isolated from the various organs of Japanese
government, the Japanese Defense Agency was yet penetrated by all of them, subject to
their policy proscriptions and budgetary reigns.53 Unlike in post-occupation Germany,
where military policy lay anchored to the security arrangements that Germany had
formed with other nations under collective agreements, In Japan, bilateral ties held
primary importance, thus enmeshing the Japanese military in the narrower foreign policy
focuses of the several ministries.
Whatever the circumstances of Japan's Post-war defense outlook, it became clear
that following occupation, the US needed the fledgling nation to become integrated into
its forward position in East and Southeast Asia. Although overcoming Japan's new-found
security identity presented an insurmountable barrier, the US did not err in courting
52
53
Samuels, Securing Japan, 50.
Ibid, 170-172.
34
Japan.54 Kennan's dramatic shift in his estimation of the country from that of a potential
resurgent threat to that of a key ally against International Communism became clearly
evident in his policy recommendations of those years.55 Still, much of the post-occupation
buildup has its roots within MacArthur's last actions as Supreme Commander of the
Allied Powers. In 1950, he had recommended creation of the National Police Reserve,
precursor to the Japan Self Defense Forces.56 On March 8th, 1952 MacArthur lifted the
previous ban on the manufacture of aircraft and ammunition. US encouragement in
defense procurement continued into the latter part of the year as evidenced by a State
Department policy document released that December encouraging the creation of a
350,000 man ground force by 1955 with corresponding naval capabilities. 57 So optimistic
were the suggestions of US foreign policy officials and so confident was the tone of US
expectations that MITI took prompt steps to moderate the growth of the newly-formed
defense industry. Desiring what they perceived as the longer-term value of a “peace
industry” and fearing the adverse effects of an economic system hinged to US military
interventions in Asia, MITI would create the National Aircraft Manufacturing Enterprise
Law within the year.58 The Weapons Production Law would follow in 1953. Although
MITI clearly saw the value of collaboration with the US in terms of technological
infusion, the level of influence it had witnessed the US exercise in Japanese industrial
development was something that would not be soon forgotten.
In light of the various institutional barriers that had been created, it would be a
false conclusion to assume that Japan had set a course for isolation. Quite the opposite
54
Oros, 44.
Pyle, 221-222.
56
Green, Arming Japan, 33.
57
Ibid, 34.
58
Ibid, 35-36.
55
35
was true. As Katzenstein elaborates, The Cold War was not simply born of geo-strategic
realities; it embodied the historical lessons that each country learned during the hot war
that preceded it.59 In the case of Japan and Germany the lesson learned was that state
security could not be defended through a preeminent military force alone. It also required
a focus on political and economic considerations, of which both nations sought to
embrace following their defeat and occupation.60 In Japan especially, the experience with
a militarily-focused state was so ruinous while the experience with a trading state so
successful, that any inklings toward military assertiveness, even with the blessing of UN
mandate, proved both contentious and enigmatic to the Japanese public.61
2.3 The Formation of the Yoshida Consensus
Noting the course of post-war security development is necessary to build a
foundation for comparison. However, it is not enough to merely look at the creation of
the Self Defense Forces or the careful nurturing of the Japanese defense industry. Rather,
these events must be taken with the legislative battles that were fought simultaneously
and in some cases, preceded them. It must be reiterated that Japan faced tremendous
pressure from the US. Yoshida Shigeru, seen by some as the father of post-war Japanese
security doctrine, stood at the forefront of his country's future.
Although accepted by many as a unanimously approved and monolithic
prescription for US-Japan relations in the years following the occupation, The Yoshida
Doctrine never appeared as a doctrine early on and it was anything but straightforward in
its formation or institutionalization. On this subject, it is Samuels who more accurately
59
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 163.
Ibid, 163.
61
Ibid, 163.
60
36
presents Yoshida's doctrine as a political consensus. To quote the author, this new
consensus was essentially a “...long road back to national autonomy and international
prestige”.62 Additionally, it comprised more than Yoshida's mainstream forces; Opposition
or, at least, likely opposition needed to be channeled into a coalition that would cement a
prosperous beginning for the new Japan.
Among the forces that Yoshida and his Liberal Internationalists were up against,
perhaps the most challenging were those organizations formed by the many wartime
participants, bolstered by large numbers of ultra-nationalists. Veteran's associations
presented a similar concern.63 Yet another troubling coalition that Yoshida found himself
faced with was that between former Japanese officers, many of them occupation-time
collaborators, and defense industrialists eager to transition back into production. 64 Joining
these re-emergent industrialists were a new sect of revisionist politicians who held
political beliefs that envisioned a muscular national identity, self-sufficient and guided by
Realpolitik policy proscriptions. On the other end of the spectrum, the left-wing
Socialists clung to peace as their supreme determinant, believing in the strictest definition
of Article 9 possible and in the concept of a Japan that would educate the world in the
ideals of Pacifism, the implied risk of martyrdom on the world stage a very real
possibility at that time.65 This political grouping which comprised one third of the Diet
would predictably have the effect of solidifying the political right well into the post war
period.
Despite the myriad differences between factions, returning the subject back to
Yoshida's Liberal Internationalists may in fact provide some insight into the statesman's
62
Samuels, Securing Japan, 29.
Ibid, 29.
64
Ibid, 30.
65
Ibid, 30-31.
63
37
effective rallying of these disparate groups. In the eyes of Yoshida's camp, economic
success and technological autonomy were primary concerns, as the other factions would
agree or at least remain pragmatic toward these issues. However, Yoshida's faction
viewed these goals not as ends, but as means necessary to the eventual establishment of
an independent national security structure. Alliance with the United States was further
viewed as a stopgap measure until Japan could obtain both the economic capacity that the
political discourse of the era demanded and the appropriate security infrastructure
required for a strong national defense.66 The primary struggles that were to come,
however, revolved around the maintenance of Article 9 and the moderation of support for
the utilization of defense production as the engine of reconstruction. The former was
aimed at preventing entanglement in US foreign conflicts while the latter was instituted
to prevent the same conflicts from becoming the primary determinant of Japan's
economic health.67
To make sure that his policy proscriptions were followed in the area of defense
cooperation, Yoshida even went so far as to leave the position of Administrative Vice
Minister open in the newly-formed National Police Reserve, guaranteeing that it would
fall upon him to fill the organization's duties in its formative year.68 Despite this teething
period of sorts in Post-war Japanese security and further despite the great level of
political maneuvering exhibited by Yoshida's faction within the Diet, an even greater
battle was brewing within Japan's ministerial bureaucracies.
66
Samuels, Securing Japan, 31.
Ibid, 33.
68
Green, Arming Japan, 37.
67
38
2.4 Ministerial Pressure in Post-war Japanese
Defense
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry proved one of the first to
effectively put both Japanese defense industrialists and US influence in their respective
places. Among its first articulations of this sentiment was its 1953 proposal backing a
domestically produced propeller aircraft for airborne defense rather than the
technologically superior American counterpart.69 MITI's aim was the creation of an
indigenous airline industry, however, it had found that it could turn toward defense
production to bolster its ends. This was alleviated in 1954 with the signing of the Mutual
Security Agreement (MSA). While this agreement freed MITI to pursue its industrial
policy with resources independent of MSA projects, it also freed industry to pursue its
inclinations in defense production. Interestingly, it prompted an unusual ritual that would
persist well into the Post-war period. Industry would use the MSA to approach American
defense companies, promoting the Defense Production Committee for the purpose of
urging Japanese government on matters concerning the defense industry. This was done
inwardly out of fear of foreign dependence while outwardly for reasons of national
security.70 In actuality, this fear was part of something that was greater than a mere
speculative concern and reflected a multi-pronged rationale. When applied to Japanese
technological capability, the vulnerability of foreign dependence is clearly lessened
through such actions. However, a more pressing benefit for technological infusion can be
found its potential for economic growth.71
69
Green, Arming Japan, 37.
Ibid, 38.
71
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 144.
70
39
This drive for technology and, more specifically, for beneficial technology
transfer is best exemplified in the case of the F-86 Sabre and the First Defense Plan.
Although Japanese industry lobbied the US government for Japanese F-86 production
and won significant agreement and encouragement from then Secretary of State Irving
Ross, the Ministry of Finance grew weary of an overly-confident domestic industry with
vocal US backing. The MOF had decided that the time had come to draw its line in the
sand.72 After much negotiation, the newly formed Japanese Defense Agency dropped its
earlier defense estimates and settled on a modestly downsized figure. US pressure
remained a key concern throughout all negotiations, however despite the Ministry of
Finance's reluctance to fully embrace American pressure, it saw the MSA and related
defense agreements as a means of forwarding its interests in non-defense cooperation
with the US. The ministry would even go on to take the pragmatic position of of lobbying
the LDP to increase defense spending ahead of MSA talks in 1954.73
In a similar way, PM Nobosuke found that he could effectively utilize alliance
negotiations to steer the Defense Production Committee. Such was the case in the spring
of 1957 when the Prime Minister put sizable pressure on the DPC to accelerate their
decision on the Lockheed P2V-7 Anti-Submarine plane. In constructing a situation where
time was an overbearing factor, he was not only able to hasten their decision ahead of the
bilateral talks in June of that year, but was also able to force the committee into making
their decision within the context of the greater alliance rather than on the grounds of
defense procurement alone.74
72
Green, Arming Japan, 39-40.
Ibid, 40.
74
Ibid, 44.
73
40
2.5 Yoshida Solidifies his Consensus
These developments in Japanese industry also had effects beyond that of
technology transfer or the advancement of ministerial interests; they directly coincided
with the ever-developing coalition of Yoshida Shigeru. That same year in 1954, as the
resumption of MSA talks loomed, there grew a robust opposition to the investment of
resources in defense production for the US Korean War effort, perceiving this as
detrimental to the health of non-defense related industries.75 This was further reinforced
by political blowback resulting from the attempts of Ashida's Kaishinto Party to recruit
former Imperial officers for public advocacy. Yoshida subsequently took swift action in
purging former flag officers from the JDA and setting other political reforms into motion.
Yoshida's consensus, however, went further than merely separating out the former
military's influence at this critical juncture in its development. Its success was due in
great part to Yoshida's ability in steering Japan between the peace constitution and the US
Alliance, between the bulwarks of pacifist sentiment and the draws of traditional
nationalism.76 Yoshida was able to further institutionalize this through such articulations
as the “comprehensive security” doctrine formulated in the aftermath of the post 1960
Treaty Crisis.77 The result of Yoshida's maneuvering among his fellow Diet members was
the effective removal of ultra-nationalism, the mitigation of revisionism, and the
reconsideration among pacifists of their own political sentiments.
Deviating slightly from the exploits of Yoshida Shigeru and his adherents, the
United States maintained its own strategic calculus throughout. From the resumption of
75
Samuels, Securing Japan, 33.
Ibid, 34.
77
Ibid, 34.
76
41
relations onward, the US held three key concerns about the newly independent nation, the
first being the possibility of a re-militarized and resurgent Japan.78 The second concerned
the possibility of a weak and unstable Japan, dependent on US assistance. The third and
final concern revolved around the prospect of a multilateral Japan. However, it was not as
much multilateralism itself that worried the United States, but a multilateralism that
included a separate peace with the Communist powers as well as the prospect of
accompanying industrial relations. Through the complex exchange of goods, services,
and guarantees, the US came to believe to a considerable extent that it could effectively
mold and direct the development of Japanese re-armament.79 This, in turn, contributed to
an alliance in which Yoshida could manage his aims while satisfying US demands and
providing an air of US deference, though such arrangements tread a thin line between
meaningful cooperation and political evasion.
The final battle that Yoshida faced for the solidification of his consensus was that
of the bureaucratic institutionalization of Article 9. Having been established into law,
Yoshida sought to maintain the article's integrity of interpretation and he accomplished
precisely this with the creation of the Cabinet Level Bureau or CLB. This new bureau
was placed at the highest level of supervisory authority over uniformed officers.
Additionally, through its review of all proposed policies and its “unified government
interpretations”, it often held more power than the ministries, the defense bureaucracy,
and even the Diet in many circumstances.80 Yoshida then instructed the Bureau to craft an
interpretation that would allow minimal capability and place a short leash on Japan's
authority for the application of armed force. This interpretation in its more encapsulated
78
Samuels, Securing Japan, 39.
Ibid, 39-40.
80
Ibid, 51.
79
42
of forms “refer[ed] to a force with the equipment and organization capable of conducting
modern warfare...determining what constitutes war potential requires a concrete judgment
taking into account the temporal and spacial environment of the country in question...It is
neither unconstitutional to maintain capabilities that fall short of war potential nor to
utilize these capabilities that fall short of war potential nor to utilize these capabilities to
defend the nation from direct invasion.”81 From Yoshida's standpoint it is also clear that
the Prime Minister identified the follies of Manchuria and East Asia as being justified in
“self-defense”.82
In the following years, however, any remaining slack in this near-airtight
interpretation was soon removed with the emergence of the “minimum necessary level”
requirement for the CLB's original “war potential” language. This period of
reinterpretation that spanned from 1955 to 1960 found that national defense under
“minimum necessary level” required an immanent and illegitimate act of aggression, a
lack of alternatives, and that any reaction be the minimum necessary level to meet such
an act.83 Although it did not explicitly bar preemptive action or nuclear weapons, few
believed the latter to be constitutional with the exception of Minister Kishi, who would
address the subject during his 1957 Diet testimony.
Still, it must be noted that with every challenge to Article 9 or the CLB's
interpretation came a strong and often disproportionate reaction. Perhaps the earliest and
most publicized of these tests came in the form of Japanese Supreme Court precedent.
Although there was no shortage of controversy in any of the other avenues for defense
reform, the court record remains important, not only because it would test the language of
81
Samuels, Securing Japan, 46.
Ibid, 46.
83
Ibid, 47.
82
43
Article 9, but because it provides perhaps the most vivid example of the divide within the
Japanese government either before or since the cases were heard.
2.6 Japanese Defense Policy and the Japanese
Supreme Court
The first major test came in 1959. This is a case that is discussed at length by
Alfred C. Oppler in his article “The Sunakawa Case: Its Legal and Political
Implications”.84 The case originated around the time that the renewal of US-Japan
Security Alliance was coming into view. What had happened was that a small group of
people were found trespassing on a United States military base. Under the US-Japan
security pact, the US had a right to secure its bases from intrusion. This sparked a great
controversy over whether this agreement in which Japan allowed its land to be used for
military applications violated Article 9. Since Japan had been host to a military force,
albeit of non-Japanese origin, the district court of the prefecture in question had to decide
if this qualified as the maintenance of war potential in proxy. The initial ruling held that
the bases were in violation.
However, this case was quickly appealed to the Japanese Supreme Court. Oppler
notes in his article the great amount of “side-stepping” that was involved in the final
decision. Rather than clarifying Article 9 as an inherent right to self defense and using it
as justification, the court cited Japanese Special Criminal Law statute instead.85 Oppler
further elaborates on the stress created by the no-war clause as evidenced by the great
split between court justices. While one group placed Article 9 away from the issue, the
84
Oppler, Alfred C. “The Sunakawa Case: Its Legal and Political Implications” Political Science
Quarterly 76 2 (1961): 241-263 (hereafter, Oppler).
85
Ibid, 250.
44
other group was critical of the decision, holding that it was unfaithful to the letter of the
Japanese Constitution. However, the precedent of this decision is to be found in its
determination that the stationing of American forces was not definitively
unconstitutional, but perhaps more notably, that it was also not inherently a constitutional
matter in the first place.86 Thus, the Japanese defense establishment was spared from
having to change policies that had allowed it to rely on the United States for national
defense. On this issue, the court found that “It goes without saying that this does not in
the least negate the inherent right of self-defense of this country as a sovereign state”.
They essentially found that the principles of peace were incompatible with
defenselessness and non-resistance and that other sections of the constitution that decry
slavery, tyranny, oppression, and intolerance would be meaningless without a right of
self-defense with which to substantiate them with.87
The second example of Supreme Court precedent concerning Article 9 would take
the form of the Naganuma Case of 1969. This is a case discussed by Robert L. Seymour
in his article, “Japan’s Self-Defense: The Naganuma Case and Its Implications”88 The
case arose when the Japanese Self Defense Forces wished to build a missile range in a
forest within the vicinity of Naganuma, Hokkaido. Under the Forest Law, however, only
publicly interested entities were allowed to do this. The Self Defense Forces, however,
could not exactly be considered a public entity due to the understanding that Article 9
prevented the maintenance of war potential and the position taken by the JDA that they
could evade this clause most effectively by dodging national recognition and abstaining
from interference in public affairs. Thus, the district court found the actions of the Self
86
Oppler, 250.
Ibid, 247.
88
Seymour, Robert L. “Japan’s Self-Defense: The Naganuma Case and Its Implications” Public
Affairs 47 4 (1974-1975): 421-436.
87
45
Defense Forces to be in violation of Article 9. Although this decision was eventually
appealed, it is important to recognize its particular implications.
Despite all of this political and legal wrangling, several things occurred in spite of
the court proceedings. The forest land in question was appropriated by the Self Defense
Forces anyway and used for its intended purpose as a missile range. Additionally, the
public stigma caused by the case held up all defense legislation in the Diet and forced the
Japanese Defense Agency to halt its public relations efforts, even putting the publication
of purely informative materials on hold. The case also solidified liberal forces in the
Japanese government in their opposition against defense-related policies in addition to
unifying the public in widespread protest.
Although the issue was eventually settled in a similar fashion to the Sunakawa
Case, its political vibrations could be felt long after. This is an opinion supported by Peter
Katzenstein. In his view, courting the public into an acceptance of both the mere
existence of the SDF and of the need for national defense remained a daunting task for
many decades to come.89 The presence of litigation, in Katzenstein's eyes, had the strong
and lasting effect of signaling to the public that government policy lacked full legitimacy.
This was not something that could be mended easily through public relations alone.
2.7 Post-1959 Japanese Defense Policy
Although the court cases reside at the open and close of the 1960's, the significant
developments that took place within that period cannot be ignored. Most significantly,
The 1960's were a time that saw the Yoshida consensus grow into a hardened policy.
89
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 115-121.
46
After Prime Minister Kishi Nobosuke won revision of the US-Japan security treaty in
1960, the public furor over a more explicit alliance with the United States pushed Kishi
and his LDP toward embracing the Yoshida line of an economic focus and the distancing
of policy from defense reform.90 His protege and successor, Ikeda Hayato followed
through on the economic focus of his predecessor, promising and then achieving a
doubling of Japan's national income within five years. At the same time, Ikeda, with a
contribution from his successor, PM Sato, would limit the scope of the US-Japan Security
Treaty to prevent entrapment in America's operations in contested Vietnam.
In addition to several Prime Ministers of the era, the Cabinet Level Bureau
returned to take up its traditional role of strengthening the peace language of the Japanese
constitution. In 1968, the bureau handed down its decision concerning the further
interpretation of the clause. This came to be known as the doctrine of “defensive defense”
and it had three specific aims as noted by Samuels. It: 1) assured Japanese people that
their country would not engage in military adventurism; 2) assured neighboring countries
that Japanese militarism would not make a recovery; and 3) provided the defense industry
with valuable guidelines with which they could determine whether a manufactured item
would be legal to produce.91
With the changes of the 1960's came some accompanying changes in the USJapan Alliance. The foundation for conflict had already been set, however; the status quo,
prized among both US and Japanese officials, was long overdue to be shaken up. At least,
a significant slackening was in the cards. Essentially, this state of affairs emanated from
the political reality of a dependent Japan, which had spared the country from the burden
90
91
Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism, 14-15.
Samuels, Securing Japan, 47.
47
of national security while securing for the US the integration of Japan into its own
foreign policy.92 Still, even taking into account the close-kept fear that a more
autonomous Japan might abandon the alliance, the US line began to show signs of wear;
by the the 1960's the call for burden sharing had become an established trend within US
rhetoric. However, despite Japanese hopes that a full partnership was a realistic
possibility, the United States had no intention of risking Japanese autonomy for the
benefit of its balance sheets.93 Even if American policy showed no signs of serious
contemplation of a more equitable alliance, by the late 1960's it was apparent to Japan
that their once confident ally was showing its exhaustion. President Johnson's 1968
summit of the South East Asian Treaty Organization bred doubts in the eyes of many over
the efficacy of the United States' continuing involvement in Asia.94 Taken with President
Nixon's 1969 officer's club speech in Guam, which was construed by some to be a
statement of withdrawal from Asia, as well as the return of Okinawa in that same year,
Japan was left with both a new area of responsibility for its forces to secure and an
alliance partner of increasingly questionable resolve; autonomous defense became a
primary issue once more and gained more ground in the Japanese defense community
with every passing day.
As lamented by the originator of Yoshida Consensus, the 60's were also a time of
regret. Even as early as 1963, Yoshida Shigeru revealed in his book that,
For an independent Japan, which is among the first rank of countries in economics,
technology, and learning, to be dependent on another country is a deformity of the
state....For Japan, a member of the United Nations and expecting its benefits, to
avoid support of its peacekeeping mechanisms is selfish behavior....I myself cannot
escape responsibility for the use of the Constitution as a pretext for this way of
national policy.
92
Samuels, Securing Japan, 44.
Ibid, 43.
94
Green, Arming Japan, 54.
93
48
Pyle regards this state of affairs that Yoshida and the Japan at large found itself in as a
replay of Japan's psychic wound, hearkening back to the period when Japan first
endeavored to modernize itself to the international system, fighting to gain the acceptance
and respect of the world powers.95
Samuels quotes a separate, more national security-focused selection from Yoshida
as well, the former statesmen explicitly holding that Japan would be in a state of
weakness if its dependence on other states for national security were to continue.96 Four
years later in 1967, the former Prime Minister would be on record restating that very
same point: “…the situation in which Japan finds itself, both at home and abroad, has
changed completely…In the matter of defense, we seem to be advancing beyond the
stage of depending upon the strength of other countries.”97 As the 1970's quickly
approached, Yoshida would soon witness the continued inviolability of his consensusturned-doctrine in the face of national and bilateral developments that were, in some
ways, a plain reality of Japanese post-war security, but in all respects a difficulty that
continued to place government, industry, and the general public at adversarial ends of
each other.
2.8 Japanese Defense in the 1970's
The seventies would be ushered in by the dual shock of renewed US-China
relations and the free-floating of the US dollar. The former effectively pulled the carpet
from underneath Nakasone and his supporters in government and industry; it removed
95
Pyle, 238-240.
Samuels, Securing Japan, 6-7.
97
Ibid, 59.
96
49
one of the primary threats that Japan had used to justify the defense buildup already
underway. The latter created an economic situation whereby it was more fiscally prudent
to import weapons than to pursue domestic production.98
To understand the situation fully, however, we must view it from the high point of
uncertainty concerning the alliance and the high point of support for autonomous
production. Prior to 1970, nearly 30 percent of a typical Japanese defense company's
budget had been earmarked for R&D and as recent as two years prior, the same company
had been receiving 50 percent more in subsidies from the Technology Research and
Development Institute (TRDI) than it had in 1967.99 If there had been any doubts about
the efficacy of the alliance following Nixon's policy statements, Doko Toshio, the newly
appointed chairman of the Keidanren, was sure to reach consensus with his peers on this
issue. Toshio would state in 1970 his belief that the US was withdrawing from Asia and
that Southeast Asian security was becoming a considerable problem. He continued that
Japan would have to increase autonomous defense capabilities and work for the collective
security of Asia.
When Nakasone issued a defense policy statement in 1970 endorsing full
indigenization of production and confirming JDA as promoter of “planned equipment
procurement”, “increased R&D”, and for the policy of “utilization of technologies
developed in the private sector”, the defense industry would see the goals that they had
set in the previous decade having finally been achieved. It was also clear that Nakasone
with his Basic Policy on Equipment Production and Development, was charging straight
ahead in meeting the sentiment of the constituencies of the JDA’s rival agencies, which
98
99
Green, Arming Japan, 59-60.
Ibid, 46-47.
50
had been caught completely off guard. That sentiment essentially reflected the need for a
reevaluation of the US-Japan defense relationship and for greater autonomous
production.100 The sudden change in policy following Detente came as a political disaster,
wiping away the gains in indigenous development that both Nakasone and his allies in
government and industry had won in those years prior. The US, however, remained
impervious, sending its Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, and Secretary of State,
William Rogers to increase pressure on Japan to import US-made weapons systems; any
progress seen in Japanese defense reform had been effectively stunted.101
Around the same time, the Yoshida Doctrine was seeing further alteration and
entrenchment. Nakasone's abortive attempt to double the defense budget had led to a
political stalemate and the prospective normalization of relations with China was now
tempting Japanese industry with the opportunities presented by new Chinese markets. 102
Tanaka Kakuhei placed the final nail in the coffin that was Nakasone's drive for defense
reform with his “peacetime limit”on defense spending, meant as a goodwill gesture to
coincide with Japan's own normalization efforts.103 His actions were followed by those of
Prime Minister Miko in 1976 with his further-tightened 1% GDP spending limit for
defense and his implementation of even stricter export controls.
Fukuda would further entrench the doctrine in 1978 under his personal tag of the
“Fukuda Doctrine”. Even as he closed negotiations on the security-centered bilateral
reforms of his predecessor, his rhetoric emphasized political cooperation in SE Asia on
the foundation of Anti-militarism and in the expanded role of Japanese leadership in the
100
Green, Arming Japan, 56-57.
Ibid, 59.
102
Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism, 15-16.
103
Ibid, 15-16.
101
51
region on purely economic grounds.104 Despite differences in terminology, Fukuda's
combination of security reform with anti-militarist counter-reforms and economic
initiatives amounted to what was essentially a signature interpretation of the doctrine that
had preceded and would ultimately overshadow it.
In spite of continued entrenchment of Yoshida's consensus, significant forces in
defense reform did exist into the 1970's. The National Defense Program Outline as it
became known, was brought forth under PM Miki and institutionalized “threshold
deterrence” and a “standard[ized] defense force” into the greater Japanese defense
policy.105 It called for the development of a peacetime military large enough to repel
minor aggression with qualitative improvements in defense capabilities and the
infrastructure capable of permitting quick and efficient mobilization. However, more
notably, its phraseology of a “standard defense force” created an effective tool for the
flexible interpretation of SDF composition, a point that was largely overlooked given the
numerous and more widely known pacifist initiatives that Miki undertook.
2.9 Japanese Defense in the 80's
Although the 1970's shaped up to be a decade of uncertainty and reformation, the
1980's would become known as the decade of the Alliance. In some ways the alliance
gained elevated prominence as the US, now a debtor nation, began to witness capital
markets and strategic power shifting toward Asia.106 Japan also saw a shift in its security
stance as contingency planning for civil war and social unrest became a less pressing
issue. At about this same time, the Japanese defense establishment began to reassert itself
104
Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism, 15-16.
Ibid, 132.
106
Ibid, 156-158.
105
52
politically, if not without great resistance. In a larger sense, the 1980's presented an
opportunity for Japan to further cement the alliance and to build the defense capabilities
that it had previously forsworn.
While autonomous production was placed aside, this was only done in an effort to
foster greater cooperation in bilateral defense projects. MITI and the JDA saw the
nurturing of systems that spoke to indigenous technological strengths as far more
beneficial to domestic industry and of greater utility to the improvement of bilateral ties.
An economically developing Asia, with its opportunities for Japanese leadership still fell
under the strategic umbrella of the United States, and as such, Japan was greatly
dependent on the US for its political stature in the region.107 Indeed, new political realities
demanded a departure from technological autonomy.
An additional qualification to Japan's alliance relationship arises from the
separation of the economic and political spheres from one another within the Japanese
national psyche, as expounded upon by Katzenstein; in some circumstances, economic
and political factors may override transnational links.108 This point is offered in order to
explain Japan's energy policy following the 1970's oil crisis, which diverged completely
with US policy efforts, or the relative ease with which alliance cooperation had been
achieved throughout the Cold War as opposed to the fanatical insistence on technological
transfusion in bilateral endeavors within the same period.109
Despite the appearance of these conceptual differences as mere semantics, they do
provide a meaningful explanation for the myriad episodes in US-Japan relations that
might otherwise have been branded as special cases. One example that was briefly
107
Green, Arming Japan, 154-155.
Ibid, 121-129.
109
Ibid, 121-131.
108
53
touched upon earlier was that of Prime Minister Miki's worldwide ban on Defense
Exports in 1976. Although the ban had been extended in 1978 and reaffirmed by the Diet
in 1981, the ban was amended in 1983 to except the United States from its scope.110
Although MITI fell onto administrative guidance to discourage military-oriented transfers
of technology and US benefit was negligible, the decision provides an example of the
willingness of some portions of the Japanese government to make at least a passing
gesture in the face of overwhelming opposition from the others.
Pertaining to the larger conceptual issue, Japan's rigidity in technology-sharing
can be explained partially within the domestic economic justification that improved
technology provides significant improvements in both product design and manufacturing.
It also bolsters a national identity that places technological preeminence among its top
ideals. These rigidities are balanced out through a countervailing flexibility concerning
security arrangements with the United States. Even on the subject of Nuclear Weapons, of
which no politician in Japan dares to take lightly, Japan has shown great flexibility on
these most sacred of principles. Despite PM Sato's initiative to ban possession,
production, and presence of Nuclear weapons within the bounds of Japanese territory,
unwritten agreements permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons by ship or aircraft
had been in effect since 1960 and would continue throughout the Cold War.111 In addition
to this flexibility on the third of Sato's Non-Nuclear Principles, which it could be
assumed did not evade the assumptions of even the most casual political observer in
Japan, the Japanese public carried on through the cold war as the great unsung supporters
of flexibility for the sake of longer-term interests. Despite great resistance on many issues
110
111
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 139-139.
Ibid, 147.
54
pertaining to national defense, it is reported that public support for the the Security Treaty
had increased from 41 to 69 percent between the years of 1969 and 1984.112
With relatively few exceptions, the taboo concerning military matters continued
into the 80's. This was quickly confirmed in 1981 when General Takeda Goro stated
frankly in a magazine interview that the doctrine of Defensive Defense was insufficiently
robust to be considered a national security doctrine and that missions should take
precedence over budget caps. Concern over these statements resulted in the suspension of
budget talks in the Diet only to be lifted after apologies from JDA Director General
Nomura and Prime Minister Suzuki followed by the prompt dismissal of Goro from his
post.113 However, it would be the policy positions of Nakasone that would produce the
more adverse reactions of that decade. Although it was within the hopes of the Prime
Minister that he could effectively break the military taboo, his efforts resulted in one of
the greatest setbacks for his LDP party since its creation in 1955. This was in no way
helped by his official visit to the Japanese war memorial or Yasukuni in 1985. Only after
reversing his hawkish stances, Nakasone was able to recoup these losses by 1986, but not
without having been reminded of the durability of Japan's deeply rooted anti-militarist
identity.114
Still, even despite setbacks to Nakasone's reform initiatives, he was able to
achieve a 6 percent increase in defense spending following his election win. It is
important to clarify, however, that this was not accomplished through any unique
persuasiveness in his own right, but instead through Nakasone's stern understanding and
adherence to the Yoshida Doctrine. Although he may have increased the defense budget,
112
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 148.
Samuels, Securing Japan, 54.
114
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 117-118.
113
55
this was only possible through a strict emphasis on strengthened security ties with the US
in the context of external threats to Asia and the third world as well as through the
utilization of foreign aid and other economic tools.115 Also, under the administrations of
Nakasone and his successor, Takeshita Noboru, the national currency saw improved
strength internationally and transformed Japan into the world’s largest donor and creditor
nation.
In re-embracing the Yoshida Doctrine, the various administrations of the 1980's
had the effect of realigning the character and mission of the Japanese Self-Defense
Forces. Where it had been focused on responding to the threat of interior subversion, the
primary mission of the SDF was shifted toward the protection of the periphery from
external attack; with the adoption of “seashore” or “forward” defense, the new task of the
SDF was the direct contravention of the Russian Navy through control of the straits that
lay within Japan's proximity.116 Japan further improved its alliance cooperation during the
1980's through the efforts that it undertook to integrate its forces with those of the US,
most notably through its assets and expertise related to sea mines and its Anti-Submarine
Warfare capabilities.117 Although the US greatly valued Japan's collaboration in ASW, it
can probably be assumed that they viewed Japan's offer to mine the straits surrounding
Russia's Pacific fleet with far more attention as this has been a capability the US had
largely forgone in the pursuit of other capabilities during this period.
As the 1980's followed its course and the dawn of a new decade loomed on the
horizon, Japan was finally brought to re-examine its defense policy as it pertained to
outer space. Although the use of outer space for military purposes had been an early
115
Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism, 14-17.
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 134.
117
Ibid, 134.
116
56
concern among Japanese legislators, it was not until the emergence of satellite imaging
late in the Cold War and the even later dialogue on Theater Missile Defense in the 1990's
that Japan had reason to view this application with any concern.
As early as 1960, the National Space Activities Council, an advisory body
answerable to the Prime Minister, stated within its first report the position that space
should be used for peaceful purposes.118 This was followed in 1969 by a formal Diet
resolution that explicitly prohibited the military use of space as well as the creation of the
Space Activities Commission to oversee the course of Japan's space development.119 This
was further entrenched by the use of the term “war potential”, most notably by the
National Socialist Party to describe any extension of the military establishment into this
sphere, even under the aegis of alliance cooperation. This was revised slightly in 1980,
when the Space Activities Council decided that the time had come to form a longer-term
strategy. The Fundamental Policy on Space Development, as it was known, allowed US
industries to assist Japan in the development of next-generation launch vehicles capable
of lifting payloads of much heavier weights than had previously been possible. 120 It did
not, however, lift the ban on the use of space for military purposes or the sale of such
technologies to 3rd parties for the same. Additionally, the revised policy would go even
further by prohibiting Japan from launching rockets from outside of national boundaries.
Interestingly, the US government also had a hand in preventing defense reforms in this
arena as they did not want competition to their own INTELSAT program nor did they
wish to gain competition in the satellite industry in general.
118
Oros, 124.
Ibid, 123.
120
Ibid, 133-136.
119
57
Still, the greatest reforms in this arena would come from the Nakasone
Administration, both domestically and within the alliance framework. Soon after raising
the 1 percent defense budget cap, he would labor to enable both the purchase of foreigncollected imagery for use by the SDF and the utilization of satellites to facilitate SDF
communication links.121 As Oros notes, Nakasone's actions directly challenged several of
the aspects present in Japan's post-war anti-militarism. In the end, it would take nearly
three years of highly charged debate in the Diet for these two reforms to win acceptance.
However, Nakasone had help, at least in some of initiatives, in the form of greater
security integration within the alliance framework.122 Additionally, Nakasone's actions in
terms of signing onto President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative would lay the
groundwork for bilateral cooperation in space well into the next two decades. The great
gains in confidence achieved by Nakasone for the greater alliance would be short-lived,
however.
No sooner did Japan phase into the new decade then there began to show signs of
tension and uncertainty in the US-Japan Alliance. The first shot across the bow of USJapan relations took the form of the debacle that was the FSX Project. Intended as both a
tool for the transfer of technology and an improvement on the interoperability of
equipment between Japan and the US, the project was fated to hit a wall of sudden
resistance from the US congress.123 With fears running high of somehow divulging vital
trade secrets to Japan that could be used to gain a foothold in the last preeminent sector of
the American defense industry, the project became waterlogged under one redraft of
121
Oros, 133-139.
Ibid, 136-137.
123
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 141-143.
122
58
terms after another; it would be a surprise to no one when the negotiation process finally
and conclusively broke down.
This would be followed in 1991 by a US export embargo placed upon Japan by
the State Department. Concerned about the illegal shipment of missile components to
Iran by Japan Aviation Electronics Industry, the US put the ban into effect, consequently
jeopardizing the supply of components and spare parts to the Air Self Defense Force, of
which that company had been its sole supplier.124 Thus, it was within the last year of the
Cold War that Japan and the US would encounter a fateful relapse into the same familiar
impasse of technology transfer. Given the timing of events, these developments cannot
escape but a hint of foreboding of what was to come.
124
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 141.
59
Chapter Three:
Military Interventions in Japan's Post-Cold
War Experience
Following on the edge of one of the most divisive breakdowns of US-Japan
defense cooperation in nearly a half century, the developments in the Persian Gulf during
the summer of 1990 reverberated strongly among Japan's political elite. It would throw
Japan headlong into a definitive crisis of post-Cold War identity and would also test the
strength of reciprocity among the two alliance partners. It was both an opportunity and a
curse of sorts, one which Japan was not prepared for either politically or militarily, but
one that was greeted with much hope and anticipation abroad along with much
disappointment and disdain. However, times and circumstances did change; change
occurred over roughly ten years and when that change reached its full course during the
Second Gulf War some thirteen years later, it did so to much different conclusions. How
the First Gulf Conflict and ensuing crises came to shape these conditions and how Japan's
reaction differed among the two conflicts is both instructive and explanatory.
3.1 Kaifu's Fateful Pledge: Japan and The First
Gulf Crisis
Phase 1:
Echoes of the Cold War
Despite the abject failure that was FSX, the crisis in the Persian Gulf proved to
illuminate the post-war Japanese defense structure in ways that may not have been overly
60
obvious prior to the conflict. The SDF revealed itself during the waning days of the Cold
War to be a force lacking in both operational capability and public mandate.125 In spite of
this reality, Japanese policy makers of the period called for an historic “about face”; one
article written in 1990 by Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Takakazu Kuriyama and
reflecting the opinions of many in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, envisioned a Japan
reborn, proactive in the realm of international opinion and affairs, but more importantly, a
Japan willing and able to accept a larger responsibility within its cooperative framework
with the United States.126 This sentiment was further reinforced by then Prime Minister
Toshiki Kaifu during a June 25th key-note address of that same year. In this address, the
Prime Minister uttered those words that would haunt him by year's end: “From now on
Japan will go out into the world and if there is a need, if there is a request from another
party, we should not hesitate in meeting it.”127
In what could have been a new role for Japan within the United Nations and a new
page in alliance cooperation, opportunities quickly spiraled into practical nightmares. As
Alan Dupont points out,
Japan acted quickly in this instance, at least initially. But then in the weeks that
followed Iraq's invasion, Japan dragged its feet while the West, led by the United
States, mobilized military forces in the Gulf. Not until the end of August did Japan
settle on a policy
"package" designed to contribute to the multinational
effort to punish Iraqi aggression. 128
The primary reason for this impasse emanated from the seemingly monolithic stature of
the Cabinet Level Bureau. Using perhaps the strictest interpretation of Article Nine
possible, the CLB would go on to deny even the deployment of transport planes to aid in
125
Dupont, Allen. “Unsheathing the Samurai Sword: Japan’s Changing Security Policy” Lowy
Institute for International Policy (2004): p. 26 (hereafter, Dupont).
126
Ibid, 2-3.
127
Bowen, Roger W. “Japan’s Foreign Policy.” Political Science and Politics” 25 1 (1992): p. 57
(hereafter, Bowen).
128
Dupont, 58.
61
coalition operations.129 Further, opposition from the political status quo in the Japanese
Diet disallowed the option, at least early on in the summer of 1990, of deploying
minesweepers to aid in US strategic preparations on the rationale that the possibility
existed for the vessels to be drawn into combat.130 Likely the largest signal of discord,
however, came in November of that year; Prime Minister Kaifu's vision of an emergent,
proactive Japanese state was shattered when his UN Peace Cooperation Corps legislation
was promptly defeated in the Diet without even coming to a vote. Had the measure
passed, it would have encompassed non-combative functions for SDF and Maritime
Safety Agency volunteers to perform following the cessation of conflicts in foreign lands.
It was not only a decisive loss at the hands of the opposition parties, but of the several
indigenous peace organizations as well, providing a clear signal that not even subtle hints
of expeditionary capability would be tolerated.131
Moving into the conflict, Courtney Purrington aptly portrays a Japan lacking in
international consciousness and further, a country that was faced with a crisis requiring a
proactive and creative diplomacy while possessing a policy structure that was reactive by
habit.132 With a strong collective memory of an failed international order and the ruinous
consequences it entailed, the Taisho generation reserved judgment on Japan's policy
course.133 It would be this very reservation of judgment that would cost Japan dearly on
the international stage and in the eyes of American scholarly and elite opinion.
129
Pyle, 290.
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 125.
131
Bowen, 58. Also see Katzenstein: “only 20 to 30 percent of the public backed the bill” Cultural Norms,
126.
132
Purrington, Courtney. “Tokyo’s Policy Response During the Gulf War and the Impact of the ‘Iraqi
Shock’ on Japan” Pacific Affairs 65 2 (1992): pp. 168-169 (hereafter, Purrington).
133
Ibid, 167.
130
62
Phase 2:
America Responds
Tracking closely with Japanese opinion, observers in America were to an equal
degree looking for signs of post-Cold War leadership and proactive policy shift among
the Japanese political class. Kenneth Pyle describes a “mantle of great power” that had
been available to Japan if that country had only reached for it.134 Instead, in the author's
characterization, “prestige and influence” was lost and this outcome is likely in no small
part due to Japan's disastrous response to the initial Gulf Crisis.
Despite Secretary of State James Baker's call that “The time [had] arrived for
Japan to translate its domestic and regional successes more fully into a broader
international role with increased responsibilities”, Japan's response to the first crisis of
the post-Cold War would be followed by far harsher and less encouraging words.135
Branded the “Scrooge of Asia” by The Economist in September 1990 and as the
contributor of a “mere begattle” toward coalition efforts in the US senate, Japan was not
faring well, even in the early stages of the conflict.136
The best that those Japanese legislators sympathetic to the coalition could muster
was a small contingent of 100 medical specialists of which only 20 would ultimately be
found.137 In the last days before the commencement of operations, Ambassador Richard
Armacost would lament that,
A large gap was revealed between Japan’s desire for recognition as a great power
and its willingness and ability to assume these risks and responsibilities…For all
its economic prowess, Japan is not in the great power league…Opportunities for
134
Pyle, 3.
Bowen, 66.
136
Ibid, 27.
137
Pyle, 291.
135
63
dramatic initiatives…were lost to caution…[and] Japan’s crisis management system
proved totally inadequate. 138
In response to initial US criticism, Japan's first reactions appeared to be evocative
of an injured national ego. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs would react quickly and
directly to US apprehensions over Japan's resolve. This was followed by the subsequent
quadrupling of Japanese financial support to the coalition effort.139 Also, as Japan had
become accustomed to doing, concessions in trade were floated as appeasement for
shortfalls in alliance reciprocity. Bowen points out that in much a similar fashion to the
Seven Points Program of 1972, which had meant to address a then mounting trade surplus
between the two nations, 1990 heralded the Structural Impediments Initiative in which
“Japan agreed to spend more on public works and capital outlays, to expand its imports of
American goods, to make fairer its marketing and retailing system, to export more
capital, and to forge a "self-reliant" defense...”140
Still, even with several direct responses to American pressure being put into
motion, other calls to action would have an opposite, cooling effect on the efficacy of US
pressure. US criticisms of Japanese “checkbook diplomacy” fresh on his mind, PM
Kaifu would attempt to advance legislation approving the deployment of Japanese forces
to Iraq on strictly logistical grounds. Much like similar initiatives, the measure was
withdrawn late in the year.141 Under these decisions by the Diet and the CLB as well as
Kaifu's subsequent reluctance, Ozawa would formally remove himself from the LDP and
138
In Samuels, Securing Japan, 67.
Bowen, 58.
140
Ibid, 63.
141
Purrington, 165.
139
64
took several long-standing officials with him out of protest for the effective deadlock in
the Japanese response.142
It soon became apparent that Japanese political forces had been mobilized and
their course was against that of the LDP as well as those who would support contribution
to the developing conflict. Their weapons were those of protest and legislative resistance,
but they were also of an ideological nature. As some commentators point out, Iraq
evoked the memory of an expansionist Imperial Japan and opposition forces clung to the
images of bombed-out Iraqi cities and the words of then Secretary of State Richard
Cheney as he drew parallels between the destruction of Nagasaki and Hiroshima and the
option of deploying similar weapons in the Persian Gulf. 143 All of these developments
provided ample material that the pacifist forces could and would use to oppose Japanese
participation in the crisis.
On the heels of the slowdown and within the final days preceding the war, the
fears of the Japanese government towards retribution from their alliance partner became
most apparent. During a private meeting between Secretary of State Baker and Japanese
Foreign Minister Nakayama ahead of the deadline set by coalition nations, Nakayama
promised that Japan would take on what would be a dramatic increase in the cost of
stationing US troops in Japan in addition to considering an increase in financial
contributions to coalition forces.144 This could not have come at a more critical time,
considering that by late 1990 the US House had already approved a punitive resolution to
begin drawing down US forces in Japan, negative sentiments having flowed over from
earlier reactions in the Senate.145
142
Samuels, Securing Japan, 66.
Purrington, 167-168.
144
Ibid, 162.
145
Pyle, 291.
143
65
Phase 3:
The Ship Slowly Turns
Despite the final attempts of its frustrated ally to move Japan closer to a policy of
deployment, the rate of Japan's policy change could simply not keep up with the demands
placed on it following the dissolution of the Cold War status quo. Following the
commencement of operations in January 1991, Japan, very much attuned to this pressure,
made good on its pledges of additional financial assistance, finally settling on a figure of
nine billion dollars. The initial Japanese domestic reaction was swift and resolute; in
addition to the package itself, Kaifu came under criticism for allegedly bending to the
will of the US in both the exact sum to be pledged and the ways in which the funds were
to be used.146 Kaifu learned to become more discreet in his subsequent dealings with the
US; later during the active stages of the conflict, Japanese firms would be allowed to
deliver electronic parts to a US in critical need of war components.147 This would,
however, be the only instance during the Gulf War in which Japan would bring itself to be
associated with combat operations.
Looking to strike a modest victory amid a string of political missteps, Kaifu
turned his sights toward the deployment of a small contingent of JASDF transport planes
for the purposes of moving refugees away from the conflict zone. Kaifu would sell the
move as a political necessity, without which Japan would become isolated
internationally. 148 However, it was likely more a necessity to alliance politics and Kaifu's
political legitimacy than anything else. It certainly did not strike of bold leadership as
much as it might have, had the CLB not immediately announced the pledge to be within
146
Pyle, 58.
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 140.
148
Ibid, 58.
147
66
the confines of the Japanese Constitution. The SDF's refugee activities would fall under
the unorthodox designation of a “transport training mission done on request” and the
specific SDF law was modified in a most unusual manner, inserting into the enforcement
clause a one-time measure for the transport of refugees, thereby sidestepping a formal
amendment procedure in the Diet. More unusual was the labeling of refugees as “state
guests and others at the request of the government” for the purposes of the existing SDF
law.
Even in spite of the legalistic hurdles cleared by the Kaifu Administration and the
artistic license taken by the same in terms of expedient measures to support the conflict,
Prime Minister Kaifu would finally torpedo his own efforts in response to intense general
opposition and the requirements of political concessions. Rather than admitting defeat,
however, he chose the politically desirable alternative of restricting his policy toward
refugee activities ad absurdum; by imposing the condition of a formal request by the
International Organization for Migration, Kaifu implemented a legal obstacle that could
not be timely resolved, thereby aborting his hamstrung attempt at a direct contribution the
Persian Gulf War.149
However, Kaifu's administration did not resign itself to political defeat, even
following the transport plane debacle. Following an additional attempt by the US
government to urge Japan in following the example of Germany, another constitutionally
restrained participant of the Second World War, the Japanese Prime Minister tried once
again to win deployment of JMSDF minesweepers to the gulf and this time, fortunately
for him, he was successful; from April 26, Japan participated in the minesweeping effort.
Also this time, Japanese public opinion was successfully pulled along, rising to a 65
149
Purrington, 166-167.
67
percent approval of operations approaching the sixth week of deployment.150 Kaifu did
have a little help on this occasion as he was able to appeal to the Japanese public under
the guise of energy security, but it could be generally surmised that the gesture was little
more than an attempt to provide direct assistance and to provide a precedent for future
efforts.151 Public opinion was also more balanced from the onset with 56 percent
supporting the deployment according to an April 24th Asahi Shinbun poll.
Even given the change of opinion among the Japanese people, this lessening of
opposition may have been less substantial given the collective shame of not being
properly recognized either bilaterally or internationally for their country's financial
contribution or for the decline in US-Japan relations that had occurred during the
conflict.152 The fact that the Prime Minister had lost support early on in the Diet had made
him dependent on and consequently, hostage to, such swings of opinion.153 Also, Kaifu's
tour of ASEAN nations ahead of the dispatch in which he expressed sorrow for harms
inflicted under the former Japanese Imperial government and received understanding for
Japan's new foreign policy initiatives proved largely instrumental.154
Perhaps the larger point to be taken away from the conflict was that by its
conclusion, Japan could be seen as having successfully moved beyond the Cold War; its
complacency had been shattered and a new age had been entered. Moreover, Japan was
now without the blinders that had prevented it from formulating effective policy during
its first crisis in a world no longer gripped by great power conflict. In many ways, it
150
Bowen, 58.
Purrington, 171.
152
Ibid, 171-172.
153
Ibid, 167.
154
Ibid, 172.
151
68
struck a major blow to the Post-war Yoshida consensus that could not be mended and
would only spread as it cracked through the entire system over the following decade.
3.2 A Lost Decade, A Resurgent LDP, And The
Second Gulf War
Phase 0:
A Decade In The Wilderness
Faced with a new security environment and possessing neither direction nor
established leadership with which to proceed, Japan would embark on its “lost decade”;
however, it was far from lost in relation to security reform. It was instead a period of selfdiscovery for the Japanese people and their political leadership. While there were no
Wilsons, Kennans, or FDRs to propose a sweeping US grand strategy that Japan could
conform to, as Pyle notes, for the first ten years after the Cold War, the US did continue
what would be a very familiar international order to Japan.155
It was this liberal democratic order that Japan had rejected some sixty years
before in exchange for their failed course of fascist Pan-Asianism. Yet, in the longer term,
this may have been a beneficial experience as new-found pacifism replaced the former
nationalism and the same liberal forces that had been suppressed during the militarist era
gained political office. Attuned to what President Wilson had formerly been trying to
accomplish, they stood primed to move toward the default liberal internationalism of the
post-Cold War United States. And predictably, the US was there to place pressure on
Japan and lead it forth into the new decade.
155
Pyle, 280-181.
69
The first significant step in terms of US alliance leadership was the Perry
Initiative of 1993. Seeing declines in the defense expenditures of both countries, the
initiative was presented as a measure for streamlining defense procurement through
burden-sharing. It was more likely, however, a means toward obtaining reciprocity during
exchanges in defense technologies and one in which the “objective criteria” would be set
by the US.156 As the United States underwent a force transformation and the situation in
North Korea became increasingly uncertain, the topic of collective self-defense would, in
turn, become less taboo via implied foreign pressure.157
Alternatively, it was illustrated during those early years that US pressure was
having quite an opposite effect of that intended. From 1993, Green places the Higuchi
Panel Report at a critical juncture in Japanese defense reform. On the heels of a noconfidence vote against PM Miyazawa (the same Miyazawa who had held a wall of
opposition against Ozawa's post-Iraq reform efforts), a new coalition government had
been formed and it was Ozawa who would find agreement with the newly-elected Prime
Minister that the National Defense Program Outline of 1976 be updated to fit Japan's new
foreign policy environment. Rather than chiefly advancing the goals of a stronger
alliance, however, the panel report had strong overtones of autonomy and multilateralism.
The Theater Missile Defense initiative, for example, was moved from the inviolable
purview of bilateral cooperation to include proposals from other nations as well as, in
what may be among the more surprising portions of the report, floating the unilateral
development of Anti-Ballistic Missile technology for Japan's use alone.158 Also, despite
focusing on the maintenance of bilateral ties, the report took special consideration for
156
Green, Arming Japan, 140-141.
Samuels, Securing Japan, 83.
158
Green, Arming Japan, 148.
157
70
possible entrapment in US foreign conflicts and held multilateralism among its three
main pillars, a modern military force and bilateral relations included.159
It would not be until the presidency of George W. Bush that the alliance would
receive a much needed revaluation and the elevated attention that the Bush
Administration would place on Japan represented a much needed “shot in the arm” for
bilateral ties. In some ways, this was a predictable outcome; the Bush Administration had
three main requirements that the alliance would facilitate: The containment of China, the
provision of logistics and intelligence support of US forces, and the facilitation of rapid
deployments within the region.160 This was especially evident even during the President's
initial election campaign in which he placed an importance on traditional alliances and
his then adviser, Condoleezza Rice, urged that never again should Japan be neglected for
China as it had been during the previous Clinton Administration.161
Following Bush's election to office, it was the “Armitage Report”, named for
perhaps the most notable figure in US-Japan relations between 2000 and 2004, that
presented a clear enunciation of the new administration's alliance goals. Within the report,
its architects saw in Japan the opportunity to craft a sort of “Special Relationship” in
Asia. It would be a more reciprocal alliance than had previously been enjoyed and one in
which US and Japanese forces would pledge to stand together in regional conflicts and in
foreign deployments. Fatefully, the 50th anniversary of the US-Japan Security Treaty
would coincide with the month of September 2001. On that occasion, Secretary of State
Colin Powell would extol:
159
Ibid, 146-147.
Dupont, 16.
161
Campbell, Kurt M. “The End of Alliances? Not So Fast” The Washington Quarterly 27 2 (2004):
157-158 (hereafter, Campbell).
160
71
I am firmly convinced that the US-Japan Security Treaty and our alliance will be
just as critical to peace and prosperity in Asia for the next 50 years as it has been
in the last 50. The diplomats who crafted both the Peace Treaty and the US-Japan
Security Treaty left us a lasting and valuable legacy. It is up to us to build on that
legacy and work hard to keep the peace. 162
Following the attacks of September the 11th, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld would
announce plans for a US Force Transformation that would shift the President's former
stance favoring traditional alliances toward a more flexible multilateral posture that
would soon come to be punctuated by “coalitions of the willing”. Anticipating the
implications of this policy shift, the Japanese Council of Defense Studies aptly foresaw
that the key to alliance maintenance had shifted from simple burden sharing to “risk
sharing”.163 The moment had finally arrived for Japan to regain its honor, that which had
been lost ten years earlier during the pivotal Gulf Crisis.
Still, what was Japan's collective mental set as it arrived at this critical moment?
What changes had taken place over the decade that would affect Japan's response to the
American call for action? It could be argued that it was the successful passage of
peacekeeping legislation in 1992 under Ozawa Ichiro's stewardship that launched Japan's
first articulation of an indigenous post-Cold War policy. Within the legislation and its
ensuing course of foreign policy, deployments became restricted by five points or “five
principles”. They required among other things that SDF forces be withdrawn at the first
sign of hostilities and also that SDF members be prohibited from using force as a
condition for achieving their mission. Also, the Komeito would receive the concession
162
Rapp, William E. “Paths Diverging? The Next Decade in the US-Japan Security Alliance”
International Institute for Policy Studies, IIPS Policy Paper (December 2003): p. 49 (hereafter,
Rapp, Paths Diverging?).
163
Samuels, Securing Japan, 82.
72
that peacekeeping force participation be frozen, preventing such missions that would
present inherent dangers to SDF personnel.164
Despite the restrictions and initial concessions, Ozawa managed to cement
himself a robust faction within the LDP. Richard Samuels has characterized him as a man
who “...invented the word normal nation. He's fought for it. He's defined a way to get at it
that is a bit odd, which is to say that Japan can participate in all these things, but only
under United Nations auspices. So, he's a man of real ideas.”165 And at a time when
Ozawa's revisionists were scoring small, but significant victories, the same could not be
said for the pacifist forces who had previously succeeded during the Iraq conflict.
Those forces represented largely by the Komeito and the reinvented Japanese
Socialist Party (now Social Democratic Party), faltered out of an inability to articulate a
workable policy during the 90's. Such was indicative of Social Democratic Party
Chairman Murayama's 1994 statement on behalf of his party, where he recognized the
US-Japan Alliance and the constitutionality of the SDF in order to broker a coalition
government with the LDP. Regardless, his party, once the stalwart protectors of the
Japanese pacifist tradition, would decline from their 1990 high of 136 Diet seats to a
mere 6 post-millennium.166 The pragmatists would also suffer defeats of their own topped
by the failed attempt of Kato Koichi to foment a rebellion in the Diet during the 1998
Diet session.167
By the early 1990's Japan had in many ways become a country that could say
“yes” to a supranational role and a more flexible definition of its own security policy.
Within the very same year of the PKO legislation, the SDF deployed to Cambodia to aid
164
Boyd, 28-29.
Samuels, before Japan Society December 12 2007.
166
Boyd, 29-30.
167
Ibid, 31.
165
73
UN efforts.168 Although they were limited to economic relief and humanitarian
development, the rate of peacekeeping-spectrum missions continued at a steady pace
throughout the 1990's, deploying Japanese forces to Mozambique in 1993, Zaire in 1994,
and the Golan Heights in 1996.169 Also despite the limitations of deployments, it is noted
by US observers that as peacekeeping operations have gained the support of the Japanese
public, so have more flexible interpretations of the Japanese Constitution.170
It is also noted that by decade's end, the SDF had jettisoned its former identity as a
domestic-only force and had become identified with its new peace-keeping role.171
Domestic forces, however, were being shifted as well and as the US turned its eyes
toward Taiwan and China, Japan would turn its security focus toward the south of its
archipelago. This transition of forces and similar redrafting of guidelines was not, in
reality, an act completely focused on bilateral ties; rather, it reflected a global role that
Japan saw itself fulfilling.172 It was also a course of action intent on attaining that elusive
goal of “normalcy” and better addressing those issues that had led to a “crisis of
expectations” during the events of 1990 and 1991. 173
During about the same period, Japan was also finding itself moving toward a shift
in its defense economy. Whereas defense autonomy had been supported in Japan to
differing degrees throughout its Post-war history, by the early 90's Japan found itself
increasingly willing to place domestic interests aside as it contemplated stronger ties with
the United States. Japanese Phased Array Radar technology, for example, was a high168
Midford, Paul “Japan’s Response to Terror: Dispatching the SDF to the Arabian Sea” Asian
Survey 43 2 (2003): pp. 339-340 (hereafter, Midford).
169
Pyle, 293.
170
Dupont, 12.
171
Ibid, 3.
172
Green, Arming Japan, 126.
173
Oros, 72.
74
interest area for the US in the first few years of the 1990's. Japan, likely seeing an
opportunity to oblige its alliance partner, allowed Mitsubishi Electronic Corporation in
1992 to transfer technologies relevant to the production of phased array modules as well
to allow access to their databases left over from the previous FSX project.174
By 1994, two influential bodies, The Defense Industry and Technology Advisory
Panel and the Advisory Panel on Defense, would come out in support of technology
transfer and joint venture while turning in opposition to defense autonomy. Their central
justification for this was that autonomy represented an injurious path for Japan, one that
carried with it both political and economic costs. Technology could be used as leverage
within the alliance and as a relative national advantage within the larger sphere of global
security, but no longer could it be viewed plainly in terms of keeping Japanese
technologies for the Japanese.175
Neither could Japan ignore the unabated disintegration of its former Yoshida
consensus. As Pyle explains, there was a sudden realization that the post-Cold War
landscape was not the one that Japan had emerged from following the Second World War
or even one reminiscent of the Taisho or militarist eras. 176 This unfamiliar regional
landscape coupled with the changing political composition of the Diet and American
pressure provided fertile ground for the next big blow to the Cold War consensus.
In 1995, LDP legislators, MOFA bureaucrats, and the JDA would come together
to propose a revised NDPO that would both expand the size and scope of Japan's defense
perimeter and satisfy the concerns of the United States in relation to exigencies around
the Taiwan Straits.177 These guidelines would be brought to the Diet for consideration in
174
Green, Arming Japan, 128.
Ibid, 126.
176
Pyle, 134.
177
Boyd, 32.
175
75
1998 and although the final law fell short of completely satisfying the revisionists, it did
advance their agenda considerably by allowing Japanese forces to operate at some level
with American combat operations. This participation was relegated to rear area support
for logistical and medical functions and explicitly forbade the transport of weapons and
munitions, but the ramifications of the law provided a stark contrast against the impasses
that Japan had encountered seven years prior.178
Providing further evidence of the decline of the pacifist consensus and the
remarkable shift from the 1990 political environment, it was the Komeito that had now
become the pragmatist, supporting the NDPO bill outright with the mere request of ex
ante approval of foreign dispatches. To further cement this point, it was also the Komeito
that ran interference against the general public, promoting the legislation as a measure to
advance peace.179 Another factor in the rise of revisionist forces was the shortage of
strong pacifist leadership. Indications of this were present as early as the 1980's with the
inability of opposition forces to defend their organizational base during Prime Minister
Nakasone's reforms, resulting in the collapse of the General Council of Trade Unions.
Proceeding the fall of the Soviet Union, these same forces became complacent in their
structure and policies and failed to evolve even as other similar parties did just that in
countries around the world.180
Alternatively, the revisionist forces within the LDP were able to take the party
reigns and pull the platform closer to a pure revisionist ideology. Further, in 1994, Diet
legislators succeeded in replacing the Single Non-Transferable Vote districts with Single
Seat and Proportional Representation, which reduced political infighting between LDP
178
Boyd, 32-33.
Ibid, 33.
180
Ibid, 35-36.
179
76
candidates and removed the necessity of identifying with a particular faction.
Additionally, changes were made to reduce the power of factional leaders in relation to
the Prime Minister, paving the way for the strong leadership of Koizumi's administration
post-2000.181 On the issue of Article 9 and defense reform, this relegation of factional
power was vital in forming a united front; before, the clashing opinions of mainstream
and anti-mainstream revisionists had prevented meaningful consensus on the issue. 182 As
a result, beginning in 1998 and continuing post-millennium, the revisionists in the LDP
saw some of their greatest victories in defense reform to that date, including Bilateral
Ballistic Missile Defense (1998), the reversal of policy on the use of space for peaceful
purposes (1998), the amendment of SDF law (1999), a five-year defense buildup plan
(2000) and several acquisition and cross-servicing agreements with the United States
(1998/99).183 Furthermore, the implementation in 1999 of most of the revised NDPO as
well as the several Acquisitions and Cross-Servicing Agreements was instrumental in
setting the groundwork for the later Japanese dispatches in the Indian Ocean as well as
those in Iraq and Afghanistan.
It also cannot be overlooked that there were several external shocks during the
late 1990's that permitted the LDP to implement their reforms with more ease than
otherwise might have been possible. The biggest shock of the period, the crisis between
the US and China over Taiwan in 1996, had the effect of illustrating the strategic
concerns that China represented as well as provided a reminder to Japan that they could
very well be drawn into greater conflicts as a matter of their bilateral ties with the US.184
Later, in 1998, Japan was gripped in a collective shock over the gross violation of its
181
Boyd, 36-37.
Ibid, 37.
183
Dupont, 19-20.
184
Ibid, 6.
182
77
airspace by North Korea during the testing of their country's Taepo-Dong I ballistic
missile. Additionally, 1999 would herald the “mysterious boat” incidents that would lead
to a small exchange of ordinance on the part of the JSDF. In Dupont's estimation, these
events would have the effect of quieting pacifist sentiment and elevating the interest
level of the Japanese public on defense issues.185
As Japan neared the end of its “lost decade”, it is aptly noted that, “Even if it was
not ‘all of a sudden’ or ‘right before our eyes,’ the norms of the Yoshida era were
changing.”186 The pacifist consensus was nearing the end of its efficacy in public
discourse. Appropriately, it would be in 1999 that Director General of the JDA, Hosei
Norota, leaving no room for ambiguity, would proclaim before the Diet Defense
Committee that Japan had the right to take pre-emptive military action if it felt a missile
attack were immanent.187
Ozawa Ichiro also played a substantial role in the disintegration of the Yoshida
Doctrine. His rise to a position of influence accompanied the successes of his fellow
revisionists throughout the 1990's. At the peak of Ozawa's power in 1999, he would make
the decision to reintegrate with the LDP under a coalition government in order to secure
the level of reform that he had fought so strongly for preceding his breakaway party. The
results of this reintegration were immediately evident: A reduction in the size of the
administration cabinets and limitations on the bureaucracy in Diet testimony, thereby
further liberating the Office of the Prime Minister from secondary influences. The
coalition government also won a revision of the cabinet law, allowing the Prime Minister
185
Dupont, 6.
Samuels, Securing Japan, 94.
187
Dupont, 7.
186
78
and members of his cabinets to introduce policies without seeking approval of the
bureaucracy.
On the surface, these changes had the effect of creating a strong office of the
Prime Minister across the board, but in terms of security policy, they were instrumental in
allowing Koizumi to create the ad-hoc committees and rapid policy implementations that
would streamline his policy responses during the US reaction to 9/11 and circa-2003
Iraq.188 The larger effect of the coalition, however, is best characterized by Boyd in his
criticism of Katzenstein's view that the Majoritarian(pacifist)/Non-Majoritarian
(revisionist) remained an immobile precedent. Whereas this had held before the
revisionist rise, with Ozawa's Liberal Party merging into the LDP and the formation of
the larger coalition government, the formerly non-majoritarian revisionists had become
the majority; in essence, the poles had flipped and the pacifist/revisionist dynamic had
been changed definitively. 189
With a strong foundation built for him by Ozawa and his fellow legislators in the
Diet, it was understandable that the election of Prime Minister Koizumi would bring with
it a momentous occasion for the LDP that would allow the revisionists in the Diet to
launch a bold new page in Japanese defense reform. And at the same time, Koizumi
represented the rise of a new revisionism, not of Koizumi's generation, but of the
generation after his, which the Prime Minister would ultimately bridge, leading some
scholars to characterize this changeover as the most consequential political shift since
1945.190
188
Boyd, Patrick J; Samuels, Richard J. “Nine Lives? : The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan”
East-West Center, Washington (2005): pp. 38-39 (hereafter, Boyd).
189
Ibid, 14-15.
190
Samuels, Securing Japan, 74.
79
Greeting Koizumi's new path for Japan was the unprecedented intersection of
several critical factors: Memories of North Korea from 1998 still lingered in Japanese
minds, a supportive US stood in the wings to bolster Japanese decision-making or
provide foreign pressure (gaigatsu) when needed, and the economic decline of ten years
had rendered economic tools of diplomacy less capable in the public mind.191 The
demand for the standing precedent of “reassurance” (formerly attached to the revisionist
“reach” and “reconciliation” or the “3 R's”), had also declined through the late 90's into
the Koizumi Administration.192 Additionally, the sinking of a North Korean spy ship in
2001 would renew the image of that nation as a threat in the public mind and would also
provide a precedent as the first destruction of a foreign military vessel since WWII.193
Koizumi's initial course following his election was one of swift action; as Samuels
notes, the Prime Minister quickly acted to elevate the policy role of his office, reform the
structure of the cabinet secretariat, and create a Cabinet Office. In practice, these reforms
would allow him such powers as the ability to submit “basic principles on important
policies” to his cabinet without Ministry approval, to administer several other agencies,
such as the JDA that had formerly been held separate, and to appoint ministers for special
missions.194 So, it was when news of September the 11th fatefully reached Japan that the
Koizumi Administration would put into action all of the groundwork it had laid from
2000 on.
Although their first reaction was one of shock and solidarity with the American
people and government, September 11th represented a chance for the Koizumi
Administration to show support for its premier ally and likely, although to a lesser extent,
191
Rapp, Paths Diverging?, 15. Also see Samuels, Securing Japan 100.
Oros, 34.
193
Also see Samuels, before Japan Society December 12 2007.
194
Samuels, Securing Japan, 74.
192
80
to recover from its country's embarrassing response to the Gulf Crisis. To this end, the
administration's reaction was nothing short of remarkable; within 45 minutes, Koizumi's
office had set in the works an Emergency Task Force, earmarked an economic aid
package to win Pakistan and India's cooperation in the operations most likely to follow,
announced a plan to amend SDF law to defend US bases, and approved a twenty million
dollar contribution to be split among the victim's families and the cleanup effort in New
York City.195 Following the initial reaction, Koizumi also saw that several destroyers and
one supply ship were dispatched to the Indian Ocean for information-gathering and
refueling missions, thereby creating a clean break from the 1990 debacle. Japanese
participation in Operation Enduring Freedom also marked the first occasion that the SDF
had been deployed to a non-peacekeeping mission in their organization's history.196
Although one could identify the actions of the administration as a successful
model for policy response, the decisions of Koizumi in those early hours represented for
Japan an unprecedented speed of reaction and an unprecedented use of Prime Ministerial
power. In order to create his Emergency Task Force, Koizumi took full advantage of his
office's Cabinet Crisis Management Center to draft his policy course and support his
declaration of a “serious emergency”. Delegating authority for the Crisis center to his
Chief Cabinet Secretary, Koizumi turned his attention toward making use of his
administration's recent reforms concerning ad-hoc offices to produce a response plan task
force for handling further policy decisions. By the second day, the creation of this task
force would mark yet another decisive success for Koizumi's administration by allowing
him to streamline the legislative process; drawing membership from the various
195
196
Midford, 330-331.
Dupont, 20-21.
81
bureaucracies, including the MOFA, the JDA, and the CLB, Koizumi's newest task force
had the ability of heading off legislative conflicts by ensuring that disagreements between
the most influential parties were aired in a forum where they could be addressed
appropriately and proposals could be redrawn in the most timely fashion.197 It must also
be mentioned as noteworthy that both day's decisions were made independently from the
traditional consultation process between the Prime Minister and his respective party;
whereas in 1990, Prime Minister Kaifu had made his first articulations toward then LDP
Secretary General Ozawa, Koizumi would consult the LDP general council only after his
task force had decided a course of action in the Diet and only as a peripheral
consideration.198
This was, however, just one aspect of Koizumi's overarching policy to assist the
United States; within a week after the 9/11 attacks, the Prime Minister would announce a
seven point plan to achieve this end and the related Anti-Terrorism Law would pass the
Diet only a month later. The law would also sanction Japan's continued deployment in the
Indian Ocean, this time extending the mission parameters to include medical and
logistical services.199 Additionally, the bill set a strong precedent against the failed
UNPCC legislation; never before had legislators been willing to support a dispatch that
did not mandate withdrawal upon becoming involved in combat-related operations.
Operations would remain outside the scope of direct combat, but the definition of noncombat operations had been widened significantly.200
As some observed, Koizumi would effectively preempt public criticism and pull it
along with him, sidestepping the political cycle that had prevented action during the first
197
Boyd, 41-42.
Ibid, 42.
199
Ibid, 41.
200
Midford, 331.
198
82
Gulf Crisis.201 And at the same time, the legislation was careful to “Reassure” the
Japanese public and legislators that their country had not adopted the self-defense
language of UN Resolution 1368 while articulating where the resolution found
compatibility with the preamble of the Japanese Constitution.202 The bill also took steps
to separate out those logistical operations that would involve weapons and ammunition,
although legally the legislation allowed for the unrestricted transport of materiel in
international airspace or at sea; This language, however, was rarely put into practice
during actual operations.203
Still, despite the reassurances provided within the bill and by the Koizumi
Administration, the Anti-Terrorism Law set many additional precedents beyond moving
the proximity of SDF activities closer to active combat operations. The MSDF, for
example, had been granted the liberty to operate under circumstances in which Japan
faced no imminent or direct threat and where UN peacekeeping operations did not
provide an overarching mandate.204 The bill also represented the first time that
revisionists had taken a position completely indifferent to the demands of Socialists in the
Diet; the requests of the Democratic Party for an outright ban on the transportation of
weapons and ammunition as well as Diet approval for dispatches was promptly
disregarded in what could be seen as a clear reversal of the state of affairs surrounding
the former UNPCC deliberations.205
So, in light of Koizumi's overwhelming success in reforming Japan's defense
posture post-9/11, the question that comes to mind would be how he and his
201
Katzenstein, Peter J. “Same War: Different Views: Germany, Japan and Counterterrorism”
International Organization 57 4 (2003): p. 752.
202
Ibid, 753.
203
Midford, 332-333.
204
Boyd, 43.
205
Midford, 333.
83
administration were able to go forward where their predecessors had tried and failed. It
has been noted that in an almost identical fashion to the policy course of the Kaifu
Administration in 1990, financial assistance was planned for both allied operations and
the victims of the conflict. Furthermore, transport planes were placed aside for
humanitarian activities in addition to a more general SDF dispatch for non-combat
operations.206 Although several factors have already been weighed, the economic “lost
decade” and standing threats from North Korea included, what specific events were
responsible for allowing the revisionist victories of 2001?
Interestingly, it has been posited that by 9/11, American pressure had declined
greatly compared to the levels experienced during the Gulf Crisis. In the decade
following 1991, the US had shifted toward a more self-reliant position within the alliance
and economic factors, such as a lack of disputes in trade, made it unlikely for one side to
leverage a position over the other.207 A good example of this dynamic in action can be
found in 2002; then US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, during a press
conference discussing the contributions of US allies, omitted the naval dispatches and
logistical support of Japan.208 In all likelihood, the most prescient examples of US
pressure surrounding the MSDF dispatches were manufactured on the request of Japanese
naval officers and Diet members.209
Paul Midford, in his article “Japan's Response to Terror: Dispatching the SDF to
the Arabian Sea”, notes the differences in the makeup of the Diet as well as collective
shame for the Gulf War debacle and the high approval rating that Koizumi enjoyed
coming into office. However, Midford holds that the determining factor was actually the
206
Midford, 330.
Ibid, 333-336.
208
Ibid, 335.
209
Ibid, 336.
207
84
public's acceptance of overseas missions for the SDF for the purposes of non-combat
peacekeeping operations.210 Midford notes that following the Cambodia mission in 1997,
it became apparent that Japan could dispatch its forces outside of home without
provoking criticism from neighboring countries. It also became apparent that the
domestic paranoia over proto-militarism had been completely unfounded.211
Ultimately, however, it would appear that besides the new composition of the Diet
from the late 90's into 2000 and the several external threats that had entered the public
consciousness during that same period, the central determining factor for revisionist
progress had been the Prime Minister and his administration all along. As Samuels points
out:
They dragged public opinion with them. In fact, public opinion never really caught
up...it was not until the ships were there for some significant period of time, and
then subsequently when the soldiers were in Iraq for some period of time doing
good things-demonstrably good things, that the Japanese public began to turn in
favor and celebrate the accomplishments and the achievements. 212
With Koizumi exercising strong traction and resolve in the foreign policy of his country,
the following two years would yield additional victories, small victories, but victories
nonetheless. After the successful extension of MSDF activities in the Indian Ocean, for
example, the Administration was able to finally win deployment of Aegis-equipped
destroyers that had been previously switched for non-Aegis vessels out of political
consideration during the initial dispatch.
In another small, but noteworthy precedent, Prime Minister Koizumi would
express his open support for Operation Iraqi Freedom and go further to express a
willingness to participate in reconstruction efforts following the cessation of
210
Midford, 339.
Ibid, 343.
212
Samuels, before Japan Society December 12 2007.
211
85
operations.213 Although it was very clear to Koizumi at the time that joint operations were
not in the realm of reality, this statement represented a level of open support for US
military action that would have been unthinkable during the earlier Gulf Crisis.
If a snapshot were to be taken at that moment in time following Koizumi's
statement of solidarity with the tentative US combat mission in Iraq, it would reveal a
near 180 degree turn in policy from Prime Minister Kaifu's Japan in those months leading
up to January 1991. Even commentators such as Andrew Oros, whose conclusions hold
steadfast to the assertion that Japan's traditional pacifist identity remains intact, are forced
to admit that the 13 years between Gulf Wars provide evidence for Realist theorists that
Japan edges toward a military role congruent with its world standing.214 By 2003, Japan
was in an historic position to recapture the torch that had been handed to it preceding the
First Gulf War. Maybe the torch did not burn as brightly as it had those years ago, but the
flame had not gone out and Koizumi, facing fewer institutional restrictions and little
opposition at home or abroad along with a high public approval rating, was poised to
grasp for it.
Phase 1:
A Japan That Can Say “Yes”
In stark contrast to Japan's 1990 response, the actions of Koizumi from 2002-2003
were markedly proactive and anticipatory. As early as spring 2002, Koizumi returned to
his successful practice of utilizing ad-hoc committees, this time to create the Iraq
Response Team, which he would chair himself. Yet again, officials were drawn from the
213
Miller, John H. “The Glacier Moves: Japan Reacts to U.S. Security Policies” Asian Affairs 30 2
(2003): pp. 138-139 (hereafter Miller, The Glacier Moves).
214
Oros, 185-186.
86
JDA and MOFA, but this time their task was to develop a new law for the specific
purpose of allowing SDF deployment. Finding Japanese law to be incompatible with the
general UN mandate, Koizumi and his team discovered within UN resolution 1483, that a
non-combat force could be sent without requiring a review of existing restrictions and
without entering the legal realm of Article 9. Further, Koizumi was able to successfully
define non-combat zones as areas in which the SDF was operating, likely pushing
Japanese legal norms to their breaking point. And even despite elevated public opposition
toward Japanese involvement, the Koizumi Administration would enact the dispatch
smoothly and seemingly without a second thought for political fallout.215
The method in which Koizumi accomplished the dispatch represents yet another
mark of the Prime Minister's new brand of Japanese leadership. On the findings of the
Iraq Response Team, Koizumi would carefully sequence the execution of the committee's
recommendations so that the influence of LDP policy councils would be minimized. He
also moved to leave the definition of a non-combat zone out of the final legislation, a
shrewd tactic that left many pragmatists and opposition forces unhappy, but did not result
in the final legislation being defeated in the Diet.216 The timing of the Prime Minister was
equally notable. Although the committee's findings had been arrived at in 2002, the
Koizumi Administration would reserve deployment until the conclusion of military
operations and the successful implementation of the post-conflict peace. Thus, following
the fulfillment of these preconditions, it was within a two-month blitz from May 21 to
July 26 that the Administration would initiate deliberations and win passage of the SDF
215
216
Samuels, Securing Japan, 75.
Boyd, 45.
87
deployment. When violence did spark up, Koizumi and his cabinet postponed actual
deployment until the spring of 2004.217
When deployment finally took place, Koizumi maintained a policy that, while
based on previous reassurances that combat roles would be avoided, placed Japanese
forces in areas that would become conflicted and took it upon himself to personally
defend those deployments through the perils that would emerge. The Administration
would formally take the position that that Iraq was no longer a “combat zone” and that
SDF personnel would not be allowed to use force to accomplish their mission. In fact,
Koizumi and his cabinet would refrain from citing Article 9 whenever possible except for
stating that prior interpretations still stood and that such restrictions would not be relevant
anyway, removing both the threat of a challenge by the CLB and the use of Koizumi's
rhetoric against him by opposition forces in the Diet.218 Still, even though the province of
Samawah was specifically chosen for its characteristics in terms of post-conflict violence,
the admittance by the US that an insurgency was underway coupled with the mere
presence of Japan in a conflicted nation made appeals by Diet members in favor of
collective self-defense of friendly forces all the more historic.219
Following on the previous example of Japanese public reaction to Operation
Enduring Freedom, once SDF forces hit the ground in Iraq, opinion shot up by nearly 20
percent in favor of deployment from a previous number of 35 percent.220 Accompanying
this reaction was the addition of an old external threat to the public consciousness;
following the deployment in 2004, allegations over the kidnapping of Japanese citizens
by North Korea in the 1970's would grow into a widely discussed and markedly
217
Boyd, 46.
Ibid, 46.
219
Dupont, 21.
220
Ibid, 21.
218
88
incendiary topic in Japan. After the official confessions of Kim Jong Il over the accuracy
of the charges, public anger turned to the advantage of the LDP and revisionist forces. 221
Probably the most significant precedent in public opinion from the end of the
Cold War through the SDF deployment in Iraq, however, was to be found in the hostage
crisis concerning Japanese national Koda Shisei. Having failed to gain entry into Iraq
through Amman, Jordan, Shisei attempted to cross into Iraq illegally and in the process
had been captured by insurgent forces. Refusing to relent to demands that the SDF be
withdrawn, the insurgents summarily executed their Japanese hostage. In what could have
been the death knell for Japan's Iraqi deployment, little public discontent arose. 222
Following the hostage crisis, further dangers were discovered in Iraq, this time
affecting the larger Japanese force; in November, 2004 SDF personnel would come under
rocket attacks spaced several days apart. Iraq would proclaim a nationwide state of
emergency shortly thereafter. Despite these event, Koizumi continued to maintain that
Iraq was no longer a combat zone and that Japan was under no direct request from the
United States to maintain forces in the country.223 Within the larger world view, by fall of
2004, Japan had become a nation engaged. Its naval forces had conducted 430 refueling
missions. Its air forces had completed 230 transport missions. Further, even during the
contentious period of the Shisei hostage situation, Koizumi would win a six-month
extension of logistical operation in the Indian Ocean in addition to now being able to
provide assistance to other countries besides the US.224 By 2005, it is almost without
contention that Japan had been drastically altered in its public opinion and power centers.
The Japan of 1990 had almost completely been supplanted and the country had entered a
221
Dupont, 7.
Glosserman, Brad. Planning Ahead. Pacific Forum CSIS (2004): 1-11 (hereafter, Glosserman).
223
Ibid, 9.
224
Ibid, 7.
222
89
new era that would be defined by Juunichiro Koizumi; it would become a “Year Zero
Administration” by whose precedent and accomplishments all subsequent Prime
Ministers and Diet coalitions would be held against.
Phase 2:
America Rejoins, Revisionists Entrench
As Japan engaged in its first deployment to a conflict zone since the Second
World War, American commentators would watch on, varying their responses from
contemplative reserve to relative indifference to borderline adulation. Richard Samuels,
appearing before Japan Society, would make a remark that reflected what some in the
foreign policy community had likely been thinking in relation to Japan's new course in
foreign policy: "This whole notion of consensus, particularly in difficult issues of foreign
policy, shouldn't be in the mix anymore, in my opinion." 225
This statement may appear straightforward at face value, but in a larger sense it
alludes to several important points: It assumes that consensus building had been an
obstacle in Japan's articulation of its foreign policy, but not just an obstacle, an avoidable
obstacle. It identifies the success of the Koizumi Administration in launching its foreign
policy initiatives first and waiting for public approval later. It additionally makes the
statement that Japan had entered a new era that demanded strong action and a resilient
administration not afraid to make unpopular decisions and stick by them.
Although Samuels' sentiments reflect a strong desire to see Japan lifted from its
old ways of political deadlock and the grindingly slow pace of consensus formulation,
others in the field at the time of the SDF dispatch were more likely to view Japan's policy
225
Samuels, before Japan Society Dec 12 2007.
90
decisions from 2003-2004 under the lens of the Japanese Diet and public opinion rather
than the actions of the Administration alone. For example, in his 2004 article, “Past its
Prime? The Future of the US-Japan Alliance”, William Rapp takes a somewhat novel
position on generational politics; rather than pointing to a more senior, pacifist sector of
the Diet, he points to an older, pacifist generation in the general public and then directs
attention to a younger population in the Diet, academia, and the Japanese population,
more realist in nature and concerned with maintaining Japan's standing in the US-Japan
Alliance.226 Rapp also gives mention to a developing sense of healthy nationalism among
younger Diet members and academics, further representing a desire for greater
assertiveness and policy autonomy while remaining cognizant of past historical follies. 227
Another prominent voice in 2003, Rajan Menon, would agree with many of
Rapp's points, primarily his point on generational change. Menon too believed that
support for abandoning the traditional minimalism in defense policy had met a critical
juncture. Drawing attention to such things as Bilateral Missile Defense, a new focus on
Japanese power projection capabilities, or the unprecedented statement of a JDA head in
support to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, Menon directs his readers to a generational
change of significant consequence.228
Turning toward the effects of American pressure and influence on Japanese
foreign policy, the disposition of the Japanese public favored highly in American opinion
following Japan's 2003 dispatch. John Miller points out in his work, The Outlier: Japan
Between Asia and the West:
226
Rapp, William E. “Past its Prime? The Future of the US-Japan Alliance” Parameters (Summer
2004): p. 106 (hereafter Rapp, Past its Prime?).
227
Ibid, 112.
228
Menon, Rajan “The End of Alliances” World Policy Journal (Summer 2003): p. 13.
91
In the short term, it seems reasonable to expect further incremental moves toward
closer security cooperation with the United States. These moves are, however,
likely to be tempered by a reluctance to foreclose Japan’s “Asia option” or jettison
its pacifist isolationist creed. This creed has, after all, served postwar Japan well,
underpinning its prosperity and rise to eminence as an economic superpower, and
post Cold War Japan has as yet confronted no crisis which might justify its
abandonment. 229
Miller continues by asserting that Japan possesses an ingrained “exceptionalism” that, in
the current period, has translated to the sense of a unique pacifist element within their
foreign policy.230 Miller had also pointed out earlier in 2003 that Japan's new course in
foreign policy was following a “change-within-continuity” approach to defense reform;
essentially Miller saw Koizumi's initiatives as historic reform draped in the orthodoxy of
prior institutional restrictions on the use of force. Although the dispatches and closer
alliance cooperation were significant in the precedent they set and their respective effects
on future reform, these policies were tempered within institutional restrictions and
doubtlessly crafted so as to not break with traditional pacifist sentiments held by many in
the general public.231
In light of this American perception of domestic political rancor on the Japanese
mainland, there was an equal amount of focus on the costs of maintaining the alliance
with Japan from a realistic American perspective. Some commentators, for example,
would say that, “...the focus of the partnership has lost its clarity” and as a result,
“expectations of what is meant by reliability on the part of both partners have begun to
diverge.”232 Perhaps it was tact on the part of American servicemen and statesmen that
criticisms concerning Japanese forces were muted, but the same could not be said for the
Netherlands or Australia, who openly criticized the SDF as a burden to their local
229
Miller, John H. “The Outlier: Japan Between Asia and the West” Asia Pacific Center for Strategic
Studies (March 2004): p. 12.
230
Ibid, 12.
231
Miller, The Glacier Moves, 38.
232
Rapp, Past its Prime?, 105-106.
92
peacekeeping operations and in a manner that could have easily substituted the word
“babysitting” for other choices of speech.233
Also chief among the concerns that racked American minds were the inherent
limitations of a Cabinet Level Bureau that had come dangerously close to invalidating the
extension of refueling activities in the Indian Ocean on thin legalistic grounds, even after
the the passing of the Revised Guidelines that same year.234 Perhaps more notable was the
near omission of Japan from some print articles that had highlighted the US relationship
with several lesser-known US allies. In Kurt M. Campell's “The End of Alliances? Not So
Fast”, an article aimed at supporting the thesis that US alliances still held value in the
post-Cold War period, Campell hardly even mentions Japan while reserving select
portions of the article for other NATO allies such as Germany. After stating that, “In the
face of new kinds of security concerns, the United States has in fact given more value to
those alliances that can reliably support U.S. interests in the war on Terrorism and
participate decisively in coalitions of the willing” the author pushes Japan off to the end
of a long list, putting that “Great Britain, Australia, Poland, Spain, Romania, Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, and Japan are part of a core group of states that forms the basis of a new
international cohort that has generally worked closely with the United States in the war
on terrorism”; Japan is not addressed independently even once.235
At the same time, however, commentators such as Rapp saw some small measure
of hope in reforming the alliance to better reflect the realities of the post-9/11, post-2003
world. For example, logistical support and non-combat arms support are singled out by
the author as small steps toward a more equitable contribution. Noting that Japan's own
233
Boyd, 10.
Dupont, 18.
235
Campbell, 158-159.
234
93
whitepaper had emphasized that the country needed to move beyond the “beginner stage”
of peacekeeping, Rapp urged more numerous and expansive initiatives such as Japan's
contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom, which had removed a burden from US
forces during those initial operations.236 Reassuringly, the author notes that as early as
2002 and moving into 2003, the US was engaging in efforts to assure Japan as to the
health of the alliance by planning stops in Tokyo as the first destination in much larger
tours of Asia. Through these measures and other ones separately aimed at educating the
public over the value of the alliance, Rapp saw the relationship as one that had been
somewhat neglected in the past, but showed a bright future if both sides would only
remain willing.237
It must also be said for the purposes of clarifying the previous detractions, that
progress on Article 9 revision had been noticed by American commentators within the
critical period of 2003-2004 as well. Dupont notes that while the extent of constitutional
change was difficult to gauge, constitutional prohibitions against the use of force had
been going through a phase of significant erosion. Further, the author viewed that given
the course of events, it appeared more likely than ever that the Japanese Constitution
would be rewritten to explicitly recognize the existence of the SDF and allow its
deployment as situations required.238 More specifically, Dupont assigns as his primary
thesis that:
...Japan is moving away from its pacifist past towards a more hard headed
and outward looking security posture characterised by a greater willingness
to use the SDF in support of its foreign policy and defence interests. 239
236
Campbell, 45.
Ibid, 43.
238
Dupont, 54-55.
239
Ibid, vii-viii.
237
94
Dupont provides an appropriate endpoint for discussion by placing the focus less
on power and autonomy and more on constructive roles. The Constitution is seen more or
less as a hindrance to future policy, but only in the sense that it prevents Japan from
shaping international institutions and norms according to Japanese values and interests. In
this way, Dupont proposes that this “...is what Koizumi means when he talks about Japan
becoming a ‘normal’ state.” 240 To be certain, some restrictions would continue to protect
Japan from entrapment in foreign commitments outside of the purview of Japanese
interests. However, the age of “doctor's note diplomacy” was slowly coming to an end
and the Koizumi Administration along with the Diet was leading the charge for revision.
In a notable success for revisionist forces, by February 2005, the Komeito would drop its
opposition to the committee draft constitution. In addition to this political victory,
revisionists had won another battle as well; a new revision procedure had been adopted
that would more than likely benefit the reformers in the future and their incrementalist
strategy for Article 9 dissolution.241 The vote did not, however, proceed in any manner
close to as expected; Micah Fink reveals striking footage in his film Japan's About Face
that shows opposition members in the Diet knocking over the speaker's microphone and
wrestling it away from his mouth as he attempts to record a vote on the historic reform. 242
In as close as a direct analogy to the recent course of coalition successes in the Diet, for
the few, but fierce opponents to the revisionist initiatives, reform was winning regardless.
Even outside of express amendment, revisionist forces had been able to increase
the flexibility of existing law considerably. In 2004, seven bills won passage that would
improve Japan's ability to prosecute military and contingency operations both at home
240
Dupont, 15.
Ibid, 48-49.
242
Fink, Micah Japan's About Face 2008 PBS Wide Angle.
241
95
and abroad. Most notable, however, was the tone of the legal reforms concerning foreign
operations; with the passage of these new laws, Japan could now process prisoners of war
on foreign soil, interdict foreign military equipment on the high seas, and pass legal
judgment on other nations for violations of international human law. Even non-military
commercial ships could now be fired upon should they refuse inspection, another historic
precedent in Japanese law.243
These laws additionally set a course for further defense reforms and acquisitions.
For the first time in SDF history, an elite 300 member counter-terrorist unit would be
created in that same year. Unlike previous units in the MSDF and the Coast Guard, this
unit would be the first cross-service force of its kind.244 Later in October of 2004, Japan's
defense white papers along with a document put out by the Council on Security and
Defense Capabilities better known as the “Araki Report”, would suggest a five to ten year
buildup in which the the JSDF would be improved in its operational effectiveness,
expanded in its core capabilities, systemically modernized, and further liberated from
past impediments to operations.
To further detail the significance of the 2004 NDPG and Araki Report, by
February 2005 the report would have the larger effect of carrying a long-advocated
proposal of the DoD, specifically the setting of common strategic objectives into law.245
In October of that year, a report would be issued with explicit recommendations for troop
realignment as well as new roles and missions for the SDF. In addition to calls for
increased participation in international peace cooperation activities and the general
improvement of the international security environment, the document called for closer
243
Dupont, 18-20.
Ibid, 30.
245
Samuels, Securing Japan, 84.
244
96
cooperation with the US on several emerging bilateral issues including: counterproliferation operations, counter-terrorism, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance,
humanitarian relief, reconstruction assistance, and peacekeeping.246 Such progress in
reform and the existence of such forward-looking reports serve to demonstrate that the
SDF of 2005 was different in close to every respect from the SDF of 2000. As Boyd
points out, it was only until the SDF's deployment in Iraq that a Japanese officer could
order the use of force without direct approval from the Prime Minister and only after
approval of his cabinet.247
With Japanese forces finally being able to conduct their missions in a “closer to
normal” manner and with support from the Prime Minister and defense officials, speaking
with an unheard-of degree of freedom, 2005 would herald yet another crucial date in the
history of the Japanese defense establishment. 67th Minister of State for Defense
Fukishiro Nukaga, upon appointment by Prime Minister Koizumi, would become the first
such appointee to pledge the upgrade of the JDA to ministry status. This pledge, which
would see fruition nearly two years later, would not only mark the beginning of what
would become the Ministry of Defense. The event would also mark the rebirth of the
defense establishment, itself; with it would come the elevation of the JDA from its
previous position subordinate to the other organs of government and into an equitable
position relative to the traditional stature of the MOFA in terms of policy formulation and
governmental influence.248 The JDA's upgrade to ministry status under Prime Minister
Abe was further reinforced by Koizumi's creation of a Deputy Office for Defense within
the Cabinet Secretariat, placing the JDA and later, the Ministry of Defense, on equal
246
Szechenyi, Nicholas “A Turning Point for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces” The Washington Quarterly 29 4
(2006): p. 141 (hereafter, Szechenyi).
247
Boyd, 8.
248
Pyle, 172.
97
footing with the MOFA in the Prime Minister's office for the first time in its Post-war
history.249
It was not only a rebirth for the defense establishment in terms of elevated power
and influence; it was a rebirth in image as well. Samuels observes that "Japan would have
what they call--this is a direct quote from the white paper--'a reliable and warm-hearted
self-defense force.'”250 The author points to the new mascot of the JSDF, Prince Pickles, a
“youngster with a sweet smile and rosy cheeks” and notes in his book, Securing Japan,
an effort on the part of the MOD to sell its defense forces as something “warm and
fuzzy”.251 A simple internet search produces the works of many of these same Ministry of
Defense PR people. One ad appeals to those Japanese with a memory of popular action
hero television shows, having uniform-clad actors pose in humorously exaggerated
positions surrounded by equally excessive video graphics and sound effects. 252 Another
ad simply titled, Seaman Ship, features choreographed dancers dressed in sailor uniforms
atop an MSDF vessel.253 Perhaps even more illustrative of the lengths that the MOD has
been willing to go can be found in the youth comic books it began publishing in 2006.
Whether the children characters are learning about the necessity of defense from North
Korean ballistic missiles or the official mascot, Prince Pickles, is learning the ways of the
Japanese Self Defense Force to take back to his home country, these Defense “Manga”
provide a rare and unusual glimpse into the minds of the “image-changers” in Japan's
defense establishment.254
249
Samuels, Securing Japan, 75.
Samuels, before Japan Society Dec 12 2007.
251
Samuels, Securing Japan, 72.
252
[2006] <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mb_Gux1ei5U&feature=related>.
253
[2006] <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZjAXJaFydwM>.
254
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/kohoshiryo/comic/h19/index.html> 5/30/2010,
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/kohoshiryo/pamphlet/pnikki1/pnikki1.pdf> 5/30/2010 Also see
<...kohoshiryo/pamphlet/pickles/pickles.pdf> and <...kohoshiryo/picture/pickles/index.html>5/30/2010.
250
98
These previous examples, although illustrative of the general efforts of the
government to shape public opinion, only shed some minor light on the whole efforts of
Japan's defense organ to shift the appearance of the SDF from its former Cold War image.
A better representation of these efforts can be found in the JDA's 2005 video production,
The Record of Defense Agency in 2005.255 Among one of the first things that become
apparent within the video, its narration and subtitles, tell an interesting tale about Japan's
defense outlook; it is narrated in British English. Australia has, after all, become closer to
Japan in recent years in both trade and defense alike. The video's subtitles, however are in
American English. As the video continues, security is de-emphasized as SDF personnel
aid in Iraqi reconstruction activities and local children pose for photographs.
Additionally, local employment is stressed above humanitarian relief. One Colonel
Kimihito Iwamura explains, “...if we construct a new road, that’s nothing more than a
road. But if we have them construct a road for themselves, this will lead to the further
development of the economy. You know, I think that what we’re sowing in Iraq are the
seeds of friendship.” This theme of employment is indicative of Japan's larger belief in
comprehensive security and this topic of human welfare is one that is repeated
continuously throughout the film. One is more likely to see footage of SDF personnel
playing with local children or putting on a cultural benefit for Iraqi communities than
standing guard or walking patrol.
The film then shifts toward the topic of conventional security, likely directed
toward a US audience. “The fight against terrorism is not over” appears in a graphic by
Prime Minister Koizumi's photograph. Following a methodical procession of MSDF
255
“The Record of Defense Agency in 2005” Japan Defense Agency 2005.
99
achievements in the Indian Ocean and statements by the narrator supporting the “wiping
out of international terrorism”, the subject matter turns toward international friendship
and goodwill, recounting the gratis refueling of a Japanese naval vessel in French port as
a token of appreciation for Japan's contribution. The contrast to the international
discontent of 1991 could not be any starker and there is little doubt that this anecdote
sought to further mend that previous trauma of Japan's foreign policy. Later in the video,
the issue of US-Japan relations is brought up under the caption “What will
happen?...What will be done?”. The obvious answer is, “cooperation”; the delicate issue
of relocation is wedged between the discussion of the 2005 US-Japan Consultative
Committee and joint military exercises undertaken that year. Just as tactfully, the segment
comes to an end by calling for a “...new structure of cooperation...” between the two
nations to preserve an alliance “...essential to Japan to ensure its safety”.
In light of the gestures made toward the United States throughout the video, it is
also notable that Japan has successfully assimilated many of the PR techniques pioneered
by the US Department of Defense. The video goes into detail about the use of film and
television as well as public events and displays to foster a better image for the Self
Defense Forces. “…There was a wide variety of contents, from SF blockbusters to family
comedy dramas. We have enjoyed the cooperation with the filming, but more than
anything else, are happy to think that citizens will be able to feel a closer connection with
the SDF.” Once again it is demonstrated how youth media are underscored as a primary
objective for development. Through technical advisorships, the Japanese defense
establishment was likely learning that they could for the first time influence popular
culture and that they could do it to their greater benefit. This influence can be seen in
100
such Japanese animations as Rescue Wings, which details the experiences of characters in
an SDF marine rescue squadron.256
Covered in the 2005 PR video, progress on Bilateral BMD was another subject
that the defense establishment sought to foster in the public consciousness. Not too long
after the release of the video, a youth defense manga would be printed displaying the
entire cast of characters crowded around a graphic of a landmass that could only be
interpreted as North Korea. Black rings surround the landmass extending out to an
abstract representation of Japan, thus making the grim statement to readers that their
country is not as safe as it would appear and that the development of Bilateral BMD can
be the hero that saves the day.257 Additionally, with the more recent focus on Anti-Piracy
operations, the most recent SDF manga tells a story of a young protagonist who's father's
ship is attacked by Somali pirates, promptly saved, of course, by MSDF personnel.258
Probably the most befitting of the SDF manga to the MOD's focus on Japanese public
opinion would concern a more fundamental topic; in this issue, the main character's class
is introduced to a female American classmate. Our protagonist accompanies the new
American student during a walk with her dog when a motorcycle rushes by, coming
straight for the animal. A man (who will later be revealed as a member of the SDF PKO
force) saves her puppy. This prompts the main character to spend the rest of the story
learning about the SDF and doing good deeds in hopes of impressing his new American
friend.259 It presents a message that is both powerful and deceptively simplistic.
256
“Rescue Wings” 2006 http://www.rescue-w.jp/ Also see “Rescue Wings” promo with tour of SDF
facilities and aircraft <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dDJaqg4tMbE&feature=related>.
257
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/kohoshiryo/comic/h19/index.html> 5/30/2010.
258
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/kohoshiryo/comic/index.html> 5/30/10.
259
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/kohoshiryo/comic/h20/index.html> 5/30/10.
101
Much like the story presented in the comic book, Japan had become a country
focused on changing its image in the world, but especially in regard to its appearance
before its most valued alliance partner. Leading its people, the new Japan could say “yes”
when it suited interests as well as “no” when it did not. It could also move beyond the
status quo and form its own pro-active policies, preempting global pressure and avoiding
criticism. More importantly, the new Japan could win praise for its actions and show its
people that their country could exist in the world as a beneficial force while not
dominating or harming others as it had in the previous century. In many ways, Japan was
a country reborn or at least, a country in the process of being reborn.
Phase 3:
An Alliance for the 21st Century?
In light of the significant commitments and reforms made by Japan surrounding
its initial dispatches to the Indian ocean and Iraq and its continued operational presence
though 2005 and 2006, the question turns to whether these developments were wellreceived and appreciated in American opinion. The answer to this question may be mixed
and it appears to vary depending on year, but while some commentators may produce less
encouraging answers, others respond more reassuringly.
In 2004 it could be said that the general consensus reflected the former sentiment.
Richard Armitage would state that year before the National Press Club that, “under the
present situation if an American ship was out in the Sea of Japan, outside the territorial
waters of Japan, and was attacked, you are technically not allowed to help us…That
doesn’t seem to be entirely reasonable.” 260 John Hill is quoted the following year citing
260
In Dupont, 8.
102
DoD sentiments concerning whether it was possible for Japan to even plan for a military
contingency.261 Samuels is later quoted following the SDF dispatch that it remained
unresolved whether the loss of several SDF personnel from direct attack would have
shattered Japanese resolve in Iraq and set policy of foreign deployments back for an
entire generation. Samuels further qualifies this statement in the same panel discussion by
stating that the unintended killing of civilians, an ever-present danger when operating in a
conflict zone, would likely set Japan back for many generations and throw the entire
policy issue of foreign deployments into jeopardy.262
Admiral Keating, also a guest before the Japan Society, would take a slightly
more congenial approach to Japan's situation. He gently prods Japan by saying,
...that’s not why you build militaries, to dispense MRE’s and pass out blankets, but
it is a very beneficial second, third order effect. For Japan to increase gradually and
transparently with fully understood and stated intentions, their military capabilities
is, from our perspective, advantageous to all of us and we will encourage them,
provided
they do it with full disclosure. 263
Without pushing the issue of Article 9 revision, the Admiral continues these sentiments
by enunciating that, “The strength of the US-Japan alliance is profound. It is important. It
is the lynchpin of our entire theater security cooperation plan...”
Other speakers, however, address the issue of Article 9 revision more directly, and
not in nearly as encouraging terms. Richard Armitage, for example, would take an
outwardly neutral position toward Article 9 in 2006 by responding that the renunciation
of war language in Japan's constitution was “...an internal matter that [would] be resolved
by the Japanese people”. Armitage's statement was outwardly neutral, but it was also
clear that his words suggested a far different interpretation. Article 9 was an issue in need
261
In Samuels, Securing Japan, 71.
Samuels, before Japan Society December 12 2007.
263
Admiral Timothy J. Keating, before Japan Society May 7 2008.
262
103
of resolution. Further, it was an issue that was causing dissension and uncertainty,
otherwise it would not have been an subject requiring the former Deputy Secretary of
State's mention. If his words appeared ambiguous, Armitage's follow-up statement would
remove any question over his sentiments.
I do know that the inability to participate in collective self-defense is an inhibitor to
alliance cooperation. But let me be clear, let me be absolutely clear: our alliance,
and the duties and responsibilities of the U.S. under that alliance, are very
understood and fully embraced by republican and democratic administrations, no
matter what decision Japan reaches on the question of
Article 9. 264
In a similar fashion to Admiral Keating, Armitage had placed the alliance as a
priority to be preserved. Unlike the Admiral, however, Armitage focused on the Alliance
as a sort of intrinsic good. He identified the asymmetry of the relationship, but pledged
fully the American end of the agreement. Also unlike Admiral Keating, Armitage had
taken a critical stand, citing the Japanese constitution as an explicit impediment to
progress. The problem with this state of affairs, however, is not that there exist persons
who are equally critical of Japanese constitutional issues and supportive of Japan as an
ally. The problem, as Samuels puts it, is that “[there] is no one left in Washington”.265
People, White House staffers, State Department officials who would spend their days
pondering the alliance such as Richard Armitage or Michael Green, as Samuels points
out, were simply out of the picture by 2007.
At the same time, Samuels responds to the direction of the alliance following
Koizumi's exit from office and the disappearance of key US figures by suggesting that a
“Goldilocks Consensus” had begun to develop. Fukuda would further cement the
developing consensus by reauthorizing the Special Measures Law in 2007 to support US
264
265
Richard Armitage, before Japan Society June 13 2006.
Samuels, before Japan Society December 12 2007.
104
operations in Afghanistan while backpedaling on Abe's values-based diplomacy to avoid
strife with China. Fukuda would also make the unexpected gesture of allowing friendly
port to the Chinese guided missile cruiser Shenzen near MSDF headquarters in
Yokosuka.266 Alternatively, it must be noted that Samuels' consensus would not be
entirely trusting of China. Samuels believed that Japan fully intended to deter Chinese
aggression. Defense planning would be disguised as deterrence against North Korea, but
it would still be aimed at China.267 And yet, it will not be aimed at a China; it will instead
aim to achieve a healthier and more productive balance between a growing China and a
uncertain United States.268
The question inevitably turns, however, back to the issue of Article 9 revision.
Boyd, writing in 2005, asks why revision had proven so elusive. Selecting a Realist
perspective to the issue, he arrives at several observations. Citing Herman Kahn, who
predicted that Japan would seek strategic power on par with that economic power it
already possessed, Boyd countered that Article 9 had remained intact and had
subsequently diverted Japan from this outcome.269 Still, despite Article 9's integral
position within Japan's defensive framework, the country had greatly expanded its
capabilities and roles, moving closer to the United States along the way.
Szechenyi continues on this theme of change within continuity; writing back in
2006, he noted that:
As much as Japan aspires to strengthen its own defensive capabilities, combat the
scourge of terrorism, and provide humanitarian assistance, it must balance the
desire to assume greater responsibilities with the need to honor its constitutionally
embedded pacifist tradition...Japan will eventually find a way to cure its allergy,
but...In the interim, the next government in Japan can continue to articulate a
266
Samuels, Securing Japan, XI.
Samuels, before Japan Society December 12 2007.
268
Samuels, Securing Japan, XII.
269
Boyd, 11-12.
267
105
progressive vision for the SDF and remind the Japanese people of the strategic
impact of expanded roles and missions 270
Although the use of self-defense as defined by the CLB continued to be relegated to the
“minimum necessary level” and never in support of the forces of other nations (Iraq and
certain BMD scenarios placed aside), authors such as Szechenyi hoped that creative
minds would prevail, that the ensuing years would mark a turning point “...when Japan
[would make] great strides in developing a security policy flexible to the challenges and
needs of the times.” 271
270
271
Szechenyi, 148.
Ibid, 148.
106
Chapter Four:
Japan's Regional Security Framework
Having gone to great efforts in paving through the development of a bilateral
missile defense architecture and having made great strides in both technology and
practical expertise, it would appear that the Ministry of Defense and their supporters in
the Diet are close to achieving those goals outlined nearly 16 years earlier in the Higuchi
Panel Report: A missile defense capability that can be used bilaterally to strengthen ties
with the United States, that can be used independently to strengthen the national security
of Japan, and alternatively, a capability that can be used in concert with other nations
outside of the alliance framework. However, while it can be said that Japan has achieved
these first two goals, the third has yet to be seen. Maybe this is a subject better suited for
another study, but it does say something about the current state of Japan's regional policy.
At this moment in time, Japan's primary and most senior regional partner remains
the United States. This chapter seeks to explore that relationship as it relates to endeavors
such as Bilateral Ballistic Missile Defense or the broader subject of continued
cooperation in regional security. Additionally, the chapter will cover Japan's relationships
with neighboring countries and with regional blocks such as ASEAN. China and North
Korea will be investigated both as points of bilateral cooperation and as points of marked
divergence within the alliance. The chapter will also provide some background into
Japan's past relations within the region from the Cold War period onward and examine
the ways in which this experience has affected Japan's regional policy development to
date. The chapter will end with an appraisal of what Japan's current course of regional
and bilateral involvement and what it will mean for the United States into the foreseeable
107
future. It will seek to more directly assess the value of the alliance in this regard and will
draw from a variety of opinions ranging from established Japan scholars to former State
Department officials to current high-ranking officers in the United States military.
4.1 Bilateral BMD
Although it was not until 1994 that Japan began to formulate a comprehensive
assessment of BMD in regard to the full range of policy options available, the subject had
been revived as an item of alliance cooperation under the newly-elected Clinton
Administration's Theater Missile Defense initiative. During his 1993 visit to Japan,
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin would present the case for joint development of a theater
missile system. Still wary from the previous FSX crisis, the JDA and industry were
unprepared to accept the practical implications that such a system would demand; it
would demand not only the abandonment or curtailing of Japan's somewhat similar Air
Defense Initiative, but would also complicate Japan's defense procurement planning
across the services. Moreover, Japan was simply not prepared technologically to take part
in co-developing such a system.272 As an additional nail in the coffin of TMD, Japanese
Socialist Party demands set TMD as the price for their support of the coalition
government that would aid in the revisionists' rise to power. As a result, despite the
establishment of a new defense industry association for the the purpose of floating ideas
and abating US pressure, no progress was made in 1993 following TMD's initial nonstarter.273
By 1994 and near the end of that year, however, things had changed considerably.
By then, the JDA, industry, and the MOFA had begun seeing the initiative not as an
272
273
Green, Arming Japan, 137.
Ibid, 138-139.
108
unneeded burden, but as a bolster to the existing alliance. Additionally, concerns over
China had begun to form, especially in regard to Chinese opposition to any missile
defense agreements formed between the US and Japan. Following the 1995 Taiwan
Straits Crisis, Chinese opposition accelerated and Japan now saw a country off of its
coasts that was concerned with the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. Essentially such
concerns were interpreted, as Michael Green points out, as an indication that China had
been operationally targeting Japan with its nuclear arsenal and that the country had
jettisoned both its policy against first-strike and its policy against targeting non-nuclear
states.274
As a result of these concerns and other separate alliance issues, Japanese and
American leaders met in 1996 to form what would become known as the “Nye Initiative”
named after the former Assistant Secretary of Defense and alliance negotiator, Dr. Joseph
Nye Jr. In addition to the revision of defense guidelines and more traditional items of
alliance cooperation, joint research on TMD received its long-awaited green light.275 It
was, however, more an agreement in principle than in actuality; to be sure it marked the
beginning of joint development and reflected a concrete desire to achieve a greater
security between the two nations, but the actual development of anything worthy of being
called a benchmark of technological achievement would be forthcoming.
This all changed following the 1998 North Korean missile test, whereafter missile
defense would regain steam and, more importantly, political weight. As a result of the
test, Japan's previously immobile peaceful-use language saw the initiation of programs to
launch the first indigenous surveillance satellites into orbit. It must be said, however, that
274
275
Green, Arming Japan, 92-93.
Ibid, 13.
109
MELCO, NEC, and Toshiba had been attempting to push their satellite imagery
technologies for some time, but had lacked support in the Japanese government. Thus, as
Oros points out, although it would be easy to construe the 1998 incident as setting off the
drive to acquire indigenous satellite reconnaissance, such systems had actually been
primed from the very beginning.276 In that same year, the Diet would actualize plans to
move forward with the co-development of Ballistic Missile Defense with the United
States. Taken with the return of the Japanese national flag to the classrooms and
legislative articulations toward the possible revision of Article 9, the effects of the 1998
crisis were impossible to ignore.277
There were, however, many different interpretations to the 1998 event and the
progress toward BMD that followed it. Oros maintains, contrary to other authors who see
the event as a independent shock precipitating alliance cooperation, that the 1998 incident
only provided a pretext for the Japanese government to pursue such cooperation with the
United States. Further, Oros holds that BMD was not an indigenous policy decision, but
instead was based solely on the pretext of US pressure, planning, and initiative.278 Going
off of this rationale, it would not be a surprise that following the 1998 legislation and the
1999 Memorandum of Understanding that clarified the framework for joint development,
Japan would not advance reform in this area until 2003, well within the vicinity of the
Second Gulf War. In addition to renewing logistical support for Enduring Freedom and
pledging a contingent of SDF personnel to Iraq, Japan launched its first military-specific
intelligence satellite in that year and made its first concrete decision to procure both
American Land-based PAC-3 and Sea-based SM-3 missile systems.279
276
Oros, 144.
Ibid, 170.
278
Ibid, 149.
279
Dupont, 19-20.
277
110
Of course, a large determinant in the decision to move forward with missile
defense revolved around concerns that Japan was lagging behind in terms of defense
capability and needed to accelerate momentum toward more advanced systems. Earlier in
2002, JDA Director General Ishiba and Administrative Vice Minister Takeshima would
openly express to their US counterparts that Japan was willing to move forward with the
BMD initiative on the grounds of a “widening technological gap”. This would
demonstrate that Japan was not only concerned for its own defense, but was also
preoccupied with the subject of bilateral interoperability and cooperation.280 Additionally,
scholars such as Alan Dupont saw the initiative as an opportunity to reshape the power
structure of the alliance and overhaul Japan's national security planning architecture
while reaffirming the central tenets of the alliance.281
These improvements in cooperation and technological progress did not occur in a
vacuum, however. Countries such as China were closely following Japan's research and
development concerning systems that they perceived could easily be transferred to
ballistic missile technology. In spite of the myriad concerns, both within Japan and
abroad, Ballistic Missile Defense has been cemented and sealed as a joint capability
between the US and Japan. As Admiral Keating remarked in 2008, “They are rather
completely integrated in our overall plan for Ballistic Missile Defense and for command
and control in the Western Pacific and Central Pacific.”282 On the topic of regional
security, this was a new Japan that could successfully deal with threats from North Korea
and act in concert with the United States to maintain peace and stability in Asia, not just
280
Samuels, 105.
Ibid, 33.
282
Admiral Keating, before Japan Society May 7 2008.
281
111
as a junior partner, but in many respects as a co-equal partner within certain limited
exigencies.
The Admiral would add that such undertakings have forced the Japanese to
expand their views. BMD and initiatives like it serve to elevate Japan out of the closed
loop of subsistence defense policy and push them to envision their security in different
ways. One interpretation might be that such technical achievements provide a stronger
foundation for alliance cooperation and will lead to more comprehensive cooperation in
the future. Another might be that BMD will lead to the elimination or resolution of
certain psychological blocks concerning the many taboos of Post-war Japanese defense. It
remains clear, however, that Japan has found versatility in BMD, both in terms of a new
area of alliance cooperation and as a jump-off point for future defense reform.
4.2 CHINA
When the subject turns to Japan's traditional security in the East Asian region,
China is often the foremost concern. As has been noted, although Japanese officials may
code North Korea for China, their primary concern is not for the upstart on their coast,
but for the larger economic and political dynamo across the Yalu River. Though relatively
weak in the 1990's, China was an exceptionally prescient concern for Japan even in back
in those formative years. For Dupont in particular, the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis was an
admonition that China was not merely a source of economic opportunity in Asia, but
could also become a regional security concern, especially considering Japan's close
relationship with one of China's most likely rivals.283
283
Dupont, 6.
112
Sheldon Simon had highlighted this dynamic in his 1996 article, “Alternative
Visions of Security in the Asia Pacific”. In it, he explored the growing tensions in the
region concerning territorial disputes and arms buildups among numerous Asian nations
coupled with the uncertain security forecast for the late 1990's. Of particular note,
however, was the author's attention to the changing relationship between the US and Asia
with special consideration for China; Simon draws particular attention to the
communication between President Clinton and PM Hashimoto in which the Prime
Minister agreed to a revitalization of the alliance relationship, trading greater burdensharing for continued protection under the US defense umbrella. Accordingly, the author
saw the agreement as a sort of slap to China, targeting the nation as a threat because of
conflicts of interest concerning North Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Seas.284
Michael Green continues on this train of thought, positing that this new strategic
alliance presented a variety of unavoidable pitfalls in the Japan-US-China trilateral
relationship. If China were to strike Taiwan, for example, and the US did not respond
accordingly, Japan could lose faith in the resolve of its American partner. Alternatively, if
the US acted and Japan did not stand in solidarity or instead, undermined US decisionmaking, then the entire alliance could fall into jeopardy as the US decoupled from the
relationship.285
The topic of Sino-Japanese relations has been even more fraught with conflict.
Although somewhat cooled at the moment, the critical years of 2000-2005 saw a great
amount of tension between the two nations. Following this period, Michael Green and
Richard Armitage chimed in on the subject, each with different, but complimentary
284
Simon, Sheldon W. “Alternative Visions of Security in the Asia Pacific” Pacific Affairs 69 3 (1996): p.
395 (hereafter, Simon).
285
Dupont, 42-43.
113
views. Green drew attention to the strange paradox between the great opportunities
available for both countries in terms of trade and the provocations that both countries had
created against each other, whether it be China's opposition to UN Security Council
reform or Koizumi's insistence on official visits to the Yasukuni shrine or naval scuffles
over disputed territories.286 Armitage likened the situation to a “...basketball game where
players are grabbing rebounds and kind of elbowing eachother a little bit”.287
Samuels additionally finds that the situation between Japan and China makes little
logical sense despite representing a strategic reality. The author refers to the mounting
growth in imports from China as well as the large gains in exports from Japan and
interchanges in nearly every aspect of trade and capital investment.288 At the same time,
he points out that in addition to unprecedented levels of military modernization, China
has taken steps to openly escalate tensions such as the 2005 anti-secession law against
Taiwan or the 2007 Anti-Satellite test. High-level suspicions that China was targeting
mainland Japan as a result of the US-Japan alliance also began to recirculate.289
Chinese naval operations provide another concern. In 2004, a Chinese Han-Class
submarine entered the hotly-disputed Exclusive Economic Zone without prior
notification, breaking explicit bilateral agreements in the process;290 since the 2001 “prior
notice” agreement, China has become increasingly confident in its forays into disputed
waters291. Even more alarming was the September 2008 breach of Japanese territorial
waters by a mystery submarine, presumed to be an unmarked Chinese vessel, which
286
Michael Green, before Japan Society June 13 2006.
Richard Armitage, before Japan Society June 13 2006.
288
Samuels, Securing Japan, 136.
289
Ibid, 140.
290
Ibid, 143.
291
Shimoyachi, Nao (2008, September 4). Chinese Submarine Intrusion Considered an Act of
Provocation. The Japan Times Online, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/member/member.html?
nn20041113a4.htm .
287
114
penetrated as far inward as the coast of Kochi Prefecture in Japan without any warning
and without the slightest indication that Japan had been able to detect the incursion. 292
Other maritime disputes, while less inflammatory, still provide grounds for disagreement
and distrust; Chinese oceanography, for example has created suspicions of increased
submarine activity and operations in disputed territories and created speculation of such
things as a complex network of Chinese sensor arrays along the ocean floor.293
Despite these flashpoints along the China-Japan relationship, Japan has
consistently made efforts to engage China and keep relations intact, even ahead of the
country's more recent “Goldilocks Consensus”. Pyle in particular notes that Japan and
China have been at odds with one another for centuries and yet Japan has always
managed to come out ahead in the relationship, whether it be merely beneficial or wildly
favorable towards Japan. 294 Earlier on during the Cold War, Japan had even come to see
China as a logical partner independent of the United States. Partnership did not extend
beyond trade, but China was still seen as a country that could benefit Japan through
meaningful economic cooperation. Pyle draws attention to the conflicted position of
Yoshida Shigeru, who despite his interest in establishing ties with the legitimate
Communist leadership of greater China, was pressured into signing a peace treaty with
the KMT government of Taiwan. Yoshida was further pressed to foreswear bilateral
treaties with the CCP, which he grudgingly obliged.295 And in spite of the markedly antiCommunist line of the US, Japan found that in between, it could forge a healthy trade
292
(2004, November 13). Unidentified Sub Enters Deep into Western Japan Territorial Waters. Kyodo
News Agency, http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/unidentified-sub-enters-deepinto-western-japan-territorial-waters.
293
Ibid, 140.
294
Pyle, 316.
295
Ibid, 317.
115
relationship with China in the 50's and 60's, becoming China's largest trade partner and
unsettling many spectators in Taiwan.296
Even with a history of trade and Japanese pragmatism, however, China would
soon grow wary of Japan. Historical issues persisted, crowding out the goodwill that
Japan had attempted to forge with its ODA. Chinese criticism both within China and
upon official visits to Japan continued throughout the 1980's. Even as South Korean
leader Kim Dae Jung extended his hand to Japan to “hope for future possibilities”,
China's Jiang Zemin remained “unwilling to forgive” on the part of China and regretfully,
while the former country's visit ended with an apology from a position of mutual
friendship, the latter country's visit ended with a return flight home.297
More recently, China has become preoccupied with Japan's attempts to bolster its
own defense capability, but in relation to the perception that Japan wishes to raise itself to
a level where it will be able to intervene militarily within the region. Seeing Japanese
peacekeeping and counter-terrorist operations as public relations tools to warm Asia to
the prospect of a militarily engaged Japan, many in China see Japan moving toward an
independent force projection capability and ambitious foreign policy goals.298 As noted
earlier, even the relatively nonthreatening prospect of missile defense between the US
and Japan has become a virtual nuclear peril to China, with some Chinese commentators
extrapolating a concept-to-deployment time of merely a few months for a Japanese
nuclear-tipped ICBM.299
China clearly sees the developing strategic situation as well as the course of their
own nation's power in the 21st century, but it is also clear that the United States will not
296
Pyle, 318.
Ibid, 330-331.
298
Dupont, 40-41.
299
Ibid, 38.
297
116
jettison a system of relationships it has spent the last 60 years developing nor will it
revise its current foreign policy to satisfy China, at least not so much that the US would
being going out of its way or its interests to do so. Some commentators speak directly to
this point, holding that America's Asia policy would prefer a more productive course of
relations between Japan and China, but not to the detriment of the US.300 Armitage puts it
simply when he says that, “...the Chinese must have a great frustration, because their
most important relationship is with the US but ours is with Japan.” 301
Alternatively, Former Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte views
the situation as non-zero-sum and one in which strong relations with Japan and China as
well as strong relations between Japan and China could create synergies that enhance
every member of the triad.302 On a similar note, many speakers will readily identify all
that would be lost should conflict break out between the three nations.303 Further, by
bringing China into organizations that the US, and likely, Japan maintain standing in,
there exists the opportunity to “change China before China changes the world”, but not
without a creative and innovative diplomatic efforts.304 In this way, perhaps instead of
seeing an entrenched US strategic order, China may benefit from seeing a multi-polar
regional dynamic, as Michael Green posits, both steadfast in shared liberal values and
welcoming toward all who would join.305
300
William S. Cohen, before Japan Society April 27 2006.
Richard Armitage, before Japan Society June 13 2006.
302
John Negroponte, before Japan Society January 31 2008.
303
Richard Armitage, before Japan Society June 13 2007.
304
Michael Green, before Japan Society June 13 2006.
305
Ibid.
301
117
4.3 NORTH KOREA
Historically, Korea and by extension, North Korea, have had a mixed relationship
with both Japan and the United States. Even as recently as the 20th century, the US turned
a blind eye to Japan's usurpation of Korea in return for Japan's recognition of US
dominion over Hawaii. 306 Although it was not until the early part of the last century that
Japan took control of Korea, the peninsula had always represented the “dagger aimed at
the heart of Japan” that had nearly facilitated the invasion of Japan by the Mongolians.
Following the end of the Cold War, North Korea took new significance as a
generalized threat to Japan. In essence, just as the Korean War and the specter of
Communism had borne the US-Japan alliance in the first place, the 1993 Korean Crisis
served to reawaken Japan's regional security consciousness and to renew its security
relationship with the United States. Unfortunately, Japan's reaction to the first of many
North Korean Crises to take place in the 1990's was not up to US expectations nor did it
succeed in salvaging Japan's diplomatic apparatus from its battered state post-Persian
Gulf. Prime Minister Hata's administration, much like that of Kaifu's, lacked the legal
authority to support a US blockade and lacked the consensus required to pursue tough
economic sanctions and more advanced forms of diplomatic recourse.307
Essentially, the crisis revealed that Japan was not prepared to act alongside the
United States in responding to regional emergencies. Samuels notes that “Operational
plans were limited or non-existent, and the future of the alliance was suddenly in
jeopardy.” 308 This state of affairs would not be remedied until the 1997 Revised
306
Richard Armitage, before Japan Society June 13 2006.
Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism, 120-121.
308
Samuels, Securing Japan, 67.
307
118
Guidelines, which finally laid out those things that were expected of Japan in a crisis
situation. The alliance was consequently strengthened by these unambiguous pledges of
support and Japan would at last be able to contribute effectively to US operations. 309
Though untested in practice, the Revised Guidelines did prime the Japanese
consciousness for the Korean missile tests that would take place August of the following
year. With this instance of North Korean provocation, Japan acted swiftly, suspending
negotiations, discontinuing economic aid, and cutting off remittances from North
Koreans working in Japan. To further contrast the differences between this new crisis and
the same period in 1993, Diet members were heard openly calling for the consideration of
retaliatory strikes in the case of additional incursions.310 It would seem that some of this
sentiment would trickle into reality during the following years; in 1999, Japan responded
to a string of “suspicious boat” incidents in which North Korean vessels intruded on
Japanese territorial waters, prompting the Obuchi Administration to grant permission to
fire live munitions (in warning) for the first time in the country's Post-war history.
Additionally, Japanese aircraft would drop several munitions in an attempt to intercept
some of the suspected vessels, another Post-war first.311
Two years later in 2001, there would be a repeat of North Korean boat incidents,
however, this time Japan would take much bolder steps. In this instance, not only did
engagement occur, but actual combat took place between the two vessels resulting in the
injury of three Japanese Coast Guard personnel and the sinking of a North Korean vessel.
309
Katzenstein, Peter J; Okawara Nobuo “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical
Eclecticism” International Security 26 3 (2001-2002): pp. 158-159 (hereafter Katzenstein, Case
for Analytical Eclecticism).
310
Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism, 124.
311
Dupont, 6.
119
As a result, defense supporters in the Diet were emboldened, pacifist stalwarts were
muted, and the Japanese public flocked to the defense issue in record numbers. 312
Following these events, by the end of 2001 it was unlikely that Japan-NK
relations would make any headway. Having normalized ties nearly a decade prior, the
Japanese people and legislators had been influenced by a period of crises and escalated
tensions for nearly the same span of time.313 As Samuels describes, North Korea had
become something of a catch-all for generalized external threats. Though poorer than
Japan's most impoverished prefectures, North Korea would rise to the top of Japan's
defense priority above International Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.314
In addition to the more obvious effects on Japanese foreign policy, the situation
with the North has also strengthened ties between the US and Japan and created new
roads for regional cooperation. On the heels of Tokyo's rapid change in policy course
through 1999, the US set up the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group. In addition
to salvaging Japan's diplomacy toward North Korea, the organization provided a new
level of negotiating power to Japan that had previously only been open to armistice
signatories such as China or the United States.315 By 2005, the peaceful resolution of
issues related to North Korea outpaced Taiwan as a common strategic objective at the
2+2 accounting in February of that year.316 With Japan growing in regional circles and
claiming the sort of leadership positions it has sought for so long, the US-Japan
relationship with regard to North Korea continues at a strong pace and, with some
certainty, will endure even as Japan's influence continues to grow in Asia.
312
Dupont, 6.
Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism, 116-117.
314
Samuels, Securing Japan, 148.
315
Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism, 144.
316
Samuels, Securing Japan, 171.
313
120
4.4 HISTORICAL ROOTS
Since Japan's re-entrance to the international system in the 1950's and the
subsequent consensus over the policies of Yoshida Shigeru, several themes have held that
country's attention. Michael Green lists five: The Alliance, the Constitution, The UN,
Economic Power, and Asia.317 Asia has always been Japan's one elusive goal. And
following the American occupation, that very region of the world that Japan so earnestly
needed to improve ties with was left with an inherent, yet undeveloped potential for
future multilateralism.
To answer how and why this situation developed, Christopher Hemmer and Peter
Katzenstein have written an illuminating article on the subject titled, “Why is there no
NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism”.
The authors begin by summarizing the traditional behavior of the United States in terms
of security cooperation. They posit that the United States has interacted with its European
partners multilaterally while dealing with its Asian partners on a bilateral basis.
Moreover, while bilateral cooperation continues in Asia, the United States continues to
strengthen its multilateralism in Europe. This relates directly to Japan's Post-war
diplomacy in Asia, because it identifies the particular aspects of the region that have
turned the country away from multilateral objectives and toward bilateral ones.
Katzenstein and Hemmer note that the US started out by establishing both a
NATO and a South East Asia Treaty Organization. However, the authors find that in the
instance of Asia, self-interested benefits did not resign the nations of the region to
multilateral security arrangements.318 The explanation for this, the authors posit, may lie
317
318
Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism, 22.
Hemmer, Christopher; Katzenstein, Peter J. “Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective Identity,
121
in part with the fact that the US had initially resigned itself to the North Atlantic rather
than to Asia. As US senators displayed quizzical inquiries into exactly how the US could
deign itself as belonging to an abstraction of geography, the very organizations that the
US was creating were being prepared for markedly different destinies; while the US
moved multilaterally in NATO, it would insist on bilateral relations between itself and
SEATO member nations, mirroring its diplomatic strategy in East Asia.
Another reason for this strong bias toward a European order as opposed to an
Asian one was quite simply, because those states possessed a greater strength relative to
Asia and were expected to recover to their pre-war levels relatively quickly. Asia, by
comparison, was not expected to grow to a strength or stature capable of being a useful
security partner to the US. Also of note was the fact that Asian problems of security
revolved around unconventional insurgencies while those of Europe comprised more
traditional great power conflict. The authors quote Eisenhower's agreement with
Churchill's appraisal that "Since sectors of the SEATO front were so varied in place and
conditions, he [Churchill] felt it best to operate nationally where possible." 319
Furthermore, while Asia's most promising nation, China, remained on a separate
ideological rail to the United States, US relations in Europe reflected a search for shared
values not found any place else. While Asia remained preoccupied “...with internal
problems and 'distract- ed' by memories of colonialism”, such could not be said for
Europe, or at least Europe's concerns were largely forward-looking.320 Hemmer and
Katzenstein further elaborate on this divide in value by placing language such as
"common civilization," "community," “shared spirit," "like-minded peoples," and
Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism” International Organization 56 3 (2002): p. 576
(hereafter, Hemmer).
319
Hemmer, 584-585.
320
Ibid, 583-585.
122
"common ideals” in a single corner. In the other corner, statements such as those by
James Eastland, cast the fight with the USSR as a “...struggle between 'eastern and
western civilization,' a battle between 'the Oriental hordes and a western civilization
2,000 years old.'” 321 Although not typical of common sentiment, the authors do believe
that such views at least loosely reflected a more general consensus held by those who
made their beginnings in the Euro-centric culture of the 1930's and 40's and had a
collective experience of racial segregation at home and of Asian weakness abroad. Thus,
the authors contend that the effects of collective identity factored heavily in America's
treatment of the two security organizations, but especially in terms of its treatment of
SEATO.
While SEATO did not result in the development of larger, more extensive
multilateral frameworks in Asia and neither the US nor Japan showed resolve in fostering
such ends, Katzenstein writes in his other article on the subject that a workable “spider
web” of bilateral connections had formed in the absence of a multilateral framework.322
As an example, he cites bilateral cooperation between India and Malaysia and between
Malaysia and Thailand to fight communist guerillas in the 1960's and 70's. This precedent
may in fact hold the very key to the future of Asian multilateralism; Japan, likely similar
to other countries in the region, has placed more importance on Comprehensive Security
than on other, more traditional subjects of defense. Rather than simply providing a
national defense, social stability figures heavily.323
By the turn of the 1990's, Japan was seeing the first hints that it could forge a
better future for itself as a participant in a new multilateral framework. It has been
321
Hemmer, 593-594.
Katzenstein, Case for Analytical Eclecticism, 164-165.
323
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 115.
322
123
mentioned that PM Kaifu's support in Asia for his post-Gulf War deployment would not
have been possible had he not brought himself before the Asian nations and expressed
deep sorrow for past Japanese actions. That expression was not done before one or even
several individual nations, but rather before the nations of ASEAN. As a result, those
nations expressed support not only for the deployment, but for Japanese intentions within
Asia and Japan's growing economic influence.324
4.5 Post-Gulf War Regionalism
With the Cold War at an end and the post-Gulf War political disposition creating a
stigma for “checkbook diplomacy” along with moves in the Diet supporting more
proactive measures, Japan was committed to reentering the international system and
building new regional ties. However, this period was a bewildering one for Japan.
Answers were not forthcoming and there was little precedent available to guide Japan
toward an optimal national course. Thus, it was not surprising that directly prior to the
fall of the Soviet Union, Japan had put forward a new multilateral security proposal for
Asia that was abstracted from any common practice of European diplomacy. Prime
Minister Nakayama's proposal would exclude socialist states such as the USSR, reserve
special status for itself and the United States, and while not demanding co-equal
reciprocity, did identify the role of the United States as an independent provider of
security in the region.325
Although this divergence from theoretical frameworks and common practice did
showcase a Japan that was desperately searching for its way during a crucial period in its
post-Cold War development, the issue of national identity was one that was carried over
324
325
Purrington, 172.
Katzenstein, Case for Analytical Eclecticism, 166.
124
much intact from the bipolar world that had preceded 1991. Green notes that Japan has
traditionally remained an outlier between the west and Asia. Although he does not go so
far back as the feudal or the Tokugawa periods when the European trade was more or less
common, Green cites the viewpoint that Meiji leaders saw their country as “a bridge
between East and West”.326 He further posits that Japan will always be pulled in these two
directions, “forever seeking a synthesis” and will continue to be tempted toward using its
Asian position as a card against the US, regional shortcomings being its only limitation. 327
Still, there were those such as Ozawa Ichiro, who wished to see Japan as a
“normal country” that could stand among other nations built on the western model.
Samuels notes that the Japanese public “...were learning, moreover, that security was not
free, and it might not even be cheap any longer.” 328 The post-Cold War period was also
demonstrating that the UN had emerged as a force in international politics.329 And so, it
would prove intuitive that Japan would pursue its return to foreign deployments via the
stamp of UN mandate and numerous UN peace-keeping missions. Furthermore, those
same missions that Japan would participate in during the 1990's would, in turn, open the
eyes of the Japanese toward the greater possibilities of their nation's foreign policy.
Within this new desire for a place in the international system emerged several
groups of Diet members, some leading the charge, others simply reflecting the changing
sentiment of the time. Richard Samuels focuses on several of the most prominent political
grouping of the 1990's, characterized as: Normal Nation-alists, Neo-Autonomists,
Pacifists, and Middle Power Internationalists respectively. For the purposes of this
chapter, however, only the first and the last of these groups provide a strong bearing on
326
Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism, 26.
Ibid, 28.
328
Samuels, Securing Japan, 67-68.
329
Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism, 193.
327
125
regional policy. The “Normal Nation-alists” as characterized by Ozawa, Abe, and
Koizumi, are said to be responsible for amplifying existing threats. And while not
producing any new ones, this group believes that strength was the path to prestige,
prestige being the group's interpretation of Japan's international aspirations. 330 Moreover,
Normal Nation-alists such as Ozawa see the UN as the only legitimate entity capable of
dispersing force, likely drawing from Japanese fears of entanglement in US wars.331
Alternatively, others Normal-Nationalists like Koizumi see the US as Japan's first priority
and Asia second;332 the US is not only a force upon which Japan should devote its
strategic trust, but also a nation to be held above others on the international stage.
The “Middle Power Internationalists” believe in a more equal division of relations
between the United States and Japan's Asian neighbors. They have taken the position that
economic and not military power should bridge the gap to a greater world standing and
hold that a continued US alliance is key if Japan will continue to place aside remilitarization in exchange for other goals.333 Although there exist differing factions within
these group, there is some consensus over the need to construct regional organizations
and play to common values among Japan and other Asian nations.334
Despite the political chasms between these two groups and, to a smaller extent,
between the two groups and other legislative blocks, Asia had risen as a concept to be
pursued on both the left and right spectrums in the 1990's. Katzenstein puts the answer to
this peculiar state of affairs in particularly simple terms: Those on the left see
participation in Asian security as a method of diminishing the influence of those who
330
Samuels, Securing Japan, 5, 112.
Ibid, 124.
332
Ibid, 126.
333
Ibid, 127.
334
Ibid, 129-130.
331
126
would seek greater national power for Japan and those on the right see participation in
Asia as an opportunity to assert paternal leadership in the region.335 Lending support to
this new flexibility and to the revisionist camp, but distancing itself from the vision of a
multilateral bond between the US and Japan, the Advisory Panel on Defense in its 1994
report would suggest a path of autonomous defense production, diverting course from
bilateral relations to create a new global role for Japan.336
Keeping the 1994 Panel Report in mind, it did appear that Japan had found a new
partner in Asia by the mid-1990's. Japan, in concert with ASEAN, would participate in a
series of new and unprecedented security dialogues, including the Track 1 ASEAN
Regional Forum and Track 2 Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific.337
Further, as Green points out, Japan had gained advantages in Asia that the US could not
have hoped to match. In 1998, for example, Japan would outmaneuver the US in
agricultural policy at the APEC summit at Kuala Lumpur, reflecting the the tactical
superiority of Japanese networks of influence in regional negotiations. 338
From Japan's perspective, multilateralism holds a wide array of benefits as it seeks
to erase the historical stain of the “former enemies” clause of the UN charter and
overcome past historical stigmas in addition to removing the effective block on foreign
deployments by legitimizing them through collective action. More importantly, however,
multilateralism remains key in Japan's quest for regional leadership.339 Asia is unlikely to
trust Japan again as an independent regional leader with muscular economic and security
proposals all of its own. Instead, Japan has leveraged its position in G-7 and subsequent
335
Samuels, Securing Japan, 208.
Ibid, 26.
337
Katzenstein, Case for Analytical Eclecticism, 162.
338
Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism, 225.
339
Ibid, 196-199.
336
127
additions of that framework to build credibility and has consistently called upon all
readily-available political capital to gain a stake among its neighbors.
In terms of the prime First Track mode of dialogue, Japan's interest and role in the
ASEAN Regional Forum is difficult to ignore. When the ARF was founded, it succeeded
in striking a compromise between Australia's proposal for an Asian version of the
Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe and Japan's independent proposal for a
regional security forum. Upon launch in 1994, the forum had a general purpose in
coordinating security cooperation in Asia, but with the overarching goal of drawing
China into regional dialogues. Chinese unilateralist actions would provide a key
motivation for seeking to bring the country under regional consensus. Thus, the ARF was
brought into being with the implicit security guarantee of the US that it would maintain
regional stability, as it had throughout the Cold War and the early 1990's, while the ARF
engaged China in more receptive terms.340
More recently, the issue of International Terrorism is one that Japan has sought to
instill in the growing Asian consciousness by fostering regional cooperation.341
Additionally, beyond the CSCAP Working Group on International Crime and ASEAN's
drug enforcement organs, Japan has invested a lot of time into Second Track dialogues
such as KEDO in an effort to forge new veins of cooperation and discover new avenues
of leadership.
Ultimately, however, the ability of Japan to assert its influence regionally will be
decided by a variety of factors. The most obvious of these factors will be whether the
image of Japan as an occupier and oppressor will remain unchanged or will instead fade
340
341
Simon, 394.
Dupont, 163-164.
128
with time. Among the less intuitive of these factors will be the position of Japan in
relation America's foreign policy in Asia; to the extent that Japan defers to Washington,
so may its image become linked to the United States and, potentially, lose legitimacy in
Asia as an independent leader.342 Alternatively, Samuels contends that Japan has also been
placed in a position where it has had to come to terms with the prospect that the US
“...might not stand by its side indefinitely.” 343
As a result of these and other realizations, Japan has sought the friendship of other
regional powers and has built mutually beneficial relationships with those nations.
Although the US-Japan Alliance continues to be Japan's most important security
relationship, Japan recognizes that the US is in no way permanently wedded to Asia;
despite the more obvious concerns for energy security, the US has reserved the right,
primarily due to its natural geography between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, to move
either toward Europe or toward Asia as the situation dictates. Countries such as Australia,
however, possess regional interests that are immobile and stand as permanent fixtures of
Japan's surroundings. Dupont in particular highlights the growing cooperation between
Japan and Australia over recent years. Intelligence cooperation, the author notes, has been
ongoing since the 1970's. More recently, overt bilateral agreements have been signed, the
2003 memorandum between Australia and Japan's respective defense ministers providing
one such example. Additionally, the country represents the only other nation besides the
US that Japan engages in security consultations with on a regular basis.344
Such developments between Japan and its neighbors are becoming increasingly
common and although the United States need not worry of losing its partner in Asia, it
342
Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism, 225.
Samuels, Securing Japan, 71.
344
Dupont, 47-48.
343
129
should remain concerned and attuned to Japan's shifting view of Asia and Asia's shifting
view of Japan. If the Alliance is to endure, it must be attended to with respect for
Japanese concerns and interests. Naturally, any relationship presupposes mutual benefit
and interests. Yet, in the case of the US-Japan alliance, it is clear that a reassessment is in
order and that the US must make decisions according to its own interests and its view of
the continued utility of the Alliance in support of those interests. For Japan, however, it
would appear that its options remain open and that it will likely continue to move, as
Henry Kissinger muses, far-sightedly, cognizant of its own interests, and with
“subtlety”.345
345
In Pyle, 14.
130
Chapter Five:
Japan's Global Security Outlook
5.1 Global Security & The Japanese Public
In the last chapter it was mentioned that Japan and the United States stand to
benefit from a secure Asia that can provide the energy resources both countries require.
Commentators such as Richard Armitage are attuned to this basic fact as well as the
reality that even before those resources reach maritime shipping, energy development,
itself, remains a highly disputed subject in Asia. It is also a very accessible one. So, it is
no surprise that when the topic turns to Global Security, the Japanese public relates more
readily to their country's supply of oil or other natural resources than the “lofty ideals” of
fighting Terrorism or spreading Democracy abroad. When Prime Minister Kaifu appealed
to the Japanese public for the deployment of minesweepers following the Persian Gulf
War, he did not make the case outright for Japan to contribute to a cause of international
punitive force against an aggressor state or even for the protection of Kuwait's “national
sovereignty”, an institution of the modern international system. He appealed to the public
fear of energy insecurity. He plead that the operation was necessary to secure future
import streams of oil.
Before Richard Samuels wrote many of the books and articles that would establish
him within the field of Asian Studies, he wrote one article in particular that addressed this
very issue of energy security in the Japanese public consciousness. In “Consuming for
Production: Japanese National Security, Nuclear Fuel Procurement, and the Domestic
Economy”, Samuels would shed light on the unusual dynamic present in Japanese
131
domestic energy sourcing. As he puts it, “Consumers serve producers rather than vice
versa.”346 He points out early in his article that whether the Yen has appreciated or
depreciated, consumer prices have remained inflated well beyond the wholesale index.
Reflecting a trend in Japanese society to sacrifice value for the sake of other economic
factors, the author details the machinations of Japan's nuclear fuel procurement.
Samuels begins by noting that Japanese nuclear facilities have commonly
negotiated at far higher prices than the value of uranium would ask on the world market
and have not only been allowed to pay significantly more, but encouraged to do so on
many occasions by the Japanese government.347 One would wonder what these other
economic factors could be that attract the Japanese into pursuing such a counter-intuitive
course. For one, paying more at the consumer level and allowing for higher costs at the
producer level has allowed for the greater diversity and stability of suppliers by deferring
deliveries.348 This course has resulted in a greater allowance of time for the purposes of
locating additional sources and has the built-in ability to reduce the impact of high prices.
This, Samuels posits, is directly in line with the wishes of the Japanese people,
who he sees as valuing “...long-term stable relationships with credible suppliers, even at
higher than market prices, [that] are preferable to the vagaries of the world market.” 349
This takes a political significance in Samuels' eyes in that it reflects the Japanese
concepts of “comprehensive security” and “equidistant diplomacy”. Essentially, the
Japanese have traditionally felt more comfortable dealing with economic and resource
issues than with politico-military calculations. Furthermore, Japan holds a strong belief in
346
Samuels, Richard J. “Consuming for Production: Japanese National Security, Nuclear Fuel
Procurement, and the Domestic Economy” International Organization 43 4 (1989): p. 630
(hereafter Samuels, Consuming for Production).
347
Ibid, 630.
348
Ibid, 640.
349
Ibid, 641.
132
maintaining relations with as many nations as possible and achieving friendly relations
whenever possible.350
To better highlight the crossover between energy security and international
relations, the author details the sanctioning culture in the UN that Japan acquiesced to
during the 1980's. Although reluctant to compromise energy interests for international
opinion, Japan would finally cease importation of uranium from South Africa in 1988 and
would prohibit dealings with South African firms operating in Namibia.351 Despite this
political calculation, Japan was already well-prepared to seek alternative sources to pick
up the loss of its South African suppliers.352 The costs were, of course, passed onto the
Japanese consumer, but this was nothing outside the norm, nor was it not well-understood
that it was in Japan's greater interests to do so. Samuels concludes that:
...what ought to be a simple economic story about price is really a political story
about national security and market ideology. Although the procurement of nuclear
fuel, a bulk commodity, is not a perfect analogue of this stream of Japanese
economic practice, its consequence, accepted higher prices and the formation of
institutions to support them, is consistent with this ideology and with consequent
strategic thinking about economic and national security
issues. 353
A similar course was noted during the 1990 Gulf Crisis. Having built stability into its oil
supply post-1973, Japan saw no reason to demand a military confrontation with Iraq and
pushed repeatedly for a diplomatic solution. Katzenstein relates that Japan felt that it
would eventually be able to purchase Iraqi oil from the Hussein regime and could apply
its competitiveness in the energy market to the developing situation. After military
operations commenced, however, Japan placed its energy interests aside in favor of
political solidarity.354
350
Samuels, Consuming for Production, 641.
Ibid, 642.
352
Ibid, 644.
353
Ibid, 646.
354
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 157.
351
133
Despite the relative ease by which the Japanese people have been able to connect
energy security with the international system, the subject of International Terrorism has
traditionally provided a much less tangible connection. This is a topic that Peter
Katzenstein covers in greater depth within his books and many articles. In Cultural
Norms, for example, the author points out that Japan as well as Germany have dealt with
Terrorism in their Post-war history and yet their methods have differed greatly; while
Germany has seen Terrorism as a general threat to the international system, Japan has
traditionally lacked the international legal norms required to prosecute this threat in a
similar fashion, nor does it possess the regional and transnational relations that have
allowed Germany to embrace its policies toward Terrorism in such an abstract universal
context.355
This is more plainly showcased in Katzenstein's work, Same War: Different
Views: Germany, Japan and Counterterrorism, where he examines the different ways that
Japan and Germany have viewed September the 11th. Germany viewed 9/11 as an
indication that intense international collaboration was needed to fight Terrorism across
the globe. For Japan, 9/11 was a crisis event that presented the opportunity to improve
bilateral ties with the United States and build precedents that could translate into closer
alliance ties militarily. It was a response that was both cautious and markedly different
from Germany's activist position post-2001.356
To explain these different courses of action, Katzenstein probes into the psyche of
the Japanese public. He find that within the two countries, conceptions of “self” and
“other” vary significantly. In his words, Germans maintain a “Hobbesian” fear of attack
355
356
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 153.
Katzenstein, Peter J. “Same War: Different Views: Germany, Japan and Counterterrorism”
International Organization 57 4 (2003): p. 733 (hereafter Katzenstein, Same War: Different
Views).
134
upon the domestic political order and a “Grotian” confidence in the solidarity of the
international community while Japan portrays a “passive” counter-terrorist policy at
home and forgoes multilateralist solutions abroad.357 Extending this out to “Balance of
Threat” theory, the author suggests that the 9/11 response of the United States can be
rationalized against past terrorist responses by Germany and Japan in that the attacks
came from abroad whereas attacks on Japan and Germany had come from within and
were carried out by indigenous groups.
Applying this further to Japan's specific culture, Kaztenstein cites the treatment of
the Japan Red Army Faction. During the 1970's and 80' s the JRA, which had been
successfully eradicated in Japan, would go on a spree of terrorist attacks throughout the
world.358 And these attacks would take Japanese government officials by surprise, leaving
them quite demonstrably with little established policy to remedy the problem. In many
ways, this was to be expected in Katzenstein's opinion. In his view, “Japan is more
methodical, less willing to create alarm by preparing for crises...and less willing to
respond to Terrorism as a global problem.”359
Seeing that terrorist organizations had been pushed out of Japan, the government
viewed them as no longer a problem worthy of immediate attention. Only when the JRA
demanded in 1977, among other things, to have several JRA cadres released from
Japanese prisons, Prime Minister Fukuda was forced to respond to the JRA and
subsequently acquiesced to their demands. Although domestic pressure forced the Diet to
sign onto the Bonn Summit and their “no concession policy”, Katzenstein notes that
Japan's conciliatory strategy remained relatively intact for the interim. Also intact were
357
Katzenstein, Same War: Different Views, 737.
Ibid, 744.
359
Ibid, 744-745.
358
135
Japan's cultural norms against the assertion of force abroad, even in the case of the
Peruvian hostage crisis of 1997.360
Katzenstein adds to this discussion of Japan's response to international threats in
Cultural Norms when he contrasts the drug policies between Japan and Germany as they
relate to action abroad. Whereas German anti-drug policy is seen to take a similar
approach to America's “extended defense” strategy, Japan has relied on strict enforcement
and a strong anti-drug culture to solve its problem.361 So, it becomes completely
understandable, much like in the case of Japanese terrorist policy, why Japan did not
pursue a transnational solution. Further, one of Japan's only forays into the realm of
transnational drug policy, the “global partnership” in the war against drugs championed
by George H.W. Bush, proved to be nothing more than a political opportunity to bolster
the alliance and did not reflect a genuine interest in eradicating drugs abroad.362
5.2 Moving Beyond The Past
With Juunichiro Koizumi's ascent to power and the rise of revisionist forces to
positions of influence, also came the articulation of new policies; unlike the insular
polices that had defined Japan's Cold War experience, these newer examples were
outward and proactive. The precedent was certainly there; the Konoye Consensus had
meshed together the ideology of a just national mission with the internationalism that
Japan had traditionally eschewed.363 However, it was during the first peak of this new
period of international assertiveness from 2000-on that Japan began to gain comfort in
obtaining influence via security policy. To be sure, it would attempt to distance itself near
360
Katzenstein, Same War: Different Views, 745.
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 181.
362
Ibid, 182.
363
Samuels, Securing Japan, 28.
361
136
completely from the previous Taisho-era militarism (save for the names of MSDF
vessels), but it was certain that much of the paranoia over a resurgent militarism had
passed and Japan would once again endeavor to rejoin the international community, this
time as a force for peace and stability.
In many ways, the Japanese leadership has been securing its country's place in the
21st century, and all without the direct guidance of the Japanese people. Japan also finds
itself operating during a time that offers it a great range of resources that can be applied
to its relationship with the United States and larger foreign policy. This new generation of
Japanese leaders “impatient with the low political profile” that Japan has held in the latter
half of the 20th century, has moved ahead with its reformation of the alliance and the
bolstering of Japan's assertiveness abroad.364
For these new leaders in the Diet and the Japanese bureaucracy, the legal
constraints posed by the Constitution do not phase their plans for a proactive foreign
policy. The clearest example of this would be the newly-reformed Japanese Coast Guard.
Richard Samuels holds the title as perhaps the only person in the security field or in Asian
Studies to chronicle the implications of the Coast Guard's development into Japan's de
facto second navy or as Samuels puts it, a virtual “fourth branch of the Japanese
military.”365 Being an agency within the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport,
the Japanese Coast Guard is allowed rules of engagement more relaxed than those of the
MSDF and is provided a mission, as revised by the Coast Guard Law, far more flexible
and comprehensive than its counterpart in the Ministry of Defense.366 This agency may in
fact be the one entity in the Japanese government to watch in coming years, as its official
364
Samuels, Securing Japan, 2.
Ibid, 182.
366
Ibid, 77-78.
365
137
literature speaks with a much more confident voice and less reserved use of language
than that of any other organ of the defense establishment.
Whether all at once or over a series of years, the security architecture of Japan has
shifted; the newer generation has seized upon the resources that Japan possesses and
continues to leverage them even as the larger Japanese population lags in understanding
the greater implications that their desire to maintain a secure and prosperous Japan
entails. Although the political atmosphere has shifted as of late toward the left, Japan's
engagement in the world has remained resolute and uninterrupted. Only the flow of time
and the level of creativity on the part of the new leadership will tell how Japan will
respond to the shift taking place in Asia and the course of US foreign policy. It remains
certain, however, that a directional change of great significance has occurred in the
Japanese ship of state and that this change appears by all accounts to be one both resilient
and positive in its course.
5.3 Japan's Global Policy & The US
Japan is a country that has come to view security as a comprehensive subject.
Earlier in these pages it was pointed out that Japan's 20th century view of security focused
largely on combating Terrorism domestically and balancing with the US against more
traditional threats abroad. The latter represents the degree to which Japan had previously
been willing to give itself to pragmatism. The former represents a more resilient
characteristic in the post-war Japanese consciousness. It therefore makes perfect sense
that Japan's first attempts to branch out after the Cold War took the form of non-combat
international operations. It would also not be widely disputed that Japan's more recent
138
efforts to combat International Terrorism represent a relative aberration in the Post-war
course of Japanese security.
However, despite these reservations, Japan has again made itself integral with
United States foreign policy. Certainly the opportunities for cooperation and alliancebuilding exist. The pertinent question is whether Japan is still willing to participate in the
“karaoke diplomacy” of the previous period, with music and lyrics provided by the
United States or whether a sort of “baseball diplomacy” will emerge, essentially an equal
back-and-forth exchange based on shared values, but American foundations.367
It thus becomes quite fitting that the one scholar to comprehensively map out USJapan Cooperation on counter-terrorism was the very same White House staffer who
suggested that George W. Bush's official gift to Prime Minister Koizumi be a baseball
mitt. It was also Michael Green who was among the first to broach the subject of counterterrorist policy as a collaborative issue. In his edited work, Terrorism: Prevention and
Preparedness: New Approaches to US-Japan Security Cooperation (2001), Green
followed the roundtable discussions funded by Japan Society in cooperation with the
National Institute for Research Advancement and the Research Institute for Peace and
Security.
Green begins by covering the roundtable discussion as it pertains to WMD
Terrorism, but specifically in terms of: 1) what it means to the US-Japan Alliance; 2) why
alliance managers should focus on this area; 3) what role nations should play in
preventing WMD Terrorism; and 4) what role nations should play in preparing to manage
367
In Samuels, Securing Japan, 2.
139
the immediate consequences of WMD terror and how they should respond (i.e. with legal
and military options).368
Green, however, remains fully cognizant of the divide that exists between the US
and Japan concerning counter-terrorist policy and he is quick to capture that in his notes.
One such example he draws attention to would reflect a divergence on joint policy toward
state sponsors of Terrorism, but on North Korea specifically. 369 Iran is also mentioned,
given Japan's growing economic ties with the country as of 2000. This comes at a time
when, as Robert C. Orr points out, the US has been criticized for being relatively
indifferent to the concerns of traditional allies in relation to the country's posturing
against its enemies.370 Although the statement applies to bilateral ties in a more general
sense, Orr specifies it in the case of Japan; he charges that America's invocation of
Terrorism was responsible for diluting the dialogue with North Korea by elevating the
subject to the centerpiece of the discussion. Green continues on this train of thought by
reminding readers of Japan's traditional fear of entrapment. He notes that in the case of
WMD Terrorism, any form of association with the US can be cause for concern, as nonstate entities make use of asymmetrical means to target perceived weak spots in
America's security framework.371 Green directly relates the subject matter to the very
points brought up by Orr in that tensions may build if the US chooses methods of
responding to Terrorism that are perceived as “unnecessary or harmful” to Japan's foreign
policy interests.372
368
Green, Michael. Terrorism: Prevention and Preparedness: New Approaches to US-Japan Security
Cooperation. New York: Japan Society Publishing Office, 2001 p. 15 (hereafter Green, Terrorism
Prevention and Preparedness).
369
Ibid, 16.
370
Robert C. Orr, before Japan Society March 1 2004.
371
Green, Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness, 15.
372
Ibid, 16.
140
Coming full-circle back to the topic of energy security, the US and Japan stand to
gain much by using this area as the basis for a stronger future alliance. Orr makes the
point that future dialogues between the US and Japan should “address the Middle East
through the development of a joint energy policy.”373 Walter Rapp, in his critical analysis
of the alliance, makes the observation that unless Japan's need for foreign oil (91 percent
sourced from the Middle East at time of printing) is addressed, policy friction will build
and Japan will be driven away from the US and toward accommodation with oil exporters
that fall in direct opposition to US foreign policy. He posits that “While America is
focused on fighting the war against Terrorism and preventing the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies, the Japanese are focused on
securing future import streams of oil and natural gas.”374 Thus, either in securing the
supply of energy from the Middle East or balancing supply with new sources in Asia, the
US will need to work closely with Japan to ensure that energy is not the Achilles Heel
that breaks the alliance and undermines those polices the US would wish to pursue in
Asia and the world at large. It would appear as though Japan has already begun seeking
alternatives, as evidenced by official guidelines published in 2005:
...stability in the region spreading from the Middle East to East Asia is critical to
Japan. Japan traditionally has close economic ties with this region, its sea lines of
communication run through the region, and Japan depends almost entirely on
energy and natural resources from overseas. In this context, Japan will strive to
stabilize the region by promoting various cooperative efforts in conjunction with
other countries sharing common security challenges. In order to enable the
international community to effectively address the range of new issues in the
twenty-first century, measures must be taken to reform the world's only global and
comprehensive international organization-the United Nations-to make it more
effective and reliable. Japan will actively pursue this goal.375
373
Robert C. Orr, before Japan Society March 1 2004.
Rapp, Paths Diverging?, 111-112.
375
National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005 (Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on
December 10, 2004)
374
141
Energy security would appear to be the obvious choice for future cooperation, being a
subject both accessible to the Japanese public and foremost on the minds of Japanese
decision-makers. While US actions may complicate Japanese interests in the Middle East
and Asia, and may do so in the furtherance of non-negotiable US foreign policy goals, it
is nonetheless beneficial to consider the possibility of altering or shifting such policies in
terms of the alliance. Certainly cost-benefit analysis could go a long way in the bolstering
of both the alliance and larger US foreign policy. The question is whether such support
for Japan's energy industry is worth the cost to America's “War on Terror” and
containment of nations such as Iran. Only time, circumstance, and individual factors will
decide the pursuit and success of this course.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
6.1 Findings and Associations
It has been chronicled within the preceding pages the degree to which Article 9
has affected Post-war Japanese security. It has also been illustrated that this article of the
Japanese Constitution heavily defines the degree to which Japan and the United States
have traditionally been able to cooperate on strategic issues and further, that such a
restriction will endure into the foreseeable future. What then could be drawn from the
previous pages to provide a realistic perspective on the current state of US-Japan
relations and how those relations relate to Japan's long-standing constitutional
restrictions? Not only perspective, but representative facts that inform Japan's current
course in relation to the alliance and the country's larger defense policy. The following
points attempt to address these representative facts and channel them into practical
statements that may inform the discussion of Article 9 and the US-Japan Alliance.
Point 1: It is widely agreed that Japan has moved
beyond the Yoshida Doctrine. It is generally agreed that
Japan has effectively broken from its pacifist past
during the events of the 1990's and early 2000's.
It has been mentioned that as early as 1963, Yoshida Shigeru, himself, viewed the
dependency of Japan on the United States for its security as a “deformity of the state”,
that it was not the mark of a “first rank” country. It has also been mentioned that the
younger generations have taken up the cause of restoring national honor and have come
143
to view the issue of national defense in very similar terms to the former Prime Minister. It
has further been pointed out by Dr. Joseph Nye Jr. that the emerging generation has
become impatient with Japan's exceedingly humble profile abroad. Although
constitutional revision is not foremost on the minds of this emerging generation, the
central theme of their decision-making process remains one of assertiveness
internationally with an elevated role for Japanese forces, whether Coast Guard or SDF.
One component that factored heavily in the dissolution of the Yoshida Doctrine
was that of entrapment, both in terms of the conditions that the doctrine was built upon
and more recently in the form of the US War on Terror and middle eastern conflicts. This
is a topic of great importance to the emerging generation in the Diet. Today, there are few,
if any, benefits to the previous Yoshida consensus; Japan is unlikely to rebound as the
second largest economy in the world as China grows in its trade and industry. Japan sees
the United States withdrawing from Asia, not decoupling, but drawing down to minimum
levels. The “free ride” has almost completely been supplanted by strategic realities in a
process first noted during the Nixon Administration.
Logically, the Heisei and their juniors would stand to benefit from a freed defense
establishment. Although they would be unlikely to place their country in a position
beholden to US foreign policy goals, they would identify the utility of participating in US
and coalition operations in a capacity that realizes more risks, but also offers more
rewards for their country's efforts. The younger generation finds itself today within grasp
of what Prime Minister Kaifu promised upon the dissolution of the Cold War, but could
not deliver. Samuels holds that the ideology of a just national mission is not incompatible
144
with Japanese internationalism, but rather has been cemented in the previous Konoye
Consensus and has remained in the Japanese psyche ever since.
Several factors have aided in advancing this sense of internationalism that the
current generation has seized upon. The success of Ozawa and his revisionist forces in
pushing through peacekeeping operations during the 1990's has had a great effect in
shifting public opinion on foreign deployments and the assertion of their country's
“rightful place” in the world. Japan's numerous security dialogues in relation to foreign
missions have likely had the additional effect of further merging the sphere of Japanese
defense with a view of healthy internationalism in the public mind. The embarrassment
and shame of the first Gulf War had the effect of creating a “shock” to the Japanese
political environment that broke the former complacency over foreign policy while PKO
and revisionist influence effectively defeated the pacifist Komeito front in the Diet and
largely muted opposition to defense reform. The revisionist coalition of the late 1990's
and the Koizumi Administration of the early 2000's combined with external events such
as the naval skirmishes with North Korea or the North's admission of kidnappings to
galvanize support for revisionist policies and have aided in passing through the key
defense reforms of 2002 and 2003.
Still, one of the most significant advancements of the 1990's and 2000's, but
especially the 2000's, was the emergence of strong Japanese leadership in the form of the
Koizumi Administration and his allies in the Diet and bureaucracy. It is evident that the
Japanese people wish for a secure and prosperous Japan as it is also evident that the
Japanese leadership wishes to deliver exactly that in addition to a new place for Japan in
world opinion, however, the degree to which Japanese leadership has been willing to lead
145
the public in achieving these goals rather than the other way around has changed near
completely since the resolution of the Persian Gulf War. Given the results of opinion polls
taken in Japan and the reaction of the public to various policies, it is evident within the
current American literature that scholars have seized upon a disconnect between the
desires of the Japanese public and the greater implications of what achieving those
desires would entail. Though Japan has not yet found its next Koizumi, it is apparent that
a great change has occurred and that this change has been one that has shifted the
paradigm of Japanese foreign policy and leadership
Point 2: Entrapment has been and continues to
represent a core concern for both Article 9 revision and
the US-Japan Alliance.
Although the Yoshida Doctrine was based in large part on the understanding that
Japan would be absorbed into the United States' Cold War posture in East Asia, few
people, if any, argue today that Japan's national security or foreign policy continue to
demand such obligations or support. Even though Yoshida and his adherents had
mastered the art of minimizing the risk of certain Japanese obligations while maximizing
the benefits of US security promises, today's leadership in Tokyo questions the
desirability of further compromises to Japanese freedom of action (or non-action). Menon
sees an emerging Japanese leadership who view the alliance as an unstable vehicle. From
the perspective of US foreign policy interests, Rapp reflects the view shared by many
commentators including Samuels, that Japanese resolve is suspect. In their view, the
Japanese public is unable to accept even moderate losses for the advancement of national
missions. Even the extremely limited casualties taken during the Iraq deployment were
146
not exactly without great fanfare. Japan was able to continue operations despite the
several hostage crises and attacks, but had even slightly heavier casualties been taken in a
single attack or over several attacks, there is little doubt that the Japanese public would
have reacted in the way Samuels predicted, setting foreign deployments back a
generation or more.
Samuels makes the additional point that Japan has made overtures toward China
under Shinzo Abe and his successors in an effort to position itself equidistant between the
poles of the Sino-American dyad. This “Goldilocks Consensus” can be taken further
when viewed with Japan's simultaneous quest for alliances in the Asia Pacific, Australia
being a prime example. Japan may never again wish to be placed between loyalty to the
United States and neglect for its own foreign policy interests, as it had when it was
pressured to sign a peace agreement with the KMT government of Taiwan or to foreswear
bilateral ties with Communist China.
Trade relations, though not always mentioned in the discussion of US-Japan
defense cooperation, play a key role in how Japan views itself relative to the dangers of
entrapment in US policies. It has been noted that as early as 1953, MITI moved swiftly to
counter American influence in the Japanese defense industry. Defense trade is seen as one
method that the US has been able to use in order to get its “foot in the door” and shape
Japanese policy. It is also an area that Japanese leaders are all too aware of in terms of the
unintended consequences of snap US decisions. The 1970's ushered in the surprise
announcement of the free-floating dollar and reproachment of China, both decisions that
greatly set back Japanese defense producers and their backers in government. Events
such as the decision of the US State Department to sanction Japan over the illegal
147
shipment of missile components in 1991, had the effect of throwing the ability of the SDF
to acquire mission-critical parts into disarray. Alternatively, whenever the United States
has required parts for its ongoing combat operations, a significant pressure is often place
on Japan to defy or revise its pacifist norms (even its export restrictions) in an effort to
maintain the alliance. This should not be taken for granted as a mark of Japanese national
style, but rather as a succession of uncomfortable exceptions made on a case-by-case
basis.
Japan's more recent foray into closer cooperation with the US in its defense trade
further demonstrates the varied and contested views of the Japanese leadership.
Technonationalism may always have its adherents, but more recently, the benefits of
cooperation and collaboration in defense technology have outweighed the Japanese desire
for technological autonomy. As the alliance shifts, this nationalism over technology will
likely return or at least increase if Japan chooses to diversify its strategic options in Asia
relative to the United States. At least Japan is unlikely to lose sight of the dangers that it
exposes itself to when it chooses to integrate into US defense acquisitions. For now,
however, the country remains pragmatic; during the 1990's especially, Japanese leaders
acknowledged that the US was pulling ahead of their country with the Revolution in
Military Affairs.
In the years following the Gulf Crisis, Japan began to open its research databases
to the United States and take on more collaborative efforts such as TMD, or later, BMD.
Some viewed these actions as an effort on Japan's part to patch up a faltering alliance
while others viewed it as a necessity in order to close the technological gap between the
two nations in terms of interception capability. Regardless of these and other rationales
148
for technological exchange and thus, vulnerability, the defense trade is an area that is
strongly correlated to the Japanese view of entrapment and is likely to continue even as
the core research and development for BMD comes to an end. Essentially, trade affects
how close or how distant the alliance will be. It is not the primary factor, but it does stand
to sway relations greatly.
Point 3: The War on Terror and/or cooperation on
counter-terrorism will not succeed as an issue
understood and accepted by both the Japanese public
and Japanese legislators/officials.
The Japanese public is patently unable to “come around” on this issue, because it
is one that is alien in their history and social experience. One reason for this is that Japan
is a country that had been plagued by domestic Terrorism, but not International
Terrorism. Japanese Terrorism also came in the form of political extremism and not
religious fanaticism. As has been noted, the Japanese consciousness is one that identifies
the root causes of unrest and violence. In this way, the “comprehensive security” that the
Japanese people are accustomed to contrasts heavily with the traditional security
methodology that has been applied to Terrorism in the international environment.
Put simply, the differences in respective policies exercised by the US and Japan
on counter-terrorism stand at near polar opposites. On the topics of extradition and the
pursuit of international perpetrators of Terrorism, Japan possesses neither the precedent
nor the legal authority nor the collective will to replicate US policy. Even in terms of
formal analysis of past terrorist acts, the US and Japan stand apart; the Japanese have yet
to identify the Aum Shin Rikyo attack as a terrorist event, citing that the perpetrators
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lacked a clear set of ideological or political goals and that the event was isolated to one
single attack. Although it was later revealed that the organization was a lot more
extensive and capable than was generally known, the popular interpretation of the event
still stands to this day.
This difference of interpretation and ideology, in turn, gets at one of the larger
difficulties in alliance relations; traditionally, the US has distanced itself from Japan and
played to shared values with Europe in an effort to create a North Atlantic community.
Lately, however, the US has been working to emphasize a set of shared values with Japan
and India in order to moderate China. At the same time, Japan has been closely working
with ASEAN and the countries of Southeast Asia to play up a sense of shared Asian
values and common interests. In this, Japan has found itself to be the outlier between the
west and Asia, or in this case, the US and Asia.
At once, the US and Japan are separated by ideology and geographical bonds, but
joined by the ability of Japan to move its rhetoric in either direction, toward the US or
Asia. While Terrorism can be seen as an “excuse” on which the US and Japan may
collaborate and maintain cordial relations, it does not stand as a stable platform for
lasting partnership. Its existence as a point of mutual action attests to Japanese flexibility,
but both the US and Japan should work to find stronger ideological and practical bonds.
Otherwise, the US may discover that its cooperation with Japan is not as stable or as
meaningful as it had imagined, much to the detriment of the long-term health of the
alliance.
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Point 4: Japan is a country for want of faultless
successes.
From Japan's minesweeping decision of 1991 onward, it became clear that the
Japan of the post-Cold War era was one that could not and would not tolerate risks, at
least early on. During the Persian Gulf War, two separate deployments were shelved for
fear of drawing Japan into combat operations. The final successful attempt at a
contribution to the coalition effort went without fault, but not without much exertion and
reassurance on the part of Prime Minister Kaifu.
Similarly, the peace-keeping operations advanced by Ozawa had the effect of
acclimating the Japanese public to the idea of sending the SDF abroad. This effect was
largely due to the zero losses experienced by Japanese forces and the meaningful nature
of their work, one in line with the well-accepted Japanese concept of comprehensive
security. During a slightly more involved use of Japanese forces, Japan's contribution to
Operation Enduring Freedom repeated the low-risk, high-reward nature of past Japanese
operations. It built slowly from the purely logistical operations of non-Aegis ships to that
of Aegis vessels conducting intelligence gathering missions in partnership with the
United States. From these early deployments to the SDF personnel who were dispatched
to Iraq, it has been shown that even as risks were ratcheted up, public response remained
generally muted.
As a qualification to this argument, it must also be noted that setbacks brought
upon by the hostage crises and insurgent attacks did not dent the resolve of the
deployment, but did cast doubt on the value of the operation. It later became discernible
that the Iraq dispatch continued to operate in flux even after the return of Japanese forces.
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The war in Iraq did not succeed in impressing the Japanese public or convincing them to
stand in solidarity with the US on the issue of International Terrorism. And the passage of
time appears to have hurt the value of Japanese contributions, at least in terms of the Iraq
deployment and later efforts to renew authorization for joint operations in the Indian
Ocean.
As highlighted in the previous examples, success may not always be faultless.
Many times it has been, and on those occasions revisionists have reaped their greatest
victories. Mission selection will be paramount in advancing the course of Japanese
security policy abroad. However, if the past is any indicator, small deployments of
increasing, but predictable and palpable risk hold the greatest prospect for stable growth
in Japan's developing foreign policy. This may not appear remarkable in and of itself, but
as long as Japan continues on its positive course, it will secure a stronger place within the
alliance and will have doors opened for it in terms of more expansive foreign policy
endeavors and a national defense that is capable of dealing with the many threats that the
country would have much rather ignored or minimized in the past.
6.2 Contending with Differences in the Current
Scholarship
Although this author has provided a sizable role to a select core of authors
throughout his thesis, it is understood that on certain issues in particular there exist
significant points of divergence. It should subsequently not be assumed that this author is
in total agreement with the entirety of each scholar's thesis or has used components of
such theses that were dependent on the original author's intent. Although the components
of many authors are used comparatively or contrastingly, or in other instances, are used to
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establish a point of reference for discussion, it is this author's belief that they are used in a
manner consistent with that of an objective survey of the issues involved. Moreover, this
author takes exception to several opinions expressed by some of the authors in an effort
to identify the parts of their respective theses that he believes are not wedded to their
subject matter nor the greater discussion of Article 9 and the US-Japan Alliance.
Continuing on this subject of differences within the current scholarship, this
author would like to state his agreement with the views of certain authors over others and
only portions of certain authors in line with the views of their peers. For instance, Pyle
perceives the desirability of “rank and honor” in the Japanese psyche. This is supported
by the statements of Japanese officials and politicians. MOD documents speak of the
many international accolades Japan has received for its contribution to Operation
Enduring Freedom in the Indian Ocean. Alternatively, the sting of international criticism
is still one that reverberates from the first Gulf War or at least Japan's contribution during
the last war has not erased the memory. This point of view bears resemblance, although a
much weaker comparison, with Michael Green's view of Japan as a country searching for
a stronger relationship with the international community. This viewpoint is found within
the thesis to be an acceptable and defensible position, as it reflects Japan's attentiveness
to the international community and shares the most overt facets of Pyle's “rank and
honor” by positioning Japan as a country in a position of “friendship and influence”,
which could easily represent another category of national policy goals that Japan would
wish to pursue.
This author would also place emphasis on both Pyle's “rank” and “honor”, while
only remaining supportive of Samuels' “prestige” and not his “power” arguments.
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Although Japan doubtlessly wishes to improve its national defense, it is clear from the
literature that this is secondary to image concerns. Energy security, on the other hand,
does benefit from increased national power, but again, is not synonymous with power for
more generalized national security goals, such as the comparatively abstract missions of
the US War on Terror or Neo-Wilsonian efforts to spread Democracy abroad. When Peter
Katzenstein talks of “autonomy”, his particular interpretation of this goal is more in line
with this author's findings than Samuels' autonomous “power”. Autonomy, in this case, is
not independence from bilateral or multilateral ties. Nor is it an independent power
projection capability to be used arbitrarily as Japan sees fit. Instead, it is something that
adds value and leverage to existing relationships. Alternatively, this author agrees with
the views of Green and Samuels when they draw attention to Japan's willingness to
downplay technological autonomy for the sake of the alliance relationship.
Additionally this author finds agreement with Kenneth Pyle's “psychic wound”
and Michael Green's “black ships”. Traumatic experiences imposed from without by
international orders foreign to Japan are found to have as much efficacy in the post-Cold
War period as they have had throughout the country's history. The concept of “catalyst
events”, as emphasized by Samuels, Katzenstein, and Green is one that is found to be
preferable to Oros' “change-within-continuity” approach. Although legal and cultural
restrictions continue to place a hold on revisionist goals, it is the opinion of this author
that these legal restrictions and cultural norms should not be seen as things capable of
proposing a plan or a course of action in and of themselves. They may, as Oros aptly
notes, create political costs for reformers and limit debate, however, it remains clear that
catalyst events such as GWI, 1995, 1998, or 2003 remain the defining factors that either
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initiated action or provided foundations for actions that were not politically defensible
beforehand. Despite Katzenstein's view that events provide only pretexts to existing
policy desires or Samuels' and others' view that such events initiate seemingly “clean
breaks” that incite action, one view need not be favored over another, because they both
serve the thesis in marking directional changes for Japanese foreign policy.
6.3 Suggestions for a Stronger Alliance
Suggestion 1: Japan does not need to repeal Article 9
immediately. However, it should repeal it as soon as
possible.
This is not to say that the current status of Article 9 renders Japan without options
in the alliance or without a functional national defense. It has been demonstrated that
despite Japan's constitutional and legal restrictions, the country has repeatedly been
willing to make exceptions to accommodate the United States. Spanning from secret Cold
War agreements permitting the presence of nuclear weapons in Japanese territory to
special exceptions made in export policy in the 1980's to low-key support from the Kaifu
Administration and the Japanese defense industry during Operation Desert Storm and all
the way up to the public support for the nuclear-powered carrier George Washington's
shore visit in 2005, Japan has proven itself to be a country pragmatic in its pacifism and
legal restraints. Additionally, Japan has demonstrated that it can find ways of working
around Article 9 in order to pursue national interests, such as the more recent utilization
of the Japanese Coast Guard.
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Despite this relative flexibility, however, there have been perhaps as many or
more examples of Japanese inflexibility on seemingly innocuous policy decisions. And in
many of these cases the inflexibility was exposed in a most abrupt and unsettling manner.
Even something as insignificant as the deployment of medical volunteers early in the first
Gulf War or the initial attempt at sending minesweepers during that same conflict
produced reactions that scarred Japan's credibility as an ally and contributor to
international security. More recently, in 2001, Koizumi was rebuffed upon his proposal
to deploy Aegis-Class Destroyers to the Indian Ocean.
Japan has managed to compensate with monetary remedies as well as alliance
concessions, but as the US begins to draw down its assets in East Asia and Japan recedes
as an economic power, such compensations and remedies will become less available with
each passing day. Much like the marginalized treatment of Japan in Campell's article on
the future of US alliances, Japan may similarly be fading out of the minds of US defense
brokers. After all, to those such as Samuels, there is “no one left in Washington”. There
are no Michael Greens in the white house.
In terms of the wider reaction from US scholars, decision-makers, and
government officials, the short view appears to be not all that reassuring. At best, figures
such as Admiral Keating will prod Japan with statements such as one related to Japan's
apparent function as an international distributor of MRE's (although he did not cast doubt
on the abilities or competence of the SDF itself). Richard Armitage might remain
concerned for the the apparent lack of reciprocity between the US and Japan in terms of
collective self-defense in extraordinary circumstances while appearing somewhat neutral,
albeit concerned for the resolution of the Article 9 issue in general. Much like Mr.
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Armitage, the topic of repeal or revision is one on the edge almost any given political
commentator's mind when they consider US-Japan relations, even if they often can not be
brought to firmly state it. Others, such as Alan Dupont, do not hesitate to take the views
of Armitage one step further, describing the security treaty as a burdensome obligation or
in the case of Menon, directly challenging the value of Japan as an ally.
In a broader sense, as Rapp points out, Japan is seen as not doing all that it can do
to add value to the Alliance. While much more can and must be done to make the
Alliance of more utility to both countries, such cannot be said in the case of the hurdle of
combat-centric operations, an activity that has become the cornerstone of US foreign
policy in the 21st century and one that the US increasingly places value on when
contemplating its foreign relations. Thus, it is in this author's judgment that although the
creativity of alliance managers will likely maintain the US-Japan relationship through
2020, past this date, dissolution become a more likely scenario. Richard Armitage
estimates that by this date, the US will still be the preeminent world power with interests
in every region of the world, but he does choose this date and not 2025 or 2030. It is
widely disseminated in Chinese literature that a world-class Blue Water Navy is staged
for this very same date of 2020. It must also be said that much of the current literature
and perspective has come into existence before the recent financial crisis and mounting
US deficit.
Though not an expiration date for Japanese action, 2020 represents in this author's
estimation a final call for repeal. Asia and China are not likely to place past history aside
any time soon and Japan's prospects for a seat on the UN Security Council are relatively
nill; the rationale for moderating defense for the purpose of reassuring Asia is found to be
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a hollow one. There are also few, if any, signs that China has changed its position on
targeting Japan with its nuclear arsenal or retracting its concerns for Japan's “virtual
nuclear capability”, which they charged would come into being with the advanced state
of Japanese involvement in BMD. Furthermore, as time passes, negative effects on
Japan's foreign policy will likely accumulate as a result of missile defense. A successful
shootdown of a North Korean missile, for example, may lead China to view its own
nuclear deterrent as inadequate and thus, fan regional hostilities. Alternatively, a failed
shootdown will likely function as an “alliance breaker” of sorts. Even if it does not
completely break the alliance, confidence will take a severe blow. Although missile
defense remains a stable platform for alliance cooperation in this author's view, in terms
of Article 9 reform, it is a lose-lose proposition.
All of these findings contribute to this author's position that Japan must repeal
Article 9 as soon as is politically viable and no later. This author correspondingly views
the critical components for successful revision as being 1) A US presence in Asia to
soften regional opinion, act as a balancer of regional actors, and present a “tether” to
which Japan is anchored for the purpose of moderating regional criticism; 2) an untested
Bilateral BMD which can neither significantly agitate China nor frighten Asia with the
prospect that Japan's ground forces and Navy could theoretically project power regionally
without fear of ballistic missiles; and 3) a strong Japanese leadership capable of passing
unpopular legislation and convincing the necessary portion of the Japanese public that it
is in their best interests to repeal Article 9, their fears being unwarranted. If even one of
these components is lacking, it will throw the entire prospect of repeal into question or
make such repeal impossible for the indefinite future. In the interim, it is likely that the
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utility of the alliance will fade and the alliance will dissolve as Japan follows a
conciliatory foreign policy in Asia and the US follows a proactive foreign policy in the
Middle East and the world. Even if revision does come, if it is anything short of repeal, it
is unlikely that Japan will escape a fate of being barred from the very combat operations
required to keep the alliance healthily alive in a changing world environment. It will also
become increasingly difficult, if not impossible to budge the institutional norm of peace
language in the Japanese Constitution, because, as Katzenstein points out, institutional
norms that are revised, but not removed become far stronger than existing norms that
have been made flexible. Thus, the choice is with Japan, but it is a choice that cannot be
put off forever, and one that will affect Japan greatly if the opportunity is missed.
Suggestion 2: Future Japanese leadership on defense
reform should follow the “Koizumi Paradigm”
The Koizumi Administration and its allies in the Diet and bureaucracy have
shown in their more than 5 years at the head of Japanese foreign policy that the model for
Japanese defense reform has shifted dramatically. In the past, consensus, both in
government and the general public was a given that went unchallenged by those wishing
to keep their offices and maintain the progress of their political causes. With the Koizumi
Administration, a bold new course of leadership was revealed in which Prime Ministers
could lead first and obtain consensus later.
During the opening stages of Operation Enduring Freedom at the outset of 9/11,
Koizumi made use of the reformed and freed office of the Prime Minister as well as adhoc committees to streamline policy responses and maintain coherency apart from party
and factional pressures. He reprised these ad-hoc committees to construct Japan's
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contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom, unprecedented in Japan's post-war history.
Additionally, the willingness of Japanese political actors to seize upon external threats
and the ability of the Kozumi Administration's policy planning and public relations
efforts to harness the political capital from these events, had the effect of creating a
multiplied force with which Japanese revisionists passed through their legislation and
defense initiatives. Although such a methodology is not revolutionary, it is unprecedented
in Japan to the degree that Koizumi and his adherents made use of it. Future reformers
should continue to play up external threats such as North Korea. Japan's current treatment
of China should succeed in about the same manner as it affords Japan both the implied
threat of Chinese militarism and the diplomatic cover to continue to pursue confidencebuilding measures with the country. Preparations for North Korea will continue to
prepare Japanese national defense for any likely Chinese exigency.
Past shame and international pressure should be emphasized to further the process
of bonding the practice of foreign deployments with the entrenched faith of the Japanese
people in the international system. Foreign accolades should also be emphasized for
contributions to international security missions, something that the Ministry of Defense is
currently doing in their film and print publications, although not as much as they could
be. Additionally, public denouncements such as those originating from Netherlands or
Japan's second strongest ally, Australia in relation to the relative burden of protecting
Japanese forces in theater should also be played upon and contrasted with the unanimous
praise exhibited for Japan when their security contribution required no such protection, as
was the case during Operation Enduring Freedom.
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In this way, if leadership is willing and able, Japan may repeat the success of the
Koizumi Administration or at least pursue as close a course of reform as circumstances
will permit. Retreat following the victories of opposition forces in the Diet should not be
pursued, but should precipitate the opposite course. Revisionists should accept that their
political system has responded well to bold actions and that within limit, actions that
stand a strong chance of success should be pursued in spite of political consensus, not
according to the conjectures and visions of an uncertain public or legislature.
Suggestion 3: The US and Japan should work toward
strengthening the interoperability of Information
Operations (IO) systems and personnel structures and
should cooperate on building a common architecture
capable of sustaining joint operations during regional
exigencies.
The topic of Computer Network Attack is one that Japan should know all too well.
By 2005, repeated internet attacks from China could no longer be ignored as damages
mounted following the controversy of certain Japanese historical textbooks. In a series of
coordinated attacks, the websites for the National Police Agency, the SDF, and the MOFA
went offline causing financial losses and harming the productivity of the Japanese
government.376
Interestingly, although certain news sources named a “National Information
Security Center”, Japan's Cyber Defense capability remained shrouded in secrecy for
nearly three years. Finally in 2008, the connection between Chinese military
376
Faiola, Anthony. (2005, May 11). Cyber warfare: China vs Japan. MSNBC News. From
http://www.crime-research.org/news/11.05.2005/1227/ .
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modernization and Japanese cyber capability was entered into public knowledge;377 the
newly-released MOD white paper was cited for its observation that China had created a
competent apparatus for Network Warfare and was seeking to use it in scenarios
concerning the Taiwan Straits, but especially as an asymmetric means of disrupting
American Command & Control structures. Despite the revelations of 2008, the subject of
a national response to cyber threats was not a new one; it was not even new in 2005 when
the Sino-Japanese “spat” in cyber space was fresh in the news.
As early as 2000, the JDA's Office of Strategic Studies had completed an in-depth
report on the characteristics of the Revolution in Military Affairs and network-based
threats in particular. In a section entitled, “Characteristics of Future Warfare”, the
publication states that in the future, “Cyber attacks will become one efficient means to
attack armed forces possessing advanced information systems.”378 The paper goes on to
say that cyber attack would soon become as important in the modern battlefield as
precision-guided munitions when used against political and economic centers of
infrastructure. Later in the paper, the OSS states something that strikes at the heart of the
issue under discussion:
The United States actively promotes various programs related to RMA by making
use of its possession of the most advanced information technologies in the world.
Taking this into consideration, Japan should promote studies on RMA as an ally of
the United
States. 379
TDRI would take the issue back up in its 2007 “Medium to Long-Term Defense
Technology Outlook”. In addition to the goal of improving Japan's information sharing
377
Hiroyuki, Koshoji. (2008, September 8). Japan Alarmed by China’s Military Buildup. UPI. From
http://www.upiasia .com/ Security/2008/09/06/japan_alarmed_by_chinas_military_buildup/2379 .
378
Office of Strategic Studies, Defense Policy Division, Defense Policy Bureau, Japan Defense Agency.
(2000, December). Info-RMA: Study on Info-RMA and the Future of the Self-Defense Forces. p.3
(hereafter OSS, Info-RMA).
379
Ibid, 5.
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processes, the Institute identified “defense against cyber attacks” as a capability that
Japan would need to acquire.380 Specifically, they recommended “...build[ing] networks
that are completely safe from and robust to electromagnetic failures arising from cyber
attacks and EMP, and [the necessity of] to conduct[ing] research into technology related to
defense against electronic attacks on computers and networks”.381 Another paper listed on
the Ministry of Defense website, likely from 2003 or 2004 lists “hacker warfare”, “cyber
warfare”, and “economic information warfare” among a series of headings intended to
highlight a variety of electronic means of attack against the Japanese state.382 The author,
Komatsu Tadashi, cites various US wargames and preparations against electronic warfare
going back to 1997 involving several civil and military agencies, including the FBI, the
NSA, and the DoD. Similar to the TDRI and OSS reports, Komatsu calls for the active
observation of US progress on Information Warfare, logically leading to the assumption
that active cooperation be undertaken between the two countries, though neither Komatsu
nor any other government source has given any indication that such cooperation has
taken place or is even within the planning stages.
Still, views in support of US-Japan cooperation are mirrored in many ways by US
scholarship, as evidenced by a 2008 report of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies titled: “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: A New Framework for Enhanced Global
Security”.383 In this publication, the concept of cyber-crime as an area of possible alliance
cooperation is briefly touched upon. The MOD white paper of the same year clearly
380
Technical Research and Development Institute, Ministry of Defense. (2007, April). Medium- to LongTerm Defense Technology Outlook. Tokyo. p.14 .
381
Ibid, 20-21.
382
Tadashi, Komatsu. “Information Warfare” Japanese Defense Agency. Retrieved from
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/ronbun/14/komatu.html (hereafter Tadashi, Information
Warfare).
383
Wakabayashi, Hideo. “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: A New Framework for Enhanced Global Security”
Center for Strategic and International Studies (2008): p.21 .
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recognizes both the attentiveness of the US to the importance of cyber operations/IO and
the leaps in development experienced by China in its use of space and cyber warfare.384
On the topic of cooperation with the US on the joint development of such capabilities,
however, the Ministry of Defense has remained strangely silent. Neither the National
Defense Program Guidelines nor any other section of the white paper acknowledge such
cooperation or even detail plans to explore the possibility of establishing such
cooperation. In fact, the only mention of the Japanese response to cyber threats in the
entire document comes when discussing the defense of Japan's domestic population. On
the subject, it lists cyber security as a key measure toward ensuring “... information
security, such as responding to cyber attacks against the Ministry of Defense and the
SDF.” The white paper also lists an SDF Command and Communications (provisional)
unit as well as a formalized response system for the purpose of addressing cyber
threats.385
Interestingly, while not one mention is made of cooperation with the US on issues
of cyber defense, the 2009 white paper starkly enunciates cooperation on fighting cyber
attack as a viable initiative in relation to Southeast Asia.386 This state of affairs appears
most odd considering the limitations of Japan's current constitutional interpretation and
the need for increased alliance cooperation; the US and Japan could likely benefit both
strategically and legally through the creation of a joint cyber capability. NATO has
demonstrated in recent years that not only is such cooperation possible between
numerous states, but that it is possible to implement fairly quickly and with stable
momentum in organizational progress.
384
Tadashi, Information Warfare.
Ministry of Defense. (2009). Jieitai Hakushou (white paper). Tokyo.
386
Ministry of Defense. (2008). Jieitai Hakushou (white paper). Tokyo.
385
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Starting in 2008, NATO member-states established the Cyber Defense
Management Authority and a Centre for Excellence on Cyber Defense.387 NATO news
briefs further explain the development of the Center as a place where partner states
“...will conduct research and training on cyber warfare and [will] include a staff of 30
persons, half of them specialists from the sponsoring countries, Estonia, Germany, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Spain.”388 In addition to these developments, US officials,
such as a former cyber coordination executive for the US ODNI have appeared at CCDsponsored conferences.389 The progress of the Center was showcased as recently as May
of this year with the commencement of Baltic Cyber Shield, which pitted a collection of
six teams from countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Sweden against an opposing
force seeking to exploit network vulnerabilities.390
Although there is a long history of cooperation among the NATO allies as well as
a well-established system for creating and improving upon new capabilities among those
allies, it would seem unrealistic to say that the US and Japan would be prevented from
following a similar course with comparable success. Cyber Defense and Information
Operations provide Japan with the opportunity to pursue new military capabilities that
have yet to be opposed by the Cabinet Level Bureau or other legal challenges.
Additionally, these mission areas provide a vital capability for use in joint responses
between the US and Japan during regional exigencies. IO therefore stands to provide a
387
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO and the fight against terrorism. Retrieved from
http://www.nato.int/cps/ en/natolive/topics_48801.htm .
388
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO opens new centre of excellence on cyber defence. Retrieved
from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_7266.htm?selectedLocale=en .
389
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Experts Discuss Multinational Approach to Cyber Conflict.
Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_64615.htm?selectedLocale=en .
390
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. (2010, May). Baltic Cyber Shield to train
technical skills for countering cyber attacks. Retrieved from http://www.ccdcoe.org/172.html .
165
strong “place-holder” in the alliance until such a time that Japan can pursue collective
self-defense and conduct active combat operations.
Subsequently, the Ministry of Defense should immediately put something into
writing to this effect, that they intend on pursuing such a course with the United States, at
least on an exploratory footing. Additionally, the MOD should do as much as possible to
distance itself from its predecessor, the JDA on the constitutionality of Cyber Defense.
The 2000 report of the OSS makes the ruinous assumption that “...because in general
cyber attacks would not necessarily cause direct physical destruction, there would be a
problem as to whether we could regard a cyber attack as the use of force from a legal
point of view”.391 The report also makes the assumption before the fact that “Exclusively
Defense-Oriented Policy” precludes Japan from pursuing the same or a similar course of
RMA as the United States. This represents a weakness in thinking, a gross
oversimplification of, and a severe impediment to Japanese defense reform and should
not be repeated by the MOD in any of its future literature. Rather, the MOD should see
Information Warfare as a gray area that can be utilized as a path around the constitutional
restraints of Article 9. They should use the ambiguous origin of cyber attacks and the
broad spectrum of cyber threats as grounds for establishing cooperation and developing
capabilities that can be used in active military contingencies. In this way, Japan may
increase its value within the alliance while developing a capability that will become vital
to the country as it moves into the 21st century.
391
OSS, Info-RMA 12.
166
Suggestion 4: The Ministry of Defense should earmark
more resources for the purpose of public relations
efforts.
The Ministry of Defense and the Japanese Defense Agency before it have
accomplished great feats in shaping the Japanese public consciousness in favor of the
Self Defense Forces. Although studies gauging the effect of MOD PR on the public
perception of the SDF are not readily available, what the JDA and later, the MOD have
accomplished in the relatively short time since they expanded their PR efforts is quite
noteworthy.
At the present stage, Japan has done well to follow the examples set by their
American counterparts. Airshows and demonstrations of ground equipment as well as
embarkation ceremonies succeed in providing an open and transparent image for the SDF.
Additionally, the establishment of a mascot that makes use of that particular Japanese
love of products or brands that evoke a lovable or easily accessible image goes to
demonstrate the astuteness of the MOD in shaping the way they are seen. Defense Manga
or comic books, represent another successful integration of media into the Ministry's PR
strategy. These are successful methodologies for managing public opinion, but there is
much room for improvement.
The Ministry of Defense might take lessons from more recent efforts of the
American military establishment to improve its image with the public. For example, it is
no surprise that Japan is one of the largest consumers of video games in the world. Yet, to
this day the Ministry of Defense has not created a single game targeted toward their key
demographic for recruitment. Although they may not see success with a direct Japanese
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copy of the US Army's First Person Shooter, America's Army, they would likely be
greeted with much success by designing a Strategy Role-Playing Game. Making use of
current SDF equipment and vehicles to create an immersive strategic environment, the
public could engage through this medium in order to gain a better understanding of the
Self Defense Forces and to form a emotional bond with the SDF mission and place in the
modern Japanese state.
Additionally, the SDF should continue working with film producers, but should
devote more attention on the medium of Japanese animation. The viewers of such
animations, which are commonly military-themed science fiction, represent a reservoir of
technical experience and a good pool for recruitment as Japan proceeds toward an
increasingly technolized military force. Closely related to this would be the unique
Japanese interest in costume play or alternatively, the general prominence of uniforms in
all sectors of Japanese life. Although not a successful medium in the United States (i.e.
the Sears 1st Infantry clothing line), Japan may find success in creating a branded line of
clothing that makes use of design themes characteristic of various uniforms of the Self
Defense Forces.
Suggestion 5: Japan should leverage its “soft power” to
improve ties with the United States on defense issues.
Japan possesses a wealth of influence at its disposal. Branded by some as “gross
national cool”, the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs may benefit from
enhancing their public relations abroad as well as at home. “soft power” is a topic that
has been debated widely. Some might attack soft power, because it may come across as
forced or unnatural. Some may oppose soft power because of the imagined effects it
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could have on the tools of such power. For example, collaboration in the arts and
entertainment with government organs could be labeled as dangerous to the innate
creativity of the medium.
However, there is a lot that can be done with a little if the Ministry of Defense or
other representative ministries choose so. For example, there is no reason why the
Ministry of Defense website or any other site of the Japanese government should not be
fully translated into at least one other language. There is no reason why documents
contained on such websites should not be translated either. There is also no reason why
points of contact at the MOD should be less than courteous with outside queries. With
these very simple changes, a world of difference can be achieved in terms of foreign (and
US) perception.
Working with documentary film makers is a slightly more involved, but equally
beneficial use of soft power. Micah Fink's documentary, Japan's About Face attests to the
impact of foreign film crews in allowing outside audiences to receive a more transparent
image of the changes in Japan's foreign policy and defense establishment. Similarly, the
MOD should create fellowships to better provide an opportunity for foreign scholars of
International Relations and Strategic Studies to experience Japan's national defense
architecture firsthand.
Additionally, The MOD and MOFA should target the younger generations of the
United States who will in time become the new leadership of their country. Japanese
cinema and animation remain popular with American audiences, including those pursuing
careers in the military and public affairs. Japan should take this opportunity to make all
components of their culture more accessible to American audiences. This would entail
169
streamlining the trade of cultural goods such as audio/visual and print media by allowing
companies to freely sell such products without the impediments of overly stringent export
restrictions. It should ease intellectual property protections in such cases as well, so as not
to discourage foreign audiences from freely obtaining and distributing media that cannot
be purchased in a translated form. Additionally, the MOD in particular would be well
served to translate such public relations products as its defense manga into other
languages. It should also consider going one step further to produce similar materials for
specific audiences, such as an American one. Japan should remember that although there
are many consumers of Japanese culture, it only takes one person in the right place with a
positive viewpoint of the Japanese nation to mean the difference between effective
deadlock and an agreement of mutual benefit.
Suggestion 6: The US-Japan Alliance should proceed on
a course of joint energy policy in the Middle East and in
Asia.
Lastly, as alliance planners look ahead at the coming decades, they should not
look to abstractions such as International Terrorism, but toward mutually-valued interests
such as energy security. When Robert Orr suggests that the US and Japan should address
the Middle East through the development of a joint energy policy, he is not only
suggesting a lens with which the two countries may view the same region of the world,
but he is also shedding light on the more essential interests that motivate their respective
foreign policies. Both the US and Japan share considerable concern over the source of
their nation's oil supplies and actively work to secure a stable stream of this resource.
170
Much like Prime Minister Kaifu was able to shore up public support for his
administration's policies during the Persian Gulf War, so too may Japanese officials and
representatives forge a new relationship with their time-honored ally. In pursuing this
course of alliance cooperation, the US may discover its Japanese ally to be more inclined
to Realist tendencies than previously thought. Further, in accepting this path to energy
security by way of theater security, the Japanese public may accept at least more
involvement internationally if not more risk. If energy security can be linked as
successfully with comprehensive security as it has been with traditional security, it
appears likely that a line of reasoning may be built within the Japanese political
consciousness that supports both the justification of foreign military deployments and the
future necessity of the alliance in maintaining Japan's greater public security.
171
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Appendix
Illustration 1.1
Illustration 1.3
Illustration 1.2